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THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


SCHOOL  OF  LAW 


A  TREATISE 


ON 


THE  LAW  OF  LIENS 


COMMON  LAW,  STATUTORY,  EQUITABLE 
AND  MARITIME 


By 

LEONARD  A.  JONES 

AUTHOR  OF  MORTGAGES.  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT,  COLLATERAL 
SECURITIES,  REAL  PROPERTY 

THIRD  EDITION,  REVISED  AND  ENLARGED 

By 

EDWARD  M.  WHITE 


IN  TWO  VOLUMES 

Volume  One 


INDIANAPOLIS 

THE  BOBBS-MERRILL  COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS 


COPYRIGHT  1888,  1894 
BY  LEONARD  A.  JONES 
ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 


COPYRIGHT  1014 
BY  THE  BOBBS-MERRILL  COMPANY 


1914 


PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION 


Numerous  statutes  have  been  enacted  and  very  many 
rulings  have  been  made  by  the  courts  on  the  subject  of  liens 
since  the  publication  of  the  last  edition  of  this  work.  In  this 
revision  the  author  has  made  a  diligent  effort  to  set  out  the 
substance  of  such  statutes  and  has  cited  a  very  large  number 
of  the  decisions  of  the  courts  made  during  the  last  twenty 
years.  He  has  found  it  necessary  to  add  many  new  sections 
and  parts  of  sections  and  to  add  many  annotations  and 
authorities  supporting  the  new  text. 

Old  section  numbers  have  been  retained  to  better  faciliate 
the  finding  of  the  great  number  of  references  to  former 
editions  cited  so  generally  by  the  courts.  Where  new  sec- 
tions have  been  added  they  have  been  designated  by  letters 
following  the  old  section  numbers. 

EDWARD  M.  WHITE. 

September  1,  1914. 


ni 


734G76 


PREFACE 


Ten  years  ago,  I  published  a  treatise  on  the  Law  of  Mort- 
gages of  Real  Property.  This  was  followed  by  two  other 
treatises  which  were  intended  to  complete  the  consideration 
of  the  general  subject  of  mortgages, — one  upon  Railroad 
Mortgages,  and  the  other  upon  Chattel  JMortgages.  In  the 
Preface  to  the  first  edition  of  the  latter  work,  published  seven 
years  ago,  I  said: — 

"I  have  regarded  these  volumes  upon  different  phases  of 
the  subject  of  mortgages  as  constituting  in  fact  one  work 
covering  the  whole  subject;  and  I  have,  therefore,  referred 
from  one  treatise  to  another  as  freely  as  I  would  to  other 
sections  of  the  same  treatise.  It  is  my  purpose  to  follow  this 
method  still  further,  in  the  preparation  of  two  other  treatises, 
— one  upon  Pledges,  including  Collateral  vSecurities,  and  one 
upon  Liens, — which  with  those  I  have  already  published,  will 
form  a  complete  series  of  works  on  Property  Securities.  The 
three  forms  of  security  upon  property — Mortgages,  Pledges, 
and- Liens — will  then  be  treated  in  works  which  are  not  only 
separately  complete,  but  which  will  also  have  reference  to 
the  relations  of  the  subjects  to  each  other." 

The  task  which  I  then  set  for  myself  I  now  complete  in 
publishing  the  present  work  upon  Liens.  Much  hard  labor 
— all  of  it,  so  far  as  authorship  is  concerned,  being  my  own 
personal  labor — has  gone  into  these  seven  volumes.  The 
favor  with  which  the  profession  has  received  the  works  of 
this  series,  heretofore  published,  I  attribute  largely  to  the 
fact  that  I  have  dealt  with  the  subjects  at  close  cpiarters,  so 
to  speak;  that  is.  I  have  sough  to  examine  the  subjects  in 
such  detail  as  to  enable  me  to  state  and  discuss  all  the  difficult 

V 


vi  PREFACE. 

and  doubtful  questions  that  have  arisen  and  been  passed  upon 
by  the  courts.  Alany  of  these  might  have  been  hidden  or 
passed  by  under  a  statement  of  an  elementary  principle:  but 
as  these  works  were  intended  for  the  practising  lawyer, 
rather* than  the  student,  I  have  deemed  it  my  province  to 
find  out  the  uncertainties  in  the  law,  and,  if  I  could,  to  refer 
them  to  some  principle,  or  to  classify  them,  and  at  least  to 
state  them,  if  I  could  do  no  more. 

The  subjects  with  which  these  works  deal  have  their  full 
share  of  intricate  questions;  and  the  subject  of  Liens  not 
less  than  the  others.  A  formidable  dif^culty  in  making  a 
satisfactory  treatise  upon  the  subject  of  Liens  has  been 
encountered  in  the  statutory  law  which  forms  so  important 
a  part  of  it.  It  is  not  so  much  that  new  liens  have  been 
created  by  statute,  as  that  the  common  law  liens  upon  per- 
sonal property,  as  well  as  equitable  liens  upon  both  personal 
property  and  real  property,  have  been  in  many  instances 
modihed  or  enlarged.  By  statute,  moreover,  maritime  liens 
have  been  in  like  manner  affected.  Finally,  many  liens  have 
been  created  which  had  never  been  asserted  at  law^  or  in 
equity,  or  in  the  admiralty.  The  statutory  law  is,  however, 
no  less  important  than  the  judicial,  to  a  complete  understand- 
ing of  the  subject;  and,  besides,  the  decisions  of  the  courts 
are  largely  based  upon  the  statutes,  and  can  be  understood 
only  by  reference  to  them.  I  have  therefore  deemed  it 
essential  to  state  the  statute  law,  sometimes  in  the  language 
of  the  statutes,  and  sometimes  briefly  and  in  substance.  This 
part  of  the  work  has  been  more  difficult  than  anv  other. 

L.  A.  J. 

Boston,  Tune  4,  1888. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  I 

CHAPTER  I. 

LIENS    AT    COMMON    LAW.' 


Sec.  Sec. 

1.  Introductor3^  16. 

2.  The   word   "lien."  17. 

3.  Definitions.  18. 

4.  Lien  at  law  an  implied  obliga- 

tion. 19. 

5.  A    lien    by    contract. 

6.  Lien  where  price  agreed  upon.        20. 

7.  Lien    by   contract.  21. 

8.  Lien  by  operation  of  law. 

9.  Lien  only   to  extent   of  inter-        22. 

est. 

10.  Lien  confers  no  right  of  prop-         23. 

erty   upon   the   holder. 

11.  A  mortgage  more  than  a  lien,        24. 

12.  An  attachment  on  process  not 

a  lien.  25. 

13.  A   judgment    only     a    general 

lien. 

14.  A  lien  either  specific  or  gen-        26. 

eral. 

15.  Limited    lien    not    to    be    ex- 

tended. 


Specific   liens. 

Definition    of   general    lien. 

Lien  for  general  balance  by 
agreement    of    parties. 

General  liens  regarded  with 
jealousy. 

Possession    necessary    to    lien. 

Possession  essential  to  create 
and    preserve    lien. 

Change  of  possession  may  not 
defeat   lien. 

The  possession  must  be  right- 
ful. 

Possession  need  not  be  actual 
or   direct. 

Mechanic  acquires  no  lien 
when  working  for  another 
mechanic. 

Lien  of  bailee  performing  ser- 
vice. 


Sec. 

27.  Equitable   liens   in  general. 

28.  Possession     not     required     in 

equitable    liens. 

29.  Lien  effective  without  change 

of  possession. 


CHAPTER  H. 

EQUITABLE    LIENS. 
Sec. 


30.  Lien   created   by  agreement. 

31.  Equitable  lien  created. 

32.  Intention   to   create    lien. 

33.  Property   to    be    designated. 

34.  Property  must  be  identified. 


Vll 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME   I. 


Sec. 

35.  Ayrcemcnt     between     several 

persons. 

36.  Lien    on    changing     stock     of 

goods. 

37.  Equitable     lien     distinguished 

from  a  trust. 
3S.  E(iuitable   lien  agreement   ful- 
liUed. 

39.  Lien  given   to  save   rights. 

40.  Lien    for    purchase-money    re- 

served. 

41.  Equitable     lien     arises     from 

conditional  delivery. 

42.  Equitable  lien  on  future  prop- 

erty. 

43.  Equitable  lien  arises  from  or- 

er   to   pay   out   of   particular 
fund. 

44.  Rule    applying     to     attorneys 

and    clients. 

45.  An  order  on  specific  fund  ef- 

fectual  to  create   lien. 

46.  Assignment    of    lien    effectual 

on   notice   to  creditor. 

47.  Equitable    assignment   not    re- 

vocable. 

48.  Agreement     to     pay     out     of 

designated     fund     will      not 
create   equitable   lien. 

49.  Creditor's    lien    on    money    in 

hands   of   debtor's   agent. 

50.  Appropriation      necessarj-      to 

constitute    equitable    lien. 

51.  Rule  strictly  held  to. 

52.  Promise    to    pay    out    of    par- 

ticular fund   not  sufficient. 

53.  Workmen    have     no     lien     on 

money    retained    from    funds 
due  contractor. 

54.  Designation  of  particular  fund 

must  be   clear  and  definite. 

55.  Bill  of  exchange  not  an  equi- 

table   assignment. 

56.  Bill  of  exchange  against  con- 

signment as  lien. 


Sec. 

57.  A  check   not  an   equitable  as- 

signment. 

58.  Lien   of  holder   of  bill   of   ex- 

change based  on  agreement. 

59.  Reference  in  a  draft  to  appro- 

priation of  proceeds  held  to 
create  lien. 

60.  Lien   created   when    consignee 

receives      goods     under     ex- 
press direction. 

61.  General    lien    of   consignee    of 

goods. 

62.  Delivery  of  bill  of  lading  suf- 

ficient    to     create     equitable 
lien. 

63.  Lien  of  one  making  advances 

to  purchase  merchandise. 

64.  Executory    agreement  to  pur- 

chase and  consign  property. 

65.  Lien  on  crop  to  be  raised. 

66.  Equitable    lien    ariises     under 

contract  on  crop  lien. 

67.  Liens   for   advances    to   manu- 

facturers on  goods. 

68.  Xo  implied  lien    on    personal 

property  on  account  of  mon- 
ey  advanced. 

69.  Contract    betwen    planter    and 

factor. 

70.  Equitable    lien    will    not    arise 

from     advancement     to     im- 
prove  property. 

71.  Lien  not  created  by  voluntary 

payment. 

72.  Voluntary   payment    of    insur- 

ance   premiums     creates     no 
liens. 

73.  No    equitable    subrogation    to 

one  paying  a  debt  of  another. 

74.  One    paying    debt    of    railroad 

company    entitled    to    subro- 
gation. 
74a.  Equitable  lien   on    legacy. 

75.  Mere  loan   of  money. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    I. 


IX 


Sec. 

76.  Surety   has   no   lien   on   estate 

of   his    principal. 
n.  Lien   by  agreement   to  giv^e   a 

mortgage. 

78.  Agreement   to    give    other   se- 

curit}'. 

79.  Debtor's   agreement   to   insure 

for  benefit  of  his  creditor. 

80.  x\greement  to   build  and   con- 

vey a  mill  as  security. 

81.  For  debt  omitted   from  mort- 

gage by  mistake. 

82.  Agreement     of     purchaser    of 

land  to  pay  debt  which  is 
lien    on    the   land. 

83.  Verbal    contract    to     pay    the 

debt  of  another. 

84.  Creditor's      lien      on      capital 

stock   of   corporation. 

85.  Lien   of  creditors   of  a  corpo- 

ration upon  its  property 
transferred  to  another  cor^ 
poration. 


Sec. 
86. 


87. 


90. 

91. 
92. 
93. 

94. 
95. 
96. 


Superiority  of  lien  of  corpo- 
rate creditor  after  transfer 
of  stock  to  another  corpora- 
tion. 

Lien  of  minority  sharehold- 
ers of  corporation. 

Shareholder's  equitable  lien  on 
funds    specially    deposited. 

Liens  created  by  assumption 
of  mortgage  or  other  liens. 

Consolidated  company  subject 
to  liens  of  original  corpora- 
tion. 

Bonds  of  original  corporation 
not  a  lien. 

Equitable  lien  against  rail- 
road company. 

Court  of  equity  appropriate 
tribunal  for  enforcing  equi- 
table  liens. 

Lien  at  law  not  enforcible  in 
equity. 

Disposition  of  property  sub- 
ject  to   equitable   lien. 

Priorities. 


CHAPTER  III. 


LIENS  BY  STATUTE. 


Sec.  Sec. 

97.  Introductory.  105. 

98.  Taxes  a  lien  on  real  estate. 

99.  State's    statutory   lien   on   real  106. 

estate.  107. 

100.  Lien     of    state     on    criminal's 

property.  108. 

101.  Improvement    liens.  109. 

102.  Water  rates  as  liens.  110. 

103.  Liens    upon     animals     damage  111. 

feasant. 

104.  Possession     not     required     to  112. 

support  statutory  liens. 


Character,  operation  and  ex- 
tent of  lien. 

Statutory  lien — How  acquired. 

Statutory  lien  may  be  modi- 
fied  by   statute. 

Repeal  of  statutory  lien. 

Rule   in  other  courts. 

Revival   of  lien. 

Statutory  liens  governed  by 
the  law  of  forum. 

Statutory  liens  legal  rather 
than  equitable. 


CONTKNTS   OF   VOLUME    I. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


AN    ATTORNIIV'S   GI-INIiKAL   OR    KliTAINlNG    LIEX. 


Sec.  Sec. 

113.  Attorney's      general      lien      a       134. 

common-law    lien. 

114.  General  lien  declared  by  stat-       135. 

utes. 

115.  .\ttorncy's  lien  on  client's  pa-       136. 

pers. 
llo.  -Attorney's      lien      does      not       137. 
amount  to  a  pledge. 

117.  .Attorney's   lien   on    life   insur-       138. 

ance  policy. 

118.  Lien   extends  to  an  execution       139. 

in   attorney's  hands. 

119.  Lien    attaches   only   when   cli- 

ent's   papers    come    into    at-       140. 
torney's    hands. 

120.  Lien  may  attach  to  articles.  141. 

121.  Xo   lien   on   client's  will.  142. 

122.  Presumption       of       attorney's 

lien.  143. 

122a.  Inspection      of      papers      on 

which  attorney  has  lien.  144. 

123.  Lien    covers    general    balance       145. 

of  account. 

124.  Lien  limited  to  debts  due  him       146. 

as  attorney. 

125.  None   but   attorneys  can  have       147. 

lien. 

126.  Lien   special    under   some    cir-       148. 

cumstances.  149. 

127.  Attorney's  general  lien  on  pa- 

pers. 150. 

128.  Discharge   of  attorney's  lien. 

129.  .Agent  of  attorney  has  no  lien.       150a, 

130.  Lien  of  member  of  attorney's 

firm.  151. 

131.  Lien    not    affected    by    client's 

assignment  in  bankruptcy. 

132.  Lien  on  papers  can  not  be  ac-       152. 

tively  enforced. 

133.  Lien  enforced  by  execution  or 

order. 


Court  may  determine  exist- 
ence and  amount  of  lien. 

Application  for  surrender  of 
papers  to  client. 

Court  may  order  papers  of 
client  surrendered  to  him. 

Attorne}''s  lien  on  money  col- 
lected. 

Does  not  attach  to  money  de- 
posited specially. 

Does  not  attach  to  papers  for 
services  rendered  to  an  ex- 
ecutor. 

Lien  on  money  recovered  on 
judgment. 

Xo  lien  until  money  collected. 

Lien  on  money  collected  by 
award. 

Lien  prevails  over  claim  of 
assignee  of  judgment. 

Lien    of    associate    counsel. 

Whether  a  lien  or  right  of 
set-off. 

Lien  for  general  balance  of 
account. 

Attorney's  special  lien  on  fund 
in  court's  hands. 

Rule    in    Pennsylvania. 

X''o  general  lien  upon  a  fund 
in  court. 

Court's  jurisdiction  over  at- 
torneys. 

Summary        jurisdiction        of 
courts    over   attorneys. 

Attorney  can  not  hold  entire 
sum  of  money  of  his  client 
for  his   fee. 

How  a  lien  may  be  pleaded 
in   defense. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    1. 


XI 


CHAPTER  V. 


AN  ATTORNEY  S  SPECIAL  OR  CPIARGING  LIEN  ON  JUDGMENTS. 


Sec. 

153. 

Attorney's    lien 
ment. 

upon   a   judg- 

154. 

Attorney's  lien 

upon  judgment 

may  be  made 

a  general  lien. 

154a 

..  Prosecuting  ai 
lien. 

ttorney  has  no 

155. 

Attorney's  lien 

not  recognized 

at  common  law. 

156. 

Time    and    manner    of    origin 

of  attorney's 

lien. 

157. 

Origin  of  lien 

is  obscure. 

158. 

Attorney's    lien 
— General  ruk 

on    judgment 

159. 

No   lien   in   several   states. 

160. 

California. 

161. 

Illinois. 

162. 

Massachusetts. 

163. 

Missouri. 

164. 

Rhode    Island. 

165. 

Attorney's  lien 
able  costs. 

limited  to  tax- 

166. 

Attorney's  lien 

on  a  judgment. 

167. 

Rule  in  United 

States  courts. 

168. 

Rule    extended 

by    statutes. 

169. 

Alabama. 

169a 

.  Alaska. 

170. 

Arkansas. 

171. 

Colorado. 

171a 

.  Connecticut. 

171b 

.  District    of    Columbia, 

172. 

Florida. 

173. 

Georgia. 

173a 

.  Idaho. 

173b 

.  Illinois, 

174. 

Indiana. 

175. 

Iowa. 

176. 

Kansas. 

177. 

Kentucky. 

177a 

.  Louisiana. 

177b 

.  Maine. 

177c. 

.  Massachusetts. 

Sec. 

178.  Michigan. 

179.  Minnesota. 

180.  Oregon. 

181.  Mississippi. 
181a.  Missouri. 

182.  Montana. 

183.  Nebraska. 

184.  New  York. 

185.  Present  code  of  New  York. 

186.  Lien    on   cause    of  action. 

187.  Ownership  of  costs. 

188.  Attorney's    undefined    lien. 

189.  Action   to   establish   lien. 
189a.  North   Dakota. 

189b.  Oklahoma. 
189bb.  Oregon. 
189c.  South  Carolina. 
189d.  South  Dakota. 

190.  Tennessee. 
190a.  Texas. 
190b.  Utah. 

191.  Verm'ont. 
191a.  Virginia. 

192.  Washington. 
192a.  West  Virginia. 
192b.  Wisconsin. 
192c,  Wyoming. 

193.  No  lien  until  judgment  is  en- 

tered. 

194.  Default   not  a  judgment. 

195.  Pending   appeal   will   not  pre- 

vent dismissal. 

196.  Client  may  settle  before  judg- 

ment. 

197.  Action  for  damages  settled  by 

parties. 

198.  Settlement  by  parties  will  not 

affect  attorney's  lien. 

199.  Attorney's     withdrawal     from 

case. 


xn 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    I. 


Sec.  Sec. 

200.  Only    attorney    is    entitled    to  218. 

a  lien.  219. 

201.  Lien  by  contract. 

201a.  Attorney's    lien    on    fund    re-  220. 

covered.  221. 

201b.  Defendant's      attorney       can  222. 

have  no  lien  on  fund.  223. 

202.  No    lien    where    court    is    not 

court  of  record.  224. 

203.  Settlement   in   fraud   of   attor-  225. 

neys.  226. 

204.  Collusion  between  debtor  and  227. 

creditor. 

204a.  Waiver   of  attorney's    lien.  228. 

205.  Court  of  admiralty.  229. 

206.  Assignment  of  judgment.  230. 

207.  Actions    not    assignable.  231. 

208.  Action    founded    on    negotia-  232. 

ble  instrument. 

209.  Notice  of  attorney's  lien.  233. 

210.  Statutory  provisions  as  to  no-  234. 

tice  of  lien.  235. 

211.  Notice  to  adverse  party.  236. 

212.  Actual  notice  not  necessary.  237. 

213.  Lien  on  damages  recovered.  238. 

214.  Judgment   for  costs   only. 

215.  Rule   in    court   of    the    king's  239. 

bench. 

216.  Rule  in  equity.  240. 

217.  Rule  in  the  United  States. 


Judgment  as  set-ofif. 

When  set-off  good  against  the 
attorney's   lien. 

Rule  in  some  of  the  states. 

Delay   in   objecting   to  set-off. 

Assignment   of  judgment. 

Equitable  assignment  of  the 
judgment. 

Lien  by  agreement. 

Lien  created  by  parol. 

Attorney's  lien  assignable. 

Attorney's  lien  superior  to 
lien  of  attachment. 

Not  defeated  by  bankruptcy. 

Attorney's   lien    on   lands. 

Rule  in  some  states. 

Waiver  of  attorney's  lien. 

Attorney's  process  to  secure 
rights. 

Settlement    by    parties. 

The    English   practice. 

Application  to  protect  lien. 

Money  paid   into   court. 

Delay    in    asserting    lien. 

Attorney  need  not  be  a  party 
to  the  record. 

Action  to  dissolve  partner- 
ship. 

Proceeding  to  wind  up  insolv- 
ent  insurance    com.pany. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


BANKER  S  LIENS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

241.  Bank   has   a  lien.  245.  Banker's     lien      only      secures 

242.  Banker's  lien  part  of  the  law                  debts  that  are  due. 

merchant.  246.  Rule  in  equity. 

243.  Only     banks  have      bankers'      247.  Customer's    several     accounts 

liens.  regarded  as  one  account. 

244.  Banker's  lien  on   securities  of      248.  Lien   attaches    only   to   securi- 

his  debtor.  ties  of  the  customer. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    I. 


Xlll 


Sec,  Sec. 

249.  Xo  lien   on   trust   securities.  256. 

250.  No     lien     on     iiduciaries'     ac- 

counts. 257. 

251.  Xo  lien   on  pledged  securities 

for  general   debts.  258. 

252.  Surplus   of  pledged  securities. 

253.  Nature   and  "extent    of  lien   as 

dependent     upon     terms     of      259. 
contract.  260. 

254.  No  lien  on  box  containing  se- 

curities. 261. 

255.  Circumstances   effecting   lien. 


X'o  lien  on  securities  casually 
left  at  the  bank. 

Lien  on  paper  received  for  col- 
lection. 

Lien  on  paper  received  for 
collection  —  Application  of 
doctrine. 

Doctrine  in  New  York. 

Lien  on  paper  of  a  corre- 
sponding bank. 

No  lien  where  no  advances 
are  made. 


CHAPTER  VII. 


CARRIERS     LIENS. 


Sec. 
262. 

263. 
264. 
265. 
266. 

267. 

268. 

269. 

270. 

27L 
272. 
273. 
274. 

275. 

276. 


277. 
278. 
279. 


Sec. 
Lien    of   common     carrier     on      280. 

goods  carried.  280a 

Origin  of  the  lien. 
Rule  in  some  states.  281. 

Carrier's  lien,  a  specific  lien.        282. 
Condition     giving     carrier     a 

lien.  283. 

Stoppage    in    transitu    not    af- 
fected. 284. 
Owner     bound      by      carrier's      285. 

lien. 
Carrier's    lien    on    passenger's      286. 

baggage. 
Lien  of  carrier  by  water.  287. 

Lien  for  freight.  288. 

No  lien  under  a  charter  party. 
Master  signing  bills  of  lading.       289. 
Terms  of  bill  of  lading. 
No     lien      before    commence-      290. 

ment  of  voyage.  291. 

One    not     a     common     carrier 

has   no   lien   without   reserv-      292. 

ing  it. 
Lien   of   substitute    carrier.  293. 

Agent    of   bailee    has    no   lien. 
Goods  of  the  United  States. 


Insurance   of  goods. 

.  Lien  only  for  usual  freight 
rate. 

Carrier's  lien  for  charges. 

No  lien  for  demurrage  im- 
plied. 

Expenses  of  keeping  proper- 
ty rejected. 

Carrier  and  warehouseman. 

Local  custom  for  carriers  by 
water. 

No  lien  for  transportation 
from   a   wharf. 

Shipowner's  lien  for  expenses. 

Shipowner's  lien  for  contribu- 
tions. 

Carrier  has  lien  for  freight 
charges  paid  for  it. 

Lien    for  import   duties  paid. 

First  carrier  a  forwarding 
agent. 

Authority  of  carriers  to  for- 
ward goods. 

Connecting  carrier  has  no 
lien. 


XIV 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME   I. 


Sec.  Sec. 

294.  Guaranty  not  binding  on  con-      317. 

necting  carrier. 

295.  No  lien  where  freigiit  is  pre-      318. 

paid. 

296.  Way-bill  accompanying  goods.      319. 

297.  First    carrier     receiving     pay- 

ment. 320. 

298.  Carrier   employed    by   another 

carrier  has  lien.  321. 

299.  Lien      only      for      customary 

freight    rate.  322. 

300.  Second  carrier  bound  by  first      323. 

carrier's   agreement.  324. 

301.  Lien  does  not  cover  advances 

for    matters    not     connected      325. 
with  the  carriage. 

302.  Damage      to      goods      before      326. 

reaching    last    carrier.  327. 

303.  Lien   on   stolen   goods.  328. 

304.  American  decisions.  329. 

305.  Carrier's  lien  on  goods  wrong- 

fully diverted.  330. 

306.  Apparent  authority  of  shipper. 

307.  The  carrier's   lien  can   not  be      331. 

set   up   by  a  wrongdoer. 

308.  Carrier  may  waive  lien.  332. 

309.  Carrier's     lien     continues     on 

goods    placed    in   warehouse. 

310.  Carrier's  lien  lost  by  delivery.      332a, 

311.  Delivery  to  the  consignee  up- 

on condition.  333. 

312.  Nature    of   delivery    necessary      334. 

to  terminate  lien. 

313.  Payment  of  freight  and  deliv-      335. 

ery  of  goods. 

314.  Terms    of    charter   party   may      336. 

be     such       that       chartered 
freight  will  not  be  due  until      337. 
cargo    has    been    delivered. 

315.  Cargo  in  hands  of  consignee.        338. 

316.  Promise    to     pay     carrier    not 

presumed    from    taking   pos-      339. 
session. 


Lien  continues  when  posses- 
sion is   secured  by   fraud. 

No  lien  where  goods  are  de- 
livered   through    mistake. 

The  carrier  has  a  lien  upon 
all  the  goods  carried. 

Delivery  of  part  of  the  goods 
not  a  waiver. 

Separate  liens  on  separate 
goods. 

Lien   waived   by   contract. 

Extension  of  time  of  payment. 

Promissory  note  does  not  af- 
fect carrier's  lien. 

When  carrier  has  no  lien  for 
freight   charges. 

Waiver  of  carrier's  lien. 

Waiver  of  lien  not  inferred. 

Waiver   by   attachment. 

Action  to  collect  freight 
charges. 

Waiver  by  issuance  of  an  ex- 
ecution. 

Lien  defeated  by  injury  to 
goods. 

Carrier's  lien  not  affected  by 
consignee's  failure  to  receive 
goods. 

.  Condition  precedent  to  car- 
rier's lien. 

Carrier's  lien  lost. 

Claiming  general  lien  does 
not   waive   special   lien. 

Carrier's  lien  founded  on  pos- 
session. 

Sale  of  goods  by  carrier  au- 
thorized  by   statutes. 

Sale  by  carrier  must  be 
made  in  good   faith. 

Sale  by  carrier  of  perishable 
goods. 

Statute  of  the  United  States. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    I. 


XV 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


LIENS  OF  CORPORATIONS  ON  THEIR  MEMBERS    SHARES. 


Sec. 

375.  Corporation    at    common    law 

had    no    lien    on    its    mem- 
bers' shares. 

376.  Lien  of  corporation  by  statute. 
Zn .  By-laws    to    regulate    transfer 

of  shares. 

378.  Notice  where  by-law  rests  up- 

on inferential  authority. 

379.  Statute   constructive  notice  of 

lien. 

380.  Usage      of      corporations      in 

claiming    liens. 

381.  Lien    can    only    be    authorized 

by  statute. 

382.  Lien    conferred      on      existing 

corporation. 

383.  Option    by    statute    does    not 

create  a  lien. 

384.  Bank  can  have  no  lien  on  its 
own  stock. 

385.  Lien    may    cover    liability 

equitable   shareholder. 

386.  Equitable    shares    subject 

lien. 

387.  Enforcement  of  lien  on  hold- 

er of  legal  title  of  shares. 

388.  Equitable  assignee  has  no  lien. 

389.  Priority  of  lien  over  equitable 

pledge. 

390.  Availability    of    lien    in    state 

other   than    that   where    cor- 
poration  is   organized. 

391.  Corporations'     lien     on 

dends. 

392.  Lien    not    confined     to 

owned. 

393.  The   word   "indebted." 

394.  Lien  not  restricted  to  particu- 

lar debt. 

395.  Liens    not    confined    to    debts 

due  for  shares. 

396.  By-laws  restricted   by  statute. 


of 


to 


divi- 
stock 


Sec. 

397.  Lien    on    calls    for   shares. 

398.  Debt    of   partnership    or    of    a 

surety. 

399.  Debt    of    joint    trustee. 

400.  Lien  in  case  of  bankruptcy. 

401.  Surety  subrogated  to  right  of 

lienholder. 

402.  Lien    of    corporation    securing 

several  debts. 

403.  Lien   may   be    waived   by  cor- 

poration. 

404.  Lien    after    notice    of    transfer 

of  stock. 

405.  Notice   to   its  officer  is   notice 

to    a    corporation. 

406.  Corporation  may  be   estopped 

to    claim    lien. 

407.  Waived    by    taking   a    transfer 

of  the  shares. 

408.  No    waiver    by    taking    other 

security. 

409.  Lien    acquired      after     attach- 

ment of  stock. 

410.  Stock  pledged  after  the   bank 

has   waived  its   lien. 

411.  Transfer  of  part  of  the  shares 

not    a   waiver. 

412.  Usage     may     operate     against 

lien. 

413.  No   waiver    by    reason    of    the 

corporation    allowing    stock 
to  remain  outstanding. 

414.  Issuing  of  certificate  will  not 

amount  to  a  waiver. 

415.  Lien  not   enforcible   on    unau- 

thorized   debt. 

416.  Payment    of    debt     discharges 

lien. 

417.  Lien  not  lost  because  debt  is 

barred   by  statute   of  limita- 
tions. 


XVI 


CONTKNTS   OF   VOLUME    I. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES  AND  MERCHANTS. 


Sec. 

418.  Factor     or     consignee     under 

common  law  has  lien  on 
goods    in   his   possession. 

419.  One  who  has  no  authority  to 

make  sales  is  not  a  factor. 

420.  Lien    of    merchandise    broker. 

421.  Lien   of  stock-broker. 

422.  Broker  employed  on  commis- 

sion has  a  lien. 

423.  An  insurance  broker  is  a  fac- 

tor. 

424.  Extent    of    insurance    broker's 

lien. 

425.  Agent's   specific    lien. 

426.  Factor's  lien   for  general   bal- 

ance. 

427.  A  general   lien   is  not  implied 

when  there  is  a  special 
agreement  which  is  incon- 
sistent with  such  a  lien. 

428.  Factor  has   no   lien   on   goods 

received  under  express  di- 
rections. 

429.  Factor's  agent  has  no  lien  as 

against  principal. 
450.  Efifect    of   factor's    assignment 
for  creditors. 

431.  Goods  received  after  death  of 

principal. 

432.  Xo   lien   on  goods  when   con- 

signor has  informed  factor 
that  goods  do  not  belong  to 
him. 

433.  ."Xgent's  lien. 

434.  Lien  of  consignee  depends  on 

manner    of   consignment. 

435.  Lien    of    consignee    on    insur- 

ance  money. 

436.  State  statutes. 
436a.     Delaware. 
436b.     Florida. 


Sec. 

436c, 

.  Georgia. 

437. 

Louisiana. 

438. 

Maine. 

439. 

Maryland. 

440. 

Massachusetts. 

440a 

.  Missouri. 

440b 

.  Xew  York. 

441. 

Ohio. 

442. 

Pennsylvania. 

443. 

Rhode  Island. 

444. 

Wisconsin. 

445. 

Debt  is  foundation   oi 

■  agent's 

lien. 

446. 

Lien   covers   interest 

on 

debt. 

447. 

Debt  must  be  due. 

448. 

Factor  can  not  claim 

Hen  for 

debt   due   his   principal. 

449. 

Factor  has  no  lien  for 

old  debt 

due    from    his    principal 

450. 

The    lien    covers    acceptances 

as  well  as  advances 

in 

mon- 

ey. 

451. 

Lien  for  duties  paid. 

452. 

Lien   exists    even    wh( 
is  barred. 

2re 

debt 

453. 

Lien  for  advancement 

on 

crop. 

453a 

.  -Arkansas. 

453  b 

1.  Florida. 

454. 

Georgia. 

455. 

Idaho. 

455a 

.  Kentucky. 

456. 

Louisiana. 

456a 

.  Minnesota. 

456h 

1.  Mississippi. 

457. 

Xorth    Carolina. 

457a 

.  Xorth   Dakota. 

458. 

South    Carolina. 

458a 

..  South  Dakota. 

458b 

>.  Tennessee. 

459. 

Virginia. 

CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME   I. 


XVll 


Sec. 

Sec. 

459a.  Liens  for  water  furnished  for 

469. 

irrigation. 

470. 

459b.  Colorado. 

459c.     Idaho. 

459d.  Kansas. 

470a 

459e.  Louisiana. 

459f.  New   Mexico. 

459g-.  Oklahoma. 

471. 

459h.  Oregon. 

459i.  South  Dakota. 

472. 

459j.  Texas. 

473. 

459k.  Washington. 

460.  Efifect  of  a  delivery  of  goods. 

474. 

461.  Delivery    to    common    carrier. 

462.  No  lien  while   consignor  con- 

475. 

trols  goods. 

476. 

463.  Delivery  of  bill  of  lading  es- 

477. 

sential. 

478. 

464.  No  lien  for  advancements  ex- 

cept  when   goods   are    deliv- 

479. 

ered. 

465.  Advances  made  on  faith  of  bill 

480. 

of  lading. 

466.  Lien    lost    by    losing    posses- 

481. 

sion. 

467.  Possession  necessary  to  lien. 

482. 

468.  Loss  of  temporary  possession 

no  waiver. 

Revival  of  the  lien. 

Disclosure  of  his  principal 
does  not  defeat  the  factor's 
lien. 

.  Factor  waives  his  lien  by 
failing  to  follow  principal's 
instructions. 

Lien  ends  with  payment  of 
the    debt. 

Enforcement  of  factor's  lien. 

Factor  employed  to  purchase 
goods. 

Factor's  special  property  in 
goods. 

Factor's  right  to  sell  goods. 

Factor  may  sell  at  a  fair  price. 

Rule    in    certain    states. 

Factor's  lien  attaches  to  pro- 
ceeds of  sale. 

Factor's  right  to  retain  pro- 
ceeds of  sale. 

Bill  of  sale  from  principal  to 
agent. 

Factor  may  sue  for  the  debt 
notwithstanding  he  has  lien. 

Carrier  may  enforce  con- 
signee's lien. 


CHAPTER  X. 


LIEN  OF  A  FINDER  OF  LOST  GOODS. 


Sec. 
483. 

484. 


485. 
486. 
487. 


Fiilder  of  goods  has  no  lien 
thereon  at  common  law. 

A  riparian  owner  has  no  lien 
on  property  cast  adrift  on 
his  land. 

Finder's  right  to  compensa- 
tion for  his  services. 

Landlord  has  no  lien  on  chat- 
tels left  on  his  premises. 

Reward   offered. 


Sec. 
488. 

489. 
490. 

491. 

492. 

493. 


Offer  of  a  reward  becomes  a 
contract. 

Ofifer  of  reward  by  a  sheriff. 

Rendition  of  services  in  se- 
curing  reward. 

Conditions  in  offer  of  reward 
must   be   complied   with. 

No  lien  implied  from  offer  of 
"Liberal   Reward." 

Withdrawal  of  ofifer  of  re- 
ward. 


XVIU 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME   I. 


Sec.  Sec. 

494.  I-"indcr    entitled    to    a  portion      496.  Waiver    of    reward     for     lost 

of  reward.  property. 

495.  Reward   to   detective.  497.  State  statutes. 


CHAPTER  XL 

innkeepers'   and   BOARDING-HOUSE   KEEPERS'    LIENS. 


Sec. 

498.  An  innkeeper's  particular  lien. 

499.  Lien  on  goods  of  a  third  per- 

son. 

500.  Attempt   to   limit   lien   of  inn- 

keeper on  goods   of  a   third 
person. 

501.  Settled  rule. 

502.  Knowledge  of  innkeeper  as  to 

ownership  of  baggage. 

503.  Innkeeper's  lien  on  goods. 

504.  No   lien   on  a   horse   unless    it 

belongs   to    his    guest. 

505.  Innkeeper  defined. 

506.  What  constitutes  one  a  guest. 

507.  Husband  liable  for  wife's  bill 

at  an  inn. 

508.  Lien  on  infant's  baggage. 

509.  Innkeepr      can       not       detain 

guest's  person. 

510.  Property    exempt     from     exe- 

cution. 

511.  Distinction   betwen   guest   and 

boarder. 

512.  A    lodging-house    keeper    not 

an  innkeeper. 

513.  Lien  affected  by  special  agree- 

ment. 

514.  When    boarding-house      keep- 

er's  lien   attaches. 

515.  Statutes  giving  liens  to  board- 

ing-house   keepers. 

516.  Lien    secures    only   reasonable 

charges. 

517.  Liens   for   advanced  money. 

518.  General    lien     for    amount    of 

the  bill. 


Sec. 

519. 

520. 


521. 

522. 

522a. 

523. 

524. 

525. 

52Sa. 

525b, 

526. 

526a. 

527. 

527a. 

527b. 

527c. 

527d. 

527e. 

528. 

529. 

530. 

531. 

531a. 

531b. 

531c. 

532. 

532a. 

533. 

533a. 


Possession   is  essential  to  the 

preservation   of   this   lien. 
Guest's  possession  secured  by 

fraud   will    not   prevent    inn- 
keeper'  lien. 
Temporary  loss  of  possession 

will  not  waive  lien. 
Xo  waiver  by  accepting  other 

security. 

Priority. 
Lien  waived  by  unlawful  sale. 
Care   and  use  of  the  property 

detained. 
Innkeeper's     lien     confers     no 

right  of  sale. 

Alabama. 
,  Arizona. 
California. 

Colorado. 
Connecticut. 

District  of   Columbia. 
,  Florida. 

Georgia. 
,  Illinois. 

Iowa.  ^ 

Kansas.  , 

Kentucky. 
Louisiana. 
Maine. 

Maryland. 

Massachusetts. 

Michigan. 
Minnesota. 

Mississippi. 
Missouri. 

Montana. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME   I. 


XIX 


Sec. 

533b, 

.  Nebraska. 

534. 

Nevada. 

534a. 

New  Hampshire, 

535. 

New   Jersey. 

535a. 

New  Mexico. 

536. 

New  York. 

536a. 

North  Carolina. 

536b, 

,  North   Dakota. 

536c. 

Ohio. 

536d. 

,  Oregon, 

537. 

Pennsylvania. 

Sec. 

537a.  South  Carolina. 
537b.  South  Dakota. 
537c.  Tennessee. 
537d.  Texas. 

538.  Utah. 
538a.  Virginia. 

539.  Washington. 
539a.  West  Virginia. 
539b.  Wisconsin. 
S39c.  Wyoming. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


LANDLORDS    LIENS  FOR  RENT. 


Sec.  ^  Sec. 

540.  In  general.  557. 

541.  Lien  by  agreement. 

542.  Lien    on   property   not    in    ex-       558. 

istence. 

543.  Chattel  mortgage  clause.  559. 

544.  Lease     that     is     a     mortgage 

must  be  recorded.  560. 

545.  Lease   of   farm   to   be   worked 

on  shares.  561. 

546.  Rule   in  Missouri. 

547.  Delivery    sufficient    to   protect       562. 

a   lien. 

548.  Provision    giving   lessor    own-       563. 

ership. 

549.  Lease    reserving    right    of    re-       564. 

entry.  565. 

550.  Re-entry. 

551.  Common-law      right      of      re- 

straint. 566. 

552.  Lien  of  a  distress  warrant. 

553.  Lien  attaches  from  beginning      567. 

of  tenancy. 

554.  Lien   prior   to   that   of  attach-      568. 

ment  or  execution.  569. 

555.  Priority    of    lien    to    tenant's 
mortgage.  570. 

556.  Landlord's   lien   paramount  to 

mortgage  lien. 


Lien  not  paramount  to  re- 
corded chattel   mortgage. 

Fraudulent  cancellation  of 
mortgage  not  effective. 

Tenant's  assignee  in  bank- 
ruptcy. 

Assignment  takes  precedence 
of   distress  warrant. 

Distress  warrants  at  common 
law. 

All  property  on  premises  lia- 
ble to  distress  for  rent. 

Exemptions  from  distress  on 
the   ground   of  public  policy. 

Privilege  of   trade. 

General  exemption  laws  do 
not  apply  as  against  a  dis- 
tress. 

Lien  for  rent  attaches  only  on 
tenant's   property. 

The  lien  attaches  only  to  per- 
sonal property. 

Lien   covers   entire   crop. 

Lien  does  not  attach  to  prop- 
erty   not    on    premises. 

Lien  attaches  to  mortgaged 
property. 


XX 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    I. 


571.  Distress   attaches   to  property 

only   where   demise  exists. 

572.  Rent    payable    must    be    fixed 

and  certain. 

573.  Distress    only     after     rent     is 

due. 

574.  Extent    of    landlord's    lien. 

575.  The    statutory    lien    for    rent 

does    not    depend    upon    the 
maturity   of   the    rent. 

576.  Expenses,  costs  and  the  like. 
576a.  Protection  of  bona  fide  pur- 
chaser. 

577.  Loss  of  lien  by  sale  of  prop- 

erty. 

578.  Loss  of  lien  by  sale  of  tenant 

to    innocent    purchaser. 
578a.  Efifect    of    removal    of    prop- 
erty to  another  state. 

579.  Consent  of  landlord  to  remov- 

al of  property. 

580.  Notice    of    lien    to    purchaser 

of  crop. 

581.  Loss  of  lien  by  sale  of  goods 

in  usual  way. 

582.  Sale  by  tenant  will  not  afifect 

landlord's  lien. 

583.  Estoppel  of  landlord. 

584.  Liability  of  purchaser  to  land- 

lord. 

585.  Lien    not    waived    by     taking 

note. 

586.  Lien    not    waived     by     taking 

mortgage. 

587.  Not  waived  by  taking  obliga- 

tion   of   third    person. 

588.  Remedy  of  landlord  who   has 

taken    security. 

589.  Tender   of    rent   due    must    be 

kept  good. 

590.  Lien    lost   by    levy   of   an    ex- 

ecution. 

591.  Lien  not  lost  by  appointment 

of  receiver. 

592.  Lien  lost  by  accepting  surren- 

der of  the  leasehold  estate. 


Sec. 

593. 

No    distraint      for     rent 
term   expires. 

after 

594. 

A  landlord's  lien  not  impaired 

by     his     tenant's     subletting 

the  premises. 

595. 

Loss  of  lien  by  destruction  of 

the  property. 

596. 

Notice    unnecessary    at 
mon  law. 

com- 

597. 

Rule    in   United    States 
notice   to  tenant. 

as    to 

598. 

Who   may   distrain. 

599. 

Rights    of    purchaser    at 
closure   sale. 

fore- 

600. 

Against    whom    distraint 
be  had. 

may 

601. 

Injunction   by  landlord. 

602. 

Alabama. 

603. 

Alabama    (continued), 
lord's  liens  upon  crops 

Land- 

604. 

Alabama     (continued), 
of  tenants  in   common, 

Liens 

605. 

Arizona. 

606. 

Arkansas. 

607. 

Arkansas     (continued), 
for    supplies    advanced. 

Lien 

608. 

Delaware. 

609. 

District  of   Columbia. 

610. 

Florida. 

611. 

Georgia. 

612. 

Georgia      (continued), 
tress   for   rent. 

Dis- 

613. 

Illinois. 

614. 

Illinois       (continued), 
upon  crops. 

Lien 

615. 

Indiana. 

616. 

Iowa. 

617. 

Kansas. 

618. 

Kentucky. 

619. 

Kentucky    (continued), 
for  rent. 

Lien 

620. 

Louisiana. 

621. 

Maine. 

622. 

Maryland — Distress   for 

rent. 

623. 

Maryland    (continued), 
on  crops. 

Lien 

CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    I. 


XXI 


Sec. 
624. 

625. 
626. 
627. 
628. 


629. 

630. 

631. 

631a, 

631b 

631c, 

632. 


Minnesota. 

Mississippi. 

Missouri. 

New  Jersey — Distress  for  rent. 

New  Jersey  (continued). 
Liens  for  rent — When  ten- 
ant's goods  seized  on  exe- 
cution. 

New  York. 

New  Mexico. 

North    Carolina. 

,  North  Dakota. 

.  Oklahoma. 
Oregon. 

Pennsylvania. 


Sec. 

633.  Pennsylvania  (continued). 

Tenant's     goods     seized     on 
execution. 

634.  South    Carolina. 

635.  South     Carolina      (continued). 

Lien    for   rent   and  advances 
for  agricultural  purposes. 

636.  Tennessee. 

637.  Tennessee    (continued).      Fur- 

nishers'   liens. 

638.  Texas.    ■ 
638a.  Utah. 

639.  Virginia. 
639a.  Washington. 
639b.  West   Virginia. 

640.  Wisconsin. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


LIVERY  STABLE   KEEPERS    AND  AGISTORS    LIENS. 


Sec. 

Sec. 

641. 

Agistors      and        livery-stable 

654.  Florida. 

keepers  have  no  lien  at  com- 

655. Georgia. 

mon   law. 

655a.  Hawaii. 

642. 

Lien    can    not    be    created    by 

655b.  Idaho. 

usage. 

656.  Illinois. 

643. 

Rule    questioned    in    Pennsyl- 

657. Indiana. 

vania. 

658.  Iowa. 

644. 

Lien  on  horse  kept  for  train- 

659. Kansas. 

ing. 

660.  Kentucky. 

645. 

The    owner   of   a   stallion    has 

661.  Louisiana. 

a  lien   upon  a  mare   for   the 

662.  Maine. 

charge  for  serving  the  mare. 

663.  Massachusetts. 

646. 

Statutes  of  the  several  states. 

664.  Michigan. 

647. 

Alabama. 

665.  Minnesota. 

647a 

,.  Alaska. 

665a.  Mississippi. 

647b 

1.  Arizona. 

666.  Missouri. 

648. 

Arkansas. 

667.  Montana. 

649. 

California. 

668.  Nebraska. 

650. 

Colorado. 

669.  Nevada. 

651. 

Connecticut. 

670.  New  Hampshire. 

652. 

Delaware. 

671.  New  Jerse}'. 

653. 

District   of   Columbia. 

672.  New    Mexico. 

xxn 


CONTENTS   OF   VOI-UxME    I. 


Sec. 

673.  New  York. 
673a.  North  Dakota. 

674.  Ohio. 
674a.  Oklahoma. 

675.  Oregon. 

676.  Pennsylvania. 
676a.  South    Dakota. 

677.  Tennessee. 

678.  Texas. 
678a.  Utah. 

679.  Vermont. 

680.  Virginia. 
680a.  Washingtoa 
680b.  West   Virginia. 

681.  Wisconsin. 

682.  Wyoming. 

683.  A  statute  creating  the  lien  at- 

taches from  its  enactment. 

684.  Property  exempt  from   execu- 

tion subject  to  the  lien. 

685.  Lien  of  stable  keeper  is  pure- 

ly statutory. 

686.  Joint  and  several   lien. 

687.  Lien  does  not  include  isolated 

cases  of  feeding. 

688.  No    lien    where    keeper    keeps 

horse   for   own   benefit. 

689.  Servant  has   no   lien   on    mas- 

ter's cattle. 

690.  Lien  upon  notice  in  writing. 
690a.  Sheriff    holding    cattle    under 

mortgage    may    contract    for 
their   keeping. 


Sec, 

691.  Prior    chattel    mortgage      su- 

perior to  stable  keeper's  lien. 
691a.  Consent  of  owner  may  be  im- 
plied. 

692.  Lien    of    stable    keeper    some- 

times   held    superior    to    lien 
of  mortgage. 
692a.  Lien  can  not  be  made  supe- 
rior to  prior  mortgage. 

693.  Lien  of  stallion  keeper  super- 
'  rior     to     subsequent     mort- 
gage. 

694.  Possession    of   keeper   is   con- 

structive notice  to  a  purchas- 
er. 

695.  Mortgage    by   owner   while   in 

temporary   possession. 

696.  Lien    by    agreement    will     not 

hold  against  mortgage. 

697.  Facts    held    to    be    waiver    of 

keeper's  lien. 

698.  Lieu    not   lost   by   delivery   of 

horse  temporarily  to  owner. 

699.  Loss    of    possession    will    de- 

prive keeper  of  lien. 

700.  Acts    of    ownership     by     lien- 

holder. 

701.  Waiver  by  including  in  claim 

that    for    which    keeper    has 
no  lien. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


LUMBERMEN  S  LIENS. 


Sec. 


702.  No    lien    at    common    law    for 

cutting  and  hauling  timber. 

703.  Lien    at    common    law    where 

possession  is  retained. 

704.  Statutory    liens    in    lumbering      707.  Florida. 

states.  708.  Georgia. 

704a.  Alabama.  709.  Louisiana. 


Sec. 

705.  Alaska. 
705a.  Arizona. 
705b.  Arkansas. 

706.  California. 


CONTENTS    OF   VOLUME    I. 


XXIH 


Sec. 

Sec. 

710.  Maine. 

721. 

711.   Maine     (continued) 

Enforce 

ment  of  the  lien. 

722. 

712.  Michigan. 

713.  Minnesota. 

111. 

713a.  Mississippi. 

724. 

713b.  Missouri. 

725. 

713c.  Montana. 

714.  Nevada. 

726. 

715.  New  Hampshire. 

727. 

715a.  New  York. 

728. 

715b.  North    Carolina. 

716.  Oregon. 

729. 

717.  Vermont. 

718.  Washington. 

730. 

719.  Wisconsin. 

730a, 

719a.  Wyoming. 

720.  Liens   for   services 

or  manual 

labor  depend  on  : 

statutes. 

730b 

Rule  by  statutes  in  some 
states. 

Contractor  not  agent  of  own- 
er to  employ  men. 

Constitutionality   of   statutes. 

The  term  "personal  services." 

Contractor  has  no  lien  for  la- 
bor of  servants. 

What  are  logs  or  lumber. 

Priority    of   lumberman's    Hen. 

Property  upon  which  lien  at- 
taches  must   be    identified. 

Lien  upon  logs  worked  upon 
by  laborer. 

Enforcement    of   labor    lien. 

.  Lien  on  dififerent  kinds  of 
timber  cut  under  one  con- 
tract. 

.  Continuous  services  under 
contract. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

mechanics',     artisans',     and     laborers'     liens     upon     PERSONAL 

PROPERTY. 


Sec.  Sec. 

731.  Lien  for  labor  at  common  law.       740. 
1Z2.  Common-law    lien    a     specific 

lien. 
IZZ.  Necessity  that  work  be   done      741. 

at   owner's   request. 

734.  Consent  of  owner  may  be  im-      742. 

plied. 

735.  Consent  of  owner  may  be  in- 

ferred. 743. 

736.  Lien    of    a    city    or    town. 

IZl .  The    lien    belongs    strictly    to      743a 
the  person  who  has  contract- 
ed with  the  owner  to  do  the      744. 
work. 

738.  Lien  for  work  of  agents.  745. 

739.  Lien    for    all    goods    delivered 

under  one  contract. 


Lien  on  part  of  the  property 
for  repair  of  all  the  prop- 
erty. 

Time  of  delivery  of  articles 
to    a    workman. 

Lien  at  common  law  only  be- 
cause of  added  value  of  arti- 
cle. 

Printer  has  no  lien  at  com- 
mon  law. 

,  Workman  must  observe  the 
terms    of    his    contract. 

Precedence  over  mortgage  de- 
pends on  circumstances. 

Possession  is  essential  to  the 
existence   of  this   lien. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    I. 


Sec. 

746.  Possession    of    an     officer     is 

possession    of    his    corpora- 
tion. 

747.  Delivery    of    property    waives 

lien. 

748.  Mode  of  payment  may  be  in- 

consistent with  a  lien. 

749.  Statutes    of    states    providing 

liens. 

750.  Alabama. 
750a.  Alaska. 

751.  Arizona. 
7Sla.  Arkansas. 

752.  California. 

753.  Colorado. 
753a.  Connecticut. 
753b.  Delaware. 

754.  District  of  Columbia. 

755.  Florida. 

756.  Georgia. 

757.  Idaho. 

758.  Indiana. 

759.  Kansas. 
759a.  Kentucky. 

760.  Louisiana. 

761.  Maine. 
761a.  Maryland. 

762.  Massachusetts. 

763.  Michigan. 

764.  Minnesota. 

765.  Mississippi. 
765a.  Nebraska. 
765b.  Nevada. 

765c.  New    Hampshire. 

766.  New  Jersey. 

767.  New  Mexico. 
767a.  New  York. 

768.  North    Carolina. 
768a.  North  Dakota. 


Sec. 

768b 

.  Oklahoma. 

769. 

Oregon. 

769a. 

,  Pennsylvania. 

769b 

.  Rhode  Island. 

770. 

South    Carolina. 

770a. 

,  South    Dakota. 

771. 

Tennessee. 

112. 

Texas. 

772a. 

.  Utah. 

772b 

.  Vermont. 

IIZ. 

Virginia. 

112,2.. 

,  Washington. 

IIA. 

Wisconsin. 

lis. 

Wyoming. 

116. 

No   lien    for   farm   laborers   in 

the  absence  of  statutes. 

111. 

Alabama. 

778. 

Arkansas. 

779. 

Arkansas    (continued).     Speci- 

fic liens    in     favor     of     em- 

ployers. 

779a 

.   California. 

779b 

.  Colorado. 

780. 

Florida. 

781. 

Georgia. 

781a 

.  Idaho. 

782. 

Louisiana. 

782a, 

.  Michigan. 

782b 

.  Minnesota. 

783. 

Mississippi. 

784. 

North    Carolina. 

784a 

.  North  Dakota. 

784b 

.  Oregon. 

784c. 

.  South  Carolina. 

785. 

South   Dakota. 

786. 

Tennessee. 

786a 

.  Texas. 

786b 

.  Washington. 

786c, 

.  Wisconsin. 

CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    I. 


XXV 


CHAPTER  XVI. 


PARTNERSHIP  LIENS. 


Sec. 

787. 


789. 
790. 

791. 

792. 

793. 


Member  of  partnership  has 
lien. 

Creditor  of  partnership  has 
no  lien. 

Quasi  lien  of  joint  creditors. 

No  equity  of  joint  creditors 
in  absence  of  joint  property. 

Conveyance  by  one  partner 
to  the  other. 

Transfer  of  one  partner's  in- 
terest to  creditor. 

Partners  may  pay  debts  of  in- 
dividual member. 


Sec. 
794. 

795. 

796. 

797. 

798. 

799. 


Dissolution  of  partnership  by 
death  of  a  partner. 

Levy  of  execution  by  creditor 
of  member. 

Legal  title  of  real  estate  con- 
veyed to  partners. 

Effect  of  notice  on  one  deal- 
ing with  individual  member 
of   firm. 

Character  of  partnership 
property  impresed  upon 
real  estate. 

Sale  of  real  estate  by  surviv- 
ing partner. 


CHAPTER  XVH. 


SELLER  S  LIEN   FOR  PURCHASE-MONEY, 


Sec.  Sec. 

800.  Lien   of  seller  on  goods  sold.      809. 

801.  Part   payment  will   not   divest 

seller  of  his  lien.  810. 

802.  Lien  amounts  to  a  special  in- 

terest. 811. 

803.  Seller    not    bound     to     deliver      812. 

on     receiving     notes     of     a 
third  person. 

804.  Seller's  lien  only  for  the  price      813. 

and  for  charges. 

805.  Exercising  right   of  lien   does 

not  rescind   the   contract.  814. 

806.  Seller's    lien    depends    on    his 

retaining   possession.  815. 

807.  Constructive       delivery       will 

not    divest    seller's    right    to 
a    lien. 

808.  Marking     and     setting     aside       816. 

goods  is  not  a  delivery. 


Qualified  delivery  will  not 
divest   lien. 

Only  actual  delivery  will  di- 
vest   the    seller's    lien. 

No   lien   after   fair   delivery. 

When  ownership  passes  the 
lien  is  not  reserved  by  a 
mere   agreement. 

Sale  contract  divests  lien 
when  possession  is  already 
in    purchaser. 

Condition  of  sale  is  waived  by 
delivery. 

Not  every  delivery  of  goods 
without  insisting  upon  the 
performance  of  such  con- 
dition is  absolute. 

Retaining  lien  by  special  con- 
tract. 


CONTENTS   OF    VOLUME    1. 


Sec.  Sec. 

817.  Lien  by  contract  is  good  only      S38. 

between    the    parties. 

818.  No  lien  except  by  mortgage. 

819.  Contract      to      mortgage        is      839. 

equitable   lien. 

820.  Property  will   not  pass   under 

conditional  sale.  840. 

821.  Difficulty    to    determine    what 

is  change  of  possession. 

822.  Where    character   of   property      841. 

is  changed  by  purchaser. 

823.  Delivery     by     warehouse     re- 
ceipt. 842. 

824.  Delivery    order     differs     from 

bill  of  lading.  843. 

825.  Warehouse      receipts       differs 

from  a  delivery  order.  844. 

826.  Wharfinger's   certificate   not  a      845. 

title   document. 

827.  Vendor     estopped     from     set-      846. 

ting  up  his  lien. 

828.  Rule      where      warehouseman 

enters    goods    in   purchaser's      847. 
name. 

829.  Seller    not   deprived      of     lien 

by   notice    of    sale    to    ware-      848. 
houseman.  849. 

830.  Possession    by    purchaser    by 

fraud  will   not  divest  lien. 

831.  Vendor    not    bound    by    order      850. 

to    warehouseman    given    by 
vendee.  851. 

832.  Warehouseman's    charge    will      852. 

not  affect  vendor's  lien. 

833.  Seller    loses    lien    by    holding 

goods     as     bailee     for     pur-      853. 
chaser. 

834.  Delivery    of     part     of     goods 

sold      is      not      delivery      of      854. 
whole. 

835.  Goods     sold     must     be     sepa- 

rated. 855. 

836.  Rule   sometimes   stated. 

837.  Intention    to    separate    goods      856. 

from  other  goods. 


Delivery      of      part      only      of 

.  goods  sold  will  not  divest 
seller's  lien. 

Lien  of  seller  not  affected  by 
the  purchaser  pledging  the 
goods  to  a  third  person. 

Vendor  may  retain  the  part 
of  the  goods  not  delivered 
for  whole  bill. 

Sale  by  purchaser  out  of  pos- 
session will  not  affect  sell- 
er's lien. 

Estoppel  of  seller  to  assert 
a  lien. 

Estoppel  of  seller  to  assert 
lien — Illustrations. 

Estoppel  of  seller. 

Seller's  estoppel  by  represen- 
tations to  the  sub-purchaser. 

Seller  estopped  by  permitting 
vendee  to  assume  to  be 
owner. 

Seller  retains  lien  in  case  of 
sale  by  vendee  when  he  has 
not  assented  to  the  sale. 

Waiver  of  seller's  lien. 

Seller  waives  lien  by  attach- 
ing the  goods  as  the  prop- 
erty of  the  purchaser. 

Giving  of  credit  by  seller 
generally  waives  his  lien. 

Admissibility  of  evidence. 

Allowing  credit  not  a  waiver 
when  seller  retains  posses- 
sion. 

Taking  note  no  waiver  of 
lien  where  seller  keeps  pos- 
session  of   goods. 

Taking  negotiable  note  from 
buyer  no  waiver  of  seller's 
lien. 

Lien  waived  by  delivery  of 
goods    sold   at   auction. 

Parol  evidence  admissible  to 
show  that  goods  were  sold 
on  credit. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    I. 


XXVll 


CHAPTEk  XVIII. 


THE   SELLERS  RIGHT  OF   STOPPAGE   IN    TRANSITU. 


Sec. 

857.  Right  of  seller  to  stop  goods 

in   transitu. 

858.  The      right     of     stoppage     in 

transitu    tirst    equitable    one. 

859.  Right  of  stoppage   in  transitu 

not  recognized   by  civil  law. 

860.  Right   of  stoppage  in  transitu 

now  a  legal  right. 

861.  Effect      of      exercising        the 

right. 

862.  Vendor      holding     goods      by 

virtue   of   lien. 

863.  Vendor's  sale  of  the  goods. 

864.  Proof      of       vendor's       claim 

made    against    vendee's     in- 
solvent  estate. 

865.  Resale    or    rescission    by    act 

of  vendee. 

866.  Resale    or    rescission    of     the 

contract. 

867.  Rescission      after       right       of 

stoppage  ceases  to  exist. 

868.  Upon      what      property      the 

right  may  be  exercised. 

869.  Who    may    exercise    the    right 

of  stoppage  in  transitu. 

870.  Right    only    exercised    by    one 

holding  the  relation  of  ven- 
dor to   the   consignee. 

871.  Stoppage   of  goods   consigned 

to    factor. 

872.  Pledgee's  exercise  of  the  right. 

873.  Lienor  no  right    of    stoppage 

after    shipment    of    goods  to 
owner. 

874.  Suret}-    has    no    general    right 

of  stoppage. 

875.  General    agent's    right    in    be- 

half of  principal. 

876.  Act    of    one    stopping      goods 

in  transitu  ratified     by     ven- 
dor. 


Sec. 
877. 


878. 


879. 


880. 


881. 


No  right  of  stoppage  where 
goods  have  been  fully  paid 
for. 

Right  of  stoppage  not  pre- 
vented by  acceptance  of 
vendee's    note. 

Right  cut  off  when  note,  or- 
der or  bill  of  third  person 
accepted  as  payment. 

Right  of  stoppage  not  pre- 
vented by  indebtedness  of 
vendor  to  vendee. 

Vendor's  right  of  stoppage 
in  transitu  not  affected  by 
part  payment  of  purchase- 
money. 

882.  Contract      of      sale      not      re- 

scinded     by    bankruptcy    of 
buyer. 

883.  Vendor's      right      to      recover 

where     after     notice     goods 
are   delivered  to  bankrupt. 

884.  Right    of    stoppage    in     tran- 

situ   exercised    only    in    case 
of  buyer's  insolvency. 

885.  Question     of     buyer's     insolv- 

ency is   for  the  jury. 

886.  Vendor      bound      to      deliver 

goods   to  solvent  vendee. 

887.  When   insolvency  at  the   time 

of   sale  immaterial. 

888.  Notice  of  vendor  to  carrier. 

889.  Demand  by  vendor. 

890.  Vendor    may    claim    goods    in 

the  hands  of  any  person  hav- 
ing   their    charge. 

891.  Notice    to    agent    is    notice    to 

the  carrier. 

892.  Notice      is      sufficient      when 

goods    are    still    in    a    ware- 
house. 


CONTKNTS   OF   VOLUME    I. 


Sec.  Sec. 

893.  Duty    of   shipowner    to    notify      910. 

ship's    master    of    notice     of 
stoppage  given  him.  911. 

894.  Vendor  gains   nothing   by   de- 

manding   goods     from     ven-      912. 
dee. 

895.  No  proof  necessary  before  de- 

manding goods  of  a  carrier.      913. 

896.  Right  of  carrier  to  take   time 

to    investigate    authority     of 
vendor's  agent.  914. 

897.  Carrier    guilty    of    conversion 

by  ignoring  vendor's  notice.      915. 

898.  Duty  of  the   carrier  to   deter- 

mine which  of  two  different 
claimants   of  goods    had   the      916. 
better  right. 

899.  Liability     for     delivery      after 

notice.  917. 

900.  Vendor  must  pay  the  carrier's 

charges.  918. 

901.  Vendor's     right     of     stoppage 

prevails  against  carrier's  lien 

for    general    balance    of    ac-      919. 

count. 

902.  When    the    right    of    stoppage      920. 

in    transitu     may     be     exer- 
cised. 921. 

903.  Goods  shipped  to  seller's  own 

order. 

904.  Different   kinds    of   actual    de-      922. 

livery. 

905.  Right    of   vendor   when    tran- 

sit   has    not    commenced.  923. 

906.  Right    not   prevented    by   pro- 

curing   warehouse    receipt. 

907.  Delivery    to    carrier    not    gen-      924. 

erally    constructive     delivery 
to  vendee. 

908.  Xot  material   that   the   carrier 

has   been   designated   by   the      925. 
vendee.  926. 

909.  Delivery  to  carrier  sometimes 

is    a    constructive      delivery 
to    the   purchaser. 


Delivery  to  carrier  may  be 
delivery  to  vendee. 

Delivery  on  board  of  the 
vendee's  ship. 

Right  exercised  even  where 
delivery  is  made  on  board 
vendee's    ship. 

Effect  where  bill  of  lading 
requires  delivery  to  vendor's 
order. 

Receipt  that  goods  are  shipped 
on    seller's    account. 

Bill  of  lading  not  conclusive 
proof  that  delivery  has 
been   made   to   vendee. 

Vendor  may  act  as  agent  of 
vendee  in  taking  bill  of  lad- 
ing. 

Transit  continues  until  goods 
arrive    at    destination. 

Transit  not  ended  by  the  ar- 
rival of  vessel  at  port  of 
call. 

Vendee  may  take  possession 
at   any   point   en   route. 

Mere  demand  by  vendee  not 
sufficient. 

Delivery  before  point  of  des- 
tination may  terminate 
transit. 

Transit  continues  while  goods 
are  held  by  a  forwarding 
agent. 

Transit  is  no1  ended  when 
vendee  repudiates  the  pur- 
chase. 

Refusal  of  insolvent  vendee  to 
take  the  goods  may  deter- 
mine the  question  of  deliv- 
ery. 

Rule  in  similar  case. 

Right  of  stoppage  remains  so 
long  as  carrier  holds  the 
goods  not  as  vendee's  agent. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    I. 


XXIX 


Sec.  Sec. 

927.  Necessity     that     carrier     part      943. 

witli  possession  of  goods  at 
transitus.  944. 

928.  Transit   ends   when   consignee 

claims    the   goods     and      the 
carrier    wrongfully      refuses      945. 
to  deliver  them. 

929.  Goods    still    in    transit     when 

on   arrival    they  are     in    the      946. 
hands   of  a   local   carrier. 

930.  Goods    in    quarantined    vessel 

after  arrival  are  still  in  tran- 
sit. 947. 

931.  Eft'ect   of   placing   goods   in    a 

custom-house.  948. 

932.  Entry    of    goods    at    custom- 

house   without    the    payment      949. 
of    duties. 

933.  Transit  not  ended  by  storage      950. 

of  goods  in  government 
warehouse.  951. 

934.  Customs  officer  is  not  a  mid-      952. 

dleman  after  consignee  has 
paid    the    duties. 

935.  Goods     placed     in     a     ware-      953. 

house  by  the  carrier  to 
await  consignee's  sending 
for  them  are  still  in  transit. 

936.  Wharfinger  a  middleman.  954. 

937.  Goods  in  the  carrier's     car  at 

destination  are  still  in  tran- 
sit. 

938.  Transit    ends    when    the    ven- 

dees take  possession   of  the      955. 
goods. 

939.  Rule   to   determine   what   con- 

stitutes possession  much 
discussed.  956. 

940.  Right   of  vendee   to   construc- 

tive  possession   while   goods      957. 
are  in  hands   of  carrier. 

941.  When    carrier   made   agent    of 

consignee    transit    ends.  958. 

942.  By  agreement  the  carrier  may 

become  the  buyer's  agent. 


Carrier's  consent  necessary  to 
be  made  agent  of  buyer. 

Transit  ends  when  goods  are 
put  in  warehouse  used  by 
the   purchaser. 

Goods  landed  at  wharf  and 
freight  paid  usually  ends 
transit. 

Assignment  of  bill  of  lading 
by  vendee  to  third  person 
for  value  defeats  right  of 
stoppage   in   transitu. 

Rule  where  instrument  is  not 
strictly  a  bill  of  lading. 

Assignee  for  creditors  not  a 
purchaser  for  value. 

Pre-existing  debt  a  valuable 
consideration. 

Transfer  of  bill  of  lading  af- 
ter stoppage  in  transitu. 

Pledge   by  a   factor   or  agent. 

Fraudulent  sale  of  the  bill  of 
lading  will  not  affect  right 
of   stoppage. 

Vendor's  right  of  stoppage  in 
transitu  not  defeated  by 
transfer  of  bill  of  lading  as 
security. 

Effect  of  transfer  of  bill  of 
lading  in  pledge  on  right  to 
make  sale  that  will  defeat 
the  vendor's  right  of  stop- 
page  in   transitu. 

Vendor's  right  not  defeated 
by  indorsement  of  bill  of 
lading  by  vendee  to  his  fac- 
tor. 

Advances  made  on  bill  of  lad- 
ing. 

Vendor's  right  not  defeated 
by  indorsement  of  bill  of 
lading. 

Delivery  order  given  by  ven- 
dor   to    vendee. 


XXX 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME   I. 


Sec. 

959.  Difference        between       ware- 

house   receipt    and    delivery 
order. 

960.  Sale     of     goods     in     transitu 

without   indorsement   of   bill 
of   lading. 

961.  Rule    where    original      vendor 

has    notice    of   resale    of   the 
goods  by  his  vendee. 

962.  Delivery    of    part     of     cargo 

does  not  determine  right  of 
stoppage   of   whole   cargo. 


Sec. 

963.  Effect    of    notice    of    stoppage 

after   part   of  goods   are   de- 
livered. 

964.  By  the   resale   by  vendee   and 

delivery    of    bill     of     lading 
right   of  stoppage   ended. 

965.  The    right    of    stoppage    para- 

mount   to    all    liens    against 
the  purchaser. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 


WAREHOUSEMEN  S   AND   WHARFINGERS     LIENS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

967.  A   warehouseman's   lien    is     a      974. 

common-law  lien. 

968.  Rule  in  some  states  as  to  lien 

on  goods   stored   but   not   in      975. 
a   warehouse. 

969.  Carrier    may    store    goods    re- 

fused by  consignee. 

970.  Warehouseman's        lien        for      976. 

freight  charges  paid  by  him.       977. 

971.  Authority     of    mortgagor     of 

chattels  to  charge  them  with 

lien  for  storage.  978. 

972.  Right    of    lienholder    to    add 

to  claim  amount  for  keeping      979. 
property. 

973.  Waiver    by   warehouseman    of      980. 

his   lien.  981. 


Delivery  of  part  of  the  goods 
not  defeating  lien  on  the  re- 
mainder for  whole  bill. 

Warehouseman's  or  wharfin- 
ger's lien  not  lost  because 
the  goods  have  a  fraudulent 
trade-mark. 

Enforcement. 

Important  distinction  between 
the  lien  of  a  warehouseman 
and  that  of  a  wharfinger. 

The  lien  of  a  wharfinger  a 
general   lien. 

Right  of  wharfinger  to  lien 
not   inferred. 

Lien  reduced  to  a  specific  lien. 

Statutes    declaring   lien. 


CHAPTER  XX. 


ASSIGNMENT  OF   LIENS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

982.  Common-law  lien  not   subject  984.  Transfer    of    possession. 

to  sale  or  assignment.  985.  Transfer  of  the  lien  debt. 

983.  Lien   a  personal   privilege. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    I. 


XXXI 


Sec. 

986.  Forfeit    of    lien    by    lienhold- 

er's   sale   of   property. 

987.  Right  of  wrong-doer  to  set  up 

lien. 

988.  Effect  of  a  sale   of  the   prop- 

erty by  lienholder. 

989.  Interest   of  lienholder  not  at- 

tachable. 

990.  Assignment  of  statutory  Hens. 


Sec. 

991.  Equitable    lien    pased    by    as- 

signment of  debt. 

992.  Attorney's    lien    assignable. 

993.  Transfer   of   lien    by   subroga- 

tion. 

994.  The    seller's    lien     passed     to 

surety  paying  the  debt. 

995.  No  subrogation  to  a  lien  un- 

til the   debt  is  paid. 


CHAPTER  XXL 


WAIVER  OF  LIENS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

996.  Introductory.  1010. 

997.  Common-law      lien      founded 

upon  possession.  1011. 

998.  Contract  lien  not  discharged 

by  owner  taking  possession.       1012. 

999.  Intention    as    affecting    waiv- 

er. 1013. 

1000.  Lien  once  lost  not  regained. 

1001.  Delivery  of  part.  1014. 

1002.  No  lien  where   parties   make 

special      contract      inconsis-      1015. 
tent  with  a  lien. 

1003.  Lien     excluded      by     special      1016. 

contract    for    payment   at   a 
future    time. 

1004.  Principle    extended    to   cases       1017. 

where     credit     is     claimed 
without    special    contract.  1018. 

1005.  Effect   of   express   agreement 

to  give  credit.  1019. 

1006.  An    agrement    for    credit    by 

note    conditional    upon    the 
giving  of  the  note.  1020. 

1007.  Waiver  of  lien  by  condition- 

al agreement.  1021. 

1008.  Effect   of   agreement    to   pay 

in   advance.  1022. 

1009.  Taking    debtor's    note    not    a       1023. 

waiver. 


Note  taken  as  payment  a 
waiver  of  right  to  lien. 

Taking  security  does  not  de- 
stroy   lien. 

Equitable  lien  not  waived  by 
taking  legal  lien. 

Lien  not  displaced  by  mort- 
gage. 

Waiver  of  lien  by  attach- 
ment by  lienor. 

Waiver  of  lien  by  inconsis- 
tent   agreement. 

Special  contract  giving  the 
seller  a  lien  not  a  waiver 
of  statutory  lien. 

Estoppel  to  set  up  lien  by 
taking  bill  of  sale. 

Waiver  by  claim  of  owner- 
ship   by    lienor. 

Refusal  to  deliver  property 
on  grounds  inconsistent 
with  a  lien. 

Lien  not  waived  by  failure 
to  assert  it, 

Claim     of     general     lien    no 
waiver   of   special    lien. 
Two  liens  for  the  same  debt. 

Lien  lost  of  the  claim  is 
mixed  with  other  claims. 


xxxu 


CONTIiNTS   OF   VOLUME    I. 


Sec. 
ILL'4. 

1025. 

1026. 

1027. 

1028. 


Lien  lost  by  merger  into 
judgment. 

Tender  of  actual  indebted- 
ness. 

Lien  not  extinguished  by 
tender  of  performance  of 
agreement. 

Lien  not  waived  by  giving 
receipt  for  property  with- 
out  reservation. 

Waiver  from  unintentional 
relinquishment  of  a  right 
not  known  to  exist. 


Sec. 

1029.  Nonperformance       of       con- 

tract. 

1030.  Use  of  property  for  its  pres- 

ervation. 

1031.  Waiver  of  a  lien  a  new  con- 
sideration. 

1032.  Effect  of  execution  of  con- 
tract on  Sunday  on  right  to 
lien. 

1032a.  Lien  not  ordinarily  lost  by 
obtaining  a  judgment  for 
the  debt. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 


REMEDIES    FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT    OF    LIENS. 


Sec. 

1033.  A    common-law   lien    defined. 

1034.  Conversion    by    lienor. 

1035.  Right     of     possession    under 

lien. 

1036.  Lienholder's  measure  of  dam- 

ages in  trover  and  trespass. 

1037.  First   step    in   enforcing   lien. 

1038.  Jurisdiction     of     a     court     of 

equity    to    enforce    lien. 

1039.  Has    jurisdiction    when    mat- 

ters of  account  are  in- 
volved. 

1040.  Jurisdiction      dependent       on 

fact  that  accounts  may  re- 
quire adjustment  after 
sale. 

1041.  In    what     states     courts     of 

equity  have  jurisdiction  to 
enforce   liens. 

1042.  Jurisdiction      of      courts      of 

LTnited  States. 

1043.  Loss  of  lien  by  taking  prop- 

erty to  another  state. 

1044.  Lien   of  partnership   not   lost 

by  dissolution. 


Sec. 

1045. 

1046. 


1047. 


1048. 

1049. 

1049a, 

1049b 

1049c, 

1050. 

1051. 

1051a. 

1052. 

1053. 

1053a. 

1054. 

1054a. 

1055. 


Lien  on  two  funds  or  two 
properties. 

Application  of  equitable 
principle  as  between  cred- 
itors of  different  persons. 

Enforcement  as  to  rights  of 
other  lienholders  or  pur- 
chasers as  dependent  on 
nature  of  lien. 

Rights  of  bona  fide  purchas- 
ers for  value. 

Statutes  as  to  remedies  by 
sale. 

,  Alaska. 

.  Arizona. 

.  California. 

Colorado. 

Delaware. 
District  of   Columbia. 

Florida. 

Georgia. 
Idaho. 

Indiana. 
Kentucky. 

Maine. 


CONTENTS   OF    VOLUME   II. 


XXXlll 


Sec. 

1056.  Massachusetts. 
1056a.  Michigan. 
1056b.  Minnesota. 

1057.  New    Hampshire. 
10S7a.  New   Mexico. 
1057b.  New    York. 
1057c.  North  Dakota. 

1058.  Oregon. 

1059.  Pennsylvania. 
1059a.  Rhode   Island. 


Sec. 

1059b.  South  Dakota. 
1059c.  Tennessee. 
1060.  Texas. 
1060a.  Utah. 
1060b.  Virginia. 
1060c.  Washington. 
1060d.  West  Virginia. 
1060e.  Wisconsin. 
1060f.  Wyoming-. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  II 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 

grantor's  OR  vendor's  implied  lien  for  purchase-money. 


Sec.  Sec. 

1061.  Nature  of  the  lien.  1077. 

1062.  Grounds  of  the  doctrine. 

1063.  How    far    adopted     in      this^       1078. 

country.  1079. 

1064.  When   lien   presumed    to    ex- 

ist. 1080. 

1065.  Against   whom    the    lien   ex- 

ists. 1081. 

1066.  The     debt      secured    by    the 

lien.  1082. 

1067.  In  whose    favor  the  lien  ex- 

ists. 

1068.  Lien    in    favor    of    tenant     in       1083. 

common.  1084. 

1069.  Subject-matter  of  the   lien. 

1070.  Lien  under  judicial  sale.  1085. 

1071.  For  unliquidated  claim. 

1072.  Lien     where     real     and    per- 

sonal  property    is    sold    to-       1086. 
gether. 

1073.  Evidence  to  show  note    was       1087. 

accepted  in  payment. 

1074.  Lien    generally    not    waived       1088. 

by  taking  note  or  bond. 

1075.  Lien   not   waived     by    gi  fing 

receipt.  1089. 

1076.  Lien,      when      defeated       by 

vendee's  conveyance. 


Protection  of  innocent  pur- 
chaser. 

Purchaser's  equitable  rights. 

Lien  defeated  by  grantee's 
mortgage. 

Priority  of  lien  by  mort- 
gage   over    equitable    lien. 

Judgment  creditor  as  quasi 
purchaser  for  value. 

Right  of  assignee  in  bank- 
ruptcy in  property  subject 
to  lien. 

Purchaser  with  notice. 

Rule  when  deed  shows  pur- 
chase-money not  paid. 

Necessary  allegations  in  an- 
swer as  defense  against 
lien. 

Lien  lost  by  taking  mort- 
gage. 

Waiver  by  taking  a  mort- 
gage. 

Lien  waived  although  se- 
curity taken  proves  worth- 
less. 

Immaterial  when  securitj'  is 
taken. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    II. 


pre- 
of 


Sec, 

1090.  Taking    security     only 

sumptive         evidence 
waiver. 

1091.  Estoppel   of  vendor. 

1092.  Assignability        of     vendor's 

lien. 

1093.  Subrogation  to  the  lien. 

1094.  Lien    in    favor    of   third    per- 

sons. 

1095.  Effect      of      indorsement 

note    without     recourse 
carry  the  lien. 

1096.  Exception     to     the     rule 

nonassignability   of  lien. 

1097.  Effect      of      indorsement 

several   notes. 

1098.  Lien    not    lost    by    changing 

the  evidence  of  the  debt. 


Sec. 
1099. 

1100. 


1101. 

;r- 

1101a. 

of 

1102. 

to 

1102a. 

1102b. 

of 

1103. 

of 

1103a. 

ng 

1104. 

Enforcement    of    lien     when 

debt  is  barred. 
Must   the    remedy  at    law   be 

exhausted    before      bill      in 

equity  can  be  filed? 
Enforcement      of      lien      by 

parties  to  bill. 
,  Vesting  of  lien  on  death  of 

vendor   in   executor. 
The  bill. 

Defenses. 
,  The    decree. 
Judgment      for     balance      of 

debt. 

Recovery    of    attorney's    fee 

in  equity  to  enforce  lien. 
Marshalling   assets. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

THE   vendor's   implied   LIEN    FOR    PURCH.\SE-MONEY. 


Sec. 

1105.  Money  paid     prematurely  as 
charge  on  the  estate. 


Sec. 

1106.  Lien  for  purchase-money 
paid  where  purchaser  de- 
clines to  complete  contract. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 


THE   VENDOR  S    LIEN    BY    CONTRACT    OR    RESERVATION. 


hec. 
1107. 

1108. 
1109. 

1110. 


nil. 


Lien  by  contract  not  a  ven- 
dor's lien. 

Legal  eflfect  of  title  bond. 

Security  not  impaired  by 
holder  of  contract. 

Reservation  of  lien  in  deed 
as  creating  an  equitable 
mortgage. 

Lien  reserved  a  lien  by 
contract. 


Sec. 

1112.  Reservation   of   lien    in    deed 

as   creating  mortgage. 

1113.  Purchaser  not  liable  for  pur- 

chase-money in  accepting  a 
mortgage    deed. 

1114.  Title  imperfect  until  the  debt 

is  paid. 

1115.  Obligation      of      a      married 

woman. 

1116.  Waiver  of  the  lien. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    II. 


XXXV 


Sec. 

1117.  Order     of     liability     of     par- 

cels   sold. 

1118.  Account    of    vendor    in    pos- 

session. 

1119.  Assignment       of       purchase- 

money  note  or  bond. 

1120.  Order  of  payment  of  several 

notes. 

1121.  Notice    to     purchaser     when 

deed    does    not    refer    to    a 
note. 

1122.  Subrogation  to  the  lien. 

1123.  Statute    of   limitations. 


Sec. 

1124.  No     obligation     to     exhaust 

personalty     before     resort- 
ing  to   real   estate. 

1125.  Proceedings         to        enforce 

such   lien. 

1126.  Remedies  of  vendor. 

1127.  Tender    of    performance. 
1127a.  Temporary  eviction  of  ven- 
dee. 

1128.  Lien     of     vendor     exhausted 

by    foreclosure    sale. 

1129.  Efifecl     of     sale     of    land    to 

pass    growing    crops. 

1130.  Restraint   of  purchaser   from 

impairing  vendor's    lien. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 


IMPROVEMENT   LIENS   OF   OCCUPANTS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

1131.  Rule    at    common    law.  1140. 

1132.  Rule   of  civil  law  adopted.  1141. 

1133.  Rule    adopted    by    courts    of 

law.  1142. 

1134.  Value     of    improvements   set 

off.  1143. 

1135.  Relief    to    one    in    possession 

under   defective   title. 

1136.  Party   in   possession    allowed       1144. 

lien   for   improvements. 

1137.  Allowance      in      equity      for       1145. 

lasting   improvements. 

1138.  Lien    of    vendee    for    perma-       1146. 

nent    improvements    made. 

1139.  Lien     by      acquiescence      of 

owner. 


In  general. 

Statutes  providing  compen- 
sation by  set-oft. 

Statutes  providing  full  equi- 
table  compensation. 

Statutes  giving  the  occu- 
pant a  lien  on  the  land  for 
his  improvements. 

Owner's  land  not  taken 
without    consent. 

Constitutionality  of  the 
statutes. 

Good  faith  of  occupant  a 
condition  of  recovery. 


CHAPTER  XXVn. 

IMPROVEMENT  LIENS  OF  JOINT  TENANTS,  TENANTS  IN   COMMON,  AND 
TENANTS  FOR  LIFE  OR  FOR  YEARS. 


Sec. 

1147.  Lien   of  joint  tenant   or   ten- 
ant  in   cominon. 


Sec. 

1148.   Lien   against    tenant   in   com- 
mon who  is  an   infant. 


XXXVl 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    II. 


Sec.  Sec. 

1149.  No    lien    except    where    im-       1155. 

provements  are  made   with      1156. 
consent  of  joint  tenant. 

1150.  J.icn     of     tenant   in   common 

or  joint    tenant    by    agree-       1157. 
nient. 

1151.  Lien    of    tenant    in    common       1158. 

settled  before  partition. 

1152.  Lien  for  excess  of  purchase-       1159. 

money  furnished  by  one 
tenant  in  common  or  joint 
tenant.  1160. 

1153.  Lien     for     money     advanced 

by  tenant  in  common  to 
discharge    mortgage.  1161. 

1154.  Lien    of    tenant    in    common 

for    price    paid    for    adverse       1162. 
title. 


No  lien   for  rents   collected. 

Lien  of  tenant  in  common 
not  good  as  against  cred- 
itors' attachment  liens. 

Judgment  creditor  not  a 
purchaser   in    some    states. 

Owelty  of  partition  a  first 
lien. 

Life  tenant  can  not  charge 
estate  with  value  of  im- 
provements. 

Exceptions  to  rule  that  life 
tenant  can  not  charge  the 
estate   with   improvements. 

Lien  of  lessee  for  improve- 
ments made. 

Lien  for  improvements  un- 
der agreement  for  a  lease. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 


LIENS    ARISING    UNDER    DEVISES. 


Sec. 
1163. 


1164. 
1165. 
1166. 


1167. 
1168. 


Equitable  lien  on  devise  of 
real  estate  subject  to  debts 
and  legacies. 

Mode  of  imposing  the  lien 
or   charge. 

Debts  and  legacies  payable 
out   of  personal  estate. 

When  devised  land  is 
charged  with  payment  of 
legacies. 

Lien  of  legatee  for  support. 

Superiority  of  lien  of  lega- 
tee over  lien  for  improve- 
ments. 


Sec. 

1169.  Waiver    by    legatee     of     lien 

on   devisee's  land. 

1170.  Effect     of     executor's     bond 

on  lien. 

1171.  Lien    not    discharged    by    ac- 

cepting note  or  security. 

1172.  As     against    purchasers    and 

creditors. 

1173.  Probate     of     will     as    notice 

of    liens    created    by    it. 

1174.  Lien    of    debts    on     land     of 

deceased     during     adminis- 
tration. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

LIENS  ARISING  UNDER  TRUSTS. 


Sec. 

1175.  For     repairs 
ments. 


Sec. 
and     improve-       1176.  Lien    of    next    friend    on    es- 
tate  of  minor  benefited   by 
him. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    IT. 


XXXVll 


Sec. 

1177.  Lien  of  trustee   for  expenses 

in  executing  his   trust. 

1178.  Resulting   trust    an    equitable 

lien. 

1179.  Lien  of  owner  of  trust  funds 

invested     in     lands     where 
title  not  in   his  name. 
1179a.  Extent    of    lien    to     secure 
trust   funds. 


Sec. 

1180.  Equitable    lien    in     favor     of 

owner  of  trust  fund. 

1181.  Lien    in    favor   of   cestui   que 

trust    upon    securities. 

1182.  Whether  creditor  has  lien  on 

property    purchased    by    his 
debtor. 

1183.  No  equitable  lien  on  account 

of   money   expended   in    re- 
moving   incumbrances. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 


MECHANICS     LIENS. — STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    WITH    ANNOTATIONS. 


Sec. 

Sec. 

1184. 

Mechanic's    lien     a     creature 

1208. 

Michigan. 

of  statute. 

1209. 

Minnesota. 

1184a 

I.  What    law    governs. 

1210. 

Mississippi. 

1185. 

Lien    reserved      by      written 

1211. 

Missouri. 

contract. 

1212. 

Montana. 

1186. 

Plan     of    stating    the     statu- 

1213. 

Nebraska. 

tory  law. 

1214. 

Nevada. 

1187. 

Alabama. 

1215. 

New  Hampshire, 

1187a 

..  Alaska. 

1216. 

New  Jersey. 

1188. 

Arizona. 

1217. 

New   Mexico. 

1189. 

Arkansas. 

1218. 

New  York. 

1190. 

Colifornia. 

1219. 

North  Carolina. 

1191. 

Colorado. 

1219a 

,.  North  Dakota. 

1192. 

Connecticut. 

1220. 

Ohio. 

1194. 

Delav.'are. 

1220a 

..  Oklahoma. 

1195. 

District  of   Columbia. 

1221. 

Oregon. 

1196. 

Florida. 

1222. 

Pennsylvania. 

1197. 

Georgia. 

1223. 

Rhode    Island. 

1198. 

Idaho. 

1224. 

South  Carolina. 

1199. 

Illinois. 

1225. 

Tennessee. 

1200. 

Indiana. 

1226. 

Texas, 

1201. 

Iowa. 

1227. 

Utah. 

1202. 

Kansas. 

1228. 

Vermont. 

1203. 

Kentucky. 

1229. 

Virginia. 

1204. 

Louisiana. 

1230. 

Washington. 

1205. 

Maine. 

1231. 

West   Virginia. 

1206. 

Maryland. 

1232. 

Wisconsin. 

1207. 

Massachusetts. 

1233. 

W^yoming. 

XXXVIU 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    II. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 


MECHANICS     LIENS — CONTRACT    OR    CONSENT    OF    OWNER. 


Sec. 

1234.  Contract   or   consent    of    the 

owner. 

1235.  Contract     of     owner     neces- 

sary to   establish  lien. 

1236.  Immaterial      whether       con- 

tract written  or  oral. 

1237.  Lien     under     contract     with 

owner's  agent. 

1238.  Agent's    authority. 

1239.  No  lien  on  land  of  a  minor. 

1240.  No    lien    by    owner    on    his 

own   building. 

1241.  The  contract  to  be  real,   not 

fictitious. 

1242.  Contract    with    owner    to    be 

precise. 

1243.  Capacity    of    owner    to    con- 

tract. 

1244.  No  power  by  equitable  own- 

er to   bind  legal  owner. 

1245.  No  power  by  tenant  to  sub- 

ject owner's  land  to  lien. 

1246.  Building  erected   on   land    of 

a  stranger. 

1247.  Right    of    purchaser    in  pos- 

session to  subject  proper- 
ty  to   lien. 

1248.  Right   of   one   having   a   con- 

tract for  purchase  of  a 
house  to  subject  it  to  a 
lien. 

1249.  Lien   on  building   erected   by 

one  having  a  bond  for  a 
deed. 

1250.  Lien  on  building  alone. 

1251.  Consent  of  owner. 

1252.  Lien   for  labor. 

1252a.  Contract   between   the  own- 
er of  land  and  builder. 

1253.  Consent     of     owner     to     im- 

provement   not    implied. 


Sec. 

1254.  Consent     of     owner     implied 

under    some    circumstances. 

1255.  By    statute    in    some    states, 

consent         implied         from 
knowledge. 

1256.  Owner     estopped      to      deny 

consent. 

1257.  Lien   on  the   interest  of  per- 

son   having     improvements 
made. 

1258.  Necessity    that    person    mak- 

ing    improvements        have 
some  estate. 

1259.  Lien    of    title     subsequently 

acquired. 

1260.  Contract    of   married    woman 

as  foundation  of  lien. 

1261.  Common-law      disability      of 

a   married   woman. 

1262.  Married    woman's     land     not 

subject    to    lien    when    con- 
tract is  with  husband  only. 

1263.  Wife's      knowledge     of     im- 

provements   not   enough    to 
show  her  consent. 

1264.  Lien     on     married     woman's 

estate   under  statutes  when 
she   consents. 

1265.  Difference         in         statutory 

terms. 

1266.  Husband's       agency       estab- 

lished   under   some    circum- 
stances. 

1267.  Liens    where    wife's    real    es- 

tate   is    in   husband's   name. 

1268.  Lien    either    where    title    be- 

longs to  husband   or   taken 
by  him  to  defraud. 

1269.  Furnished        on        husband's 

credit. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME   II. 


XXXIX 


Sec. 

1270.  Lien    on    land    held    by   joint 

tenancy. 

1271.  Husband's    estate      by      cur- 

tesy subject  to  lien. 

1272.  Word  "owner"  includes  lease- 

hold   estate. 

1273.  Effect   of  forfeiture   of  lease. 

1274.  Lien  on  leasehold  estate  may 

include    buildings    and    fix- 
tures, etc. 

1275.  Lien    not    extended     beyond 

lessee's  interest. 

1276.  Interest    of    lessor    not     sub- 

jected by  the  lessee. 


Sec. 
1277. 


1278. 


1279. 

1280. 
1281. 

1282. 


Lessee's  interest  only  sub- 
ject to  lien  for  improve- 
.ments  he  has  agreed  to 
make. 

Whether  lessor's  permission 
to  lessee  to  make  repairs 
subjects   estate   to   lien. 

Necessity  that  lessor  author- 
ize improvements. 

Covenant   to  build  or  repair. 

Statute  under  which  lien  is 
claimed. 

Rule  in  Pennsylvania. 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 


MECHANICS    LIENS  OF  SUBCONTRACTORS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

1283.  Who    are    subcontractors    as       1292. 

defined   by   statutes.  1293. 

1284.  Presumption    of    reliance    on       1294. 

lien. 

1285.  Modes    adopted    by    mechan- 

ic's lien  statutes.  1295. 

1285a.  Lien  of  subcontractor  on 
bonds  and  warrants. 

1286.  Notice    to    the    owner.  1296. 

1287.  Extent   of   lien. 

1288.  Changes  in  the  contract. 

1288a.  Notice   by   subcontractor   as       1297. 
required   by   statute. 

1289.  Subcontractor  bound  by  con-       1298. 

tractor's  contract.  1299. 

1289a.  Contractor  no  lien  where  he 
has  agreed  to  turn  over 
building  free  of  liens.  1300. 

1290.  Effect    of    payment    to    con- 

tractor   on    lien   of    subcon-       1301. 

tractor. 
1290a.  Rule  in  Georgia.  1302. 

1290b.  Rule  in  Michigan. 

1291.  Whether  premature  payment       1303. 

to     contractor     will     defeat 
lien  of  subcontractor. 


Estoppel  of  owner. 

Estoppel  of  subcontractor. 

Subcontractor's  lien  limited 
to  the  indebtedness  of  con- 
tractor to  him. 

Right  of  owner  to  limit  his 
liability  to  subcontractor  by 
agreement. 

Subcontractor  can  only  look 
to  indebtedness  due  con- 
tractor. 

Set-off  not  arising  out  of 
the  contract. 

Burden  on  subcontractor. 

Right  of  subcontractor  where 
contractor  abandons  the 
work. 

Subcontractor  has  no  lien 
for  damages  and  expenses. 

Lien  defeated  by  assignment 
of  debt. 

Lien  defeated  by  garnish- 
ment of  owner. 

Duty  of  subcontractor  who 
holds  disputed  account. 


xl 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    II. 


Sec. 

1304.  Subcontractors'     direct      lien 

under  statutes. 
1304a.   Constitutionality       of       lien 
statutes. 

1305.  Burden   on   owner  to  protect 

his  property  from  liens. 

1306.  Lien  of  subcontractor  limited 

to  value  of  work. 


Sec. 

1307.  Payments     by     original    con- 

tractor to  laborer  to  be  ap- 
plied   to   account. 

1308.  Payments     made     by     owner 

upon   account. 

1309.  Payments   to   subcontractor. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 


MECHANICS      liens:    FOR    WHAT    LABOR    AND    MATERIALS    GIVEN. 


Sec.  ,  Sec. 

1309a.  Building      the      subject     of      1320. 
liens. 

1309b.  Foundation      constitutes      a       1321. 
building. 

1309c.  Terms  "Structure"  and  "Im- 
provement." 1322. 

1309d.  "Building"  not  inclusive  of 
every  species  of  erection  on 
land.  1323. 

1310.  Lien  confined  to  the  particu- 

lar building. 

1311.  Lien    on    the    structure    upon       1324. 

which  the  labor  or  material 

is  bestowed.  1325. 

1312.  Houses  on  distinct  lots. 

1313.  Labor    under     one    contract,       1326. 

t 

upon  several  buildings. 

1314.  Buildings  erected  under  sep-      1327. 

arate  contracts. 

1315.  Labor  upon  lots  belonging  to       1328. 

different   owners. 

1316.  Building       projecting       upon 

land  of  another. 

1317.  Contract     to     erect     two     or       1329. 

more    buildings    for    entire       1330. 
sum. 

1318.  Apportionment    of   liens. 

1319.  Apportionment  of  liens  with-       1331. 

out   particular   statute. 


Apportionment  by  agreement 
of  parties. 

Contract  for  work  on  several 
houses  divided  so  as  to  give 
separate  liens  on  each. 

Distinct  alterations  or  re- 
pairs not  recovered  for  un- 
der one  lien. 

Mingling  of  lienable  ac- 
counts with  those  for  which 
there   is   no  lien. 

Lien  for  work  done  away 
from  the  premises. 

Xo  lien  for  articles  fur- 
nished. 

Materials  furnished  with  ref- 
erence to  their  use. 

Materials  intended  for  a  par- 
ticular use. 

Rule  of  some  states  that  ma- 
terial furnished  must  be  ac- 
tually used  in  construction 
of  the  building. 

Rule  in  other  states. 

Xo  lien  for  materials  fur- 
nished solely  on  the  credit 
of  the  purchaser. 

Evidence  of  purpose  for 
which  materials  were  fur- 
nished. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    11. 


xli 


Sec. 
1332. 


1333. 

1334. 
1335. 


1336. 
1337. 


1338. 

1339. 
1340. 

1341. 
1342. 

1343. 

1344. 

1345. 

1346. 
1347. 

1347a 

1348. 


Material-man  not  precluded 
from  showing  that  mater- 
ials were  furnished  on  the 
credit  of  the  building  by 
charging  them  to  the  buy- 
er. 

Materials  charged  to  build- 
ing. 

Materials   sold   by  purchaser. 

No  lien  for  machinery  fur- 
nished for  a  mill  unless 
done  as  part  of  its  con- 
struction. 

Machinery  purchased. 

No  lien  for  machinery  fur- 
nished for  the  manufacture 
of  materials. 

Work  in  making  slight 
changes  incidental  to  plac- 
ing machinery. 

Lien   for  repair  work. 

Reservation  of  title  till  ma- 
terials are  paid  for. 

Whether  a  fixture. 

Fixtures  unsuitable  or  not 
accepted. 

Lien  for  furnaces,  ranges, 
and  heaters. 

A  drain  pipe,  a  part  of  a 
house. 

Lien  for  putting  mirrors  into 
the  walls  of  a  house. 

Repairs  in  refitting  a  theater. 

Materials  furnished  for  up- 
holstering a  hall. 

.  Powder  used  in  construction 
of  a  railroad. 

Grading  about  a  building  not 
construction  work. 


Sec. 

1349.  Lien  for  constructing  a  side- 

walk. 

1350.  Fences  and  sodding. 

1351.  Furnace  stack. 

1352.  No  lien  for  lumber  furnished 

and  used  in  erecting  a  scaf- 
fold. 

1353.  When  lien  does  not  arise  for 

labor     in     pulling     down     a 
building. 

1354.  Lien    may    exist    for    taking 

down  a  building. 

1355.  No  lien  for  removing  a  build- 

ing. 

1356.  No  lien  for  labor  in  hauling 

lumber. 

1357.  No  lien  for  labor  in  cooking 

for   workmen. 

1358.  No     lien     on     a     claim     for 

breach  of  contract. 

1359.  No  lien  for  loan  of  money. 

1360.  Surety  has  no  right  to  a  lien 

for   materials    furnished. 

1361.  Artisans        and        mechanics 

equally  entitled  to  liens. 

1362.  Owner   can   have   no   lien   on 

his  own  property. 

1363.  General    manager    not    a    la- 

borer. 

1364.  Bookkeeper  not  a  laborer. 

1365.  No    lien    for    superintending 

the  construction  of  a  build- 
ing. 

1366.  Superintendent  of  a  mine  who 

also  works  entitled  to  a  lien. 

1367.  Architect    not    entitled    to    a 

lien. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

mechanics'  liens  :  what  property  is  subject  to. 


Sec. 

1368.  Land  subject  to  lien. 

1369.  The  whole  land  of  the  own- 

er subject   to   lien. 


Sec. 

1370.  Meaning  of  the  phrase   "Lot 

of  land." 

1371.  Lots  appurtenant  to  a  mill. 


xlii 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME   II. 


Sec. 

1372.  Quantity    of    land    necessary 

for  use  and  occupation. 

1373.  Lien     on     building     separate 

from  the  land. 

1374.  Several  and  not  a  joint  lien. 

1375.  Public  buildings  of  states  and 

municipal  corporations. 

1376.  Lien  not  on  public  buildings 

but  on  moneys. 

1377.  Lien  on  fund  by  force  of  city 

ordinance. 

1378.  Property  of  quasi  public  cor- 

porations. 

1379.  Grain  corporation,  not  a  pub- 

lic corporation. 


Sec. 

1380.  House    of    minister    plenipo- 

tentiary of  foreign  power. 

1381.  Contract  to  erect  building  to 

be    used    for    unlawful    pur- 
pose. 

1382.  Land   held    under   homestead 

exemption. 

1383.  Xo    lien    on    house    built    on 

government    land. 

1384.  In  general. 

1385.  Lien    for    machinery     not    a 

separate  lien. 

1386.  Machinery  not  affixed  to  real 

estate  not  subject  to  lien. 

1387.  Lien  on  fixtures  in  general. 

1388.  Trade  fixtures. 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 


MECHANICS     liens:    THE    CLAIM,    CERTIFIC.\TE,    OR    NOTICE. 


Sec.  Sec. 

1389.  How  lien  is  procured.  1399. 

1390.  Particulars     required     to     be 

stated  in  the  notice. 

1391.  Form  of  notice  or   claim  not 

material.  1400. 

1392.  Statement   must   show   prima 

facie  right  to  Ijen. 

1393.  Partnership  claim  of  lien.  1401. 
1393a.  Claim  filed  by  assignee. 

1394.  Only  one  lien  under  one  con-       1402. 

tract.  1403. 

1395.  Subcontractor  may  make  sin- 

gle   claim    for    all    material 
furnished.  1404. 

1396.  Claim  for  materials   to  show 

that  they  were  used  or  fur-      1405. 
nished  for  use  in  the  build- 
ing. 1406. 

1397.  Name  of  the  owner  or  reput- 

ed owner  to  be  stated.  1407. 

1398.  Name  of  owner  when  the  lien 

attached  must  be  stated.  1408. 


Where  property  has  been 
conveyed,  necessity  that  no- 
tice name  owner  at  time  of 
filing  statement. 

Rule  under  statute  requiring 
name  of  owner  to  be  stated 
if  known. 

Sufficiency  of  statement  as  to 
ownership. 

Owner  of  building. 

Statement  of  name  not  nec- 
essary in  the  absence  of  a 
statute   requiring   it. 

Account  or  claim  to  be  spe- 
cific. 

Terms,  conditions,  and  time 
given. 

Statement  of  credits  in  a  no- 
tice. 

Dates  of  items  in  a  claim  to 
be  stated. 

Statement  not  to  be  in  ex- 
cess of  amount  due. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    II. 


xliii 


Sec.  Sec. 

1409.  Account  to  show  the  amount       1430. 

of  the  lien. 

1410.  Sufficiency    of    statement    of       1431. 

amount  of  balance  due. 

1411.  Claim     bad     when     contract       1432. 

shown  only  partly  complet- 
ed and  amount  due  not  dis-       1433. 
closed. 

1412.  Including    nonlienable    items.       1434. 

1413.  Overstatement  of  amount  due 

not  necessarily  fatal. 

1414.  Intentional         omission        of       1435. 

credits. 

1415.  Statute      may      protect      one       1436. 

against  an  overstatement  of       1437. 
amount  due. 

1416.  Statement  of  aggregate  price 

of  work  and  materials.  1438. 

1417.  Statutes    requiring    the    filing 

of  true  account.  1439. 

1418.  Bill    of  particulars   when    re- 

quired by  statute  not  com- 
plied with  by  filing  for  bal-       1440. 
ance  due. 

1419.  Account    containing   a   lump-       1441. 

ing  charge. 

1420.  Rule  under  some  statutes.  1442. 
142L  In  general. 

1422.  Insufficient      description      of       1443. 

property  in  a  notice. 

1423.  Notice    not    invalid    for    de-       1444. 

scribing  too  much  land. 

1424.  Imperfect    but    sufficient    de-       1445. 

scriptions. 

1425.  Description    of    limited    area 

of  land.  1446. 

1426.  Failure     of     description     not 

cured  by   survey  after   suit 

filed.  1447. 

1427.  Limitation    from    completion 

of  building.  1448. 

1428.  Same       limitation       affecting 

subcontractor. 

1429.  Transfer      of      title      during 

progress   of  building.  1449. 


Filing    statement    premature- 

]y. 

Filing  lien  within  a  limited 
time  after  last  work  done. 

Notice  where  there  are  dis- 
tinct contracts. 

Notice  for  wages  under  a 
monthly  or  yearly  contract. 

Where  materials  are  fur- 
nished for  several  houses 
under  one  contract. 

Materials  furnished  on  run- 
ning account. 

Continuous  contract. 

Presumption  that  accounts 
are  based  upon  independent 
contracts. 

Abandonment  of  work 
deemed  completion  of  work. 

Suspension  of  work  and  its 
resumption  not  commence- 
ment of  the  work. 

No  lien  for  work  under 
abandoned  contract. 

Contract  for  additional  work 
or  material. 

Date  of  last  material  sup- 
plied  but  not  used. 

The  lien  relates  back  to  the 
beginning  of  the  work. 

Filing  lien  after  substantial 
completion. 

Lien  filed  within  time  limit- 
ed from  the  completion  of 
additional  work. 

Alterations  and  repairs  made 
after  substantial  comple- 
tion. 

Completion  of  contract  after 
possession  given  to  owner. 

Extension  of  time  for  filing 
lien  by  delivery  of  material 
at  house  after  its  comple- 
tion. 

Whether  lien  is  filed  in  time 
question  of  fact. 


xliv 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    II. 


Sec. 

1450.  Rule    for    computing   time. 

1451.  In  general. 

1452.  Form  of  verification  of  claim. 

1453.  Affidavit  made  by  agent. 

1454.  Verification    to    the    best    of 

one's    knowledge    or    belief. 


Sec. 

1455.  Notice    or    claim    not    to    be 

amended  after  filing. 

1456.  Effect    of    amendment    when 

allowed  by  statute  to  re- 
store lien  which  has  been 
lost  by  failure  to  give  no- 
tice. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

MECH.\NICS'    liens:    PRIORITY    AS    REGARDS    MORTGAGES    AND    OTHER 
INCUMBRANCES    AND    LIENS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

1457.  Building  as  part  of  realty.  1471. 

1458.  A     mortgage     for    purchase- 

money. 

1459.  Priority     of     recorded    mort-       1472.^ 

gage. 

1460.  Recordation    of  mortgage   as 

dependent   on   statutes.  1473. 

1461.  Marshalling   securities. 

1462.  Priority  as  to  building  alone. 
1462a.  Improvement       placed       on       1474. 

mortgaged  land. 

1463.  Conveyance  of  land  to  secure       1475. 

a  debt. 

1464.  Machinery    attached    to    such 

building.  1476. 

1465.  Priority     of    mechanic's    lien 

as  dependent  on  priority  of       1477. 
contract    under    some    stat- 
utes. 

1466.  Contract     too     moderate     to       1478. 

create  prior  lien. 

1467.  Relief  of  mechanic  against  a       1479. 

mortgage. 

1468.  Impairment     of    mortgagee's 

rights  by  prior  contract.  1480. 

1469.  Priority    of    lien    from    com- 

mencement of  the  building. 

1470.  Lien    dates    from   commence- 

ment of  building.  1481. 


Application  of  rule  in  favor 
of  subcontractors  as  well 
as  contractors. 

Excavation  for  the  founda- 
tion of  a  building  a  com- 
mencement of  the  building. 

Necessity  that  work  should 
be  done  with  intention  of 
continuing  it. 

Work  not  done  on  the  prem- 
ises. 

Effect  of  stopping  work  by 
owner  after  building  is 
cominenced. 

Enlargement  of  contract  aft- 
er work  is  commenced. 

Right  of  mortgagor  to  sub- 
ject property  to  lien  as 
against  mortgagee. 

Repairs  or  additions  made  to 
completed  building. 

Mortgage  attaches  to  after 
acquired  property  but  sub- 
ject to  existing  conditions. 

Rule  as  to  priority  in  states 
in  which  a  Hen  attaches 
from  commencement  of 
work. 

Meaning  of  phrase  "com- 
mencement  of  work." 


CONTENTS    OF   VOLUME    11. 


xlv 


Sec. 

1482.  Labor     and     materials     per- 

formed   and    furnished    un- 
der one  contract. 

1483.  Time  of  performing  labor  or 

furnishing  materials. 

1484.  Merger   of    mortgage    having 

priority      over      mechanic's 
lien. 

1485.  Estoppel     of    lienor     by     his 

acts  or  agreement. 

1486.  Mortgage    given    precedence 

of   a  lien   by   reason    of   es- 
toppel. 
1486a.  A     mortgage     under     some 
circumstances    subordinated 
to  subsequent  liens. 


Sec. 
1487. 


1488. 
1489. 

1490. 

1491. 

1492. 


Vendor's  lien  for  purchase- 
money  superior  to  mechan- 
ic's lien. 

Subsequent  conveyance. 

Sale  of  property  subject  to 
lien. 

Precedence  of  prior  attach- 
ment. 

Judgment  lien  acquired  dur- 
ing the  construction  of 
building. 

No  priority  among  different 
persons  having  mechanics' 
liens  upon  the  same  build- 
ing. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 


MECHANICS     liens:   ASSIGNMENT  OF. 


Sec. 

1493.  Assignability    of    a    mechan- 

ic's lien. 

1494.  Lien    not    destroyed    by    as- 

signment of  the  lien  debt. 

1495.  Mechanic's  lien  assignable  in 

equity. 

1496.  Assignment   of   note   for   lien 

debt. 


Sec. 

1497.  Assignee  must  show  his  right 

as  such. 

1498.  Completion     of    contarct    by 

assignee  with   owner's  con- 
sent. 

1499.  No   particular    words    neces- 

sary to  assign  a  debt  or  lien. 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII. 


MECHANICS     liens:    WAIVER    AND    LOSS    OF. 


Sec. 

1500.  Lien    waived    by    agreement 

either   express    or    implied. 
1500a.  Agreement  not  to  file  a  lien 
a  waiver  of  right  to  do  so. 

1501.  Waiver    of    right    by    an    im- 

plied   agreement. 

1502.  Waiver  binding  between  con- 

tractor  and    owner   binding 
on  all  persons. 


Sec. 

1503.  Waiver    on    promise    of   pay- 

ment. 

1504.  Lien    waived    in    favor    of    a 

mortgagee    not    to    be    en- 
forced as  against  him. 

1505.  Release   of   lien   not   inferred 

from  doubtful  expressions. 

1506.  Estoppel      of      subcontractor 

from  claiming  a  lien. 


xlvi 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    II. 


Sec.  Sec. 

1507.  Waiver    by   subcontractor    of      1524. 

lien   by    directing  owner  to 
pay  contractor.  1525. 

1507a.  Waiver  by   surety    on    con- 
tractor's  bond. 

1508.  Lien  discharged  by  payment      1526. 

of  the  debt. 

1509.  Unaccepted     orders     on     the       1527. 

owner. 

1510.  Contract      enforcible       when       1528. 

payable    otherwise    than    in 
money.  1529. 

1511.  Dissolution   of   lien   by   tiling 

a    bond   with   sureties. 

1512.  Right    of    contractor    to    en-      1530. 

force  lien  after  abandoning 
contract.  1531. 

1513.  Contractor's  abandonment  of 

contract  may  deprive  those 
under  him  from  claiming  a      1532. 
lien. 
1513a.  Prevention     of     completion       1533. 
of    contract    by    the    act    of 
the   owner.  1534. 

1514.  Under     provisions     allowing 

the   owner  to  complete  the 

work     abandoned     by     the       1535. 

contractor. 

1515.  Rule    by    statutes    in    a    few       1536. 

states. 

1516.  Waiver      of      subcontractor's 

lien     by     abandonment     of       1537. 
work. 

1517.  Building  contract  terminated 

by  death  of  contractor.  1538. 

1518.  Lien  not  lost  by  destruction 

of  building.  1539. 

1519.  Lien    waived    by    taking    col- 

lateral security.  1540. 

1520.  Intention  to  waive  the  lien. 

1521.  Lien    not    waived    by    taking       1541. 

security  on  same   property. 

1522.  Lien  and  security  must  be  on       1542. 

same  property. 

1523.  Agreement  that  taking  of  se- 

curity will  not  waive  lien. 


Agreement  to  take  a  convey- 
ance a  waiver. 

Agreement  for  payment  by  a 
conveyance  as  waiver  of 
lien. 

Confusion  of  accounts  in  a 
note  as  a  waiver  of  lien. 

Taking  note  of  third  person 
not  a  waiver. 

When  contractor  not  deemed 
collateral  security. 

Agreement  to  pay  for  work 
out  of  particular  money  not 
security. 

Lien  waived  by  deposit  of 
money  as  security. 

Taking  a  fire  insurance  pol- 
icy as  security  not  a  waiver 
of  lien. 

Taking  debtor's  note  not  a 
waiver. 

Taking  a  promissory  note 
not  prima  facie  payment. 

In  some  states  taking  a 
promissor}'  note,  prima  fa- 
cie payment. 

Notes  payable  after  time  for 
filing  the  lien. 

Taking  note  not  due  until 
time  when  lien  can  not  be 
asserted  as  a  waiver. 

Discharge  of  lien  by  notes 
expressly  received  in  pay- 
ment. 

Destruction  of  building  cuts 
off  lien. 

In  some  states  the  lien  re- 
mains on  the  land. 

Lien  on  land  second  to  prior 
mortgage. 

Lienholder  not  subrogated  to 
insurance    money    paid. 

Not  defeated  by  subsequent 
conveyance. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  II. 


xlvii 


Sec. 
1543. 


1544. 
1545. 

1546. 
1547. 


Lien  defeated  by  conveyance 
by  owner  where  it  does  not 
attach   until   notice   is    filed. 

Lien  cut  off  by  sale  under 
prior   mortgage. 

Lienholder  required  to  look 
to  the  title  upon  which  im- 
provement  is   made. 

Lien  not  defeated  by  bank- 
ruptcy of  owner. 

Jurisdiction  of  court  to  en- 
force lien  not  divested  by 
bankruptcy   of   owner. 


Sec. 

1548. 


1549. 
1550. 
1550a 

1551. 

1552. 


Only  interest  of  bankrupt 
taken  by  assignee  in  bank- 
ruptcy. 

Lien  for  balance  after  a  div- 
idend. 

Lien  not  defeated  by  ap- 
pointment of  receiver. 

.  Death  of  owner  of  the 
property. 

Lien  not  to  be  enforced  aft- 
er the  debt  has  become 
barred  by  the  statute  of 
limitations. 

Lien  not  divested  by  judg- 
ments against  the  owner. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX. 


MECHANICS    liens:   PROCEEDINGS  TO   ENFORCE. 


Sec.  Sec. 

1553.  Proceedings   to  enforce  liens      1562. 

dependent  on  the  practice 
in  different  states. 

1554.  Rules  of  practice.  1563. 

1555.  Lien    not    extended    to    cases 

falling      only      within      the       1563a 
spirit  of  the  law.  1564. 

1556.  Liberal      construction      after 

the   lien  has  attached.  1565. 

1557.  Lien  law  has   no  extra-terri- 

torial effect. 

1558.  Effect    of    repeal    of    statute      1566. 

under      which      mechanic's       1567, 
lien  has  accrued.  1568. 

1559.  Whether  proceedings  are  le- 

gal  or  equitable   dependent 

upon  the  statute.  1569. 

1560.  In   code   states   the    foreclos- 

ure   of   a    lien   an    equitable       1570. 
suit. 

1561.  Court  of  equity  can  not  take      1571. 

jurisdiction  to  enforce  a 
lien  without  the  aid  of  a 
statute.  1572. 


Filing  complaint  to  enforce 
lien  generally  the  com- 
mencement of  a  suit. 

Suit  brought  on  notice  by 
publication. 

.  Rule  for  computing  time. 

Lapsed  lien  not  revived  by 
suit. 

Action  to  foreclose  lien  pre- 
mature if  brought  before 
the    debt   is    payable. 

Notice  to  commence  suit. 

Parties  plaintiff. 

Partners  to  give  joint  notices 
and  bring  joint  proceedings 
to  enforce  a  lien. 

Consolidation  claims  or  ac- 
tions. 

Parties  defendant  in  suits  to 
enforce  liens. 

Necessary  parties  defendant 
where  suit  is  an  equitable 
proceeding. 

The  owner  a  necessary  party. 


xlviii 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    IF. 


Sec.  Sec. 

1573.  Husband  and  wife.  1592, 

1574.  Contractor  a  necessary  party 

in  suit  by  subcontractor  to       1593. 
enforce  lien. 

1575.  Not     necessary     to     join    all       1594. 

joint  contractors. 

1576.  Contractor  who  has  assigned 

his  contract  not  a  necessary       1595. 
party  defendant. 

1577.  Indorser    of    note    a    proper 

party. 

1578.  Grantor  not  a  necessary  par-       1596. 

ty   where   he   has   conveyed 

the  real  estate.  1597. 

1579.  Subsequent      mortgagee      or       1598. 

other    incumbrancer    to    be 
made  a  party. 

1580.  Trustee  and  cestui  que  trust       1599. 

both  to  be  made  parties. 

1581.  Prior    lienholder    not    a    nee-       1600. 

essary  defendant.  1601. 

1582.  Prior     lien    not    affected    by 

mortgage  foreclosure. 

1583.  Prior     mortgagee     necessary      1602. 

party  where   lienholder  has 
prior  lien  on  building  alone. 

1584.  Other  lienors, 

1585.  New     parties     to     be     sum-      1603. 

moned    any    time    prior    to 

final  decree.  1604. 

1586.  Where   the     owner    dies,   his 

executor     or     administrator       1604a 
to  be  substituted  as  party. 

1587.  Petition  or  complaint  to  sub- 

stantially    conform     to    the       1605. 
statute.  1606. 

1588.  What     the     complaint     must      1607. 

show. 

1589.  Averments    in   the    complaint 

continued.  1608. 

1590.  Complaint    to    aver    that    the 

materials  were  used  in  the      1609. 
structure. 

1591.  Complaint   to   show   that   de-      1610. 

fendant  was   owner  or  had 
some  interest. 


Not  required  to  prove  the 
precise  title  of  owner. 

Necessary  allegations  of  sub- 
contractor. 

To  aver  an  indebtedness  by 
owner  to  original  contrac- 
tor. 

Not  necessary  to  allege  in  the 
complaint  that  the  indebt- 
edness arose  under  a  par- 
ticular contract. 

Allegations  as  to  date  of 
execution  of  contract. 

One  contract. 

Abandonment  of  contract 
through  no  fault  of  con- 
tractor. 

Damages  allowed  to  defend- 
ant by  way  of  set-off. 

Description  of  the  land. 

Efifect  of  variance  in  de- 
scription in  notice  and  in 
the  complaint. 

Variance  as  to  parties  be- 
tween claim  filed  and  the 
complaint,  not  ground  for 
dismissal. 

Case  proved  to  be  substan- 
tially as  alleged. 

Variance  as  to  amount  of  the 
lien  claim. 

.  Owner  to  appear  and  an- 
swer complaint  to  enforce 
lien. 

Amendment  of  complaint. 

Evidence  admissible. 

Question  for  the  court  to  de- 
termine whether  a  lien  ex- 
ists. 

Judgment  to  direct  a  sale  ot 
owner's  interest. 

Interest  allowed  from  date 
of   finding. 

Decree  for  sale  of  separate 
buildings  on  separate  lots. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    II. 


xlijc 


Sec. 

1611.  Judgment   where    money   has 

been  paid  into  court. 

1612.  Sale  on  credit. 

1613.  Judgment   for  a  deficiency. 

1614.  A  personal  judgment    to    be 

rendered    only    for    a    defi- 
ciency  after   a   sale. 
1614a.  Receivers. 

1615.  Judgment   against   contractor 

in  suit  by  subcontractor. 


Sec. 

1616.  Costs. 

1616a.  Attorneys'  fees. 

1617.  Reversal  of  decree  of  sale. 
1617a.  Appeal. 

1617b.  Distribution  of  proceeds  of 
sale. 

1617c.  Effect  of  agreement  to  post- 
pone execution. 


CHAPTER    XL. 


LIENS  OF  MECHANICS  AND  OTHERS  UPON  RAILROADS. 


Sec. 

1698.  General     lien     laws     usually 
not   applicable   to   railroads. 

1619.  Railroad  considered  as  an  en- 

tirety. 

1620.  Railroad  regarded  as  one  im- 

provement. 

1621.  No    lien    on    subscription    for 

railroad. 

1622.  Railroad   bridge   not  a  build- 

ing. 

1623.  Railroad    bridge    not    an    im- 

provement. 
1623a.  Tools      used      in      building 
bridge    not    materials    used. 

1624.  Terms      "structure,"      "erec- 

tion,"  or    "improvement." 

1625.  Lien  for  railroad  ties  superior 

to  lien  of  mortgage. 
1625a.  Prior  mortgage  on  railroad 
property    superior    to    me- 
chanic's lien. 

1626.  Rule  in  some  states. 

1627.  Liens  for  repairs  subordinate 

to    lien    for    existing    mort- 
gage. 

1628.  Liens  of  contractors  and   la- 

borers. 

1629.  Who  a  laborer. 


Sec. 

1630. 

Lien  of  labor  personal. 

1631. 

No  lien  for  money  advanced 

to  laborers. 

1632. 

Equitable  subrogation  to  lien. 

1633. 

Contractor  who  is  stockhold- 

er not  estopped  from  assert- 

ing contractor's  lien. 

1633a 

I.  Statutes  creating  liens  upon 

railroads. 

1634. 

Alabama. 

1635. 

Arizona. 

1636. 

Arkansas. 

1637. 

California. 

1638. 

Colorado. 

1639. 

Connecticut. 

1641. 

Florida. 

1642. 

Georgia. 

1643. 

Idaho. 

1644. 

Illinois. 

1645. 

Indiana. 

1646. 

Iowa. 

1647. 

Kansas. 

1648. 

Kentucky. 

1649. 

Maine. 

1650. 

Maryland. 

1651. 

Massachusetts. 

1652. 

Michigan. 

1653. 

Minnesota. 

1 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME   IT. 


Sec. 

1654.  Mississippi. 

1655.  Missouri, 

1656.  Montana. 

1657.  Nebraska. 

1658.  Nevada. 

1659.  New  Hampshire. 

1660.  New  Jersey. 

1661.  New  Mexico. 

1662.  New  York. 

1663.  North  Carolina. 
1663a.  North   Dakota. 

1664.  Ohio. 
1664a.  Oklahoma. 
1664b.  Oresron. 


Sec. 

1665.  Pennsylvania. 

1666.  Rhode   Island. 
1666a.  South  Dakota. 

1667.  Tennessee. 

1668.  Texas. 

1669.  Utah. 

1670.  Vermont. 

1671.  Virginia. 

1672.  Washington. 

1673.  Wisconsin. 

1674.  Vendor's     lien     on     railroad 

company's  land. 

1675.  Priority    of    mortgage     over 

subsequent  judgment. 


CHAPTER   XLI. 


MARITIME  LIENS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

1676.  Lien  defined.  1688. 

1677.  Characteristics     of     maritime 

liens. 

1678.  Maritime   lien   a   strict   right.       1689. 

1679.  Lien  for  repairs  and  supplies. 

1680.  Demand  for  supplies  and  re-      1690. 

pairs    to    be    made    by    the 
master.  1691. 

1681.  Home  port  of  vessel. 

1682.  Supplies     and     repairs     pre- 

sumed   to    be    furnished    on       1692. 
owner's  credit. 

1683.  Lien  for  supplies  where  there 

are  several  owners.  1693. 

1684.  No  lien  for  supplies   sent   to 

vessel's  home  port.  1694. 

1685.  Lien  where  owners  hold  the       1695. 

vessel    out    as    foreign    ves- 
sel. 1696. 

1686.  Presumption  that  repairs  are 

furnished    on    credit    of    the 
vessel.  1697. 

1687.  Lien    for    supplies    furnished 

to  vessel  in  foreign  port  by 
home  citizen. 


Rule  where  supplies  or  re- 
pairs are  obtained  by  own- 
er and  not  master. 

Supplies  charged  to  vessel 
when  ordered  by  owner. 

Rule  where  dealing  is  with 
charterer. 

No  lien  for  supplies  obtained 
by  charterer  at  place  of  his 
residence. 

Character  of  vessel  deter- 
mined by  place  of  owner's 
residence. 

Lien  only  for  necessary  re- 
pairs and  supplies. 

No   lien    for   family   supplies. 

No  lien  for  purchase-money 
of  cargo. 

Lien  arising  from  actual  fur- 
nishing of  repairs  or  sup- 
plies. 

No  lien  for  general  balance 
of  account. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    II. 


Sec.  Sec. 

1697a.  No    lien    in    favor    of    part       1712. 
owner  for  advances  or  sup- 
plies. 1713. 

1697b.  Husband's  lien  for  supplies      1714. 
furnished      where     wife     is 
owner. 

1698.  No  maritime  lien  in  favor  of       1715. 

underwriters       for      unpaid 
premiums  of  insurance.  1716. 

1699.  Lien  of  one  advancing  money 

to  pay  off  lien. 

1700.  Seamen's    liens    upon    vessel       1717. 

and    its    proceeds    for    pay- 
ment of  their  wages.  1718. 

1701.  Seamen's  liens  on  freight  for 

their  wages.  1719. 

1702.  Seaman's     lien     enforced     by 

proceeding  in  admiralty.  1720. 

1703.  Landsmen    assisting   in    load- 

ing   vessel    not    entitled    to       1720a 
lien. 

1704.  Seaman's    lien    against    char-       1721. 

tered  vessel. 

1705.  Fishermen's    liens    for    serv- 

ices on  board  vessel.  1722. 

1706.  Master  of  ship  not  entitled  to 

lien  for  his  wages. 
1706a.  Master  as  against  owner  not 

entitled  to  payment  out  of      1722a. 
surplus  proceeds  of  sale  of      1723. 
vessel. 

1707.  Ship's  husband  not  entitled  to       1724. 

lien  for  advancements  made 

to  satisfy  ship's  bill.  1725. 

1708.  Services  of  freight  agent  not 

maritime  in  character. 

1709.  Shipping  broker  not  entitled       1725a. 

to   lien   on   vessel   for   serv- 
ices   in    obtaining    charter-       1726. 
party.  1727. 

1710.  Chief  engineer   at   an   annual       1728. 

salary  not  entitled  to  lien. 

1711.  Quarantine        commissioners       1729. 

entitled  to  liens. 


Pilots  entitled  to  lien  where 
their   services  are   required. 

Stevedore  entitled  to  lien. 

Workmen  removing  ballast 
from  vessel  in  port  entitled 
to  liens. 

Watchman  in  port  not  enti- 
tled to  lien. 

Cooper  entitled  to  lien  in 
putting  cargo  into  good 
condition. 

Towage  services  presump- 
tively a  lien  on  vessel. 

Maritime  lien  for  salvage 
services. 

Lien  for  wharfage  arising 
against  foreign  vessel. 

Lien  in  admiralty  in  favor  of 
vessel  on  cargo  for  freight. 

.  Lien  in  contract  of  affreight- 
ment. 

Lien  for  labor  and  materials 
in  construction  of  vessel  un- 
der general  maritime  law. 

No  lien  in  L^nited  States  for 
work  done  and  materials 
furnished  in  constructing 
vessel. 

.  Liens   for  repairing  vessels. 

Lien  on  vessels  at  common 
law. 

Competent  for  state  to  cre- 
ate lien  by  statute. 

Admiralty  courts  no  jurisdic- 
tion   to    enforce    liens    for 
construction    of    vessel. 
What  included   in   statutory 
liens. 

Contract  of  owner. 

Materials  for  two  vessels. 

Lien  only  for  materials  actu- 
ally used  in   construction. 

Statutory  liens  enforced  in 
what  courts. 


Hi 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME   II. 


Sec. 

Sec. 

1730.  Admiralty     courts     g 

overned 

1766. 

by  provisions 

of  state  stat- 

1767. 

ute. 

1768. 

1731.  Xo     lien    on     vessel 

at    her 

home  port. 

1769. 

1732.  Statutory  lien  limited 

to  time 

specified     for 

its     < 

enforce- 

1770. 

ment. 

1733.  Filing  specifications. 

1771. 

1734.  Departure  from 

port. 

1735.  Lienholders  to  ; 

join  in  suit. 

1771a. 

1736.  Alabama. 

1737.  Arizona, 

1772. 

1738.  California. 

1739.  Connecticut. 

1773. 

1739a.  Delaware. 

1774. 

1740.  Florida. 

1741.  Georgia. 

1775. 

1742.  Illinois. 

1743.  Indiana. 

1743a.  Iowa. 

1776. 

1744.    Kentucky. 

1745.  Louisiana. 

1777. 

1746.  Maine. 

1747.  Maryland. 

1778. 

1748.  Massachusetts. 

1749.  Michigan. 

1779. 

1750.  Minnesota. 

1751.  Mississippi. 

1752.  Missouri. 

1780. 

1753..  Montana. 

1754.  New  Hampshire 

1755.  New  Jersey. 

1781. 

1756.  New  York. 

1757.  North  Carolina. 

1758.  Ohio. 

1781a. 

1759.  Oregon. 

1760.  Pennsylvania. 

1761.  South  Carolina. 

1782. 

1762.  Tennessee. 

1763.  Texas. 

1783. 

1764.  Vermont. 

1764a.  Virginia. 

1765.  Washington. 

West  Virginia. 

Wisconsin. 

Maritime  lien  arising  from 
torts  committed  by  master. 

Lien  arising  against  vessel  to 
blame  in  collision. 

No  maritime  lien  upon  im- 
movable structure. 

Personal  injuries  from  negli- 
gence. 

.  Damages  resulting  in  death 
of  person. 

Rank  of  liens  given  by  state 
laws. 

Rank  of  maritime  liens. 

Decisions  not  in  accord  with 
rule. 

Nonmaritime  liens  postponed 
until  maritime  liens  satis- 
fied. 

Priority  as  between  different 
maritime  liens. 

Liens  payable  in  inverse  or* 
der  of  their  dates. 

Contemporaneous  liens  paid 
pro  rata. 

Pro  rata  distribution  not  ap- 
plied to  vessels  of  northern 
lakes. 

Liens  payable  in  order  of 
dates  at  which  claims  ac- 
crue. 

Prior  lien  for  supplies  pre- 
ferred over  subsequent  lien 
for  damages. 

Decree  for  damages  in  col- 
lision case  overriding  all 
prior  liens. 

Lien  for  damages  against 
tug  boat. 

Claim  for  damages  by  differr 
ent  lienors  on  account  of 
collisions. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME    11. 


liii 


Sec.  Sec. 

1784.  Priority  of  lien  for  necessary       1800a 

repairs   over   prior   lien   for 
damages  for  breach  of  con-       1801. 
tract. 

1785.  Material-men's  liens  superior       ISOla 

to    government's    claim    of 
forfeiture. 

1786.  Lien  for  seamen's  wages   fa-       1802. 

vored  in  admiralty. 

1787.  Priority  of  salvage  lien  over       1803. 

liens    for    repairs    and    ma- 
terials. 1804. 

1788.  Rank  of  liens  for  towage. 

1789.  Lien  of  owner  not  allowed  to 

prejudice  other  liens.  1805. 

1790.  Law  of  place  of  contract  and 

of  forum. 

1791.  Comity  in  enforcing  liens.  1806. 

1792.  Classification  of  liens. 

1793.  Mortgagor  in  possession  may       1806a 

confer  right  of  lien. 
1793a.  Mortgage     not    a    maritime 

contract.  1807. 

1794.  Liens  for  supplies  in  foreign 

ports      superior      to      prior       1807a 
mortgages. 

1795.  Mortgage    lien    postponed    to       1808. 

construction  lien. 

1796.  Rank  of  bottomry  bond.  1809. 

1797.  No  lien  while  vessel  in  court's 

custody.  '       1810. 

1797a.  Partial  payments.  1810a 

1798.  Lien     security     carried     with 

assignment  of  debt. 

1799.  Maritime    lien     not    lost    by 

sale  of  vessel.  1811. 

1799a.  Lien  for  repairs  in  nature  of 
proprietary  right. 

1800.  Lien  sometimes  lost  by  delay 

in  enforcing  it.  1812. 


Limitation  as  against  bona 
fide  purchaser. 

When  lien  lost  in  case  of 
ocean  vessel. 

Rule  not  applied  to  vessel 
making  daily  trips  about 
harbor. 

Rule  in  navigation  of  lakes 
and  rivers. 

Lienholder  may  await  return 
of  vessel. 

Due  diligence  to  require 
creditor  to  follow  the  ves- 
sel. 

Claim  for  seamen's  wages 
stale  as  against  bona  fide 
purchaser. 

When  lien  for  damages  not 
deemed  stale. 

State  statute  providing  for 
notice  not  applicable  to  for- 
eign vessel. 

When  lien  will  not  be  held 
to  be  seasonably  filed. 

.  Lien  waived  by  an  agree- 
ment. 

Lien  not  lost  by  accepting  a 
note. 

Accepting  long-time  note  a 
waiver. 

Additional  security. 
Maritime  lien  not  to  be  di- 
vested   b~y    any    proceeding 
for    forfeiture    in    common- 
law  court. 

No  lien  for  unpaid  balance 
after  vessel  has  been  sold 
under  execution  to  satisfy 
lien. 

Liens  to  transfer  to  proceeds 
of  sale   by  good   faith  sale. 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II.   §§   1061-1812.] 


Aaron  v.  Warner,  62  Miss.  370       1120 
Abbott   V.    American    Hard    Rub- 
ber Co.,  33  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  578  87 
Abbott  V.  Abbott,  18  Nebr.   503 

183,   198,   207 
V.  Nash,   35  Minn.   451  1516 

V.  United  R.  Co.  of  St.  Louis, 

138  Mo.  App.  530  181a 

Abel  V.  Potts,  3   Esp.  242  212 

Abelman  v.   Myer,   122   App.   Div. 

(N.  Y.)  470  1401 

Aberaman  Iron  Works  v.  Wick- 
ens,  L.   R.   4   Ch.   101  1106 
Abercrombie  v.  Ely.  60  Mo.  23       1375 
Abernathy  v.  Ross.  14  Ky.  L.  282 

1068 
Abham  v.   Boyd,   7   Daly    (N.  Y.) 

30  1506,   1584 

Abington    v.    Steinberg,    86    Mo. 

App.   639  626 

Abel   V.   Lee,    6   Tex.    427 

115,  137,  159 

Abraham  v.  Ag-new,  83  Wis.  246     719 

V.   Carter,   53   Ala.   8  542 

V.   Hall,    59    Ala.    386  603 

V.   Nicrosi,  87  Ala.  173  602 

Ackerman  v.  Ackerman,  14  Abb. 

Pr.    (N.    Y.)    229  188,   189,   209 

Acme,    The,     7    Blatchf.     (U.    S.) 


366 


1808 
1700 


Acorn,   The,   32  Fed.    638 
Acquackanonk    Water    Co.    v. 
Manhattan    Life     Ins.     Co.,     36 
N.  J.  Eq.  586  1489 

Acton    V.    Wadding-ton,    46    N.    J. 
Eq.    16  1061,  1062,   1063, 

1064,   1074,   1083,  1092,   1098,   1099 
Adams  v.  Adams.  16  Vt.  228  1243 

V.  Buchanan,  49  Mo.  64 

1076,  1081,  1086 
V.   Buhler,  116  Ind.  100  1589 

V.   Buhler,  131  Ind.  66  1200 

V.   Clark,   9   Cush.    (Mass.)    215 

266,   281 
V.   Central  City  Granite  Brick 

&c.  Co.,  154  Mich.  448  1369 
V.  Cowherd,  30  Mo.  458  1116,  1119 
V.  Feeder,  19  Ky.  L.  581  1092 

V.   Fox,  40  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  442 

166,   184,   232,  235 
V.  Goodrich.  55  Ga.  233  781 

V.   Gorham,    6    Cal.    68  825 

V.  Grand    Island    &    W.    C.    R. 
Co.,   10    S.    Dak.    239 

1619,    1620,    1666a 
V.   Grand    Island    &   W.    C.    R. 

Co.,  12  S.  Dak.  424  1666a 

V.  Hobbs,  27  Ark.  1  556 


Adams    v.     Island    City,    1    Cliff. 
(U.   S.)   210  1718 

V.  Jordan     (Tex.     Civ.     App.), 

136  S.  W.  499  1102a 

V.   La    Comb,    1    Dall.    (U.    S.) 

440  569,  632 

V.   Lee,   82  Ind.   587       174,   220,   235 
V.   Mackenzie,    59    Ore.    89  1588 

V.   Phillips,  75  Ala.  461  1585 

V.   Russell,   85  111.   284        1109,  1487 
V.  Shaffer,    132   Ind.    331  1200 

Addison  v.   Enoch,   168  N.   Y.   658 

48,  52 
Adee  v.   Adee.   55  App.   Div. 

(N.  Y.)    63  184 

Aderhold  v.  Bluthenthal,  95  Ala. 

66  576a,   603 

Adg-er  v.  Pringle.  11  S.  Car.  527  1098 
Adler    V.    World's    Pastime    Ex. 
Co.,   126   111.    373  1367,  1412 

V.   World's    Pastime    Ex.    Co., 

26   111.   App.   528  1199 

Adone    v.    La    Porte     (Tex.    Civ. 

App.),    124    S.    W.    134  990 

A.  D.  Patchin,  The,  12  Law  Rep. 

21  1798 

Adsit    V.    Hall,    3    How.    Pr.     (N. 

S.)    (N.    Y.)    373  186 

Aeronaut,    The,    36    Fed.    497 

1690,  1691 
Aeschlimann     v.     Presbyterian 

Hospital,   165   N.   Y.    296  1413 

Aetaza  v.  Smallpiece,  1   Esp.  23      310 
Aetna    Elev.    Co.    v.    Deeves,    125 
App.    Div.    (N.   Y.)    842        1276,   1278 
V.   Deeves,    57    Misc.     (N.    Y.) 

632  1218 

Aetna    Indemnity    Co.    v.    Comer, 

136   Ga.    24  1375 

Aetna  National   Bank   v.   Fourth 

National    Bank,    40   N.    Y.    82  57 

A.    F.    Englehardt    Co.    v.    Kauf- 
man,   5   App.   Div.    (N.   Y.)    475      806 
Agee  V.   Mayer,   71   Ala.    88  603 

Agnes   Barton,   The,    26   Fed.    542 

1687,  1808 
Agnew  V.  McGill,  96  Ala.  496  1102 
Agricultural    Ins.    Co.    v.    Smith, 

112  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)    840  184 

Aguire  v.  Parmelee.  22  Conn.  473 

902,   922,   965 
Ahearn    v.    Boyce,    19    Mo.    App. 
552  1513a 

V.   Evans,    66   111.   125  1644 

Ah    Louis    V.    Harwood,    140    Cal. 

500  1398,   1433 

Ahrend  v.  Odiorne.  118  Mass.  261 

1062,  1063 
Aiken    v.    Wasson,    24    N.    Y.    482 

725,  1629,   1645 

Iv 


Ivi 


TAELE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  1-lOGOf;  Vol.   II,   §g   1061-1812.] 


Aikens  v.   Frank,   21  Mont.  192     1501 
V.   Stadell,  9  Kans.  App.  298       577 
Aina,   The,    40   Fed.    269  1699 

Ainis  V.    Ayres,    62    Hun    (N.    Y.) 

376  878 

Ainsley    v.    Mead,     3    Lans.     (N. 

Y.)    116  1265 

Ainslie  v.  Kohn,  16  Ore.  363 

1304a,   1406,  1453 

Ainsworth   v.   Atkinson,   126   Ind. 

318  1559 

Aitcheson     v.     Endless     Chain 

Dredge,    40    Fed.    253  1677,  1696 

Aitken,  In  re,  4  B.  &  Aid.  47  150 

Akeley    v.    Miss.    &    R.    R.    Boom 

Co.,    64    Minn.    108  713 

Akerman    v.    Humphrey,    1    Car. 

&   P.   53  958 

Akers  v.  Kirke,  91  Ga.  590  1262 

V.  Luse,  56   Iowa  346        1088,   1090 
Alabama     v.     Stanton,     5     Lea 

(Tenn.)    423  1117 

Alabama  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Mee- 

den,    150   Ala.    587  747 

Alabama,  The,  19  Fed.   544  1677 

Alabama,  The,    22    Fed.    449  1808 

Alabama  &c.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Tis- 

dale,  139  Ala.   250     1299,   1404,   1413 
Alanson    Sumner,    The,    28    Fed. 

670  1700,  1732,  1756 

Alaska   Fishing-    &    Development 

Co.,   In   re,   167   Fed.    875  1717 

Albany  v.  Lynch,   119   Ga.   491        1375 
Albany,  The,  4  Dill.    (U.  S.)   439    1682 
Alberti  v.   Moore,   20   Okla.   78        1615 
Albert  Palmer  Co.  v.  Van  Orden, 
64    How.    Pr.    (N.    Y.)    179 

185,  189,   210 
Albion,  The,   1   Hagg.   333  1778 

Albrecht  v.  Foster  Lumber  Co., 
126    Ind.    318 

1200.  1405,  1412,  1413,  1559 
Albright  v.  Mills,   86  Ala.   324  603 

V.  Smith,  2  S.  Dak.  577 

1304,   1305,  1441 

Alcalde,  The,  132  Fed.  576    1679,  1680 

Alden  v.  Carver,   13   Iowa  253  970 

V.   White,   32   Ind.  App.   393  174 

Alderman   v.    Hartford,    etc.,   Co., 

66  Conn.  47  1253 

V.   Nelson,   111    Ind.   255  174 

Alderson  v.  Lee,   52   Ore.   92  716 

Alderson,  Ex  parte,  1  Mad.  53    45,  47 

Aldine   Mfg.   Co.   v.    Phillips,    118 

Mich.    162  3 

Aldrich  v.  Cooper,  1  'White  & 
Tudor's  Lead.  C.  in  Eq.  (7th 
Eng.    ed.)    (1897)    36  953 

Aldridge    v.     Dunn,     7     Blackf. 

(Ind.)     249  1074,   1081,  1098 

Aleck    V.    Jackson,    49    N.    J.    Eq. 

507  1594 

Alexander  v.  Berry,  54  Miss.  422  69 
V.  Ellison,  79  Ky.  148  1091,  1147 
V.   Hooks,    84   Ala.    605  1072 

V.  Munroe,    54   Ore.    500  180 

V.  Pardue,  30  Ark.  359  542 

V.   Slavens,    7    B.    Mon.     (Ky.) 

351  1504 

Alford  V.  Wilson,   62   Te::.   484        1103 
Algonquin,   The,    88   Fed.   318  1800 


Alice    Tainter,    The,    5    Ben.    (U. 

S.)    391  1682 

Alida,    The,    Abb.    Adm.     (U.    S.) 

173  1728 

Aline,  The,  1  W.  Rob.  Ill  1781 

Alkyns    v.    Amber,    2    Esp.    Cas. 

493  470 

Allan  V.  Gripper.  2  C,  &  J.  218       940 
Allegheny   National    Bank's    Ap- 
peal,   99   Pa.    St.    148  1158 
Allen  V.  Agnew,   24  N.  J.  L.   443      627 
V.   Becket,  84  N.  Y.   S.  1007  981 
V.   Bennet,  8  Sm.  &  M.    (Miss.) 

672  1064 

V.  Center  Valley  Co.,  21  Conn. 

130  788,   789 

V.   Elwert,   29   Ore.   428  1355 

v:  Frumet  M.  &  S.  Co.,  73  Mo. 

688  1211,   1408,   1412, 

1431,    1436,    1437,    1494,    1597 
V.  Glover,    27    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

483  786a 

V.   Gripper,    2   Cr.   &   J.    218  942 

V.   Grissom,    90    N.    Car.    90 

789,   791 
V.    Houston    Ice    &    Brew.    Co., 
44     Tex.     Civ.     App.     125 

583,    638 
V.  Jones,    24    Fed.    11  800 

V.  Loring,    34   Iowa    499  1081 

V.  Mackay,     1     Spr.      (U.     S.) 

219  1769 

V.  Maury,    66    Ala.    10  825 

V.   Megguire,   15   Mass.   490  23 

V.  Middleton,    99    Ga.    758  1053 

V.  Montgomery,  48  Miss.  101  69 
V.   Newberry,   21  How.    (U.  S.) 

244  1730 

V.  Ogden,  1  Wash.  (U.  S.)  174  972 
V.  Rowe,  19  Ore.  188  1255,  1402 
V.   Sales,   56  Mo.   28 

1254,  1276,   1542 
V.    Schvs-0!5,-evt,  113  Ga.  Gff  12:)3 

V.   Shortridge,    1    Duv.     (Ky.) 

34  68 

V.   Smith,     12     C.     B.      (N.     S.) 

638  521 

V.   Spencer,    1    Edm.    Sel.    Cas. 

(N.  Y.)   117  22,   24 

Allen    County    v.    United    States 

Fidelity  &c.  Co.,  122  Ky.   825     1203 
Alley  V.   Lanier,   1   Cold.    (Tenn.) 

540  1225,   1272 

Allgood    V.    Merrybent    &    D.    R. 

Co.,  33  Ch.  Div.   571  1674 

Alligator,   The,   153    Fed.    216  1717 

Allis  V.  Meadow  Spring  Distilling 

Co.,   67   Wis.    16  1232,   1520,   1569 

Allison    V.    Bristol    Marine     Ins. 

Co.,  L.  R.  1  App.  Cas.  209  326 

Allman     v.     Corban,     4     Baxt. 

(Tenn.)    74  1335 

Allred  v.   Hale,   85   Ga.    570 

781,   1053,   1197 
Alsager  v.   St.   Katherine's  Dock 

Co.,   14   M.    &   W.    794  322 

Alsberg  v.  Latta,  30  Iowa  442 

927,   940 
Alston  V.  Wilson,   64  Ga.  482  611 

Alt   V.   Weidenberg,    6   Bosw.    (N. 
Y.)    176  687,   968 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Ivii 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 


Althouse    V.    "Warren,    2    E.    D. 

Smith   (N.  Y.)    657 

1532,  1536,  1608,  1613 
Althen  v.  Tarbox,  48  Minn.  18  1262 
Altieri  v.  Lyon,  13  N.  Y.  617  1543 

Alvey  V.   Reed,   115   Ind.   148  1239 

Alvord  V.   Davenport,   43  Vt.   30      524 
V.   Hendrie,  2  Mont.  115    1212,  1433 
Alwood  V.  Mansfield,  33   111.   452     613 
Amazon  Irrigating-  Co.  v.  Briesen, 

1   Kans.  App.   758  759 

Ambrose   Mfg.    Co.    v.    Gapen,    22 

Mo.    App.    397  1211,   1283 

American    Bridge    Co.    v.    Hous- 

tain,   113   Minn.   16  1421 

American  Cotton  Co.  v.  Phillips, 

31  Tex.  Civ.  App.  79  638 

American    Eagle,    The,    19    Fed. 

379  1798 

American   Fire   Ins.   Co.   v.   Prin- 

gle,  2  Serg.  &  R.   (Pa.)  138 

1439,  1470,  1472,  1475 
American    Ins.    Co.    v.    Coster,    3 

Paige    (N.    Y.)    323  1800 

American    Lead    Pencil    Co.    v. 

Davis,    108    Tenn.    442  190 

American  Nat.  Bank  v.  Barnard, 

15    Colo.    App.    110  1552 

American  Radiator  Co.  v.  McKee, 

140  Ky.  105  1599 

V.   Pendleton,    62   Wash.    56        1384 
American  Trading  &  Storage  Co. 

V.   Gottstein,   123   Iowa   267  1039 

American   Trust   Co.   v.   W.   &  A. 

Fletcher    Co.,    173'  Fed.    471 

1723,  1746 
America,   The,    16    Lavv^   Rep.    264 

1776,  1781 

Ames    v.    Birkenhead    Docks,    20 
Beav.    332  1675 

v.  Dyer,    41    Maine    397  1367 

V.  Palmer,    42    Maine   197 

262,  304,  307 
Amherst    College    v.    Smith,    134 

Mass.   543  1170 

Amidon   v.    Benjamin,    126    Mass. 
276  1542 

v.  Benjamin,   128   Mass.    534 

1397,   1399 
Amorv    v.    Flvn,    10    Johns.     (N. 
Y.)    102  485 

V.   Reilly,    9   Ind.    490  1107 

Amos    v.    Clare,    9    Phila.     (Pa.) 
35  1282 

V.  Garvin    (Ala.),    39    So.    990      777 
Amos    D.    Carver,    The,    35    Fed. 

665  1773,  17Sla 

Amstel.    The,    Blatchf.    &    H.    (U. 

S.)    215  1V13 

Ancaster  v.   Mayer,   1   Bro.   C.    C. 

454  1165 

Anders  v.  Blount,    67   Ga.    41  571 

Anderson    v.    Alseth,    6    S.    Dak. 

566  785 

V.  Armstead,    67   111.    452  1264 

V.   Beard,    54    Ga.    137  454 

V.   Berg,   174  Mass.   404  1207 

V.   Bosworth,  15  R.  L  433     138,  150 

V.  Davison,    42    Hun     (N.    Y.) 

431  1164 

V.  DeBraekeleer,  25  Misc.    (N. 

Y.)    343  184 

V.   Griffith,    66    Mo.    44  1086 


Anderson   v.    Henry,    45   W.    Va. 

319  639 

V.   Huff,   49   N.   J.   Eq.  349  1286 

V.    Itasca    Lumber    Co.,    86 

Minn.  480  179 

V.  Jacksonville,    P.    &    M.    R. 

Co.,  2  Woods  (U.  S.)  628  1674 
V.  Mather,   44  N.   Y.   249  1265 

V.   Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.,   86 

Kans.    179  176 

V.   Mississippi,    23    Miss.    459        98 
V.   Perry,    98    Tex.    493  1015 

V.   Reed,    106   N.    Y.    333  823 

V.  Tingley,  24  Wash.  537  718 

V.  Volmer,    83  Mo.    403  1211 

Anderson    Lumber   Co.   v.    Fried- 
lander,    54    N.    J.   L.    375  1216 
Anderson's  Appeal,   3   Pa.  St.   218  571 
Andrews  v.  Brown.   21   Ala.   437       799 
V.  Burdick,    62    Iowa   714 

1287,  1289,  1290,  1291,  1541 
V.  Crandell,  16  La.  Ann.  208  661 
V.  Hobgood,     1     Lea     (Tenn.) 

693  1092 

V.   Key,   77   Tex.   35  1101 

V.  Mann,   31   Miss.    322  791 

V.  Morse,   12   Conn.    444 

158,    167,    201a,    209,    217 
V.    St.    Louis    Tunnel    R.    Co., 

16   Mo.    ApD.    299  1655 

V.  Scotten,  2  Bland   (Md.)    629 

1074 
V.   Stewart,  81  Ga.   53  568,   611 

V.   Wade,  3  Sad.    (Pa.)   133  1018 

Andrews  Mfg.   Co.  v.  Porter,  112 

Ala.   381  603 

Andrews  &c.   Co.   v.   Atwood,   167 

111.   249  1184a,   1300 

Andrus  v.   Coleman,   82   111.  26       1074 
Angela   Maria,    The,    35    Fed.    430 

1791,   1792 
Angell  V.  Bennett,  1  Sprague   (U. 

S.)    85  205 

Angier    v.    Bay    State    Distilling 

Co.,   178  Mass.   163  1341,  1343 

Angler,    The,    83   Fed.    845  1800 

Anglo-American  Sav.  &  L.  Assn. 

V.  Campbell,  13  App.  D.  C.  581    1459 
Anglo-California  Bank   v.   Gran- 
gers'  Bank,   16   Rep.   70  381 
Angus    V.    McLachlan,    23    Ch.    D. 

330  522,   524,  1011 

Anketel  v.  Converse,  17  Ohio  St. 

11  1063,   1080 

Ann    C.    Pratt,    The,    1    Curt.    (U. 

S.)    340  1810 

Anne,  The,  1  Mason    (U.   S.)    508     278 
A.nnis   v.    (jilmore,    47   Maine   152 

711,  728 
Ansley  v.   Pasahro,   22   Nebr.    662 

1063,   1458 
Antelope.    The,    1    Low.     (U.    S.) 

130  1705 

Antler    Park,     etc.,    Min.    Co.    v. 
Cunningham,  29  Colo.  284 

1249,  1616a 
Apperson  v.  Farrell,  56  Ark.  640  1470 
Appleman  v.  Myre,  74  Mich.  359  729 
Apollo,    The,    1    Hagg.    Adm.    (U. 

S.)    306  1697a 

Arata   v.   Tellurium   Gold    &    Sil- 
vsr  Mining   Co.,    65  Cal.   340 

1401,   115  I 


Iviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I 

Arbuckle  v.  Illinois  M.  R.  Co.,  31 
111.    429  1644 

V.  Nelms,    50    Miss.    556  625 

A  Raft  of  Cypress  Logs,   9   Chic. 

L.    N.    26  1719 

Archer  v.   Archer,   147   App.   Div. 
.(N.    Y.)    44  1064 

V.  McMeehan,  21  Mo.  43  418,  426 
Archibalfl    v.    Citizens'    Bank,    64 

Miss.    523  1751 

Arctic,   The,    22   Fed.    126 

1756,  1773,   1780 

Arcturus,  The,  17  Fed.   95  1706 

Arcturus,   The,   18   Fed.    743 

1776,   1799,   1802 

A.    R.    Dunlap,    The,    1    Low.    (U. 

S.)     350  1699,  1713 

Argo   V.    Field,  112   Ga.    677  1053a 

Arians  v.  Brickley,  65  Wis.  26 

702,   703,  719,   731 

Arkansas  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  McKay, 

30    Ark.    682  1589 

Arkansas,  The,  17  Fed.  383  1770 

Armentrout  v.  Gibbons,  30  Grat. 

(Va.)    632  1111 

Armitage  v.  Mace,  48  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.     107,     113  673,   685,   688 

Armstrong    v.    Ashley,     22    App. 
(D.    C.)    368  1146 

V.   Chemical    Nat.     Bank,     41 

Fed.   234  251 

V.   Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  62  Mo. 

639  291 

V.   Hallowell,  35  Pa.  St.  485       1389 
V.   Jackson,    1    Blackf.     (Ind.) 

374  1144,   1145 

V.   Nichols,    32   Ind.    408  1262 

V.   Walker,  9  Lea  (Tenn.)  156     636 
Armstrong    Cork    Co.    v.    Mer- 
chants'   Refrig.    Co.,    184   Fed. 
199  1277 

Arnold  v.  Budlong,  11  R.  I.  561  1325 
V.  Coburn,  32  W.  Va.  272  1125 
V.   Delano,  4  Gush.   (Mass.)   33 

800,    802,    808,    821,    828,    850, 
852,    853,    861,   948 
V.  Farmers'    Exchange,    123 

Ga.  731  1588 

V.  Morris,   7   Daly   (N.  Y.)    498     36 
V.    Patrick,    6    Paige    (N.    Y.) 

310  1079 

V.  Spurr,  130  Mass.  347  1254 

V.   Suffolk  Bank,  27  Barb.    (N. 

Y.)     424  376,   377,  398 

Aronson  v.  Oppegard,  16  N.  Dak. 

595  631a 

Arthur   v.    Schooner   Cassius,    2 

Story    (U.    S.)    81  284,   338 

V.  Sylvester,  105  Pa.  St.  233  125 
Arthur  B.,  The,  1  Alaska  353  1703 
Artisan,  The,  8  Ben.  (U.  S.)  538  1799 
Artisan,  The,  9  Ben.  (U.  S.)  106  1704 
Asay  V.   Sparr,   26  111.   115  614 

Ascher  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  36 

U.   C.    Q.    B.    609  892,  931 

Ash    V.    Putnam,    1    Hill    (N.    Y.) 

302  866 

Ashbrook  v.  Roberts,  82  Ky.  298  1063 
Ashdown  v.  Woods.  31  Mo.  465  1535 
Ashford  v.  Iowa  &c.  Lumber  Co., 

81   Nebr.   561  1213 

Ashmore  v.  Whatley,  99  Ga.  150   1048 


§§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1812.] 

Aspunwall  v.  Hickford.  3  B.  &  P. 

44n  265 

Associates   v.    Davison,    29    N.    J. 

L.    415  1216,  1248,   1252a 

Aste    V.    Wilson,    14    Colo.    App. 

323  1191,  1505 

Astrand  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R. 

Co.,   24   Misc.    (N.   Y.)    92  184 

Atascosa  v.   Angus,   83   Tex.    202   1375 
Atchison  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 

Connell,  25  Kans.  370  1647 

Athenian,    The,    3    Fed.   248 

1779,  1787,   1788,   1802 
Atkins  V.  Barwick,  1  Stra.  165        865 
v.   Byrnes,    71    111.    326  585,   586 

V.   Colby,    20    N.    H.    154 

857,   878,   902,   921 
V.  Little,  17  Minn.   342 

1235,    1257,    1334 
V.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co., 

29   Fed.   161  87 

V.  Womeldorf,    53   Iowa  150        554 

Atkinson   v.   James,   96  Ala.   214      603 

V.  Lindsey,    39    Ind.   296  1091 

V.  Woodmansee,    68    Kans.    71 

1605,  1616a 

Atlanta    Land    &    Loan    Co.    v. 

Haile,    106    Ga.    498  1110 

Atlanta  Nat.  Bank  v.  Four  States 
Grocer  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  135 
S.    W.    1135  5 

Atlanta  R.  Co.  v.  Owens,  119  Ga. 
833  203 

Atlantic  Coast  Brew.  Co.  v.  Don- 
nelly, 59  N.  J.  L.  48  1216 

Atlantic  Dynamite  Co.  v.  Balti- 
more &  O.  S.  W.  R.  Co.,  101 
111.    App.    13  1560,   1644 

Atlantic,  The,  Crabbe  (U.  S.) 
440  1799 

Atlantic,    The,    53    Fed.    607 

1677,  1700,   1704,   1706 

Atlantic  Trust  &  Banking  Co.  v. 
Nelms,    115    Ga.    53  78 

Atlantic  Trust  Co.  v.  Carbondale 
Coal  Co.,  99  Iowa  234  73,  1520 

Atlantic  Works  v.  Glide,  The, 
157   Mass.    525  1729,   1748 

Atlas  Portland  Cement  Co.  v. 
Main  Line  Realty  Corp.,  112 
Va.    7  1276,  1277 

Atlas    S.    S.    Co.    v.    Colombian 

Land    Co.,    102    Fed.    358  265 

Atlas,    The,    42    Fed.    793  1706 

Attebury  v.  Burnett,  52  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  617  1119,   1126 

Atterbury  v.  Somers,  35  Misc. 
(N.    Y.)    805  513 

Attorney-Gen.  v.  Baliol  College, 
9    Mod.    407  1136,   1137 

V.   Continental    Life    Ins.    Co., 

71   N.   Y.    325  57 

V.  North    American    Life    Ins. 

Co.,   93  N.  Y.   387  240 

Attorney,  In   re,    87   N.   Y.    521 

135,   146 

Atwater  v.  Mower,  10  Vt.   75  543 

Atwood  V.  Vincent,  17  Conn.  575      1063 
V.  Williams,  40  Maine  409         1304 

Audenreid  v.  Randall,  3  Cliff. 
(U.   S.)    99  802,   946 

Auditor  v.  Ballard,  9  Bush  (Ky.) 
572  490 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


lix 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Aug-ir  V.  Warder,   68  "W.   Va.    752 

1574,   1613 
Auf?ustine    Kobbe,    The,    37    Fed. 

696  1713 

Aiierustine    Kobbe,    The,    37    Fed. 

702  1699 

Aug-ustine    Kobbe,    The,    39    Fed. 

539  1781 

Auld     V.     Travis,     5     Colo.     App. 

535  650 

Aurand   v.   Martin.   188    111.    117      1312 
V.  Martin,    87    111.    App.    337      1312 
Aurora  Nat.   Bank   v.   Black,   129 

Ind.    595  758 

Aurora    Shipping-    Co.    v.    Boyce, 

191    Fed.    960  1759 

Aurora,    The,    1    Wheat.    (U.    S.) 

96  1679 

Au     Sable     River    Boom     Co.    v. 
Sanborn,    36    Mich.    358 

1000,  1009,  1048,  1537 
Austen  v.  Halsey,  6  Ves.  475  1090 
Austin   V.    Hieronymus.    117   Ala. 

620  704a 

Austin  V.  Munroe.  47  N.  Y.  360     1243 
V.   Selig-man,    18    Fed.     519  789 

V.   Wohler,  5  Bradw.  (111.)  300 

1199,   1245,  1469 
Austin   &   N.   W.    R.    Co.   v.   Dan- 
iels,   62    Tex.    70  1495,  1668 
V.  Rucker.  59  Tex.  587     1630,   1668 
Autrey     v.     Whitmore,     31     Tex. 

623  1083 

Averill   v.   Longfellow,    66   Maine 

237  193 

Avery  v.    Clark,    87    Cal.    619 

1087,  1092,  1332,  1458,   1480 
V.  Hackley,    20   Wall.    (U.    S.) 

407  1020 

Aycock  Bros.  Lumber  Co.  v.  First 

Nat.    Bank,    54    Fla.    604  1119 

Ayers  V.   Duprey,    27  Tex.    593        1081 
V.   Johnson,    7   N.    J.   L.    119  628 

Aylmore  v.  Kahn,  5  Ohio  Cir.  D. 

410  674 

Ayres  v.   Revere,   25  N.   J.  L.   474 

1184,  1216,   1554,   1572 
Auxvasse  Milling-  Co.   v.    Cornet, 
85  Mo.  App.  251  626 


Babb    v.    Reed,     5    Rawle     (Pa.) 

151  1240,   1362 

Babbitt    v.    Condon,    27    N.    J.    L. 

154  1216,   1258 

Babcock  v.  Bonnell,  80  N.  Y.  244 

857,   861,   862 
Babka  v.   Eldred,   47  Wis.    189 

719,  726 
Bach  V.  Kidansky.  186  N.  Y.  368  1063 
Baohman,  In  re,  12  N.  Bank.  Repr. 

223  ,377393 

Bacon  v.  Bacon,  94  Va.  686      253',  398 

V.  Carr,  112  Iowa  193  616 

v.   Howell,  60  Miss.  362  556 

Badger  Lumber  Co.   v.   Holmes, 

55  Nebr.  473  1315,   1370 

V.  Marion    Water   Supply   Co., 
48  Kans.  182 

1341,   1344,   1378 

V.   Parker,   85  Kans.   134  1202 

V.   Stipp.  156  Mo.  366  1442 

Baeder  v.  Carnie,  44  N.  J.  L.  208    1755 


Bags  of  Linseed.  1  Black  (U.  S.) 

108  270,   308,   310,   311,   315,   1720 

Bagwell  V.  Jamison,  Cheeves   (S. 

Car.)    249  598 

Bailey    v.   Adams,    14    Wend.    (N. 
Y.)    201  1002 

V.  Block  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  125 

S.   W.   955  1060 

V.  Culverswell,  8  B.  &  C.  448  875 
V.   Davis,    19    Ore.    217  689 

V.  Finch,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  34  250 

V.  Hudson    River    R.     Co.,     49 

N.   Y.    70  ■  61 

V.   Hull,   11   Wis.   289  1608 

v.   Johnson,  1  Daly   (N.  Y.)  61 

1543,  1588,  1589,  1594 
V.  Mason,  4  Minn.  546  1558 

V.  O'Pallon,  30  Colo.  419  650,  1050 
V.    Quick,    28    La.    Ann.    432  620 

V.    Quint,  22   Vt.    474  745,   997 

V.   Smock,   61  Mo.  213  1119 

V.  Tindall,  59  Tex.  540  1079,  1081 
V.  Welch,     4     B.     Mon.     (Ky.) 

244  96 

Bailey   v.   Wright,    3    McCord    (S. 

Car.)    484  571.    585 

Bailey   Const.    Co.   v.    Purcell,    88 

Va.  300  1559 

Bailey,  In   re,  12  Ch.  Div.   268       1164 
Bailey,    In    re,    66    How.    Pr.    (N. 

Y.)   64  185,   228 

Bailev,   In   re,   4  N.  Y.   Civ.   Proc. 

R.  i40  220 

Bailey,    In    re,    31    Hun     (N.    Y.) 

608  228 

Bain  v.   Clark,  10  Johns.    (N.  Y.) 

424  592 

V.  "Wells,  107  Ala.  562  603 

Baird   v.   Peall,    92    Cal.    235  1190 

Baizley  v.  Adorilla,  The,  121   Pa. 

St.    231  1722,  1724,  1760 

Baker  v.  Abrams.  42  Nebr.  880     1520 
V.   Compton,    52    Tex.    252 

1107,   1109.  1110 
V.   Cook,  11  Mass.  236  155,  162 

V.   Dewey,    15    Grant    Ch.     (U. 

C.)     668  811,   850 

V.  Fessenden,   71   Maine   292 

1023,   1322,  1339 
V.   Fleming-,    6    Ariz.    418  1063 

V.  Fuller,    21   Pick.    (Mass.) 

318  462 

V.   Gilbert.    93    Ind.    70  1090 

V.  Hoag,  3  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  203  484 
V.  Hoag,  7  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  113  487 
V.   Hoag-,    Seld.    Notes    (N.    Y.) 

45  487 
V.   Stone     (Tenn.),     58     S.     W. 

761  1262 

V.  Stratton,  52  N.  J.  L.  277  507 
V.   Updike,    155   111.    54  1086 

V.   Waldron,    92    Maine    17 

1249,  1309b 
V.   "Winter,   15  Md.    1  1206 

V.   Young-,  90  Ala.   426  1103 

Baker's    Appeal,    21    Pa.    St.    76 

789,   790,   791 
Balch  V.  Chaffee,  73  Conn.   318 

1344,   1348 
V.   New  York    ^   O.   M.   R.   Co., 

46  N.   Y.   521      725,    1629,   1662 
V.  Symes,   T.   &   R.    87 

121,  126,   128,  1011 


Ix 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Baldwin  v.  Bradish  Johnson,  The, 

3    Woods    (U.    S.)    582        1793a,   1794 

V.  Merriclt,  1  Mo.  App.   281        1343 

V.  Morgan,   73  Miss.   276  783 

V.   Whaley,   78   Mo.    186  1128 

Balize,   The,   52   Fed.    414  1706a 

Balkcom  v.   Empire  Lumber  Co., 

91    Ga.    651  708 

Ball    V.    Doherty,    128    N.    Y.    S. 

1014  1404 

V.   Hill,    48    Tex.    634  1098,   1099 

V.  Paquin,   140   N.   Car.    83  1260 

V.   Sledge,    82    Miss.    749 

578a,   580,   625 
Ball    &    Wood    Co.    v.    Clark    & 
Sons  Co.,  31  App.  Div.    (N.  Y.) 
356  1298 

Ballard  v.  Burgett,  20  N.  Y.  314  820 
V.  Camplin,  161  Ind.  16  1063,  1094 
V.  Carter,  71  Tex.  161  1101,  1125 
V.  Johnson,  114  N.  Car.  141  574 
V.  Mayfield,    107    Ala.    396  603 

V.   Ross,  38  Wash.  209  98,   101 

V.  Wiltshire,    28    Ind.    341  1743 

Ballew  V.  Roler,  124  Ind.  557  1093 
Ballinger  v.  Tarbell,  16  Iowa  491  222 
Ballou  V.   Black,    21   Nebr.   131 

1213,  1304,  1304a,  1320,  1436 
Balsbaugh   v.   Frazer,   19   Pa.   St. 

95  145,  151 

Baltimore    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Trim- 
ble, 51  Md.  99  1067,   1099,  1158 
Bametzrieder  v.   Canevin,   44  Pa. 

Super.    Ct.    18  1286 

Bancroft   v.    Crosby,    74    Cal.    583 

1092,   1096 
Bang  V.  Brett,   62  Minn.  4  1076 

Bangor  v.  Goding,  35  Maine  73  108 
Bangs   V.   Berg,    82   Iowa  350 

1392,   1407 
Bank  v.  Brooks,  42  Leg.  Int.   26       33 
V.   Donaldson,  6  Pa.  St.  179        1163 
V.  Lanier,     11     Wall.     (U.    S.) 

369  384 

Bankhead    v.    Owen,    60   Ala.    457 

1076,   1092,   1095,   1107,   1108 
Bank    of   America   v.    McNeil,    10 

Bush   (Ky.)    54         376,   404,   405,  410 
Bank  of  Attica  v.  Manufacturers' 

&  Traders'  Bank,  20  N.  Y.   501    377 
Bank    of    Charleston    v.    Curtiss, 
18   Conn.   342 

1313,  1350,  1369,  1413,   1421 
Bank    of   Hamilton   v.    Dudley,    2 

Pet.    (U.    S.)    492  1145 

Bank  of  Holly  Springs  v.  Pinson, 

58    Miss.    421  375,   377,  378 

Bank  of  Kentucky  v.  Herndon,  1 

Bush   (Ky.)   359  788,   789,   792 

Bank    of    Knoxville    v.    Bradley, 

15    Lea    (Tenn.)    279  1068 

Bank  of  Louisiana  v.  Wilson,  19 

La.   Ann.   1  1745 

Bank  of  Metropolis  v.  New  Eng- 
land Bank,  1  How.    (U.  S.)  234     237 
V.  New    Eng.    Bank,    6    How. 

(U.   S.)    212  260 

Bank    of   Pennsylvania   v.    Gries, 

35   Pa.   St.   423  1367 

Bank   of  Republic  v.  Millard,   10 

Wall.     (U.    S.)    152  57 

Bank  of  Rochester  v.  Jones,  4  N. 
Y.    497  62,   418,   465 


Bank    of    Rome    v.    Haselton,    15 

Lea    (Tenn.)    216  33 

Bank    of    United    States    v.    Mac- 

alester,  9  Pa.  St.  475  251 

Bank  of  Utica  v.  Smalley,  2  Cow. 

(N.    Y.)    770  388 

Bank   of  Washington  v.   Nock,  9 

Wall.    (U.    S.)    373  38,  253 

Banks   v.   McQuatters    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.),    57    S.    W.    334  1067,   1083 

Banner,  Ex  parte,  2  Ch.  Div.  278    869 
Bansands    v.    Middlesex    County 

Bank,    26    Conn.    144  384 

Barber  v.  Hoffman  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),    37    S.    W.    769  1123 

V.  Marble,  2  Thomp.  &  C.    (N. 

Y.)    114  547 

V.   Reynolds,    44    Cal.    519 

1413,  1481,  1491,  1614 
Barclay    v.    Wainwright,    86    Pa. 

St.    191  1282,  1330,  1523 

Barclay's    Appeal,    13    Pa.    St. 

495  1392 

Barclift  v.   Lillie,   82  Ala.   319        1076 
Bardwell   v.   Anderson,    13   Mont. 
87  1418 

V.  Mann,   46   Minn.    285  1558 

Barilari    v.   Ferrea,    59    Cal.   1        1441 
Barkdill  v.   Herwig,   30  La.  Ann. 

618  1120 

Barker  v.  Berry,  8  Mo.  App.   446 

1235,   1262,   1263 
V.  Berry,  4  Mo.  App.  585  1262 

V.  Brown,    138    Mass.    340 

284,   343,   969 
V.   Havens,   17   Johns.    (N.   Y.) 

234  262 

V.  Maxwell,    8    Watts    (Pa.) 

478  1310 

V.   Prentiss,    6    Mass.    430  260 

V.   St.    Quentin,    12    M.    &    W. 

441  155,  157,   234 

V.   Smark,   3   Beav.   64  1099 

Barker  &c.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Mara- 
thon Paper  Mills  Co.,  146  Wis. 
12  1232 

Barlow  v.  Delany,  36  Fed.  577       1071 
Barlow   Bros.    Co.   v.   Gaffney,    76 

Conn.    107  1290 

Barnacle  v.   Henderson,  42  Nebr. 

169  1532 

Barnahee   v.    Holmes,    115    Iowa 

581  231 

Barnard  v.  Campbell,  65  Barb. 
(N.   Y.)    286  947 

V.  Hassan,    60    Ore.    62  1394 

V.  McKenzie,   4   Co'n.   1151 

1191,   1356,   1554,  1614 
V.   McLeod,    114   Mich.    73  1208 

V.  Norwich    &    "W.    R.    Co.,    4 

Cliff.     (U.    S.)    351  42 

V.  Wheeler,   24  Maine  412  329 

Barndt  v.  Parks,  103  Minn.  360    1391 

Barnes    v.     Fisher,     9    Mo.    App. 

574  1548 

V.  Freeland,   6  T.   R.   80  867 

V.  Newcomb,   11   Weekly  Dig. 

(N.    Y.)    505  139 

V.   Taylor,    30   N.    J.   Eq.    467 

158,   204,   209,  234,   235 
Barnes'   Appeal,    76   Pa.   St.    50 

559,   633 
Barnes,  Ex  parte,  84  Ala.   540  602 


TAHLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixi 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.   I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Barnesley  v.  Powell.  1  Amb.  102     229 
Barnett  v.  Brandao,  6  M.  &  G.  630 

244,  248,  256,  418 
V.  Griffith,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  201  1459 
V.   Mason,   7  Ark.   253  5,   818 

V.  Salyers,  11  Ky.  L.  465    1063,  1099 
V.  Stevens,  16  Ind.  App.  420 

1504,   1506 
V.  Walker,    39    Misc.     (N.    Y.) 

323  515 

V.  Warren,    82   Ala.    557  418 

Barr  v.  Logan,  5  Harr.   (Del.)   52    800 

Barrett    v.    Goddard,    3    Mas.    (U. 

S^107  933 

V.  Lewis,   100   Ind.   120     1061,   1070 

V.  Millikan,    156    Ind.    510        1304a 

V.   Nichols,    85   Ark.    58  751 

Barror    v.    Carrier,    34    Ind.    App. 

353  1066 

Barrow   v.    Coles,   3   Camp.   92  820 

Barrow,    Ex    parte,    L.    R.    6    Ch. 

Div.    783  936,   942 

Barrows    v.    Baughman,    9    Mich. 

213  1519,  1524 

Barry  v.  Boninger,  46  Md.   59  420 

V.    Longmore,    13    Ad.    &    El. 

639  447 

Barstow    v.    McLachlan,    99     HI-    ^^^ 
641  1^5*^ 

V.  Robinson,    2   Allen    (Mass.) 

605  1609,  1696,  1728,  1748 

Barthell  v.  Chicago,  M.   &   St.  P. 

R.  Co.,  138  Mass.  6SS  175 

Bartle  v.  Oilman,   18  N.  T.   260       187 
Bartlett   v.    Bilger,    92    Iowa    732 

1315,   1459 
V.   Drew,    57    N.    Y.    587  84 

V.  Loundes,   34  W.  Va.   493  555 

V.  Pritchard,    2   Pick.    (Mass.) 

512  820 

V.   Sullivan,    87    111.    219  613 

Bartley  v.  Smith,  43  N.  J.  ^^^3^^^^^ 

Barton  v.  Grand  Lodge,   70  Ark. 
613  1291 

V.  Groseclose,   11   Idaho   227        820 
V.   Herman,  3  Daly  (N.  Y.)  320 

1613,   1614 
Barto's   Appeal,    55   Pa.    St.    386 

IZoO,   1/bZ 

Bartram  v.  Farebrother,   4  Bing. 

579  865,   875,   924 

Basham   v.   Toors,   51   Ark.    309 

1189,   1306,   1438,   1440 

Bashor    v.    Nordyke    &c.    Co.,    25 

Kans.    222  1520 

Bass  V.  Upton,   1  Minn.   408    (Gil. 

292)  9'70 

Bassett  v.  Baird,  85  Pa.  St.  384     1547 
V.  Brewer,   74   Tex.    554 

1408,   1449,  1452 
V.  Menage,  52  Minn.  121 

1486a,  1579 
V.  Swarts,  17  R.  I.   215 

1470,   1472,  1511 

Basshor  v.   Baltimore  &  Ohio  R. 
Co.,  65  Md.  99  1206,   1337,   1623a 

V.  Kilbourn,   3   McAr.    (D.   C.) 

273  1397,   1422 

Batchelder    v.    Hutchinson,    161 

Mass.   462  1465 

v.   Rand,  117  Mass.  176    1313,   1317 


Batchelder,    In    re,    2   Lowell    (U. 

S.)    245  813,   829,   852 

Bates   V.  Bigelow,   86   Ark.    86 

1075,   1085 
V.  Childers,    4    N.    Mex.    347 

1061,   1063,   1092,   1103 
V.  Emery,  134  Mass.  186  1726 

V.  Harte,   124   Ala.   42*7  1344 

V.  National  Bank.  88  Hun  (N. 

Y.)    236  1218 

V.  National    Bank,    157    N.    Y. 

322  1218 

V.  New  York  Ins.  Co.,  3  Johns. 

Cas.    (N.   Y.)    238  391 

V.   Santa  Barbara,   90   Cal.  543 

1190,   1375,   1613,   1616 
Bates    Machine    Co.    v.    Trenton 

&  N.  R.  R.  Co..  70  N.  J.  L.  684    1660 
Batesville  Institute  v.  Kauffman, 

18  Wall.    (U.  S.)    151  991 

Bath  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Sagadahoe  Nat. 

Bank,    89   Maine    500  377 

Batre  v.  Auze,  5  Ala.  173  1101 

Battle  v.  McArthur,  49  Fed.  715  1655 
Battle  Creek  Lumber  Co.  v.  Po- 
land, 150  Mich.  690  1442 
Battler,  The,  67  Fed.  251  1773 
Bauer  v.  Long.  147  Mich.  351  1270 
Baum   v.   Covert,    62   Miss.    113 

1341.   1387 
V.   Grigsby,  21  Cal.  172 

1074,  1083,  1086,   1087,  1092 
Baumann  v.  Post,  12  N.  Y.  S.  213 

971,   981 

Bawtree  v.  Watson,  2  Keen  713       216 

Baxley  v.  Segrist,   85  Ala.  183  603 

Baxter  v.  Bush,  29  Vt.  465     548,  1110 

v.  Hutchings,    49   111.   116 

1238,  1245 
V.  Sisters    of   Charity,    15    La. 

Ann.    686  1204 

Bay  V.   Pope,   18   Cal.    694  1141 

Bayard    v.    McGraw,    1    Bradw. 

(111.)    134  1524,  1532,  1580 

Bayer  v.  Reeside,  14  Pa.  St.  167  1407 
Bayley    v.    Greenleaf,    7    Wheat. 
(U.   S.)    46        1063,    1064,    1076,   1081 
V.  Merrill,    10    Allen     (Mass.) 

360  513,   514 

Baylies   v.    Sinex,    21    Ind.    45 

1272,   1276,   1384 
Bazemore   v.   Davis,    55    Ga.    504 

1136,  1149 
Bazin  V.  Segura.  5  La.  Ann.  718     620 
Beach  v.  Huntsman,  42  Ind.  App. 
205  1200 

v.   Wakefield,    107   Iowa   567 

1201,   1509,   1646 
Beadles    v.    Hartmus,    7    Baxt. 

(Tenn.)    476  475 

Beakley  v.   Rainier    (Tex.),   78   S. 

W.    702  449 

Beal   v.    Harrington,    116    111.   113 

1061,   1076,  1086 
Beall    V.    Butler,    54    Ga.    43  577 

V.  Golmar,  122  Ala.   414  553 

V.   Hudson  County  Water  Co., 

185   Fed.   179  1009 

V.   White,   94   U.   S.   382 

104,   555,   576a,   592,  609,  744 
Beals  V.  Congregation,  The,  1  E. 
D.  Smith   (N.  Y.)   654 

1390,   1391,   1397,   1614 


Ixii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Beam  v.   Blanton,   38   N.   Car.    59 

40,   811 
V.   First  M.  E.  Church,  3  Clark 

(Pa.)    343  1378 

Bean  v.  Bolton,  3  Phila.  (Pa.) 
87  1019 

V.  Brown,  54  N.  H.  395  1308 

V.   Edg-e,    84    N.   Y.    510  820 

V.  Johnson,    17    Ky.   L.    585  660 

V.   Soper,  56  Maine  297  710,   711 

Bear  v.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  M. 
R.   Co.,   48   Iowa   619  1201 

V.  Whusler,     7     Watts     (Pa.) 

144  1114 

Beardsley  v.  Chapman,  1  Ohio 
St.    118  1142 

V.   Cook,    143   N.    Y.    143  1287 

Beams,   In   re,   18    N.   Bank   Reg. 

500  931,   933,  962 

Beasley  v.  Baltimore  &  P.  R.  Co., 
27   App.   D.   C.   595  294 

V.   Webster,   64   111.   458  1199 

Beattie    v.     Dickinson,     39     Ark. 

205  1109 

Beatty  v.  Parker,  141  Mass.  523 

1252,    1344 
Beck  V.  Birdsall,   19  Kans.   550     1161 
V.     Catholic     University,     172 

N.    Y.    387  1249 

V.    Lavin,    15    Idaho    363  757 

V.    Minnesota    and    W.    Grain 

Co.,   131   Iowa   62  616 

V.  Tarrant,  61  Tex.  402     1093,  1099 
V.   Venable,   59  Ind.   408  541 

Beck  Coal  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  H. 
A.  Peterson  Mfg.  Co.,  237  111. 
250  1348 

Beckel   v.    Petticrew,    6    Ohio    St. 

247  1308,    1329,    1334 

Becker    v.    Brown,    65    Nebr.    264 

668,    691 
V.    Dalby,     (Iowa)     86    N.    W. 

314  616 

V.    Hallgarten,    86    N.    Y.    167 

921,    946 
V.     Superior    Court,    151     Cal. 

313  1190 

Beckham     v.     Scott,     (Tex.     Civ. 

App.)    142    S.    W.    SO  1110 

Beckhard  v.  Rudolph,  68  N.  J. 
Eq.    315  1216 

v.  Rudolph,  68  N.  J.  Eq.  740     1216 
Beckstead    v.    Griffith,    11    Idaho 

738  455,     781a 

Beckwith  v.  Union  Bank,  4  Sandf. 

(N.    Y.)     604  246.     245 

Bedford  v.  Burton,  106  U.  S. 
338  1115 

V.   Gartrell,    88   Miss.    429  625 

Bedsole    v.    Peters,    79    Ala.    133 

1187,  1286.   1287,   1374,   1422,   1614 
Beebe    Stave    Co.    v.    Austin,    92 

Ark.    248  751a 

Beech  V.   Canaan,   14  Vt.   485  191 

Beehler    v.     Ijams,     72     Md.     193 

1272,    1460 
Beekman    v.    Lansing,    3    Wend. 

(N.    Y.)     446  590 

Beers   v.    Knapp,    5   Ben.    (U.    S.) 

104  1335 

Beh    V.    Moore,    124    Iowa    .')64        691 
Beidler    v.    Hutchinson,    233    III. 
192  1329 


Beilharz   v.    Illingsworth,    (Tex.) 

132    S.    W.    106  1495 

Beinecke   v.    Secret,   The,    3    Fed. 

665  1682,  1689,  1690,  1691 

Beken    v.    Kingsbury,    113    App. 

Div.    (N.    Y.)    555  440b 

Belanger    v    Hersey,     90    111.    70 

1199,  1554,  1587 
Belcher    v.    Capper.    4    M.    &    G. 
502  272 

V.   Grimsley,   88   N.   Car.   88  631 

Belding      v.      Gushing,      1      Gray 

(Mass.)     576  1373 

Belfast,  The,  7  Wall.    (U.   S.)    624 

1681,   1686,  1724,  1725,  1729 
Bell    V.    Allen,    76    Ala.    450  603 

V.    Bair,    28    Ky.    L.    614  1143 

V.  Barnet,  2  J.  J.  Marh.   (Ky.) 

516  1134 

V.    Hurst,    75   Ala.    44  603 

V.    McDuffle,    71    Ga.    264  1107 

V.    Matheny,    36    Ark.    572  606 

V.    Mecum,    75    N.    J.    L.    547      1216 
V.  Moss,  5   Whart.    (Pa.)    189 

875,  878,  888,  894 
V.  New  York,  105  N.  Y.  139  1376 
V.     Radcliff,    32    Ark.     645  453 

V.    Teague,    85    Ala.    211  1187 

V.  Vanderbilt,  12  Daly  (N.  Y.) 

467  1375 

V.    Vanderbilt,     67    How.     Pr. 

(N.   Y.)    332  1376 

Bell's  Appeal,    115    Pa.    St.    88        1585 
Belmont    Farms    v.    Dobbs    Hdw. 

Co.,     124     Ga.     827  1532 

Bement    v.    Trenton    Locomotive 

Co.,    32    N.    J.    L.    513  1216 

Benbow  v.  The  James  Johns,   56 

Ore.    554  1759 

Bender's    Will,    In    re.    111    App. 

Div.    (N.  Y.)    23  184 

Benheim  v.  Pickford,  31  App.   D. 

C.    488  171b 

Benedict  v.  Danbury  &  N.  R.  Co., 
24   Conn.   320  1289,   1639 

V.    Field,    16    N.    Y.    595  803 

V.   Schaettle,    12    Ohio    St.    515 

857,  861,  884,   885,  887,  965 
Bengal,    The,    Swab.    4B8  1810 

Benjamin  v.   Benjamin,   17  Conn. 

110  158,     217,     222 

Bennett    v.     Akin,     38     Hun     (N. 
Y.)     251  1163,     1167,     1168 

v.   Beadle,    142    Cal.    239  1738 

V.   Bennett,   84  Miss.  493  1149 

V.  Gray,   82  Ga.   592  708.  1044 

V.  Murphy,   123   App.   Div.    (N. 

Y.)    102  1086 

v.  Shackford,  11  Allen  (Mass.) 

444  1324 

V.   Shipley,  82  Mo.   448 

1061.   1063.  1067 
Bennitt    v.    Wilmington    Star    M. 

Co.,   119   Til.    9  1580,   1585 

Benny   v.   Rhodes,    18   Mo.    147         478 
Bensel,    In    re,    68    Misc.    (N.    Y.) 

70  184 

Benson    v.    Mole,    9    Phila.    (Pa.) 

66  1031 

V.    Shines,    107    Ga.    406  1572 

V.   Snvder,    42   W.   Va.    223  1101 

Bent   V.    Barnett,    90    Ky.    600        1239 

V.  Lipscomb,  45  W.  Va.  183     192a 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixiii 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I, 

Bently  v.   Davidson,   74   Wis.    420 

1559 
Berentz     v.     Belmont     Oil     Min. 

Co.,    148    Cal.     577  1190 

Berg-er  v.   Berger,  104   Wis.  282    1063 
V.    Turnblad,    98    Minn.    163      1325 
Berg-fors  v.  Caron,  190  Mass.  168 

1514 
Bergstrom,    In    re,   131   App.   Div. 

(N.   Y.)    794  184 

Berkey,  etc.,  Furniture  Co.  v. 
Sherman  Hotel  Co.,  81  Tex. 
135  554,   557 

Berkshire  Woollen   Co.,  v.   Proc- 
tor,   7    Cush.     (Mass.)     417  511 
Bernal  v.   Pirn,   1   Gale  17                   320 
Bernays    v.    Field,    29    Ark.    218 

606,     1095,     1096 
Berndston     v.     Strang,     L.     R.     4 

Eq.  481  862,  902,   909,  953 

Berrie  v.  Howitt,  L.  R.  9  Bq.   1      229 

Berry    v.    Berry,    8    Kans.    App. 

584  617 

V.    Bog-g-ess,    62   Tex.    239  1109 

V.    Grace,    62    Fed.    607  313 

V.    Van    Winkle,    2    N.    J.    Eq. 

269  1161 

Bertha    M.    Miller,    The,    79    Fed. 

365  1693 

Bertheolet    v.     Parker,     43     Wis. 

551  1390,    1589,    1591 

Berwind-White  Coal  Min.  Co.  v. 
Metropolitan  S.  S.  Co.,  166  Fed. 
782  1746,    1800 

Best    V.    Baumgardner,    122    Pa. 

St.     17  1222 

Bethel    v.    Chicago    Lumber    Co., 

39  Kans.   230  1262,   1452 

Betts  V.   Gibbins,    2   Ad.    &   B.    57 

837,    962 
Bevan   v.   Crooks,   7   Watts   &   S. 
(Pa.)    452  564 

V.    Thackara,    143    Pa.   St.    182 

1260,  1392 
V.    Waters,    Moody    &    M.    235 

641,    644,   731 
Bevan,    In    re,    33    Beav.    439  136 

Bewick    v.    Muir,    83    Cal.    368        1190 
Beyer       v.       Fenstermacher,       2 

Whart.    (Pa.)    95  571 

B.    F.    Lee    Co.    v.    Sherman,    43 

Pa.    Super.    Ct.    557  1222 

B.   F.   Woolsey,   The,    7   Fed.    108 

1723,  1729,  1798 
Bibb    v.    Prather,    1    Bibb     (Kv.) 

313  1105 

Bibbins  v.  Polk  County,  100  Iowa 

493  98 

Bibend  v.  Liverpool  &  London 
Fire  &  Life  Ins.  Co.,  30  Cal. 
78  42 

Bickford  v.   Ellis,   50  Maine  121      232 
Bicknell    v.    Trickey,    34    Maine 

273  711.    1205 

Biddlo   v.    Biddle,    3    Har.    (Del.) 

539  608 

Bierce    v.    Red    Bluff    Hotel    Co., 

31    Cal.    160  891 

Bierly    v.    Royse,    25    Ind.    202 

703,  1054 
Bierschenk  v.  King,  38  App.  Div. 

(N.    Y.)     360  1578 

Biesenbach   v.   Key,    63    Tex.    79       638 


§§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   s§   1061-1S12.] 

Bigelow   V.    Doying,    49    Hun    (N. 
Y.)    403  1218 

V.    Heaton,    4    Denio    (N.    Y.) 

496  308,   701 

V.   Heaton,  6  Hill    (N.  Y.)   43      317 
V.    Sheehan,    161    Mich.    667        178 
Bigelow,    In    re,    2    Ben.     (U.    S.) 

469  384,     398 

Biggs  V.  Barry,  2  Curt.  (U.  S.) 

259  921 

V.    Clapp,    74    111.    335  1299 

V.    Piper,    86    Tenn.    589  636 

Big   Horn   Lumber   Co.    v.   Davis, 

14    Wyo.    455  1442 

Bills   V.   Mason,   42   Iowa  329  1119 

Bingham   v.    Vandegrift,    93    Ala. 

283  557 

Binns  v.  Pigot,  9  Car.  &  P.  208 

503,    504 
v.    Slingerland,    55    N.    J.    Eq. 

55  1216 

Binstead  v.  Buck,  2  W.  Bl.  1117      483 
Birch   v.    Magic   Transit   Co.,    139 

Cal.    496  1255 

Bird    v.    Anderson,    41    N.    J.    L. 
392  627 

V.   Brown,   4  Exch.   7S6 

875,    876,    885,    928 
V.    Georgia    R.    R.,    72   Ga.    655 

291,   292,  293 
V.  St.  John's  Episcopal  Church, 

154   Ind.   138  1599 

Bird  of  Paradise,  The,  5  Wall. 
(U.    S.)    545 

270,    322,    324,    327,    1720,    1808 
Birdsall  v.  Cropsey,  29  Nebr.  672 

1108 
Birley    v.    Gladstone,    3    M.    &    S. 

205  31 

Birmingham  Building  &  L.  Assn. 

V.    Boggs,    116    Ala.    587  1458 

Birmingham     Iron     Foundry     v. 

Glen   Cove  Co.,    78   N.   Y.   30        1557 
Birney   v.   Wheaton,    2    How.    Pr. 

(N.   S.)    (N.    Y.)    519  507 

Bischoff  V.   Trenholm,   36  S.   Car. 

75  634 

Bishop  V.  Garcia,  14  Abb.  Pr.  (N. 
S.)     (N.    Y.)    69  209,    222 

V.    Globe    Co.,    135    Mass.    132 

388,  390,  405 

V.    Honey,    34    Tex.    245  1381 

V.   Shillito,   2   B.   &   Aid.   329        820 

V.    Snell,    37    Ala.    90  1086 

Bissel   V.    Price,    16    111.    408      289,   302 

Bissell    V.    Lewis,     56     Iowa    231 

1201,   1264,    1423,    1519,    1528 
V.    Pearce,    28   N.    Y.    252 

8,    641,    691,    744 
Bitter  v.  Monat  Lumber  &c.  Co., 

10    Colo.    App.    307  1373 

Bivens  v.  West   (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

46    S.    W.    112  577 

Bixby    V.    Whitcomb,     69    N.    H. 

646  1287 

Bizzell  V.  Nix,  60  Ala.  281     1099,  1123 
Black   V.   Appolonio,    1   Mont.    342 

1408,    1413,    1556 
V.    Black,   32  N.    J.   Eq.   74  236 

V.  Brennan,  5  Dana  (Ky. )   310 

498,   499,   504,   1041 
V.    Latham,    63    Tex.    414  587 

V.    Rose,    2    Moore    P.    C.     (N. 

S.)    277  313,   319 


Ixiv 


TAELE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 


Blackburn  v.  Gregson,  1  Bro.  Ch. 

420  1061.    1062 

Black  Diamond  Coal  Min.  Co. 
V.  H.  C.  Grady,  The,  87  Fed. 
232  1681.    1703 

Blackford    v.    Ryan,     (Tex.    Civ. 

App.)    61  S.  W.   161  678,   691 

Blackman    v.   Marsicano,    61   Cal. 

638  1190 

V.  Pierce,  23  Cal.  508     917.  965,  973 

Blackshear  V.  Burke,  74  Ala.  239    811 

Blaine    v.    The    Chas.    Carter,    4 

Cranch     (U.    S.)     328  1801 

Blair  v.  Lanning,   61  Ind.   499  174 

V.    Marsh.    8    Iowa   144  1119 

V.   Morgan,    59    S.    Car.    52  458 

V.   St.    Louis  H.    &   K.    R.   Co., 

23  Fed.   704  1655 

V.    St.   Louis,   H.   &   K.   R.   Co., 

25   Fed.   232  1655 

V.    St.    Louis    &c.    R.    Co.,    24 

Fed.    148  86 

V.    "Walker,    26    Fed.    73  1655 

Blaidsdell    v.     Smith.     3     Bradw. 

(111.)    150  1110,   1119 

Blake  v.  Counselman.  95  Iowa 
219  616 

V.    Nicholson.    3    M.    &    S.    167 

731.   740,    743.   974,   1002 
V.    Pitcher,    46   Md.    453 

1256,  1327,  1532 

Blakeley    v.    Moshier,     94    Mich. 

299  1535,    1537 

Blakely  v.  Dinsdale,  2  Cowp.  661  911 
Blakenev   v.    Nalle,    45    Tex.    Civ. 

App.    635  1226 

Blakey     v.     Blakey,     27     Mo.     39 

1365,  1629 

Blanchard  v.  Ely,  179  Mass.  586  1056 
V.  Fried.  162  111.  462  1312,  1421 
V.  Martha     "Washington,    The, 

1  Cliff.   (U.  S.)   463  1681 

V.    Portland    &    R.    F.    R.    Co.. 

87  Maine  241  1365 

V.  Raines,  20  Fla.  467  597,  610 

Blanche   v.    Bradford.   38    Pa.   St. 

344  562 

Bland  v.  Robinson,  148  Mo.  App. 

164  181a 

Blanton  v.  Brandenburg.  143  Ky. 

651  1508 

Blatchford  v.  Blanchard,  160  111. 

115  1524 

Blattner  v.  Wadeligh,  48  Kans. 
290  1397 

V.  Woodworth,  31  N.  T.  285     1542 
Blauvelt    v.    Van    Winkle,    29    N. 

J.    Eq.    Ill  1172 

Bleaden     v.     Hancock,    Mood.     & 

M.    465  743 

Bledsoe  v.  Mitchell,  52  Ark.  158  580 
Blevins  v.  Rogers.  32  Ark.  258  1092 
Blewitt    V.    Greens,    57    Tex.    Civ. 

App.    588  1102a 

Blight  V.  Davies,  28  Beav.  211  466 
Bliss    V.    Patten.    5    R.    I.    376 

1223,  1253,   1260.  1262.  1263 
Blitz    V.    Fields.    118    Mich.    85 

1208.    1290b 

Block  V.  David.  120  N.   Car.   402     768 

V.  Latham,   63  Tex.   414      638,  1045 

V.  Murray,  12  Mont.  545    1274,  1276 

V.  Pearson,    19    Okla.    422  1262 


Block  V.  Smith.  61  Ark.  266  606 

Blohm.  The.  1  Ben.    (U.  S.)   288     1700 
Blomstrom  v.  Dux,   175  111.  43o 

108G.   1087,   1088 
Blonde  v.  Menominee  Bay  Shore 

Lumber    Co.,    106    Wis.    540         719 
Bloom   V.    McGehee,    38    Ark.    329 

589,  743a 
Bloomingdale     v.      Memphis      & 
Charleston      R.      Co.,      6      Lea 
(Tenn.)   616     884,  888,  891,  895,   897 
Bloomington  Hotel  Co.  v.  Garth- 
wait,    227    111.    613  1199,    1431 
Blossom    V.    Champion,    28    Barb. 

(N.   T.)    217  857,   946 

Blount  V.  Dagger,  115  Ga.  109,     1262 
Bloxam  V.  Morley,  4  B.  &  C.  951     802 
V.    Sanders,    4    B.    &    C.    941 

800,   802,  832,  850 
Blum   V.    Jones,    51    Ala.    149  603 

V.    Marks,     21    La.     Ann.     268 

887,    927,    965 

Blumauer    v.     Clock,     24     Wash. 

596  ^    718 

Blumenthal    v.    Anderson,    91    N. 

Y.    171  228 

Blythe    v.    Poultney,    31   Cal.    233 

1287,    1299,    1512 
Board  V.   Wilson,   34   W.   Va.    609 

1069,     1092 
Boardman  v.   Sill,   1   Camp.    410n 

973,     1018,     1019 
Board    of    Comrs.    v.    Snodgrass 

&c.    Mfg.    Co..    52    Kans.    253      1375 

Board    of    Education    v.    Dupar- 

quet,    50    N.    J.    Eq.    234  1498 

V.    Greenbaum,    39    111.    609        1375 

v.    Neidenber,    78    111.    5^         1375 

V.  Scoville,  13  Kans.  17    1202,  1375 

Board    of    Supervisors   v.    Gillen, 

59    Miss.    198  1375 

Bob   Connell,   The,   1   Fed.    218       1717 
Bock   V.    Gorrissen,    30   L.    J.    Ch. 

39  427 

Bodey   v.    Thackara,    143    Pa.    St. 

171  1262.    1263 

Bodley    v.    Denmead,    1    W.    Va. 

249  1351,   1535 

Bogart     V.     John     Jay,     The,     17 

How.    (U.    S.)    399  1703a,    1794 

Boggs     V.     Martin,     13     B.     Mon. 
(Ky.)    239  262,    320,    331 

V.    Price,    64    Ala.    514  576a 

Bohanan    v.    Paterson,    9    Wend. 

(N.   T.)    503  151 

Bohannon   v.    Hammond,    42    Cal. 

227  1723 

Bohem    v.    Seabury,    141    Pa.    St. 

594  1513a,    1568 

Bohmer    v.    City    Bank,     77    Va. 

445  379,    388,    413 

Bohn   V.   McCarthy,   29   Minn.    23 

1235,    1304a 
Bohn  Mfg.  Co.  V.  Hynes,  83  Wis. 

388  •      800,  821,  852 

Bohtlingk   v.   Inglis,    3    East    381 

325,  859,  878,  882.  887.  893.  922 
Bold    Buccleugh,    The,    7    Moore 

P.    C.    267  1777 

Bolin     V.     Huffnagle,     1     Rawle 

(Pa.)    9  910.    911.   912 

Boling  V.   Howell.    93   Ind.    329      1083 

■  Bolivar,   The,  Olcott's  Adm.   474   1805 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixv 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Bolland  v.  Bygrave,  R.  &  M.  271 

241,    245 
Bollar    V.    Schoenwirt,    30    Misc. 

(N.   Y.)    224  184 

Bolter  V.  Kozlowski,  211  111.  79    1199 

Bolton   V.   Duncan,    61   Ga.   103         585 

V.    Hey,    148    Pa.    156  1502 

V.  Lancashire  &  Yorkshire  R. 

Co.,    L.    R.    1    C.    P.    431 

834,    923,    925,    940 
V.    Puller,    1    B.    &    P.    539  241 

Bolton's    Appeal,    3    Grant    (Pa.) 

204  1434 

Bombay,   The,   38   Fed.    512  1690 

Bombeck  v.  Devorss,  19  Mo.  App. 

38  1211,    1574 

Bond  V.  Carter,  96  Tex.   359    586,  688 

V.    Kent,    2    Vern.    281  1080 

V.  Newark,   19  N.  J.   Eq.  385      1487 

Bonnell    v.    Holt,    89    111.    71  1092 

Bonsall  v.   Comly,   44  Pa.   St.   42     632 

V.    Taylor,    5    Iowa    546  1532 

Boogren   v.   St.  Paul  City  R.   Co., 

97   Minn.   51  179 

Boon  V.  Murphy,   6  Black.    (Ind.) 

272  1086,    1089 

Boone    v.    Darden,     109    N.    Car. 

74  631 

Boos    V.    Ewing-,    17    Ohio    500         1080 
Booth   V.    Oliver,    67    Mich.    664       544 
V.    Pendola,    88    Cal.    36 

1190,    1313,    1314,    1569 
Borden    v.    Croak,    131    111.    68  542 

V.  Mercer,  163  Mass.  7     1356,  1406 
Boring  v.  Jobe   (Tenn.),  53  S.  W. 

763  190 

Borror   v.    Carrier,    34    Ind.    App. 

353  1063 

Borst    V.    Corey,    15    N.    Y.    505    1099 
Boston  V.  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  R. 

Co.,   76  Va.   180  1228,    IGIS,    1619 

Boston  &  Colorado  Smelting  Co. 
V.   Pless,    8  Colo.    87        209,    211,    221 
V.    Pless,    9    Colo.    112  171 

Boston   &  K.    C.   Cattle  Loan   Co. 

V.    Dickson,    11    Okla.    680  674a 

Boston,    The,    Blatchf.    &    H.    (U. 

S.)    309  1798,    1801 

Bosworth    V.    Tallman,     66    Wis. 

533  217 

Boteler  v.   Espen,   99   Pa.   St.    313 

1277,    1278 
Botsford    V.    Burr,    2    Johns.    Ch. 
(N.    Y.)    405  1178 

V.    New    Haven,    M.    &    W.    R. 

Co.,  41  Conn.  454       1618,  1639 
Bottomly  v.  Grace  Church,  2  Cal. 

90  1327,    1328,    1590 

Bottorf     V.     Conner,     1     Blackf. 

(Ind.)    287  1100 

Bouker  Contracting-  Co.  v.  Pro- 
ceeds of  Sales  &c.,  168  Fed. 
428  1703 

Bourcier   v.    Edmonson,    58    Tex. 

675  638 

Boiirg-et    V.    Donaldson,    83    Mich. 

478  1301 

Bourg-ette   v.   Williams,    73   Mich. 

208  712,   1558 

Boutner   v.    Kent,    23    Ark.    389      1325 
Bouton    V.     McDonough,     84     111. 

384  1375,    1614 

Bouvier  v.   Brass,    12   Ariz.    310       699 


Bovard     v.     Mayflower,    The,     39 

Fed.    41  1760 

Bowden  v.   Bridgman,    (Tex.   Civ. 
App.)     141     S.     W.     1043  1092 

V.  Dugan,  91  Maine  141     691,  691a 
Bowen    V.    Aubrey,    22    Cal.     566 

1287,  1502 
V.    Burke,    13    Pa.    St.    146  806 

V.    Fisher,    14    Ind.    104  1100 

V.     Phinney,     162     Mass.     593 

1207,  1289,  1304 
Bovv-ers  V.  Davis,  79  111.  App.  347    614 
Bowes    V.    New    York    Christian 
Home,  64  How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)   509 

1218,  1564 
Bowles  V.  Jones,  29  Ky.  L.  1022     619 
V.    Rogers,   '6    Ves.    95  1082 

Bowlin      V.      Pearson,      4      Baxt. 

(Tenn.)     341  1002 

Bowling     V.     Garrett,     49     Kans. 
564  1484 

V.    Scales,    1    Tenn.    Ch.    618        235 
Bowling     Green     Sav.     Bank     v. 
Todd,    52    N.    Y.    489 

115,   127,   130,   137,   140 
Bowman   v.   Faw,   5   Lea    (Tenn.) 
472  1081 

V.     Hilton,     11     Ohio    303 

262,  289,   301 
V.    Smiley,    31   Pa.    St.    225  632 

V.    Spalding,    8    Ky.    L.     (Ab- 
stract)   691  791 
Bowman  Lumber  Co.  v.   Newton, 

72  Iowa   90       1311,   1313,   1317,   1418 
Bowser  V.  Scott,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.) 

86  572 
Boyce  V.  Day,   3   Ga.  App.   275  611 

V.    Expanded    Metal    &c.    Co., 

136    111.    App.     352  1599 

V.   Stanton,     15     Lea     (Tenn.) 

346  1117 

Boyd    V.    Blake,    42    Minn-    1 

1248,  1259,  1369,  1604a 
V.    G.    W.    Chase    &    Son    Mer- 
cantile Co.,  135  Mo.  App. 
115  181a 

V.  Jackson,  82  Ind.  525    1083,  1098 
V.    Jones,     8     Ky.    L.     (Abst.) 

602  1178 

V.    McLean,    1    Johns.    Ch.    (N. 

Y.)    582  1178 

V.  Martin,     9    Heisk.     (Tenn.) 

382  1069 

V.    Blole,    9    Phila.    (Pa.)    118 

1329,    1331 
V.  Mosely,  2  Swan  (Tenn.)  661 

806,    821 

V.   Stipp,   151   Iowa  276  616 

Boyer    v.    Austin,    75    Mo.    81         1086 

V.    Clark,    3    Nebr.    161  220 

Boylan    v.    Victory,    40    Mo.    244 

1436,    1729 
Boyle  V.   Boyle,   106  N.   Y.    654       201a 
V.     Metropolitan     St.     R.     Co. 

134    Mo.    App.    71  181a 

V.   Robbins,    71    N.    Car.    130      1219 

Bovnton    v.    Braley,    54    Vt.    92      1028 

V.  Champlin,   42   111.   57     1063,  1086 

V.    Libby,     62    Maine    253  820 

Boynton   Furnace  Co.   v.   Gilbert, 

87  Iowa    15  1289 
Bozeman  v.   Ivey,   49   Ala.    75  1116 


Ixvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   10G1-1S12.] 


Bozman  v.  Masterson,    (Tex.  Civ. 

App.)    45    S.    W.    758  1103a 

Bozon    V.    Bolland,    4    Myl.    &    C. 

354  127,    132,    149,    153,   166 

Brabant  v.   Lillie,   117   Mich.    167    712 
Brabazon     v.     Allen,     41      Conn. 

361  1313 

Brace    v.   Marlborough,    2    P.    W. 

491  10 

Bracher    v.    Olds,    60    N.    J.    Eq. 

449  158 

Brackett    v.     Pierson,    114    App. 

Div.    (N.    Y.)    281  702 

Brackett,    In    re,    114    App.    Div. 

(N.    Y.)    257  184 

Bradbury  v.  Butler,  1  Colo.  430    1559 
V.  Donnell,  136  Mo.  App.  676    1117 
Bradeen     v.     Brooks,     22     Maine 

463  818 

Braden    v.     Ward,     42    N.     J.     L. 

518  158.   204,   209 

Bradford    v.    Anderson,    60    Nebr. 
368  1460 

V.    Dorsey,   63   Cal.    122  1190 

v.    Harper,    25   Ala.    337 

1063,  1074,  1116 
V.    Howe,    11    Ky.    L.    10  1117 

V.   Marvin,   2  Fla.    463       1063,   1089 
V.     Neill     &c.     Const.     Co.,    76 

111.    App.    488  1509,    1532 

V.  Peterson,    30    Nebr.    96 

1263,    1264 
V.  Underwood  Lumber  Co.,  80 

Wis.    50  719 

Bradford  Banking  Co.  v.  Briggs, 

31    Ch.    Div.    19  389,    404 

Bradish    v.    James,     83    Mo.     313 

1421,   1423 
Bradley    v.    Bosler,    1    Barb.    Ch. 
(N.    Y.)    125  1100 

V.    Cassels,    117    Ga.    517  781 

V.    Curtis.    79    Ky.    327 

1069,    1116,    1119 
V.   Michael,    1    Ind.    551  800 

V.    Richmond,     6    Vt.    121  154a 

V.  Piggot,  "Walk.    (Miss.)   348     569 
V.   Root,    5    Paige    (N.    Y.)    632 

45,    47 
V.    Simpson,    93    111    93  1199 

V.   Spofford,   23  N.  H.   444 

982,   987,   1035 
Bradshaw     v.     Warner,     54     Ind. 

249  820 

Bradt    v.    Koon,    4    Cow.    (N.    Y) 

416  219,    223 

Brady    v.    Anderson,    24    111.    110 

1519,   1532,   1554 
Braeger     v.     Bolster,     60     Wash. 

579  718 

Brainard    v.    Burton,    5    Vt.    97        548 

V.    Elwood,    53    Iowa    30  175 

V.    Kings,    155    N.    Y.    538  1287 

Brame     v.     Swain,     111     N.     Car. 

540  1128 

Branch  v.  Galloway,  105  N.   Car. 
193  457 

V.    Taylor,    40    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

248  1126 

Brandao  v.   Barnett,   12   CI.   &   F. 

787  241,    242,    244,    255,    427 

Brander  v.    Phillips,    16    Pet.    (U. 
S.)   121  475,  476,   478 


Brandt    v.    Bowlby,    2    B.    &    Ad. 
932  820 

V.   Verdon,    18   N.   Y.    S.    119       1411 
Branham    v.    Nye,    9    Colo.     App. 

19  1404 

Branin  v.  Connecticut  &  P.  R.  R. 

Co.,    31    Vt.    214  1670 

Brantford     City,     The,     29     Fed. 

373  1791 

Branth  v.  Branth,  57  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

592  168,    209 

Brasfield   v.    Powell,    117   N.    Car. 

140  456 

Brasher  v.  Alexandria  Cooperage 

Co.,    50    La.    Ann.    587  1204 

Bratt   V.   Bratt,    21   Md.    578  1069 

Bratton    v.    Ralph,    14    Ind.    App. 

153  1539 

Brawley     v.      Catron,      8      Leigh 

(Va.)    522  1071,    1077 

Bray     v.     Smith,     87     Iowa     339 

1245,    1254 
V.    Wise,    82    Iowa    581  699 

Breault      v.       Archamboult,       64 
Minn.    420  713 

V.     Merrill     &     Ring    Lumber 

Co.,    72   Minn.   143  713 

Breckenbridge  v.  Millan,  81  Tex. 

17  557 

Breene  v.  Merchants'  &  Mechan- 
ics' Bank,  11   Colo.   97  84 
Bremen     v.     Foreman,     1     Ariz. 

413  1188,  1247,  1257,  1608 

Brenan  v.   Currint,   Sayer   224  6 

Breneman    v.    Harvey,    70    Iowa 

479  1375,    1376 

Brennan   v.    Swasey,    16   Cal.    140 

1190,  1406,  1409.  1420,  1521,  1613 
Brent    v.    Bank    of   Washington, 
10  Pet.    (U.   S.)    596 

376,     377,     388,     393,     417 
Brewer  v.   Chappell,   101   N.    Car. 

251  457,    631 

Brewster    v.    McNab,    36    S.    Car. 
274  634 

V.   Sime,   42   Cal.    139  950 

Bridges  v.  National  Bank,  185  N. 

Y.    146  384 

Briggs    V.    Austin,    55    Hun     (N. 
Y.)     612  543,    548 

V.  Boston    &    Lowell    R.    Co., 
6  Allen   (Mass.)   246 
284,  291,  305,  335,  1033,  1051a 
V.    Hill,     6    How.     (Miss.)     3  62 

1063,   1092 
V.    Large,    30    Pa.    St.    287  564 

V.     Light     Boat,     A,     7     Allen 

(Mass.)     287  1677,    1727 

V.  Light  Boat  Upper  Cedar 
Point,  11  Allen  (Mass.) 
157  279 

V.  Light-Boats,  The,   11  Allen 

(Mass.)     525  1748 

V.  Planters'   Bank,  Freeman's 

Ch.    (Miss.)    574  1110 

V.    Titus,    7    R.    I.    441 

1223,    1271,    1308 
Bright    V.    Boyd,    1    Story    (U.    S.) 
478  1131,   1132,  1135,   1136 

V.  Larcher,  4  De  G.  &  J.  608    1165 
Brinckerhoff    v.    Board    of    Edu- 
cation,   2    Daly    (N.    Y.)    443      1375 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixvii 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Brinckerhoff  v.  Board  of  Educa- 
tion, 37  How.  Pr.  (N.  T.) 
499  1375 

V.   Vansciven,   4   N.   J.   Eq.   251 

1074,    1083,    1086 
Brindley    v.    Cilgwyn    Slate    Co., 

55   L.   J.   Q.   B.    67  912 

Bring-ham  v.  Knox,  127  Cal.  40     1637 
Brinkerhoff  v.  Brinkerhoff,  23  N. 

J.    Eq.    477  1487 

Brintnall     v.     Smith,     166     Mass. 

2^3  663 

Brisben    v.    Wilson,     60    Pa.     St. 

452  632 

Brisben's  Appeal,   70  Pa.  St.  405  1164 
Brisco  V.  Minah  Consol.  Min.  Co., 

82    Fed.    952  1074,    1083 

Briscoe  v.   Bronaugh,   1   Tex.   326 

1061,    1083 
V.  Callahan,   77  Mo.   134  1087 

V.     McElween,     43     Miss.     556 

572,    625 
Bristol-Goodson    Electric    Lig-ht, 
&c.,  Co.  V.  Bristol  Gas,  &c.,  Co., 
99    Tenn.    371  1506 

Bristol,    The,    11    Fed.    156 

1769,   1799,    ISOOa,   1806 
Bristol,    The,    29    Fed.    867  1769 

Bristow  V.  Evans,  124  Mass.  548 

1421,  1601 
V.     Whitmore,     9    H.    L.     Cas. 

391  1177 

British  Empire  Shipping-  Co.  v. 
Somes,    El.    &    Bl.    353  804 

V.    Somes,    8    H.    L.    Cas.    338       972 
Brittan  v.  Barnaby,  21  How.    (U. 

S.)    527  313 

Brittinum  v.   Jones,   56  Ark.   624 

1155 
Broach  v.  Smith,  75  Ga.  159  1063 
Broadwell    v.    King-,    3    B.    Mon. 

(Ky.)    449  1092 

Broadwood    v.    Granara,    10    Ex. 

417  500,    502 

Brock  V.  Hidy,  13   Ohio   St.   306    1126 
V.    J.    J.    Haley    &    Co.,    88    S. 

Car.    373  458 

Brodenham   v.   Hoskins,   2   De   G. 

M.    &    G.    903  248 

Broderick     v.     Poillon,     2     E.     D. 

Smith  (N.  Y.)  554       1235,  1589,  1605 
Broders  v.  Bohannon,  30  Ore.  599 

547,    548 
Brodt    V.    Rohkar,    48    Iowa    36 

1201,     1558 
Brogan  v.  McEachern,  103  Maine 

198  711 

Brokaw  v.  Tyler,  91  111.  App.  148 

1281 
Brom    V.    Herring-,    45    Tex.    Civ. 

App.    653  1110 

Bromley    v.    Hopewell,    2    Miles 

(Pa.)    414  633 

Bronson    Electric    Co.    v.    Rhen- 

bottom,    122    Mich.    608  388 

Brook     v.     Wentworth,     3     Anst. 

881  743 

Brooke   Iron    Co.    v.   O'Brien,   135 

Mass.    442  911.    921 

Brookman    v.    Hamill,    43    N.    Y. 

554  1725,   1729,  1730,  1756,  lS06a 

Brooks  V.  Blackwell,   76  Mo.   309 

1211,   1607 


Brooks  V.  Burlington,  &c.,  R.  Co., 
101  U.   S.  443 

1290,  1470,  1620,  1625 
V.  Cunningham,  49  Miss.  108  572 
V.    Hanford,    15    Abb.    Pr.    (N. 

Y.)    342  206,   217 

V.  Harrison.  41  Conn.  184     513,  527 
V.    Lester,    36    Md.    65 

1460,  1469,  1472,  1474 
V.   Mastin,   69   Mo.    58  1533 

V.    Snell,    1    Sprague    (U.    S.) 

48  196,    205 

V.    Staton,    79    Ky.    174  463 

V.  Young-,  60  Tex.  32         1092,  1098 
Brooks,  In  re,  2  Nat.  Bank  Reg. 

466  1092 

Brosnan    v.    Trulson,    164    Mass. 

410  1605 

Brothers    v.    Williams,    65    Wis. 

401  681 

Brothers  Apap,  The,  34  Fed.   352 

1810 

Brown  v.  Arundell,  10  C.  B.   54       564 
V.   Barrett,   75   Mo.   275  1086 

V.    Bigley,    3    Tenn.    Ch.    618 

132,  190,  193,  230 
V.  Blankenship,  108  Ky.  464  1087 
V.    Brown,   109   N.   Car.   124  631 

V.   Budd,   2   Ind.   442  1092 

V.   Byam,    65   Iowa   374  1088 

V.  Christie,  35  Tex.  689     1063,  1086 
V.    Clayton,    12    Ga.    564  262 

V.  Danforth,  37  App.  Div.    (N. 

Y.)     321  1581 

V.    East,    5    T.    B.    Mon.    (Ky.) 

407  1105 

V.    Georgia    C.    &    N.    R.    Co., 

101    Ga.    SO  173,    198 

V.   Gilman,    4   Wheat.     (U.     S.) 

255  1080,    10S6,    1087 

V.    Goble,    97    Ind.    86  1559 

V.    Goolsby,    34    Miss.    437         1585 
V.    Hamil,    76   Ala.    506  603 

V.    Hare,    3    H.    &    N.    484  916 

V.    Harper,    4    Ore.    89        1494,    1495 
V.    Holmes,    21    Kans.    687  1021 

V.    Howard,    86   Maine   342       1054a 
V.    Knapp,    79    N.    Y.    136 

1163,    1164,    1165 
V.   Kough,   29   Ch.   D.   848  51 

V.    LaCrosse    City    Gas    Light 

&  Coke  Co.,   16  Wis.   555 

1421,  1600 
V.  Lowell,  79  111.  484  1199,  1287 
V.    Lyon,    81    Miss.    438  1104 

V.    McGran,    14    Pet.     (U.    S.) 

479  475 

V.   McKee,   80   Tex.   594  1102 

V.  Moore,   26  111.   421         1199,  1465 
V.   Morgan,   163   Fed.   395  175 

V.   Morrison,    5   Ark.    217 

692a,  1235,  1248 
V.    Myers,   145    Pa.    St.    17  1416 

V.  New  Bedford  Inst,  for  Sav- 
ings, 137  Mass.   262     251,  252 
v.   New   York,    9    Hun    (N.   Y.) 

587  144,    200 

V.  New  York,   11  Hun   (N.  Y.) 

21  44,  187,  188,  193 

V.   North,    8   Ex.   1  916 

V.    Peterson,     25    App.    D.    C. 

359  997,    1014 


Lxviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Brown   v.   Philadelphia,   B.   &   W. 

R.  Co.,  36  App.  D.  C.  221  262 
V.  Porter,  2  Mich.  N.  P.  12  1079 
V.    Rash,    40    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

203  1122 

V.  Rodocker,  65  Iowa  55  1358 
V.    School   Dist.,    48   Kans.   709 

1495,   1499 
V.    Simpson,    4    Kans.    76  1063 

V.   Sims,   17  Serg.  &  R.    (Pa.) 

138  564 

V.    Sloan,    55   Nebr.    28  788 

V.   Smith,    55   Iowa  31  1494 

V.  Smith,   24  S.  Dak.   231  770a 

V.  Thomas,  14  111.  App.  428  547 
V.  Tanner,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  597  314 
V.  Truax,  58  Ore.  572  83,  1018 
V.   Turner,    60   Mo.   21  626 

V.  Vanlier,  7  Humph.    (Tenn.) 

239  1063,  1082 

V.  Volkening-,  64  N.  T.  76  1581 
V.     Welch,     5     Hun     (N.     Y.) 

582  1602 

V.  Williams,    120    Pa.    St. 

24  l-'.OO,   1500a 

V.    Wrig-ht,    25    Mo.    App.     54 

1211,    1421 
V.    Young,    55   S.    Car.    309  458 

V.    Zeiss,    9   Daly    (N.   Y.)    240 

1235,   1236,  1543 
V.  Zeiss,   59   How.   Pr.    (N.  Y.) 

345  1586 

Brown  &  Haywood  Co.  v.  Trone, 

98    Wis.    1  1431 

Brown  Const.   Co.  v.  C.  L.  Const. 

Co.,    234    111.    397  1289 

Browne  v.  Davis,  109  N.  Car.  23   1143 
V.     Smith,     2     Browne     (Pa.) 

229n  1368 

Brownell     v.     Twyman,     68     III. 

App.    67  613 

Brownell     Improvement     Co.     v. 

Nixon,   48   Ind.  App.  195  98 

Browning     v.     Belford,     83     App. 

Div.    (N.   Y.)    144  331 

Browninski    v.    Pickett,    113    Ky. 

420  1304 

Brown's  Estate,  In  re,  5  Pa.  Dist. 

R.    286  1163 

Brown    Shoe    Co.     v.    Hunt,     103 

Iowa    580  515 

Broxton    Artificial    Stone    Works 

V.    Jowers,    4    Ga.    App.    91  1424 

Bruce  v.  Anderson,  176  Mass.  161 

177c 
V.  Berg,  8  Mo.  App.  204  1435,  1444 
v.  Pearsall,  59  N.  J.  L.  62  1216 
V.    Tilson,    25   N.   Y.   194  1127 

V.    Wait,    3    M.    &   W.    15      447,    464 
Brudenell    v.    Boughton,    2    Atk. 

268  1164 

Brum    V.     Merchants'    Mut.    Ins. 

Co.,    4   Woods    (U.   S.)    156  85 

Bruner   v.    Sheik,    9    Watts    &    S. 

(Pa.)     119  1245 

Bruner's    Appeal,    7    Watts    &    S. 

(Pa.)    269  1045 

Brunold  v.  Glasser,   25  Misc.    (N. 

Y.)    285  1263 

Brunsdon    v.    Allard,    2    E.    &    E. 

17     13,  28,  155,  196,  203,  216,  218,  234 
Brunswick,    etc.,   Co.    v.   Murphy, 
89  Miss.  264  557,  971 


Brush    V.     Kinsley,    14    Ohio    20 

1063,    1092 
Bruton  V.  Beasley,  135  Ga.  412       708 
Bryan  v.  Abbott,   131   Cal.   222        1397 
V.   Madison     Supply     Co.,    135 

Ga.   171  611 

V.  Sanderson,  3  McArthur   (D. 

C.)    431  553 

V.    Whitford,    66    111.    33  1199 

Bryans  v.  Nix,  4  M.  &  W.  775  465,  907 
Bryant   v.    Grady,    98    Maine    389 

1532,    1533 
V.    Mercier,    82    Ga.    409  612 

V.    Stephens,    58    Ala.    636 

1045,  1067,  1079,  1100,  1124 
Bryon  V.   Carter,   22  La.  Ann.    98 

375,   377,  380,  381 
Bryson   v.   Collmer,   33   Ind.   App. 

494  1069,   1092 

Buchan   v.    Summer,   2    Barb.   Ch. 

(N.    Y.)     165  94,    796 

Buchanan  v.  Roy,  2  Ohio  St.  251    1563 

V.   Selden,   43  Nebr.   559  14.'!3 

V.    Smith,    43    Miss.    90  1210 

Buck    V.    Hall,    170    Mass.    419       1600 

V.    Lee,    36    Ark.    525  556 

V.    Paine,    50    Miss.    648  783 

V.    Payne,    52    Miss.    271  783 

Buckeye  State,  The.  1  Newb.   (U. 

S.)    Ill  1802 

Buckingham  v.  Flummerfelt,  15 
N.    Dak.    112  1348 

V.  Thompson,  (Tex.  Civ.  App.) 

135  S.   W.    652  1091 
Buckland    v.    Pocknell,    13    Sim. 

406  1071,    1074 

Buckley  v.  Commercial  Nat. 
Bank,     171     111.     284  1312 

v.    Commercial   Nat.   Bank,    62 

111.    App.    202  1312 

v.   Furniss,   15   Wend.    (N.   Y.) 

137  801, 

837,  878,  887,  921,  962,  965 
V.  Handy,  2  Miles  (Pa.)  449  1018 
v.   Packard,  20  Johns.    (N.  Y.) 

421  478 

V.   Runge     (Tex.     Civ.     App.), 

136  S.   W.   533  1083,    1110 
V.    Taylor,    51    Ark.    302 

1283,    1404,    1556 
Buckner  v.  Lancaster,  (Tex.  Civ. 
Aop.)    40  S.  W.   631  21 

v.   Mcllroy,   31   Ark.    631     606,    985 
Buckstaff    V.    Dunbar,    15    Nebr. 

114  1256 

Budd  V.  Busti,  1  Har.   (Del.)   69    1063 
V.    Lucky,    28   N.    J.    L.    484  1216 

V.    School    Dist.    No.    4,    51    N. 

J.  L.   3t)  1216,   1286 

Buddecke  v.  Spence,  23  La.  Ann. 

367  437 

Buddington  v.  Stewart,  14  Conn. 

404,    409  1682 

Buel   V.   Lockport,   3   N.   Y.   197     1502 
Buffalo    V.    Yattan,    Sheldon    (N. 

Y.)    483  735 

Buffalo  German  Ins.  Co.  v.  Third 

Nat.    Bank,    171    N.    Y.    670  384 

Buffalo  Oolitic  Limestone  Quar- 
ries Co.  V.  Davis,  45  Ind.  App. 
116  1011,  1018 

Buffington   v.   Hilley,   55  Ga.    655 

597,   1018 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixix 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.   I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1001-1812.] 


Buford    V.    McCormick,     57    Ala. 

428  1069,    1083,    1085 

Builders'  Supply  Depot  v.  O'Con- 
nor, 150  Cal.  265       1599,  1615,  1616a 
Building    &    Loan    Assn.    v.    Co- 
burn,    150    Ind.    684  1373,   1462 
Bulger   V.    Holly,    47   Ala.    453        1083 
Bulkly  V.  Healy,  58  Hun   (N.  Y.) 

608  1599 

Bullard    v.    Bank,    IS    Wall.     (U. 
S.)    589  384 

V.    Dudley,    101    Ga.    299  1197 

V.    Randall,    1    Gray    (Mass.) 

605  57 

Bullitt     V.      Eastern      Kentucky 

Land    Co.,    99    Ky.    324  1105 

Bullock    V.    Graham,    87    Ky.    120 

1102,  1103 
V.    Horn,    44    Ohio    St.    420 

1291,    1297 
V.    Tschergi,    4    McCrary     (U. 

S.)    184  821 

Buncombe    v.     Tommey,     115    U. 

S.    122  1618,    1663 

Bunn   V.    Valley   Lumber    Co.,    51 

Wis.    376  817 

Bunney    v.    Poyntz,    4    B.    &    Ad. 

568  322,   801.   834,   837,   877 

Bunton     v.     Palm,     (Tex.),     9     S. 

W.    182  1487 

Buntyn     v.     Shippers'     Compress 

Co.,    63    Miss.    94  1210 

Burbank  v.  Wright,  44  Minn.  544 

1572 
Burbridge  v.  Marcy,  54  How.  Pr. 

(N.    Y.)     446  1235,    1236,    1281 

Burch   V.    Burch,    52    Ind.    136        1164 
V.    Burch,    82    Ky.    622  1155 

Burchard  v.  Rees,  1  Whart.  (Pa.) 

377  571 

Burdick   v.    Moon,    24    Iowa    418 

1262,    1264 
V.    Murray,    3    Vt.    302 

731,  1002,  1036 
V.    Moulton,    53    Iowa    761  1256 

Burford   v.   Crandell,   2   Cr.   C.   C. 

86  387 

Burger    v.    Hughes,    5    Hun     (N. 
Y.)   180  1088 

V.    Potter,    32    111.    66  1088 

Burgess    v.    Fairbanks,    83    Cal. 
215  1100 

V.   Gun,    3    Har.     &    J.     (Md.) 

225  27-5 

V.    Kattleman,    41    Mo.    480         546 
V.   Wheate,   1  W.  Bl.   123  1105 

Burghall    v.    Howard,    1    H.    Bl. 

366  858 

Bui-gie    V.  "Davis,    34    Ark.    179 

751a,  778 
Burgin  v.  Marx,  158  Ala.  633  581 
Burgin  &  Sons  Glass  Co.   v.  Mc- 

Intire,    7    Ga.    App.    755  173 

Burgwald    v.    Weippert,    49    Mo. 

60  1260 

Burk    V.    Lane    Lumber    Co.,    28 

Ky.    L.    545  1143 

Burke  V.  Coyne,   188  Mass.  401     1235 

V.    Dunn,    117    Mich.    430  800 

V.   Mackenzie,   124   Ga.    248        1239 

Burket   v.    Boude,   3   Dana    (Ky.) 

209  618 


Burkett  V.  Munford,   70  Ala.   423 

1126 
Burkhart  v.   Howard,   14   Ore.   39 

1119 
V.    Reisig,    24    111.    529  1199 

V.    Scott,    69   W.    Va.    694  192a 

Surkitt   V.   Harper,   79   N.   Y.    273 

1235,  1236,  1251,  1265,  1281 
Burks    V.    Burks,    12    Ky.    L.    552 

1102a 
Burleigh     v.     Palmer,     74     Nebr. 

122  139 

Burleigh  Bldg.  Co.  v.  Merchant 
Brick  &  Bldg.  Co.,  13  Colo. 
App.    455  1444 

Burlingim  v.  Cooper,  36  Nebr.  73 

1560 
Burling's    Est.,    In    re.,    1    Ashm. 

(Pa.)    377  1354 

Burlington  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Chicago  Lumber  Co.,  15  Neb. 
390  282 

Burlington  C.   R.   &   N.  R.   Co.   v. 

Verry,    48    Iowa    458  1646 

Burlington  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Comrs.  of 
Courthouse  and  City  Hall,  67 
Minn.    327  1375 

Burn    V.    Brown,    2    Stark.    272  428 

V.    Burn,    3    Ves.    Jr.    573  33 

V.    Carvalho,     4    Mylne    &    C. 

690  43,   45,   55,   58 

V.   Whittlesey,    2  Mac  Ar.    (D. 

C.)    189  1599 

Burnham  v.  Winsor,  5  Law  Rep. 

507  931,   932 

Burns  V.  Allen,  1  New  Eng.  Rep. 
143  137 

V.   Allen,   15   R.   L   32  151 

V.   Griffin,    24   Grant's   Ch.    (U. 

C.)     451  1098,    1105 

V.   Harris,    67   N.    Car.   370  789 

V.    Sewell,    48    Minn.    425  1328 

V.  Taylor,   23   Ala.   255     1063,  1091 

Burpee    v.    Townsend,    29    Misc. 

(N.   Y.)    681  184 

Burr  V.  Graves,  4  Lea  (Tenn.) 
552  693,    1225,    1272 

V.   Maultsby,    99    N.    Car.    263 

1470,    1488 
V.    Van    Buskirk,    3    Cow.    (N. 

Y.)    263  593 

V.  Wilson,     13     U.     C.     Q.     B. 

478  931 

Burrell  v.   Way,  176  Mass.   164     1605 
Burrill  v.  Cleeman,  17  Johns.   (N. 

Y.)     72  332a 

Burritt  v.   Rench,    4  McLean    (U. 

S)    325  956 

Burrough  v.  Elv,  54  W.  Va.   IIS        21 
V.    White,    18    Mo.    App.    229 

1389,    1418 

Burroughs     v.      Burroughs,     164 

Ala.    329  1071 

V.   Gilliland,    90    Miss.    127         1074 

V.    Tostevan,    75    N.   Y.    567        1614 

Burrus  v.  Roulhar,  2  Bush   (Kv.) 

39  ■      1086 

Burt  V.  Parker  Co.,  77  Tex.  338    1286 

V.  Wilson,  28  Cal.  632      1063,  1083 

Burton   v.   Curyea,    40   111.   320  825 

V.    McKinney,    6    Bush    (Ky.) 

428  1102a 

V.   Smith,   13  Pet.    (U.   S.)    464     582 


Ixx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I.  §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Buser  v.  Shephard,  107  Ind.  417   1558 
Busfield    V.     Wheeler,     14     Allen 

(Mass.)  139  1033,  1044,  1056,  1499 
Bush    V.    Willis,    130    Ala.    395 

580,     602,     603 
Bush,    Ex    parte,    7    Viner's    Abr. 

74  113,  131,  154,  156 

Buskirk   v.   Purinton,   2  Hall    (N. 

Y.)    561  304 

Buswell    V.   Marshall,    51   Vt.    87      548 
Butchers'  Union,  &c.,  Co.  v.  Cres- 
cent City,  &c.,  Co.,  41  La.  Ann. 
355  113,  115,  177a 

Butler  V.  Doug-lass,  3  Fed.  612  1123 
V.  Gain,  128  111.  23  1199,  1286,  1554 
V.  Gannon,   53   Md.  333  622 

V.   Ng-.    Chung,    IGO    Cal.    435      1190 
V.    Rahm,    46    Md.    541  1675 

V.    Rivers,    4    R.    I.    38  1257 

V.  Williams,   5  Heisk.   (Tenn.) 

241  1116 

V.    Woolcutt,    2    B.    &    P.    (N. 

R.)    64  265,    303,    901 

Butler-Ryan     Co.     v.     Silvey,     70 

Minn.    507  1523,   1532 

Butt   V.    Ellett,    19   Wall.    (U.    S.) 

544  542 

Butterfield     v.     Baker,     5     Pick. 
(Mass.)    522  550 

V.    Okie,    36    N.    J.     Eq.     482 

1076,    1083 
Button  V.  Schroyer,  5  Wis.  598     1108 
Butts    V.    Carey,    143    App.    Div. 
(N.   Y.)    356  184 

V.  Cuthbertson,  6  Ga.  166  1009 
Byard  v.  Parker,  65  Maine  576  1570 
Bynum  v.  Hill,  71  N.  Car.  319  1165 
Byre   v.    Herran,   1   Daly    (N.   Y.) 

344  1380 

Byrne    v.    Union    Bank,    9    Rob. 

(La.)    433  375,    381 

Byrnes    v.     Fuller,     1    Brev.     (S. 

Car.)    316  867 

Byrns     v.     Woodward,     10     Lea 
(Tenn.)    444  1116 


Cabarga,  The,  3  Blatchf.    (U.  S.) 

75  1696,    1728 

Cabeen    v.    Campbell,    30    Pa.    St. 

254  921 

Cabot,    The,    Abb.    Adm.     (U.    S.) 

150  1707 

Cade  V.  Brownlee,  15  Ind.  369       1069 
Cadwalader  v.  Tindall.  20  Pa.  St. 

422  564 

Cady    V.    Fair    Plain    Literary 

Assn.,   135  Mich.    295  1552 

V.  McDowell,   1   Lans.    (N.  Y.) 

,84  515 

Caay   Lumber   Co.    v.    Conkling, 

70    Nebr.    807  1392 

Cage   V.    Wilkinson,    3    Sm.    &   M. 

(Miss.)    223  146,  158,   166 

Cahill    V.    Cahill,     9    N.    Y.    Civ. 

Proc.    R.     241  198,   207 

V.   Capen,   147  Mass.   493  1315 

V.  Lee,   55  Md.   319  592,   622 

Cain  V.  Cox,  23  W.  Va.   594  1146 

V.  Hockinsmith  Wheel  &  Car. 

Co.,   157   Fed.    992  115 

Cairo  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Cauble, 
85    111.    555  1644 


Cairo  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Watson, 

85   111.   531  1283,   1644 

Cairo  &  Vincennes  R.  Co.  v.  Fack- 
ney,  78  111.   116 

990,  1041,   1495,   1631,   1644 
Calahan  v.   Babcock,   21   Ohio   St. 

281  902,   929,  935,   965 

Caldwell   v.   Asbury,    29    Ind.    451 

1260,  1421 
V.  Bartlett,    3    Duer     (N.    Y.) 

341  306 

V.   Fraim,  32  Tex.  310  1110 

V.  Lawrence,    10    Wis.    331 

982,   990,  1493 
V.  Tutt,   10   Lea    (Tenn.)    258 

521,   698 
Caldwell    Institute    v.    Young,    2 

Duv.    (Ky.)    582  1203,   1276 

Calef  V.  Brinley,   58  N.  H.   90  1215 

Calhoun     Brick     Co.     v.     Pattillo 

Lumber  Co.,  10  Ga.  App.  181  1435 
California  Portland  Cement  Co. 
V.  Wentworth  Hotel  Co.,  16 
Cal.  App.  692  1190,  1327,  1438,  1493 
California  Powder  Works  v. 
Blue  Tent  Gold  Mines  (Cal.), 
22  Pac.   391  1405 

California,   The,   1   Sawy.    (U.   S.) 

463  1712 

Calkins  v.  Steinbach,  66  Cal.  117  1153 
Call  V.  Seymour.  40  Ohio  St.  670  820 
Callaway  v.  Walls,  54  Ga.  167  454 
Calvert  v.  Aldrich,  99  Mass.  74  1147 
v.   Coxe,  1  Gill   (Md.)   95  219 

Calvin  v.  Duncan,  12  Bush   (Ky.) 

101  1126 

Camanche,    The,    8   Wall.    (U.   S.) 

448  1718 

Cambria    Iron    Co.'s   Appeal,    114 

Pa.    St.    58  587 

Cambridge  &c.  Mfg.   Co.   v.   Ger- 

mania  Bank,  128  Ga.  178  1197 

Camden  v.  Vail,  23  Cal.   633 

1080,   1086,   1088 
Camden   Iron  Works  v.   Camden, 

60   N.   J.   Eq.   211  1344 

Cameron  v.  Consolidated  Lumber 
Co.,   118  N.  Car.   266  768 

v.   Grouse,  11  App.  Div.  N.  Y.) 

391  430 

V.   Fay,  55  Tex.  58  1541 

v.  McCullough,  11  R.  I.   173 

1223,   1262 
V.  Marshall,  65  Tex.  7  1382 

V.  Mason,    7    Ired.    Eq.     (N. 

Car.)    180  1063 

Camp    V.    GifCord,    67    Barb.     (N. 
Y.)    434  1071 

V.   West,   113    Ga.   304  559 

Campbell  v.  Abbott,  60  Misc.   (N. 
Y.)    93  673,   701 

v.  Bowen,  22  Ind.  App.  562  615 

V.  Campbell,  21  Mich.  438  1153 
V.  Campbell,  11  N.  J.  Eq.  268  1151 
V.   Henry,  45  Miss.  326  1086 

V.  J.   W.    Taylor   Mfg.    Co.,    62 

N.   J.   Eq.   307  1335 

V.   J.    W.    Taylor   Mfg.    Co.,    64 

N.   J.   Eq.   344  1335 

V.  Los     Angeles     Gold     Mine 

Co.,  28   Colo.  256  1616a 

V.   Mesier,    4    Johns.    Ch.     (N. 

Y. )    334  35 

V.  Muliett,    2    Swanst.    551  788 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxi 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.   I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   lOGl-1812.] 


Campbell  v.   Rankin,  28  Ark.  401 

991,  1063,  1107,   1119 
V.  Reeves,     3     Head     (Tenn.) 

226  429 

V.  Roach,   45  Ala.   667 

1085,  1094,  1100 

V.   Scarf e,  1   Phila.   (Fa.)    187      1289 

V.   Sidwell,  61  Ohio  St.  179         1080 

V.  Terney,   7   N.  J.  L,.  J.   189        158 

Campbell    Printing    Press    Co.    v. 

Powell,   78  Tex.   53  854 

Campbell,       etc..      Mfg.      Co.      v. 

Walker,    22    Fla.    412  610 

Canada,  The,   7  Fed.  119       1618,   1713 
Canal  Bank  v.  Hudson,  111  U.  S. 

66  1136,  1164 

Canal    Co.    v.    Gordon.    6    Wall. 

(U.  S.)   561  1450,   1500,   1620 

Canary,  The,  No.  2,  22  Fed.   532 

1730,  1745 
Cane  v.   Martin,    2   Beav.    584 

122,  122a 
Canisius  v.  Merrill,   65   111.   67 

1350  1554 
Cann  v.  Fidler,  62  Ind.  116  '  1163 
Canney   v.    Canney,    131    Mich. 

363  201 

V.  McDaniel,    46   Tex.    303  1092 

V.  Williams,  14  Colo.  21 

1389,  1390,  1406, 
1417,  1556,  1614 
Cannon  v.  Bonner,  38  Tex.  487       1086 
Canterbury    v.    Jordan,    27    Miss. 

96  552,   625 

Canton  Roll.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Rolling 
Mill  Co.   of  A.,   155   Fed.   321 

1329  1587 
Canton,   The,    1   Spr.    (U.   S.)    437 

1703,  1704 
Cantrell    v.    Ford    (Tenn.),    46    S. 

W.    581  190 

Cantwell    v.    Terminal    R.    Ass'n. 

of  St.  Louis,   160  Mo.  App.   393     281 
Cape  Fear  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Tor- 
rent,   46    Ga.    585  1741 
Capelle  v.  Baker,  3  Houst.   (Del.) 

344  1194,   1555 

Capital    Lumber    &    Mfg.    Co.    v. 

Crutcher,  140  Ky.   394  1507 

Capitol,    The,     22    How.     (U.     S.) 

129  1725 

Capp  V.  Stewart,   38  Ind.   479  1262 

Capper  v.   Spottiswoode,  Tamlyn 

21  1080 

Capron  v.  Strout,  11  Nev.  304 

1308,  1366,   1441,  1558 
Cardinal   v.    Edwards,    5   Neb.    36 

699,   1002 
Carew  v.   Stubbs,   155   Mass.   549 

1252a.   1288,   1458,   1542 
Carey  v.   Boyle,   53   Wis.   574 

1069,  1093 
V.  Boyle,   56  Wis.  145  1069 

V.   Seifert,    44    Pa.    Super.    Ct. 

577  1222 

Carey-Lombard    Lumber    Co.    v. 

Bierbauer,    76   Minn.    434  1244 

Carey-Lombard  &c.  Co.  v.  Jones, 

187    111.    203  1279 

Cargo    V.    Argos,    L.    R.    5    P.    C. 

134  283,    2S7 

Cargo  ex  Sultan,   Swab.   504  2S7 

Carhart  v.  Reviere.  78  Cal.  173       1119 


Carlisle   v.  Kinney,   66   Barb.    (N. 
y.)   363  800 

V.   Knapp,    51    N.    J.    L.    329 

1216,   1283 
Carlton  v.   Buckner,   28   Ark.   66 

1092,   1096 
Carman    v.    Mclncrow,    13    N.    Y. 

70  1218,   1287.  1294 

Carnes  v.  Hubbard,  10  Miss.  108  1086 
Carney  v.  La  Crosse  &  Milw.   R. 
Co.,    15    Wis.    503  1574 

V.   Tully,    74    111.    375  1199 

Carolina,    The,    30    Fed.    199  1771 

Carpenter  v.  Bayfield  Western  R. 
Co.,    107    Wis.    611  719 

V.   Black   Hawk  G.   M.   Co.,   65 

N.  Y.   43  1674 

V.  Gillespie,  10  Iowa  592  553,  582 
V.  Leonard,  5  Minn.  155  1260,1313 
V.  Mitchell,  54  111.  126 

1092,   1111,   1115,   1119,   1141 
V.  Momsen,   92  Wis.  449  422 

V.  Sixth  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Am. 

L.   Reg.    (N.   S.)    410  209 

V.   Small,    35    Cal.    346  1141 

Carr   v.    Hobbs,    11    Md.    285 

1063.  1083 
V.  Holbrook,  1  Mo.  240  1110 

V.  Hooper,   48   Kans.    253 

1313,   1451,  1607 
V.  National  Security  Bank,  107 

Mass.    45  57 

V.   Thompson,    67    Mo.    472 

1086,  1090 
Carrico  v.  Farmers'  &  Merchants' 

Nat.  Bank,   33  Md.   235  1086 

Carrie,    The,    46   Fed.    796  1806 

Carriger  v.  Mackey.  15  Ind.  App. 

392  1462 

Carroll   v.   Bancker,   43   La.   Ann. 
1078  620 

V.  Draughon,  154  Ala.  430  169 
V.  Mullanpay     Sav.     Bank,     8 

Mo.   App.    240  381 

V.  Shapard,  78  Ala.  358  1086 

V.   Swift,    129    La.    43  800,   811 

V.  Van      Rensselaer,      Harr. 

(Mich.)    225  1063 

Carson  v.  Electric  Light  &  Power 
Co.,    85    Iowa    44  616 

V.   Kelley,  57  Tex.  379  1102a 

V.   Steamboat  Daniel  Hillman, 

16  Mo.   256  1436 

V.  White,    6    Gill    (Md.)    17 

1404,  1417 
Carson    Opera    House    Assn.    v. 

Miller,    16    Nev.    327  1289,  1304 

Carswell  v.  Patzowski.  3  Pennew. 

(Del.)     593  1194 

Carter   v.    Andrews,    56    111.    App. 
646  613 

V.  Attoway,  46  Tex.  108  1101 

V.  Bennett,    6   Fla.   214 

167,   172,  219 
V.   Brady,    51    Fla.    404  1301 

V.   Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  130 

Mo.   App.   719  181a 

V.  Davis,  8  Fla.  183  167,  172,  220 
V.  Du  Pre,   18   S.   Car.   179  635 

V.  Humboldt  Fire  Ins.   Co.,  12 

Iowa   287  1541 

V.   Keeton,  112  Va.  307  1276 

V.   Leonard,   65  Nebr.   670  1119 


Ixxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §.§   10G1-1S12.] 


Carter    v.    Martin,    22    Ind.    App. 

445  1502 

V.  Rockett,    8    Paige    (N.    Y.) 

437  79 

V.  Sims,     2    Heisk.     (Tenn.) 

166  1109 

V.   The  Byzantium,  1  Cliff.   (U. 

S.)    1  1532 

V.   Townsend,    1    Cliff.    (U.    S.) 

1  1808 

V.   Walters,   63  Ga.   164  598 

Carter    County    Court    v.    Butler, 

81   Ky.    597  1116 

Carthage  Superior  Limestone  Co. 
V.  Central  Methodist  Church, 
156   Mo.   App.    671  1412 

Cartwright  v.  Wilmerding,  24  N. 

Y.    521  932,   959 

Carver  v.   Bagley,   79  Minn.   114     713 
V.   Coffman,    109    Ind.    547 

1149,  1151 
V.   Crookston   Lumber   Co.,    84 

Minn.    79  713 

V.  Eads,  65  Ala.  190 

1063,   1064,  1094 
V.  United  States,  7  Ct.  CI.   (U. 

S.)    499  200 

Cary    Hdw.    Co.    v.    McCarty,    10 

Colo.  App.   200  1272,    1423,   1439 

Casar    v.    Sargeant,    7    Iowa    317 

175,    210 
Cascade    Boom    Co.    v.   McNeeley 

Logging  Co.,   37   Wash.   203  718 

Case  V.  Allen,  21  Kans.  217  692 

V.  Beauregard,  99  U.   S.  119 

787,  788,  789,  790,  791,  792,  793 
V.   Davis,  15  Pa.  St.  80  633 

V.   Fogg,  46  Mo.  44  523,   524 

V.   Kloppenburg,    27    La.    Ann. 

482  620 

Case  Mfg.   Co.   v.   Smith,   40   Fed. 

339  1340,   1581 

Caserly  v.  Wayne  Circuit  Judge, 

124  Mich.   157  1604a 

Case  Plow  Works  v.  Union  Iron 

Works,    56    Mo.    App.    1  976 

Casey  v.  Ault,  4  Wash.  167  718 

v.  March,   30  Tex.  180 

115,   137,  141,  159 
V.  Weaver,    141    Mass.    280 

1308,  1534,  1608 
Cash  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  26  Tex. 

Civ.  App.   109  786a 

Cashman  v.  Henry.  75  N.  Y.  103     1260 
Cassell  V.  Lowry,  164   Ind.  1  1099 

Casserly  v.  Waite.  124  Mich.  157    1560 
Castagnetto  v.  Coppertown  Min. 

&c.    Co.,    146    Cal.    329  1392 

Castanola  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co., 

24    Fed.    267  946 

Caster    v.    McClellan,    132    Iowa 

502  1275 

Castikyan    v.    Sloan,    33    App.    D. 

C.    420  472 

Castle  V.  Sworder,  5  H.  &  N.  281     852 
Castor  V.   Jones,    86   Ind.    289  1163 

Gate  V.   Gate.   87   Tenn.   41  1092 

Catherine  Whiting,  The,  99  Fed. 

445  1756 

Catlin  V.  Douglass,   33   Fed.   569 

1202,  1438 
Cator  V.  Pembroke,   1   Bro.   G.  G. 
301  1076,  1084,   1105 


Cattanach   v.    Ingersoll,   1   Phila. 

(Pa.)    285  1306 

Cattell  V.  Ferguson,  3  Wash.  St. 
541  1262,   1266 

V.  Simons,   6  Beav.  304  216 

Caulfleld    v.    Polk,    IV    Ind.    App. 

429  1300,   1336 

Cayo  V.  Pool's  Assignee,  108  Ky. 

124  276,   317 

Caylor   v.   Thorn,    125   Ind.    201      1200 
Cayuga    Co.     National    Bank    v. 

Daniels,  47  N.  Y.  631  61,   62 

Cecil   V.   Henry    (Tex.),   93   S.   W. 

216  1075 

Cecil  Bank  v.  Farmers'  Bank,  22 

Md.   148  260 

Central  &  Montgomery  R.  Co.  v. 

Henning,    52    Tex.    466  1668 

Central  Bank  v.  Peterson,   24  N. 

J.   L.   668  628 

Central    Bldg.    Co.    v.    Karr   Sup- 
ply  Co.,    115    111.    App.    610  1598 
Central  Loan   &c.   Go.  v.   O'Sulli- 

van,    44   Nebr.    834  1262 

Central  Lumber  Co.  v.  Bradock 
Land  &c.   Co.,   84  Ark.   560  . 

1189,  1329 
Central  Nat.  Bank  v.  Brecheisen, 

65  Kans.   807  659 

Central  of  Georgia  R.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago Portrait   Co.,   122  Ga.  11     336 
V.   Shiver,   125   Ga.    218  1197 

Central  R.  Co.  v.  Pettus,  112  U. 
S.    116  101,   147,  169,   201,   208 

V.  MacCartney,    68    N.    J.    L. 

165  316 

Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Bartlett,  57 
N.  J.  L.   206  1469 

V.   Cameron,  Iron  &  Coal  Co., 

47  Fed.  136  1309d,   1472 

V.   Condon,  67  Fed.   84  1666a 

V.  Georgia  Pac.  R.  Co.,  S3  Fed. 

386  1654 

V.   Richmond,    N.    I.    &    B.    R. 

Co.,    68   Fed.   90  1525 

V.   Sheffield  &c.  R.  Co.,  42  Fed. 

106  1187,    1341,    1556 

V.  Texas    &    St.    L.    R.    Co.,    27 

Fed.    178  1655 

V.  Utah  Cent.  R.  Co.,  16  Utah 

12  1669 

Central  Trust  Go.  of  N.  Y.  v. 
Richmond,  N.  I.  &  B.  R.  Co., 
105    Fed.    803  177 

Certain    Logs     of    Mahogany,     2 

Sumn.     (U.    S.)    589       270,   327,   1692 
Cessna's    Appeal,     7    Sad.     (Pa.) 

183  1389 

Chadbourn  v.  Williams,  71  N.  Car. 

444  1219,   1313,   1468,   1480 

Chadwick  v.  Broadwell,  27  Mich. 

6  998,   1002 

GhafTin  v.  McFadden,  41  Ark.  42    1588 

Challoner  v.  Bouck.  56  Wis.  652    1477 

V.  Howard,    41    Wis.    355  1605 

Chalmers,   Ex  parte,  L.  R.    8   Ch. 

289  840,   852 

Chamberlain    v.    Heard,    22    Mo. 

App.    416  626 

V.  Masterson,   26  Ala.   371  511 

V.   Wood,    100   Maine  73  710 

Chamberlin  v.  McCarthy,  59  Hun 

(N.    Y.)    158  1274 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Ixxiii 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  1-lOGOf;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Chaniberlin   v.   Peltz,    1  Mo.   App. 

183  81 

Chamberlin-Hunt  Academy  v. 
Port  Gibson  Brick  &c.  Co.,  80 
Miss.   517  1287 

Chambers  v.  Benoist.  25  Mo.  App. 

520  1591 

Chambersburg  Ins.  Co.  v.  Smith, 

11   Pa.   St.   120  412 

Champion  v.  Brown,  6  Johns.  Ch. 

(N.    Y.)    398  1083 

Champlin    v.    McLeod,    53    Miss. 

484  1088 

Chance  v.  McWhorter,  26  Ga.  315 

1079,   1083 

Chancellor  v.  Law,  148  Ala.   511     583 

Chandler    v.    Belden,     18    Johns. 

(N.    Y.)    157  268.    322.    1002 

V.  Chandler,   78   Ind.    417  1100 

V.  Fulton,    10   Tex.    2 

861,   875,   919,   929,   953,   965 
V.  Hanna,   73  Ala.   390 

1187,   1451,  1559,  1560 
Chanslor    v.    Chanslor,    11    Bush 

(Ky.)    663  1180 

Chapin  v.  Miles  &  Ricketts,  151 
111.    App.    164  614 

V.   Persse    &c.    Paper    "Works, 
30  Conn.   461      1310;  1311, 
1314,   1325,   1328,   1330,   1539 
V.  Waters,  116  Mass.  140  1165 

Chapman  v.  Abrahams,  61  Ala. 
108  1067 

V.  Allen,    Cro.    Car.    271 

641,   742 
V.  Beardsley,   31   Conn.    115 

1063,  1071 
V.  Brewer,  43  Nebr.  890  1468,  1521 
V.   Chapman,  55  Ark.   542  1088 

V.   E!lg-in,    J.    &    E!.    R.    Co.,    11 

Ind.  App.   632  758 

V.   Haw,   1    Taunt.    341  llrMj 

V.  Kent,   3    Duer    (N.   Y.)    224     426 
V.   Lee,    64    Ala.    483  1099,  1100 

V.  Liggett,    41    Ark.    292 

1063,   1083,   1092 
V.   Peebles,   84  Ala.   283  1101 

V.   Searle,  3   Pick.   (Mass.)   38     833 
V.   Shepard,  39   Conn.   413  842 

V.   Stockwell,  18  B.  Mon.   (Ky.) 

650  1074 

V.   Tanner,  1  Vern.   267  1061 

V.   The  Engines  of  the  Green- 
point,  38  Fed.  671  1718 
V.  Wadleigh,    33    Wis.    267 

1469,  1476 
V.   White,    6    N.    Y.    412  57 

Chappel   V.    Comfort,   31   L.    J.    C. 

P.    58  274 

Chappell   V.   Cady,   10   Wis.   Ill 

115,  731 
Charboneau  v.  Orton.  43  Wis.  96  151 
Charles    v;    Godfrey,    125    Wis. 

594  1616 

V.  Neigelson,   15   111.   App.   17     691 
Charles    Carter,    The,    4    Cranch 

(U.    S.)    328  1786 

Charles    E.    E'alk,    The,    157    Fed. 

780  1679,  1697a 

Charles  Hemje,  The,  5  Hughes 
(U.   S.)    359  1697 


Charles  Spear,  The,   143  Fed.  185 

1688 
Charleston  Lumber  &  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Brockmyer,  18  W.  Va.  586 

12.31,   J-33,    1260,   1487 
Charlotte    Vanderbild,    The,    19 

Fed.   219  16S6,  1793 

Ciiarlwood    V.    Berridge.    1    Esp. 

345  234 

Charnley   v.    Honig,    74   Wis.    163 
i        r  1513a 

Charnock  v.  Colfax.  51  Iowa  70     1375 
Chase  v.  Chase,   65  How.  Pr.    (N. 
Y.)    306  .  233 

V.   Corcoran,   106  Mass.   286         485 
V.  Ingalls,   122   Mass.   381  820 

V.   Peck,    21    N.    Y.    581 

77,   82,   1063,   1071,   1105 
V.  Steel,  9  Cal.  64  795 

V.   Westmore,    5   M.    &   S.    180 

6,  320,   322,   741,   850 
V.   Westmore,  Selw.  N.  P.  1322    973 
Chastian    v.    Lumpkin,     134     Ga. 

219  173 

Cheatham  v.  Rowland.  72  N.  Car. 

340  1243,  1580 

Chelmsford,   The,   34   Fed.   399 

1680,   1681,   1687,   1808 
Cheney  v.  Bonnell,   58  111.   268       1273 
V.  Troy  Hospital.  65  N.  Y.  282 

1218,  1286,  1599 
Cherry  v.  North  &  South  R.  Co., 
65  Ga.   633  1560 

V.   Strong,    96    Ga.    183  1605 

Chesapeake  &  O.   R.   Co.  v.  Dob- 
bins, 23  Ky.  Law  1588  280a 
Cheshire   v.   Des   Moines   City  R. 

Co.,  153  Iowa  88  175 

Cheshire  Provident  Inst.  v.  Stone, 

52  N.  H.   365  1215.  1465,   1468 

Chester  Rolling  Mills  v.  The  Ho- 

patcong,  53  Hun   (N.  Y.)  634       1809 
Chevret     v.     Mechanics'     Mill     & 

Lumber  Co.,   4   Wash.   721  730 

Chicago  V.  Hasley,   25  111.   595       1375 
V.  Robbins,    2    Black     (U.    S.) 

418  1492 

Chicago  &  Alton  R.  Co.  v.  Union 
Rolling  Mill  Co.,   109  U.   S.   702 

1006,  1016,   1340,  1536,  1644 
Chicago  &  B.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Moran, 

187   111.   316  1440 

Chicago  &   Great  Western  Land 

Co.  V.  Peck,  112  111.   408  1086 

Chicago    &   Northwestern   R.   Co. 

V.  Jenkins,  103   111.  588  282 

Chicago  Artesian  Well  Co.  v.  Co- 
rey, 60  111.  73  1199 
Chicago  Building  &  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Talbotton  Creamery  &  Mfg. 
Co.,  106  Ga.  84  1520 
Chicago,  Burlington  &  Quincy  R. 
Co.  V.   Painter,  15  Nebr.   394 

929,    965 
Chicago  Lumber  Co.  v.  Allen,  52 
Kans.   795  1492 

V.  Des  Moines   Driving  Park, 

97  Iowa  25  1201 

V.  INIerrimack   &c.   Bank,    52 

Kans.  410  1438 

V.   Osborn,    40    Kans.   168 

1257,   1393,  1453 
V.  Schweiter,    45   Kans.    207 

1245,    1247,    1458,    1470 


Ixxiv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   10G1-1S12.] 


Chicago   Lumber   Co.    v.   Tomlin- 

son,    54    Kans.    770  1428 

V.  Woods,    53    Iowa    552  1508 

V.   Woodside,   71   Iowa  359         1290 
Chicago  Lumber,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Gar- 

mer,    132    Iowa   282  1290 

Chicago   Marine  &   Fire   Ins.    Co. 

V.    Stanford,    28    111.   168  57 

Chicago,  P.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dorsey  Fuel  Co.,  112  111.  App. 
382  282 

Chicago,   R.    I.    &   Pac.   R.    Co.   v. 

Hubbell,    54    Kans.    232  280a 

Chicago  Smokeless  Fuel  Gas  Co. 

V.   Lyman,   62   111.   App.   538  1274 

Chickering-Chase    Bros.     Co.     v. 

White,    127   Wis.    83  507,   515 

Child   V.   Hudson's  Bay   Co.,   2   P. 

Wms.    207  377 

Childers    v.    Greenville,     69    Ala. 

103  1287 

Childs  V.  Anderson,  128  Mass. 
108  1315 

V.  Bostwick,   65   How.   Pr.    (N. 

Y.)   146  1454,   1614 

V.  Northern    R.    Co.,    25    U.    C. 

Q.   B.   165  897 

V.  Shower,  18  Iowa  261  1145 

Chilton   V.    Braiden,   2   Black    (U. 

S.)    458  1063,  1115 

Chimera,  The,  Coote,  Adm.  138  1781 
China,  The,  7  Wall.  (U.  S.)  53  1769 
Chisholm    v.    Randolph,    21    111. 

App.    312  1199,   1532 

V.  The    J.    L.    Pendergrast,    32 

Fed.  415  1706 

V.  Williams,  128  111.  115 

1257,   1532,  1591 
Chitwood     V.     Trimble,     2     Baxt. 

(Tenn.)    78  1111,  1116,   1119 

Choate        v.      Tighe,      10     Heisk. 

(Tenn.)    621  1069 

Choteau  v.  Thompson,  2  Ohio  St. 

114  1220,    1257,    1272,    1325,    1326, 

1327,  1370,  1437,  1480, 

1481,    1482,    1492 

Chouteau    Spring    Co.    v.    Harris, 

20  Mo.   382  381 

Chowning  v.  Barnett,  30  Ark.  560    109 

Chrisman  v.  Hay,  43  Fed.  552         1074 

Christian    v.    Allee,    104    111.    App. 

177  1074,   1090,   1408 

V.   Clark,  10  Lea  (Tenn.)  630     1120 

V.  Ellis,   1   Grat.    (Va.)    396  787 

V.  Field,  2  Hare  177  1182 

V.   Illinois  Malleable  Iron  Co., 

92  111.  App.  320  1313 

Christian-Craft    Grocery    Co.    v. 

Kling,  121  Ala.  292  1370,  1462a 

Christman  v.  Charleville,   36  Mo. 

610  1558 

Christmas    v.    Russell,    14    Wall. 

(U.    S.)    69  48,   57 

Christnot  v.  Montana  G.  &  S.  M. 

Co.,    1    Mont.    44  1308 

Christopher    v.     Christopher,     64 

Md.    583  1076 

Christy  v.  Ogle.  33  111.  295  1127a 

V.  Perkins,     6    Daly     (N.    T.) 

237  193 

Church  V.  Allison,  10  Pa.  St.  413   1284 

V.  Bloom,  111   Iowa  319  583 

V.   Griffith,    9    Pa.    St.    117  1274 

V.  McLeod,    58   Vt.    541  820 


Church   V.   Smith,   39   Wis.   492        1107 
V.   Smithea,  4  Colo.  App.  175     1462 
Chusan,  The.  2  Story   (U.  S.)   455 

1681,   1800a,    lS06a,    1808 
Cimbria,  The.  156  Fed.  378 

1681,   1682,  1800 
Cincinnati     Tobacco     Warehouse 

Co.   V.   Leslie,   117   Ky.    478     63,   983 
Circassian,    The,    1    Ben.    (U.    S.) 

209  1713 

Citizens'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Culver,  54 

N.   H.   327  232 

Citizens'    State   Bank    v.    Adams, 

91    Ind.   280  1100 

Citizen's  State  Bank  of  Monroe- 
ville,  Ind.,  v.  Kalamazoo  Coun- 
ty Bank,   111   Mich.   313  377 
Citizens'    Sav.    Bank    of    Olin    v. 

Woods,   134  Iowa  232  586,   616 

City  Bank   Case,  Ex  parte,   3  De 

G.,   F.   &   J.   629  248,   251 

City  Nat.  Bank  of  Marshalltown 

V.  Crahan.  135  Iowa  230  1014 

City  of  Camden,  147  Fed.  847 

1693,   1699 
City  of  London,   The,   1   W.  Rob. 

(U.   S.)    88  1700 

City  of  Mexico,  The,  28  Fed.  239  1694 
City  of  New  York,  The,  3  Blatchf. 

(U.  S.)    187  1690 

City  of  Pittsburgh,  The,  45  Fed. 

699  1677,   1760 

City  of  Salem,  The.  10  Fed.  843  1759 
City  of  Salem.  The.  31  Fed.   616 

1699,  1732 
City  of  Tawas,  The,  3  Fed.  170 

1779,   1788,   1802 
Claes  V.   Dallas   &c.   Loan   Assn., 

83  Texas  50  1226,   1462 

Claflin  V.  Bennett,  51  Fed.  693  147 
Clain  V.  Hutton,  131  Cal.  132  1356 
Clanton  v.  Eaton,   92  Ala.   612  603 

Clapp  v.  Peck,   55  Iowa  270 

878    935 
V.   Peterson,   104   111.   26  '     84 

v.   Sohmer,  55  Iowa  273       878,  960 
Clara  A.  Mclntyre,  The,   94   Fed. 

552  ,  1679 

Clare  v.  Lockard,  122'  N.  Y.  263       231 

Clark  V.  Adams,  33  Mich.   159  712 

V.   Anderson,   88   Minn.    200        1430 

V.  B.  B.  Richards  Lumber  Co., 

68  Minn.  282  846 

V.  Beyrle,  160  Cal.  306     1190,  1375 
V.  Binninger,  L.  Abb.  N.  C.  (N. 

Y.)    421  228 

V.   Boarman,  89  Md.  428    1431,  1573 
V.  Burns,  118  Mass.  275  503 

V.   Dobbins,   52   Ga.    656        454,   577 
V.   Draper,  19  N.  H.  419 

800,   802,  854 
V.   Erwin,  72  Miss.   926  854 

V.   Farrar,    74   N.   Car.    686  457 

V.   Fraley,  3  Blackf.  (Ind.)  264    572 
V.   Hale,  34  Hale  398  733 

V.  Hall,  10  Kans.  80  1330 

V.   Hall,   7  Paige    (N.  Y.)   382        i  or, 
V.   Haynes,    57    Iowa    96  616 

V.   Huey,  12  Ind.  App.   224  1391 

V.  Hunt,  3   J.  J.  Marsh.    (Ky.) 

553  1074 

V.   Kingsley,    8    Allen    (Mass.) 

543  1207,  1534 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


Ixxv 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Clark    V.    Lowell    &    L.    R.    Co.,    9 

Gray     (Mass.)     2:>,1  304,   305 

V.  Manning-,    90    111.    380  1199 

V.   Manning-,  95  111.  580    1580,  1585 
V.  Manning,     4    Bradw.     (111.) 

649  1580 

V.  Mauran,    3    Paige     (N.    T.) 

373  45,  880 

V.  Merchants'  Bank,   2   N.   Y. 

380  258 

V.  Moore,  64  111.  273  1013,  1016, 
1199,  1465,  1519,  1531,  1536 
V.  Parker,  58  Iowa  509  1257,  1539 
V.  Raymond,  27  Mich.  456  1591 
V.   Schatz,   24  Minn.   300  1392 

V.   Smith,  6  M.  &  G.  1051      196,   203 
V.  Smith,  14  111.  361  1728 

V.   Stilson,  36  Mich.  482  1098 

V.  Taylor,   91  Cal.   552  1616 

Clarke  v.  Boyle,  51  111.  104  1199 

V.   Curtis,  11  Leigh  (Va.)  559     1072 
V.  Royle,    3    Sim.    499  1074 

V.   Soiithwick,    1   Curt.    (U.   S.) 

297  30,  35 

Clarkson  v.  E)des,  4  Cow.   (N.  T.) 
195  262 

V.  Louterback,    36    Fla.    600    1495 
Claybrooks  v.  Kelly,   61  Tex.  634 

1067,  1069 
Clay,  Succession  of,  34  La.  Ann. 

1131  1063 

Clayton    v.    Butterfleld,    10    Rich. 
(S.  Car.)  300  507 

V.   Farrar  Lumber  Co.,  119  Ga. 

37  1574 

Clayton,  The,  5  Biss.  (U.  S.)  162    1704 
Clear  Creek  Co.  v.  Root,  1  Colo. 

374  1191,  1559 

Clement  v.  Newton,  78   111.   427     1532 
Clementson    v.    Grand    Trunk    R. 

Co.,  42  U.  C.  Q.  B.   263  949 

Clemson   v.    Davidson,    5   Binn. 

(Pa.)    392  21,   68,   460 

Cleveland    v.    Martin,    2    Head 

(Tenn.)   128  1108,   1119 

Cleveland  C.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Knick- 
erbocker  Trust  Co.,    86   Fed.    73 

1618,  1619,   1664 
Cleveland     &c.     Lumber     Co.     v. 

Piggse,   84  Ark.  126  1235 

Clevenger     v.     Dunaway,     84     111. 

367  613 

Cleverly    v.    Moseley,    148    Mass. 

280  1401,   1421,   1600 

Clifford  V.  Beems,  3  Watts   (Pa.) 

246  632 

V.   Gruelle,  17  Ky.  L.  842  1092 

V.  Turrill,   2  De  G.   &  Sm.   1       121 

Clifton  V.  Foster,  103  Mass.  233     1546 

Cline  Piano   Co.  v.   Sherwood,   57 

Wa.sh.    239  192 

Clinton,  The.  160  Fed.  421  1681 

Close   V.    Clark,    16   Daly    (N.   T.) 
91  1411 

V.  Waterhouse,  6  East  523n         731 
Cloud    V.    Kendrick,    1    Wklv.    N. 
Cas.    (Pa.)    601  '  1349 

v.  Needles,   6  Md.   501  590 

Clough  V.  McDonald,  18  Kans.  114 

1202,   1289,   1304,   1428 
V.  Mississippi    &    R.    R.   Boom 

Co.,    64  Minn.   87  713 

Clyde  V.  Simpson,   4  Ohio  St.   445 

89,   1163 


Clyde    V.    Steam    Trans.    Co.,    36 

Fed.    501  1729,    1773,    1794 

Clymene,  The,   12   Fed.   346  1712 

C.  N.  Johnson,  The,  19  Fed.  782     1804 
Coakley  v.  Rickard.  120  N.  Y.  S. 

1118  184 

Coal-Float   v.    Jeffersonville,   112 

Ind.   15  1743 

Coates  V.  Acheson,   23   Mo.   App. 
255  513 

V.  Donnell,   16  J.  &  S.   (N.  Y.) 

46  42,   542 

V.   Doran,   83  Mo.   337  57 

V.   Railton,  6  B.  &  C.  422     917,   921 
Cobb   V.   Howard,   3  Blatchf.    (U. 

S.)    524  1798 

Cobbey  v.  Dorland,  50  Nebr.  373     183 
Coburn   v.   Harvey,   18   Wis.   148 

624,   640 
V.  Kerswell,  35  Maine  126 

710,   724,  1010 
V.  Stephens,  137  Ind.  683  1405 

Cocheco  Bank  v.  Berry,  52  Maine 

293  1440,    1465 

Cochran  v.  Ripy,  13  Bush   (Ky.) 

495  825 

V.  Waits,  127  Ga.   93  611 

V.  Wimberly,   44  Miss.   503        1109 

Cochrane   v.    Schryver,    17    N.    Y. 

Week.  Dig.  442  512,  513,  515 

Cockburn    v.    Watkins,    76    Ala. 

486  603 

Cockrill    V.    Joyce,    62    Ark.    216 

241,  248 
Coddington  v.  Bay,  20  Johns.   (N. 
Y )    637  259 

■V-.    Beebe,    29    N.    J.    L.    550       1216 
V.   Hudson  County  Dry  Dock, 
&c.,    Co.,   31   N.   J.   L.    477 

1216,  1258,  1358,  1370 
Code  V.  Carlton,  18  Nebr.  328  1657 
Codling  V.  Nast,  8  Mo.  App.  573  1417 
Codwise  v.  Taylor,  4  Sneed.  (Ky.) 

346  1102a 

Coe  V.  Hart,  6  Am.  L.  Reg.  27  'i^^ 

V.  New  Jersey  Midland  R.  Co., 

27  N.  J.   Eq.   110  74 

V.    New   Jersey   M.    R.    Co.,    31 

N.  J.  Eq.  105  1384,  1660 

V.    New   Jersey   M.   R.    Co.,    34 

N.   J.   Eq.    266  1660 

V.  Ritter,   86  Mo.   277        1418,   1579 

Coenen    v.    Staub,    74    Iowa   32       1349 

Coffey   V.    Smith,   52   Ore.    538         1444 

Coffin   V.    Heath,    6   Met.    (Mass.) 

76  1147,   1148 

V.    Reynolds,    37    N.   Y.    640        1629 

Cogel  V.  Mickow,  11  Minn.   475     1382 

Coggill   V.    Hartford   &   N.    H.    R. 

Co.,   3   Gray    (Mass.)    545  820 

Cohee   v.   Baer,   134   Ind.   375         1604a 
Cohen  v.   Broughton,   54   Ga.   296 

571,    612 

V.   Kyler,    27   Mo.    122  1387 

V.  Woollard,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  686   1102a 

Cohn  V.  Hager,  30  Ark.  25     1189,  1235 

V.  Wright,  89  Cal.   86       1405,  1589 

Coit    V.    Fougera,    36    Barb.     (N. 

Y.)    195  1086,   loss 

V.  Schwartz,   29  Kans.   344  445 

V.  Waples,  1  Minn.  134  986 

Colclough  V.  Mathis,   79  Ga.  394     611 

Coldeleugh    v.    Johnson,    34    Ark. 

312  1123 


Ixxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,  §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§  1061-1812.] 


Cole   V.    Barron,    8   Mo.    App.    509 

1404,  1407,  1449,  1591,  1615 
V.  Bennett,   6   Price   15  203 

V.  Berry,  42  N.  J.  L.  308  820 

V.  Clark,  85  Maine  336  1235 

V.    Colby,    57   N.   H.    98 

1313,    1314,    1317 
V.   Custer  County  Agric,   &c., 
Assn.,   3   S.   Dak.   272 

1421.   1600 
V.    Grant,    2    Caines     (N.    Y.) 

105  217 

V.  McNeill,  99  Ga.  250  1365 

V.  Scott,   2  Wash.    (Va.)    141     1064 
V.    Smith,    24    W.    Va.    287 

40,  1069,   1072 

V.  Turner,  4  Russ.  376  1163 

V.    Tyng-,    24    111.    99  973 

V.   Uhl,   46   Conn.    296        1444,    1603 

Colean  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Jones,  122  111. 

App.  172  613 

Coleg-rave    v.    Manley,    T.    &    R. 

400  122,   122a.   132 

Coleman    V.    Austin,    99    Ga.    629 

173,  210 
V.  Ballandi,  22  Minn.  144  1382 
V.  Fairbanks,  28  La.  Ann.  93  620 
V.  Howell,   (N.  J.)   16  Atl.  202 

1171 
V.  Ryan,   58  Ga.  132  233 

V.   Siler,    74  Ala.   435 

579,  583,  585,  603 
Cole  Mfg.  Co.   V.  Falls,   90   Tenn. 

466  1225,   1304a 

Coles  V.  Marquand,  2  Hill  (N.  T.) 
447  577 

V.  Withers,  33  Grat.   (Va.)  186 

1099,  1109,  1116 

Colfax,    The,    179    Fed.    975    1680,    1756 

Collett  V.  Preston,  15  Beav.  458      216 

Colley  V.  Doughty,  62  Maine  501    1570 

Collier  v.  Hecht-Brittingham  Co., 

7    Ga.   178  174 

V.  Pfenning,  34  N.  J.  Eq.  22     1487 

Collins  V.  Blake,  79  Maine  218,       108 

V.  Cowan,  52  Wis.  634  730 

V.    Hathaway,     Olc.      (U.     S.) 

Adm.  205 

V.  Martin,  1  Bos.   &  P.   648  248 

V.  Megraw,  47  Mo.  495       1263,  1264 
V.   Mott,    45   Mo.    100 

1335,  1341,  1384,  1478 
V.  New  Albany,  59  Ind.  396  1370 
V.    Nickerson,    1    Sprague    (U. 

S.)    125  205 

V.    Patch,    156   Mass.    317  1368 

V.    Snoke,    9    Wash.    566  1398 

Collins'  Appeal,  35  Pa.  83         571,  633 

Collins  Granite  Co.  v.  Devereux, 

72    Maine    422  761 

Collinson   v.    Owens,    6   Gill   &   J. 

(Md.)    4  75 

Collman    v.    Collins,    2    Hall    (N. 

T.)    569  304 

Colman  v.   Goodnow,   36   Minn.    9 

1248,   1259,   1451,    1452 
Colorado  Iron  Works  v.  Ricken- 
berg,  4  Idaho  262  1283 

V.  Riekenberg,  4  Idaho  705       1327 
V.   Taylor,  12  Colo.  App.   451    1249 
Colorado    State    Bank    v.    David- 
son, 7  Colo.  App.  91  171,  173 
Colquitt  V.   Kirkman,   47   Ga.   555 

655,    692 


Colt  V.  Fougers,  36  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)    195  1071 

v.  Lawrenceburg  Lumber  Co., 

44   Ind.   App.   122  1262 

Colter   V.    Frese,    45    Ind.    96 

1200,    1286,    1305 
Columbia  Finance  &  Trust  Co.  v. 

Morgan,   19   Ky.   L.   1761  1130 

Columbia,    The,    27    Fed.    704 

1769,    1799 
Columbus     Southern     R.     Co.     v. 

Woolfolk,   94   Ga.    507  308 

Columbus,   The,    5   Sawy.    (U.   S.) 

4S7  1690,    1729,    1731 

Combination    Land    Co.    v.    Mor- 
gan,   95    Cal.    548  1077 
Combs  V.  Lippincott,   35  N.  J.  L. 

481  1216 

Comfort,   The,    25    Fed.    158  1686 

Commercial    Bank    of   Albany   v. 

Hughes,  17  Wend.    (N.  Y.)   92      241 
Commercial    Loan,    &c.,    Assn.    v. 

Trevette,    160    111.    390  1504 

Commercial    Nat.    Bank    v.    Heil- 

bronner,  108  N.  Y.  439    418,  466,  478 
Commercial      Telegram      Co.      v. 
Smith,    57    Hun    (N.    Y.)    176 

188,  189,  194,   209 
Commerell  v.  Poynton,  1  Swanst. 

1  122a 

Commonwealth   v.    Lelar,    8   Leg. 

Int.    50  590 

Commonwealth  Title  Ins.  & 
Trust  Co.  V.  Ellis,  192  Pa.  St. 
321  1500a 

Compher  v.    Missouri    &    K.    Tel. 

Co.,  137  Mo.  App.  89  181a 

Compton    V.    State,    38    Ark.    601 

151,  230,  231 
Comstock      V.       McCracken,       53 
Mich.   123  731,   1023 

V.   McEvoy,   52   Mich.    324  1208 

Conant  v.  Brackett,  112  Mass. 
18  1276,    1280 

V.    Seneca    Co.    Bank,    1    Ohio 

St.  298  376,  404 

Conard  v.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.,  1 
Pet.    (U.  S.)   386  451,  946 

V.   Nicoll,   4  Pet.    (U.   S.)    291       451 
V.   Pacific  Ins.   Co.,   6  Pet.    (U. 

S.)    262  451 

Concord  Apartment  House  Co.  v. 
O'Brien,   228   111.    476  1505 

V.    O'Brien,    128    111.    App.    437 

1502,   1505 
Condict  V.  Flowers.  106  111.  105     1540 
Condon  v.   Church  of  St.  Augus- 
tine, 112  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)   168   1616 
Cones  V.   Brooks,    60   Nebr.    698 

132,   183 
Confiscation  Cases,  1  Woods   (U. 

S.)    221  620 

Conklin  v.   Bauer,    62   N.   Y.    620 

1245,  1247 
V.  Carver,  19  Ind.  226  657.  687 
V.  Second  Nat.  Bank,  45  N.  Y. 

655  384 

V.    Wood,    3    E.    D.    Smith    (N. 

Y.)    662  1390.    1  1^4.   1455 

Conlan    v.    Leonard,    82    N.    J.    L. 

108  1581 

Conlee  v.  Clark.  14  Ind.  App.  205 

1445 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


Ixxvii 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,  §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§  1061-1812.] 


Connah    v.    Hale,    23    Wend.    (N. 

Y.)    462  564 

Connecticut  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Scott,  81  Ky.  540  405 

Connell  v.  Beattie,  34  Ark.  113     1126 
V.    Drumback,    18    Ohio    C.    C. 

502  159 

Conner    v.    Banks,    18    Ala.    42 

1116,    1119 

V.   Boyd,   73  Ala.   385  196 

V.   Lewis,  16  Maine   268  1248 

Connolly  v.  Bouck.  174  Fed.  312       63 

Connor  v.  Mason,   143   Ky.    635     1203 

Conover  v.   Warren,    6  111.   498       1063 

Conrad    v.    Atlantic    Ins.    Co.,    1 

Pet.    (U.    S.)    386  11 

V.   Patzelt,   29  La.  Ann.   465         620 

V.  Starr,   50  Iowa  470 

1201,  1257,  1469,  1558 

Conrow  v.  Little,  115  N.  Y.   387      743 

V.  Little,  41  Hun   (N.  Y.)   395  9 

Conroy  v.  Woods.  13  Cal.  626    791,  795 

Consignees'   Favorite  Box  Co.   v. 

Speer,    5    Ga.    App.    156  708 

Consolidated   Engineering  Co.   v. 

Crowley,   105   La.    615  1204,   1328 

Constantia,     The,     6    Rob.    Adm. 

321  884,  886 

Constantine  v.  The  River  Queen, 

2    Fed.    731  1716 

Center   v.    Farrington,    46    Minn. 

336  1397 

Continental  B.  &  L.  Assn.  v.  Hut- 
ton,   144  Cal.   609  1404 
Converse    v.    Hill,    14    La.    Ann. 
89  859 
V.  Sorley,  39  Tex.   515                  1101 
Conveyor,    The,    147    Fed.    586        1700 
Conway   v.    Crook,    66   Md.    290 

1206,   1262,   1263,   1264 
v.    Lowry,    7    W.    N.    C.    (Pa.) 

64  632 

V.   Starkweather,   1   Denio    (N. 

Y.)    113  571 

Conwell  V.  Kuykendall,  29  Kans. 

707  576 

Conyer.'?    v.    Funis,    2    Mason    (U. 

S.)    236  882 

V.  Gray,  67  Ga.  329  151 

Good  V.  Pollard,  10  Price  109  1011 

Cook    V.    Atkins,    173    Ala.    363 

999    1075 
V.    Banker,    50    N.    Y.    655        '        • 
96,    1081,    1183 
V.   Black,    54  Iowa   693  32 

V.    Cobb,    101    N.    Car.    68  784 

V.   Gregg,  46  N.  Y.   439  103 

V.   Heald,    21    111.    425  1554 

V.  Kraft,  60  Barb.   (N.  Y.)   409 

1081 
V.   Murphy,    150   Pa.    St.    41 

1289,   1502 
V.    Prentice,    13    Oregon    482 

498    501 
V.  Ross,  117  N.  Car.  193  1365 

V.   TuUis,      18      Wall.      (U.    S.) 

332  1180 

V.   Vreeland,   21   111.   431  1199 

V.    Williams      (Pa.),     24     Atl. 

746  1289 

Cooke  V.  Thresher,  51  Conn.   105 

137,   146,   154,  228 
Cook,   In   re,    3   Biss.    (U.    S.)    116 

1470,  1546 


Cook's  Admr.  v.  Brannin,  87  Ky. 

101  431,  463 

Cooley  V.  Holcomb.  68  Conn.  35     1445 
V.    Patterson,     52     Maine     472 

165,  194 
Coombe  v.  Knox,  28  Mont.  202  182 
Coombs    V.    Bristol    &    Exeter   R. 

Co.,   27    L.    J.    Ex.    401  310 

Cooper  V.  Bill,  3  H.  &  C.  722    835,  921 
V.   Cappel,   29  La.  Ann.   213  620 

V.  Cleghorn,   50  "Wis.  113  1340 

V.   Jackson,   107   Ga.    255  1367 

V.   Kimball,   123   N.   Car.   120        457 
V.   Merritt,   30   Ark.    686  1105 

V.    Singleton,    19    Tex.    260      1102a 
Cooper,    Ex    parte,    11    Ch.    Div. 

68  320,  834,  836,  837,  926,  940 

Cooper  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Delahant,   36 

Ore.   402  1406,  1453 

Cooper's   Trusts,   In   re,   4  De  G., 

M.  &  G.  757  1164 

Coorsen    v.    Ziehl,    103    Wis.    381, 

562  1262,    1264 

Coos  Bay  Wagon  Co.  v.  Crocker, 

6  Sawyer  (U.  S.)   574  1063,  1064 

Coover's  Appeal,  29  Pa.  St.  97,  80,  795 
Cope   V.    Vallette    Dock   Co.,    119 

U.    S.    625  1677 

Copeland    v.    Dixie    Lumber    Co., 
(Ala.),    57    So.    124  1613 

V.    Kehoe,    67    Ala.    594 

105,    1253,    1260,    1261,    1263 
V.    Manton,    22    Ohio    St.    398 

1287,  1301 
V.   Stein,   8  T.   R.   199  433 

Copeland    v.    Bosquet,    4    Wash. 

588  820 

Copley  V.   Hay,   16   Daly    (N.   Y.) 
446  1511 

V.   O'Neil,     57     Barb.     (N.     Y.) 

299  1239 

Coplinger   v.   The   David   Gibson, 

14    Ind.    480  1743 

Copp   V.    Copp,   103   Maine   51  711 

Coram  v.  Ingersoll,  148  Fed.  169 

177G 
Corbett    v.    Chambers,    109    Cal. 
178  1398 

V.   Gushing,   4  N.   Y.   S.   616        522a 
v.   Greenlaw,    117   Mass.    167 

1259,    1414 
V.    Laurens,    5    Rich.    Eq.     (S. 

Car.)   301  1149,  1159 

Corbin   Banking  Co.   v.   Mitchell, 

141    Ky.    172  376 

Corbitt  V.  Reynolds,  68  Ala.  378 

576a,    603 
Cordova    v.    Hood,    17    Wall.     (U. 

S.)   1  1084,  1090,  1092,   1098 

Cordova    Coal    Co.    v.    Long,    91 

Ala.    538  1071 

Corey  v.   Harte,   21   Weekly  Dig. 

247  228 

Corlies  v.  Howland,   26  N.  .J.   Eq. 

311  1063,   1074,   1082,   1083,   1090 

Corliss,    Mr.,    34    Alb.    L.    J.    364 

791,    795 
Cornelia    Planing    Mills    v.    Wil- 
cox,   129    Ga.    522  1262 
Cornell    v.    Barney,    26    Hun    (N. 
Y.)   134                                       1273,  1281 
V.    Barney,   94   N.   Y.    394 

1235,   1236,   1280,    1281 


Ixxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Cornell  v.  Conine-Eaton  Lumber 

Co.,   9   Colo.   A  pp.   2:>.5  1572 

V.   Lamb,   2   Cow.    (N.   Y.)    652 

571,   598 
V.    Lamb,    20    Johns.    (N.    Y.) 

407  586 

V.  Matthews,  27  N.  J.  L.  522    1216 
Corning   v.    Ashley,    51    Hun    (N. 
Y.)    483  691a 

V.   Loomis,    111   Mich.    23  1099 

Cornwall  v.  Haig-ht,   8   Barb.    (N. 
Y.)    327  800 

V.   Arctic,   The,    75   Fed.    601      1699 
Corsair,  The,  145  U.  S.  335    1725,  1729 
Corwine  v.  Corwine,  23  N.  J.  Eq. 
368  1164 

V.  Corwine,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  579     1163 
Cory  V.   Barnes,   63    Vt.    456  816 

Coryell  v.  Ferine.  6  Rob.   (N.  Y.) 

23  1722,  1725 

Cosgrove  v.  Farwell,  114  111.  App. 

491  1519 

Cost    V.    Newport    Builders,    &c., 

Co.,   85  Ark.   407  1289,  1298 

Costello  V.   Portsmouth  Brewing 

Co.,    69    N.    H.    405  377 

Coster   V.    Greenpoint   Ferry   Co., 
5    Civ.    Proc.    R.    (N.    Y.)    146 

185,  198,  210 
Costigan    v.    Stewart,    76    Kans. 

353  176 

Cotes  V.   Shorey,   8   Iowa  416 

1236,    1325,   1327 
Cotta   V.    Carr,   27   Misc.    (N.   Y.) 

545  673 

Cotten  V.  McGehee,  54  Miss.  510 

1092 
Cottman  v.  Martin,  1  Mete.  (Ky.) 

563  1074 

Cotton    V.    Arnold,    118    Mo.    App. 

596  697 

Cottrell  V.  Finlayson,  2  Code  Rep. 

(N.   Y.)    116  151 

Couch  V.  Davidson,  109  Ala.  313     603 
Coug-hlan    v.    Longini,    77    Minn. 

514  1445 

Coughlin  V.   N.   Y.   Cent.   &  Hud. 
R.   Co.,   71  N.  Y.   443 

164,    165,   184,    188,   193, 
196,    197,    203,    206,    208 
Coulter,    In    re,    2   Sawyer    (U.    S. 

42  1546 

Coumbe,   In   re,    24   Grant    (Ont.) 

Ch.   519  276,   330 

Counsman  v.   Modern   "Woodmen, 

69   Nebr.   710  208 

Count    de   Lesseps,    The,    17    Fed. 

460  1722 

Couper  V.    Gaboury,    69   Fed.    7     1641 
Courtemanche  v.  Blackstone  Val. 

St.  R.  Co.,  170  Alass.  50        1207.  1244 
Courtney    v.    Insurance    Co.,    49 
Fed.    309  1213 

V.    McGavock,    23    Wis.     619 

197,  208,  209 
Couturie  v.   Roensch    (Tex.),    134 

S.  W.    413  474 

Covell    V.    Hitchcock,    23    Wend. 
(N.   Y.)    611  921.    <I35,   965 

V.  Weston,   20  Johns.    (N.  Y.) 

414  1174 

Coventry   v.    Gladstone,   L.    R.    6 
Eq.    44  917 


Covington  v.  Bass,   88  Tenn.  396 

190,  203,  223 
V.  Newberger,  99  N.  Car.  523      499 
Cowan      V.      Sharp,      11      Heisk. 

(Tenn.)   450  1092 

Cowardin    v.    Anderson,     78    Va. 

88  1157 

Cowasjee  v.  Thompson,   5  Moore 

P.    C.    165  878,    907,    914 

Cowdrey  v.    Galveston,   H.    &    H. 

R.  Co.,  93  U.  S.  352  147,  167 

Cowdrick    v.    Morris,    9    Pa.    Co. 

Ct.   312  1309d 

Cowell    V.    Simpson,    16    Ves.    275 

128,  154,   850,  1000,   1009,  1011 
Cowen  V.  Boone,  48  Iowa  350   229,  231 
V.   Paddock,   137   N.   Y.    188        1254 
Cowing    V.    Snow,    11    Mass.    415 

268,   270,   1035 
Cowl    V.    Varnum,    37    111.    181 

1074,  1519 
Cowper  V.  Andrews,  Hobart  39 

731 
Cowperthwaite  v.  Sheffield,  3  N. 
Y.    243  56 

V.  Sheffield,  3  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct. 

416  55 

Cox  V.   Broderick,   4   B.   D.   Smith 
(N.   Y.)    721  1298,   1543 

V.   Burns,   1    Iowa   64 

861,   866,   924,   965 
V.  Cagle,  112  Ga.  157  1361 

V.  Colles.  17  Bradw.    (111.)    503 

1532  1599 
V.  Fletcher,  5  Ga.  App.  297'  708 
V.    Jordan,    86    111.    560  613 

V.  Keiser,  as  Bradw.   (111.)  432 

1535 
V.    North    Wisconsin    Lumber 

Co.,    81    Wis.    141  719 

V.    McMullen,    14    Grat.    (Va.) 

82  1158 

V.  Murray,  1  Abb.  Adm.  (U.  S.) 

340  1713 

V.  Rominc,   9  Grat.   (Va.)   27     1098 
V.    Smith,    93    Ark.    371  1071 

V.    Western    Pac.    R.    Co.,    44 
Cal.  18 

1394,    1619,    1620,    1637 
V.  Western    Pac.    R.     Co.,     47 
Cal.   87 

1394.    1619,    1620,   1637 
Cox's    Succession,     32     La.    Ann. 

1035  1204 

Coykendall    v.    Eaton,    55    Barb. 

(N.  Y.)    188  506 

Cozzens  v.  Whitneu,  3  R.  I.   79       229 
Craddock    v.    Dwight,     85    Mich. 
587  712 

V.      Riddlesbarger,      2      Dana 

(Ky.)    205  552,   618 

Craft    V.    Russell,    67    Ala.    9 

1077,  1083 
Craggs  V.  Earls,  8  Okla.  462  1063 
Crasin   v.    O'Connell,   169   N.    Y. 

573  800 

V.  Travis,   1  How.  Pr.    (N.  Y.) 

157  217 

Craig  V.  Dunn,  47  Minn.  59  1142 
V.  Merime,  16  111.  App.  214  613 
V.    Smith,    37    N.    J.    L.    549 

1216,    1287,   1301 
V.    Swinerton,    8    Hun    (N.   Y.) 

144  1247 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxix 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,    §§   1061-1812.] 


Grain  v.  National  Life  Ins.  Co. 
of  U.  S.,  56  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
406  990,  1126 

Crampton  v.  Prince,  83  Ala.  246    1087 
Crandall    v.    Cooper,    62    Mo.    478 

1462a,    1469,    1470 
V.    Lyon,    188    111.    86  1405 

V.    Sorg,    198    111.    48  1279 

Crane    v.    Genin,     60    N.    T.     127 

1218,  1286,  1287,   1293,  1295 
Crane     Mfg.     Co.     v.     Keck,     35 

Nebr.   683  1307 

Crans    v.    Hamilton    County,    87 

Ind.   162  1086 

Cranston  v.  Union  Trust  Co.,  75 
Mo.    29  1619 

V.   Cargo   of   250   Tons   Coal,   2 

Fed.   614  310 

V.    Philadelphia     Ins.     Co.,     5 

Binn.    (Pa.)    538  425,   469 

Crass    V.    Memphis    &    C.    R.    R. 

Co.,    96   Ala.   447  336 

Craton  v.  Wright,  16  Iowa  133     1142 
Craven    v.    Ryder,    6    Taunt.    433 

801,    841,    960 
V.   Ryder,    2   Marsh.   127  914 

Crawcour   v.   Salter,    18    Ch.    Div. 

30  820 

Crawcour,    Ex    parte,    9    Ch.   Div. 

419  820 

Crawford  v.  Anderson,  129  Ind. 
117  1313 

V.    Blackman,    30    Kans.    527 

1430,  1432 
V.  Coil.  69  Mo.  588  626 

V.    Collins,    45    Barb.    (N.    T.) 

269  1756 

V.    Crockett,    55    Ind.    220 

1200,    1206,    1337,   1574 
V.  Powell,  101  Ind.  421  1200 

V.  Richeson,  101  111.  351         99,  993 
V.   The  Caroline  Reid,   42   Cal. 

469         ,  1729.  1738 

Crawfordsville    v.    Barr,    45    Ind. 

258  1327 

v.  Barr,   65   Ind.  367  1368,   1574 

V.   Boots,    76   Ind.    32  1421 

v.    Brundage,    57    Ind.    262  1327 

V.    Irwin,    46    Ind.    438  1200 

V.  Johnson,  51  Ind.  397     1200,  1423 

V.    Lockhart,    58    Ind.    477  1327 

Crawley   v.    Riggs,    24   Ark.    563 

1092,    1096 
Crawshay    v.    Eades,    1    B.    &    C. 
181  926,  927,  942,   962 

v.    Homfray,    4   B.    &   Aid.    50 

6,   322,   850,   973,    988,    1002,    1004 
Cray   v.    Samuel,    65    Ga.    739  572 

Crean    v.    McFee,    2    Miles     (Pa.) 

214  1511,   1552 

Creer  v.  Cache  Valley  Canal  Co., 

4    Idaho    280  1479 

Creighton   v.   Ingersoll,   20   Barb. 

(N.  Y.)    541  187 

Cresap    v.    Manor,    63    Tex.    485      1086 
Crescent,    The,    88    Fed.    298  1808 

Crill  v.  Jeffrey,   95   Iowa   C34  616 

Crilly    V.    Philip    Rinn    Co.,    135 

111.  App.   198  1599 

Crippen    v.    Heermana,    9    Paige 

(N.    Y.)    211  1088 

Cripwell,  Ex  parte,  5  Dowl.  Pr. 
Cas.  689  150 


Crisflel   v.   Murdock,   55   Hun    (N. 

Y.)    143  99 

Crisrnon     v.     Barse     Live     Stock 

Com.  Co.,  17  Okla.  117  674a 

Cristobal     Colon,     The,     44     Fed. 

803  1771 

Crocker  v.   Mann,   3   Mo.   472  626 

Croft    V.    Perkins,    174    111.    627 

1003,  1064,  1083 
Croke  v.  Thresher,  51  Conn.  105     158 
Crommelin    v.    N.    Y.    &    Harlem 
R.    Co.,    43    (N.    Y.)     (4    Keyes) 
90  281,   282,   731 

Cromwell  v.  Owings,  7  Har.  &  J. 

(Md.)    55  562 

Cronan  v.   Corbett,   78   Conn.    475 

1313,  1421 
Cronk     v.     Whittaker,     1     E.     D. 

Smith     (N.    Y.)    647  1298 

Cronkright  v.   Thomson,   1   E.   D. 

Smith   (N.  Y.)   661      1298,  1588,  1614 
Crook    v.    Girard    Iron    &    Metal 

Co.,  87  Md.  138  381 

Crooks    V.    Allan,    5    Q.    R.    Div. 

OQ  288 

v.   Finney,   39   Ohio  St.   57 

1536,   ir.37 
Crosby  v.  Dracut,  109  Mass.  206    1142 
V.   Loop,    14    111.    330  1412 

v.  Morristown  &  C.  G.  R.  Co., 

(Tenn.)    42   S.   W.   507     1666a 
v.   The   Littie,    40    Fed.    367        1811 
Croskey  v.   Corey,  48   111.   442 

1519.   1528 
V.  Coryell,  2  Whart.   (Pa.)   223 

1329 
V.   Northwestern  Mfg.   Co.,   48 

111.    481  1199 

Cross  V.  Ackley,  40  Iowa  493  175 
V.  Brown,  (R.  I.)  33  Atl.  370  244 
V.  Burlington  &  S.  W.  R.  Co., 

58    Iowa    62  90 

V.   Daly,   5   Daly    (N.   Y.)    540    1543 
V.    Dore,    20    Wash.    121 

718,  730b,  1060f 
V.  O'Donnell,  44  N.  Y.  661  861,  912 
V.  Phenix  Bank.  1  R.  I.  39  402 
V.   Tome,    14    Md.    247  622 

V.   Wilkins,    43   N.    H.    332  515 

Crossan    v.    New    York    &    N.    E. 

R.    Co.,   149   Mass.   196  291,   297 

Cross    &    Gault's   Appeal,    97    Pa. 

St.    471  1179 

Cross'    Appeal,    In   re,    97   Pa.    St. 

471  28 

Crossland  v.   Powers,    (Ark.),    13 

S.    W.    722  1092 

Crotty    v.    MacKenzie,    52    How. 
Pr.    (N.  Y.)   54  184,  193,  209 

V.    McKenzie,    10    J.    &    S.    (N. 

Y.)    192  187,   188 

Crouch  V.   Moll,   56    Hun    (N.   Y.) 

603  1614 

Crowell  V.  Gilmore,  18  Cal.  370    1492 
Crowfoot    v.    Gurney,    2    Moo.    & 

Scott    473  43 

Crowl   V.   Nagle,    86   111.    437  1585 

Crowley  v.  Le  Due,  21  Minn.  412     179 
Crump  v.  Gill,   9  Phila.   (Pa.)  117 

1548 
Crystal  Stream,  The,  25  Fed.  575 

1708,   1709 
Cudworth   V.   Bostwick,   69   N.   H. 
536  1287,    1289 


Ixxx 


TALLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,  §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 


Cuer   V.    Ross,    49   "Wis.    652  719 

Culbertson  v.  Stevens,  82  Va.  406 

1065 
Culbreth    v.    Philadelphia   W.    &. 

B.  R.  Co..  3  Houst.   (Del.)  392       284 
Cullers  V.  First  Nat.  Bank  (Tex.), 

29  S.  "W.  72  1106 

Cullins   V.   Flag-staff  Silver   Min. 

Co.,   2   Utah   219  1366 

Culmer  v.  Caine,  22  Utah  216 

1413,  1443 

V.  Clift,   14   Utah   286  1370 

Culver    V.    Atwood,    67    111.    App. 

303  1184a 

V.   Atwood,   170  111.   433  1184 

V.   Elwell,   73  111.   536 

1312,   1313,   1610 
V.  Fleming-,    61    111.    498  1199 

V.  Lieberman,    69    N.    J.    L. 

341  1317 

V.   Schroth,   153    111.    437  1413 

Cumberland,  The,  30  Fed.  449 

1680,   1681,   1691,   1692,  1699 

Cuming  v.  Brown,  9  East  506  946 

V.   Wright,   72  Ga.  767  781 

Cummings    v.    Emslie,    49    Nebr. 

485  1486a 

v.   Gann,   52  Pa.  St.   484       487,   489 

v.  Harris,  3  Vt.  244     4,  5,  641,   731 

V.  Moore,  61  Miss.  184  1098 

V.  Oglesby,  50  Miss.  153  1119 

Cuney  v.  Bell,  34  Tex.  177  1075 

Cunnea  v.  Williams,   11   111.  App. 

72  554,   585,   588,   613 

Cunningliam   v.   Alabama,   L.   Co. 
4  Ala.   652  395,   577 

V.   Barr,   45  Kans.   158  1428 

V.   Ferry,  74  111.   426  1199 

V.   Hamill,  84  Mo.  App.  389  666 

V.  Hedrick,  23  W.  Va.  579         1125 
V.  McGrady,    2    Baxt.    (Tenn.) 

141  226 

V.   Widing,   5  Abb.  Pr.    (N.  Y.) 

413  133 

Cupp  V.  Lester,  104  Va.  350  1060b 
Cureton  v.  Gilmore,  3  S.  Car.  46  69 
Curie  v.  Wright,  140  Iowa  651  1610 
Curnew  v.  Lee,  143  Mass.  105  1338 
Curnow  v.    Blue   Gravel   &c.   Co., 

68    Cal.    262      1184,  1190,  1559,  1600 
Currier   v.    Boston    &   M.    R.    Co., 
37    N.    H.    223  158,   165,   212,   220 

v.   Cummings,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  145 

1278,   1335,   1479 
Curry     v.     Roulstone,     2     Overt. 

(Tenn.)    110  946 

Curtin  v.  The  Ashur  W.  Parker, 

84    Fed.    832  1800 

Curtis  V.  Broadwell,  66  Iowa  662 

120,   1201 
V.  Clarke,    113    Mich.    158  1074 

V.  Jones,   How.   App.   Cas.    (N. 

Y.)  137  731 

V.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.,  118 

Mo.  App.  341  181a 

Curtiss  V.  Ellenwood,  59  111.  App. 

110  613 

Gushing     v.      Breed,      14      Allen 

(Mass.)   376  835 

Cushwa  V.  Improvement  Loan  & 
Building  Assn.,   45   W.   Va.   490 

1532,   1535 
Cutcliff  V.  McAnally,   88  Ala.    507 

1260,  1261,   1431,  1432,  1438 


Cutler  V.  McCormick,  48  Iowa  406 

1286,  1287,   1290 
V.   Rae,  7  How.    (U.  S.)    729         310 


D 

Daggett  V.  Tracy,  128  Mass.  167 

1142 
Dahlstrom    v.    Featherstone,    18 

Idaho   179  173a 

Dailey  v.  Grimes,  27  Md.  440  572 

Daily   v.   Reid,    74   Ala.    415  1092 

Daisy    Day,    The,    40    Fed.    538 

1698,  1773,  1774,  17S1,  1786 
Dale     V.     Council     Bluffs     Sav. 

Bank,   65   Nebr.   692  668 

V.    Taylor,    63    Kans.    674  617 

Daley  v.  Legate,  169  Mass.  257     1324 
V.   Somers  Lumber   Co.,    70   N. 

J.    Eq.    343  1291 

Dalgleish    v.    Grandy,    1    N.    Car. 

249  631 

Dall  V.  Robinson,  115  Mass.  429    1313 
Dalles    Lumber    &    Mfg.    Co.    v. 
Wasco  Woolen  Mfg.  Co.,  3  Ore. 
527  1311,    1312 

Dalrymple    v.    Ramsey,    45    N.    J. 

Eq.   494  1216,  1244,   1560 

Dalton  V.  Laudahn.  27  Mich.  529    544 
V.   Rainey,   75   Tex.   516  1116 

Dalzell  V.   Daniel  Kaine,  The,  31 

Fed.   746  1696,   1699,   1717,   1760 

Dame  v.   Coffman,   58  Ind.   345       1262 
Damron    v.     Robertson,     12     Lea 

(Tenn.)    372  227 

Dana    v.    Brown,    1    J.    J.    Marsh. 
(Ky.)     304  375 

V.    Third    National    Bank,    13 

Allen    (Mass.)    445  57 

Dance     v.     Dance,     56     Md.     433 

1074,  1076 
Danforth   v.    Pratt,    42    Maine    50 

505     999 
Daniel  v.   Harris,   84   Ga.   479        '    612 
V.  Watson,   72  Tex.    642  1102 

V.  Weaver.  5  Lea  (Tenn.)  392, 

1176,  1235,  1272,  1334 
Daniel  Kaine,  The,  31  Fed.  746  1728 
Daniel  Kaine,  The,  35  Fed.  785  1697a 
Daniels  v.  Moses,  12   S.   Car.   130 

1116,    1123 
Dano  V.   Mississippi,   &c.,   Co.,   27 

Ark.   564  751,  778,  1494,  1619 

Danziger    v.    Simonson,    21    J.    & 

S.    (N.    Y.)    158  1218 

D'Aquila  v.  Lambert,   2   Eden   75 

857,    858 
Darby    v.    Jorndt,    85    Mo.    App. 

274  576a 

Darling     v.     Harmon,     47     Minn. 
166  1147 

V.  Hunt.   46  App.  Div.    (N.  Y.) 

631  1011 

V.   Neumeister,   99   Wis.    426      1369 

V.   Bobbins,   60  Vt.   347  1110 

Darlington    v.    Chamberlain,    120 

111.    585  432 

V.    Chamberlain,    20    111.    App. 

443  1002 

V.    Missouri    Pac.    R.    Co.,    99 

Mo.  App.   1  284,   310 

V.   New  York,   31   N.   Y.    164     1375 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Darring-ton    v.    Moore,    88    Maine 

569  1437 

Darrow  v.   Morgan,   65  N.  Y.   333 

1218,    1613 
Dart    V.    Fitch,    23    Hun    (N.    T.) 
361  1287 

V.  Mayhew.  60  Ga.  104         454,  708 
Daubig-ny  v.   Duval,    5   T.   R.    604 

307,   982 
Daughaday     v.     Paine,     6     Minn. 

4-13  1084,    10S6,    1089 

Daugherty   v.    Eastburn,   74   Tex. 

68  1102 

Davenport  v.  Bank  of  Buffalo,  9 

Paige    (N.    Y.)    12  251 

V.   Murray,    68  Mo.   198    1074,   1090 

Davidson  v.  Alfaro,  80  N.  Y.  660     220 

V.  Alfaro,  16  Hun   (N.  Y.)   353    217 

V.  Allen,  36  Miss.  419       1092,  1095 

v.  Coon,   125   Ind.   497       1163,   1164 

V.    Jennings,    27    Colo.    187 

1616a,    1617 
V.  La  Plata  County,   26  Colo. 

549  171 

V.    Stewart,     200     Mass.     393 

1369,    1532 
Davies,    In    re,    15    Weekly    Rep. 

46  •    151 

Davies-Henderson     Lumber     Co. 
V.    Gottschalk,    81    Cal.    641 

1190,    1235,   1382 
Davis    V.    Alvord,    94    U.    S.     545 

1212,  1320.  1448,  1556,  1559,  1589 
V.  Arledge,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.)  170  564 
V.    Bigler,    62    Pa.    St.    242 

985,     988,    1018 
V.    Bilsland,    18    Wall.    (U.    S.) 

G59  1212,    1470,    1494,    1498 

V.   Bowsher,   5  T.  R.   481      241,   244 
V.    Bowsher,    5    T.    R.    488  244 

V.     Bradley,     28    Vt.    118  465 

V.    Brown,    67    Mo.    313  1512 

V.    Bullard,    32    Kans.    234 

1428,  1430,  1438 
V.  Child,  2  Ware  (U.  S.)  78  1697a 
V.  Church,  1  Watts  &  S.   (Pa.) 

240  1568 

V.    Connecticiit    Mut.    L.    Ins. 

Co.,    84    111.    508  1465 

V.    Cox,    6    Ind.    481  1088 

V.   Davis,   128    Pa.   St.    100  632 

V.  Gyde,  2  Ad.  &  Ell.  623       585,  586 
V.   Hamilton,   50  Miss.   213  1110 

V.  Henry,   63  Miss.   110  589 

V.    Hines,    6    Ohio    St.    473 

1220,  1406,  1418 
V.  Humphrey,  112  Mass.  309  1254 
V.  John  Mouat  Lumber  Co.,  2 

Colo.    381  1574 

V.    Livingston,    29    Cal.    2S3 

1190,  1287,  1288 
V.  McMillan,  13  Ind.  App.  424  1588 
V.    McWhirter,    40    U.    C.    Q.    B. 

598  928 

V.   Meyers,    41   Ga.    95  611 

V.   Parsons,   157   Mass.   584  153  4 

V.  Payne,  4  Rand.    (Va.)      562,   577 
V.    Pearson,     44     Miss.     508 

1084,    1086 
V.  Rankin,  50  Tex.  279  1101 

V.    Reynolds,    4    Camp.    267  960 

V.    Russell,    52    Cal.    611  825 

V.    Smith,    5    Ga.    274  1136 


Davis  V.   Stratton,   1  Phila.    (Pa.) 
2S9  13.30 

V.    Taylor,    103    Ga.    366  1053 

V.  Thomas,  23  La.  Ann.  340  620 
V.  Treacy,  8  Cal.  App.  395  1587 
V.    Upham,    191   111.    3  72  1199 

V.    Washington,    18    Tex.    Civ. 

App.    67  638 

V.    Webber,    66   Ark.    190  170 

V.    Wilson,    55    Ore.    403  1064 

V.    Wilson,    86    Tenn.    519 

576a,  636 
Davis  &  Rankin,  &c.,  Co.  v.  Vice, 

15    Ind.    App.    117  1235 

Davis'   Appeal,    83   Pa.   St.    34S        1163 
Davis     Gasoline-   Engine    Co.     v. 

McHugh,    115    Iowa   415         557,    820 
Davis,   The,   10  Wall.    (U.   S.)    15    279 
Dawson    V.    Dewan,-  12    Rich.    L. 
(S.   Car.)    499  590 

V.    Ellis,    151    111.    App.    92 

576a,   577,    580 
V.   Girard  Life   Ins.,    etc.,   Co., 

27   Minn.    411  1067 

V.   Harrington,   12   111.   300  1199 

Day    V.    Bowman,    109    Ind.    383 

174,    226,    235 

V.  Chapman,  88  111.  App.  358    1412 

V.  Larsen,   30   Ore.   247  180 

V.    Wetherby,    29    Wis.    363  789 

Dayhuff    v.    Dayhuff,    81    111.    499 

1092,    1101 
D.  B.  Steelman.  The,   48  Fed.  580 

1697b,    1747,    1793a, 
1797a,    1808,    1810 
Deady   v.    Fink,    5    N.   Y.   S.    3        1550 
Dean    v.    Scott,    67    Iowa    233  1074 

V.    Wheeler,    2    Wis.    224  1588 

Dearborn  Foundry  Co.  v.  Augus- 
tine,   5    Wash.    67  1559 
Deardorff    v.    Everhartt,    74    Mo. 

37  1306,    1328 

Dearie   v.    Martin,    78    Pa.    St.    55 

1262,    1264 
Deason  v.  Taylor,   53  Miss.   697     1071 
Deatherage     v.     Henderson,      43 
Kans.    684  1327,   1332 

V.  Woods,   37  Kans.   59 

1202,   1391,    1452,   1453 
Deaver  v.   Rice,   20   N.    Car.    567      631 
V.    Rice,    4    Dev.    &    B.    L.    (N. 

Car.)    431  547 

De    Bouverie    v.    Gillespie,    2 

Edm.    Sel.    Cas.    (N.   Y.)    472        lOlS 
Decan  v.  Shipper,  35  Pa.   St.   239      952 
Decker    v.    Myles,    4    Colo.    558      1559 
De    Coursey   v.    Guarantee   Trust 
&   Safe  Deposit  Co.,   81   Pa.   St. 
217  598 

Deering   v.   Lord,    45   Maine   293      710 
V.   Schreyer,   58  App.  Div.    (N. 

Y.)    322  44 

Deeze,    Ex    parte,    1    Atk.    228  449 

De  Forest  v.  Holum,  38  Wis.  516 

1080,    1090 
De   Graff   v.    Wickham,    89    Iowa 

720  1289 

DeGraffenreid  v.  St.  Louis  S.  W. 

R.  Co.,  66  Ark.  260  170 

Deibler    v.    Barwuk,    4    Blackf. 

(Ind.)    339  1063,    1092 

DeKlyn   v.    Gould,    165    N.    Y.    282 

1253,    1401 


Ixxxii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,  §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Delahay  v.  Clement,  3  Scam. 
(111.)    201  1552 

V.    Goldie,    17    Kans.    263 

1202,    1304,    1428.    1453 
Delahunty  v.  Central  Nat.  Bank, 

63    App.    Div.    (N.    Y.)    177  244 

Delamater    v.    M'Caskle,    4    Dem. 

Sur.    (N.  Y.)    549  139 

Do  Lancev  Stables  Co.,  In  re,  170 

Fed.    860  632 

Delaney  Forge,  &c.,  Iron  Co.  v. 
Iroquois  Transp.  Co.,  142  Mich. 
84  1726 

V.    Iroquois    Transp.    Co.,    205 

U.    S.    354  1726 

V.  The  Winnabago,   142  Mich. 

84  1749 

Delany    v.     Carpenter,     62    Misc. 

(N.   Y.)    416  1444 

Delassus    v.    Poston,    19    Mo.    425 

1063 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Ox- 
ford Iron  Co.,  33  N.  J.  Eq.  192 

1630,   1660 
V.   Oxford   Iron    Co.,    38   N.   J. 

Eq.    340  384 

Delaware  R.  Construction  Co.  v. 
Davenport  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  46 
Iowa    406  1484 

De    L'lsle    v.    Moss,    34    La.    Ann. 

164  1094 

Dell   V.    Marvin,    41    Fla.    221        1616a 
Delmonico  v.  Guillaume,  2  Sandf. 

Ch.    (N.   Y.)    366  799 

Delos  De  "Wolfe,  The,  3  Fed.  236 

1756 
De    Lovio    v.    Boit,    2    Gall.     (U. 

S.)    398  1698 

Delray   Lumber   Co.   v.   Keopine, 

132    Mich.    17  1299 

Deming-Coborn  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Union  Nat.  Sav.,  &c.,  Assn., 
151    Ind.    463  1579 

De  Morris  v.  Wilbur  Lumber  Co., 

98   Wis.    465  719 

Dempsey  v.   Carson,   11  U.   C.  C. 

P.    462  850 

Dempster  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Downs,  126 

Iowa   80  377 

Denham    v.    Harris,    13    Ala.    465 

573     585 
Denison  v.  Shuler.  47  Mich.  598  'l479 
Denkel's   Estate,   In   re,    1   Pear- 
son  (Pa.)   213  1471,  1492 
Denmead   v.   Bank   of  Baltimore, 

9    Md.    179  1478 

Dennett   v.    Cutts,    11    N.    H.    163 

115,  128,  208 
Dennie  v.  Harris,  9  Pick.  (Mass.) 

364  290,   451 

Dennis  v.    Coker,   34   Ala.    611        1454 

V.   Smith,  38  Minn.   494  1412 

V.   Walsh,   16   N.   Y.    S.    257         1262 

Dennistoun    v.    McAllister,    4    E. 

D.   Smith    (N.  Y.)    729 

1440,    1512,    1613 
Denny      v.      Steakly,      2      Heisk. 

(Tenn.)   156  1074,   1086 

Dent    V.    Dent,    30    Beav.    363  1160 

Denver    &    R.    G.   R.    Co.    v.    Hill, 

13    Colo.   35  291,    292,   293 

Depue  v.  Sergent,  21  W.  Va.  326    1101 
De   Ronde   v.    Olmsted,    47    How. 
Pr.    (N.    Y.)    175  1235 


De  Ronde  v.  Olmsted,  5  Daly  (N. 

Y.)    398  1259,   1276 

Derrickson    v.    Edwards,     29     N. 

J.   L.    468  1216,    1423,   1434 

V.   Nagle,   2  Phila.    (Pa.)    120    1283 
Dersheimer   v.   Maloney,    143    Pa. 

St.    532  1289,   1502 

Desaman    v.    Butler,    114    Minn. 

362  179 

Descadillas   v.    Harris,    8    Greenl. 

(Maine)     298  878 

Desha  v.   Pope,   6   Ala.   690  465 

Deshon      v.      Bigelow,      8      Gray 

(Mass.)   159  820 

Deslix  V.  Jone,  6  Rob.  (La.)  282  620 
De  Smet,  The.  10  Fed.  483  1777,  1794 
Des   Moines   L.    «&:   T.    Co.    v.    Des 

Moines     Nat.     Bank,     97     Iowa 

668  406 

Des  Moines  Nat.   Bank  v.   Coun- 
cil Bluff's  Sav.  Bank,  150  Fed. 

301  616 

v.    Warren    County   Bank,    97 

Iowa    204  377 

Des  Moines  Sav.  Bank  v.  Goode, 

106    Iowa    568  1504 

De  Steaguer  v.  Pittman,   54  Tex. 

Civ.   App.   316  1114 

Detroit,  The,   1  Brown   Adm.   141 

1802 
Detroit    Lumber    Co.    v.     Petrel, 

The,  153  Mich.  528  1749 

Detwiler  v.  Cox,  75  Pa.  St.  200  572 
Deutsch    v.    Webb,    10    Abb.    N. 

Cas.    (N.   Y.)    393  189 

Develin  v.  Mack,  2  Daly   (N.  Y.) 

94  1297,    1599 

Dever    v.    Hope,     The,     42    Miss. 

715  1729 

Devereux     v.     Taft.     20     S.     Car. 

555  1224,   1484 

De    Vinne    v.    Rianhard,    9    Daly 

(N.    Y.)    406  743 

Devlin  v.  Wisconsin  Storage  Co., 

147   Wis.   518  981 

Df\-ov  v.  Boyer,  3  Johns.    (N.  Y.) 

247    .  217 

De     Wandelaer     v.     Sawdey,     78 

Conn.  654  171a 

Dewey    v.    Fifleld,    2    Wis.    73 

1588,    1589 
Dewing    v.    Hutton,    40    W.    Va. 

521  419,  997,  1014 

V.  Wilbraham  Congregational 
Society,  13  Gray  (Mass.) 
414  1252,    1324 

De   Winter   v.    Thomas,    34    App. 

D.    C.    80  48,   52 

DeWitt    V.    Smith,     63    Mo.    263 

1286,  1304,   1421,   1423,   1556 
De  Wold  V.  ,  2  Chat. 

68  150 

De  Wolf  V.  Howland,  2  Paine  C. 

C.     (U.    S.)    356  428,    471,    1009 

Dexter  v.  Olsen,   40  Wash.  199     786b 
V.     Sparkman,     2     Wash.     165 

718,   1493 
V.    Wiley,    2    Wash.    171  718 

Dey    V.    Anderson,    39    N.    J.    L. 

199  1308.    1536 

Dey,  In  re.  9  Blatch.  (U.  S.)  285  1470 
Diamond     Flint     Glass     Co.     v. 

Boyd,   30    Ind.   App.    485  1104 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Ix 


XXlll 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Dias   V.   Bouchaud,   10    Paige    (N. 

T.)    445  451 

Dibblee   v.   Mitchell,   15    Ind.    435 

1086,  1090 
Dibrell  v.  Smith,  40  Tex.  447  1098 
Dicas  V.  Stockley,  7  C.  &  P.  587 

128     129 
Dickason  v.   Eby,   73  Mo.   133     '  1098 
V.  Fisher,   137  Mo.  342     107G,  1092 
Dickerson  v.  Carroll,  76  Ala.  377 

1061,  1081 
V.    Mechling-,    30   Nebr.    718 

1252a,  1487 
Dickey's  App.,  115  Pa.  St.  73  1335 
Dickinson  v.  Bolyer,  55  Cal.  285 

1313 

V.   Coats,   79   Mo.    250  57 

V.    Harris,    52   Ark.    58  606 

V.  Worthington,  10  Fed.  860     1083 

Dickman    v.    Williams,    50    Miss. 

500  965 

Dicks    V.    Nimmons,    88    S.    Car. 

428  ■  •  458 

Diederich  v.  Rose.  228,111.  610      1135 
Diehl    V.    Friester,    37    Ohio    St. 

473     ■  137,    159,    220 

Dierks  v.  Walrod,  66  Iowa  354     1247 

Dietrich  v.  Crabtree.  8  Wkly.  N. 

Cas.    (Pa.)    418  1278 

V.  Folk.  40  Ohio  St.  635  1086 

Dietz  V.  McCallum,   44  How.  Pr. 

(N.   T.)    493  203 

Diffle  V.   Thompson    (Tex.),   SS   S. 

W.    381  1107 

Dill    V.    Wisner,    88    N.    Y.    153 

1164,  1165 
V.  Wisner,  23  Hun  (N.  T.)  123 

1164,  1165 
Diller  v.    Burger,    68    Pa.    St.    432 

1435,    1449,    1475 
Dillon   V.    Barnard,   21    Wall.    (U. 
S.)    430  48 

V.    Porier,    34   La.    Ann.    1100       620 
Dimick  v.  Cooly,  3  Civ.  Proc.  R. 

(N.   Y.)    141      185,    189,    :.'03,    210,    233 
Dimmick    v.    Cook,    115    Pa.    St. 

573  1335,   1343 

Dingledine   v.    Hershman,    53    111. 

280  1199 

Dingley     v.     Bank     of    Bentura, 
57  Cal.  467  1111,  1112 

V.    Greene,    54    Cal.    333 

1287,    1288,    1299 
Dinkins   v.   Bowers,   49   Miss.   219 

1210 
Dinn    v.    Grant,    5    De    G.     &     S. 

451  1105 

D.     I.    Nofziger    Lumber    Co.    v. 

Waters,    10   Cal.   App.    89  1421 

Director,   The,   34  Fed.   57      1713.   1784 

Dirks    V.    Richards,    Car.     &    M. 

626  1018 

V.   Richards,   4  M.   &  G.    574     1025 

Disbrow  v.  Walsh  Brothers,  The, 

36   Fed.    607  1677,    1700 

Dishman     v.     Frost     (Tex.     Civ. 

App.),    140    S.    W.    358  1126 

Dittman      v.      Iselt      (Tex.      Civ. 

App.),    52    S.   W.    96  1123 

Dittmer  v.  Bath,   117  Mich.   571    1208 
Dixon    V.    Baldwen,     5    East    175 

867,    904,    917,    919,    921,   939 


Dixon    V.    Buel,    21    111.    203  1495 

V.  Central  of  Georgia  R.  Co., 

110    (}a.    173  284 

V.   Dixon     1    Md.    Ch.     220  1092 

V.    Gayfere,    17    Beav.    421 

1071,  1074 
V.  Hyndman,  177  Mass.  506  1460 
V.    La    Farge,    1    L.    L>.    Smith 

(N.    Y.)    722  1235,    1589 

V.    Stansfield,    10   C.    B.    398  424 

V.    Williams,    82    Ga.    105  1053 

V.    Yates,    5    B.    &    Ad.    313 

809,  836,  S3S,  841,  852,  885,  960 
D.  L.  Billings  Co.  v.  Brand,  187 

Mass.    417  1439 

D.    M.    French,    The,    1   Low.    (U. 

S.)    43  1799,    1804 

Doane   v.    Badger,    12  Mass.    65      1147 

V.   Bever,    63    Kans.    458  1237 

V.  Clinton,  2  Utah  417     1405,   1532 

V.    Garretson,    24    Iowa    351 

552,    553,    582,   616 
V.    Russell,    3    Gray     (Mass.) 

382  423,    986,    1033,   1056 

Dobbins  v.  Walton,  37  Ga.  614  404 
Dohson    V.    Thurman,    30    Ky.    L. 

1331  1417 

Dobschuetz    v.    Holliday,    82    111. 

371  1273,  1274 

Dod    V.    Fourth    Nat.    Bank.    59 

Barb.    (N.   Y.)    265  259,  261 

Dodd    V.     Brott,    1    Gil.     (Minn.) 

205  179,    222 

Dodge    V.    Evans,    43    Miss.    570 

1063,  1064,  1083 
V.    Hall,    168   Mass.    435  1600 

V.   Manning,   1   N.   Y.    298  1163 

V.   Romain    (N.   J.   L.),   IS   Atl. 

114  1262 

V.    Schell,    20    Blatch.    (U.    S.) 

517  201 

V.    Walsham,    16    R.    L    704        1223 
Dodsley  v.   Varley,   12  Ad.   &  EI. 

632  802 

Dodson    V.    Wentworth,    4    M.    & 

G.    1080  885,    921,    944 

Doe  V.  Monson,  33  Maine  430  710,  729 
Doebling  v.  Loos,  45  Mo.  150  1533 
Dole  V.  Bangor  Auditorium  Assn., 

94   Maine   532  1205,    1445 

Dolinski  v.  First  Nat.  Bank 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.).  122  S.  W. 
276  1113 

Dollahite    v.    Orne,    2    Sm.    &    M. 

(Miss.)    590  1119 

Dolliver  v.  American  Swan  Boat 

Co.,   32   Misc.    (N.   Y.)    264  184 

Dolphin,  The,   6  Ben.    (U.  S.)    402 

1700 
Dolphin,     The,     1     Flip.     (U.     S.) 

580  1698 

Domestic  Sewing  Machine  Co.  v. 

Watters,    50   Ga.    573  515 

Domnau    v.    Green,    4    Wils.    Civ. 

Cas.  Ct.  App.   (Tex.)  322  690 

Donaher    v.    Boston,    126    Mass. 

309  1325 

Donahue    v.    Cromartie,    21    Cal. 

80  1190,  1327,  1331,   1335,   1341 

Donahy      v.      Clapp,      12      Cush. 

(Mass.)    440  1289 

Donald  v.  Hewitt.  33  Ala.  534  28,  41 
Donaldson    v.    Holmes,    23    111.    85 

1245,   1256 


Ixxxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Donaldson  v.  McDowell,  1 
Holmes    (U.    S.)    290  1720 

V.    O'Connor,    1    E.    D.    Smith 

(N.    Y.)     09.5  1.558 

V.    Wilkerson,    170    Ala.    507       603 
V.    Wood,    22    Wend.     (N.    Y.) 

394  1350 

Donath  v.   Broomhead,   7   Pa.   St. 

301  931     933     940 

Donegan  v.  Hentz,  70  Ala. '437   'l086 
Donnell    v.     Manson,     109    Mass. 
576  1748 

V.    Starlight,    The,    103    Mass. 

227        710.744,1729,1748,1795 
Donnellan  v.  Hardy.  57  Ind.  393     795 
Donnelly     v.     Adams,     115     Cal. 
129  1190 

V.  Bdelen.  40  Md.  117       1167,  1172 
Donovan    v.    Donovan,    85    Mich. 
63  1074 

V.    Frazier,    15    App.    Div.    (N. 

Y.)    521  1533 

Doolittle  V.  Jenkins.  55  111.  400     1073 
V.  Plenz.  16  Nebr.  153 

1213,  1317,  1319.  1406,  1418 
Door    V.    Life    Ins.    Clearing    Co., 

71    Minn.    38  379 

Dora,    The,    34    Fed.    343 

1778,    1786,    1796 
Dora,  The,   34   Fed.   348  1699 

Dore  V.   Sellers,   27   Cal.    588  1287 

Dorestan   v.   Krieg,    66   Wis.    604 

1232,    1301,    1302 
Dorman  v.  Crozier,  14  Kans.   224 

1453,    1454 
Dormer  v.  Fortescue,  3  Atk.  124 

1133 
Dorsey   v.    Hall,    7   Nebr.    460  1108 

V.      Langworthv,      39      Greene 

(Iowa)    341  1381 

Dothage  v.   Stuart,   35  Mo.   251     1134 
Doty    V.     Deposit    Building    and 

Loan    Assn.,    103    Ky.    710  1072 

Dougherty     v.     Kellum,     3     Lea 

(Tenn.)    643  636 

Doughty  V.  Devlin,  1  E.  D.  Smith 

(N.   Y.)    625  1218,   1293,   1589 

Douglas  V.  McCord,  12  Bradw. 
(111.)    278  1199,   1287 

V.    St.   Louis   Zinc   Co.,   56   Mo. 

388  1389,   1470.   1547,   1548 

V.  Shumway,  13  Gray  (Mass.) 

49S  822 

Douglass  V.  Blount,  22  Tex.  Civ. 

App.    493  1120 

v.   Huston,   6  Ohio  156  94 

V.   McFarland,    92   Cal.    656  752 

Dover  v.   Gregory,   10  Sim.   393     1166 

Dow     v.     Ker,     Speers'     Ch.      (S. 

Car  )    413  77 

Dowd'  V.    Dowd,    126   Mich.    649       712 
Dowdney  v.   McCullom,   59   N.   T. 

367  1510 

Dowell  V.   Cardwell,  4  Sawy.    (U. 

S.)   217  44 

Dowling  V.   Eggemann,   47  Mich. 

171  137 

Downer      v.      Zanesville      Bank, 

W^right     (Ohio)     477  379 

Downey  v.   Chicago  T.   &  T.   Co., 

86   111.   App.    664  613,   614 

Downingtown  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Frank- 
lin Paper  Mill  Co.,  63  N.  J. 
L.    32  1216 


Dows  v.  Greene,   24  N.   Y.   638  946 

V.    Greene,    16    Barb.    (N.    Y.) 

72  465 

V.    Kidder,    84    N.   Y.    121  820 

V.  Perrin.  16  N.  Y.  325         946,  952 
Doyle  V.  McLeod,   4   Wash.  732       718 
V.   Orr,    51    Miss.    229  1084 

V.    State,    61    Ind.    324  1559 

V.   Triutt,    23   Mo.    App.    448        1211 
V.    True,    36   Maine   542        710,   729 
V.    Wagner,    100   Minn.    380        1421 
Drago   V.   Smith,   92  Hun    (N.   Y.) 

536  184 

Drake    v.    Green,    48    Kans.     534 

1455,  1456 
V.  O'Donnell,  49  How.  Pr.    (N. 

Y.)    25  1287,    1290 

V.    Taylor,    6   Blatchf.    (U.    S.) 

14  34 

V.    Whaley,    35    S.   Car.    187  635 

Drakford    v.    Turk,    75    Ala.    339 

599,  603 
Dredge  No.  1,  The,  137  Fed.  110  1699 
Dreiband    v.    Candler,    166    Mich. 

49  178 

Dresser  v.  Lemma.  122  Wis.  387     702 
V.    Mo.    &    Iowa   R.    Construc- 
tion  Co.,   93   U.   S.   92  1085 
Drew    V.    Mason,    81    111.    498  1341 
Drexel  v.   Pease,   133   N.   Y.   129         63 
V.    Richards,    48    Nebr.    322         1389 
v.    Richards,    50   Nebr.    509         1421 
Driesbach,    v.    Keller.    2    Pa.    St. 

77  1354 

Drinkwater  v.  Goodwin,  1  Cowp. 

251  445,  470 
V.    Moreman,    61    Ga.    395  1067 

Driscoll  V.  Hill.  11  Allen   (Mass.) 
154  1308 

V.  West  Bradley  &  Cary  Mfg. 

Co.,    59    N     Y.    96  375,    ^81 

Driver    v.    Ford,    90    111.    595  1199 

V.    Hudspeth,    16    Ala.    348 

1107,   1123 

v.   Jenkins,   30  Ark.  120  541 

V.    Maxwell,    56    Ga.    11  611 

Drope    V.    Thaire,    Latch    126  513 

Drumm  Com.  Co.  v.  Core,  47  Tex. 

Civ.    App.    216  1116 

Drummond  Carriage  Co.  v.  Mills, 

54   Nebr.   417  744 

Druse  v.  Horter,   57  Wis.   644         1232 
Du  Bay  v.  Uline,   6  Wis.   588  1589 

Dubois  v.  Hull,  43  Barb.    (N.  Y.) 
26  1071,  1088,  1090,  1098,  1100 

V.  Wilson,   21  Mo.   213  1470 

Du    Brutz   V.    Bank   of  Visalia,    4 

Cal.   App.    201  241 

Dubuque,    The,    2    Abb.     (U.    S.) 

20  1706,   1800,   1802 

Ducker   v.    Gray,    3    J.    J.    Marsh. 

(Ky.)    163  1086 

Duckwall   V.   Jones,   156   Ind.    682 

1616a 
Dudgeon  v.  Dudgeon,  87  Mo.  218 

1163 
Dudley  v.   Dickson,   14   N.   J.   Eq. 

252  1063,  1080,  1086 
V.  Goddard.  11  Ky.  480  1069 
v.  Harvey,  59  Miss.  34  625 
V.  Jones,  77  Tex.  69  1513 
V.    Toledo    A.    A.    &    N.    M.    t\.. 

Co.,   65  Mich.   655     1494,  1652 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Ixxxv 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,    §§   1001-1S12.] 


Duffy  V.   Baker,   17  Abb.   N.   Cas. 
(N.   Y.)    387  1445 

V.   Brady,    4   Abb.   Pr.    (N.   Y.) 

432  1600 

V.    England.    176    Ind.    575  418 

V.    McManus,    3    E.    D.    Smith 

(N.   Y.)    657  1588,  1600 

Dufolt  V.   Gorman.    1   Minn.    (Gil. 

234)   301  279 

Dufur    Oil    Co.    v.    Enos,    59    Ore. 

528  30,  63 

Du,<?an    V.    Brophy,    55    How.    Pr. 

(N.    Y.)    121  1235,    1236 

Duggan  V.  Smith,  27  Wash.   702     718 
V.    Washoug-al    Land    &    Log- 
ging  Co.,    10    Wash.    84       718 
Dugge  V.   Stumpe,    73   Mo.    513       1101 
Duignan     v.      Montana     Club,      16 

Mont.    189  1283 

Duke    V.    Balme,    16    Minn.    306 

1063,   1088 
V.    Duke,    93   Mo.   App.    244  666 

Dukes    V.    Turner,    44    Iowa    575 

1108,  1117,  1125 
Dulgnan    v.    Montana    Club,     16 

Mont.    189  1656 

Dummer    v.    Smedley,    110    Mich. 

466  854,    1086 

Dumont   v.    Fry,   13    Fed.    423  244 

Dunagan  v.  Dollman,  64  Ind.  327    1308 
Dunavant    v.    Caldwell    &    N.    R. 

Co.,  122  N.  Car.  999  1459,   1618 

Dupbar  v.   Rawles,   28    Ind.    225      820 
Duncan  v.  Bateman,  23  Ark.  327 

1325 
V.   Berlin,    60   N.   Y.   151  57 

V.   Jayne,    76   Miss.    133  625 

V.   Koster,  L.   R.    4   P.   C.  171        333 
V.    Louisville,    13    Bush    (Ky.) 

378  1119 

V.    Stone,    45  Vt.   118  820 

V.  Wallace,  114  Ind.  169  1163 

Dunham  v.   Cincinnati,   Peru   &c. 
R.   Co.,   1   Wall.    (U.   S.)    254        1625a 
V.  Hanna,  18  Ind.   270  787 

V.  Pettee,  1  Daly   (N.  Y.)   112 

973,    1002 
Dunkerson,    In    re,    4    Biss.     (U. 

S.)    227  384 

Dunkin  v.  VanDenbergh,  1  Paige 

(N.  Y.)    622  217 

Dunklee  v.   Crane,   103   Mass.   470     1465 

V.  Fales,  5  N.  H.  527  13 

V.  Locke,  13  Mass.  525         162,  220 

Dunlap     V.     Aycock,     10     Heisk. 

(Tenn.)    561  637 

V.  Berthelot,   122  La.   531  456 

V.   Burnett,    13   Miss.    702  1089 

V.    Burnham,    38    Maine    112        194 

V.    Dunseth,    81   Mo.    App.    17      556 

V.   Shanklin,  10  ^^.   Va.   662        1116 

V.    Thorne,    1    Rich.    (S.    Car.) 

213  509 

Dunlap,    The,    1    Lowell    (U.    S.) 

350  130S 

Dunn   V.   Brager,    116   Md.    242        1206 
V.     Kanmacher,     26     Ohio    St. 

497  1286 

V.    McKee,     5     Sneed     (Tenn.) 

657  1556 

V.    North    Mo.    R.    Co.,    24    Mo. 

493  1375,    1618,    1623 

V.    Rankin,    27    Ohio    St.    132 

1220,  1296 


Dunning  v.  Clark.  2  E.  D.  Smith 
(N.   Y.)    535  1611 

V.   Galloway,   47  Ind.   182  235 

V.    Stearns,    9    Barb.     (N.    Y.) 

630  817 

Dunphy    v.    Riddle,    86    111.    22 

1560.    1571.   1585 
Dunton  v.  Outhouse,  64  Mich.  419 

1061,  1063,  1064,  1102 
Dunwell  V.  Bidwell,  8  Minn.  :M  1558 
Duplantier    v.    Wilkins,     19    La. 

Ann.   112  620 

Dupont    V.    Vance,    19    How.     (U. 

S.)    162  310 

Dupuy    V.    Leavenworth,    17    Cal. 

262  799 

Durette    v.    Briggs,    47    Mo.    356 

1086,   1090 
Durgy   Cement    &   Umber   Co.    v. 

O'Brien,  123  Mass.  12  871,  884,  965 
Durkee  V.  Koehler,  73  Nebr.  8:^.3  1613 
Duross  V.  Broderick,  78  Mo.  App. 

260  1262 

Duryea   v.    Burt,    28    Cal.    569 

787,    796,    797,    798 
Dusenbury   v.    Newark,    25    N.    J. 

Eq.    295  1487 

Dustan    V.    McAndrew,    44    N.    Y. 

72  802 

Dustin  V.   Crosby,   75  Maine   75     1247 
Dutcher  v.   Culver,  24  Minn.  584 

559,   572,   598 
Duthie    V.    Hilton,    L.    R.    4    C.    P. 

138  332a 

Dutro  V.   Wilson,   4   Ohio   St.   101 

1257,  1272,  1280 
Dutton  V.  Bratt   (Ark.),  11  S.  W. 
821  1086 

V.    Mason,    21    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

389  190a 

V.  New  Eng.  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co., 

29  N.   H.  153  1010,   1519 

Dwenger    v.    Branigan,     95    Ind. 

221  1069,  1093 

Dvv'ight  V.  Newell,  3  N.  Y.  185  96 

Dye    V.    Forbes,    34    Minn.    13 

1392,   1497 
Dyer    v.    Clark,    5    Met.     (Mass.) 
562  796,    799 

V.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  42  Vt. 

441  331 

V.   Martin,   5    111.   146  1063 

Dymonds  v.   Bruhns,   200   111.   292 

1199 


E 


E.  A.  Baislev.  The,  13  Fed.  703  1686 
E.  A.  Barnard,  The,  2  Fed.  712 

1681,  1682,  1683,  1685.  1715, 
1774,  1776,  1777 
Eagleson  v.  Clark,  2  E.  D.  Smith 

(N.  Y.)  644  1615 

Eakins  v.   Frank,   21  Mont.   192    1506 

Bales   V.   Francis,  115  Mich.   636     712 

Fames  v.   Mayo,   6   111.   App.   334     559 

Earl   V.   Malone,   80   Ark.    218  607 

Earle   v.   Burch,    21   Nebr.   702        1108 

V.  Marx,  80  Tex.  39  1101,  1102a 

V.  V^^illets,  56  N.  J.  L.   334  1216 

Early   v.    Albertson,    2   Wkly.    N. 

Cas.   369  1330 

V.  Burt,   68  Iowa  716  1201 


Ixxxvi 


TARLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Eason  v.  Johnson,  69  Miss.  371       625 
East    V.    Ferguson,    59    Ind.    169 

419,    731,   1009 
Easter    v.    Goyne,    51    Ark.    222 

645,    691,    692a 
Eastern    Ark.    Hedge    Fence    Co. 

V.  Tanner,   67  Ark.  156  1309c 

Eastern    Star,   The,    1   Ware    (U. 

S.)   184  1799,   1805 

Eastern   Texas   R.   Co.   v.   Foley, 

30   Tex.   Civ.   App.    129  1668 

East  Hoquiam   Boom   &c.   Co.   v. 

Neeson,   20   Wash.    12  729 

East  Line  &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Culber- 
son,   72   Tex.    375  1585 
Eastman    v.    Newman,    59    N.    H. 

581  1215 

Eastmore    v.    Bunkley,     113     Ga. 

637  1368 

Easton   v.    Smith,   1   E.   D.    Smith 

(N.    T.)    318  187 

Easton,   Ex   parte,   95  U.   S.    68 

1677,  1719 
East    St.    Louis    v.     Illinois    &c. 

Bridge    Co.,    52    111.   App.    436      1047 
Eastwood  V.  Standard  Mines  &c. 

Co.,    11    Idaho   195  1256 

Eaton  V.   Bell,    5   B.   &  Aid.   34        478 
V.  Cook,  32  Vt.   58 

870,   879,  910,   961 
V.  Hixon,    35    Kans.    663  1421 

V.   Truesdail,   42   111.    307  450 

Eberhardt    v.    Schuster,    10    Abb. 

N.   Cas.    (N.   Y.)    374  196,   206 

Eby    V.    Schumacher,    29    Pa.    St. 

40  886 

Eccles  Lumber  Co.  v.  Martin,   31 

Utah    241  1227,  1235 

Eccleston    v.    Hetting,    17    Mont. 

88  1283,  1656 

Echols  V.   Head,   68  Ga.   152  811 

Ecke  V.   Fetzer,   65   Wis.   55  1161 

Eckhard  v.   Donohue,  9  Daly   (N. 

Y.)    214  105,   673,  690 

Edan  v.   Dudfleld.   1   Q.  B.   302  813 

Eddins  v.  Tweddle,  35  Fla.  107     1588 
Eddy  V.  Loyd,   90  Ark.  340  1532 

Eddy,  The,  5  Wall.  (U.  S.)  481 

268,   284,   303,  311 
Edgar    v.    Salisbury,    17    Mo.    271 

1322,   1364,  1365,   1408,   1419 
Edgecomb   v.   Jenney,   108   Maine 

538  731 

Edgerly  v.   The   San  Lorenzo,   29 

Cal    418  1738 

Edith",   The,    94   U.    S.    518      1729,  1730 
Edminster    v.    Higgins,    6    Nebr. 

265  1063 

Edmondson   v.    Nuttall,    17    C.    B. 

(N.  S.)   280  1034 

Edmonson     v.     Phillips,     73     Mo. 

57  1100 

Edna,  The,   185  Fed.   206  1736 

Edward  v.  H.  B.  Waite  Lumber 

Co.,    108    Wis.    164  719,   724 

Edward  Ney  Co.,  In  re,  114  App. 

Div.    (N.   Y.)    467  184 

Edwards    v.    Anderson,    36    Tex. 

Civ.   App.    611  638 

V.  Brewer,  2  M.  &  W.  375 

850,   878,   884,   935 


Edwards  v.   Derrickson,   28  N.   J. 

L.   39  1216,   1341,   1368. 

1425,  1429,   1532,  1575 
V.    Edwards,    24    Ohio    St.    402 

1260,   1319 
V.   Edwards,  5  Heisk.   (Tenn.) 

123  1101,   1102b 

V.   Elliott,  36  N.  J.  L.  449  1755 

V.  Elliott,  21  Wall.   (U.  S.)   532 

1722,   1724,  1725, 
1729,  1774,  1775 
V.  Fairbanks,    Louque's    Dig. 

583  620 

Edwin   Post,   The,   11   Fed.    602     1677 
Egan  V.  A  Cargo  of  Spruce  Lath, 
41    Fed.    830  311 

V.  A    Cargo    of    Spruce    Lath, 

43    Fed.    480  308 

Ege  V.   Ege,    5   Watts    (Pa.)    134 

552,  572,  598 
Eggirt  V.  Snoke,  122  Iowa  582  1407 
Ehdin  v.  Murphy,  170  111.  399  1418 
Ehlers   v.    Elder,    51    Miss.    495 

1532,  1535 
Eichelberger  v.  Gitt,  104  Pa.   St. 

64  1110 

Eichleay    v.    Wilson,    29    Pittsb. 

Leg.   J.    (N.    S.)    50  1355 

Einstein    v.    Jamison,    95    Pa.    St. 

403  1260 

Eisenbeis  v.  Wakeman,   3   Wash. 

St.    534  1326,  1614 

Eisman   v.    Whalen,    39    Ind.    350 

1066,  1076 
Eisner    v.    Avery,    2    Dem.    Sur. 

(N.    Y.)    466  202 

Elder  v.   Clark,   51  Fed.   117  1457 

V.   Jones,    85    111.    384  1092 

Eledona,    The,   2   Ben.    (U.   S.)    31 
Eledona,  The,  2  Ben.  (U.  S.)  31         1679 
Elexena,  The,  53  Fed.  359 

1805,   1810a 
Eley  V.   The  Shrewbury,   69   Fed. 

1017  1681,  1758 

Elin,  The,  8  Prob.  Div.  39  1781 

Eliza    Jane,   The.    1    Spr.    (U.    S.) 

152  1684,  1686,  1799,  1800a 

Eliza  Ladd.  The,  3  Sawy.   (U.  S.) 

519  1722,   1722a 

Eliza,  The,  3  Hagg.  Adm.  87  1777 
Elkin  V.  Harvey,  20  La.  Ann.  545  811 
Elkins     V.     Schillinger,     151     111. 

App.    571  1616a 

Ella  B.,   The,   26  Fed.   Ill  1756 

Ella,  The,   84  Fed.  471 

1682,  1688,  1693,  1799 
Ellenwood  v.  Burgess,  144  Mass. 

534  1252a,   1288,   1458,   1534 

EUershaw    v.    Magniac,    6    Exch. 

570  869,   916 

Ellett  V.   Tyler.   41   111.   449  1488 

Ellinwood      v.      Worcester,      154 

Mass.   590  1207 

Elliot   V.    Bradley,    23   Vt.    217  465 

V.  Edwards,  3  Bos.  &  P.  181    1090 
Elliott  V.  Atkins,  26  Nebr.   403 

115,   238 
V.  Cox,   48    Ga.    39  461 

V.  Hodgson,  133  Ga.  209  655 

V.  Martin,    105   Mich.    506 

498,   499,  504,   664 
V.   Plattor,   43   Ohio  St.   198       1071 
Elliott    &c.    Engineering    Co.    v. 
Baker,   134  Mo.  App.   95  1469 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxxvii 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.   I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Ellis  V.   Hunt,   3   T.  R.    464 

806,  857,   858,   882,   939 
V.   Jones,    70    Miss.    60  625 

V.   Porter,  8  Utah  108  1276 

V.   Singletary,    45    Tex.    27 

1081,  1086,  1090,  1098 
Ellison    V.    Branstrator,    45    Ind. 
App.   307  1041 

V.  Jackson  "Water  Co.,  12  Cal. 

542  1184 

Elmore  v.  Robinson,  18  La.  Ann. 

651  993 

Elmslie    v.     Thurman,     87     Miss. 

537  1092,   1119 

Elstner-Martin     Grocery    Co.    v. 

Barmont,    113    La.    894  1745 

Elswick  V.  Matney.  132  Ky.  29     1074 
Elwell    V.    Coon    (N.    J.    Eq.),    46 

Atl.    580  418,  464 

Elwood  State  Bank  v.  Mock,   40 

Ind.    App.    685  1521 

Ely  V.   Cook,   9   Abb.   Pr.    (N.  T.) 

336  222 

V.   Cook,   28  N.  T.   365  223 

V.  Ehle,    3    N.    T.    506  988 

Embree    v.    Fowler,    3    Mo.    App. 

598  1520 

Bmden  v.  Darley.  4  B.  &  P.  22  215 
Emerson  v.  Gainey,  26  Fla.  133  1421 
V.  Hedrick,  42  Ark.  263  751a,  778 
Emery  v.  Hertig,  60  Minn.  54  1334 
Emig  V.  Cunning-ham,  62  Md.  458 

561,   562,   565 
Emigrant    Industrial    Sav.    Bank 
V.  Goldman,  75  N.  T.  127 

1218,   1581,  1582 
Emily  Souder,  The,  17  "Wall.    (U. 
S.)    666 

1686,   1688,  1699,   1713,   1775,   1794 
Emison  v.  Risque,  9  Bush   (Ky.) 
24  1063,   1102a 

V.  "Whittlesey,   55  Mo.   254 

1086,  1087,  1090 
Emma  B.,  The,  162  Fed.  966  1729 
Emma    L.    Coyne,    The,    11    Chic. 

L.    N.    98  1804 

Emma  Silver  Mining  Co.  (lim- 
ited) V.  Emma  Silver  Mining 
Co.,   12   Fed.    815  196 

Emmert     v.     Reinhardt,     67     111. 

527  613 

Empire    Land     &     Canal    Co.     v. 

Engley,    18    Colo.    388  1562 

Empire   Portland    Cement    Co.    v. 

Payne,  128   Iowa  730  1201 

Emslie,   In  re,   102  Fed.   291  1406 

Endner  v.  Greco,  3  Fed.  411  1677 

Engfer    v.    Roemer,    71    "Wis.    11 

1235    1279 
Engl  V.  Harden,  123  "Wis.   407 

719,  726 
England  v.  Beatty  Organ  Co.,  41 

N.    J.    Eq.    470  1660 

English  v.  Duncan,  14  Bush 
(Ky.)    377  619 

v.   Russell,   1  Hempst.    (U.   S.) 

35  1107 

v.   Sill,    63    Hun    (N.    T.)    572    1498 

V.   Warren,   65  N.  J.  Eq.  30       1216 

Ennis  v.  Currie,  2  Month.  L.  Bui. 

66  214 

v.  Curry,  22  Hun   (N.  T.)   584     217 

Enterprise,  The,  181   Fed.   746        1760 

Entwistle,  In  re,  3  Ch.  Div.  477       61 


B.   P.   Dorr,   The,   v.   "Waldron,   62 

111.  221  1742 

Bpeneter      v.      Montgomery,      98 

Iowa  159  1289 

Epley  v.   Scherer,   5  Colo.   536        1594 
Equitable  L.   Ins.   Co.  v.  Slye,   45 
Iowa   615 
1201,  1385,   1457,  1462a,  1470,  1626 
Brastina,   The,   50   Fed.   126  1717 

E.  R.  Darlington  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Westlake  Const.  Co.,  161  Mo. 
App.    723  1211 

Brdman    v.    Moore,    58    N.    J.    L. 

445  1343 

Brickson  v.  Lampi,  150  Mich.  92    691 

V.   Russ,  21  N.  Dak.  208  1532 

v.  Smith,   79.  Iowa  374  1072 

Ericsson  v.  Brown,  38  Barb.    (N. 

Y.)    390  725,   1365,   1629 

Brie,  The,  3  "Ware   (U.  S.)   225       1704 
Brinagh,   The,   7  Fed.   231  1715 

Erisman    v.    Delaware    County 

Nat.  Bank,  1  Pa.  Super  Ct.  144    248 
Brmeling  v.  Gibson  Canning  Co., 

105  111.  App.  196  463,  446 

Brmul  V.  Kullok,  3  Kans.  499       1257 
Brnack  v.   Campbell,   14  App.   D. 

C.    186  1409 

Ernst  V.   Reed,    49   Barb.    (N.   T.) 

367  1543 

Ervin   v.    Oregon    R.    &c.    Co.,    27 

Fed.    625  87 

Escher  v.  Simmons,  54  Iowa  269     1080 
Essency    v.    Essency,    10    "Wash. 

375  786b 

Esslinger  v.  Huebner,  22  "Wis.  632 

1262,   1325,  1334 
Esteban    de    Antunano,    The,    31 

Fed.  920  1686,   1707,  171.'? 

Estey  v.   Cooke,   12   Nebr.   276  699 

V.  Hallack  &c.  Lumber  Co.,  4 

Colo.    App.    165  1574 

Estey  Co.  v.  Dick,   41  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.    610  968 

Eter  V.   Edwards,   4   "Watts    (Pa.) 

63  484 

Ettridge    v.    Bassett,    136    Mass. 

314  1458 

Eubank  v.  Finnell,  118  Mo.  App. 
535  1061,  1074 

V.   Poston,  5  T.  B.  Mon.    (Ky.) 

285  1092 

Eufaula  Water  Co.  v.  Addyston 
Pipe  &c.  Co.,  89  Ala.  552 

1309c,   1327,   1330,   1344,   1378 
Eureka  Stone  Co.  v.  First  Chris- 
tian Church.  86  Ark.  212  1378 
European    Bank,    In    re,    L.    R.    8 

276  ■  1047 

Evangel,  The,  94  Fed.  680  1699 

Evans  v.  Ashe,  50  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

54  1107 

V.  Beddingfield,  106  Ga.  755         756 

V.  Bentley,    9    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

122  1126 

V.   Billingsley,  32  Ala.  395  603 

V.  Borchard,   8  Tex.   Civ.  App. 

276  1047 

V.   Bryan,  95  N.  Car.  174  787 

V.   Collins,  94   Iowa  432  616 

V.   Bnloe,   64  Wis.   671  1110 

V.   Feeny,  81  Ind.  532         1100,  1127 
V.   Goodlet,     1    Blackf.     (Ind.) 

246  1074 


Ixxxviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,    §§   1061-1S12.] 


Evans  v.  Grosbeck,  42  Tex.  Civ. 
App.    43  B68 

V.   Grog-an,  153  Pa.  St.  121       1500a 
V.  Herring-,  27  N.  J.  L.  243 

571,  573 
V.  Nichol,  4  Scott  (N.  R.)  43  907 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  11  Pitts.  L.  J. 

4  1378 

V.   Sanford,    65    Minn.    271        1424 
V.  Tripp,  35  Iowa  371       1201,  1570 
Evans    Marble    Co.     v.    Interna- 
tional Trust  Co..  101  Md.   210     1206 
Evansville  v.  Page.  23  Ind.  525       1370 
Evansville  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Marsh, 

57  Ind.  505  300 

Evansville  Nat.  Bank  v.  Metro- 
politan Nat.  Bank,  2  Biss.  (U. 
S.)   527  384 

Everett  v.  Coffin,  b'  Wend.  (N. 
T.)   603  1020 

V.   Neff,   28  Md.  176  591 

V.   Saltus,    15    Wend.     (N.    T.) 

474  304,   987,   1019 

Everman  v.   Robb,   52  Miss.    653      542 
Ewart    V.    Stark,    8    Rich.    L.    (S. 

Car.)    423  513 

Ewing  V.   Allen,   99   Iowa   379        1368 
V.  Barras,  4  Watts  &  S.   (Pa.) 

467  1421 

V.  Folsom,  67  Iowa  65 

1289,   1334,   1396 
Exchang-e   &c.    Bank   v.   Bradley, 
15  Lea  (Tenn.)  279 

1098,  1110,   1116 
V.   Stone,   80  Ky.   109  1082 

Exeter,  The,  1  C.  Rob.  173  1778 

Eyerman  v.  Mt.  Sinai  Cem.  Assn., 

61   Mo.    489  1512 

Eyler  v.  Crabbs,  2  Md.  137  1100 

Eyre  v.  Sadleir,  14  Ir.   Ch.   119        10S4 
Eyre,   Ex   parte,   1    Ph.    227  254 

Eystra  v.  Capelle,  61  Mo.  578         1262 


F 


Pagan    v.    Boyle    Ice    Mach.    Co., 

65    Tex.    324  1550,   1557 

Fain  v.  Inman,  6  Heisk.    (Tenn.) 

5  1082,  1099 

Fairbairn    v.    Moody,    116    Mich. 

61  1406 

Fairbanks    v.    Devereux,    58    Vt. 

359  191,   217,   218,   222 

V.  Eureka,   67  Ala.  109  820 

V.   Sargent,    39    Hun     (N.    Y.) 

588  44 

Fairbanks-Morse    Co.     v.    Union 

Bank  &c.  Co.,  55  Wash.  538  1756 
Faircloth  v.  Webb,  125  Ga.  230  781 
Faith   V.   East   India  Co.,   4   B.    & 

Aid.  630  273,  323,   327 

V.  Taylor,   69   111.   App.    419  613 

F.  A.  Kilburn,  The,  129  Fed.  107     1682 
Falardeau    v.    Washburn,     199 

Mass.  363  177c 

Falconer    v.    Cochran,    68    Minn. 

405  1570 

Fales  V.   Roberts,  38  Vt.   503  820 

Falk,  Ex  parte,  L.  R.  14  Ch.  Div. 

446  893,    962,  963 

Falmouth  Nat.  Bank  v.  Cape  Cod 

Ship  Canal  Co.,  166  Mass.  550  77 
Fanning  v.  Krapfl,  61  Iowa  417    1563 


Fanny,   The,    2   Low.    (U.   S.)    508 

1676,  1776,  1777 
Fargason  v.  Ford,  119  Ga.  343  611 
Farina  v.  Home,  16  M.  &  W.  119  905 
Farmer     v.     Stillwater    Co.,     108 

Minn.  41  179 

Farmers'    &  Merchants'   Bank   v. 

^Vasson,    48    Iowa    336  375 

Farmers'  Bank  v.  Iglehart,  6  Gill 

(Md.)    50  379,   388,  391,   416,    417 

V.   Winslow,  3  Minn.  86  1469 

Farmers'  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Canada  & 

St.  L.  R.   Co.,  127   Ind.   250  1645 

V.   Candler,  87  Ga.  241  1619 

v.   Detroit  &c.   R.  Co.,  71  Fed. 

29  1675 

V.  Longworth,  83  Fed.  336         1675 
V.   Stuttgart  &c.  R.  Co..  92  Fed. 

246  1632 

Farmers'  Packing-  Co.  v.  Brown, 

87  Md.  1  439 

Farmer's   Supply   Co.,    In    re,    170 

Fed.    502  31 

Farmers'   &c.  Nat.  Bank  v.   Tay- 
lor, 91  Tex.  78  1521 
Farmilo  v.  Stiles,  52  Hun   (N.  Y.) 

450  1262 

Farmiloe  v.  Bain,  1   C.  P.   D.   445 

823,   841 
Farnet   v.    Creditors,    8   La.    Ann. 

372  620 

Farney   v.    Kerr    (Tenn.    Ch.),    48 

S.  W.   103  644,  677 

Farnham  v.   California  Safe  De- 
posit &c.  Co.,  8  Cal.  App.  266     1190 
V.   Richardson,    91    Maine    559 

1444,   1445 
Farnum    v.    Boutelle,    13    Mete. 

(Mass.)    159  431,  462,   464 

Fai-rel  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co., 

102  N.  Car.  390  267,  884,   965 

Farrell   v.    Harlem   Terminal   &c. 

Co.,  70  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  565  967,  981 
Farrington  v.  Meek,  30  Mo.  578  731 
Farrington,  In  re,   146  App.  Div. 

(N.  Y.)    590  184 

Farrow  v.  Woodey,  149  Ala.  373  777 
Farwell  v.  Murphy,  2  Wis.  533  1579 
Fathman  &c.  Planing  Mill  Co.  v. 

Ritter,  33  Mo.  App.  404  1328,  1589 
Fatout  V.  Board  of  School  Comrs., 

102    Ind.    223  1375 

Fatwell   v.   Grier,   38   Iowa   83  585 

Faught  V.  Henry.  13  Bush   (Ky.) 

471  1128 

Faushee    v.    Grig-sby,    12    Bush 

(Ky.)   75  1367 

Faver  v.  Robinson.  46  Tex.  204  1086 
Favorite,    The,    3    Sawy.    (U.    S.) 

405  1794 

Favourite,  The,  2  C.  Rob.  232  1706 
Fawell  v.  Heelis,  Amb.  724  1061.  1082 
Fay   v.   Orison,    60    Iowa   136  1290 

Feeny  v.  Rothbaum,  155  Mo.  App. 

331  1309c,   1404 

Fehling  v.    Goings,    67   N.   J.    Eq. 

375  1216 

Fein  v.  Davis,   2  Wyo.   118  1591 

Feise  v.  Wray,   3   East   93 

801,  850,  861,  869,  878,  8»l 
Fejavary  v.  Broesch,  52  Iowa  88  543 
Felgenhauer    v.    Haas,    123    App. 

Div.    (N.   Y.)    75  1416 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


Ixxxix 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§  1061-1812.] 


Felice  B.,  The,  40  Fed.  653 

1706,   1792,   1796 
Felin    v.    Locust   Realty    Co.,    232 

Pa.   123  1289 

Felkner  v.  Tighe,  39  Ark.  357         1106 
Feltman  v.  Chinn,  19  Ky.  L.  1147     660 
Felton  V.  Minot,  7  Allen   (Mass.) 
412  1207 

V.   Smith,  84  Ind.  485         1088,  1119 
Fenck  &c.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Mehler, 

102    Ky.    Ill  1302 

Fenter  v.  McKinstry.  91  111.  App. 

255  1064,   1090 

Fenton  v.   Logan,   9  Bing.   676  563 

Ferax,  The,  1   Spr.    (U.  S.)   180        1748 
Ferguson  v.  Ashbell,  53  Tex.  245 

1404,   1556 
V.  Burk,  4  B.  D.  Smith,  (N.  Y.) 

760  1287 

V.  Despo,  8  Ind.  App.  523  1645 

V.   Hardy,    59    Ga.    758  612 

V.   Herring,  49  Tex.  126  965 

V.   Miller,    6   Cal.    402  1457 

V.   Shepherd,  58  Miss.  804  1070 

Ferguson    Lumber    Co.     v.    Low 

(Ark.),   17   S.   W.   879  751a 

Ferniman  v.  Nowlin,  91  Ark.  20       606 
Fernwood  Masonic  Hall  Assn.  v. 

Jones,  102  Pa.  St.  307  576,   632 

Ferran  v.   Hosford,   54   Barb.    (N. 

Y.)    200  1721 

Ferris  v.  Lawrence,  138  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)   541  184 

V.   The    E.    D.    Jewett,    2    Fed. 

Ill  1708 

V.  Van  Vechten,  73  N.  Y.  113 

1179,   IISO 

Ferriss  v.  Schreiner,  43  Minn.  148    699 

F.  E.  Spinner,  The,   48  Fed.   577    16S6 

Fetter  v.  Field,  1  La.  Ann.   80  811 

V.   Wilson,  12  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  90 

1203,  1261,  1262,  1283, 
1264,  1271 
F.  H.  Stanwood,  The,  49  Fed.  577    1781 
Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  v.  Parkin- 
son, 68  Nebr.   319  1213 
Fidelity    Storage    Corporation    v. 
Trussed  Concrete  Steel  Co.,  35 
App.  D.  C.  1  1195 
Field   V.    Columbet,    4   Sawy.    (U. 
S.)  523                                                    1134 
V.  Lang,    87    Maine    441  28 
V.  Maxwell,  44  Nebr.  900     183,   217 
V.  New  York,  6  N.  Y.  179  43 
Fieldings    v.    Mills,    2    Bosw.    (N. 

Y.)    489  1005 

Fields  V.  Argo.  103  Ga.  387  611 

V.   Carlton,    75    Ga.    554  1141 

V.  Drennen,  115  Ala.  558  1080,  1086 

Fietsam  v.  Kropp,  6  Bradw.   (111.) 

144  1066,   1069 

Fife  V.  Irving,  1  Rich.  L.  (S.  Car.) 

226  5S5 

Filfmore  v.  Wells,  10  Colo.  228 

171,  230 
Filston   Farm   Co.   v.   Henderson, 

106  Md.   335  1369 

Finance  Co.  v.  Charleston  G.  &c. 

R.  Co.,   48  Fed.  45         122,   122a,   123 
Finch    V.    Hull,    24    Hun    (N.    Y.) 
226  1163 

V.   Redding,    4   B.    Mon.    (Ky.) 

87  1532 

V.  Turner,  21  Colo.  287  1614 


Findley  v.  Armstrong.  23  W.  Va. 

113  1107,   1110 

Findon  v.  McLaren.  6  Q.  B.  891         564 

Finlayson     v.     Biebighauser,     51 

Minn.   202  1209 

V.  Crooks,   47  Minn.   74  1017b 

Finley's  Appeal,  67  Pa.  St.  453 

1260,  1269 
Finn  v.  Smith,  186  N.  Y.  465  1404 
Finnell  v.  Finnell,  156  Cal.   589 

1011,   1064 
V.  Higginbotham,  97  Ky.   21  39 

Finney  v.  Harding,  136  111.  573 

554,    576a,   614 
Firmenick    v.    Bovee,    1    Hun    (N. 
.     Y.)   532  222 

First  Baptist  Church  v.  Andrews, 

87  111.   172  1614 

First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Adam,  138  111. 
483  542,   544,    614 

V.   Campbell,      124     Tex.     Civ. 

App.    160  1359 

V.   Day,  52  Iowa  680  1494 

V.   Day,  64  Iowa  118  1494 

V.  Ege,  100  N.  Y.  120  432 

V.   Elgin,  136  111.  App.   453  1376 

V.   Elmore,  52  Iowa  541  1201 

V.   George  R.  Barse  Com.   Co., 

61   Mo.   App.    143  699 

V.   Hartford  Life  &c.   Ins.   Co., 

45  Conn.   22  379,   382,   411 

V.   Kirkby,  43  Pla.  376  755 

V.   Martin,  127  La.  744  177a 

V.   Peavy   Elevator    Co.,    10    S. 

Dak.  167  45Sa 

V.  Pettet,    9   Heisk.    (Tenn.) 

447  946 

V.  Redman,  57  Maine  405 

1350,   1490 
V.   Salem   Capital    Flour   Mills 

Co.,   39   Fed.    89  1063,  1092 

V.   Scott,  123  N.  Car.  538  253 

V.   Whitman,   94  U.  S.  343  57 

V.  Wm.   R.  Trigg  Co.,   10  6  Va. 

327  1009,   1228 

First  Presby.  Church  v.  Santy,  52 

Kans.   462  1396 

First    State    Bank    v.    Cox    (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  138  S.  W.  1  1113 

v.     Siblev     County     Bank,     96 

Minn.    456  179 

Fischel  v.   Keer,   45  N.  J.  L.   507     628 

Fischer    v.    G.    W.    Cone   Lumber 

Co.,   49  Ore.   277  716 

V.  Hanna.  8  Colo.  App.   471       1365 

Fischer-Hansen     v.     Brooklyn 

Heights  R.  Co.,  173  N.  Y.  492       204 

Fish  V.  Plowland.  1  Paige  (N.  Y. ) 

20  1080.   1086,   1087 

V.  McCarthy,   98  Cal.   484  1239 

V.  Stubbings,   65   111.  492  1199 

Fishbaugh     v.      Spunangle,      118 

Iowa  337  583 

Fisli     Creek     Boom     &c.     Co.     v. 

Weed,   80  Wis.   630  730b 

Fishell  V.  Morris,  57  Conn.   547 

21,   641,    697 
Fisher  v.  Abney,  69  Tex.  416         1101 
V.  Brown,    24   W.   Va.    713  1103 

V.   Cockerill.     5     T.     B.     Mon. 

(Ky.t    129  1144 

V.   First     Nat.     Bank.     37     111. 

App.  333  432 

V.  Johnson,  5  Ind.  492      1069.  1092 


xc 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,  §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,  §§  1061-1812.] 


Fisher    v.    Kollerts.    16    B.    Men. 
(Ky.)    398  570,    619 

V.  Mylius,    62   W.   Va.   19  192a 

V.  Oskaloosa,  28  Iowa  381  175 

V.  Rush,  71  Pa.  St.  40  1282,  1532 
V.  Shropshire,  147  U.  S.  133  1076 
V.  Smith,  39  L.  T.  430  973,  1004 
V.  Willing,  8  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 

118  1706 

Fisk  V.  Newton,  1  Denio   (N.  Y.) 
45  284 

V.  Potter,  2  Abb.  App.  Dec.  (N. 
T.)  138 

1063,   1071,  1076,   1080,  1674 
Fiske  V.  Judge,  2  Speers  (S.  Car.) 

436  585 

Fitch  V.  Baker,   23   Conn.   563 

1257,  1260,   1270,  1271.   1313 
V.   Cornell,  1  Sawy.  (U.  S.)  156 

1134,  1146 
V.  Creighton,  24  How.    (U.  S.) 

159  101,  1042 

V.     Kennard   (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

133  S.  W.   738  1095 

V.  Newberry,  1  Doug.   (Mich.) 

1  292,   298,   304,   305 

V.   Snedaker,   38  N.  Y.   248  490 

V.   Steagall,  14  Bush  (Ky.)  230    684 
Fitchett  V.   Canary,    38   N.   Y.   St. 

531  701 

Fitzgerald  v.  First  Presbyterian 
Church,   1   Mich.    (N.   P.)    243 

1493  1495 
V.  Flannagan,  106  U.  S.  648  791 
V.  Fowlkes,    60   Miss.    270  625 

V.   Stewart,   2   Sim.   333  43 

V.  Thomas,  61  Mo.  499 

1235,   1312,   1313,   1370,  1597 
Fitzgerald's  Exrx.  v.  Irby,  99  Va. 

81  191a 

Fitzhugh  V.  Bank  of  Shepherds- 
ville,  3  T.  B.  Mon.   (Ky.)  126         375 
V.  McKinney,  43  Fed.  261  217 

V.  Maxwell,  34  Mich.   138  1126 

Fitzpatrick    v.    Allen,    80    Pa.    St. 
292  1313 

V.  Ernst,  102  Minn.  195  1432,  1435 
V.   Flannagan,    106   U.   S.    648 

787,  788,  789,  792,  794 
V.  Thomas,  61  Mo.  512  1310,  1328 
V.  Thomas,  76  Mo.  513  1312,  1313 
V.  Thomas,  7  Mo.  App.   343 

1312,  1313 
Fitzsimmons  v.   Howard,   69  Ala. 

590  603 

Flack  V.   Charron,   29  Md.   311  791 

Flaherty    v.    Doane,    1    Low.    (U. 

S.)    148  1700,   1704 

Flanagan  v.  Cushman,  48  Tex.  241 

1061,  1063,  1098 

V.   Shuck,   82  Ky.   617  798 

Flandreau  v.  White.  18  Cal.  639     1560 

Flannery  v.  Rohrmayer,  46  Conn. 

558  1262,  1271 

V.  Rohrmayer,  49  Conn.  27         1271 

Fleece  v.  O'Rear,   83  Ind.   200 

1069,   1090,    1093 

Fleitz  V.  Vickery,  3  Mo.  App.  593   1257 

Fleming   v.    Bumgarner,    29    Ind. 

424  1202,   1488 

V.  Davenport,  116  N.  Car.  153     574 

V.  Greener,  173  Ind.  260  1493 

V.  Kerns,  37  W.  Va.  494  1102a 


Fleming    v.    Prudential   Ins.    Co., 
19   Colo.   App.    126  1191,    1581 

V.   St.    Paul    City    R.    Co.,     47 

Minn.  124  1422 

Flenniken    v.    Liscoe,     64    Minn. 

269  1535 

Fletcher  v.  Lazier,  58  Minn.  326     816 
V.  Morey,   2   Story   (U.  S.)    555 

63,   93 
Fletcher-Crowell    Co.    v.    Cheva- 
lier,  108  Maine  435  1205 
Fletcher  Guano  Co.  v.  Vorus,   10 

Ga.  App.   380  611 

Flinn  v.  Barber,  61  Ala.  530  1099 

v.   Hubbard,  16  Colo.  App.  464     233 
Flint  V.  Luhrs,  66  Minn.  57  665 

V.  Rawlings,  30  La.  Ann.  557  811 
V.  Raymond,  41  Conn.  510  1444 
V.  Van  Dusen,  26  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

606  202 

Flint    &c.    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Douglass 

Sugar  Co.,  54  Kans.  455  1470 

Florida  Cent.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Pa- 
gan,  104  Ga.   353  173 
Flornian    v.    School   District,    6 

Colo.   App.   319  1375 

Flour  City  Nat.  Bank  v.  Garfield, 

30  Hun    (N.   Y.)    579  58 

Flournoy  v.  Shelton.  43  Ark.  168 

751a,   767,   778 

Floyd  V.  Cook,  118  Ga.  528  611 

V.   Harding,  28  Grat.  (Va.)  401  1157 

Flynn  v.  Lemieux,  46  Minn.  458     1142 

Foerder  v.  Wesner,  56  Iowa  157 

1236,   1366 
Fogarties  v.  State  Bank,  12  Rich. 

L.    (S.  Car.)    518  57 

Fogarty  v.  Wick,  8  Daly   (N.  Y.) 

166  1218,  1457,   1614 

Fogg  V.  Rogers,  2  Coldw.  (Tenn.) 
290  1116 

V.   St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  17  Fed. 

871  86 

Foley  V.  Markham,  60  Minn.  216  713 
Folkner  v.  Colshear,  39  Ind.  201  1262 
Follett  V.  Reese,  20  Ohio  546  1086 
Folmar  v.  Copeland,  57  Ala.  588  603 
Polsom  V.  Barrett,  ISO  Mass.  439  663 
Fonda  v.   Jones,    42   Miss.    792 

1086,   1090 
Foot  V.  Tewksbury,  2  Vt.  97 

193,   196 
Foot,    In    re,    11    Blatchf.    (U.    S.) 

530  865,  940 

Forbes  v.  Marsh,  15  Conn.  384         820 
V.   Mosquito  Fleet  Yacht  Club, 

175    Mass.    432  1275 

V.  Willamette  Falls  Elec.  Co., 

19  Ore.  61  1341.   1624 

Forbush      v.      Leonard,      8      Gil. 

(Minn.)  267  166,   179 

Force  v.  The  Pride  of  the  Ocean, 

3  Fed.  162  1796 

Ford  V.   Clewell,   9  Houst.    (Del.) 
179  557,   60S 

V.  Holton,  5  Cal.  319  1141 

V.   Smith,  1  McArthur   (D.   C.) 

592  1063,  1100 

V.  State  Board,  166  Mich.  658  1375 

V.  Wilson,  85  Ga.  109    1519,  1520 

V.  Yates,  2  M.  &  G.  549        851 

Fordham's  Appeal,  78  Pa.  St.  120 

1437,   1475 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


XCl 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Ford's    Admr.    v.    Thornton,    3 

Leig-h    (Va.)    695  2H,   246 

Foreman  v.  Central  Trust  Co.,  71 

Fed.   776  1675 

Forman  v.  St.  Germain,  81  Minn. 

26  1325 

Forrest  v.  McBee,  78  S.  Car.  105     7S4c 
Forrester   v.   Howard,   30   Ky.   L. 
375  177 

V.   Preston,   2  Pitts.    (Pa.)    298 

1260,   1264 
Forsberg  v.  Lundgren,  64  Wash. 

427  718 

Forshaw,  In  re,  16  Sim.  121  130 

Forstman    v.    Schulting,    35    Hun 

(N.    T.)    504  187,  198,   233 

Forsythe  v.  Beveridge,  52  111.  268 

155,   161 
Forth   V.    Simpson,    13    Q.    B.    680 

21,   644 
Fortier   v.    Delgado,    59    C.    C.    A. 

180  782 

Ft.  Worth  &  D.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Read, 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  140  S.  W.  Ill 

1629,   1668 
Forwood    V.    Dehoney,    5    Bush 

(Ky.)  174  1119,  1120 

Foshay    v.    Robinson,    137    N.    Y. 
134  1513 

V.   Robinson,    62    Hun    (N.   Y.) 

619  1299 

Foskett  V.  Swayne.  70  Conn.  74     1262 
Foss  V.   Cobler,    105    Iowa   728 

132,   175 

V.  Desjardins,  98  Maine  539     1205 

Fossett   V.    Rock    Island   Lumber 

&c.    Co.,    76    Kans.    428        1298,   1599 

V.   Turk,    171   Ala.    565  1083 

Foster  v.  Colby.  3  H.  &  N.  705         322 

V.   Colby,   28  L.  J.  Ex.   81  273 

V.   Cox,  123  Mass.  45  1313,   1316 

V.  Dohle,  17  Nebr.   631 

1213,  1304,   1329 
V.  Fowler,    60   Pa.    St.    27 

1375,   1378,   1618 
V.  Frampton,  6  B.  &  C.  107 

919,    940,    941,   942 
V.  Hoyt,  2  Johns.  Cas.    (N.  Y.) 

327  447 

V.   Juniata  Bridge  Co.,  16   Pa. 

St.   393  484 

V.   Lyons,  19  Ky.  L.  1906  1101 

V.  McGraw.  64  Pa.   St.  464         1308 
V.   Napier,  74  Ala.  393  603 

V.   Poillon,   2   B.  D.    Smith    (N. 

Y.)  556  1588 

V.   Powers,   64  Tex.  247  1101 

V.  Schneider,    50   Hun    (N.    Y.) 

151  1408,   1411 

V.  The    Richard    Busteed,    100 

Mass.  409         1725,   1748,   1807 
V.   Tierney,  91  Iowa  253  1367 

V.  Westmoreland,  52  Ala.  223     603 
V.   Wulflng-,    20   Mo.   App.    85 

1417, 1575 
Foster,  Ex  parte,  2  Story  (U.  S.) 

131  10,   12,  13 

Fostoria  Gold  Min.  Co.  v.  Hazard, 

44    Colo.    495  1066 

Fouch  V,  Wilson,   60   Ind.   64 

1080,  1086,   1088 
Foulks  V.   Reed,    89   Ind.   370  1083 

Fourth  Avenue  Baptist  Church  v. 
Schreiner,  88  Pa.  St.  124    1222,   1585 


Fourth  Baptist  Church  v.  Trout, 

28  Pa.  St.  153  1434,   1603 

Fourth    Nat.    Bank    v.    American 
Mills   Co.,   29   Fed.    611  480 

v.  American  Mills  Co.,  137  U. 

S.  234  433 

V.   City  Nat.  Bank,  68  111.  398 

245,   246 
Foushee    v.    Grigsby,    12    Bush 

(Ky.)    75  1203,  1465 

Fowler  v.   Coates,   128   App.   Div. 
(N.   Y.)    381  1126 

V.  Hawkins,    17   Ind.    211  547 

V.   Lewis'  Admr.,  36  W.  Va.  112 

147,  153,  166,  192a,  229,  230 
V.  McTaggart,  1  Bast  522  910,  911 
V.  Mutual    Life    Ins.    Co.,    28 

Hun   (N.  Y.)   195       1161,   1581 
V.   Parsons,  143  Mass.  401 

291,   434,   1020 
V.  Rapley,  15  Wall.  (U.  S.)  328 

555,   576a,  581,   582,   609 
V.   Rust,  2  A.  K.  Marsh.   (Ky.) 

294  1088 

V.  Seaman,  40  N.  Y.  592  1260 

Fox   V.    Davidson,   1   Mackey    (D. 
C.)    102  553,   609 

v.   Fox,    24    How.    Pr.    (N.    Y.) 

409  235 

V.  Frazer,   92   Ind.   265     1086,  1091 
V.  Holt,  36  Conn.  558  1682 

V.   Jackson,    8    Barb.    (N.   Y.) 

355  202 

V.   Jones,  26  Fla.   276  610 

V.   Kidd,   77   N.   Y.   489  1218 

V.   McGregor,  11  Barb.   (N.  Y.) 

41  335,   499,   503,  504, 

518,  524,  641 
V.  Nachtsheim,  3  Wash.  684  1559 
V.  Seal,  22  Wall.  (U.  S.)  424  1665 
V.  Willis,   60  Tex.   373  965 

V.   Wunker,    18    Ohio    Cir.    Ct. 

610  1348,   1350 

Foxcroft   V.    Devonshire,    2   Burr. 

931  418 

Fox,  In   re,   52  N.  Y.    530  1164 

Foxworth  v.   Brown,   120  Ala.    59 

576a,   578,   579,  580 
Fralick  v.  Betts,  13  Hun   (N.  Y.) 

632  1730,   1756,   1810 

Frail  v.   Ellis,  16  Beav.   350  1090 

Frailey    v.    Winchester    &    B.    R. 

Co.,  96  Ky.  570  1393a 

Frampton    v.    Blume,    129    Mass. 

152  1164 

France   v.    Woolston,    4    Houst. 

(Del.)   557  1194,  1361,   1421 

Frances,  In  re,   8  Cranch     (U.  S.) 

418  907 

Francis  v.  Clemow,  Kay  435  1163 

V.   Sayles,  101  Mass.  435 

1276,   1280 
V.  Webb,  7  C.  B.  731  196,  203 

V.   Wells,   2   Colo.    660        1063,   1094 
Francis,  The,  In  re,  21  Fed.  715     1691 
Frank  v.  Chosen  Freeholders,  39 
N.    J.    L.    347  1286,   1375 

V.   Hudson,   39  N.   J.   L.  347       1216 
Frankfort     &     S.      Tpk.     Co.     v. 
Churchill,    6   T.    B.   Mon.    (Ky.) 
304  375 

Frank    G.    Fowler,    The,    17    Fed. 
653  1776,   1782,  1783 


XCll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 


Franklin    v.    Hillsdale    Land    &c. 

Co.,    70   111.   App.    297  1088 

V.   McDonald,  163  111.   139  1091 

V.  Meyer,    36   Ark.    96  1013 

V.   Walker,   171    111.   405  1090 

Franklin   Fire  Ins.   Co.   v.   Coats, 

14  Md.   285  1206,   1235,   1541 

Franklin    Sav.    Bank    v.    Taylor, 

131    111.   376  1243,   1571,  1573 

Franklin   St.  Church  Trustees  v. 

Davis,    S5   Va.    193  1427 

Frantz    v.    Masterson    (Tex.    Civ. 

App.),   133   S.  W.   740  H27a 

Fraschieris  v.  Henriques,  6  Abb. 

Pr.    (N.   S.)    (N.   Y.)    251  932 

Fraser    v.    Davie,    5    Rich.    L.    (S. 
Car.)    59  572 

V.  Rutherford,  26  Wash.  658  718 
v.   Witt,   D.   R.    7   Eq.    64 

857,   918,   929 
Frazee  v.   Frazee,   79   Md.   27  1206 

Frazer  v.   Barlow,   63  Cal.   71  1601 

V.   Hillard,   2   Strobh.    (S.   Car. 

309  944 

V.   Jackson,  46  Ga.  621         576a,   577 

Frazier  v.  Hendren,  80  Va.  265       1116 

V.  Thomas,   6  Ala.   169  602 

Freibroth  v.  Mann,  70  111.  523       1199 

Freeman  v.  Bucking-ham,  18  How. 

(U.   S.)    182  1690 

V.   Carson,   27  Minn.  516  1539 

V.   Collier    Racket    Co.,    100 

Tex.  475  638 

V.   Cram,  3  N.  Y.  305  1218 

V.  Gilpin,  1  Phila.  (Pa.)  23  1361 
V.  Nichols,  116  Mass.  309  811,  814 
V.   Rinaker,    185    111.    172 

1199,  1367 
V.   Schroeder,  43  Barb.   (N.  Y.) 

618  1459 

V.   Shreve,  86  Pa.  St.  135  148 

V.   Stewart,  41  Miss.   138 

787,   788,   789 

Freeson  v.  Bissell,  63  N.  Y.  168     1127 

French  v.  Bauer,  134  N.  Y.  548      1293 

V.   Bauer,  16  Daly  (N.  Y.)  309    1290 

V.  Dickey,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  302         1098 

Fresno   Canal   Co.   v.   Dunbar,    80 

Cal.    530  30 

Fretz    V.    Bull,    12    How.    (U.    S.) 

466  1798 

Frick  V.  Hilliard,  95  N.  Car.  117     820 
Friedlander     v.     Taintor,     14     N. 

Dak.    393  1367 

Friedman  v.  Roderick,  20  Bradw. 

(111.)    622  1495,   1496 

Frink  v.  Pratt,  130  111.  327  576a 

Frinkwater  v.  Goodwin,  1  Cowp. 

251  418 

Frisbey  v.  Thayer,  25  Wend.    (N. 

T.)  396  577 

Frissell  v.  Haile,  18  Mo.  18  163 

Friswell  v.  King-,  15  Sim.   191  120 

Frith  v.  Forbes,  32  L.  J.  Ch.  10        428 

v.  Forbes,  4  De  G.  F.  &  J.  409 

56,  61 

Frohlich    v.     Ashton,     159    Mich. 

265  1507 

V.  Beecher,  139  Mich.  278  1208 

V.   Carroll,  127  Mich.  561  1266 

Frolich  v.  Blackstock,   155  Mich. 

604  1259 

Froment,  In  re,  125  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)    647  1450,  1756 


Front  St.   Cable  R.   Co.   v.   John- 
son,   2    Wash.    112  1624 
Frorer  v.  Hammer,  99  Iowa  48 

576a,   577 
Frost  V.  Deutsch  (Tex.),  13  S.  W. 
981  463 

-V.   Falgetter,  52  Nebr.  692 

1289,   1615 
V.   Ilsley,   54   Maine   345  107 

Frothing-ham   v.    Jenkins,    1    Cal. 

42  270,   320 

Frudden   Lumber  Co.   v.   Kinnan, 

117   Iowa   93  1327 

Fruin   v.  Mitchell  Furniture  Co., 

20   Mo.   App.    313  1575 

Fry   V.    Breckinridge,    7    B.    Mon. 
(Ky.)    31  571 

V.   Chartered  Mercantile  Bank, 

L.    R.    1    C.    P.    689  274 

V.   Jones,  2  Rawle   (Pa.)    11  572 

V.   Prewett,  56  Miss.  783  1064 

Fudickar     v.      Monroe      Athletic 

Club,  49  La.  Ann.  1457  1343 

Fuller  V.  Bradley,  25  Pa.  St.  120 

276,   320 
V.   Clemmons,  158  Ala.  340  169 

V.   Kitchens,  57  Ga.  265  781 

V.   Nickerson,  69  Maine  228       1327 
V.   Pauley,  48  Nebr.  138  1487 

Fullenwider  v.  Longmoor,  73  Tex. 

480  1286,   1290,   1291,   1382,   1594 

Fullerton  v.  Chatham  Nat.  Bank, 
17   Misc.    (N.   Y.)    529  253 

V.  Leonard,   3    S.  Dak.   118 

1315,  1453 
Fullerton  Lumber  Co.  v.  Osborn, 

72   Iowa  472  1512,   1513 

Fulp    V.    Kernersville    Lig-ht    &c. 

Co.,   157   N.    Car.   154  1219 

Fulton    V.    Harrington,    7    Houst. 
(Del.)    182  1013 

v.    Parlett,   104  Md.    62     1313,   1370 
Fulton     Iron     Works     v.     North 
Center    Creek   M.    &    S.    Co.,    80 
Mo.    265  1436,   1597 

Funk  V.  McKeoun,  4  J.  J.  Marsh. 

(Ky.)   162  1105 

Fuquay   v.    Stickney,   41   Cal.    583 

1255,   1276 
Furbush  v.  Chappell,  105  Pa.  St. 

187  567 

Furniss  v.  Hone.  8  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

247  814 

Furr  V.  Morgan,  55  Miss.  389  1099 
Fury  V.  Boeckler,  6  Mo.  App.  24  1574 
Futch  V.  Adams,  47  Fla.  257  1559 


G 


Gaar  v.  Millikan,  68  Ind.  208         1083 
V.   Nichols,    115    Iowa    22S  820 

Gable   v.   Preachers'   Fund   Assn, 

59    Md.    455  1272,   1545 

Gaddis    v.    Howell,    31    N.    J.    L. 

313  1755 

Gafford  v.  Stearns,  51  Ala.  434       541 
Gage    v.    Callanan,    113    N.    Y.    S. 

227  767a 

Gager   v.    Watson,    11    Conn.    168 

158,    217 
Gaines  v.   Buford,   1   Dana    (Ky.) 
481  1144 

v.  Keeton,   68  Miss.   473  586 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


XCUl 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   lOGl-1812.] 


Gaines  v.  Lizardi,  1  Woods  (U. 
S.)    56  1146 

V.  New  Orleans,  1  Woods   (U. 

S.)    104  1146 

V.  New   Orleans,   15   Wall.    (U. 

S.)    624  1146 

V.   Travis,   Abb.    (U.    S.    Adm.) 

297  205 

Gaither    v.    Stockbridge,    67    Md. 

222  591,  622 

Galbraith  v.  First  State  Bank  <& 
Trust  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  133 
S.    W.    300  77 

V.  Reeves,    82   Tex.    357  1105 

Galbreath    v.    Davidson,    25    Ark. 

490  1235 

Gale  v.  Blaikie,   126  Mass.  274       1542 
V.   Blaikie,    129    Mass.    206  1442 

Galena   &   Chicago    Union   R.    Co. 

V.  Rae,  18  111.  488  262 

Gale's    Succession,    21    La.    Ann. 

487  620 

Gallagher    v.    Mars,    50     Cal.    23 

1063,    1064 
Gallagher's    Appeal,    114    Pa.    St. 

353  789 
Galland    v.    Schroeder,    21    Wkly. 

N.    Cas.    (Pa.)     103  1449 

Galland,  In  re,  L.  R.  31  Ch.  Div. 

296  124,   136 

Gallup  V.  Perue,   10  Hun    (N.  Y.) 

525  184 

Galveston  R.  Co.  v.  Cowdrey,   11 

WalL    (U.    S.)    459  1457 

Galyon  v.  Ketchen,  85  Tenn.  55  1541 
Gambling    v.    Haight,    59    N.    Y. 

354  1527 
Gammon     v.     Chandler,     30     Maine 

152  165,   193,   194 

Gann  v.  Chester,  5  Yerg.  (Tenn.) 

205  1081 

Gano    V.    Chicago    &    N.    W.    R. 

Co.,   60  Wis.   12  217 

Gantner  v.  Kemper,  58  Mo.  567  1307 
Garber    v.    Spivak,    114    N.    Y.    S. 

762  1277 

Garbett   v.   Veale,    5    Q.    B.    408        787 
Gardner  v.  Eberhart,  82  111.   316  1370 
v.    Hall,    29    111.    277 

1006,    1519,    1524,    1536 
v.   Leek,   52   Minn.    522  1470 

V.   London,   C.   &   D.   R.  Co.,  L. 

R.   2   Ch.   201  1675 

V.   New   York   Central   R.    Co., 

72    N.    J.    L.    257  1216 

V.  Planters'  Nat.  Bank  of 
Honey  Grove,  54  Tex. 
Civ.    App.    572  32 

V.    Trechman,    15    Q.    B.    Div. 

154  273,   274 

V.   Tudor,      8      Pick.       (Mass.) 

206  -  884 

V.  Watson,     18    Bradw.     (111.) 

386  1585 

Gardenville,    &c.    Loan    Assn.    v. 

Walker,    52    Md.    452  1167 

Garland    v.    Hickey,    75    Wis.    178 

719,   1044 
v.  Hull,      13      Smedes      &     M. 

(Miss.)  76  70 

Garland,  The,  5  Fed.  924  1806a 

Garner  v.  Cutting,   32   Iowa  345      616 

v.  Cutting,  32  Iowa  547       553,   601 

V.   Douglasville   Banking   Co., 

136   Ga.    310  611 


Garner    v.    Galdwin,    12    Weekly 
Dig.    9  220 

V.   Garner,    1    Lea    (Tenn.)    29 

190,   230 
Uarnett    v.    Berry,    3    Mo.    App. 

197  1262,   1263 

Garr    v.    Mairet,    1    Hilt.    (N.    Y.) 

498  184,   187 

Garretson    v.    Creditors,    1    Rob. 

(La.)    445  620 

Garrett     v.     Parker      (Tex.     Civ. 

App.),    39    S.    W.    147  1101 

Garrick     v.     Jones,     2     Ga.     App. 

382  454,   781 

Garrigan     v.     Huntimer,     21     S. 

Dak.    269  189d 

Garrison     v.     Hawkins     Dumber 
Co.,    Ill   Ala.    308  1420 

V.  Mooney,     9     Daly     (N.     Y.) 

218  1287,   1301 

V.  Vermont  Mills,   152  N.  Car. 

643  426,   461,   466 

V.  Vermont  Mills,   154  N.  Car. 

1  4 

Garroutte  v.  White,  92  Mo.  237       626 
Garson  v.  Green,  1  Johns.  Ch.  (N. 

Y.)   308  1064,   1074 

Gaskell  v.  Beard,  58  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

101  1218,     1408,   1412 

Gaskill    v.    Davis,    61    Ga.    644         1276 
v.  Moore,  4  Cal.  233  1273 

V.   Trainer,    3    Cal.    334 

1272,  1273 

Gaston   V.   White,   46   Mo.    486        1125 

Gates    V.     Brown,     1     Wash.     St. 

470  1404 

V.    O'Gara,    145    Ala.    665  1337 

V.   Parrott,    31    Nebr.    581  668 

V.   Whitcomb,    4    Hun    (N.    Y.) 

137  1252a 

Gates,  In  re,  51  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.) 

350  184 

Gaty   V.    Casey,    15    111.    189 

1199,  1539,  1557 
Gaule   V.   Bilyeau,   25   Pa.   St.    521 

1257,     1272,   1350 
Gault  V.   Deming,   3   Phila.    (Pa.) 
337  1469 

V.  Wittman,    34    Md.    35  1455 

Gause    V.    BuUard,    16    La.    Ann. 
107  11] 

V.  Richardson,  4  Houst.  (Del.) 

222  608 

Gauseford    v.    Dutillet,    13    Mart. 

(La.)    284  460 

Gauss      V.      Hussmann,      22      Mo. 

App.    115  1323,   1412,   1431,   1517 

Gay  V.  Brown,  1  B.  D.  Smith   (N. 
Y.)    725  1235 

V.    Hardeman,    31    Tex.    245 

806,    811,   818 
V.  Nash,   78  N.   Car.   100  457 

Gaylord    v.    Knapp,    15    Hun    (N. 
Y.)    87  1080 

v.  Loughridge,    50    Tex.    573 

1184,  1185,  1359 
"azelle.  The,  1  Spr.  (U.  S.)  378  1811 
G.    C.   Morris,    The,    2    Abb.    Adm. 

(U.   S.)    164  1704 

Geary     v.     Hennessy,     9     Bradw. 

(111.)    17  1262,    1263,    1264 

Geddes   v.   Bowden,   19   S.   Car.    1 

1224,   1253 


XCIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.   I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 


Ciee     V.     Gee,     2     Sneed     (Tenn.) 

395  1152 

V.    McMillan,    14   Ore.    268  1063 

Geiger   v.    Hussey,    63    Ala.    338 

1187,  1287 
Geiss  V.  Rapp,  14  Leg.  Int.  116  1434 
General    Burnside,    The,    3    Fed. 

228  1681,     1772,     1773, 

1776,    1779,    1794 
General     Cass,     The,     1     Brown 

Adm.     (U.    S.)    334  1677 

General   Fire  &c.  Co.   v.  Chaplin, 

.63   Mass.   375  1430 

General  Jackson,  The,  1  Spr.    (U. 

S.)   554  1798,   1799 

Gen.  J.  A.  Dumont,  The,  158  Fed. 

312  1690 

General     Meade,     The,     20     Fed. 

923  1808 

General    Smith,    The,    4    Wheat. 

(U.   S.)    438  1680,   1725 

General  Supply  Co.  v.  Hunn,  IL'6 

Ga.    615  1197 

General    Tompkins,    The,    9    Fed. 

620  1699 

Geneva,   I.    &   S.    R.   Co.    v.    Sage, 

35    Hun     (N.    Y.)     95  317,   701 

Gentle   v.    Britton,    158    Cal.    325    1255 

Gentry   v.    Walker,    93   Ky.   405      1128 

George  v.  Elston,   1  Scott  518  215 

V.   Everhart,    57    Wis.    397 

1559,   1616 
V.   Stubbs,     26    Maine    243  820 

V.   Tufts,    5    Colo.    162  820 

V.    Washington       County       K. 

Co.,   93  Maine   134  1649 

Geo.    B.    Swift    Co.    v.    Dolle,    39 

Ind.    App.    653  1500 

George     Dumois,     The,     68     Fed. 

926  1690 

Geo.    S.    Lyon     &    Sons    Lumber 

Mfg.   Co.   V.    Equitable   Loan   & 

Inv.   Assn.,  174   111.   31  1519 

George  S.  Wright,  The,   1  Deady 

(U.   S.)    591  1712 

George    T.    Kemp.    The,    2    Low. 

(U.    S.)    477  1682,    1688,    1712 

George    W.    Anderson,    The,    161 

Fed.    760  1693 

George   W.   Elder,   The,   159   Fed. 

1005  1759 

Georgia     Loan     Saving     Co.      v. 

Dunlop,    108    Ga.    218  756 

Georgia   Steel   Co.   v.   White,   136 

Ga.    492  1197 

Georgia,    The,    32    Fed.    637  1693 

Gerard    v.    Birch,    28    N.    J.    Eq. 

317  1216 

Gere   v.    Gushing,    5    Bush    (Ky.) 

304  1203,   1532 

Germain   v.   Central  Lumber  Co., 

120  Mich.   21  1011 

German  v.  Browne,  137  Ala.  429     169 
v.   Central    Lumber    Co.,     116 

Mich.    245  712 

German-American  Bank  of  Buf- 
falo  V.    The   Unadilla,    73    Fed. 

350  1773 

German     Bank     v.     Schloth,      59 

Iowa    316 

1201,  1393,  1495,  1499,  1532 
Germania     B.      &     L.     Assn.     v. 

Wagner.    61   Cal.   349  1190.   1438. 

1481,  1483,   1511,   1552,   1613 
Germania     Savings     Banks     Ap- 
peal, 95  Pa.  St.  320  1260 


German  Luth.  Church  v.  Heise, 
44  Md.  453  1206,  1417,   1435, 

1437,    1450,   1519,   1609 
German    Nat.    Bank    v.    Elwood, 

16    Colo.    244  1572 

German  Security  Bank  v.  Jef- 
ferson,   10    Bush    (Ky.)     326 

398,   400 
German    State    Bank    v.    Herron, 

111    Iowa    25  616 

Gerold    v.    Guttle,    106    111.    App. 

630  973 

Gesas,    In    re,    146   Fed.    734  241 

Getchell    v.    Allen,    34    Iowa    559 

1201,   1457,  1462a,   1626 
V.    Clark,    5    Mass.    309 

155,     162,    193,    196 
V.  Moran,    124    Mass.    404 

1313,   1400 
Getto    V.    Friend,    46    Kans.    24 

1247,   1470 
Getty   V.    Tramel,    6T   Iowa    288      1264 
Geyer    v.     Western     Ins.     Co.,     3 
Pitts.    (Pa.)    41  377,   380, 

393,  398,  409,  417 
G.  F.  Brown,  The,  24  Fed.  399  1780 
Ghio    v.    Shutt,    78    Tex.    375  638 

Giant  Powder  Co.  v.  Oregon 
Pac.    R.    Co.,    42    Fed.    470 

1347a,   1618,   1623a,   1624,   1664b 
v.     Oregon    Western     R.     Co., 

59  Ore.   236  1664b 

V.    San    Diego    Flume    Co.,    78 

Cal.    193  1190,    1447,   1574 

V.    San    Diego    Flume    Co.,    88 

Cal.    20  1447 

Gibbons  v.  Hecox,  105  Mich.  509     241 

Gibbs    V.    Grant,    27    N.     J.     Eq. 

419  1458 

V.  Hanchette,    90  Mich.    657      1408 

Gibbs,  Ex  parte,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  Div. 

101  917,   962 

Gibson  v.  Buckner,  65  Ark.  84  170 
v.  Carruthers,   8  M.  &  W.   321 

858,    881,     902,   911 
v.  Chicago    &c.     a.     co.,     izz 

Iowa    565  200 

v.   Gautier,   1  Mackey    (D.   C.) 

35  540,  551,  552,   553, 

560,  573,  590,   609 
V.  Lenane,  94  N.  Y.  183 

1286,  1287,  1299 
v.  Nagel,  15  Mo.  App.  597  155C 
v.   Stevens,    7    N.    H.    352  787 

V.   Stevens,     8    How.     (U.     S.) 

384  460 

V.   Stone,     43     Barb.     (N.     Y.) 

285  51,   52 

Gibsonburg  Banking  Co.  v. 
Wakeman  Bank  Co.,  20  Ohio 
C.   C.   591  241 

Giddens  v.  Boiling,  92  Ala.  586  603 
V.  Gaskins,  7  Ga.  App.  221  1053 
V.   Green,    48    Fed.    489  1101a 

Gifford  V.  Callaway,  8  Colo. 
App.    359  98 

V.  Meyers,    27   Ind.    App.    348      615 
Gihon    V.    Fryatt,    2    Sandf.     (N. 

Y.)    638  217 

Gilbert  v.  Fowler,  116  Mass. 
375  1207 

V.   Greenbaum,    56    Iowa    211 

553,    575,    591,   616 
V.  Marshall,    56    Ga.    148  1053 

V.   Peteler,    38    N.    Y.    165  1138 

V.   Tharp,    72    Iowa    714  1201 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


XCV 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   1-lOCOf;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Gilbert    Hunt    Co.    v.    Parry,    59 

Wash.    646  1336,   1412 

Gilbert  Knapp,  The,  37  Fed.  209  1713 

Gilchrist    v.    Anderson,    59    Iowa 

274  1290,   1512 

V.  Hore,  34  Mont.   443  182 

Gilcrest    v.    Gottschalk,    39    Iowa 

311  1521,   1532 

Gile    V.    Atkins,    93    Maine    223 

645,    1054a 
Giles  V.  Comstock,   4  N.  Y.   270       571 
V.  Ebsworth,    10    Md.    533 

562,    585,   622 
V.   Gano,    102    Ga.    593  708 

V.   Perkins,    9    East    12  241 

Gilkinson    v.    Middleton,    2    C.    B. 

(N.    S.)     134  326 

Gill   V.   Balis,   72   Mo.    424  84 

V.   Buckingham,  7  Kans.  App. 

227  617 

V.   Patten,    1    Cranch     (U.    S.) 

465  1134 

Gillen    v.    Hubbard,     2    Hill     (K. 

Y.)    303  1513 

Gillespie    v.    Bradford,     7    Yerg. 
(Tenn.)     168  1458,   1487 

V.   McCleskv,    160    Ala.    289         577 
V.  Remington,   66  Tex.  108 

1532,    1596,   1600 
Gillespie,    In    re,    190    Fed.    88  132 

Gilliam  v.   Smither    (Tex.),   33   S. 
W.    984  579 

V.  Tobias,      11      Phila.      (Pa.) 

313  633 

Gillingham    v.     Charle.3ton    Tow 

■.at   Co.,   40   Fed.    649  1G09 

Gilman    v.    Brown,    1    Mason    (U. 

S.)    191  1063,    1064 

1075,     1100,   1107 

V.  Dingeman,    49  Iowa  308        1092 

V.  Disbrow,   45   Conn.    563 

1262,   1263,   1264 
V.   Elton,    3    Brod.    &   B.    75  56  i 

V.   Gard,    29    Ind.    291  1200 

Gilmour    v.    Colcord,    183    N.    Y. 

342  ■  1614 

Gilson    V.    Gwinn,    107    Mass.    126 

278,   304 
Girard     Point     Storage     Co.     v. 
Riehle,    7    Sad.    (Pa.)    594  1599 

V.     Southwark     Foundry,     105 
Pa.    St.    248 

1310,  1372,  1378,  1379 
Gisbourn  v.  Hurst,  1  Salk.  249  262 
Gist    V.    Hanly,    33    Ark.    233 

115,    170,   232 
Gittings    V.    Nelson,    86    111.    591 

542,   568 
Given  v.  Alexander,   25  La.   Ann. 

71  456 

Givens  v.  Easley,   17  Ala.    385  603 

Glacius    V.    Black,    50    N.    Y.    145 

1599,   1614 
Gladstone   v.    Birley,    2    Mer.    404 

1,   4,  20,   31 
Glascock    V.   Lemp,    26    Ind.    App. 

175  657,   9S2 

Glass  V.  Freeberg,  50  Minn.  386  1470 
V.  Hampton     (Ky.    App.),    122 

S.    W.    803  1143 

V.   St.    Paul    Carriage    Co.,    43 

Minn.    228  1313,   1589 

Glaze   V.   Watson,   55    Tex.    563 

1094,   1101 
Gleason    v.    Sheriff,    20    La.    Ann. 
266  620 


Gleason    v.    Traynham,    111    Ga. 

887  1492 

Glendon    Co.    v.    Townsend,     120 

Mass.    346  1546 

Glenmanna,   The,   Lush    115  287 

Glenmont,  In  re,  32  Fed.  703  1722 
Glenmont,   The,    34   Fed.    402 

1683,    1691,  1722 
Glide,    The,    167    U.    S.    606  1748 

Globe,    The,    2    Blatchf.     (U.    S.) 

427  1676.   1776 

•Globe       Iron       Roofing      Co.       v. 

Thacher,   87   Ala.  458  1453,   1454 

Globe     Works     v.     Wright,     106 

Mass.    207  744 

Gloucester   Ins.    Co.    v.    Younger, 

2    Curt.    (U.   S.)    322  1698 

Glover   Co.   v.    Rollins,    87   Maine 

434  1585 

Glyn   V.    East   West   India   Dock, 

7    App.    Cas.    591  898 

Gnash   v.   George,   58  Iowa  492 

510,  1088,  1090 
Goble     v.     Schooner     Delos     De- 
Wolf,    3    Fed.    236  1772 
Goddard    v.     Trenbath,     24     Hun 

(N.    Y.)     182  189,   233 

Godeffray    v.    Caldwell,     2     Cal. 

489  1359 

Godfrey  Lumber  Co.  v.  Cole,  151 

Mich.   280  1208 

V.   Kline,    167    Mich.    629  1208 

Godin   V.   London  Assurance  Co., 

1    Burr.    489  418,    466,   582 

Godts  V.   Rose,   17    C.   B.    229  830 

Godwin    v.    Collins,    3    Del.    Ch. 

189  1063 

Goeing  v.  Outhouse,  95  111.  346  583 
Goell  V.  Mor.se,  126  Mass.  480  641 
Goembel  v.  Arnett,  100  111.  34  791 
Goepp    v.     Gartiser,     35     Pa.     St. 

130  1491 

Goff  V.  Pain,  34  Mo.  177  1494,  1495 
Gogen    V.    Walsh,    124    Mass.    516 

1207,  1286 
Golden  v.  McCabe,  121  Mich.  666  712 
Golden    Rod,    The,    151    Fed.    6 

1681,  1686 
Goldheim   v.    Clark,    68   Md.    498 

1244,     1313,   1542 
Golding,   Ex  parte,  L.   R.    13    Ch. 

Div.     628  953,    960,   963 

Goldman  v.  Brinton,  90  Md.  259  1504 
Goldtree    v.    San    Diego,    8    Cal. 

App.     512  llPO 

Golrick  v.  Telia,  22  R.  L  281  1223 

Goodall  V.  Skelton,  2  H.  Bl.  316  808 
Goodbar  v.  Cary,  16  Fed.  316  792 
Goodbub    V.    Hornung,    127    Ind. 

181  1200,   1558 

Goodfellov>r   V.   Manning,    148    Pa. 

St.  96  1238 

Goodhart   v.   Lowe,    2   Jac.    &   W. 

349  859,  861 

Goodin      v.      Elleardsville      Hall 

Assn.,   5  Mo.  App.   289 

1343,  1384,  1387 
Goodman  v.   Baerlocker,   88  Wis. 

287  123^ 

V.  Pence,  21   Nebr.   459  1494 

V.  Stewart,  Wright  (Ohio)  216  262 

V.   White,   26  Conn.  317  1579 

Goodnough    Mercantile    &    Stock 

Co.   V.    Gallowav,    156   Fed.    504 

34,   716 


XCVl 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Goodnough      v.      Galloway,      171 

Fed.    940  29 

Goodrich  v.   Bodley,   35   La.   Ann. 
r,25  564,   620 

V.  McDonald,   112  N.  Y.  157 

153,  185,  186,  231 
V.  McDonald,  142  N.  Y.  157  209 
V.  Willard,     7     Gray     (Mass.) 

183  641 

Goodrich    Lumber    Co.    v.    Davie, 

13  Mont.   76  1421 

Goodrow  V.  Buckley,  70  Mich.  513    712 
Goods,  E;x  parte,  2  Deac.  Bkrptcy. 

R.  389  468 

Goodwin  v.  Cunningham,  54  Nebr. 

11  1470 

V.  Mitchell   (Miss.).  38  So.  657    625 

V.   Scannell,   6  Cal.   541  825 

Goodwine  v.  Morey,  111  Ind.  68     1127 

Gordon   v.    Bell,   50   Ala.   213 

1063,  1083,  1104 
V.  Correy,  5  Binn.  (Pa.)  552  585 
V.   Deal,   23   Ore.   153 

1392,   1397,  1554,  1555 
V.  Digg-s,   9  La.  Ann.  422  993 

V.  Freeman,  112  Minn.  482  782b 
V.   Hennings,   89  Nebr.   252  183 

V.  Johnson,  186  111.  18  1110,  1119 
V.  Johnson,  186  111.  App.  423  1101 
V.  Kearney,  17  Ohio  572  257 

V.   Manning,   44   Miss.   756  1075 

V.   Rixey,    76    Va.    694  1111 

V.  Torrey,   15   N.   J.    Eq.   112 

1429,   1439,   1470,   1578 
Gordon     Hardware     Co.     v.     San 
Francisco  &  S.   R.   Co.,   86   Cal. 
620  1394,   1396,   1412,   1445 

Gorgas  v.  Douglas,   6  Serg.  &  R. 

(Pa.)    512  1310,   1315 

Gorman  v.  Sagner,  22  Mo.  137 

1501,   1519 
V.  Williams,    26  Misc.    (N.   Y.) 

776  699 

Gortemiller     v.     Rosengarn,     103 

Ind.    414  1243 

Gorthy  v.  Jarvis.  15  Dak.  509         784a 

Gosline  v.  Thompson,  61  Mo.  471   1560 

Gosling  V.  Birnie,  7  Bing,  339  828 

Goss  V.  Greenleaf,  98  Maine  436     1375 

V.  Helbing,   77  Cal.   190  1341 

V.  Lester,   1   Wis.    43  1045 

V.   Strelitz,  54  Cal.  640      1307,  1455 

Gossler  v.   Schepeler,    5  Daly   (N. 

Y.)     476  869,   872 

Gould  V.  Jacobson,  58  Mich.  288 

1730,   1749 
V.  Wise,   18   Nev.   253 

1238,  1255,  1276,  1372 
Goulding  v.  Smith,  114  Mass.  487  1449 
Gourdier  v.  Tliorp,  1  E.  D.  Smith 

(N.   Y.)    697  1599 

Gove  V.  Gather,  23  111.   634  1382 

Grace  v.  Nesbitt.  109  Mo.  9  1418 

V.  Oakland    Bldg.    Assn.,    166 

111.  637  1417,   1457 

V.   Shively,  12  Serg.  &  R.   (Pa.) 

217  632 

Grace    Greenwood,    The,    2    Biss. 

(U.    S.)    131  1794 

Gracie   v.    Palmer,    8   Wheat.    (U. 

S.)    605  273,   1690 

Gracie  Kent.  The,  169  Fed.  893     1688 
Graf    V.    Cunningham,    109    N.    Y. 
369  1299,   1513 


Graham  v.  Dyster,  6  Maule  &  S. 
1  478 

V.  Gardner,    45    Wash.    648  718 

V.   Holt,  4  B.  Mon.    (Ky.)   61 

1532,   1535,  1565 
V.   Magann      Fawke      Lumber 

Co.,  118  Ky.  192  759a 

V.   Meehan,      4      Bradw.      (111.) 

522  1199 

V.  Moffett,  119  Mich.   303 

1069,   1071,   1088 
V.  Mt.  Sterling  Coal  Road  Co., 
14  Bush   (Ky.)    425 

1378,  1618,  1619,  1648 
V.  Richerson,  115  Ga.  1002  1063 
V.  Seignious,  53  S.  Car.  132  580 
V.   Smith,  27  U.  C.  C.  P.  1  934 

V.  Winchell,  4  Ohio  C.  D.  139    691a 
Grainger  v.  Old  Kentucky  Paper 

Co.,  105  Ky.   683  1462 

Grand    Island    Banking    Co.    v. 

Koehler,    57    Nebr.    649  1471 

Grand    Opera    House    Co.    v.    Ma- 

guire,  14  Mont.  558  1462 

Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Che- 
boygan Circuit  Judge,  161 
Mich.  181  178 

Grand  Rapids  Chair  Co.  v.  Run- 
nels,   77   Mich.    104  712 
Grand   Trunk,    The,    1    Paine    (U. 

S.)    73  1706 

Granite  State,  The,  1  Sprague  (U. 

S.)  277,  710,  744,  1465,   1793,  1794 

Granman    v.    Humboldt,    The,    86 

Fed.  351  1703 

Granquist  v.  Western  Tube  Co., 
240    111.    132  1235 

v.  Western   Tube  Co.,   144   111. 

App.    230  1235 

Grant  v.   Hazeltine,   2  N.  H.   541     196 
v.   Hill,   4  Gray   (Mass.)   361 

857,  865 
V.  Lookout    Mountain    Co.,    93 

Tenn.    691  190 

V.  Mechanics'   Bank,    15   Serg. 

&  R.   (Pa.)  140      379,   39i,   393 
V.  Poillon,    20    How.     (U.    S.) 

162  1697a 

V.  Strong,  18  Wall.  (U.  S.)  623 

1519,   1520,   1525 
V.   Taylor,    3    J.    &    S.    (N.    Y.) 

338  242,   243,  255 

V.  Vandercook,    57    Barb.     (N. 

Y.)   165  1614 

V.  Whitwell,   9   Iowa  152 

104,   552,   553,  566, 
577,   581,   582,  616 

Grant's  Appeal,  44  Pa.  St.   477 

632,   633 
Grantwood  Lumber  &  Supply  Co. 
V.  Abbott,  80  N.  J.  L.  564 

1216,  1280 
Grapengether     v.     Fejervary,      9 

Iowa  163  1063 

Grapeshot,  The,  22  Fed.  123 

1696,  1756,  1773,   1780,   1781, 
1782,   1797,   1802 
Grapeshot,   The,    9   Wall.    (U.    S.) 

129  1679,  1688,   1699 

Gratitude,  The,  42  Fed.  299    1781,  1801 
Graton     &     Knight    Mfg.     Co.    v. 
Woodworth-Mason    Co.,    69    N. 
H.    177  1335,   1480 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


XCVU 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Graves  v.  Bemis,  8  Allen   (Mass.) 
593  1207 

V.   Coutant,  31  N.  J.  Eq.   763 

1063,   1082,  1083,   1098,   1099 
V.  Eades,  5  Taunt.  429  234 

V.  Graves,  8  Sim.  43  1164 

V.  Pierce,  53  Mo.  423 

1335,   1384,    1385,   1386,  1418 

Gray  v.  Baird,  4  Lea  (Tenn.)  212    1067 
V.  Bremer,  122  Iowa  110  601 

v.   Carleton,   35   Maine   481 

108,   1240 
V.  Dick,  97  Pa.   St.   142  1416 

V.  Dunham,   50   Iowa  170  1600 

V.   Elbing-,  35  Nebr.  278  1436 

V.   Havemeyer,   53   Fed.   174        1617 
V.  Holdship,   17  S.   &  R.    (Pa.) 

413  1384,   1387 

V.  Lawson,    36    Ga.    629        209,   212 
V.  New   Mexico   Pumice   Stone 

Co.,  15   N.  Mex.   478  1616a 

V.  Pope,    35    Miss.    116  1261 

V.   Rawson,    11    111.    527         566,  613 
V.  Walker,   16   S.   Car.   143 

1224,  1252,   1253 
V.   Wilson,  4  Watts  (Pa.)  39 

590,   633 
Gray's  Harbor   Boom   Co.   v.   Ly- 
tic Logging-  &c.   Co.,   36  Wash. 
151  718 

Great  Northern   R.   Co.   v.   Swaf- 

field,  L.  R.  9  Ex.  132       281,   283,   332 
Great      Western      Mfg.      Co.      v. 
Hunter,   15  Nebr.   32 

1236,   1329,  1340,   1453 
Great  Western   Planing  Mill   Co. 

V.  Bermans,  19  Mo.  App.  671       1483 
Great  Western  R.  Co.  v.  Crouch, 

3    H.    «&   N.    183  332 

Great  Western  R.  Co.,  Ex  parte, 

L.   R.    22   Ch.   Div.    470  266 

Great    West    No.    Two.    The,    v. 

Oberndorf,   57   111.   168  278 

Greek  v.  McDaniel,   68  Nebr.   569 

183,  208 
Greeley  v.  Harris,  12  Colo.  226  1556 
Green  v.  Betts,   1   Fed.   289 

1119,   1126 
V.  Biddle,  8  Wheat.   (U.  S.)   1 

1132,   1133 
V.   Campbell,   52   Cal.    586  270 

V.  Clifford,   94  Cal.   49      1574,    1575 
V.  Demoss,  10  Humph.  (Tenn.) 

371  1082,   1092 

V.  Farmer,    4    Burr.    2214 

15,  16,   17,   418,    731,   732 
V.  Farrar  Lumber  Co.,  119  Ga. 

30  1290a 

V.  Fox,  7  Allen   (Mass.)   85 

1002,  1010.   1535 
V.   Homestead    F.    Ins.    Co.,    82 

N.   Y.   517  1541 

V.   Jackson  Water  Co.,  10  Cal. 

374  1560 

V.  Jacobs,   5  S.  Car.   280  543 

V.  Jarvis  (Tenn.).  42  S.  W.  165 

1101,   1102a 
V.  Johnson    (Tex.    Civ.    App.), 

44  S.  W.  6  1066 

V.  Putnam,    1    Barb.     (N.    Y.) 

500  1151 

V.  Sanford,  34  Nebr.  363 

1572,   1585 


Green    v.    Southern   Express   Co., 
39    Ga.    20  173,   210 

V.   Sprague,   120   111.   416  1465 

Green  Bay  Lumber  Co.  v.  Adams, 
107   Iowa   672  1293 

V.   Independent    School    Dist., 

125  Iowa  227  1375 

V.  Miller,   98   Iowa   468  1413 

V.   Thomas,  106  Iowa  420 

1413,   1516 
Green    &c.    Lumber   Co.    v.    Bain, 

77  111.  App.   17  1564 

Greene  v.  Cook,   29  111.  186  1108 

V.  Ely,    2    G.    Greene    (Iowa) 

508  1417 

V.  Paul,   155   Pa.   St.   126  1242 

V.  Robinson,  110  Ala.  503  1187 

Greenfield  v.  New  York,  28  Hun 

(N.  Y.)    320  133 

Greenleaf  v.  Beebe.  80  111.  520 

1260,  1264 

Greenlee  V.  Rowland,  85  Ark.  101   170 

Greeno  v.  Barnard,  18  Kans.  518    1063 

Greenough  v.  NlchoLs,  30  Vt.  768    1228 

v.  Wiggington,     2    G.    Greene 

(Iowa)  435  1260,  1270 

Greenway  v.   Turner,   4  Md.   296 

1329,  1437 
Greenwood  v.  Harris,  8  Mo.  App. 

603  1404,   1408 

Greer  v.   Church,   13   Bush    (Ky.) 

430  820 

Gregory   v.   Morris,    96   U.    S.    619 

29,   816 
V.   Stryker,    2    Denio     (N.    Y.) 

628  731 

Gregson,    In    re,    26   Beav.    87  131 

Greider's  Appeal,  5  Pa.  St.  422         593 
Greines,    In    re,    60   Misc.    (N.   Y.) 

542  1511 

Gresham   v.    Galveston   County 

(Tex.),    36   S.   W.   796  422 

Gress  Lumber  Co.  v.  Rodgers,  85 

Ga.    587  1585 

Greve  v.   Dunham,    60   Iowa  108 

923,   927,   929,   935,   937,   965 
Greville  v.   Browne,   7  H.  L.  Cas. 

689  1163 

Grewar  v.  Alloway,   3   Term.   Ch. 

584  1346 

Grey   v.    Vorhis,    8    Hun    (N.    Y.) 

612  1452,   1454 

Gribblo    v.    Ford     (Tenn.),    52    S. 

W.   1007  190 

Grice  v.  Richardson,  3  App.  Cas. 

(D.    C.)     319  832,   852 

Gridley  v.  Garrison,   4  Paige   (N. 
Y.)    647  217 

V.    Sumner,    43    Conn.    14 

1192,   1286,   1287 
Grieff  v.  Cowguill,  2  Disn.   (Ohio) 

58  418,   468 

Oriel's  Appeal  (Pa.),  9  Atl.  861      1490 
(Jrier    v.    Cowan,    Addison    (Pa.) 

347  571 

Griff  V.  Clark,  155  Mich.   611 

1406.   1408 

Griffin  v.  Byrd,  74  Miss.  32  1072 

i         V.   Chadbourne,   32  Minn.  126     713 

V.   Ernst,    124    App.    Div.     (N. 
I  Y.)  289  1336,  1384 

I        V.   Seymour,  15  Colo.  App.  487    1245 
I  Griffith   V.   Buck,    13   Md.    102  791 

1        V.  Speaks,  111  Ky.  149  660 


XCVlll 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,  §§   l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 


Griffiths  V.  Perry,  1  El.  &  El.  680 

823,   837,   852,   SGI 
Griggs   V.   Horton,    84   Ark.    623 

606,   607 

V.   Stone,  51  N.  J.  L.  549    1216,  1386 

V.   White,  5   Nebr.   467  183 

Griggsby  v.  Hair,  25  Ala.   327       1092 

Grimes  v.  Grimes,  141  Ind.   480 

1069,   1102 
Grimm  v.  Pacific  Creosoting  Co., 

50  Wash.  415  718 

Gring  v.  Cargo  of  Lumber,  38  Fed. 

528  308 

Grinnell  v.   Cook,   3   Hill    (N.  Y.) 
485  499,   503,   504,   509,  513, 

521,  531,    641,  735 
V.   Suydan,   5  N.  Y.   Super.   Ct. 

132  34,   62 

Griswold    v.    Bragg,    18    Blatchf. 
(U.     S.)     202  1133,   1140, 

1142,   1144,   1145 
V.  Carthage  &c.  R.  Co.,  8  Mo. 

App.   52  1494 

Gritton    v.    McDonald,    3    Mete. 

(Ky.)    252  1074 

Grode    v.    Van    Valen,    25    N.    J. 

Eq.   95  1173 

Groesbeck  v.  Evans.  40  Tex.  Civ. 

App.   216  638 

Gross  V.  Hartley.  66  Miss.   116         625 

V.   Eiden,   53  Wis.  543  721,   726 

Gross,  In  re.  24  L.  T.   (N.  S. )   198     251 

Grosvenor  v.  Phillips,  2  Hill   (N. 

Y.)    147  461,  465 

Groth  V.  Stahl,  3  Colo.  App.  8       1263 

Grove    v.    Brian,    8    How.    (U.    S.) 

429  460 

V.  Miles,  71  111.  376  1108,  1118 

Growning    v.    Behn,    10    B.    Mon. 

(Ky.)   383  1079 

Grubb  V.  Crane,   5  111.   153  1098 

Grubbs  v.  Wysors,  32  Grat.  (Va.) 

127  1120,  1122 

Gruhn  v.  Richardson,  128  111.  178  1092 
Grundeis  v.  Hartwell,  90  111.  324  1199 
Gubbins   v.   Equitable   Trust   Co., 

80  111.  App.  17  614 

Gudger      v.      Barnes,      4      Heisk. 

(Tenn.)    570  1123 

Guelich  v.  Clark,  3  Thomp.  &  C. 

(N.  Y.)  315  1164 

Guernsey  v.  Reeves,  58  Ga.  290  1287 
Guerrant    v.     Dawson,    34    Miss. 

149  1586 

Guesnard  v.  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co., 

76    Ala.    453  290,   451 

Guest  V.  Lower  Merion  Water  Co., 
142    Pa.    St.    610  1375,   1378 

V.  Opdyke,  31  N.  J.  L.  552  627 

Guiding  Star,  The,  9  Fed.  521 

1698,  1699,  1722,   1758,   1794,  1795 
Guiding  Star,  The,  18  Fed.  263 

1729,   1730,   1772,   1773, 

1774,   1775,   1793a 

Guild  V.  Borner,  7  Baxt.    (Tenn.) 

266  230 

V.  Rogers,  8  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  502    629 

Guilford  v.  Smith.  30  Vt.  49 

307,   921,   933,   942 
Guise  V.  Oliver,  51  Ark.  356  778 

Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Blount, 
(Tex.    Civ.    App.),    136    S.    W. 

566  1092 


Gulf  C.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.  V.  North 
Texas  Grain  Co.,  32  Tex.  Civ. 
App.    93  336 

Gulf,  W.  T.  &  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Browne, 

27  Tex.  Civ.  App.  437  302 

Gumbel  v.  Beer,  36  La.  Ann.  484  800 
Gump  V.  Showalter,  43  Pa.  St.  507 

646,   676 
Gunn  V.   Barry,   15   Wall.    (U.   S.) 
610  109,  1145 

V.   Bolckow,   L.   R.   10   Ch.   491 

32-2,   826,    852,   853 

Gunter  v.  Beard.  93  Ala.  227       1127a 

V.  Du  Bose,  77  Ala.  326  603 

Gurney  v.    Behrend.   3    El.   &   Bl. 

622  895,   946,   952 

V.  Crockett,  Abb.  Adm.  (U.  S.) 

490  1715 

V.   Sharp,   4  Taunt.  242  428 

V.  Walsham,   16   R.    I.    698  1223 

Gustine  v.  Phillips.  38  Mich.  674    885 

Gutshall    v.    Kornaley,    38    Colo. 

195  1454 

Guy  V.   Carriere,   5   Cal.   511 

1247,  1458 
V.   Du  Uprey.  16  Cal.  195  1239 

Guy,  The,   9   Wall.    (U.   S.)    758 

1681,  1808 
Gwathmey    v.    Etheridge,    99    N. 

Car    571  457 

Gwin'v.  Selby,   5  Ohio  St.   96  788 

Gwyn    v.    Richmond    &    Danville 

R.   Co.,    85   N.   Car.    429  873 

Gwynne,  Ex  parte,  12  Ves.  379 

835,   836,   861 

H 

Haag  V.  Hillemeier,   41   Hun    (N. 

Y.)    390  1218 

H.  A.  Baxter,  The,  172  Fed.  260  1811 
Habegger  v.  Kipp,  96  Minn.  456  179 
Hackett  v.   Badeau,   63  N.  Y.   476 

1252a 

Hadden  v.  Knickerbocker,  70  111. 

677  555,    577,   614 

V.   Powell,   17  Ala.   314  603 

Haddow  V.  Lundj',  59  N.  Y.  320    1180 

Haden     v.     Buddensick,     6     Daly 

(N.   Y.)    3  1218 

Hadley    v.    Nash,    69    N.    Car.    162 

1109,   1119 
V.    Pickett,    25    Ind.    450  1080 

Hadlock   v.    Shumway,    11   Wash. 

690  718. 

Haebler  v.  Luttgen,  61  Minn.  315  418 
Haeussler  v.  Thomas,  4  Mo.  App. 

463  1462a,  1469.   1478 

Hagan  v.  American  &c.  Mission- 
ary Soc,   14  Daly    (N.  Y.)    131    1293 
Hagar    v.    Union    Nat.    Bank,    63 

Maine    509  375,    384,   391 

Haggard  v.  Scott,  142  Iowa  682  811 
Haegertv    v.    Palmer,     6    Johns. 

Ch.     (N.     Y.)     437  41,   820 

Hague  V.   Dandeson,   2   Ex.   741        391 

Hahn  v.  Bonacum,   76  Nebr.   837   1213 

V.   Bonacum,    76    Nebr.    890        1468 

V.   Sleepy  Eye  Milling  Co.,  21 

S.    Dak.    324  785 

Hahn's  App.,  39  Pa.  St.  409  1469 

Haifley  v.   Haynes,    37   Mich.   5.35 

576a,    712,   1048 
Haight   V.    Holcomb,    7    Abb.    Pr. 
(N.    Y.)     213  184,   214 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


XCIX 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,  §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,  §§  1061-1812.] 


Haille    v.    Smith,     1    Bos.     &    P. 

563  465,  869,  880 

Haines  v.   Chandler,   26  111.   App. 

400  1199 

Halbert    v.    Gibbs,    16    App.    Div. 

(N.    Y.)     126  184 

Haldeman    v.    McDonald     (Tex.) 

58   S.    W.   1040  1382 

Hale  V.  Baker.  60  Tex.  217 

1107,  1114 
V.   Barrett,    26    111.    195  973 

V.   Brown,    59    N.    H.    551      724,    725 
V.   Burlington,    C.    R.    &   N.    R. 
Co.,    2    McCrary    (U.    S.) 
558  1521,    1544 

V.   Burton,  Dudley    (Ga.)    105      571 
V.  Omaha    Nat.    Bank,    49    N. 

Y.    626  95,   541 

V.   Omaha    Nat.    Bank,    64    N. 

Y.   550  810 

Halff  V.   Allyn,    60   Tex.   278 

902,    917,    921,    929,   935 
Half  Moon,  The,  46  Fed.   812        I8u7a 
Hall  V.  Acken,   47   N.   J.    L.   340      1239 
V.  Amos,   5    T.    B.    Mon.    (Ky.) 

89  562 

V.  Ayer,    9    Abb.    Pr.     (N.    Y.) 

220  184,   212 

V.  Banks,     79     Wis.     229 

1301,  1304 
V.  Bullock,  29  Ky.  L.  1254  1243 
V.   Bunte,    20    Ind.   304  108 

V.   Citv    of    Buffalo,    1    Keyes 

(N.    Y.)    193  56 

V.   Click,    5    Ala.    363  1119 

V.   Cowen,     51     Wash.     295  1335 

V.   Erkfitz,    125    Mich.     332         1262 
V.    Hall,    50    Conn.    104  1063 

V.  Hall,    11    Tex.    526  1041 

V.  Hinckley,    32   Wis.    362  1469 

V.  Hudson,     2      Spr.      (U.     S.) 

65  1697a 

V.  Jackson,    20    Pick.    (Mass.) 

194  426 

V.  Johnson,    57    Mo.    521 

1211,  1607 
V.  Lockerman,    127    Ga.    537 

173.   203 
V.  McGaughey,     114     Ga.     405 

553,   611 
V.  Mobile    &    Montgomery    R. 
Co.,    58    Ala.    10 

1110,    1111,    1119 
V.   Mullanphy      Planing      Mill 
Co.,    16    Mo.    App.    454 

1464,    1478,   1479 
V.   Ody,  2  B.   &  P.   28  215 

V.  Parker,    94    Pa.    St.    109        1282 
V.  Pettigrove,  10  Hun   (N.  Y.) 

609  1519 

V.  Pike,    100    Mass.    495  505 

V.  St.   Louis   Mfg.   Co.,   22   Mo. 

App.    33  1335,    1385,   1464 

V.   Scovel,  10  N.  Bank.  R.  295   1066 
V.   Sheehan,     69    N.    Y.    61S 

1313,  1317 
V.   Spaulding,   40   N.   .1.   L.    166 

1216,  1456 
V.  Stevens,  116  N.  Y.  201  1808 
V.   Thomas,    111    N.    Y.    S.    979 

1413,     1421,    1492 
V.  Tittabawassee     Boom     Co., 

51  Mich.  377  712,  738, 

743a,    1021,   1025 
TIallagan  v.  Herbert,  2  Daly   (N. 
Y.)    253  1455 


Hallahan    v.    Herbert,    57    N.    Y. 
409  1493,   1495 

V.  Herbert,     4    Daly     (N.     Y.) 

209  1251,    1257,    1558 

V.  Herbert,  11  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  S.) 

(N.   Y.)    326  109 

Hallam    v.    Coulter,     24     Ky.     L. 

2200  177 

Hallett  V.   Bousfleld,   18   Ves.   187 

288,   461 
V.  Hallett,    2    Paige     ("N. 
15 


10 


11 


Y.) 

89,   1163 
Lea 

1346 
Wall. 
946 


Halley      v.      Alloway, 

(Tenn.)    523 
Halliday    v.    Hamilton, 

(CJ.    S.)    560 
Halliwell    Cement    Co.    v.    Elser, 

156  Mo.  App.   291  1235,    1263 

Hallock    V.    Smith,    3    Barb.     (N. 

Y.)    267  1090,   1096 

Hallowell    v.    Fawcett,    30    Iowa 

491  476 

Halloway    v.    Vincent,     143     Mo. 

App.    434  1069 

Halpin    V.    Hall,    42    Wis.    176  727 

Halsey,    In    re,    13    Abb.    N.    Cas. 

(N.    Y.)    353  202 

Halstead    v.    Stahl,    47    Ind.    .\pp. 

600  1200 

Halsted     &c.     Co.     v.     Arick,     76 

Conn.     382  1313 

Hamblen   v.    Folts,   70   Tex.   132      1092 
Hamburger    v.    Rodman,    9    Daly 
(N.    Y.)     93 
801,    802,    834,    841,    847,    852,    962 
Hamilton     v.     Buck,     36     Maine 
536  710,   720 

V.   Dunn,    22    111.    259  1199 

V.    Gilbert,    2    Heisk.    (Tenn.) 

680  1098 

V.  McLaughlin,    145    Mass.    20    701 
V.   Naylor,    72   Ind.    171  1200 

V.  Reedy,   3   McCord    (S.   Car.) 

38  552,    567 

V.    Schwehr,    34    Md.    107  1461 

V.   Williford,    90    Ga.    210  1240 

V.  Windolf,     36    Md.     301  622 

V.   Wright,    27    Ky.    L.    1144      1099 
Hamilton-Brown      Shoe      Co.      v. 

Lewis,    7   Tex.   Civ.   App.    509      1119 
Hamlett     v.     Tallman,     30     Ark. 

505  542,   589 

Hammett  v.   Linneman,   48  N.   Y 

399  815 

Hammersmith    v.    Hilton,    8    Mo. 

App.    564  1568 

Hammond    v.    Anderson,    1    B.    & 
P.    (N.    R.)    69  832,    836,    962 

V.   Danielson,    126    Mass.    294 

8,    744 
V.  Harper,    39    Ark.    248  606 

V.  Peyton,    34   Minn.    529 

_  1063,   1092 

V.   Pullman,    129    Mich.    567        712 
V.   Shephard,    50    Hun    (N.    Y.) 

^^,318  1558,   1563a 

V.   Will,    60    111.    404  614 

Hammond    &c.    Co.    v.    Hartzell, 

125   Mich.    177  14''4 

Hammonds    v.    Barclay,    2    East 

227  3,    10,    431,    445,    450 

Hampton      v.      Christensen,      148 

Cal.    729  1100 

Hanch    v.    Ripley,    127    Ind.    151      691 
Hancock's  Appeal,  115  Pa.  St.  1  1222 


TAELE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Hancox    v.    Dunning,    6    Hill    (N. 

Y.)    494  1734,   1756 

Handel    v.    Elliott,    60    Tex.    145 

109,  1226,  1558 
Hanes  v.  Wadey,  73  Mich.  178  1558 
Haney     v.     Adaza     Co-Operative 

Creamery   Co.,    108    Iowa   313      1494 
Hanger    v.    Fowler,    20    Ark.    667 

229,   230 
Hankee    v.    Arundel    Realty    Co., 

98    Minn.    219  1599 

Hankinson    v.    Hankinson,    61    S. 
Car.    193  458 

V.  Vantine,   152  N.  T.   20  1278 

Hanna  v.   Colorado  Sav.  Bank,  3 
Colo.  App.  2S  1393a,  1417 

V.   Davis,   112  Mo.   599  1080 

V.   Island  Coal  Co.,  5  Ind.  App. 

163  174,   193,   197,   201a, 

203,   206,   207 
V.   Phelps,    7   Ind.   21 

6,    419,   422,   731,   1019 
V.  Wilson,   3  Grat.    (Va.)    243   1099 
Hannah    &c.    Mercantile    Co.    v. 

Mosser,   105  Mich.   18  1424 

Hannan    v.    Osborn,    4    Paige    (N. 

y.)   336  1155 

Hannon  v.  Gibson,  14  Mo.  App.  33 

1235,  1321 

V.  Gibson,  14  Mo.  App.  331       1605 

Hansel  v.  Noble,  95  Pa.  St.  345        731 

Hansen  v.  Kinney,  46  Nebr.  207     1433 

V.  Prince,   45  Mich.   519  544 

Hanson  v.  Cordano,  96  Cal.  441       1309 

V.   Meyer,  6  East  614  836,    837 

V.  News  Pub.  Co.,  97  Maine  99 

1253,  1338 
Hapgood  V.  Cornwell,  48  111.  64  791 
Happy  V.  Mosher.  48  N.  Y.  313 

1756,   1809 

Haralson    v.    Boyle,    22    La.    Ann. 

210  620 

V.  Langford,  66  Tex.  Ill    1102a 

V.  Speer,  1  Ga.  App.  573      708 

Harbeck    v.    Southwell,    18    Wis. 

418  1232 

Hardeman  v.  De  Baughn,  49  Ga. 

596  461 

Hardin  v.   Boyd,  113  U.   S.   756 

1108,   1123 
V.  Marble,    13    Bush    (Ky.)    58 

1203,  1565 
V.   State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  493  505 

Harding  v.  Conlon,  146  App.  Div. 

(N.    Y.)    842  184 

Hards  v.  Connecticut  Mut.  L.  Ins. 

Co.,   8   Biss.    (U.   S.)   234  1465 

Hardwick    v.    Griffith,    11    Idaho 

751  455 

Hardy  v.  Mathews,  101  Mo.  App. 

708  626 

Hare   v.    Stegall,    60  111.    380  614 

V.  Van    Deiisen,    32    Barb.    (N. 

Y.)    92  1071,    1086 

Hargett  v.  McCadden,  107  Ga.  773  227 
Harker  v.  Conrad,  12  Serg.  &  R. 

(Pa.)  301  1329,  1421 

Harkness    v.    Russell,    118    U.    S. 

663  820 

Harlan  v.  Bennett,  32  Ky.  L.  473 

114,  177 
V.  Rand,  27  Pa.  St.  511 

722,  1245,   1289,   1311,   1342 


Harlan    v.    Stufflebeem,    87    Cal. 

508         .  1190,    1446,   1599 

Harman  v.   Allen,  11   Ga.   45 

1272,  1276 
V.  Anderson,  2  Camp.  242  828,   921 
Harman's  App.,  124  Pa.  St.  624       1444 
Harmon  v.  Ashmead,  68  Cal.  321 

1190,   1401,   1438 
V.   Ashmead,  60  Cal.   439 

1565.  1588 
V.   Juge,    6   La.   Ann.    768  620 

V.   San  Francisco  &  S.  R.  Co., 
86  Cal.   617 
1190,    1394,    1412,    1413,   1569 
V.   San    Francisco    &c.    R.    Co. 

(Cal.),  23  Pac.  1024  1315 

Harms  v.  Solen?,  79  111.  460  614 

Harnish  v.  Herr,  98  Pa.  St.  6  1416 

Harper  V.  Wilkings,  63  Miss.  215     1069 
Harriet  Ann,  The,  6  Biss.   (U.  S.) 

13  1805 

Harriet,  The,  Olcott  (U.  S.)  229     1715 
Harrington    v.    DoUman,    64    Ind. 
255  1200,   1408,   1413 

V.  Miller,  4  Wash.   808 

1398,   1559,   1569,   1572,   1578 
V.  Union    Oil    Co.,    144    Fed. 

235  1015 

Harris  v.  Berrv  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
123  S.  W.  1148  1102a 

V.     Boggs,     5     Blackf.     (Ind.) 

489  564 

V.   Clark,  3  N.  Y.   93  55 

V.   Dammann,  3  Mackey  (D.  C.) 

90  573,   574,   590,  609 

V.   Dennie,  3  Pet.   (U.  S.)  292 

290,   451 
V.   Fly,  7   Paige   (N.  Y.)    421 

89,   1163,   1164 
V.  Graham,   86  Ark.    570  1262 

V.  Hanie,  37  Ark.  348  1071 

V.  Hanks,  25  Ark.  510  1066,  1090 
V.   Harlan.    14    Ind.    439  1079 

V.  Harris,  9  Colo.  App.  211  1392 
V.  Harris,  18  Colo.  App.  34  1574 
V.  Hart,    6    Duer    (N.    Y.)    606 

904,   921 
V.   Jones,   S3   N.   Car.   317  543 

V.   King,  16  Ark.  122  1108 

V.  Nicolopulo,  38  La.  Ann.  12  800 
V.   Pratt,  17  N.  Y.  249 

861,   921,   922,   932,  948 
V.   Schultz,  64  Iowa  539  1341 

V.   Shields,    111   Va.    643  1110 

V.  Tuttle,  114  Ky.   882  787 

V.    Watkins,    Kay    438  1163 

V.  Woodruff,  124  Mass.  205  644 

V.  Youngstown  Bridge  Co.,  93 

Fed.   355  1501 

Harrisburg,  The,  119  U.  S.  199       1771a 

Harrison  v.  Castner,  11   Ohio  St. 

399  1142 

V.  Guill,  46  Ga.  427  612 

V.  Jenks,   23   La.  Ann.   707  620 

V.   Mora,   150   Pa.   St.   481  465 

V.   Schoff,   101   Iowa   463  1064 

V.    Union    Pacific    R.    Co.,    13 

Fed.    522  85 

V.  Woinen's  Homeopathic  Assn. 
134   Pa.   St.   558 

1335,   1384,   1444 
Harrison  &c.  Iron  Co.  v.  Council 
Bluffs    Water    Works    Co.,     25 
Fed.    170  1378,    1530,    1576 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


CI 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,  §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§  1061-1812.] 


Haishbarg-er  v.   Foreman,   81   111. 

364  1083 

Harshman      v.      Armstrong,     119 

Ind.   224  174 

Harson    v.    Pike,    16    Ind.    140 

487,   488,    490 
Hart    V.    Barney    &    Smith    Mfg. 
Co.,    7    Fed.    543  820 

V.   Boston   R.    B.    &  L.    R.    Co., 

121   Mass.   510  1651 

V.    Carpenter,    24    Conn.    427        820 
V.  Globe  Iron  Works,  37  Ohio 

St.  75  172,  1384,  1548 

V.  Mullen,  4  Colo.  512       1191.  1614 
V.   Proceeds   of   The   Oakland, 

32    Fed.    234  1786 

Hartford      Bldg-.      &c.     Assn.     v. 

Goldreyer,   71   Conn.   95      1192,    1455 
Hartley    v.    Hitchcock,    1    Stark. 
408  310,    745,    972,    1000 

V.    Richardson,    91    Maine    424 

1444.    1448 
Hartman    v.    Keown,    101    Pa.    St. 

338  700 

Hart's  Appeal,   96   Pa.   St.   355        1665 
Hartshorne   v.    Johnson,    7    N.    J. 
L.   108  265 

V.    Seeds,    1    Chester   Co.    Rep. 

(Pa.)   460  646,   676 

Harvey  v.  Brewer.  178  N.  T.   5     121S 
V.  Hampton,  108  111.  App.   501 

580,    614 

V.    Kelly,    41    Miss.    490  1111 

V.    Morris,    63    Mo.    475  1126 

V.   Wallace,   99   111.  App.   212     1199 

Harvey    In    re,    14    Phila.     (Pa.) 

287  151 

Harvill  v.  Lowe.   47   Ga.   214  1109 

Harwood   v.    La  Grange,    62   Hun 

(N.    Y.)     619  44 

Haseltine  v.   Aushernian,   87  Mo. 

410  626 

Haskell     v.     Gallagher,     20     Ind. 
App.    224  1388 

V.    Rice,   11   Gray    (Mass.)    240 

802,    837,    841 
V.   Scott,   56  Ind.   564         1080,  1093 
Haskins    v.    Warren,    115    Mass. 

514  800,  809 

Haslett    v.    Gillespie,    95    Pa.    St. 

371  1222 

Hassett  v.  Curtis,  20  Nebr.  162     1213 

v.  Rust,  64  Mo.  325    1211,  1575,  1613 

Hastings    v.     Belknap,    1     Denio 

(N.    Y.)    190  569,    577 

V.  Drew,   76  N.  Y.   9  84 

V.   Wood.s,   2  Mo.  App.   148  1375 

Haston   v.    Castner,    31   N.    J.   Eq. 

697  1174 

Hatch  V.  Faucher.  15  R.  I.  459      1223 
Hatcher   v.   Briggs,    6   Ore.    31        1135 
V.   Hatcher,   1   Rand.    (Va.)    53 

1107,    1116 
Hatchett     v.     Miller     (Tex.     Civ. 

App.),    53    S.    W.    357  638 

Platfleld   v.    Haubert,    51    W.    Va. 

190  820 

Hathaway    v.     Davis,     32     Kans. 
693  1272,    1273,    1274 

V.   Fall  River   Nat.    Bank,   131 

Mass.    14  251 

Hathorne    v.    Panama    Park    Co., 

44    Fla.    194  1559,    1594 

Hattie   Low,   The,   14   Fed.    880      1706 


Hattie    M.     Bain,    The,     20     Fed. 

389  1709,   1713 

Hatton    V.     Bodan    Lumber    Co., 

57   Tex.   Civ.  App.    478  990,   1060 

Haugh  v.  Blythe,  20  Ind.  24  1088 
Haughery    v.     Thiberge,     24     La. 

Ann.    442  1204 

Hauptman    v.    Catlin,    20    N.    Y. 

247  1218,   1260 

Hause  V.    Judson,    4   Dana    (Ky.) 

7  965 

Hauselt    v.    Harrison,    105    U.    S. 

401  29 
V.    Vilmar,    2    Abb.    N.    C.    (N. 

Y.)    222  48 

Havana,     The,     1     Spr.      (U.     S.) 

402  1681,    1706,    1729,1791 
Havens  v.  West  Side  Elec.  Light 

Co.,    17    N.    Y.    S.    580  1276 

Haverly  v.  Becker,  4  N.  Y.  169  82 
Havighorst    v.    Lindberg,    67    111. 

463  1199,  1290,  1507 

Hawes   v.   Chaillee,    129    Ind.    435 

1076,    1086 
V.    Mitchell,    15    Gray    (Mass.) 

234  1748 

V.  Watson,  2  B.  &  C.  540  828,  845 
Hawk  V.  Leverett,  71  Ga.  675  1078 
Hawk  Eye  Woollen  Mills  v.  Conk- 

lin,    26    Iowa    422  789 

Hawkins    v.    Chambliss,    120    Ga. 
614  781 

V.    Giles,    45   Hun    (N.   Y.)    318 

543,    548 
V.  Loyless,  39  Ga.   5 

173,   196,   209,  210 
V.    Thurman,    1    Idaho   598       •  1116 
Plaworth   v.    Wallace,    14    Pa.    St. 

118  1274 

Haxtun  Steam-Heater  Co.  v.  Gor- 
don,   2    N.    Dak.    246  1470 
Ilayden    v.    Logan,    9    Mo.    App. 
492  1319 
V.  McDermott.      9      Abb.      Pr. 

(N.   Y.)    14  217 

V.    Wulfing,    19    Mo.    App.    353 

1404,  1407 
Hayes   v.   Campbell,   63   Cal.   143 

278,  305 
V.    Fessenden,    106    Mass.    228 

1248,   1252a,   1259 
V.    Hammond,    162    111.    133 

1413,  1418 
Hayes'  Appeal,  113  Pa.  St.  380  1551 
Hayford      v.      Cunningham,.      72 

Maine    128  1723,    1729,    1746 

Haygood  v.  Dannenberg  Co.,  102 

Ga.   24  173 

Haynes   v.    County   of   Coles,    234 
111.    137  1301 

V.    Holland    (Tenn.),   48   S.   W. 

400  1352 

V.   McGeehee,    17    Fla.   159  610 

Ha7/s     V.     Goodman,     16     Montg. 

County  Law   Repr.   43  1370 

V.  Mercier.  22  Nebr.  656    1397,  1591 

V.   Mouille,    14    Pa.    St.    48 

267,  878,  885,  887,  921,  922,  965 
Hazard    v.    Howland,    2    Spr.    (U. 
S.)    68  lC97a 

V.    Manning,    3    Hun     (N.    Y.) 

613  731,  1027 


Cll 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,  §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,  §§  1061-1812.] 


Hazard    Powder    Co.    v.    Loomis, 

2  Disney   (Ohio)   544 

1:^20, '1435,   1436,  1480 
Hazelrigg    v.     Boarman,     8     Ky. 

L.    (abstract)    607  1088 

Hazeltine  v.   Moore,    21   Hun    (N. 

Y.)    355  1071,  1086 

Hazenwinkle    Grain    Co.    v.    Mc- 

Comb.    116    HI.    App.    541  33,   34 

Hazlehurst   v.   Sea   Isle  City   Ho- 
tel   Co.     (N.    J.)    25    Atl.    201       1458 
H.     C.     Behrens    Lumber    Co.    v. 

Lager,    26   S.   Dak.    160  1262 

H.   C.   Grady,   The,    87   Fed.   232     1703 
H.    C.    Houston    Lumber    Co.    v. 

Wetzel  &  T.  R.  Co.,   69  W.  Va. 

682  1624 

Healey   Ice   Mach.    Co.    v.    Green, 

181   Fed.    890  1262 

Healy  v.   Fallon,   69   Conn.   228      1599 
Healy    Ice    Mach.    Co.    v.    Parks, 

155  111.   App.   232  .1476 

Heard    v.    Holmes,    113    Ga.    159 

1197,   1293 
Hearne   v.    Chillicothe    &   Bruns- 
wick  R.   Co.,   53   Mo.   324  1283 
Heart  v.   State   Bank,   17  N.   Car. 

Ill  375 

Heartt  v.  Chipman,  2   Aik.    (Vt.) 

162  191,  204,  209 

Heath    v.    Solles,    73    Wis.    217 

1262,  1264 
V.   Tyler,    44  Md.  312  1206,   1448 

'Heaton   v.    Horr,    42    Iowa   187       1334 
Heavenrich     v.     Alpena     Circuit 

Judg-e,   111   Mich.    163  178 

Hecht    V.    Spears,    27    Ark.    229      1092 
Heekmann   v.   Pinkney,   81   N.   T. 

211  1218,  1236,  1287,  1299,  1599 

Hedden   Const.   Co.   v.   Proctor   & 

Gamble    Co.,    62    Misc.    (N.    Y.) 

129  1283 

Hedden     Const.     Co.,     In     re,     72 

Misc.    (N.   Y.)    153  1218 

Hedlund    v.    Payne,    60   Misc.    (N. 

Y.)    603  1253 

Hefflin  v.  Bell,  30  Vt.  134  820 

Heffner      v.      Gwynne-Treadwell 

Cotton  Co.,   160   Fed.   635  428 

Heg-ler  v.   Eddy,    53   Cal.    597  820 

Heideg-ger  v.  Atlantic  Milling  Co., 

16  Mo.  App.  327  1384,  1464 

Heidelbach    v.    Jacobi,    28    N.    J. 

Eq.    544  1460 

Heidenbluth  v.   Rudolph,  152  111. 

316  1506 

Heidritter  v.  Elizabeth  Oil  Cloth 

Co.,    6   Fed.   138  1550 

Heier    v.     Meisch,     33    Mo.    App. 

35  1394 

Heim   v.   Elliott,    66   "Wash.   361     1230 
V.    Vogel,    69    Mo.    529  1579 

Heinekey  v.  Earlee,   8   El.   &   Bl. 

410  867,    924 

Heinrich  v.   Carondelet  Gymnas- 
tic  Soc,    8   Mo.    App.    588  1417 
Heins   v.    Peine,    6    Rob.    (N.    Y.) 

420  446 

Heist    V.    Baker,    49    Pa.    St.    9      1110 
Heister  v.  Mount,  17  N.  J.  L.  438 

158,  204 
Hektograph     Co.     v.     Fourl,     11 

Fed.   844  199 


Helen   Brown,   The,   28   Fed.    Ill 

1734;  1748 
Heller  v.  Elliott.  45  N.  J.  L.  564  849 
Helm    V.    Chapman,    66    Cal.    291 

1190,    1309c 

V.   Meyer,    30   La.   Ann.    943         437 

V.   Swiggett,   12   Ind.   194  386 

Helser  v.  Pott.  3  Pa.  St.  179     571,  592 

Heltzell  V.   Chicago  &  A.   R.   Co., 

77    Mo.    315  1655 

V.    Kansas    City,    St.    L.    &    C. 

R.  Co.   77   Mo.   482  1655 

Heman    v.    Britton,    88    Mo.    549 

84,  85 
Hempstead     Real     Estate,     etc., 
Assn.   V.    Cochran,    60    Tex.    620 

557,   638 
Henchett    v.    Kimpson,    2    Wils. 

140  628 

Henchey   v.    Chicago,    41    111.    136 

167,  193 
Henderson  v.  Burton.  3  Ired.  Eq. 
(N.    Car.)    259  1063 

V.    Connolly,    123   111.    98 

1252a.    1487,   1592 
V.  Hughes,  4  Ga.  App.  52  611 

V.    Kanawha    Dock    Co.,     185 

Fed.    781  1680 

V.   State,    109   Ala.    40  603 

V.  Sturgis,   1  Daly   (N.  Y.)    336 

1218,    1301,    1438,    1440,   1559 
Hendrick   v.   Foote,   57   Miss.    117 

1115,    1119 
V.    Posey,   104   Ky.    8  177 

Hendrick    Hudson,    The,    3    Ben. 

(U.   S.)    419  1677 

Hendrie,  etc.,  Co.,  The,  v.  The 
Holy  Cross,  etc.,  Co.,  17  Colo. 
App.    345  1249 

Henley    v.    Wadsworth,    38    Cal. 

356  1289,   1513 

Henly   v.    Walsh,    2    Salk.    686  735 

Henry  v.  Bunker,  22  Mo.  App.  650 

1211 
V.   Davi§,    60   Miss.    212  625 

V.    Hand,    36    Ore.    492  1221 

V.    Hinds,    IS    Mo.    App.    497 

1304,   1432,   1589 

V.  Mahone,   23  Mo.   App.   S3        1393 

V.  Plitt,   84  Mo.  237  1350,   1404 

V.    Rice,    18    Mo.    App.    497  1235 

V.  Traynor,  42  Minn.  234     179,  227 

Henry  &  C.  Co.  v.  Evans,  97  Mo. 

47  1304,  1304a,  1556 

V.  Halter.  58  Nebr.  685     1367,  1432 

Henry    County    v.    Allen,    50    Mo. 

231  49 

Henry  Dennis,  The.  47  Fed.  918  1697 
Hensel    v.    Johnson,    94    Md.    729 

1206,    1434 
V.   Noble,    95   Pa.   St.    345  740 

Henson    v.   Reed,    71   Tex.    726        1093 
V.    Westcott,    82    111.    224  1091 

Hentig  v.  Sperry,  38  Kans.  459  1391 
Henvell  v.  Whitaker,  3  Russ.  343  1166 
Hepburn   v.   Snyder,  3   Pa.   St.   72 

28,   1063,   1179 
Herbert  v.   Herbert,   57  How.  Pr. 
(N.   Y.)    333  1243,  1286,   1287 

V.  Schofleld,   9  N.  J.   Eq.   492      1063 
Hercules,  The,  1  Brown  Adm.  560 

1802 
Herman    v.    Metropolitan    St.    R. 
Co.,    121    Fed.    184  184 


TAlILli   OF    CASES. 


cm 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Herman  v.   Perkins,    52   Miss.   813      783 
Hermann  v.  New  York,  130  App. 

Div.   (N.  Y.)   539  1283 

Hern  v.  Hopkins,  13  S.  &  R.  (Pa.) 

269  1429.  1439,  1470,  1472,  1491 

Herr  v.   Johnson,   11   Colo.   393         540 
Herrell  v.  Donovan,  7  App.  D.  C. 

322  1289 

Herrick  v.  Carman,  10  Johns.  (N. 

Y.)    224  260 

Herrin    v.    Warren,    61    Miss.    509 

1210,   1287,  1302,  1654 
Herring  v.  Hoppock,  15  N.  Y.  326    820 
Herring-Hall-Marvin        Co.        v. 
Kroeger,     23     Tex.     Civ.     App. 
672  1375 

Herron    v.    Gill,    112     111.     247 

552,    577,   580,    614 
V.    Graham,    3    Wkly.    N.    Cas. 

(Pa.)   176  1532 

Hersey  In   re,   171   Fed.   1001  616 

Hersh  v.   Carman,   51  Nebr.   784    1533 
Hershy    v.    Du    Val,    47    Ark.    86 

170,   229,    230 

V.   Shenk,   58  Pa.   St.   382  1354 

Hertzfeld  v.  Bailey,  103  Ala.  473    1076 

Hervey  v.  Gay.  42  N.  J.  L.   168      1272 

V.   Illinois  Midland   R.   Co.,   28 

Fed.   169  86 

V.  R.  I.  Locomotive  Works,  93 

U.  S.  664  820 

Heryford  v.  Davis,  102  U.  S.  235     820 
Heslop  V.   Gatton,   71   111.   528  1164 

v.  Metcalfe,  3  Mylne  &  C.   183 

122a  132 
Hess  V.  Poultney,  10  Md.  257  'l206 
Hester  v.  Allen,  52  Miss.  162  783 
Heston    v.    Martin,    11    Cal.     41 

1406,  1409 
Hett    V.    Collins,    103    111.    74  1099 

Hewes  v.  Dehon,  3  Gray  (Mass.) 

205  1165 

H.    E.    Willard,   The,    52    Fed.    387 

1697,  1697a,  1725 
Hewison   v.  Guthrie,   2  Bing.    (N. 
C.)    755  322,  850,  1000 

V.  Guthrie,  3  Scott  298  1011 

Hevs^itt  V.  Truitt,  23  Mo.  App.  443 

1211 
Hewlet   V.   Flint,   7  Cal.   264  852 

Heyde  v.   Suit,   22  Ind.  App.  83     1423 
Heyward    v.    Maynard,    119    App. 

Div.    (N.   Y.)    66  184 

Heyvv^ood  v.  Waring,   4  Camp.  291  21 
Hezekiah    Baldw^in,    The,    8    Ben. 

(U.    S.)    556  1677 

H.  F.  Cady  Lumber  Co.  v.  Reed, 

90   Nebr.    293  1286 

Hibbert   v.   Cooke,    1   Sim   &   Stu. 

552  1160 

Hibernia  Ins.   Co.   v.   St.  Louis  & 

N.  O.  Transp.  Co..  13   Fed.   516        85 
Hickey  v.  Collom.  47  Minn.   565    1328 
V.    O'Brien,    11    Daly    (N.    Y.) 

292  1614 

Hickman  v.  Thomas,  16  Ala.   666 

503,    641 
Hickox  V.  Fay,  36  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  9  1024 
v.   Greenwood,    94   III.   2  66 

1199,  1247,  1248,  1249, 
1250,    1257,    1487 
Hicks    V.    Morris,     57    Tex.     65S 

1066,    1093,    1098 
V.    Murray,    43    Cal.    515  1390 


Hicks   V.   Roanoke   Brick   Co.,    94 

Va.    741  1375 

Hickson  Lumber  Co.  v.  Gay  Lum- 
ber  Co.,    150   N.    Car.    281  1063 
Hiester    v.    Green,    48    Pa.    St.    96 

1063,    1114 
Higgins  V.  Bretherton.  5  C.  &  P. 
2  269 

V.    Carlotta    &c    Co.,    148    Cal. 

700  1279 

V.   Ferguson,    14    111.    269  1256 

V.  Higgins,  121  Cal.  487  33 

V.   Scott,   2   B.   &  Ad.    413     231,   452 

Higgs    V.    Smith,    100    Ark.    543      1100 

High   V.   Batte,   10   Yerg.    (Tenn.) 

186  1100 

Highlander,    The,    4    Blatch.    (U. 

S.)    55  1006,   1535,  1536 

Highlander,    The,    1    Spr.    (U.    S.) 

510  1704 

Hight  V.   Fleming,   74  Ga.   592  781 

Hightower    v.     Bailey,     108     Ky. 

198  1304 

v.    Rigsby,    56   Ala.    126  1092 

Higley    v.    Rinkle,    57    Kans.    222 

1184a 
Hilderbrandt  v.  Savage,  4  Wash. 

524  1614 

Hilger    v.     Edwards,    5    Nev.    84 

743a,   1029 
Hill    V.    Aldrich,    48    Minn.    73         1458 
V.     Alliance     Bldg.     Co.,     6     S. 

Dak.    160'  1496 

V.    Bishop,    25    111.    349  1325 

V.   Bourcier,   29   La.   Ann.   841      992 
V.    Bowers,    45    Kans.    592  1350 

V.     Braden,     54     Ind.     72 

1200,    1310,    1327 
V.    Brinkley,    10    Ind.    102 

155,   167.   174 
V.   Burgess,   37   S.    Car.   604  733 

V.    Coats,   109   111.    266  614 

V.  Cole,   84  Ga.   245  1110 

V.    Downs,    9    Ky.    L.    767  1116 

V.     George,     1     Head     (Tenn.) 

394  636 

V.    Gill,    40   Minn.    441 

1235,     1252a,     1259,     1392 
V.  Golden  Gate,   The,   1  Newb. 

(U.  S.)   308       1682,  1683,   1691 
V.   Grigsby,    32    Cal.    55  1107 

V.    Kauffman,    98    Md.    247  1206 

V.   La  Crosse   &   M.    R.   Co.,   11 
Wis.    214 
1232,  1378,  1425,  1600,  1618 
V.    McLean,     10    Lea     (Tenn.) 

107  1080,    1087 

V.  Mathewson,  56  Conn.  323     1286 
V.    Miles,    83    Ark.    486  248 

V.    Newman,    38    Pa.    St.    151      1356 
V.   Pine  River  Bank,   45   N.  H. 

300  404 

V.  Reeves,   57   Ga.   31  611 

v.  Ryan,  54  Ind.  118  1310 

V.    Sloan,    59    Ind.    181  1534 

Hillburn   v.   O'Barr,   19    Ga.   591      1257 

Hillhouse  v.   Pratt,   74   Conn.    113 

1247,  1248 
Hilliker     v.     Francisco,     65     Mo. 

598  1306,   1404,   1418 

Hills    v.    Elliott,    16    Serg.    &    R. 

(Pa.)    56  1327,  1330 

V.   Halliwell,    50   Conn.    270        1551 

v.  Ohlig,   63   Cal.   104  1190,   1405 


CIV 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §sS   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Hillsburg    v.    Harrison,    2     Colo. 
App.  298  731,   743a,   753, 

779b,   797,   1025 
Hills'  Elstate,  In  re,  2  Clark  (Pa.) 

96  1434 

Hill's   Trusts,   In   re,   16   Ch.    Div. 

173  1164 

Hilman  v.  Brigham,  117  Iowa  70     616 
Hilton   V.   Merrill,   106   Mass.    528 

1252a    1254 
V.   Vanderbilt,   82   N.   T.    591  '     478 
Hilton  Bridg-e  Const.  Co.  v.  New 
York    Central   &   H.    R.   R.   Co., 
145    N.   Y.    390  1574 

Himely  v.  Wyatt,  1  Bay  (S.  Car.) 

102  562,    564 

Himes    v.    Langley,    85    Ind.    77 

1071,  1088 
Hinchley    v.    Greany,    118    Mass. 

595  1504 

Hinchman  v.  Graham,  2  Serg-.   & 
R.    (Pa.)    170  1329 

V.    Lybrand,    14     Serg.     &     R. 

(Pa.)    32  1500,   1519, 

1520,  1524 
Hinckley    v.    Field's    Biscuit    &c. 

Cracker  Co.,  91  Cal.  136    1190,  1283 
Hinckley   &c.   Iron  Co.   v.  James, 

51    Vt.    240  >  1228 

Hindert    v.     American     T.     &     S. 
Bank,    198    111.    538  1199 

V.    American    T.     &     S.     Bank 

100    111.    App.    85  1199 

Hines  v.  Chicago  Bldg.  Mfg.  Co., 
115   Ala.   637  1535 

V.    Perkins,    2    Heisk.    (Tenn.) 

395  1107.   1116 

Hine,     The,    v.    Trevor,    4    Wall. 

(U.  S.)   555      1725,  1729,  1743a,  1750 
Kingston  v.  Wendt,  1  Q.  B.  Div. 

367  287,   288 

Hinman    v.    Rogers,    4   Ohio   Dec. 

303  159 

Hinson   v.    Gamble,    65    Ala.    605      229 
Hinton  v.  Goode,   73   Ga.   233  781 

Hippie    V.    Canal-Boat    Fashion, 

3    Grant    Cas.     (Pa.)     40  1760 

Hipsley  v.   Price,   104   Iowa   282      616 
Hiram    R.    Dixon,    The,    33    Fed. 

297  1722 

Hirschorn     v.     Caney,     98     Mass. 

149  820 

Hiscock  V.   Norton,   42   Mich.    320 

1061,  1071 
■Hiscox  V.  Greenwood,  4  Esp.  174    733 
V.    Harbeck,    2    Bosw.    (N.    Y.) 

506  1728 

Hitchcock     V.     Hassett,     71     Cal. 
331  542 

V.  Kiely,  41   Conn.   611     1260,   1268 
Hitchings  v.   Olsen,   184  Fed.   305 

1729  1755 
Hitt  v.  Pickett,  9  Ky.  644  1107*,  1116 
Hoag  V.   Hay,   103    Iowa   291  1247 

Hoagland   v.   Dusk,   33   Nebr.    376 

1520,  1532 
V.   Van   Btten,   22   Nebr.    681     1599 
Hoatz  V.  Patterson,  5  Watts  &  S. 

(Pa.)    537  725 

Hobbs    V.    Davis,    50    Ga.    213  551 

V.    Head    &    Dowst    Co.,    184 

Fed.    409  1215 

V.    Head    &    Dowst    Co.,    185 

Fed.    1006  1215 


Hobbs  V.  Spencer,  49  Kans.  769  1202 
Hobbson  v.  Townsend,   126   Iowa 

453  1327 

Hobley   v.   Day,    51   Hun    (N.    Y.) 

644  1257 

Hobson     V.     Edwards,     57     Miss. 
128  1119 

V.    Watson,    34    Maine    20 

155,  158,  193,   214 
Hockaday    v.    Lawther,     17     Mo. 

App.    636  1099 

Hodgdon  v.  Waldron,  9  N.  H.   66 

275,  276,  743a,  1029 
Hodges  V.  Kimball,  49  Iowa  577     465 
V.  Planters'  Bank,   7  Gill   &  J. 

(Md.)     306  376,    404 

V.   Roberts,   75  Tex.   517  1116 

Hodgkins    v.    Bowser,    195    Mass. 

141  663 

Plodgson  V.  Loy,  7  T.  R.  436    801,  881 

Hodnett  v.  Bormer,   107  Ga.   452     230 

V.    Stewart,   131   Ga.    67  173 

Hodo    V.    Benecke,    11    Mo.    App. 

393  515 

Hodson   V.   Warner,    60   Ind.    214      820 
V.   Wright,   1    Ala.   App.   433         777 
Haeussler    v.    Mo.    Glass    Co.,    52 

Mo.    452  1387 

Hoey  V.  Hews,  3  La.  Ann.  704  620 
Hofer's  Appeal,  116  Pa.  St.  360  1435 
Hoffa  V.  Person,  1  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

367  721 

Hoffman   v.   Barthelmess,    63    Ga. 
759  495 

v.    Brungs,    83    Ky.    400  463 

V.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co., 

125    Mich.    201  306,   312 

V.   Laurans,   18   La.   70  1272 

v.   McColgan,   81   Md.    390  1275 

V.    McFadden,     56    Ark.     217 

1260,  1262,  1263,  1264,  1265 
V.  Miller,  9  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  334  257 
V.    Walton,    36    Mo.    613 

109,  1261,  1390,  1408,  1414 
Hoff's  Appeal,  102  Pa.  St.  218  1465 
Hofgesang   v.    Meyer,    2    Abb.    N. 

Cas.    (N.   Y.)    Ill        1218,   1286,   1287 
Hogan    V.    Black.    66    Cal.    41  160 

V.   Gushing,    49   Wis.    169  720 

V.    Missionary    Soc,    14    Daly 

(N.  Y.)    131  1297 

Hoges  V.  Holeman,  1  Dana  (Ky.) 

50  787 

Hogue  V.  Sheriff,  1  Wash.  T.  172    997 

V.   Sheriff,   1   Wash.   T.    195        786b 

Holbrook    v.    Ives,     44     Ohio     St. 

516  1515 

V.   Vose,    6   Brosw.    (N.   Y.)    76 

931,  932,  946,  947,  958,  960 
V.    Wight.    24    Wend.    (N.    Y.) 

169  418,     461,    465 

Holcroft  V.  Halbert,  IP  Ind.  256  1743 
Holden    V.    Cox,    60    Iowa    449 

576a,    581,     616 
V.    Winslow,    18    Pa.    St.    160      1437 
Holderman    v.    Manier,    104    Ind. 

118  728,    732,    745,    1054 

Holderness    v.    Collison,    1    Man. 
&   R.    55  967,    979 

V.    Collison,    7    B.    &    C.    212 

265      967     979 
V.    Shackels,    3    M.    &    R.'   25    'lOOO 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


cv 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Holl    V.    Griffen,    10    Bing-.    246        828 
HoUaday    v.    Rutledge,    145    Ala. 

656  603 

Holland    v.    Jones,    9    Ind.    495      1578 
V.    McCarty,    24    Mo.    App.    82 

1211,    1372,    1421,    1423 
V.    Wilson,    76    Cal.    434  1190 

Holler'  V.    Apa,    18    N.    Y.    S.    588 

1604a,    1616 
Holliday   v.    Bartholomae,   11    111. 
App.    206  570 

V.    Mathewson,    146   Mich.    336 

1208,    1373,    1382 
Hollingsworth   v.   Dow,    19    Pick. 
(Mass.)    228  26,    733 

V.    Hill,    69    Miss.    73  625 

V.    Napier,    3    Caines    (N.    Y.) 

182  958 

Hollins    V.    Hubbard,    165    N.    Y. 

534  432     465 

Hollins,    In    re,    197    N.    Y.    361     '   184 
Hollis  V.    Claridge,   4   Taunt.    807 

115,    125,    146 
V.  Hollis,  4  Baxt.    (Tenn.)    524 

1088 

Hollister    v.    Mott,    132    N.    Y.    18 

1512,   1513 
Holly     V.     Huggeford,      8     Pick. 
(Mass.)    73 

307,    429,    982,    983,    986,    989 
Holman    v.    Patterson,     29    Ark. 

357  1075,    1108 

Holmes     v.     Bailey,     92     Pa.     St. 

57  465 

V.   Balcom,    84   Maine  226  482 

V.    Bank,    87    Pa.    St.    525  465 

V.  Bell,  139  App.  Div.    (N.  Y.) 

455  184 

V.    Hall,    8    Mich.     66  544 

V.    Oregon    &c.   R.    Co.,    5   Fed. 

75  1806a 

V.    Pye.    107    Ga.    784  611 

V.    Richet,   56   Cal.    307     1327,    1590 

V.    Waymire,    73    Kans.    104  229 

Holroyd   v.   Breare.    4    B.    &    Aid. 

43  215 

V.  Gwynne,    2    Taunt.    176  820 

Hoist    V.    Pownal,    1    Esp.    240 

875,    926,    930,    931,    936 
Holt  V.  Bank  of  Aug-usta,   13  Ga. 
341  64,    74 

V.    Quimby,    6    N.    H.    79  221 

Holt  Mfg.  Co.  V.  Collins,  154  Cal. 

265  779a 

Holzhour    V.    Meeer,    59    Mo.    434 

1352.    1353 
Homans  v.   Combe,  3  Cranch   (U. 

S.)    365  1457 

Home   Brew.    Co.   v.    Johnson,    41 

Ind.    App.    44  1445 

Home   Lumber    &    Supply    Co.    v. 

McCurley,   84  Kans.   751    1404,   1412 
Home   Sav.   &c.   Assn.   v.   Burton, 

20   Wash.    688  1481 

Hommel    v.    Lewis,    104    Pa.    St. 

465  1330.    1332 

Honaker   v.    Jones,    102    Tex.    132 

1072,    1110 
V.    Jones,     (Tex.    Civ.    App.) 

115    S.    W.    49  1072 

Honore    v.    Bakewell,    6    B.    Mon. 

(Ky.)     67  1074,    1092 

Hood  V.  Baker,   165   Ind.   562  99 

V.  Hanning,  4  Dana   (Ky.)    21    555 


Hooker  v.  McAllister,  12  Wash. 
46  680a,    689 

V.   McGlone,   42   Conn.   95 

1247,    1259,    1268,    1567 

Hooper    v.    Brundage,    22    Maine 

460  165,   220,   231 

V.  Byles,  2  Vern.  480  1182 

V.    Fletcher,    145    Cal.    375  1287 

V.    Hood,    54    Cal.    218 

1190,  1401,  1572 
V.  Strahan,  71  Ala.  75  1076,  1083 
V.    Welch,    43    Vt.    169 

115.  191,  193,  194,   209,  212,  217 
Hoopes    V.    Worrall,    1    Del.    Co. 

Rep.    (Pa.)    Ill  676 

Hoops  V.  Crowley,  12  Serg'.  &  R. 

(Pa.)    219n  632 

Hooven,  Owens  &  Reutschler 
Co.  V.  Featherstone,  99  Fed. 
ISO  1421,  1432 

Hoover   v.    Epler,    52    Pa.    St.    522 

643,    689,    993,    994,    995 
V.    Tibbits,    13    Wis.    79 

921,   931,  935,   944 
Hope  Mining  Co.,  In  re,  1  Sawy. 

(U.    S.)    710  109,    1557 

Hope,   The,   1   Asp.    563  1787 

Hope,    The,    49   Fed.    279  1698 

Hope,   The,   191   Fed.    243  1748 

Hopkins    v.    Forrester,    39    Conn. 

351  1413,    1533 

V.    Gilman,    22   Wis.    476  1161 

V.    Gilman,    47   Wis.    581  1161 

V.    Rays,    68    N.    H.    164  715 

V.    Simpson,    3    Houst.     (Del.) 

90  60S 

V.   Wood,    79    111.    App.    484  614 

Hopkinson    v.    Forster,    L.    R.    19 

Eq.    74  57 

Hopper  V.  Childs,  48  Pa.  St.  310    1282 

v.  Haines,   71  Md.   64  623 

V.   Hays,    82  Mo.  App.   494  579 

Horace  Waters  &  Co.,  v.  Gerard, 

189   N.  Y.   302  515 

Horn   V.   Baker,   9   East    215  820 

Hornbrooks  v  Lucas,   24   W.   Va. 

493  585,    586 

Horncastle    v.    Farran,    3     B.     & 

Aid.    497  322 

Horning   v.    Wiederspalen,    28   N. 

J.   Eq.    387  1164 

Horton  v.  Carlisle,  2  Disney 
(Ohio)    184  1325,   1326 

V.    Champlin,    12    R.    I.    550 

157,    164,    214 
V.   Horner,   14   Ohio   437  1092 

Hoskins   v.    Carter,    66    Iowa    638 

1201 
V.   Knight,   1   M.   &   S.   245  573 

V.  Paul,  9  N.  J.  L.  110    557,  564,  627 
V.    Rowe,    61    Iowa   180  1068 

V.  Wall,  77  N.  Car.  249      1063,  1110 
Plostler,  Case  of,  Yelv.   66  6 

Hotaling   v.    Cronise,    2    Cal.    60 

1421,   1542 
Hough   v.   Collins,    176   111.   188       1237 
v.    Edwards,    1    H.    &    N.    171 

118,   157 
Houghton  V.  Bauer,  70  Iowa  314    616 
V.    Blake,    5    Cal.    240 

1300,  1327,  1328 
V.    Matthews,    3    Bos.    &    Pul. 

485  448,    449,   466 


CVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  A^ol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Houghton  V.  Rogan,   17  Tex.  Civ. 

App.    285  1119 

Houlditcli   V.   Desanges,   2   Starlt. 

337  850 

Houser  v.   Cooper,   102   Ga.   823        750 
Houston    V.   Dickson,    66   Tex.    79 

1064,    1102a 
V.    McCluney.    8    W.    Va.    135 

1150,   1156 
V.    Stanton,    11    Ala.    412  1076 

Hovey    v.     East    Providence,     17 
R.    L.    80  1375 

V.   Elliott,    21   J.   &   S.    (N.   Y.) 

V.   Elliott,  118  N.  Y.  124  29,  30 

V.  Rubber  Tip  Pencil  Co.,  14 
Abb.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N. 
Y.)    66  217 

V.  Smith,  1  Barb.    (N.  Y.)    372     600 
How  V.  Kirchner,  11  Moore  P.  C. 

21  326 

Howard   v.  Doolittle,   3   Duer    (N. 
Y.)    464  1276 

v.    Herman,    9    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

79  1086 

V.  Macondray,  7  Gray   (Mas.s. ) 

516  327 

V.    Osceola,    22    Wis.    453 

115,   204,   208 
V.  Riker,   11  Abb.  N.   Cas.    (N. 

Y.)   113  iSV 

V.    Robinson,   5   Cush.    (Mass.) 

119  1465 

V.    Shepherd,   9   C.   B.   297  951 

V.  Tucker,  1  Barn.  &  Ad.  712     326 
V.  Veazie,  3  Gray   (Mass.)   233 

1248,    1254,    1465 
Howard,  The,  29  Fed.  604 

1691,  1730,  1731 
Howe   V.    Kindred,    42    Minn.    433 

1520,   J542 

V.   Klein,    89   Maine   376  220 

V.  Patterson,  78  Maine  227       1548 

V.    Schmidt,    151   Cal.   436  IIGO 

V.    Stewart,    40    Vt.    145  S68 

Howe,  In  re,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.)    124      77 

Howell  V.  Alport,   12  U.   C.   C.   P. 

375  P34 

V.   Harding,   8  East  362  115 

V.  Hathaway,   28  Nebr.   807        1264 

Howe   Machine   Co.    v.   Miner,    28 

Kans.    441  94 

V.    Sloan,    87    Pa.    St.    438  564 

Howes  V.  Ball,  7  B.  &  C.   481  745 

V.    Newcomb,    146    Mass.    76 

691,    6Pla 
V.    Reliance   Wire-Works   Co., 

46  Minn.   44  1324,  1329,  1513a 
Howett  V.   Selbv,   54  111.   151  1199 

Howitt  V.  Merrill,  113   N.  Y.   630     235 
Howland   v.   Porlaw,   108  N.   Car. 
567  631 

V.   Lounds,   51  N.   Y.   604  490 

Hoye  Coal  Co.  v.  Colvin,  83  Ark. 

528  1574 

Hoyt  V.  Hoyt,   85  N.  Y.   142  1163 

v.  Miner,  7  Hill   (N.   Y.)    525 

1297,   1599 
V.    Sprague,    103   U.   S.    613  794 

V.   Story,    3   Barb.    (N.   Y.)    262 

48,   50,  52,   60 
Hoyt,  In  re,  3  Biss.   (U.  S.)   436 

1232,  1470,  1492 
Hubbard  v.  Bellew,  10   Fed.   849        80 
V.  Brown,  8  Allen  (Mass.)   590 

1412,    1445 


Hubbard  v.  Clark,    (N.  J.)    7  Atl. 

26  1101 
v.  Clark,   3  Stew.  N.  J.  Dig. 

540  1082 

V.   Ellithorpe,   135  Iowa  259 

175  201a 
v.  Moore,  132  Ind.  178  1200,'  1574 
V.   Moss,  65   Mo.   647  626 

v.  Roach,   2  Fed.   393  1719 

Hubbell  v.  Hendrickson,  175  N. 
Y.    175  1061,    1064 

V.   Schreyer,   56   N.   Y.   604 

1400,  1614 
Hubbersty   v.   Manchester,    Shef- 
field &  Lincolnshire  R.  Co.,   L. 
R.    2    Q.    B.    59  397 

Hubble  V.  Dunlap,  101  Ky.   419 

177,  203 
Huckleby  v.  State,  57   Fla.  433  90 

Hudler  v.  Golden,  36  N.  Y.  446       105 
Hudmon    v.    Trammel!,     86    Ala. 

472  1589 

Hudson  v.   Granger,   5  B.   &  Aid. 

27  433,  472 
V.  Vaughan,  57  Ala.  609  603 
V.  Wright,  3  Ala.   App.  290  603 

Hudson  Trust  &  Saving  Inst.  v. 
Carr-Curran  Paper  Mills,  (N. 
J.)    44  Atl.  638  laS 

Huff  v.   Clark,   59   Tex.   347  1382 

V.   Earl,   3  Ind.    306  1000 

V.   Jolly,   41   Kans.   537      1245,   1258 
Huffman  v.  Cauble,   86   Ind.   591 

1116,    1124 
Hug  V.  Hintrager,  80  Iowa  359 

1290,    1427,    1453 
Hughes    V.    Anslyn,    7    Mo.    App. 
400  12^2 

V.  Gibson,  15  Colo.  App.  318     1289 
V.    Kershow,    42    Colo.    210 

1020,   1141 
V.    Lambertville    Electric 

Light,    etc.    Co.,    53    N.    J. 
Eq.    435  1384 

V.   Lansing,   31   Ore.   118  1500 

V.   Lennv,   5   M.   &   W.    183  745 

V.    McCasland,    122    111.    App. 

365  1199,    1257 

V.    Mavre,    3    T.    R.    275  115 

V.    Peters,    1    Coldw.     (Tenn.) 

67  1262,    1263 

V.    Smith,    114    La.    297  1204 

V.    Torgerson,    96    Ala.    346 

1367,  1572.  1586,  1600 
V.  Whitaker,  4  Heisk.   (Tenn.) 

399  637 

Hughes'  Admr.  v.   Sebre,   2  A.  K. 

Marsh.    (Kv.)    227  600 

Hulett  V.   Whipple,  58   Barb.    (N. 

Y.)    224  1081 

Hull    V.    Phillips,    128    Mo.    App. 

247  181a 

Hull     of    a     New     Brig,     The,     1 

Story    (U.    S.)    244  1748 

Hull     of     a     New     Ship,     The,     2 

Ware    (U.    S.)    203  1798 

Hulse     V.     Washburn,     59     Wis. 

414  1588 

Hulsman  v.   Whitman,   109  Mass. 

411  1467 

Humboldt    Lumber    Mill    Co.     v. 

Crisp,    146   Cal.    686  l.-,3r> 

Humboldt.  The,  86  Fed.  351  1709 

Humbolt  Bldg.  Assn.  v.  Volmer- 

ing   (Kv.  App.),   47  S.  W.   1084  1470 
Hume  V.  Dixon,  37  Ohio  St.  66      1078 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


evil 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,  §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§  1061-1812.] 


Hume    V.    Riggs,    12    App.    D.    C. 
355  609 

V.   Simmons,   34   Fla.   584  1196 

Hummer  v.  Scliott,   21  Md.  307     1086 
Humpiirey    v.    Browning,    46    111. 
476  167    229 

V.   Thorn,    63   Ind.   296  1090 

Humphreys  v.  McFarland 

(Miss.)    48   So.    1027  1498 

V.  Reed,  6  Whart.   (Pa.)   435       331 
Humptulips       Driving       Co.       v. 

Cross,    65    Wash.    636  192 

Hunder  v.  Le  Conte,   6   Cow.    (N. 

Y.)     728  589 

Hunn  V.  Bowne,  2  Caines   (N.  Y.) 

38  846 

Hunnicutt,    etc.    Co.    v.    Van 

Hoose,   111   Ga.   518  1512 

Hunstall  v.  Withers,  86  Va.  892    1099 
Hunt   V.  Harbor,    80   Ga.    746 

1092,    1119 
V.    Haskell,    24    Maine    339 

262,    270,    335 
V.      McClanahan,       1       Heisk. 

(Tenn.)   503  190.  230.   2.35 

V.    McMahan,    5    Ohio    133  1144 

V.  Marsh,   80   Mo.   3  96 

1074,    1086,    1090 
V.  N.  Y.  &  Brie  R.  Co.,  1  Hil- 
ton   (N.    Y.)    228  302 
V.   Ward,   3   T.   R.    467                      936 
V.  Waterman,   12   Cal.   301 

1087.    1088 
V.    Wing,    10    Heisk.    (Tenn.) 

139  776,    786 

Hunter  v.   Blanchard,   18   111.   318 

1235,    1327 
V.   Mathews,    67   Ark.    362  578 

V.    Trukee   Lodge,    14   Nev.    24 

1214,    1285,    1298,    1304a,    1556 
V.  Walter,   128  N.  Y.   668  1513a 

V.   Whitfield,   89   111.   229 

559,    580,    614,    1046 
Huntington  v.  Barton,  64  111.  502 

1554 
Huntley  v.   Holt,   58  Conn.    445 

1262,    1263 
Huntsman      v.      Linville      River 

Lumber  Co.,    122   N.    Car.   583        768 
Hurd      V.      Hartford      &      N.      Y. 
Steamboat    Co.,    40    Conn.    48        285 
V.    Hixon,    27    Kans.    722  1382 

V.  Wheeling  &  L.  E.  R.  Co.,  4 

Ohio    N.    P.    404  159 

Ilurlbert  v.  Brigham,   56  Vt.   368 

115,   137,   146 
V.    New    Ulm    Basket    Works, 

47   Minn.    81  1401,   1589 

Hurlburt  v.  Just,   126  Mich.  337    1413 
Hurley   v.    Hollyday,    35   Md.    469 

1074,  1116 
V.  Lally,  151  Mass.  129  1207 

V.   Tucker,    128  App.   Div.    (N. 

Y.)    580  U-:! 

Hurlock  V.   Smith,   39  Md.   436        1098 
Huron,  The,    29   Fed.   183 

1687,  1734,  1748 
Hurry  v.  Mangles,  1  Camp.  452  832 
Hursey  v.   Hassam,   45   Miss.   133 

1210,   1614 

Hursh   V.    Bvers,    29    Mo.    469  513 

V.   Carman,   51   Nebr.   784  1532 

Hurst  V.  Bell.   72   Ala.   336  603 

V.   Marshall,   75   Tex.   452  1093 

V.   Sheets,   21    Iowa   501        175,  217 


Huse   V.   Washburn,    59    Wis.    414 

1232,   1559,   1600,  1613 
Hussey  v.    Fields,   1   Spr.    (U.   S.) 
394  1705 

V.  Manufacturers'  &  Me- 
chanics' Bank,  10  Pick. 
(Mass.)     415  375,    414 

V.  Peebles,  53  Ala.   432  603 

V.   Thornton,    4   Mass.    405  820 

Husted  V.  Ingraham,  73  N.  Y.  251 

77    95    819 
V.  Mathes,  77  N.  Y.  388 

1251,    1254,    1260,    1265 
Hutchings  v.  Nunes,  1  Moo.  P.  C. 
(N.   S.)    243  875,    876 

V.  Western  &  Atlantic  R.  Co., 

25   Ga.    61  269 

Hutchins  v.  Blaisdell,  106  Maine 
92  710 

V.    Olcutt,    4   Vt.    549  1010 

Hutchinson    v.    Howard,    15    Vt. 
544  115,    191,    193,    202,    227 

V.  Patrick,  22  Tex.  318  1114 

V.  Fetters,  18  Vt.  614  191,  196,  203 
V.   Worthington,   7   App.   D.   C. 

548  171b,  1015 

Hutton  V.  Bragg,   7  Taunt.  14 

271,     272,     461 
V.   Moore,   26   Ark.   382      1092,   1107 
Huxford    V.    Bogardus,    40    How. 

Pr.    (N.   Y.)    94  1614 

Hyde  v.  Culver,   4  La.  Ann.  9        1745 
V.     German     Nat.     Bank,     115 

Wis.   170  719 

V.    Tanner,    1    Barb.     (N.    Y.) 

75  1174 

Hydraulic  Brick  Co.  v.  Bormans, 

19   Mo.    App.    664  1471,    1478 

Hyer   v.    Smith,    48   W.   Va.    550        820 
Hylton    V.    Brown,    2    Wash.    (U. 

S.)    165  1133 

Hynson  v.  Cordukes,  21  La.  Ann. 

553  620 

Hyperion's    Cargo,    The,    2    Low. 
(U.   S.)    93  1720 


laege  v.  Bossieux,  15  Grat.   (Va.) 

83  1494,    1495 

Ida  Meyer,   The,   31    Fed.   89  1703 

Idas,  The,   Brown   &   L.    65  1697a 

Iglehart    v.    Arminger,    1    Bland. 

Ch.    (Md.)    519  1092 

Ilett    v.    Collins,    103    111.    74  1086 

Ilex,  The,  2  Woods  (U.  S.)  229  1713 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Alexan- 
der, 20  111.  23  284 
v.  Wells,  104  Tenn.  706  190 
Illinois,  The,  2  Flip.  (U.  S.)  383  1698 
Ilsley  v.  Stubbs,  9  Mass.  65  903,  912 
Imogene  M.   Terry,   The,   19   Fed. 

463  1706 

Imperial  Bank  v.  London   Docks 
Co.,    L.    R.    5    Ch.    Div.    195 

823,    874,    994 
Independent  Sash,  Door  &  Lum- 
ber   Co.    v.    Bradfield,    153    Mo. 
App.   527  1211,    1453 

Indiana  I.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Larrew, 

130    Ind.    368  1645 

Indiana    Mut.    B.    &    L.    Assn.    v. 

Papton,    18    Ind.    App.    304  1597 

Indianapolis   Northern   Trac.    Co. 

V.  Brennan,  174  Ind.  1  1200 

Indiana,  The,  Crable  (U.  S.)   470    1883 


CVlll 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


India,   The,    14    Fed.    476  1690 

India,  The,   16  Fed.   262  1690 

Indoe  V.   Morman,   26   Wis.   588      1126 

Industrial  Loan  Assn.  v.  Saul,  68 

N.   Y.   S.   837  981 

V.   Saul,  34  Misc.    (N.  T.)    188     976 

Ingalls   V.   Green,   62   Vt.   436  691 

V.   Vance,    61   Vt.    582 

641,    685,    691,   691a,    692a 
-  Ing-ersoll  v.  Coal  Creek  Coal  Co., 

117  Tenn.  263  190 

V.  Coran,  211  U.  S.  335  177c 

V.   Van   Bokkelin,    7    Cow.    (N. 

Y.)    670  1036 

Inglis  V.  Usherwood,  1  East  515 

878,    889,    911,    915 
Ingraham     v.     Rich      (Tex.     Civ. 

App.)    136   S.   W.   549  638 

Inslee  v.   Lane,   57  N.   H.   454 

861,    884,    887,    921,     937,     965 
Instalment   Bldg.   v.   Wentworth, 

1   Wash.   St.   467  1401,   1559 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Baring,  20    Wall. 

(U.    S.)    159  1679,   1699 

V.   Dunham,    11   Wall.    (U.    S.) 

1  1698,    1722,    1729 

V.    Proceeds   of   Sale,    24    Fed. 

559  1698 

V.   Proceeds   of  Sale,   23 

Blatchf.    (U.    S.)    292         1698 
V.    Stinson,    103   U.    S.    25  1541 

International  Boom  Co.  v.  Rainy 
Lake  River  Boom  Corp.,  97 
Minn.    513  713 

International,  The,  30  Fed.   375    1704 
Interstate     B.     &     L.     Assn.     v. 
Ayers,  177  111.   9  1248,   1470 

V.  Ayers,  71  111.  App.  529  1470 

Inverarity    v.     Stowell,     10     Ore. 

261  1275,    1384,     1457 

lola.    The,    189   Fed.    972        1682,    1741 
Iowa    Brick    Co.    v.    Des    Moines, 

111   Iowa   272  1290,    1375 

Iowa      Mortgage      Co.    v.    Shan- 
quest,    70   Iowa   124  1443,    1483 
Iowa  Stone  Co.   v.  Crissman,   112 

Iowa  122  1290 

Ira  B.  Ellems,  The,  48  Fed.  591    1720 
Ireland    v.    Atchison    &c.    R.    Co., 
79   Mo.    572  1619 

V.   Livingston,    L.    R.    5    H.    L. 

395  869 

Iris,    The,    100    Fed.    104 

1722a,    1724,    1725 

Irish  v.  Lundin,   28  Nebr.   84  1249 

Iron   Co.   V.   Murray,   38   Ohio   St. 

323  1500,   1501 

Iron   Works   v.    Jensen,    3   Wash. 

St.    584  1764a 

Irvin  V.  Garner,   50   Tex.   48  1080 

Irvine  v.  Muse,  10  Heisk. 
(Tenn.)    477  1086,    llOS 

v.  Palmer,  10  Tenn.  463  74a 

Irwin  V.  Crawfordsville,  72  Ind. 
Ill  1423 

V.  Miller,   72  Miss.   174  765 

V.    Workman,    3    Watts    (Pa.) 

Isaack  v.   Clark,   2   Bulst.   306  496 

Isaac   May,    The,    21   Fed.    687 

1699,    1793 
Isbell   V.   Dunlap,   17    S.    Car.    581 

784c,    778 
Island  City.  The,   1  Low.    (U.   S.) 
375  1706,    1715 


Itasca  Cedar  &  Tie  Co.  v. 
Brainerd  Lumber  &c.  Co.,  109 
Minn.    120  713 

Ivall  V.  TVillis,  17  Wash.  645  71S 

Ives  V.  Polak,  14  How.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)    411  958 

Ivey  V.  White,   50  Miss.   142 

1210,    1267 


Jackman  v.  Hallock,   1   Ohio   318   1092 
Jacks  V.   Smith,   1  Bay    (S.   Car.) 

315  571 

Jackson  v.  Bain,   74  Ala.   328  603 

V.   Clopton,   66  Ala.   29 

144,   169,  203 
V.    Corley,    30    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

417  638 

v.    Cummins,    5    M.    &   W.    342 

641,  742 
v.  Hill,  39  Tex.  493  1098,  1101 
V.   Holland,    31    Ga.   339  641 

V.    Ivory    (Tex.    Civ.   App.)    30 

S.   W.    716  1092 

V.    Kasseall,    30    Hun    (N.    Y.) 

231  641,   690,   691 

V.   Loomis,   4   Cow.    (N.   Y.) 

168  1133 

V.   Ludeling,   2   Woods    (U.   S.) 

254  1146 

V.  McCray,   63  Kans.   238  659 

V.    Nichol,    5    Bing.     (N.    Cas.) 

508  267,    885,   901,   919, 

920,  921,  922,  929,  940,   965 
V.    Rutledge,    3    Lea     (Tenn.) 

626  1069,    1115 

V.    Stanley,    87    Ala.    270  1086 

V.   Stearns,   48   Ore.   25  180 

Jackson's    Appeal,    6    Sad.     (Pa.) 

327  632 

Jacobs    V.    Knapp,    50    N.    H.    71 

10,   26,    715,   721,   722,   723,   982 
V.  Latour,  5  Bing.   130 

16,    330,    644,   1014 
V.  Union  Trust  Co.,  155  Mich. 

233  99 

Jacobus     V.     Mutual     Beneiit     L. 
Ins.    Co.,   27    N.    J.    Eq.    604 

1216.    1459,    1472 
Jacquith    V.     American    Express 

Co.,    60   N.    H.    61  1043 

Jacubeck  v.  Hewitt,   61   Wis.   96     728 
Jaffrey   v.    Allan,    3    Paton    191        859 
Jalie  V.   Cardinal,   35   Wis.    118        511 
James    v.    Bird,    8    Leigh     (Va.) 
510  40,  811 

V.    Dalby,    107    Iowa    463 

1262,    1264 

V.    Griffin,    1    M.    &    ■^'.    20  924 

V.   Griffin,   2  M.   &  W.   623  884, 

902,  904,  908,  919,  921,  924,  940 

V.    Hambleton,    42    111.    308 

1312.    1313 
V.  Van  Horn,  39  N.  J.  L.   353 

1216,    1312,    1455,     1456,    1472 
James  B.  Lambie  Co.  v.  Bigelow, 

34    App.    D.    C.    49  1195 

James   Farrell,    The,    36    Fed. 

500  1686,    1687 

James    Freeman    Brown    Co.    v. 

Harris,    88    S.    Car.    558  461 

James   Guy,   The,   1   Ben.    (U.   S.) 

-I  I  O  1  fi  J\  9 

James  Guy,   The,    5   Blatchf.    (U. 
S.)   496  1681 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


CIX 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


James  H.  Prentice,  The,  36  Fed. 

777  1728 

Jameson    v.    Gile,    98   Iowa    490      1250 
James   River   &c.   Co.   v.   Banner, 

3    N.    Dak.    470  1457 

James   T.   Easton,   The,   49    Fed. 

656  1793a,   1808 

Jamison   v.    Barelli,    20    La.    Ann. 

452  1204 

V.  Ranck,   140  Iowa  635  175 

Janes  v.  Osborne,  108  Iowa  409    1487 
Jaquith    v.    American    E!xpress 

Co.,   60   N.   H.    61  519 

Jarboe  v.  Templer,  38  Fed.  213     1613 
Jarchow    v.    Pickens,    51   Iowa 

381  557 

Jarden     v.     Pumphrev,     30     Md. 

361  1202 

Jarechi  v.   Philharmonic   Soc,   79 

Pa.    St.    403  1341 

Jarman  v.  Farley,  7  Lea   (Tenn.) 

141  1083,   1090 

Jarrell   v.   Block,    19    Okla.    467      1383 
V.    Rogers,    15    Mass.    389 

15     23     251 
V.   State  Bank,   22   Colo.    3o"   'l479 
Jarvis-Conklin    Mortgage    Trust 

Co.       V.       Sutton,       46       Kans. 

166  1257,    1589 

Jaytes       v.       Franklin       Savings 

Bank,   85   111.   256  1500 

J.     C.     Rich,     The,     46     Fed.     136 

1722,    1725 
J.   C.   Williams,  The,   15   Fed.   558 

1707,    1708 
Jean  v.   Spurrier,   35   Md.   110  622 

V.    Wilson,    38    Md.    288  1473 

Jeanie    Landles,    The,    17    Fed. 

91  1688 

Jeffards  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R. 

Co.,    49   App.   Div.    (N.   Y.)    45        184 
Jefferson   v.   Church    of    St.   Mat- 
thew,   41    Minn.    392  1307,    1410 
Jefferson,    The,    20    How.    (U.    S.) 

393  1725 

Jeffersonville   Water-Supplv    Co. 

v.    Ritter,    146    Ind.    521  1405 

Jeffrey  v.  Moran,  101  U.  S.  285     1675 
Jeffries    v.    Fitchburg   R.   Co.,    93 

Wis.    250  320 

V.    Snyder,    110    Iowa    359  981 

Jeffryes  v.  Agra  &  Masterman's 

Bank,   L.    R.    2    Eq.    674  247 

J.     E.     Greilick     Co.     v.     Rogers, 

144  Mich.   313  1208 

V.    Taylor,    143    Mich.    704  1408 

Jenckes    v.    Jenckes,    145    Ind. 

624  1200.   1494 

Jenkins    v.    Adams,    22    Hun    (N. 

Y.)    600  189,    210 

V.    Freyer,    4    Paige     (N.    Y.) 

47  1173 

V.   Means,    59    Ga.    55  1141 

V.   Stephens.   60   Ga.   216  231 

Jenkins      &      Reynolds      Co.      v. 

Wells,    220    111.     452  1617a 

Jenks    V.    Osceola    Tow^ns"hip,    45 

Iowa  554  lb4a 

Jenkyns    v.    Brown,      14      Q.      B. 

496  916 

V.   Usborne,    7   M.    &   G.    678 

875,    958 
Jennie    B.    Gilkey,    The,    19    Fed. 

127  1681,    1698 

Jennie    Middleton,    The,    94    Fed. 

683  1682 


Jennings  v.  Bank  of  California, 
79   Cal.   323  377,  388 

V.    Sturdervant,    140    Ind.    641 

1163,    1164 
V.  Wilier,   (Tex.  Civ.  App.)    32 

S.  W.  24  1301 

Jenny    Lind,    The,    3    Blatch.    (U. 

S.)     513  1756 

Jensen  v.   Dorr,   159   Cal.   742  1738 

Jerecka   Mfg.    Co.    v.    Struther,    8 

Ohio    C.    D.    M.    5  1220 

Jersev    v.    Britain    Ferry    Float- 
ing Dock  Co.,  L.  R.   7  Eq.   409    1074 
Jerusalem,    The,    2    Gall.    (U.    S.) 

345  1777 

Jessup  V.  Atlantic  &  G.  R.  Co., 
3    Woods    (U.    S.)    441  1642 

V.  Stone,   13   Wis.   466 

1232,    1469,    1470,    1487,    1592 

Jesurun  v.  Kent,   45   Minn.   222        764 

Jewell    V.    McKay,    82    Cal.    144      1616 

V.    Peron,    94   Mich.    83  1515 

Jewett    V.    Keenholts,     16    Barb. 

(N.    Y.)    193  1174 

Jewitt,  In  re,  34  Beav.  22  136 

J.    F.    Spencer,    The,    5    Ben.     (U. 

S.)     151  1679 

J.      F.     Warner,     The,      22      Fed. 

345  1806a 
Jimison    v.    Reifsnelder,    97    Pa. 

St.    136  562 

Jobe  V.  Chedister,  5  Lea   (Tenn.) 

346  1088 
V.   Hunter,   165   Pa.   St.   5  1266 

Jodd  V.   Duncan,   9   Mo.    App.   417 

1250,  1528 
John    A.    Morgan,    The,    28    Fed. 

895  1706 

John    and    Mary,    The,    1    Swal. 

471  1810 

John     C.     Fisher,     The,    50     Fed. 

703  ISOS 

John  Cutrell,  The,   9   Fed.   777 

1717,  1811 
John  Dillon,  The,  46  Fed.  527  1800 
John    Farron,    The,    14    Blatchf. 

(U.   S.)    24  1726,    1729,    1794 

John    G.    Stevens,    The,    40    Fed. 

331  1781 

John   G.   Stevens,    The,    170   U.    S. 

113  1769,    17G1 

John  M.  Bonner  Memorial  Home 
V.  Collin  County  Nat.  Bank, 
57   Tex.    Civ.   App.   313  1117 

John  M.  Welch,  The,   18  Blatchf. 

(U.   S.)    54  1719 

John    Paul    Lumber    Co.    v.    Hor- 

mel,    61    Minn.    303  1442 

Johns  V.  Bolton,  12  Pa.  St.  339     1532 
V.    Sewell,    33    Ind.    1  1089 

Johnson  v.  Algor,  65  N.  J.  L. 
363  13] 7 

V.   Ballard,   44   Ind.    279        174.   220 
v.    Barnes    &c.    Bldg.    Co.,    23 
Mo.   App.   546 

1211,    1408,    1412 
V.    Bennett,    6    Colo.    App.    362 

1191,    1571 
V.   Boudry,    116  Mass.   196  1609 

V.    Building    Co.,   The,    23    Mo. 

App.    546  1412 

V.    Campbell,    120   Mass.    449        435 
V.    Cantrill,    92    Ky.    59  1069 

V.  Cawthorn,  1  Div.   &  B.   Eq. 

(N.    Car.)    32  lOEl 


ex 


TArsLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I.   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Johnson    v.    Chicag-o    &    P.    Elev. 
Co.,    105    111.    462  1742,   1770 

V.  Chicago  &  P.  Elevator  Co., 

119    U.    S.    388  1729 

V.  Coney,   120  Ga.  767  79 

V.  Davis,  60  Mich.  56  332a 

V.   De   I'eyster,   50  N.   Y.   666      1599 
V.    Dewey,    36    Cal.    623 

1276,    1278 
V.    Douglass,    2    Mackey     (D. 

C.)   36  566,  570 

V.  Durner,  88  Ala.  580     602,  1103a 
V.    Emanuel,    50    Ga.    590  551 

V.    Farnum,    56    Ga.    144  811 

V.   BVazee,   20   S.  Car.    500  1224 

V.    Godden,    33    Ark.    600  1086 

V.    Gold,    32    Minn.    535  1407 

V.    Griffiths    (Tex.    Civ.    App.), 

135    S.    W.    683  1226 

v.  Hill,  3  Stark.  172  499,   502 

v.    Hulett,   56    Tex.    Civ.   App. 

11  638 

V.     Johnson    Railroad    Signal 

Co.,    57   N.   J.    Eq.    79  158 


Jones,    51   Miss.    860 
Keeler,    46   Kans.    304 
Leman,    131    111.    609 
Lockhart,      16     Tex.     Civ. 


1115 

1584 
1177 

1126 


1095 


1270 
649 


App.    32 

v.   McClure,    10   N.   Mex.    506      1367 
V.    McCurry,    102    Ga.    471  173 

V.    McGrew,    42    Iowa    555 

1063,  1083 
V.  McKinnon,  45  Fla.   388  1063 

V.   McMillan,   13   Colo.    423  171 

V.   Nunnerly,    30   Ark.    153 
V.   Parker,    27   N.   J.   L.    239 
1239,    1262,    126 
V.    Perry,    53    Cal.    351 
V.   Pike,   35   Maine   291      1205,    1248 
V.    Prussing,   4   111.   App.   575 

571,    613,    614 
V.  Puritan  Min.   Co.,   19  Mont. 

30  1373 

V.   Ravitch,   113  App.   Div.    (N. 

Y.)    810  184 

y.    Salter,    70    Minn.    146    '         1312 
v.    Spencer,    49    Ind.    App.    166 

1200,  1283 
v.  Story,  I  Lea  (Tenn.)  114  166 
V.    Sug-g,    21    Miss.    346  1086 

v.  Tacneau,    23   La.   Ann.    453      620 
V.    Townsend,    77    Tex.    639 
V.    Tutewiler,    35    Ind.    353 
V.   Upham,   2   El.    &   El.   250 
V.   Ward,   27    Ohio   St.    517 
V.     Weinstock,     31     La.     Ann. 

698  1204 

John    S.    Parsons,    The,    110    Fed. 

994  16S4 

Johnston  v.  Cochrane,  84  N.  Car. 
446  1115,    1126 

V.    Gwathmay,    4    Litt.     (Ky.) 

317  1092 

V.     Harrington,     5     Wash.     73 

1392,  1449,   1452 
V.  Smith,  70  Ala.  108  1103,  1129 

John    T.    Moore,    The,     3    Woods 

(U.  S.)   61  1698.  1715,  1745,  1794 

Joiner    v.    Perkins,    59    Tex.    300 

1064,  1074,  1094,  1098,  1102 
Jollv  V.  Stallings,  78  Tex.  605  1070 
Jones    V.    Paisley,    27    Okla.    220 

1286,  1444 
V.    Bank,    10    Colo.    404  84 

V.  Bonner,  2  Exch.   230  203,  234 


1098 

1262 

632 

1758 


228 
421 


564 
632 


Jones   V.   Byrne,   149    Fed.   457        1116 
V.     Church    of    Holy    Trinity, 

15   Nebr.    81  1490 

V.    Doss,    27   Ark.    518  991,   1092 

V.    Dull'    Grain    Co.,    69    Nebr. 

91  183,  204 

V.    Earl,    37    Cal.    630  88*8,    891 

V.  Eubanks,   86  Ga.  616       611,   G12 
V.    Findley,    84    Ga.    52  576 

V.    Fletcher,    42    Ark.    422  791 

V.   Fox,   23   Fla.    454  610 

V.    Frost,    L.    R.     7    Ch.    App. 

773 
V.    Gallagher,    3    Utah    54 
V.   Goldbeck,    8  Wkly.  N.   Cas 

(Pa.)    533 
V.     Gundrim,     3    Watts    &    S 

(Pa.)    531  572,    598, 

V.    Hartsock,    42    Iowa    147 

1570,    1571 
V.    Hurst,    67    Mo.    568 

1495,   1532,   1568 
V.    Janes,    56    Ga.    325  1063 

V.  Jeffres,   11   Bush   (Ky.)   636   1204 
V.    Johnson,    SI    Ga.    293  1585 

V.    Jones,    8   M.    &   W.    431  962 

V.   Keen,   115   Mass.    170 

1727,   1748,   1795 
V.   Kern,    101   Ga.    309  1450 

V.    Louisville    Tobacco    Ware- 
house Co.,   135  Ky.  824        619 
V.   Lusk,   2  Mete.    (Ky.)    356 

789     793 
V.    Manning,    53    Hun    (N.    Y.) 

631  1276 

V.   Marks,    40    111.    313  470a 

V.    Menke,    168    N.    Y.    61  1281 

V.    Morgan,    39    Ga.    310      115,    203 
V.    Morrill,    42    Barb.     (N.    Y.) 

623  501 

V.    Mount    Zion,    30    La.    Ann. 

711  1204 

V.  Parker,  51  Wis.  218      1069,   1093 
V.   Parsons,   25   Cal.   100  795 

V.    Pearle,    1    Strange    556 

335,  519,  523,  986,  1032,   1038 
V.     Peppercorne,     Johns.     Ch. 

430  252 

V.    Phelan,    20    Grat.    (Va.) 

229 
V.    Pothast,    72    Ind.    158 

1262, 
V.    Ragland,    4   Lea    (Tenn.) 

539  1063,     1082, 

V.    Rush,    156    Mo.    364 
V.     Shawhan,    4    Watts    &    S. 

(Pa.)    257 

725,    1171,    1365,    1532 
V.   Shorey,   8   Iowa   416  1325 

V.   Sinclair,   2   N.   H.    319 

307,    987,    1035 
V.    Swan,    21    Iowa    181  1235, 

1236,     1325,     1330,    1437,    1443 
V.   Tarlton,   9  M.   &  W.   675 

334,    1019,    1025 
V.    Thurloe,    8    Mod.    172 

519,    523,    850 
V.  Vantress,    23   Ind.   533  1089 

V.   Walker,   63   N.   Y.    612 

1251,    1262,     1263,    1265 
V.   Walker,   44   Tex.    200  638 

V.   White,    72    Tex.    316  1532 

V.    Wolfe     (Tenn.),    42    S.    W. 

216  1071 

V.    T^'vlie,    82   Ga.    745  612 

V.  Young,   180  111.   216  1184a 


639 
1270 


1099 
1090 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


CXI 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.   I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Jones  V.  Young,  78  111.  App.  78  1184a 
Jones    &    Magee    Lumber    Co.    v. 

Boggs,  6a  Iowa  589  1560,  1565 

V.    Murphy,    64    Iowa    165 

1289,  1290,  1395,  1441 
Joost  V.  Sullivan,  111  Cal.  286  1444 
Joplin    Sash    &    Door    Worlvs    v. 

Shade,    137    Mo.    App.    20  1211 

Joralmon    v.     McPhee,     31     Colo. 

26  1457 

Jordan    v.    Board    of    Education, 

39    Minn.    298  1375 

V.    Bryan,    103    N.   Car.    59  631 

V.   Hunt,  3  Dowl.  P.  C.   666  203 

V.  James,  5  Ohio  88 

418,    465,    861,    946 
V.    National    Shoe    &    Leather 

Bank,  74  N.  Y.  467  245,  246 
V.  Westerman,  62  Mich.  170  206 
V.    Wimer,    45    Iowa    65 

1063,    1071,    1083 
Jorgensen    Co.    v.    Sheldon,    2 

Alaska    607  1587 

Joseph  V.  Seward,   91  Ala.  597     1102a 
Joseph  Brown,  The,   (U.  S.)  Adm. 

202  1773 

Joseph    Cunard,    The,    Olcott    (U. 

S.)    120  1713 

Josephine  Spangler,   The,   9   Fed. 

773  1695,    1794 

Josephine,    The,    In   re,    39    N.    Y. 

19  1729 

Joseph     N.     Eisendrath     Co.     v. 

Gebhardt,   222   111.    113      1184a,   1199 
Joule    V.    Jackson,    7    M.    &    W. 

450  563 

Jourdaine  v.  Lefevre,  1  Esp.  66       241 
Joyce    V.    Swann,    17    C.    B.     (N. 
S.)    84  916 

V.    Wilkenning,    1    MacArthur 

(D.    C.)    567  573,    609 

J.   P.    Tweed   v.    Richards,    9    Ind. 

525  1743 

J.    R.    Thompson,    The    v.    Lewis, 

31    Ala.    497  110 

J.     S.     Warden,     The,     155     Fed. 

697  1755 

Judah    V.    Kemp,    2    Johns.    Cas. 

(N.  Y.)    411  1019 

Judge  V.   Curtis,  72  Ark.   132 

606.   1033 
Judson   V.   Etheridge,    1   C.    &   M. 
743  641 

V.   Stephens,    75   111.   255 

1245,  1257,  1272,  1276 
Judy    V.    Farmers    &    Traders' 

Bank,    81   Mo.    404  252 

Julia    Ann,    The,    1    Spr.     (U.    S.) 

382  1811 

Julia   L.   Sherwood,   The,   14   Fed. 

590  1756 

Just     V.     State     Sav.     Bank,     132 

Mich.    600  406 

Justice    V.    Justice,    115    Ind.    201 

174.    201a,    227 
J.    W.    Tucker,    The,   20    Fed.    129 
1676,    1773,    1776,    1777,    1778,    1779. 
1780,    17S8,    1800,    1801,    1802 


Kahn  v.  Bank  of  St.  Joseph,  70 
Mo.    262  396 

Kalorama,  The,  10  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
204  1681,    1688 

Kane   v.    O'Connors,    78   Va.    76      1178 


JCangas   v.   Boulton,    127    Mich. 

539  712 

Kankakee    Coal    Co.    v.    Crane 

Bros.    Mfg.    Co.,    128    111.    627      1532 
V.    Crane   Bros.    Mfg.    Co.,    138 

111.     207  1519 

Kansas   City   Elevated   R.    Co.    v. 

Service,    77    Kans.    316  176 

Kansas  City  Hotel  Co.   v.   Sauer, 

65    Mo.    279  1374 

Kansas  City  Plaining  Mill  Co.  v. 

Brundage,    25    Mo.    App.    268 

1235,    1262-1264 
Kansas  Lumber  Co.  v.   Jones,   32 

Kans.    195  1383 

Kansas     Mtg.      Co.      v.      Weyer- 

heuser,   48  Kans.   335  1470, 

1472,    1478 
Kansas   Pac.    R.    Co.    v.   Thacher, 

17    Kans.    92  176,    211 

Kappler   v.   Sumpter,   35    App.   D. 

C.   404  171b 

Karnosky     v.     Hoyle,     97     Miss. 

562  1751 

Karns    v.    McKinney,    74    Pa.    St. 

387  562,    564 

Karo,    The,    29    Fed.    652  273 

Kassing  v.   Keohane,   4   111.   App. 

460  567 

Kate  Hinchman,  The,  6  Biss.   (U. 

S.)    367  1776,    1779,    1794 

Kate   Tremaine,   The,    5   Ben.    (U. 

S.)    60  1713 

Katzenbach     v.     Holt,     43     N.     J. 

Eq.   536  1503 

Kauffelt    v.     Bower,     7     Serg.     & 

R.    (Pa.)    64  1061,    1063,    1090 

Kaufman     v.     All     Persons,     &c., 

16    Cal.    App.    287  1025 

v.    Keenan,    2    N.    Y.    S.  .395  1S9 

V.   Leonard,    139   Mich.    104 

967     973 
v.    Underwood,    83   Ark.    118 

606,     607 
Kay  V.  Smith,  10  Heisk.    (Tenn.) 

41  1554     1556 

v.    Towsley,    113   Mich.    281    '    1470 
Keahey     v.     Bryant     (Tex.     Civ. 

App.),    134    S.    TV.    409  579 

Kealey    v.    Murray,    61    Hun    (N. 

Y.)    619  1254,    1397,    1454 

Keane    v.    Athenry    &c.    R.    Co., 

19   W.    R.    43  1674 

V.  Athenry   &c.   R.   Co.,  19   W. 

R.    318  1674 

Kearney    v.    Wurdeman,    33    Mo. 

App.    447  1412,    1432,    1567 

Kearsarge,   The,    1   Ware    (U.   S.) 

546  1696,   1746,   1809 

Keas    V.    Burns,    23    Iowa    233        1142 
Keating    v.    The    John    Shay,    81 

Fed.    216  1703,    1713 

Keating    &c.    Mach.    Co!    v.    Mar- 
shall Elec.  &c.  Co.,  74  Tex.   605 

1226,    1341,    1443,    1470,    1480 
Keefe    v.    Minehan,    93    III.    App. 

586  1199 

Keehn  v.  Keehn,  115  Iowa  467       229 
Keeler  v.  Goodwin,  111  Mass.  490 

823,    824,     835,     910 
Keeling    Brew.    Co.    v.   Neubauer 

Decorating  Co..    194  111.   580        1199 
Keenan    v.    Dorflinger,    19    How. 

Pr.    (N.   Y.)    153  193,   203 

Keep  Mfg.  Co.   v.   Moore,   11   Lea 

(Tenn.)    285  277 


CXll 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,  §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II.  §§  1061-1812.] 


Kehoe     v.     Hansen,     S     S.     Dak. 
198  1356 

V.   Miller.    10   Abb.   N.    C.    (N. 

Y.)     393  185,     189,   210 

Keim     v.     Myers,     44     Ind.     App. 

299  615 

Keim's    Appeal,    27    Pa.    St.    42        864 

Keith   V.    Fink,   47    111.    272  792 

V.  Horner,   32    111.    524      1063,   1092 

V.   "Wolf,   5   Bush    (Ky.)    646       1074 

Kellebrew  v.   Hines,   104  N.   Car. 

1S2  1069 

Kellenberg-er    v.    Boyer,    37    Ind. 

188  1202,  1488,  1578 

Keller    v.    Denmead,    68    Pa.    St. 
449  1257 

V.    Houlihan,    32    Minn.    486 

1390,    1392,    1452 
V.    Lewis,    53    Cal.    113  1126 

V.    Struck,    31    Minn.    446  1382 

V.    Tracy,    11    Iowa    530  1572 

V.    Weber,    27    Md.    660 

596,    597,     600,    622 

Kelley  v.   Borden  City  Mills,  126 
Mass.    148  1339,    1369 

V.   Chapman,   13   111.    530  1571 

V.   Goodwin,    95   Maine    538  621 

V.  Horselu,   147   Ala.   508  229 

V.    Kelley,    77    Maine    135 

710,  724,  728,  1023 
V.    King-,    18    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

360  638 

V.  Northern  Trust  Co.,  190  111. 

401  1199 

Kellogg   V.    Howes,    81    Cal.    170 

1190,    1287 
V.   Howes,   136   U.   S.    639  1190 

V.  Little  &c.  Mfg-.  Co.,  1  Wash. 

St.    407  1421 

Kellog  Newspaper  Co.   v.   Peter- 
son,   162   111.    158  613 
Kelly   V.   Ailing,    84    Conn.    487      1192 
V.  Davenport,  1  Browne  (Pa.) 

231  590 

V.  Johnson,  251  111.  135  1199,  1289 
V.  Karsner,  81  Ala.  500  1075,  1102 
V.  Kelly,  54  Mich.  30  38,  77,  83 
V.  Laws,  109  Mass.  395  1397,  1401 
V.    McGehee,    137    Pa.    St.    443 

1260,    1573 
V.    Mills,    41    Miss.    267  1094 

V.   New  York  City  R.  Co.,  122 

App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  467  150a 
V.  Pavne,  18  Ala.  371  1096,  1119 
V.  Phelan,  5  Dill.  (U.  S.)  228  244 
V.    Rosenstock,    45    Md.    389 

1473,     1474 
V.    Rowane,    33    Mo.   App.    440 

1512,    1513a 

V.   Ruble,   11   Ore.   75  1063,   1094 

Kelly,    In    re,    18    Fed.    528  968 

Kelsey  v.  Beers,  16  Abb.  Pr.    (N. 

Y.)    228  1811 

V.    Layne,    28    Kans.    218 

641,    643,    687 
Kemp   V.    Falk,    7    App.    Cas.    573 

861,  893,  953,  954.  960,  962 
Kempe  v.  Kempe,  5   De  G.,  M.  & 

G.    346  1164 

Kendal,   Ex  parte,   17  Ves.    514      1046 

Kendall  v.  Fader,  199  111.   294     llS4a 

V.    Fader,    99   111.   App.    104        1413 

V.    Haynes    Lumber    Co.,    96 

Wis.    659  719 


Kendall    v.    Marshall,     48    L.    T. 

(N.    S.)     951  919,   921 

Kendall    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Bundle,    78 

Wis.    150  1519 

Kendrick  v.   Eggleston,    56   Iowa 

128  1088,   1090 

Kenly   v.    Sisters    of    Charity,    63 

Md.   306  1206,   1286 

Kennard    v.    Harvey,    80    Ind.    37 

576a,   580,  615 
Kennebec   Framing  Co.   v.   Pick- 
ering,  142  Mass.    80  1442 
Kennedy  v.   Apgar,    93   N.   Y.    539 

1349,    1579,    1584 
v.   Groves,    50    Tex.     Civ.     App. 

266  638 

V.  House,  41  Pa.  St.  39  1421 

V.    Lange,    50    Md.    91  562 

V.    Reames,    15    S.    Car.    548 

458,    543,    635 
V.    South    Shore    Lumber    Co., 

102    Wis.    284  719 

Kennon  v.  Wright,  70  Ala.  434  603 
Kenny  v.  Gage.  33  Vt.  302  1228,  1461 
Kensington,  Ex  parte,  1  Deac.  58  446 
Kent    v.    Brown,    59    N.    H.    236 

1341,  1343,  1344 
V.  Gerhard,  12  R.  I.  92  1063,  1069 
V.    Muscatine    &c.    R.    Co.,    115 

Iowa   383  1646 

V.    New    York    Cent.    R.    Co., 

12   N.    Y.    628  1270,   1662 

V.   San  Francisco   Sav.   Union, 

130   Cal.   401  1086 

V.   Williams,    114   Cal.   537  1086 

Kenton  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bowman,  84 
Ky.    430  405,    408 

V.    Bowman,    15    Am.    &    Eng. 

Corp.    Cas.    578  376  . 

Kenyon  v.  Covert,  53  Hun  (N. 
Y.)    638  1756 

V.    Peckham,   10   R.    I.    402  1223 

Keogh    V.    Main,    18    J.    &    S.    (N. 

Y.)    183  1454 

Keppel    V.    .Tackson,    3    Watts    & 

S.    (Pa.)    320  1372 

Kerby   v.   Daly,    45   N.   Y.    84 

1240,   1362 

Kerckhoff-Cuzzner  Mill  &c.  Co. 
V.  Cummings,   86  Cal.   22  1190 

V.  Olmstead,   85  Cal.   80  1438 

Kerford  v.  Mondel.  28  L.  J.  Exch. 

303  1025 

Kern  v.   Hazelrigg,   11  Ind.   443    1092 
V.    School   Directors,    etc.,   155 

111.   App.    62  1063 

Kerns  v.   Flynn,   51  Mich.   573        1574 
Kerr     v.     Hoskinson,     5      Kans. 
App.    193  99 

V.    Moore,    54    Miss.    286 

990,    1494,    1495 
Kerrick  v.  Ruggles,  78  Wis.  274    1248 
Kerrigan    v.     Fielding,     47    App. 
Div.    (N.  Y.)    246  1511 

V.    Fielding,    49   App.   Div.    (N. 

Y.)     635  1511 

Kerr-Murray  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Kala- 
mazoo Heat  &c.  Co.,  124  Mich. 
Ill  1208 

Kersey  v.  O'Day,  173  Mo.  560  181a 
Kershaw    v.    Fitzpatrick,    3    Mo. 

App.   575  1348,   1419 

Kessler  v.  McConachy,  1  Rawle 
(Pa.)    435  562 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


CXlll 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,  §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,  §§  1061-1812.] 


Ketchum  v.  Watson,  24  111.   591      820 
Kettlewell     v.     Watson,     21     Ch. 

Div.    685  1061 

Key   City,   The,   14   Wall.    (U.   S.) 

653  1800 

Keystone      Iron-Works      Co.      v. 

Douglass   Sug-ar   Co.,    55   Kans. 

195  1470 

Keystone  Min.   Co.   v.   Gallagher, 

5  Colo.  23  1191,  1393a 

Kezartee   v.    Marks,    15    Ore.    529 

1221,   1310,   1397,   1402, 
1406,   1421,   1452 

Kidd    V.    Wilson,    23    Iowa    464 

1201.  1249,  1260,  1262,  1264 
Kidder  v.  Page,  48  N.  H.  380  1045 
Kiel    V.    Carll,    51    Conn.    440 

1408,    1413^    1595 
Kieldseb   v.   Wilson,    77   Mich.    45 

704,    725 
Kiene    v.    Hodge,    90    Iowa    212 

1457,    1472 
Kiersage,    The,    2    Curt.     (U.    S.) 

421  1727,   1794 

Kiessig  v.  AUspaugh,  91  Cal.  234 

1190 

Kiewit  V.  Carter,   25  Nebr.   460     1511 

Kilbourne   v.   Jennings,    38    Iowa 

533  1289 

V.  Wiley,  124  Mich.  370     178,  1094 

Kilpatrick    v.    Harper,    119    Ala. 

452  576a 

Kimball    v.    Ship    Anna   Kimball, 
2   Cliff.    (U.   S.)    4  1009,   1010 

V.    Thomnson,  13  Mete.  (Mass.) 

283  791 

Kimball,  The,  3  Wall.    (U.  S.)   37 

324,  327,  1808 
Kimble    v.    Esworthy,    6    Bradw. 

(111.)    517  1086 

Kimbrough    v.    Curtis,    50    Miss. 

117  1119 

King  V.   Bates,   57  N.  H.   446  820 

V.   Blackmore,   72  Pa.   St.   347     588 
V.   Blount,    37   Ark.   115  606 

V.  Denison,  1  Ves.  &  B.  260     1164 
V.    Greenway,    71    N.    Y.    413 

1725,  1733,   1756,   1810 
V.   Indian   Orchard   Canal   Co., 
11    Cush.    (Mass.)    231 

25,    731,    745,    997 
V.    Kellev,    25    Minn.    522  713 

V.  I.amon,   193   111.   537  1199 

V.  Lamon,  91  111.  App.  74  1199 

V.  May,   1  Doug.   193  118 

V.    Richards,    6    Whart.    (Pa.) 

418  303,    304 

V.  Rowlett.   120  Mo.  App.   120      626 
V.    Sankey,'  6   N.    &   M.    839  119 

V.    Smith,    42    Minn.    2S6 

1245,   1251,   1542 
V.    Thompson,    9    Pet.    (U.    S.) 

204  1138 

V.      Young      Men's      Assn.,      1 

Woods  (U.  S.)  386    1111,  1125 
King,   Ex.  parte,  17  Ves.   115  iS^i 

Kingsbury     v.     Milner,     69     Ala. 

502  1102a 

Kingsland   v.   Chetwood,   39   Hun 

(N.   Y.)    602  1155 

Kingston,    The,     23     Fed.     200 

168S,    1730,   1756,   i:.M 
Kingston,    The,    34    Fed.    402  1G91 


Kinloch    v.    Craig,    3    T.    R.    119 

464.    871 
Kinney    v.    Blackmer,    55    Conn. 
261  1192,    1286 

V.    Duluth    Ore    Co.,    58    Minn. 

455  1494 

V.   Bnsminger,   94  Ala.   536        1086 

V.    Mathias,    81    Minn.    64  1315 

V.  Robison,   52  Mich.   389      178,   220 

V.    Sherman,    28    111.    520  1512 

Kinsey     v.     Spurlin      (Tex.     Civ. 

App.)    102    S.    W.    122  1389 

V.    Stewart,    14    Tex.    457  137 

Kinsley    v.    Buchanan,    5    Watts 

(Pa.)    118  1532 

Kinzey   v.   Thomas,   28   111.   502      1519 
Kipp    V.    Rapp,    2    How.    Pr.    (N. 
S.)    (N.   Y.)    169  233 

V.    Rapp,    7    Civ.    Proc.    R.    (N. 

Y.)    385  214 

Kirby  v.   Kirby,  1  Paige    (N.   Y.) 
565  193 

V.    McGarry,    16    Wis.    68 

1232,    1554 
V.    Schoonmaker,    3    Barb.    Ch. 

(N.   Y.)    46  787 

V.    Tead,    13   Met.    (Mass.)    149 

1259,    1271 
Kirchner  v.   Venus,    12   Moore   P. 

C.    361  270,    326 

Kirk   v.    Sheets,    90   Ala.    504  1101 

V.  Williams,  24  Fed.  437    1112,  1113 
Kirkham    v.    Boston,    67    111.    599 

1063,   1073,   1086 
Kirkman    v.    Shawcross,    6    T.    R. 

14  18,   265,  732 

Kirkpatric  v.   Bank   of  Augusta, 

30    Ga.    465  1741 

V.    Cason,    30    N.    J.    L.    331  658 

V.    Chesnut,    5    S.    Car.    216       1163 

Kirn    v.     Champion    Iron    Fence 

Co.,   86  Va.  608  1229 

Kirschner   v.   Mahoney.    96   N.   Y. 

S.    195  1296 

Kirsey    v.    Means,    42    Ala.    426 

42,   65,   66 
Kirtland   v.   Moore,    40   N.   J.    Eq. 

106  1216 

Kitchen    v.    Spear,    30    Vt.    545       927 
Kitson    v.    Crump,    1    Wkly.     N. 

Cas.    (Pa.)    164  1342 

Kitteridge    v.    Freeman,     48    Vt. 

62  745,    997 

Kittredge    v.    Bellows,     7    N.    H. 
399  13 

v.  Newmann.  26  N.  J.  Eq.  195 

1262,   1458 
v.    Sumner,    11    Pick.     (Mass.) 

50  989 

Kittrell  v.  Hopkins.  114  Mo.  App. 

431  1412 

Kittridge   v.    Ribas,    18   La.   Ann. 

718  620 

Kizer  Lumber   Co.   v.   Mosely,   56 

Ark.    544  1434,    1436,    1559 

Kleber  v.  ^^ard,   88   Pa.   St.   93         562 
Kleinert     v.     Knoop,     147     Mich. 

387  1451,    1605 

Kline    v.    Comstock,    67    Wis.    473 

727,    728 
v.  Cutter,  34  N.  J.  Eq.   329  1216 

V.    Cutter,    35    N.    .T.    L.    534       1216 
v.  Green,  83  Hun    (N.  Y.)   190    673 


CXIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.   I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Kling   V.    Railway    Const.    Co.,    7 

Mo.    App.    410  1306,    140S 

Klondike    Lumber    Co.    v.    Will- 
iams,  71  Ark.  331  1235,  1361 
Klopp   V.    Lebanon    Bank,    46   Pa. 

St.    88  401 

Knabb's  Appeal,  10  Pa.  St.  186     1421 
Knapp    V.    Brown,    45    N.    Y.    207 

1236,    1277,    1281 
V.  Brown,  11  Abb.  Pr.    (N.  S.) 

(N.    Y.)    118  1235 

V.    St.    Louis    &c.    R.    Co.,    74 

Mo.    374  1619 

V.    Swaney,    56   Mich.    345  1375 

Knapp    Elec.    "Works    v.    Mecosta 

Elec.    Co.,    110    Mich.    547  1591 

Knapp,    In    re,    85    N.    Y.    284 

115,   137,    139,   146, 
■155,    188,    220,   231 
Knaube  v.  Kerchner,  39  Ind.  217 

1348,  1349 
Knauft  V.  Miller,  45  Minn.  61  1314 
Knickerbrocker  Ice   Co.   v.   Van- 

dermark,    50    111.    App.    231  1283 

Knickerbocker  Inv.  Co.  v.  Voor- 
hees,  128  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
639  184 

Knight    V.    Begole,    56    111.    122      1199 
V.    Blanton,    51    Ala.    333  1101 

V.    Knight,    113    Ala.    597  1074 

V.    Norris,    13    Minn.    473 

1367,    1406,    1409,    1440 
V.  Old  Nat.  Bank,   3  Cliff.    (U. 

S.)    429  384 

V.    Providence    &c.    R.    Co.,    13 

R.    I.    572  289 

Knights  V.  Wiffen,  L.  R.   5   Q.   B. 

660  843,    845 

Knisely     v.     Williams,     3     Grat. 

(Va.)    265  1116 

Knobeloch,   Ex   parte,   26   S.    Car. 

331  634 

Knott    V.    Carpenter,    3    Head 

(Tenn.)    542  1262,   1264 

V.     Shepherdstown    Mfg.     Co., 

30   W.   Va.    790  29,    31 

Knowles  v.  Joost,  13  Cal.   620       1287 
V.     Pierce,     5     Houst.     (Del.) 

178  564 

V.    Sell,   41   Kans.   171  617 

Knox  V.  Hunt,  18  Mo.  243  581,  626 

V.   Starks,   4   Minn.   20  1469 

Knutzen     v.     Hanson,     28     Nebr. 

591  1213 

Koch  V.  Sumner,  145  Mich.  358     1599 
Koenig   v.   Boehme,    14   Mo.    App. 
593  1211 

V.  Mueller,   39  Mo.   165  1341 

Kohler  v.   Hayes,    41   Cal.   455  820 

Kollock   V.   Parcher,   52   Wis.   393 

719,    726 
Kollum   V.   Emerson,   2   Curt.    (U. 

S.)     79  1697a 

Koons  V.  Beach,   147   Ind.   137 

174,  201a 
Korbly  v.  Loomis,  172  Ind.  352  1200 
Kornegay  v.  Styron,   105  N.   Car. 

14  1810 

Kotcher     v.     Perrin,     149     Mich. 

690  1208 

Kountz   V.    Consolidated    Ice   Co., 

36    Pa.    Super.    Ct.    639  1222 

Kountz  Bros.  Co.  v.  Consolidated 
Ice  Co.,  28  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
266  1384 


Krauss  v.   Brunett,   73  Misc.    (N. 

Y.)    428  1218 

Kremer  v.   Southern   Exp.   Co.,   6 

Cold.    (Tenn.)    356  284 

Kretzmer     v.     The     William     A. 

Levering,    35    Fed.    783  1755 

Kreutz   v.    Cramer,    64    N.    J.    Eq. 

648  1216 

Krey  v.  Hussmann,  21   Mo.   App. 

343  1211 

Kritzer    v.    Tracy    Eng.    Co.,    16 

Cal.   App.   287  1190 

Krone  v.   Klotz,    3   App.   Div.    (N. 

Y.)    587  184 

Krotz  V.  A.  R.  Beck  Lumber  Co., 

34    Ind.    App.    577  1244,    1245 

Kruger  v.  Wilcox,   1  Ambler  252 

418,    466 
Kuehn  v.   Syracuse  Rapid   Tran- 
sit R.   Co.,   186  N.   Y.   567  184 
Kuhns     V.     Turney,     87     Pa.     St. 

497  1260 

V.      Westmoreland      Bank,      2 

Watts    (Pa.)    136  401 

Kulp  V.  Chamberlain,  4  Ind.  App. 

560  1200 

Kunkle   v.    Reeser,    5    Ohio   N.   P. 

401  1435 

Kurtz   V.    Dunn,    36   Ark.    648  606 

Kuschel  V.  Hunter,  118  Cal.  xvi    1487 
Kusterer  v.  Beaver  Dam,  56  Wis. 

471  197,    206-208 

Kyle    V.    Bellenger,    79    Ala.    516 

10S6,  1111 
Kyle,  Ex  parte,  1  Cal.  331  160,  165 
Kymer    v.    Suwercropp,    1    Camp. 

109  862,    863 


Lablache   v.    Kirkpatrlck,    8    Civ. 

Proc.   R.    (N.   Y.)    256  210 

Labouisse     v.     Orleans     Cotton- 
Rope   &c.   Co.,   43   La.  Ann.   245 

1063,    1092 
Lacey  v.  Smith   (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

Ill   S.   W.   965  1107 

Lachenmeyer     v.     Lachenmeyer, 

65   How.   Pr.    (N.   Y.)    422  209 

Lackington    v.    Atherton,     7     M. 
&    G.    360  831,    905 

V.    Atherton,    8    Scott    (N.    R.) 

^8  926 

Lackner  v.  Turnbull,  7  Wis.  105    1605 
La   Crosse    &   M.    P.   Co.   v.   Van- 

derpool,    11    Wis.    119  1622 

Ladd  V.  Ferguson,   9  Ore.   180  180 

Ladner  v.  Balsley,   103   Iowa   674 

586,   616 
Lady   of   the  Lake,    The,   L.   R.    3 

Adm.    &   Ecc.    29  1697a 

La  Forgee  v.  Colby,   69  111.  App. 

443  1369 

Lagoo  V.  Seaman,  136  Mich.  418     712 
Lagow     V.     Badollet,     1     Blackf. 

(Ind.)    416  1022 

La  Grille  v.  Mallard,   90  Cal.   373 

1283,  1345 
Laing   v.    The    Forest    Queen,    69 

Minn.   537  1750 

Laird    v.    INIoonan,    32    Minn.    358 

1235,   1304,    1304a,    1305,   1306 

Lake   v.   Brannin,   90   Miss.    737      1290 

V.  Craddock.   3  P.  T^'ms.   158     1147 

V.   Gaines,   75   Ala.    143  603 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxv 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I, 

Lake   v.   Gibsonj   1    Eq.   Cas.   Abr. 
290  1147 

V.  Ingham,  3  Vt.  158  212 

Lalaurie    v.    Woods,    8    La.    Ann. 

366  620 

Lamb    v.    Cannon,    38    N.    J.    Eq. 
362  1458 

V.   Hannemann,    40    Iowa   41 

1201,    1235,     1406,     1437,     1453 
V.   Utley,   146  Mich.    654  815 

Lambard   v.    Pilte,    33    Maine    141 

1205.    1343 
Lamberson,    In    re,    63    Barb.    (N. 

Y.)    297  139 

Lambert  v.  Davis,  116  Cal.  292     779a 

V.  Nicklass,  45  W.  Va.   527        680b 

V.  Robinson,   1   Esp.   119  281 

V.  Williams,   2   Tex.  Civ.   App. 

413  1310 

Lambeth     v.      Ponder,      33     Ark. 

707  556 

Lamb    Lumber    Co.    v.     Roberts, 

23    S.    Dak.    191  1247,    1382 

Lamont    v.    Washington    &c.    R. 

Co.,  2  Mack    (D.  C.)    502  183,  196 

Lamotte    v.    Wisner,    51    Md.    543 

577,    580 
Lamport  v.  Beeman,  34  Barb.   (N. 

Y.)    239  1104 

Lampson      v.      Bowen,      41     Wis. 

484  1571 

Lancaster   v.    Whiteside,   108   Ga. 

801  577,    578 

Lancaster    Countv    Nat.     Bank's 

Appeal,   127   Pa.   St.   214      1164,    1171 
Land  v.   Roby,   56  Tex.   Civ.   App. 

333  576a,    580 

Landau    v.     Cottrill,     159     Maine 

308  1469 

Landers  v.  Dexter,  106  Mass.  531 

1310,  1313,  1314 
Landis  v.   Gooch,   1   Disn.    (Ohio) 

176  476 

Landreth    v.    Powell,    122    Tenn. 

195  190 

Landry     v.     Blanchard,      16     La. 

Ann.    173  722,   760 

Landyskowski      v.      Martyn,      93 

Mich.    575  1513a 

Lane     v.     Bailey,     47     Barb.     (N. 

Y.)    395  251 

V.    Cotton,    1   Salk.    17  731 

V.  Hallum,  38  Ark.   385  170 

V.   Jackson,    5    Mass.    157  865 

V.  Jones,   79  Ala.  156       1187,  1374, 

1410,     1414,    1423,     1431,     1532 

V.    Lane    Potter    Lumber    Co., 

40    Mont.    541  713 

V.    Ludlow,    6    Paige    Ch.     (N. 

Y.)    316  1105 

V.    Old   Colony    &c.    R.    Co.,    14 
Gray    (Mass.)    143 

312,  320,  321 
V.  Penniman,   4  Mass.   91  270 

V.  Robinson,  18  B.  Mon.   (Ky.) 

623  902,    909,    921 

V.    Snow,    66    Iowa   544  1250 

V.  Steinmetz,  9  W.  N.  C.   (Pa.) 

574  562,    564 

Lang  V.   Adams,    71   Kans.    309      1572 
V.  Buffalo  Seamen's  Union,  22 

Alb.    L.    J.    (N.    Y.)    114         233 
Langan  v.   Sankey,   55  Iowa   52     1494 
Langford    v.     Leggitt,     99     Miss. 
266  •  783 


§§   l-1060f;   Vol.   II,    §§   1061-1812.] 

Langford   v.   Mackay,    12    Bradw. 

(111.)      223  1199,    1463 

Langsdorf  v.  Le  Gardeur,  27  La. 

Ann.   363  620 

Langstaff  v.  Stix,  64  Miss.  171  940 
Langston    v.    Anderson,     69    Ga. 

V.   Roby,    68    Ga.    406  217 

Langworthy  v.  New  York  &c. 
R.  Co.,  2  E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.) 
195  262 

Langworthy      Lumber       Co.       v. 

Hunt,   19   N.  Dak.   433  1219a 

Lanier  v.   Bell,    81   N.   Car.    337 

1219,  1325 
Lanigan    v.    Bradley    &c.    Co.,    50 

N.    J.    Eq.    201  1498 

Lann    v.     Church,     4    Madd.     391 

149,    166,    228 
Lanning   v.    Tompkins,    45    Barb. 

(N.   Y.)    308  77 

'^ansing  v.  Ensign,  62  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)    363  185 

V.  Rattoone,   9   Johns.    (N.  Y.) 

43  576 

Lanyon    v.    Blanchard,    2    Camp. 

597  423 

Lapene    v.    Meegel,    26    La.    Ann. 

SO  456 

Lapenta    v.     Lettieri,     72     Conn. 

377  1499 

Lapham    v.     Ransford,     27     Ohio 

Cir.    Ct.    81  123S 

Laraway     v.     Tillotson,     81     Vt. 

487  577 

Larch,    The,    2    Curt.    (U.    S.)    427 

1697a,  1707 
T.arch,  The,  3  Ware  (U.  S.)  28  1697 
Larkin    v.    McMullin,    120    N.    Y. 

206  1286,   1287,   1293,    1299,   1512 

Larkins    v.    Blakeman,    42    Conn. 

292  1314 

Larmine  v.  Carley,  114  111.  196  470a 
Earner.  In  re,  20  Wkly.   Dig.   (N. 

Y.)    73  138 

Larscheid  v.  Hashek  Mfg.  Co., 
142    Wis.    172  1061 

V.    Kitten,    142    Wis.    172  1091 

Las-well  v.   Presbyterian  Chnirch, 

46  Mo.   279  1406,   1409,   1452 

Latham  v.  Staples,  46  Ala.  462  1094 
Lathrop  v.  Clewis,  63  Ga.  282  611 
Latson   v.   Nelson,    11   Pac.    Coast 

L.    J.    589  1287.   1289 

Lauer    v.    Bandow,    43    Wis.    556 

1248.    1262,    1263 
V.      Dunn,      115      N.      Y.      405 

1218.   1301 
V.   Dunn,   52   Hun    (N.   Y.)    191 

1218,     130],     1511 
Laughlin     v.     Excelsior     Powder 
Mfg.    Co.,   153   Mo.   App.   508        181a 
V.    Reed,    89    Maine    Z26  1546 

Lauman's    Appeal,    8    Pa.    St.    473 

1392,  1404 
Launberga,  The,  154  Fed.  959  1796 
Launsbury    v.    Iowa    &c.    R.    Co., 

49    Iowa   255  1290 

Lauretta,    The,    9    Fed.    622 

1799.  1800 
Lavender  v.  Abbott,   30  Ark.   172 

1063,    1090,    1101 
V.   Atkins,   20  Nebr.   206  206 

v.  Hall,   60  Ala.  214  603 


ex  VI 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Lavigne     v.     Naramore,     52     Vt. 

267  1110 

Laviolette  v.  Redding,  4  B.  Mon. 

(Ky.)     81  1272,     1532 

Lavoie  v.  Burke,  69  N.  H.  144       1215 

Law   V.   Butler,    44   Minn.    482        1092 

Lawrence      v.     Meyer,      35      Ark 

104  1090 

V.    Stonington   Bank,    6    Conn. 

521  260 

V.  Taylor,  5  Hill  (N.  T.)  107  1459 
V.    Weeks,   107  N.   Car.    119  457 

Lawrenceburgh      Ferry-boat     v. 

Smith,  7   Ind.   520  1743 

Lawson   v.   Cundiff,    81   Mo.    App. 

169  1090 

V.   Dickenson,   8  Mod.   306  126 

V.  Hogan,   93   N.   Y.   39  1598 

V.    Kimball,    68    N.    H.    549        1215 

Lawton  v.  Case.  73  Ind.  60  1200.  1590 

Lax    V.    Peterson,    42    Minn.    214 

1313,    1317 
Leach  v.  Minick,  106  Iowa  437     1462 
V.     Thompson,     138    111.    App. 

85  1291 

Leads    V.    Little,    42    Minn.    414      1599 
Leahart   v.   Deedmeyer,    158   Ala. 

295  169 

Leak  v.   Cooks,   52   Miss.   799  783 

V.  Williams,   30  Ky.  L.   782        1067 
Learned    v.    Brown,    94    Fed.    876 

1681,    1698,    1745 
Leary  v.  Corvin,  181  N.  T.  222  30 

V.    Corvin,    92    App.    Div.     (N. 

Y.)    544  39 

Leask  v.  Hoagland,   64  Misc.    (N. 
Y.)    156  184 

V.    Scott,    L.    R.    2    Q.    B.    Div. 

376  949 

Leavenson       v.       Lafontaine,       3 

Kans.   523  176,  217 

Leaver    v.    Kilmer,    71    N.    J.    L. 

291  1373 

Leavy    v.    Kinsella,    39    Conn.    50 

849,    972 
Le  Blanc,  In  re,  14  Hun    (N.   Y.) 

8  88 

Ledbetter    v.    Quick,    90    N.    Car. 

276  594,    631 

Ledford   v.   Smith,    6  Bush    CKv.) 

129  1063,    1074 

Ledos  v.  Kupfrian,    28   N.   J.   Eq. 

161  1080,    1083 

Ledoux    V.    Jones,    20    La.    Ann. 

530  620 

Lee    V.    Burke,     66    Pa.    St.     336 

1306.   1416 
V.     Citizens     Nat.     Bank,      13 

Ohio    Dec.    913  378,    384 

V.  Creditors,  2  La.  Ann.  599  111 
V.      Glemingsburg,      7      Dana 

(Ky.)    28  490 

V.      Gould,      47      Pa.      St.      398 

747,    1002 
V.    Hovt,    101    Iowa    101  1327 

V.  Kimball,  45  Maine  172  946,  949 
V.  Lee's  Admr.,  30  Kv.  L.  619  40 
V.   Murphy,    119   Cal. '364  1086 

V.    O'Brien.    54   Tex.    635  1556 

V.   Phelps,   54   Tex.   367  1556 

V.    Storz   Brew.    Co.,    75    Nebr. 

212  1604 

V.  Vanmeter,  98  Ky.  1  660,  691 
V.    Winston,    68    Ala.    402  229 


Leeds   v.   Wright,   3   B.    &   P.    320 

917,    921,    944 
Leese    v.    Martin,    L.    R.    17    Elq. 

224  254 

Leftwich  Lumber  Co.  v.  Flor- 
ence Mut.  Bldg.  &c.  Assn.,  104 
Ala.    584  1494,    1532,    1617c 

Legg  V.    Evans,    6   M.    &   "W.    36       986 
V.    Mathieson,    2    Giff.    (U.    S.) 

71  1675 

V.    Willard,    17    Pick.    (Mass.) 

140  1014 

Leggett    V.    Bank    of    Sing    Sing, 

24   N.   Y.    283  376,   377,   393,    398 

Legnard  v.  Armstrong,  18  Bradw. 

(111.)    549  1199 

Lehigh  Coal  &  Nav.   Co.  v.   Cen- 
tral  R.   Co.,   29   N.   J.  Eq.   252       1630 
Lehman  v.   Howze.   73   Ala.   302       603 
v.    Stone,    4    Wills.    Civ.    Cas. 
Ct.    App.     (Tex.)     121 

576a,   638 
V.    Tallahassee    Mfg.    Co.,    64 

Ala.    567  244 

Lehman,    Ex    parte,    59    Ala.    631 

169,  203,  217,  218 
Lehmann  v.  Schmidt,  87  Cal.  15  1018 
Lehndorf  v.  Cope,  122  111.  317  1092 
Leiberman  v.  Bowden,  121  Tenn. 

496  1076 

Leiby  v.  Wilson,  40  Pa.  St.  63       1282 
Leiegne   v.    Schwarzler,    67   How. 
Pr.    (N.    Y.)    130  1400,    1594 

V.     Schwarzler,    10     Daly     (N. 

Y.)     547  1218 

Leighton   v.   Serveson,    8   S.    Dak. 

350  189d 

Leightsey    v.    Rentz,    85    S.    Car. 

401  458 

Leird    v.    Abernathy,    10    Heisk. 

(Tenn.)    626  1102a 

Leismann     v.     Lovely,     45     Wis. 

420  1238 

Leisse    v.    Schwartz,    6   Mo.    App. 

413  1263,  1404 

Leitch    V.    Owings,    34   Md.    262         622 
Leith's    Estate,    In    re,    L.    R.    1 

P.   C.   296  4,    7 

Leiweke  v.   Jordan,    59   Mo.   App. 

619  1067 

Leland  v.  The  Medora,  2  Woodb. 
&    M.    (U.    S.)    92 

1709,  1800,  1801,  1805 
Lemay  v.  Johnson,  35  Ark.  225       606 
Lembeck      v.      Jarvis      Terminal 
Cold   Storage  Co.,   68   N.   J.   Eq. 
492  310 

V.  Jarvis  Terminal  Cold  Stor- 
age Co.,  69  N.  J.  Eq. 
781  309 

Lemieux  v.  English,  19  Misc.   (N. 

Y.)    545  1299 

Lemly    v.    La    Grange    Iron    &c. 

Co.,     65    Mo.     545  1422 

Lempriere  v.  Pasley.  2  T.  R.  485     431 
Lenel's    Succession,    34    La.    Ann. 

868  1204 

Lenox   v.   Yorkville   Co.,    2   E.   D. 

Smith    (N.   Y.)    673  1608 

Leonard  v.  Brooklyn,  71  N.  Y. 
498  1375 

V.    Cook,    (N.    J.    Eq.),    20    Atl. 

855    •  1487 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXVll 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,    §§   lOGl-1812.] 


Leonard    v.    Davis,    1    Black    (U. 
S.)     476  800,   850 

V.  Decker,   22  Fed.   741  1770 

V.    Harris,    147    App.    Div.     (N. 

Y.)    458  515 

V.    Reynolds,    7    Hun    (N.    Y.) 

73  1375 

V.   Sheard,    1    El.   &   131.    667  837 

Leonard   Richards,    The,    41   Fed. 

818  1781 

Leonard's    Exrs.    v.    Winslow,    2 

Grant   Cas.    (Pa.)    139  265 

Leopold   V.   P^urber,   84   Ky.    214      1128 
V.    Godfrey,    50    Fed.    145  613 

V.    Godfrey,    11    Biss.     (U.    S.) 

158  552 

Le  Roy  v.  Globe  Ins.  Co.,  2  Edw. 

Ch.    (N.    Y.)    657  88 

Lesher    v.    Roessner,    3    Hun    (N. 

Y.)   217  209,  214 

Leslie  v.   Hinson,    83  Ala.   266  990 

Lessard  v.  Revere,  171  Mass.  294 

1375 
Lessasier    v.    The    Southwestern, 

2    Woods    (U.    S.)    35  949 

Lessells   v.    Farnsworth,    3    How. 

Pr.    (N.    S.)     (N.    Y.)    364  673 

Lessels    v.    Farnsworth,    3    How. 
Pr.    (N.    S.)    (N.   Y.)    73 

690,    694,    1009 
Lesseps  v.  Ritcherm,  18  La.  Ann. 

653  620 

Lester    v.    Houston,    101  N.    Car. 
605  1219,  1235 

V.    Pedigo,    84   Va.    309  1229 

Leszynsky     v.     Merritt,     9     Fed. 

688  115,    122,   135 

Lett   v.    Morris,    4   Sim.    607 

43,    45,    47,   55 
Leuckhart  v.   Cooper,   3   Bing.   N. 

Cas.    99  265,   901 

Leven  v.  Smith,   1  Denio    (N.   Y.) 

571  815 

Levering  v.   Bank,   1  Cranch    (U. 

S.)    152  1700 

Levy  v.  Barnard,   8   Taunt.   149 

423,     447,   469 

V.   Rudolph,    22   Ky.   L.    258        1096 

V.   Steinbach,    43    Md.    212  217 

V.   Twiname,    42   Ga.    249  552 

Lewin    v.    Whittenton    Mills,    13 

Gray    (Mass.)    100  1411 

Lewis    V.    Boskins,    27    Ark.    61      1108 
V.   Caperton,     8     Grat.      (Va.) 

148  1081 

V.   Chapmen,    59    Mo.    371  1116 

V.   Chicksaw      Co.,      50      Iowa 

234  1375 

V.   Covilland,    21    Cal.    178 

1086,  1092 
V.  Cranmer,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  124  1102a 
V.  Day,    10    Wkly.    Dig.    49 

185,   198 
V.  Galena    &c.    R.    Co.,    40    111. 

281  460 

V.  Hancock,    11    Mass.    72  270 

V.  Harris,   4  Mete.    (Ky.)    353   1178 
V.  Hawkins,   23   Wall.    (U.   S.) 

119  1108,   1123 

V.  Henderson,  22  Ore.   548  1076 

V.  Kinealy,    2    Mo.    App.    33        137 
V.  Lozee,     3     Wend.      (N.     Y.) 

79  585 


Lewis       V.       Lyman,       22       Pick. 
(Mass.)    437  550 

V.  McDowell,    88   N.   Car.   261   1123 
V.   Mahon,     9     Baxt.      (Tenn.) 

374  636 

V.   Mason.    36   U.   C.    Q.   B.    590 

865,    878,   931 
V.   Omaha   St.    R.    Co.    (Nebr.), 

114  N.  W.   281  114,   183 

V.  Owens,   124   Ga.   228  781 

V.   Pusey,   8  Bush    (Ky.)    615     1116 
V.    Saylors,   73    Iowa   504  1311 

V.   Shearer,    189    111.    184 

1064,   1092 
V.   Tyler,    23    Cal.    364  641 

Lewis'  Appeal,   66  Pa.   St.   312 

598,    632,    633 
Lewis  Co.  V.  Knowlton,  84  Minn. 

53  993 

Lewis,  Ex  parte,   2   Gall.    (U.   S.) 

483  1719 

Lex    V.    Holmes,    4    Phila.     (Pa.) 

10  1262 

L'Hommedieu  v.  Dayton,  38  Fed. 

926  1026 

L'Hote  Lumber  Co.  v.  Dugui,  115 

La.  669  1204 

Libbev  v.  Tidden,   192  Mass.  175  1367 
Liberty  No.    4,   The,    7    Fed.    226 

1781,   1798 

Lichtentag     v.     Feitel,     113     La. 

931  1204 

Lichty    V.    Houston    Lumber    Co., 

39  Colo.  53  1447 

Lickbarrow  v.  Mason,  6  East  21 

10,   20,  335,   418,   466, 

858,    862,    986,   1033 

V.  Mason,   2    T.   R.    63  946 

V.   Mason,  5   T.   R.   367  807 

V.  Mason,      1      Smith's     Lead. 

Cas.   (8th  ed.)    753        909,   951 
V.  Mason,      1      Smith's      Lead. 

Cas.    (8th   ed.)    797  858 

Liebstein    v.    Newark,    24    N.    J. 

Eq.    200  1487 

Liefert   v.    Galveston    &c.    R.    Co. 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.).  57  S.  W.  899  332a 
Lienard    v.    Dresslar,    3    Fost.    & 

Fin.    212  473 

Liesmann     v.     Lovely,     45     Wis. 

420  1248 

Liggett     Spring     &     Axles'     Co. 
In    re    appeal    of,    111    Pa.    St. 

291  .  241 
Lighthouse  v.   Third  Nat.   Bank, 

162    N.    Y.    336  744 

Lightner  v.  Brannen,  99  Ga.  606     611 
Lillie   V.    Case,    54    Iowa   177  1108 

Lillie  Laurie,    The,    50   Fed.    219 

1787,   1793a 

Lillie   Mills,    The,    1    Spr.    (U.    S.) 
307  1799,   ISOOa 

Lillie,    The,    42    Fed.    237 

1800.    1810,   1811 

Limerick    v.    Ketcham,     17    Okla. 
532  1262 

Lime    Rock,    The,    49    Fed.    383 

1690,    1699,    1799a,   1808 

Linda    Flor,    The,    Swab.    309  1781 

Lindauer    v.    Fourth    Nat.    Bank, 
55    Barb.    (N.   Y.)    75  261 

Lindbloom  v.   Kidston,   2   Alaska 

292  1079 


CXVlll 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 


Lindemann  v.  Belden  Consol.  M. 

&c.  Co.,  16  Colo.  App.   342  1367 

Linden     Steel     Co.     v.     Imperial 
Refining-    Co.,    146    Pa.    St.    4 

1334,    1421 
Lindholm  v.   Itasca  Lumber  Co., 

64    Minn.    46  179 

Lindley   v.   Cross,    31   Ind.    106 

1200,   1260,   1455 
V.   Miller,   -67    111.    244  613 

Lindner   v.   Hine,   84   Mich.   511        176 
Lindsay    v.     Gunning,    59    Conn. 
296  1369 

V.   Huth,    74   Mich.    712  1451 

V.  Lowe,    64  Ga.    438  1053 

Lindsay    &c.    Co.    v.    Mullen,    176 
U.    S.    126  713 

V.     Zoecler,   128  Iowa  558  1201 

Lindsay    v.    Bates,    42    Miss.    397 

1092,   1096 
V.  Lindsey,    45    Ind.    552  1163 

Lindslev    v.     Caldwell,     234     Mo. 

498  181a 

Lingan    v.    Henderson,    1    Bland 

(Md.)    236  1099,   1108 

Linn    v.    Bass,    84   Ala.   281  1094 

V.   O'Hara,    2    E.   D.   Smith    (N. 

Y.)    560  1513 

Linne  v.   Stout,    41   Minn.    483        1604 
Llnneman  v.   Bieber,   85  Hun   (N. 

Y.)    477  1494,   1532 

Linthicum    v.    Tapscott,    28    Ark. 

267  1099 

Linton    v.   Butz,    7   Pa.    St.    89  813 

Linville   v.    Savage,    58   Mo.    App. 

509  1080 

Lipman   v.  Jackson   Iron  Works, 

128    N.    Y.    58  1485 

Lippincott    V.    Leeds,    77    Pa.    St. 

420  1260 

Lipscomb  v.  Fuqua,  55  Tex.  Civ. 

App.    535  1110 

Liquid    Carbonic    Acid    Mfg.    Co. 

V.  Lewis,  32  Tex.  Civ.  App.  481  553 
Lissa  V.   Posey,   64   Miss.   352  1081 

Litchfield  v.  Johnson,  4  Dill.    (U. 

S.)     551  1142,    1145,   1146 

Litherland   v.   Cohn   Real   Estate 

&c.    Co.,    54    Ore.    71  1236 

Lithgow    V.     Sweedberg     (Tex.), 

78    S.    W.    246  772 

Litt     V.     Cowley,     7     Taunt.     169 

883,     888,   899 
V.   Cowlev,    1   Holt   N.   P.   338      887 
Littell  &c.  Co.  V.  Miller,  3  Wash. 

480  1397 

Little   V.    Brown,    2    Leigh    (Va.) 
353  1066,   1080 

V.  Rogers,     2     Mete.     (Mass.) 

478  162 

V.   Sexton,    89    Ga.    411  173 

V.  Vredenburgh,      16     Bradw. 

(111.)   189  1262,  1269,  1519 

Littlefield    v.    Morrill,    97    Maine 

505  710 

Littlejohn     v.     Millirons,     7     Ind. 

125  1257 

Littler   v.    Friend.    167    Ind.    36      1276 
Little    Rock,    H.    S.    &    T.    R.    Co. 

V.    Spencer,    65    Ark.    183  1629 

Littleton  Savings  Bank  v.  Osce- 
ola  Land   Co.,    76    Iowa   660        1240 
Little   Valeria   &c.   Co.   v.    Inger- 
soll,    14    Colo.   App.    240  1276 


Live  Oak,   The,  30  Fed.   78  1793,  1805 
Livermore  v.   Wright,   33  Mo.   31 

1431,   1432 
Livesey    v.    Hamilton,    47    Nebr. 

644  1532 

Livingston  v.   Farish,   89  N.  Car. 
140  631 

V.   Lovgren,    27    Wash.    102         718 
V.  Mildrum,    19    N.    Y.    440 

1218.    1581 
V.  Newkirk,   3   Johns.   Ch.    (N. 

Y.)     312  1104 

L.   L.  Lamb,  The,   31   Fed.   29  1704 

Lloyd    V.    Arney,     43     Ind.     App. 
450  1200 

V.  Hibbs,    81    Pa.    St.    306  1262 

Lloyd,    In    re,    22    Fed.    90  789 

L.    Luderbach    Plumbing    Co.    v. 

Its    Creditors,    121    La.    371  620 

Loaners'   Bank   v.   Nostrand,  21  J. 

&    S.    (N.    Y.)    525  232 

Lochte  V.  Lefehvre,  128  La.  108     456 
Locke  V.  Lewis,   124  Mass.   1  794 

v.   Prescott,    32    Beav.    261  248 

Lockett   V.   Nicklin,   2    Ex.    93  856 

Lockhart    v.    Smith,    40    S.    Car. 

112  458 

Lockwood     V.     Mechanics'      Nat. 

Bank,    9    R.    I.    308  377 

Loeb  V.  Blum,  25  La.  Ann.  232  904 

V.   Peters,  63  Ala.   243 

857,  885,  887,  946,  949,  964 
Loewenberg  v.   Arkansas  &c.   R. 

Co.,   56   Ark.    439  294 

Lofton   V.   Moore,    83   Ind.    112        1164 
Logan   V.   Attex,    7    Iowa    77 

1235,  1532,  1589 
V.  Billings     &c.     R.     Co.,     40 

Mont.     457  713 

V.   Taylor,    20    Iowa    297  1487 

Logwood    V.    Robertson,    62    Ala. 

523  1069 

Lomax    v.    Dore,    45    111.    379 

1199,   1571 
V.  LeGrand,     60    Ala.     537 

576a,    603,   777 

Lombard     v.     Johnson,      76      111. 

599  1568 

London  &  N.  "W.  R.  Co.  v.  Bart- 
lett,    7    H.    &    N.    400  919 

V.  Glyn,    1    El.    &    El.    652  2S0 

London       Chartered       Bank       v. 

White,  L.   R.   4   App.   Cas.    413      244 
Long     v.     Abeles,     77     Ark.     156 

1189,  1492,  1513 
V.  Burke,  2  Bush  (Ky.)  90  1074 
V.   Caffrey,    93    Pa.    St.    526 

1289,   1500,   1500a 
V.  McLanahan,     103      Pa.     St. 

537  1282,   1310 

V.   Pace,    42   Ala.    495  1102 

V.   Scott,    24    App.    D.    C.    1       1178 

V.   Wilkinson,   57   Ala.   259  1092 

Long    Island,    North    Shore     &c. 

Transp.  Co.,  In  re,  5  Fed.  599  1806a 
Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re,   19 

Wend.    (N.   Y.)    37  381 

Longstreet    v.     Phile,     39     N.     J. 

L.   63  1034 

Longstreth  v.  Pennock,  20  Wall. 

(U.    S.)    575  560 

Longwell     v.     Ridinger,     1     Gill 
(Md.)     57  600 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


CXIX 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Longworth     v.     Handy,     2     Dis. 

(Ohio)    75  115,    137,    147,   226 

Lonkey   v.    Cook,    15   Nev.    58 

1214,    1304,   1304a 
V.  Wells,    16    Nev.    271 

1214,    1418,   1420 
Lookout  Lumber  Co.  v.  Mansion 
&c.    R.    Co.,    109    N.    Car.    658 

1470,   1574 
V.   Sanford,   112   N.   Car.    655      1574 
Loomis  V.   Davenport  &c.  R.  Co., 

17  Fed.  301       1069,  1076,  1086,   1088 
Loonie  v.  Hogan,   9   N.  Y.   435 

1245,    1248,    1296 
Lord    V.    Collins,    76    Maine    443 

108,  662 
V.  Johnson,  120  111.  App.  55  613 
V.  Jones,  24  Maine  439  644,  731 
V.   Lord,    22    Conn.    595  1165 

V.   Wilcox,    99    Ind.    491    1101,   1102 
V.  Wormleig-hton,    Jac.    580      122a 
Loring-  v.   Small,   50  Iowa  271        1375 
Los   Angeles   County   v.    Winans, 

13   Cal.   App.   234  93 

Los    Angeles    Gold    Min.    Co.     v. 

Campbell,  13  Colo.  App.   1  1616a 

Los    Angeles    Pressed    Brick    Co. 
v.     Los    Angeles     Pac.     Boule- 
vard &c.  Co.,  7  Cal.  App.   460     1328 
Losie  V.  Underwood  Lumber  Co., 

79   Wis.    631  719 

Loss   V.    Fry,    1    City   Ct.    (N.    Y.) 
7  744,   1793 

V.   Fry,    1    Robt.     (N.    Y.)     7 

744,   1793 
Loth  V.  Carty,   85  Ky.  591  619 

Lothian   v.    Wood,    55    Cal.    159 

1279,    1387 
Lottawanna,    The,    20    Wall.    (U. 

S.)    201  1706a 

Lottawanna,    The,    21    Wall.     (U. 
S.)    558  1680,    1725,    1729 

1730,  1731,  1745,  1776,  1793a,  1806a 
Loud  V.  Pritchett,  104  Ga.  648  708 
Louis  Dole,  The,  14  Fed.  862  1799 
Louisa    Jane,    The,    2    Low.     (U. 

S.)    295  1718 

Louisa,   The,  2  Woodb.    &  M.    (U. 

S.)    48  1799 

Louisiana   Nat.    Bank    v.    Knapp, 

61   Miss.    485  1067,   1092,   1094 

Louis    Olsen,    The,    52    Fed.    652 

1706,   1729 
Louisville    &    N.    R.    Co.    v.    Mc- 
Guire,    79    Ala.    395  1019 

V.   Proctor,   21   Ky.   L.   447  177 

Louisville       Bank       v.       Newark 

Bank,   11   Nat.   Bank  R.   49  384 

Louisville      Building      Assn.      v. 

Kerb,    79    Ky.    190  1462,   1487 

Louisville   E.    &    St.   L.   R.   Co.   v. 

Wilson.    138   U.    S.    501  1648 

Love  V.  Cox,   68  Ga.  269  781,   1197 

V.   Shartzer,    31    Cal.    487  1141 

Lovett  V.   Brown,  40  N.  H.  511 

982,   989 

V.  Moore,    98    Ga.     158  173 

Low   V.   Martin,    18    111.    286  973 

Lowden   v.    Sorg,    233   111.    79  1552 

V.  Sorg,    129    111.    App.    261        1389 

Lowe    V.    Howard    Co.,     94    Ind. 

553  1375 

Lowenstein  v.  Myer,  114  Ga.  442     756 


Lowery  v.  Peterson,   75   Ala.    109 

1107,    1108,   1119 

V.   Steward,   25   N.    Y.    239  60 

Low,  In  re.  2  Low.   (LJ.  S.)   264       1705 

Lowis  V.   Cutter,    6   Mo.   App.   54   1408 

Lowrey   v.    Smith,    97    Ind.    466         1093 

V.   Svard,    8    Colo.    App.    3  57        1614 

Loyd   V.   Guthrie,    131   Ala.    65        1535 

V.  Krause,  147  Pa.  St.  402  1289 

V.  McCaffrey,   46   Pa.  St.   410         57 

Lucas   V.   Campbell,    88  111.    447        137 

V.   Dorrien,    7    Taunt.    278 

256,  825,  828,  921 
V.  Hunter,  153  Pa.  St.  293  1313 
V.   Peacock,    9    Beav.    177  166 

V.   Rea    (Cal.),    101   Pac.    537      1604 
V.   Taylor,    105   Md.    90  1747 

V.  Wade,  43   Fla.  419  1064 

Lucas   Co.    V.   Roberts,    49   Iowa 

159  1290 

Luce  V.  Curtis,  77  Iowa  347  1462 

Luckett    V.    White,    10    Gill    &    J. 

(Md.)    480  1163 

Lucy   V.   Hopkins,   11   Ky.   L.    907 

1063,  1099 
Ludgate  Hill,  The,  21  Fed.  431  1693 
Ludington  v.   Gabbert,   5   W.   Va. 

330  1116 

Ludlow  V.   Grayall,    11   Price   58   1183 
Ludwick     V.      Davenport-Treasy 

Piano  Co.,  112  N.  Y.  S.   1023       767a 
Luigart  v.  Lexington  Turf  Club, 

130   Ky.    73  1276 

Lula,   The,    10    Wall.    (U.    S.)    192 

1679,    1681,    1686,    1688,    1699,   1793 
Lumbard  v.  Syracuse  &c.  R.  Co., 

55  N.  Y.  491       1287,  1293,  1294,  1299 
Lumbering    Mfg.     Co.    v.    School 

Dist.,    13    Ore.    283  1375 

Lumbley  v.   Gilruth,    65   Miss.«23    625 

V.   Thomas,    65    Miss.    97  783 

Lumpkin    v.    Louisville    &    N.    R. 

Co.,    36    Ga.    135  174 

V.   Snook,    63    Iowa    515  1503 

Lundauer   v.    Fourth   Nat.    Bank, 

55   Barb.    (N.  Y.)   75  259 

Lundy  v.   Pierson,    67   Tex.   233      1110 
Luneau  v.  Edwards,   39  La.  Ann. 

876  177a,   229 

Lunquest  v.   Ten   Evck,   40   Iowa 

213  1131,   1142 

Lunsford    v.    Wren,     64    W.    Va. 

458  1359,   1580 

Lunt   V.    Bank    of   North    Ameri- 
ca,  49   Barb.    (N.   Y.)    221  57 
Lupin  V.  Marie,   2  Paige    (N.   Y.) 
169                                                              904 
V.  Marie,   6  Wend.    (N.  Y.)    77 

40,     811,   814 
Lupton    V.    Lupton,     2     Johns.     Ch. 
(N.  Y.)    614  1164 

V.  Rugges,     2    Pennew.     (Del.) 

515  608 

Lurch    V.    Brown,    119    N.    Y.    S. 
637  515 

V.   Wilson,    114  N.  Y.   S.    789        502 
Luscher    v.    Morris,    18    Abb.    N. 

Cas.    (N.    Y.)    67  1584 

Lusk   V.   Davis,    27   Ind.    334  1743 

V.  Hopper,   3   Bush    (Ky.)    179 

1093,    1116,   1119 
Luter  V.  Cobb,   1   Coldw.    (Tenn.) 
525  1556 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-lOGOf;  Vol.   II,   §§   lOGl-1812.] 


Luther    v.    Arnold,     8     Rich.    L. 

(S.    Car.)    24  598 

Lutz    V.    Ely,    3    Abb.    Prac.     (N. 
Y.)    475  1413 

V.     By,  3  B.  D.  Smith   (N.  Y.) 

621  1536 

Lybrandt    v.    Eberly,    36    Pa.    St. 

347  1357 

Lycett  V.   Stafford  &c.  R.   Co.,  L. 

R.    13    Eq.    261  1674 

Lyde    v.    Mynn,    4    Sim.    505  78 

Lyle    V.    Barker,    5    Binn.     (Pa.) 

457  1036 

Lynam  v.  King,  9  Ind.  3       1272,   1276 
Lynch      v.      Cashman,      3     E.      D. 
Smith    (N.    Y.)    660  1287 

V.   Cronan,     6     Gray     (Mass.) 

531  1408,   1412 

V.   Smith,    154    111.    App.    469 

576a,   580 

Lynde  v.  Lynde,  64  N.  J.  Eq.  736     206 
V.  Parker,    155    Mass.    481  691a 

Lyndhurst,    The,    48    Fed.    839 

1800a,   1806a 

Lyon  V.   Champion,   62  Conn.   75   1263 
V.   Clark,    132   Mich.   521  1074 

V.   Elser,    72    Tex.     304  1226 

V.   Logan,    66   Tex.   57        1600,   1601 
V.  Logan,    68    Tex.    521  1313 

V.  McGuffev,    4    Pa.    St.    126      1259 
V.  New   York   &c.    R.    Co.,    127 

Mass.    101  1651 

V.   Ozee,    66    Tex.    95  1226,   1382 

Lyon    Lumber    Co.    v.    Equitable 
L.   &c.   Co.,   174  111.   31  1519 

Lyons    v.    Carter,    84    Mo.    App. 

483  1619 

V.   Deppen,   90  Ky.   305  557 

V.  Howard,   16  N.  Mex.  327       1217 

Lyste^s  Appeal,   54  Mich.  325        1555 

Lytle  V.  Bach,  29  Ky.  L.    424  177 


M 


Maanss     v.     Henderson,     1     East 

335  447 

Mabie  v.   Sines,  92  Mich.   545  712 

McAllister  v.    Case,    15    Daly    (N. 

Y.)    299  1218 

V.   Clopton,    51    Miss.    257  1210 

V.  Des    Rochers,    132    Mich. 

381  1413 

McAlpin  V.  Duncan,  16  Cal.  126 

1190,   1286,   1287,  1290 
McAlpine    v.    Burnett,    23    Tex. 

649  1084 

McArthur  v.  Porter,  1   Ohio  99      1098 
McAuley  v.  Mildrum,  1  Daly   (N. 

Y.)    396  1218,   1313,  1543 

McBratney   v.    Rome   &c.    R.    Co., 

17    Hun    (N.    Y.)    385  206 

McBride    v.    Farmers'    Bank,    26 

N.    Y.    450  259 

McBroom's     Appeal,     44     Pa.     St. 

92  1665 

McCaa  v.  Grant,  43  Ala.  262    169,  202 
McCabe  v.  Britton,   79    Ind.   224        174 
V.   Fogg,   60   How.   Pr.    (N.  Y.) 

488  185,    189 

V.  McRae,  58  Maine  95  1500 

McCaffery  v.  Knapp,   74  111.  App. 
80  1742 


McCaffrey    v.    Wooden,    62    Barb. 
(N.    Y.)    316  3 

V.  Woodin,  65  N.  Y.  459       542,   544 
McCain   v.    Portis,   42   Ark.    402 

170,   228 
McCall  V.  Eastwick,  2  Miles   (Pa.) 

45  1520 

McCamly  v.  Waterhouse,  80  Tex. 

340  1119 

McCandless'    Appeal,    98    Pa.    St. 

489  1158 

McCandlish     v.     Keen,     13     Grat. 

(Va.)     615  40,   1063,  1072 

McCants  V.   Bush,   70   Cal.   125        1190 

McCarthy   v.    Caldwell,    43    Minn. 

442  1263 

V.   Groff,     48     Minn.     325  1439 

V.   Miller,    122    111.    App.    299      1461 

V.    Neu,    93    111.    455  1555 

McCartney     v.     Buck,     8     Houst. 

(Del.)  34     1331,  1333,  1347,  1361,  1555 
McCarty  v.   Burnet,    84   Ind.   23 

1272,   1274 
V.   Carter,   49  111.   53 

1239,   1245,  1253, 

1256,   1257,  1280 

V.  Van   Etten,    4  Minn.    461        1421 

V.   Williams,    69    Ala.    174  1074 

McCaslin    v.    Nance,    4  6    S.    Car. 

568  7S4c 

V.    State,    44   Ind.    151 

1116,   1124,   1127 
McClain   v.   Williams,   11   S.  Dak. 

227  515 

McClaugherty    v.     Croft,    43     W. 

Va.    270  1101 

McClintic  v.  Wise,  25  Grat.    (Va.) 

448  1119,   1120 

McClintock    v.    Criswell,     67    Pa. 
St.    183  1277 

V.  Rush,    63    Pa.    St.    203 

1407,   1421 
McClure    v.    Harris,    12    B.    Mon. 

(Ky.)    261  1086 

McColl    V.    Eraser,    40    Hun     (N. 

Y.)    Ill  1180 

McComb  V.  Judsonia  State  Bank, 

91   Ark.    218  817 

McCombie  v.  Davis,   7  East  5 

20,   307,   460,  987 
McCombs   V.    Becker,    3    Hun    (N. 

Y.)    342  543,   548 

McConnell  v.  Beattie,  34  Ark.  113 

1108,   1119,   1122 
McCorkle    v.    Herrmann,    117    N. 

Y.    297  1294 

McCormack  v.  Butland,  191  Mass. 
424  12,'-j4 

V.   Phillips,   4  Dak.   506 

1184,  1559 
McCormick  v.  Blum,  75  Miss.  81     783 
V.  Hadden,    37    111.    370  820 

V.  Lawton,    3    Nebr.    449 

1213,   1263,   1264,   1578 
V.  Los    Angeles    City    Water 

Co.,    40    Cal.    185  1357 

McCoy  V.  Grandy,  3   Ohio  St.  463 

1131,  1144,   1145 
V.  McCoy,   36  W.  Va.   772  229 

V.   Quick,    30  Wis.   521 

1425,   1537,   1571,   1600 
McCraw    v.    Gilmer,    83    N.    Car. 
162  814 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


CXXl 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


McCready    v.     Rumsey,     6     Duer 

(N.    Y.)    574  377,   379,  388 

McCree     v.     Campion,     5     Phila. 

(Pa.)  9  1361,   1475 

McCreery  v.  Claffin.  37  Md.  435       564 
McCrie    v.    Hixon   Lumber   Co.,    7 

Kans.    App.    39  1462 

McCrillis    v.     Wilson,    34    Maine 

286  724 

McCrisaken   v.    Osweiler,    70   Ind. 

131  758 

McCristal  v.  Cochran,  147  Pa.  St. 

225  1309b,   1353 

McCue    V.    Whitwell,     156    Mass. 

205  1252a,  1514 

McCulloug-h  V.  Baker,  47  Mo.  401 

1513a 
V.   Caldwell's      Exr.,      8      Ark. 

231  692a 

V.   Flournoy,    69    Ala.    189  229 

V.   Kibler,    5    S.    Car.    468  458 

McCutchon   v.   Wilkinson,   12   La. 

Ann.    483  456 

McDaniel  v.  Cain,  159  Ala.   344       605 
McDaniels    v.    Robinson,    26    Vt. 

316  503,    504,   518 

McDearmid  v.  Foster,  14  Ore.  417 

749,    769,  776 
McDermott    v.    Palmer,    8    N.    Y. 

383  1349 

McDole  V.   Purdy,   23  Iowa  277 

1063,   1067,   1071,   1088 
McDonald  v.  Backus,  45  Cal.  262 

1190,  1575 
V.   Beach,    2   Blackf.    (Ind.)    55 

788,  790 
V.  Bennett,  45  Iowa  456  641,  658 
V.   Elyton    Land    Co.,    78    Ala. 

382  1071 

V.  Kelly,  14  R.  I.  335  1223,  1498 
V.  Lindall,      3      Rawle      (Pa.) 

492  1423 

V.   Mayor,   170   N.   Y.   409  1454 

V.  Minneapolis     Lumber     Co., 

28  Minn.   262  1371 

V.  Napier,  14  Ga.  89  146,  167,  203 
V.  Patterson,  186  111.  381  1427 
V.  Patterson,  84  111.  App.  326  1608 
V.    Rosengarten,    134    111.    126 

1452,   1453 
V.   Smith,    57   Vt.   502  217,   218 

V.  The  Nimbus,   137  Mass.   360 

1725,   1725a,   1748,   1807 

V.   Willis,   143   Mass.   452  1451 

McDonell  v.  Dodge,  10  Wis.  106     1238 

McDonough     v.     Cross,     40     Tex. 

251  1086 

V.   Sherman,  138  App.  Div.   (N. 

Y.)    291  184 

McDougall  V.   Crapon,   95  N.  Car. 

292  745,   749,   768,    997 

McDowell   V.   Bank   of   Wilming- 
ton, 1  Harr.   (Del.)   27    377,   391,   398 
V.   Bank      of     Wilmington     & 
Brandywine,       1       Harr. 
(Del.)    369  241 

V.  Rockwood,  182  Mass.  150  1207 
V.   Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  4  Bosw. 

(N.   Y.)    670  196,   197 

V.   The  Lena  Alowbray,  71  Fed. 

720  1706 

McElmurray    v.    Turner,    86    Ga. 
215  781 


McElroy    v.    Braden,    152    Pa.    St. 

78  1289,   1502 

V.   Dice,   17   Pa.   St.   163  632 

McElwaine    v.    Hosey,    135    Ind. 

481  1200 

McElwee    v.    Metropolitan    Lum- 
ber Co.,   69  Fed.   302  834,    842 
V.  Sandford,    53    How.   Pr.    (N. 

Y.)    89  1401 

McEvoy    V.    Niece,    20    Tex.    Civ. 

App.    686  638 

McEwan    v.    Smith,    2   H.   L.    Cas. 

309  823,   852,  881,   958 

McEwen  v.  Union   Bank  &c.   Co., 

35  Mont.  470  1450 

McE'arland    v.    Farmer,    42   N.    H. 

386  820 

v.  Wheeler,   26  Wend.    (N.  Y.) 

467    22.  24.  731,  740,  997,  1001 
McFarlane  v.  Foley,  27  Ind.  App. 

484  1341 

McFeron   v.   Doyens,    59   Ore.   366 

1221,   1385,   1494 
McFetridge  v.  Piper.  40  Iowa  627 

927,   929,  937,  940 
McGee  v.  Fitzer,  37  Tex.   27  556 

McGeever  v.  Harris,  148  Ala.  503     1263 
McGeorge       v.       Stanton-DeLong 

Lumber  Co.,  131  Wis.  7  719,  774 
McGhee    v.    Edwards,     87     Tenn. 

506  499,  502,  504,  641.  691,  692a,  744 
McGill  v.  Howard,  61  Miss.  411  625 
McGiliick    V.    McAllister,    10    111. 

App.   40  598 

McGillicuddy      v.      Edwards,      96 

Maine   347  662 

McGillivray    v.    Case,    107    Iowa 

17  1451,   1453 

McGinnis  v.   The   Grand   Turk,    2 

Pitts.    (U.    S.)    326  1715 

McGinniss     v.      Purrington,      43 

Conn.   143  1248 

McGirr    v.    Sell,    60    Ind.    249  820 

McGlauflin    v.    Beeden,    41    Minn. 

408  1392 

V.   Wormser,  28  Mont.  177  1589 

McGonigal    v.    Plummer,    30    Md. 

422  1076,   lOSG 

McGowan  v.  Gate  City  Malt  Co., 

89   Nebr.    10  1213 

McGrade      v.      German      Savings 

Inst.,    4    Mo.    App.    330  57 

McGrath    v.    Barlow    (Miss.),    21 

So.    237  580 

McGraw  v.   Bayard,    96   111.   146 

1199,  1504,   1559,   15S0,   1585 
v.  Godfrey,  56  N.  Y.  610    1259,  1613 
McGreary  v.  Osborne,  9  Cal.  119    1272 
McGregor  v.    Comstock,  28  N.   Y. 

237  187,   188,   214 

V.  Cook,    4    Will.     (Tex.)    Civ. 

Cas.   Ct.   App.   141  1375 

V.  Matthis,   32   Ga.    417  1119 

McGrew  v.  McCarty,  78  Ind.  496    1310 
McGugin  V.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  33 

W.  Va.  63  1231,   1235,  1283,  1554 

McGuinn  v.  Federated  Mines  &c. 

Co.,   160   Mo.  App.    28  1276 

McGuinness   v.    Boyle,    123    Mass. 

570  1316 

McHendry  v.  Reilly.  13  Cal.  75       1069 
McHenry   v.    Kniclverbocker,    128 

Ind.   77  l.'Ol 


cxxu 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  1-lOGOf;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 


McHenry   v.   Philadelphia   &c.   R. 

Co..    4    Harr.     (Del.)     448  284 

Machir  v.  Burroughs,  14  Ohio  St. 

.519  12G0 

McHorney  v.  The  D.  B.  Steelman, 

70   Fed.   326  1800 

Mcllvain    v.    Hestonville    &c.    R. 

Co.,  5  Phila.  (Pa.)  13  137S.   161S 

Mcllvane  v.  Hilton,  7  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

594  507 

Mclntire,  In  re,  142  Fed.   593  639 

Mcintosh    V.    Schroeder,    154    111. 
520  1564 

V.   Thurston,  25  N.  J.  Eq.  242 

1248,   1252a,   1272,   1458 

Mclritosk  V.  Bach,  110  Ky.  701         230 

Mclntyre  v.  Carver,  2  Watts  &  S. 

(Pa.)    392  14,   26,   731,   733 

V.   Trautner,  63  Cal.  429    1190,  1445 

V.  Trautner,  78  Cal.  449  1616 

Mack  V.  Colleran,  136  N.  Y.  617 

1294,  1307 
V.  Colleran,  18  N.  Y.  S.  104 

1297,  1307 
McKay  v.  Green,  3  Johns.  Ch.  (N. 
Y.)   56  1101,   1182 

V.  Gulf  Refining-  Co.,  176  Fed. 

93  1740 

McKee  v.  Travellers'  Ins.  Co.,  41 

Fed.    117  1491,  1589 

McKeen    v.    Haseltine,    46    Minn. 

426  1356,  1520,   1532 

McKelvain  v.  Allen,  58  Tex.  383     1110 
McKelvey    v.    Jarvis,    87    Pa.    St. 
414  1308 

V.  Wonderly,  26  Mo.  App.  631    1211 
McKenzie   v.    Baldridge,    49    Ala. 
564  1127 

V.  Wardwell,  61  Maine  136  214 

^klcKeown  v.  Collins,  38  Fla.  276  1088 
Mackey  v.  Craig,  144  Ind.  203  1102 
McKibben         v.        Worthington's 

Exrs.,   103   Kv.   356  1054a 

McKillip  V.  McKillip,  8  Barb.   (N. 

Y.)   552  1071 

McKim  V.  Moody,  1  Rand.    (Va.) 

58  1146 

McKinnev    v.    Reader,     6    Watts 
(Pa.)    34  632 

v.   White,  162  N.  Y.  601  1396 

McKinnon  v.  Johnson,  54  Fla.  538 

1061,  1073 
McKircher  v.   Hawley,   16   Johns. 

(N.  Y.)    289  598,   599 

McKleroy  v.  Cantey,  95  Ala.  295      602 

V.   Tulane,  34  Ala.  78  1126 

McKnight  v.  Parish  of  Grant,  30 

La.   Ann.    361  1204 

V.  Spain,  13  Mo.  534  100 

v.  Washington,  8  W.  Va.  666 

1231,   1289,   1290 
Mackreth  v.  Symmons.  15  Ves.  329 

1061,  1074,   1075,   1083 
Mack  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Thompson,  176 

Fed.   499  1717 

McLaren  v.  Hall,  26  Iowa  297  1262 
McLaughlin  v.  Green,  48  Miss.  175 

1210,  1539 
V.  Reinhart,  54  Md.  71  1505,  1524 
v.  Riggs,    1     Cranch     (U.    S.) 

410  600 

McLaurie  v.  Thomas,  39  111.  291 

1086,   1092 


McLean    v.    Breithaupt,    12    Ont. 

App.    383  935 

McLean  v.  Fleming,  L.  R.  2  H.  L. 
(Scotch)    128  274 

V.   Klein,   3  Dill.    (U.   S.)   113        543 
v.  Lafayette  Bank,   3  McLean 

(U.    S.)    587  398,   407 

V.   Sanford,    26    App.    Div.    (N. 

Y.)  603  1276 

V.   Wiley,  176  Mass.  233  1444 

V.  Young,    2    MacAr.     (D.    C.) 

184  1424 

McLearn  v.  McLellan,  10  Pet.  (U. 

S.)    625  1063 

McLeod  V.  Capell,  7  Baxt.  (Tenn.) 
196  1225 

V.  Evans,    66   Wis.   401  37 

Maclzer  v.  Swan,  75  Kans.  496       580 
McMahon  v.  Bridwell,  3  Mo.  App. 
572  1306 

V.  Vickery,  4  Mo.  App.  225         1341 
McManigle  v.  Grouse,  34  Leg.  Int. 

(Pa.)    384  676 

Macmanus  v.  Thurber,  50  Hun  (N. 

Y.)    604  68 

McMaster  v.  Merrick,  41  Mich.  505 

998,   1002,   1412 
McMeekin  v.  Worcestor,  99  Iowa 

243  742 

McMillan  v.  Phillips,  5  Dak.  294   1286 
V.   Schenider,  147  Mich.  258      1270 
V.  Seneca  Lake  Grape  &c.  Co., 
5   Hun    (N.   Y.)    12 

1286,  1290,  1298 
McMillen  v.  Rose,  54  Iowa  522  1121 
McMonagl©   v.    Nolan,    98    Mass. 

320  1748 

V.  Wilson,    103    Mich.    264  1413 

McMurray  v.  Hutcheson,  10  Daly 

(N.    Y.)    64  1511 

V.  Taylor,  30  Mo.  263  1532 

McMurrich  v.  Bond  Head  Harbor 

Co.,    9   U.   C.    Q.   B.    333  375 

McMurry  v.  Brown,  91  U.  S.  257 

1519,  1524,   1525 
McNab  &c.  Mfg.   Co.  v.   Paterson 
Bldg.  Co.,  71  N.  J.  Eq.  133 

1216,  1345,   1412 

McNagney  v.  Frazer,  1  Ind.  App. 

98  174 

McNail   V.   Ziegler,    68   111.    224 

806,  850 
McNamara  v.  Godair,  161  111.  228  641 
McNamee  v.  Ranch,  128  Ind.  59  1421 
McNaughton  v.   Elkhart,   85   Ind. 

384  1492 

McNeal   v.   Clement,   2   Thomp.   & 

C.    (N.   Y.)    363  1512 

McNeal  Pipe  Co.  v.  Howland,  111 

N.   Car.   615  1378,   1480 

McNeal   Pipe   &c.   Co.  v.  Bullock, 

38    Fed.    565  1374,   1378,   1587 

McNicholas    v.    Tinsler,    127    111. 

App.   381  1276 

McNiel,    Ex    parte,    13    Wall.    (U. 

S.)    236  1725,   1729 

McNultv    v.    Offerman,    141    App. 

Div.    (N.  Y.)    730  1255 

McNutt   V.    Strayhorn,   39   Pa.   St. 

269  789 

Macomber  v.  Bigelow,  126  Cal.  19  1494 
Macon  &  Western  R.  Co.  v.  Mea- 

dor,  65  Ga.  705 

895,  901,   902,   937,   9C0 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


CXXlll 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  yol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


McPhee  v.   Guthrie,   51  Ga.   83 

1141,   1145 
V.   Kay,   30  Nebr.   62  1451 

V.  Liitclifield,  145  Mass.  565        1401 
McPheeters    v.    Merimac    Bridge 

Co.,    28  Mo.    465  1375,   1618 

McVherson  v.  Cox.  96  U.  S.  404 

115,   119,    134,   167 

V.   Johnson,  69  Tex.  4S4  1123 

V.   Smith,  14  Wash.   226  718 

V.  Walton,  42  N.  J.  Eq.  282       1216 

McQuaide  v.   Stewart,   48    Pa.   St. 

198  1308 

McQuinn   v.   Federated    &c.    Mill. 

Co.,    160   Mo.   App.    28  1211 

McRae  v.   Bowers  Dredging  Co., 

86  Fed.  344  1700,   1756 

V.   Creditors,  16  La.  Ann.  305    1022 

V.  Warehime,    49    Wash.    194      192 

McRimmon     v.     Martin,     14     Tex. 

318  1084 

McSorley    v.    Larissa,    100    Mass. 

270  1142 

Mac,  The,  L.  R.  7  Prob.  Div.  126    1677 
McWhirter    v.    Swaffer,    6    Baxt. 

(Tenn.)   342  1092 

McWilliams  v.  Allan,  45  Mo.   573 

1414,   1418 
V.   Brookens,    39    Wis.    334        1127 
V.  Jenkins,   72  Ala.   480        166,  229 
Macy  V.  DeWolf.  3  Woodb.   &  M. 

(U.    S.)    193  1697a 

Madaris    v.    Eldwards,    32    Kans. 

284  1486 

Madden  v.  Barnes,  45  Wis.  135     1074 

V.   Kempster,  1  Camp.   12  434 

Maddox  v.  Maddox,  146  Ala.  460    576a 

V.   Oxford,   70   Ga.   179  1178 

Madison     County     Coal      Co.      v. 

Steamboat  Colona,  36  Mo.  446    1436 
Madison  Supply  &c.  Co.  v.  Ricli- 

ardson,  8  Ga.  App.  344  568,   611 

Madrid,   The,  40  Fed.   677 

1722,  1729,  1773.   1793a,   1794 
Maelzer  v.  Swan,  75  Kans.  496 

580,   617 
Maggie  Hammond,   The,   9   Wall. 

(U.  S.)    435  1720a,   1729 

Maggie   P.,   The,   32   Fed.   300  1715 

Magowan   v.   Stevenson,    58   N.   J. 

L.   31  1216 

V.   Stevenson,  58  N.  J.  L.  408       1216 

Magruder  v.   Peter,    11   Gill   &   J. 

(Md.)    217  1099,   1116 

Maguire  v.  Card,  21  How.   (U.  S.) 

248  1729,   1730 

Mahan  v.  Surerus.  9  N.  Dak.  57    1184a 
Maher     v.     Shull,     1     Colo.     App. 

322  1249 

Maher,   In   re,   169   Fed.    947  3 

Mahley  v.   German  Bank,   174   N. 
Y.  499  1218 

V.  German  Bank,  66  App.  Div. 

(N.  T.)   623  1218 

Mahon   v.    Guilfoyle,    IS   N.    Y.    S. 

93  1512 

Mahone  v.   Southern  Tel.   Co.,   33 

Fed.  702  201a 

Maine,  The,  184  Fed.  968  1698 

Main    St.    Hotel    Co.    v.    Horton 

Hdw.   Co.,   56   Kans.    448  1287 

Main,   The,    51   Fed.    954  1713 

Mairs  v.  Bank  of  Oxford,  58  Miss. 
919  1084 


Major  v.  Bukley,   51  Mo.   227  1084 

V.  Collins,  11  Bradw.  (111.)  658 

1312,  1495,   1610 

Majors  v.  Maxwell,  120  Mo.  App. 

281  990 

Makings  v.  Makings,  1  De  G.,  F. 

&  J.   355  1163,  1164 

Malbon  v.  Birney,  11  Wis.  107 

1512,  1513 

Malcolm  v.  Scott,  3  Hare  39         43,   55 
v.   Burrett,  1  E.   D.  Smith    (N. 

Y.)   234  299 

V.   Gillett,   21  N.  Y.   412  1031 

V.  La  Crosse  Abattoir  Co.,   80 

Wis.  170  1232,  1304,  1304a 

V.  Marion    Water-Works    Co., 

77   Iowa  .715  1290 

Malmgren   v.    Phinney,    50   Minn. 

457  1458,   1560 

Malon    V.    Scholler,    48    Ind.    App. 

691  ^1076 

Malone  v.   Big  Flat  Min.   Co.,   76 
Cal.   578  141.i 

V.  Shamokin   Val.    &c.    R.    Co., 

85  Pa.  St.  25  1665 

V.   Shamokin  Val.    &c.    R.   Co., 

34    Leg.    Int.    438  1665 

V.  Wright  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  34 

S.  W.  455  253 

V.   Zielian,  1  Man.   (Del.)  285     1432 
Malone's  Committee  v.  Lubus,  29 

Ky.   L.    800  .„^*^^^ 

Malter    v.    Falcon    Min.    Co.,    18 

Nev    209  1390,   1397,   1401,   1556 

Mame,  The.  189  Fed.  419  1717 

Man  V.  Shiffner.  2  East  523^^   ^^^^  ^^^ 

Manasses  v.  Dent.  89  Ala.  565  603 
Manchester   v.    Searle,    121   Mass. 

4]^8  1242,   1466 

Mandeville  v.   Reed,   13    Abb.   Pr. 

(N.  Y.)    173  ^^^    ^        1548 

Maneely  v.   New  York,   119   App. 

Div     (N.  Y.)   376  1570 

Mangum  v.  Stadel,  76  Kans.  764^    ^^^ 

Manhasset,  The,  18  Fed.  918^^^  ^'^^^^ 

Manhattan  L.    Ins.   Co.   v.   Pauli- 

son,   28  N.  J.  Eq.  304  1439 

Manhattan,  The,   46  Fed.  79^7  ^^  ^^^^^ 

Manifold  V.  Jones,  ^^\^^^W\\  ^^,^ 

Manlowsky    v.    Stephan,    233    HI- 
409  161ba 

Maniy  v.   Do-"Yfo6'l4?7%5'l585 
V.   Slason,   21   Vt.   2n^^_  ^^^^^   ^^^^ 

Mann  v.  Corrigan,  28  Kans.  194     1647 
V.   Forrester,   4   Camp^^60   ^^^     ^^^ 

V.   Schroer,   50  Mo.   306     '  1600 

Manning  v.  Frazier    96  111.  2*9     1072 
V.  Hollenbeck,   27  Wis.    202 

499,    o  ^  U 
V.  Wells,    9    Humph.     (Tenn.) 

746  513 

Manningford  v.  Toleman,  1   Coll. 

670  -iT:«!> 

Mann  Lumber  Co.  v.  Bailey  Iron 
Works  Co.,  156  Ala.  598  750 


CXXIV 


TADLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — ^Vol.  I,  §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,  §§  1061-1812.] 


Manor    v.    Heffner,    15    Ind.    App. 

299  1327 

Mansfield  v.  Dameron,  42  W.  Va. 

794  1074 

V.   Dorland,   2  Cal.   507  160,   165 

Mantonya  v.  Reilly,  184  111.  183     1298 

V.   Rutly,    83    111.    App.    275        1299 

Manuel   v.   Reath,    5   Phila.    (Pa.) 

11  632 
Marble    Lime    Co.    v.    Lordsbury 

Hotel  Co..  96  Cal.  322  1439,   1569 

Marcardier    v.    Chesapeake    Ins. 

Co.,   8   Cranch    (U.   S.)    39  1692 

Marcella  Ann,  The,  34  Fed.  142       1747 
Marchand  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 

Co.,   147  Mo.   App.    619  1066 

Marean  v.  Stanley,  34  Colo.  91       1617a 
V.   Stanley,  5  Colo.  App.  335 

1508,  1552 
Mareng-o,  The,   1  Low.    (U.  S.)    52 

1697,  1697a 
Marfleld  v.  Goodhue,  3  N.  T.  62  478 
Marg-art   v.    Swift,    3    McCord    (S. 

Ca  r)378  552 

Margorie,  The,  151  Fed.  183  1800 

Maria    and    Elizabeth,    The,      12 

Fed.    627  1781 

Marine  &  F.   Ins.   Bank  v.   Jaun- 

cey,  1  Barb.    (N.  Y.)   486  60 

V.  Jauncey,  5  N.  T.  Super.  Ct. 

257  55,   58 

Marion  County  v.  Rives,  133  Ky. 

477  177 

Marion    S.    Harris,    The,    85    Fed. 

798  1686 

Marion,  The,  1  Story   (U.  S.)  68      1723 
Mark  v.  Murphy,  76  Ind.  534  1480 

Mark  Lane,  The,   13   Fed.    800        1713 
Markoe  v.  Andras,   67  111.   34 

1111,   1119 
Marks  v.  Lahee,  3  Bing.   N.   Cas. 

408  743 

V.  New  Orleans   Cold   Storage 

Co.,   107   La.   172  976 

Markwald    v.     Creditors,    7    Cal. 

213  921 

Marlette   v.    Crawford,    17   Wash. 

603  718 

Marmon  v.  White,  151  Ind.  445       1138 
Marquat  v.  Marquat,  7  How.  Pr. 

(N.  Y.)   417  1092 

Marquess  v.  Ladd,  30  Ky.  L.  1142     618 
Marquette  Mfg'.  Co.  v.  Jeffery,  49 

Mich.   283  820 

Marrener  v.  Paxton,  17  Nebr.  634 

1213,  1304,   1329 
Marryatt  v.  Riley,  2  Abb.  Pr.   (N. 

Y.)    119  1586 

Mars   V.   McKay.   14    Cal.    127  1187 

Marschall    v.     Smith     (Tex.     Civ. 

App.),   132  S.  W.    812  190a 

Marseilles    Mfg'.    Co.    v.    Morgan, 

12  Nebr.    66  695 
M.irsh    V.    Alford,    5    Bush    (Ky.) 

392  1261 

V.   Flint,   27  Maine   475  729 

V.  Fraser,  27  Wis.  596  1232,  1559 
V.   Oneida  Cent.  Bank,  34  Barb. 

(N.  Y.)    298  241 

V.  Titus,  3  Hun  (N.  Y.)  550  67,  846 
V.  Turner,  4  Mo.  253  1063,  1084 
V.  Union    Pac.    R.    Co..    3    Mc- 

Crary  (U.  S.)   236  295 


Marshall   v.   Cooper,  43   Md.   46 

V.  Curtis,  5  Bush  (Ky.)  607  'l729 
v.  Giles,  3  Brev.  (S.  Car.)  488  571 
V.   Giles,  2  Treadw.  Const.    (S. 

Car.)  637  572 

V.   Hall,   42  W.  Va.   641  1101 

V.   Kaighn,    2    Wkly.    N.    Cas. 

426  1341 

V.   Marshall    (Tex.),    42    S.    W. 

353  1064,   1074 

V.  Meech,  51  N.  Y.  140 

184,   187,  188,  193,   209, 
214,   220,   231 
Marsh's    Admr.    v.    Elsworth,    37 

Ala.  85  111 

Marston  v.  Baldwin,  17  Mass.  606 

815,   820 
v.  Kenyon,  44  Conn.  349 

1313  1317  1413 
V.  Stickney,  55  Maine  383  '  1546 
V.   Stickney,  60  N.  H.  112  1243 

Martens  v.  O'Neill.  131  App.  Div. 

(N.   Y.)    123  1290 

Martin  v.  Adams,  104  Mass.  262       813 
V.   Berry,    159   Ind.    566  1579 

v.  Black,  9  Paige    (N.  Y.)    641 

569,   577 
V.   Black,   3    Edw.   Ch.    (N.   Y.) 

580  569,   591 

V.   Burns,    54   Kans.    641  1418 

V.   Cauble,  72  Ind.   67 

1086,  1090,  1099,  1100 
V.  Eversal.  36  111.  222  1327,  1331 
V.  Harrington,  57  Miss.  208  229 
V.   Hawks,    15    Johns.    (N.    Y.) 

405  209,  212,   214 

V.  Hawthorne,  5  N.  Dak.  66  784a 
V.   Hewitt,  44  Ala.  418  lOS 

V.   Kanouse,    17    How.    Pr.    (N. 

Y.)   146  217 

V.   Kennedy,  83  Ky.  335  177 

V.   Martin,   164   111.   640  1092 

V.  Morgan,    64    Iowa    270 

1290,  1298,  1593 
V.   Nichols,  121   Ga.   506  1197 

V.   0'Ba.nnon,   35   Ark.    62 

1108,   1119 
V.  Pepall,   6  R.   I.    92  1271 

V.  Roberts,  57  Tex.  564  1185,  1226 
V.   Simmons,    11    Colo.    411  1421 

V.   Smith,  33  Ky.  L.  582  177 

V.   Smith,   58   N.    Y.    672  304 

V.   Smith,  25  W.  Va.  579  1069 

V.   Stearns,   52   Iowa  345 

553.   575,   592,   616 
V.   Swift,   120   111.    488  1614 

V.   Turner    (Ky.   App.),    115    S. 

W.   833  1092,   1097 

V.  Wakefield,  42  Minn.  176 

724,   728 
V.  Warren,  109  Mich.   584  1208 

Martindale  v.  Smith,  1   Q.  B.  389 

805,  852,  861 
Martine  v.  Nelson,  51  111.  422  1361 
Martin,  In  re,  4  Fed.  208  1450 

Martino    Cilento,     The,     22     Fed. 

859  1806 

Martsolf    v.    Barnwell,    15    Kans. 

612  1465 

Marvin  v.  Marvin,  75  N.  Y.  240     1563a 

V.  Taylor,    27    Ind.    73  1578 

V.  Wallis,   6  El.  ,&  Bl.   726  809 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


CXXV 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Mary  Bell,   The,   1    Sawy.    (U.   S.) 

135  1680 

Mary  Chilton,  The.  4  Fed.   847 

1681,   1682,  1683,  1685,   1688 
Marye  v.  Dyche,  42  Miss.  347 

551,   562,   625 
Mary  Gratwick,  The,  2  Sawy.  (U. 

S.)   342  1729 

Maryland  Brick  Co.  v.  Dunkerly, 
85    Md.    199  1329,   1434 

V.   Spilman,  76  Md.   337 

1313,   1329,  1520 
Maryland     Land     &c.     Assn.     v. 

Moore,  80  Md.  102  1076 

Mary  McCabe,  The,  22  Fed.  750  1684 
Mary  Morgan,  The,  28  Fed.  196 

1688,   1691,  1811 
Marysville  Nat.   Bank  v.   Snyder, 

85   Mo.   App.    82  666 

Mary,  The,  1  Paine  (U.  S.)  671  1695 
Masich  v.  Shearer.  49  Ala.  226  1084 
Maskell   v.   Farrington,    3   De   G., 

J.   &  S.   338  1164 

Mason    v.    Daily    (N.    J.    Eq.),    44 
Atl.   839  1086,  1087 

V.   Germaine,   1  Mont.    263 

1408,  1413,  1470,  1494,  1495 
V.  Hatton,  41  U.  C.  Q.  B.  610  806 
V.  Lickbarrow,    1    H.    Bl.    357 

857     859 
V.  Morley,  34  Beav.  471  'lOll 

V.  Redpath,  39  U.  C.  Q.  B.  157 

865,   924 
V.  Thompson,   9   Pick.    (Mass.) 

280  503,   504,   518 

V.   Wilson,   43   Ark.   172         923,  929 
Mason    Stable    Co.    v.    Lewis,    16 

Misc.    (N.   Y.)    359  673 

Massachusetts  &  So.  Const.  Co.  v. 
Gill's    Creek,    48    Fed.    145 

154,   157,   165-167,  189c 
Massachusetts  Iron  Co.  v.  Hooper, 

7  Cush.   (Mass.)  183  375 

Massey  v.  Mcllwain,  2  Hill's  Bq. 

(S.   Car.)    421  77 

Masters  v.  BaVreda.  18  How.    (U. 
S.)    489  880 

V.   Templeton,   92    Ind.    447 

1086,   1091 

Masterson   v.    Burnett    (Tex   Civ. 

App.),    37    S.    W.    987  1110 

V.   Cohen,  46  Tex.  520  1114 

V.   Pullen,   62   Ala.  145  1108 

Mather    Humane    Stock    Transp. 

Co.  V.  Anderson,  76  Fed.  164     1625a 
Mathes  v.  Staed,  67  Mo.  App.  399     581 
Mathews  v.  Burke,  32  Tex.   419      576a 
V.  Davis,    6    Humph.     (Tenn.) 

324  1146 

V.  Victor  Hotel  Co.,  132  N.  Y. 

S.  375  515 

Mathew^son  v.  Saunders,  11  Conn. 

144  1163 

Mathias  v.  Sellers,  86  Pa.  St.  486 

6,   731,   732 

Matlock  V.  Matlock,   5  Ind.   403        787 

Matter  v.  Wathen,   99  Ark.  329       806 

Matthews    v.    Creditors,     10    La. 

Ann.    718  620 

V.   Gibbs,   30  D.  J.  Q.  B.   55  333 

V.  Menedg-er,  2  McLean  (U.  S.) 

145  418,    466 

V.  Stone,  1  Plill   (N.  Y.)   565  564 


Matthews        v.        Wagenhaeuser 
Brew.  Assn.,  83  Tex.  604  1283,   1435 
V.   Young,     16    Misc.     (N.     Y.) 

525  1500a 

Matthias  v.  Mesnard,  2  Car.  &  P. 

353  564 

Mattie  May.  The.  45  Fed.  899  1713 
Mattie  May.  The,  47  Fed.  69  1713 

Mattison  v.   Young,   24   N.  J.   Eq. 

535  384 

Mattix   V.    Weand,    19   Ind.    151 

1063,  1079,   1080,  1091 
Mauch    Chunk    v.   Shortz,    61    Pa. 

St.    399  1344 

Mauck  V.  Rosser,  126  Ga.  268  1613 
Maud   Carter,    The,    29    Fed.    156 

1722,   1791 
Maude  Webster,  The,  8  Ben.    (U. 

S.)    547  1770 

Mauney    v.    Ingram,    78    N.    Car. 

96  641 

Maupin    v.    McCormick,    2    Bush 

(Ky.)    206  1074 

Maxen  v.  Landrum,    21   La.   Ann. 

366  433,   437 

Maxey   v.   White,   53   Miss.    80  625 

Maxwell  v.  The  Powell,  1  Woods 

(U.    S.)    99  1811 

May    v.    Lewis,    22    Ala.    646  1126 

V.      McGaughey,    60    Ark.    357 

577    578a 
V.  Wilkinson,    76    Ala.    543 

1083,    1099,   1123 
Mayer   v.    Mutchler,    50    N.    J.    L. 

162  1216,    1286 

Mayes    v.    Hendry,    33    Ark.    240 

1090,   1100 
V.   Ruffners,    8    W.    Va.    384 

1231,   1397 
Mayfield     v.     White,     1     Browne 

(Pa.)    241  632 

Mayham  v.   Coombs,  14  Ohio   428 

1086,   1088 
Maynard    v.    Anderson,    54    N.    Y. 
641  1018 

V.   Ivey,    21    Nev.    241 

1406,    1412,    1554 
May   Queen,   The,    1    Spr.    (U.    S.) 

588  1793 

Mavrhofer    v.    Board    of    Educa- 
tion,   89    Cal.    110  1375 
Mays   V.   Rogers,    37   Ark.    155        1174 
V.   Sanders,     (Tex.)     36    S.    W. 

108  1113 

V.   Sanders,    90    Tex.    132  190a 

May    &c.    Brick    Co.    v.    General 
Engineering  Co.,   180  111.   535 

1405,   1407 
Mead  v.   Thompson,   78   III.   62  614 

Meakin  v.  Duvall,  43  Md.  372  1172 
Meands  v.  Park,  95  Maine  527  710 
Meany  v.  Head,   1  Mason    (U.  S.) 

319  10 

Mears  v.  Kearney,  1  Abb.  N.  Cas. 

(N.    Y.)    303  1090 

Mechanics'      Bank      v.      Earp,      4 
Rawle    (Pa.)     384  398,   408 

V.  Merchants'    Bank,     45     Mo. 

513  377 

V.   Seton,    1    Pet.    (U.    S.)    229      376 
Mechanics'   Mut.   L.   Assn.   v.   Al- 

bertson,    23    N.    J.    Eq.    318  1216 

Mechanics'    P.    M.    Co.    v.    Nast, 
7   Mo.   App.    147  1421 


CXXVl 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Mechanics'  Sav.  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  V.  Scoggin  (Tenn.),  52  S. 
W.    718  1141 

Medewe's   Trust,   In   re,   26   Beav. 

588  251,   252 

Meehan  v.  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co., 
83    Minn.    187  1605 

V.   Williams,    2    Daly    (N.    Y.) 

367  1608 

V.   Williams,      36      How.      Pr. 

(N.   Y.)    73  1543 

Meek  v.  Parker,  63  Ark.  367  1537 

Meeker  v.  Wilson,  1  Gall.   (U.  S.) 

419  451,   1014 

Meekins   v.    Walker,    119   N.   Car. 

46  457 

Meeks    v.    Sims,    84    111.    422  1532 

Mehl  V.  Fisher,  13  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

330  1607 

Mehrle  v.   Dunne,   75   111.   239  1.513 

Meier  v.  Meier,  15  Mo.  App.  68  72 

V.   Thomas,    5    Mo.    App.    584        626 

Meig-han      v.      American      Grass 

Twine  Co.,   154   Fed.   340  184 

Meigs  V.   Dimock,    6   Conn.   458      1063 
Melasky     v.     Jarrell     (Tex.     Civ. 

App.),    131   S.   W.    856  583,   638 

Meletopulo    v.    Ranking,    6    Jur. 

1095  907 

Melick    V.    Benedict,    43    N.    J.   L. 

425  572 

Mellis   V.    Race,    78    Mich.    80  1235 

Mellor   V.  Valentine,    3    Colo.    255 

1235,   1256,   1258,   1441 
Melton  V.  Coffelt,  59  Ind.  310  1127 

Memphis     v.      Laski,      9      Heisk. 

(Tenn.)    511  1542 

Memphis  &  L..  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Freed, 

38    Ark.    614  870,   910 

Menagh    v.    Whitwell,    52    N.    Y. 

146  789,    792,   795 

Menier  v.  Hooper's  Telegraph 
Works,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  App.  Cas. 
350  87 

Menken  v.  Taylor,  4  Lea  (Tenn.) 

445  1120,   1122 

Menominie,    The,    36    Fed.    197 

1676,   1699,   1729,   1750,   1773 
Mensing    v.     Cardwell,     33     Tex. 

Civ.    App.    16  638 

Menzel  v.   Tubbs,   51    Minn.    364     1315 
Mercantile     &     Exch.     Bank     v. 

Gladstone,   L.    R.    3    Ex.    233  901 

Mercer  v.  Cross,  79  Ga.   432  611 

V.   Graves,   L.    R.    7    Q.    B.    499 

155,    216,   218 
Merchant  v.  Humeston,   2   Wash. 
433  1406,   1422 

V.   Ottumwa      Water      Power 

Co.,    54   Iowa    451  1494 

V.   Session,   5  N.   Y.   Civ.  Proc. 

24  2.33 

Merchants'  &  Mechanics'  Sav. 
Bank  v.  Dashiell,  25  Grat. 
(Va.)     616  1229,   12S3 

Merchants'  Bank  v.  Hibbard,  48 
Mich.    118  825 

V.   Shouse,    16    Rep.    442  381 

V.   Shouse,    102    Pa.    St.    488 

375,   391 
Merchants'       Banking       Co.       v. 
Phoenix    Bessemer    Steel    Co., 
5    Ch.   Div.    205  801,    827,   910 


Merchants'      Bank      of      London 

V.   Maud,   19  ^V.   R.   657  246 

Merchants'    Nat.    Bank    v.    Arm- 
strong,   107    Ga.    479  174,   238 
v.   Coates,    79    Mo.    168  57 
v.   Pope,    19    Ore.    35                       478 
Merkle     v.      O'Neal,      5      Blackf. 

(Ind.)    289  600 

Merriam    v.    Currier,    191    Mass. 

133  1748 

Merrick    v.    Avery.    14    Ark.    370 

1721,   1808 
v.  La  Hache,   27  La.  Ann.   87     620 
Merrick,    In   re,    91   Mich.    342  745 

Merrigan     v.     English,     9     Mont. 

113  1285,   1304,    1304a,    1382,   1470 
Merrill     v.      Bartlett,     6      Pick. 

(Mass.)    46  1697a 

V.  Bickford,    65    Maine    118      1163 
V.   Fisher,    204   Mass.    600  1787 

V.  Hunnewell,  13  Pick. 

(Mass.)   213  836 

V.   Ressler,    37    Minn.    82  543 

Merriman    v.    Bartlett,    34    Minn. 
524  1392 

v.  Jones,    43    Minn.    29  1283 

Merrit  v.  Fisher,   19   Iowa   354       616 
Merritt    v.     Crane     Co.,    225     111. 
181  1594 

V.  Hopkins,    96   Iowa    652 

1201,   1290 
V.  Judd,    14    Cal.    59  1108 

V.  Merchandise,   30  Fed.   195    1797 
V.   Pearson,   58  Ind.   385  1304a 

V.  Peirano,    10    App.    Div.    (N. 

Y.)   563  968 

V.  Wells,    18   Ind.    171  1083 

Mervin  v.  Sherman,  9  Iowa  331 

1519,  1520 
Merwin  v.  Chicago,  45  111.  133  154a 
Messmore    v.    Stephens,    83    Ind. 

524  1081,   1099 

Metcalf   V.    Fosdick,    23    Ohio   St. 

114  548 
V.  Hunnewell,  1  Gray  (Mass.) 

297  1248 

V.  Hutchinson,       1     Ch.     Div. 

591  1164 

Metz  V.  Cutcher,  83  S.  Car.  396     1560 
Metzger  v.   McCann,   92   111.  App. 

109  1312 

Mexal     V.     Dearborn,      12     Gray 

(Mass.)   336  1017 

Meyer  v.   Berlandi,   39  Minn.   438 

692,    1235,    1382,    1457 
V.   Bloom,   37   Ark.    43  556 

V.   Broadwell,   83   Mo.    571 

1262,   1269 
V.   Delaware     R.     Const.     Co., 

100  U.  S.   457  1529 

V.  Hornby,     101     U.     S.     728 

1625,   1633 
V.  Ives,  28  Colo.  461  1560,   1608 

V.   Oliver,     61    Tex.    584  638 

V.   Seebald,    11    Abb.    Pr.     (N. 

S.)    (N.    Y.)    326  1614a 

Meyer  Bros.  Drug  Co.   v.  Brown, 

46    Kans.    543  1245,   1470 

Mevers    v.    Bennett,    7    Daly    (N. 
Y.)    471  1235,    1243,   1543 

v.  Bloom,    20    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

554  190a 

V.   Buchanan,    46    Miss.    397      1242 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


cxxvn 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Meyers    v.    McAllister,    94    Minn. 
510  800,  806 

V.   Thomas,    3   Mo.   App.    604      1312 
Meyerstein    v.    Barber,    L.    R.    2 

C.   P.    83  465 

Michael  v.  Reeves,  14  Colo.  App. 

460  1343,   1387 

Micou  V.  Ashurst,  55  Ala.  607        1126 
Middlesex   v.    State    Bank,    38    N. 

J.    Eq.    36  223 

Middlesex    Freeholders    v.    State 

Bank,  38  N.  J.  Eq.   23  225 

Middlesworth  v.  Houston  Oil  Co. 

of    Texas,    184    Fed.    857  190a 

Middleton  v.  Fowler.  1  Salk.  282     262 
V.   Hill,    1   M.    &    S.    240  215 

V.   Mag-nay,     2     Hem.     &     Mil. 

233  1162 

Middletown      Savings      Bank      v. 
Fellowes,    42    Conn.    36 

1247,    1248,    1258,   1472 
Midland  County  Sav.  Bank  v.  T. 

C.  Prouty  Co.,  158  Mich.   656        990 
Midland    R.    Co.    v.    Wilcox,    122 

Ind.  84       1492,  1494,  1495,  1619,  1645 
Midland    Val.    R.    Co.    v.    Moran 

Bolt  &c.  Mfg-.  Co.,  80  Ark.  399    1637 
Miedreich  v.   Rank,    40   Ind.  App. 

393  174 

Mildred,  The,   43  Fed.   393  1677 

Miles  v.   Coutts,   20  Mont.   47  1289 

V.   Gorton,   2  Cr.   &  M.   504 

832,  837,  841,  852,  853,  878,  962 
V.   James,  36   111.   399  554,  614 

V.   New    Zealand    Alford    Est. 

Co.,  32  Ch.  Div.  266  389 

Miles,   Ex    parte,    L.    R.    15    Q.    B. 

Div.   39  869 

Milg-ate   v.   Kebble,   3   Man.   &   G. 

100  802 

Millard  v.  Harvey,  10  Jur.   (N.  S.) 
1167  1139 

V.   Webster,    54   Conn.    415  923 

V.  West,    50    Iowa    616  1581 

Miller  v.  Anne,  17  Lane.  Law  Rev. 
312  1262 

V.  Atlee,   3    Exch.    799  151 

V.  Barroll,  14  Md.  173 

1436,  1437,  1542 
V.  Batchelder,  117  Mass.  179  1441 
V.   Bider     (Iowa),    105    N.    W. 

594  601 

V.  Blose.  30  Grat.  (Va.)  744  1178 
V.  Brown,  11  Lea  (Tenn.)  155  1382 
V.  Calumet    Lumber    &c.    Co., 

121   111.  App.   56  1605 

V.  Calumet    Lumber    &c.    Co., 

Ill  111.  App.  651  1298 

V.   Clark,    2    E.    D.    Smith    (N. 

Y.)    543  1248 

V.  Crabbe,  66  Mo.  App.   660 

666,   691 
V.  Denny,  99  Ky.   53  1071 

V.  Farmers'       &       Mechanics' 

Bank,   30  Md.   392  257 

V.  Fosdick,  26  Ind.  App.  293  1325 
V.  Henderson,    10    Serg.    &    R. 

(Pa.)    290  1523 

V.  Hershey,  59  Pa.  St.   64  1222 

V.  Hoffman,    26    Mo.    App.    199 

1187,   1211,   1370,   1568,   1600 
V.   Hollingsworth,  33  Iowa  224 

1235,   1262,   1325 


Miller  v.  HoUingsworth,  36 
Iowa  163  1264 

v.   Linguist    (Tex.    Civ.   App.), 

141    S.   W.    170  1110 

V.  Mclntyre,     6    Pet.     (U.     S.) 

61  1585 

V.   Mansfield,  112  Mass.   260         284 
V.  Marston,    35    Maine   153 

503,   641,   644 
V.  Mead,  127  N.  Y.  544  1247 

V.  Mead,  3  N.  Y.  S.  784  1252a 

V.  Mead,  53  Hun   (N.  Y.)   636     1251 
V.  Moore,    1    E.    D.    Smith    (N. 

Y.)  739  121S,   1532,   1535, 

1536,   1559,   1599 

V.  Morg-an,  22  La.  Ann.  625       1769 

V.  Morrison,  47  W.  Va.  664         1101 

V.  Newell,  20  S.  Car.   123 

158,  189c,  207,   227 
V.   People's  Lumber  Co..  98  111. 

App.    468  1199 

V.   Price,   20   Wis.    117  787 

V.  Price,    4    Cal.    Unrep.    Cas. 

983  471 

V.   Schmitt,   67  N.  Y.   S.  1077     1370 
V.   Seal,    71    Iowa    392  1201 

V.   Shepard,    50   Minn.    268 

1315.  1319 
V.   Stoddard,   50  Minn.   272  1460 

V.   Ticknor,     7     Bradw.     (111.) 

393  1583 

V.  Wilkinson,  167  Mass.  136     1444 
Miller   Hardwood  Lumber   Co.   v. 

Wilson,    50   Ark.    380  1247 

Miller's  Appeal,  35  Pa.  St.  481  864 

Milligan  v.  San  Antonio  &c.  R. 
Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  46  S.  W. 
918  1668 

Milliken  v.  Warren,  57  Maine  46 

800,   802,   852,   853 

Millikin   v.   Jones,    77   111.    372  641 

V.   Shapleigh,  36  Mo.  596  261 

Milliman   v.   Neher,   20    Barb.    (N. 

Y.)  37  30 

Mills  V.  Ball,  2  B.   &  P.  457 

919,   924,  930,  936 
V.   County     of     Thurston,      16 

Wash.  378  98 

V.   Heeney,   35  111.  173  1609 

V.  Hobbs,   76  Mich.   122  1382 

V.  La  Verne  Land  Co.,  97  Cal. 

254  1493 

V.  Matthews,  7  Md.  315 

1272,  1276,  1280 
V.  Olsen,  43  Mont.  129  1307,  1417 
V.   Shirley,    110   Mass.    158  515 

V.   Terry    Mfg.    Co.,    91    Tenn. 

469  1326 

Millsap  V.  Ball,   30   Nebr.    728 

1213,  1599 
Milner  v.  Cooper,  65  Iowa  190 

553,    610 
V.  Norris,   13   Minn.   455  1483 

V.   Ramsey.  48  Ala.  287  1101 

Miltimore  v.   Nofziger  Bros.   Lum- 
ber Co..   150  Cal.   790  1190,  1492 
Milwain  v.  Sandford,  3  IVTinn.  147    1532 
Milwaukee  Mechanics'  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Brown,  3  Kans.  App.  225  1494 

INIims    v.    Macon     &c.     R.    Co..     3 

Kelly   (Ga.)   333         1062,   1069,   1074 
Minah   Consol.   Min.    Co.   v.    Bris- 
coe,  32  C.  C.  A.  390  1061 
Mineah  v.  Stotts.  130  Iowa  530     1238 


CXXVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 


Mine  &  Smelter  Supply  Co.  v. 
Idaho  Consol.  Mines  Co.,  20 
Idaho  300  1198 

Miner  v.  Beekman.  50  N.  Y.  337    1139 
V.   Hoyt,   4   Hill    (N.  Y.)    193 

1296,   1300 
V.  Moore,   53  Tex.   224  1382 

Miners'      Co-Op.      Assn.     v.     The 

Monarch,  2  Alaska  383  1720,  1720a 
Minerva,  The,  1  Hagg.  Adm.  347  1704 
Minge     v.     Barbre,    51    La.     Ann. 

1285  456 

Mining-   Co.    v.    Cullins,    104    U.   S. 

1  T  fi  "1  ^  fi  fi 

Minna,  The.  11  Fed.  759         1700,   1705 
Minneapolis    Trust    Co.    v.    Great 
Northern   R.   Co.,   74    Minn.   30 

1441,   1445 
V.  Great   Northern    R.    Co.,    81 

Minn.  28  1445 

Minnitt    v.    Talbott,    L.    R.    Ir.    1 

Ch.  Div.  143  1175 

Minor  v.  Hoyt,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
193  1599 

V.  Marshall,  6  N.  Mex.  194 

1401,   1451,   1554 
Minton     v.     Underwood     Lumber 

Co.,  79  Wis.   646  719 

Minturn  v.  Maynard,  17  How.  (U. 

S.)    477  1697,  1707 

Misa  V.  Currie,  L.  R.  1  App.  Cas. 

554  242    244 

Misch  V.   O'Hara,   9  Dalv   (N.  Y.) 

361  515 

Mississippi  Planing  Mill  v.  Pres- 
byterian Church,  54  Mo.  520        1404 
Mississippi,   The,   6   Fed.   543  1748 

Missoula  Mercantile  Co.  v.  O'Don- 
nell,   24  Mont.   65 

1343,  1387,   1397,  1571,   1572,   1590 
Missouri  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Baker, 
14   Kans.   563  1629,   1647 

V.   Brown,    14    Kans.    557  1647 

Missouri    River    Lumber    Co.    v. 

Finance    Co.,    93    Iowa    640  1201 

Mitchel  V.  Ede,  11  Ad.  &  Ell.   888 

460,    911,   915 
Mitchell  V.   Butt,    45   Ga.   162  1094 

V.   Comfort,  31  L.  J.  C.  P.  58         273 
V.  Dawson,   23   W.   Va.   86 

1077,  1083 
V.   Fidelity    Trust    &c.    Vault 

Co.,   20  Ky.  L.   713  1054a 

V.   Hodges,   87   Ind.   491  1270 

V.  Mitchell,  143  App.  Div.    (N. 

Y.)    172  184 

V.  Monarch    Elevator    Co.,    15 

N.  Dak.   495  784a 

V.  Oldfield,  4  T.  R.  123 

122,  209,  215 
V.  Packard,  168  Mass.  467  1367 
V.  Page,   107  Maine   388  710 

V.  Penfleld,    S    Kans.    186  1202 

V.   Sanford,  149  Mo.  App.  72         626 
V.   The  Magnolia,  45  Mo.  67       1729 
Mitchell's    Admr.    v.    Stewart,    13 

Serg'.  &  R.    (Pa.)   295  633 

Mivalaz  v.   Genovely,   121  Ky.   235 

1293.  1532 
Mivelaz  v.  Johnson,  124  Ky.  251 

1397,   1421 
v.   Johnson,  30  Ky.  L.  389 

1424,   1532 


Mix  v.   Ely,   2  G.   Greene    (Iowa) 

513  1406,    1586 

Mize  v.   Barnes,   78   Ky.   506 

1094,   1110 
Moakes  v.  Nicolson,  19  C.  B.    (N. 

S.)    290  915 

Mobile  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Whitney,  39 

Ala.    468  481 

Mobile   Mut.    Ins.    Co.   v.    Cullom, 

49    Ala.    558  375,   395 

Mobley  v.  Dent,  10  S.  Car.  471  634 

Mochon  v.   Sullivan,   1  Mont.    470 

1184,   1212,  1470,   1559 
Moeller  v.  Holthaus,  12  Mo.  App. 

526  1076 

Moet    V.    Pickering,    L.    R.    6    Ch. 
Div.   770  975 

V.   Pickering,  L.  R.   8   Ch.  Div. 

37,2  975 

Mofat   V.    Henderson,    18    J.    &    S.  ' 

(N.  Y.)   211  102 

Mohawk     Bank     v.     Burrows,     6 

Johns.  Ch.   (N.  Y.)  317  217 

Moher  v.  Rasmusson,  12  N.  Dak. 

71  784a 

Mohr   v.    Boston    &c.    R.    Co.,    106 
Mass.   67  906,   919 

V.  Clark,  3  Wash.  T.  440  786b 

Monaghan  v.  Goddard,  173  Mass. 
468  1252 

V.   Putney,  161  Mass.  338  1444 

Monat  V.  Fisher,  104  Mich.   262     1208 
Monat   Lumber   &c.   Co.   v.   Free- 
man, 7  Colo.  App.  152         1191,   1588 
Money    v.    Dorsey,    7    Sm.    &    M. 

(Miss.)   15  1109 

Monk    v.    Exposition    Deepwater 

Pier  Corporation,  111  Va.  121  1060b 
Monongahela  JS'av.  Co.  v.  The  Bob 

Connell,   1   Fed.   218  1719 

Monroe  v.  Clark,  107  Maine  134    1328 
V.  "West,    12    Iowa    119 

1248,   1257,   1469 
Monroe   B.   &  L.   Assn.   v.   Johns- 
ton,  51  La.  Ann.   470  800,   811 
Monsoon,  The.  1  Spr.  (U.  S.)  37       1690 
Montague  v.  Mial,  89  N.  Car.  137 

594,  631 
Montandon  v.  Deas.  14  Ala.  33 

1272,   1519,   1520 
Montauk,    The,    10    Ben.    (U.    S.) 

455  1704 

Montauk,  The,  v.  Walker,  47  111. 

335  1742 

Monteith       v.       Kirkpatrick,       3 

Blatch.    (U.  S.)    279  289 

Montgomery  v.  Allen,  107  Ky.  298 

1248,   1259 
V.   Carr,   18   Ky.   L.    607  177 

Montgomery  Iron  Works  v.  Dor- 
man,   78  Ala.   218  1422 
Monticello  Bank  v.  Sweet,  64  Ark. 

502  1459 

Montieth  v.  Great  Western  Print- 
ing Co.,   16   Mo.   App.    450  999 
Moody    V.    Tschabold,    52    Minn. 
51                                                             1458 
V.  Webster,     3    Pick.     (Mass.) 

424  423 

Mooney  v.   Hough,   34    Ala.    80  603 

V.   Musser,   45  Ind.   115  475,   476 

Moore  v.  Alexander,  81  Ala.  509     1101 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


CXXIX 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§   1-lOCOf;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 


Moore    v.    Anders,    14    Ark.    628 

1107,   1119 
V.   Bank  of  Commerce,  52  Mo. 

377  381,  406 

V.   Bowen,   9   Rep.   588  185 

V.   Carter,   146   Pa.   St.    492  1502 

V.   Erickson,   158   Mass.   71  1252 

V.   Faison,    97   N.    Car.    322  631 

V.  Hitchcock,  4  Wend.   (N.  Y.) 

292  731 

V.  Holcombe,    3    Leigh     (Va.) 

597  1076,   1077 

V.   Ingram,   91  N.  Car.  376  1063 

V.   Jackson,  49  Cal.  109      1247,  1276 
V.   Jacobs,   190   Mass.    424  1534 

V.  Knight,  6  Lea  (Tenn.)  427     1129 
V.  L-ackey,    53   Miss.    85 

1110,   1111,   1119 

V.  Lincoln    Park    &c.    Co.,    196 

Pa.    St.    519  1682 

V.  Martin,    58   Ga.    411  1053 

V.  Newbury,   6  McLean    (U.  S.) 

472  1808 

V.  Parrish,  163  111.  93  1418 

V.   Raymond,  15  Tex.  554  1092 

V.   Rolin,   87  Va.   107  1430 

V.   Taylor,   40  Hun    (N.  Y.)    56     228 
V.   Taylor.   2   How.   Pr.    (N.   S.) 

(N.   Y.)    343  233 

V.  The  Robilant,   42   Fed.   162 

1690,   1798,  1810 
V.   Vaughn,    42    Nebr.    696  1275 

V.  Westervelt,    1    Code    R.    (N. 

S.)    131  187 

Moores  v.  Lunt,  60  N.  Y.  649  1725a 
V.  Lunt,  1  Hun  (N.  Y.)  650  1725a 
V.  Lunt,  4  T.  &  C.    (N.  Y.)   154 

1725a 

Moran  v.  Chase,   52  N.  Y.   346 

1218,   1313,   1349 
V.   Schnugg,     7     Ben.     (U.     S.) 

399  1457 

More  V.   Lott,   13   Nev.   376  935 

Morehouse  v.  Collins,  23  Ore.  138    1600 

V.  Moulding,  74  111.  322     1199,1299 

Moreland  v.  Metz,  24  W.  Va.  119 

1101,    1125,    1127a 
Moreton    v.     Harrison,     1     Bland 

(Md.)  491  1099 

Morewood    v.    Enequist,    23    How. 

(U.  S.)    491  1722 

Morey  v.  Herrick,  18  Pa.  St.  123    1178 
Morgan     v.     Arthurs,      3     Watts 
(Pa.)    140  1335 

V.  Bank   of  North   America,    8 

Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  73  377,  380 
V.  Benthein,  10  S.  Dak.  650  1382 
V.   Campbell,   22  Wall.    (U.   S.) 

381  551,   553,   560,   614 

V.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  76  Mo. 

161  1562,   1571,   1655 

V.   Congdon,   4  N.  Y.    552 

731,  739,  974 
V.  Dalrymple,  59  N.  J.  Eq.  22  1061 
V.   Muldoon,    82   Ind.   347  1492 

V.  Parham,    16    Wall.     (U.    S.) 

471  1681 

V.   Roberts,    38    111.    65  161 

V.   Stevens.  6  Abb.  N.  Cas.   (N. 

Y.)   356  1296 

V.   Taylor,     15     Daly     (N.     Y.) 

304  1413 

V.  Taylor,  5  N.  Y.   S.   920  1413 


Morganstern    v.    Thrift,    66    Cal. 

577  787 

Morganton  Hardware  Co.  v. 
Morganton  Graded  School, 
150  N.   Car.   680  1375 

Mori   V.   Howard.  143   Ky.  480  1076 

Morison   v.  Gray,   2   Bing.   260  875 

Moritz  V.  Larsen,   70  ^Vis.   569        1559 
V.   Splitt,    55   Wis.    441  1592 

Morley  v.  Hay.  3  M.  &  Ry.  396 

940,   965 

Mornan   v.    Carroll,    35    Iowa   22 

1242,  1646 

Moroney's  Appeal.  24  Pa.  St.  372    1459 
Morrell   v.   Miller,   36  Ore.   412  180 

Morrell  Hdw.  Co.  v.  Princess 
Gold  Min.  Co.,  16  Colo.  App. 
54  1273 

Morrill  v.  Jenkins,  2  N.  Y.  Leg. 
Obs.    214  600 

V.  Merrill,    64    N.    H.    71 

737,   748 

Morris  v.  Fromlet,  3  Ohio  N. 
P.    287  1073 

V.   Ham,.  47    Ark.    293  1092 

V.   Parker,      1      Ashm.       (Pa.) 

187  632 

V.   Pate,    31    Mo.    315  1080 

V.   Ross,  184  Pa.  St.   241  1289 

V.   Shryock,    50    Miss.     590 

857,  861,  935,  965 
V.  Terrell,  2  Rand.  (Va.)  6  1146 
V.   Tinker,    60    Ga.     466  1141 

Morris   Canal    &   Banking   Co.   v. 

Lewis,   12  N.   J.   Eq.    323  1487 

Morris  County  Bank  v.  Rock- 
av/ay  Mfg.  Co.,  14  N.  J.  Eq. 
189  1329,    1470 

V.   Rockaway  Mfg.   Co.,    16   N. 

J.    Eq.    150  1310,   1312 

Morrison  v.  Brown,  83  111.  562  1115 
V.  Clark,  20  Utah  432  1235,  1262 
V.  Hancock,    40   Mo.    561 

1304,  1328 
V.  Henderson,  126  Pa.  St.  216  1222 
V.  Minot,  5  Allen   (Mass.)    403 

1207,   1412 

V  Philipi,  35  Minn.  192  1398 
V.  Ponder,  45  Ga.  167  147,  173 
V.  State,  111  Ga.  642  611 
V.   Steamboat    Laura,    40    Mo. 

260  1532 

V.   Whaley,    16    R.    I.    715  1223 

Morrison,  In  re,  10  N.  Bank  Reg. 

105  „^    408 

Morrow    v.    Turney's    Admr.,    35 

Ala    131  ^''1 

Morse  v.  Androscoggin  R.  Co., 
39    Maine    285  74-5 

V.  Cooke,   13  Price   473  203 

V  Dole,  73  Maine  351  1465 
V.   School       Dist.,       3       Allen 

(Mass.)    307  1252 

V.   Sherman,    106    Mass.    430        800 
Mors-le-Blanch   v.   Wilson,   L.   R. 

8   C.    P.    227  309 

Morton  v.  Austin,  12  Cush. 
(Mass.)     389  1010,   1532 

V.  Hallam,   89   Ky.   165  204ti 

V.  Naylor,    1   Hill    (N.   Y.)    583 

47,  48,  60 
V.  Tucker,  145  N.  Y.  244  1218 
V.   Urquhart,    79   Minn.    390  21. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,  §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§  1061-1S12.] 


Mosely  v.  Norman,  74  Ala.  422 

169,   193,   203,  217,  218 
Moses  V.  Franklin  Bank,  34  Md. 

574  57 

Moses   Taylor,    The,    4    "Wall.    (U. 

S.)    411  1725,    1729,    1738,   1750 

Mosher    v.     Independent    School 

Dist.,    44   Iowa   122  1375 

Moshier  v.   Meek,   80   111.   79 

10G3,    107:^,    1076,    1092 
Moss   V.    Shear,    25   Cal.    38  1141 

Moss'  Appeal,  35  Pa.  St.  1G2     632,  633 
Mossburg   V.  United   Oil   &c.   Co., 

43    Ind.   App.    465  1352 

Mosteller  v.  Holborn,  21  S.  Dak. 

547  1018 

Mott  V.  Lansing,   57  N.  Y.    112 

1731,    1756,   1809 
V.  Mott,   107   Maine   481  710 

Mottram    v.   Heyer,    1    Denio    (N. 
Y.)    483  933 

V.  Heyer,     5     Denio      (N.     Y.) 

629  931,    932,    933 

Moule,    Ex    parte,    5    Madd.    462 

227,   228 
Moulton    V.    Bennett,    18    Wend. 
(N.   Y.)    586  150 

V.   Greene,    10   R.   I.    330        732,   741 
V.  Norton,     5     Barb.     (N.     Y.) 

286  571 

Moultrie  Lumber  Co.  v.  Jenlvins, 

121    Ga.    721  1197 

Mount     V.     "Williams,     11     Wend. 

(N.    Y.)    77  7 

Mountain  City  Market  &c.  Assn. 

V.  Kearns,  103  Pa.  St.  403  1272 
Mt.  Desert,  The,  158  Fed.  217  1690 
Mount  Holly  Paper  Co.'s  Appeal, 

99    Pa.    St.    513  376 

Mt.   Tacoma  Mfg-.  Co.  v.  Cultum, 

5    Wash.   294  1421 

Mowers  v.   Fethers,   61  N.  Y.  34     498 
Mowrey    v.     Vandling-,     9     Mich. 

39  1102 

Mowry   v.   Hill,   14   R.   L    504  1223 

Moxley  v.   Shepard,   3   Cal.    64        1492 
Moyes     v.     Kimball,     92     Maine 

231  1507a 

M.   Pugh  Co.  V.  Wallace,   198  111. 

422  1199 

Muellerweisse   v.   Pile   Driver   E;. 

O.  A.,  69   Fed.   1005  1724,    1725 

Muench  v.  Valley  Nat.  Bank,   11 

Mo.    App.    144  241,    242,   999 

Muir  V.   Cross,   10  B.  Mon.    (Ky.) 
277  1519 

V.  Fleming,     1     D.     &     R.     N. 

P.    C.    29  428 

Muldoon    V.    Pitt,    54    N.    Y.    269 

1235,    1236,   12S1 
Mulherrin      v.      Hill,      5      Heisk. 

(Tenn.)    58  1116 

Mulholland    v.    Thompson-Hous- 
ton Elec.  L.  Co.,  66  Miss.  339     1751 
Mulkey  v.  Thompson,  3  Ga.  App. 

522  756 

Mull  V.  Jones,  18  N.  Y.  S.   359       1411 

Muller     V.     New     York,     23     Civ. 

Proc.    R.    (N.   Y.)    261  184 

V.   Pondir,   55  N.   Y.   325  868 

Mulligan     v.     Mulligan,     18     La. 

Ann.    20  1367 

Mulliner    v.     Florence.     3     Q.    B. 
Div.    484  335,    423,    518,   524 


Mulrey     v.      Barrow,      11      Allen 

(Mass.)  152  1207,  1252a,  1441,  1500a 
Mulvane  v.  Chicago  Lumber  Co., 

56   Kans.    675  1248,   1313 

Mumford    v.    Brown,    6   Cow.    (N. 

Y.)    475  1276 

Mundine  v.  Berwin,  62  Tex.  341  1185 
Mundy  v.  Monroe,   1  Mich.   68       1558 
V.  Munson,    40    Hun     (N.    Y.) 

304  33 

Munford   v.   Pearce,  70  Ala.   452 

1126,   1127 

Munger    v.    Curtis,    42    Hun     (N. 

Y.)    465  1218,    1460,   1543 

V.   Green,   20   Ind.   38  1121 

V.   Lenroot,   32   Wis.   541    721,   1645 

Munn  V.  Burch,   25  111.  35  57 

Munns   v.   Isle   of   Wight   R.   Co.,  , 

L.    R.    5   Ch.   App.   414  1674 

Munroe     v.     Sedro     Lumber     &c. 

Co.,  16  Wash.   694  718 

Munsell      v.      Carew,      2      Cush. 

(Mass.)    50  550 

Munson  v.  Porter,  63  Iowa  453 

641.  658,  683.   684,  743a, 
1018,   1021,    1025,   1030 
Murch   V.    Wright,    46    111.    487  820 

Murphree    v.    Countiss,    58    Miss. 

712  1092 

Murphy  v.   Adams.   71  Maine  113 

719.  990,  1495,  1498 
V.  Brown,  12  Ariz.  268  105,  605 
V.   Buckman,   66   N.  Y.   297  1513 

V.  Hardiman,    112    App.    Div. 

(N.    Y.)     670  1299 

V.   Hussa,  70  N.  J.  L.  381  1216 

V.   Liope,    3    J.    &    S.     (N.    Y.) 

542  1009 

V.  McGough,    105   Ga.    816  1053 

V.  Morton,   139   Pa.   St.   345        1502 
V.  Murphy,    15   Mo.   App.    600 

12G0,   1263 
V.   Murphy,   22   Mo.   App.   18 

1323,   1365 
V.  Myar,    95   Ark.   32  606 

V.  Warren,    55    Nebr.    215  788 

V.  Williams    (Tex.   Civ.  App.), 

116    S.    W.    412  122« 

Murphy  Tugs,  The,   28  Fed.   429 

1710,   1717 
Murray  v.   Able,   19   Tex.   213  1119 

V.   Earle,    13    S.    Car.    87 

1224,    1253,    1500,   1507 
V.  Gouverneur,    2    Johns.   Cas. 

(N.    Y.)     438  1133 

v.   Jibson,     22     Hun     (N.     Y.) 

386  185 

V.  Keyes,    35    Pa.    St.    384  1260 

V.  Pinkett,    12   CI.   &  F.   764        249 
V.  Rapley,    30    Ark.    568 

1189.    1382,   1559 
V.  Witte,    16    S.    Car.    504  1098 

Murray,    In    re,    3    W.    N.    (1867) 

190  131 

Mushlitt   V.    Silverman,    50   N.   Y. 

360  1554,   1556 

Muskegan,   The,   v.  Moss,    7   Ohio 

St.    377  1728 

Muskegon    Booming    Co.    v.    Un- 
derbill,  43   Mich.    629  821,   919 
Muspratt  v.  Gregory,   3  M.  &  W. 

677  563,   564 

Musson    V.    Elliott,    30    La.    Ann. 
47  811 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


CXXXl 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,  §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §j  1061-1812.] 


Muto   V.   Smith,    175    Mass.    175      1424 
Mutual    Benefit    L.     Ins.     Co.     v. 
Rowand,    26   N.   J.   Eq.    389 

1216,  1367,  1459,   1469,   1470,   1472 
Mutual  B.  &  L.  Assn.  v.  Wyeth, 

105  Ala.   635  1101 

M.  Vandercook,  The,  24  Fed.  472 

1706,    1718,    1781,    1787,    1798 

Myer   v.   Dupont,    79   Ky.   416  1C21 

V.  Jacobs,  1  Daly  (N.  Y.)  32       418 

Myers    v.    Humphries    (Tex.),    47 

S.    W.    812  1011 

V.  McHugh,   16  Iowa  335  175 

V.   Mayfield,     7      Bush      (Ky.) 

212  618 

V.   Smith,    27   Md.    91  622 

V.  Uptegrove,   3  How.  Pr.    (N. 
S.)    (N.   Y.)    316 

731,    739,    741,   1009 
Mystic,    The,    30    Fed.    73 

1717,    1788,    1792 

N 


Nagle      V.      Garrigues,      46      Pa. 
Super.   Ct.   155  1 

V.  McFeeterm,    97    N.    Y.    196 
418, 
Nairn   v.   Prowse,   6  Ves.   752  1 

Nans    V.    Cumberland    Gap    Park 

Co.,   103   Tenn.   299  1 

Napier  v.   Jones,    47   Ala.    90  1 

Narble  v.  Jones  &c.  Lumber  Co., 

19   Nebr.    732  1 

Nash  V.   Chicago,   M.   &  St.   P.  R. 
Co.,    62    Iowa    49  1289,   1 

V.  Mosher,    19    Wend.    (N.    Y.) 

431  986,    988,   1 

V.  Orr,    9    Ga.    App.    33 
V.   Taylor,  83  Ind.  347  1 

Nashville    Trust    Co.    v.    Smythe, 

94   Tenn.    513  ■  1 

Nass  V.  Chadwick,  16  Tex.  157     1 
Nathan  v.   Shivers,  71  Ala.   117 
National    Bank    v.    Danforth,    80 
Ga.  55  1 

v.  Eyre,    3    McCrary     (U.    S.) 

175 
V.  Insurance    Co.,     104    U.     S. 

54 
V.   Petterson,   200    111 
v.   Rogers,    166   N.    Y 
V.   Sprague,    20    N.   J. 


215  1 

380 

Eq.    13 
1458,   1 

V.  Williams,    38    Fla.    305  1 

V.  Watsontown   Bank,    105   U. 
S.    217  376, 

Nat.  Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Sulli- 
van, 117  La.   163 
National     Bank     of     Deposit     v. 

Sardy,   26  Misc.    (N.  Y.)    555 
Nat.      Bank      of     Metropolis      v. 
Sprague,   21   N.   J.   Eq.    13 

793,   1 
National    Bank    of    Phoenixville 

V.   Bonsor,  38  Pa.  Sup.  Ct.   275 
National      Bank      of      Xenia      v. 

Stewart,    107   U.    S.    676 
National    Cash    Register    Co.    v. 
Brocksmit,    103    Iowa   271 
V.   Schwab,   111  Iowa  605 
V.   \v'ait,    158    111.    App.    16S 
National    Cash    Register    Co.,    In 
re,   174  Fed.   579 


450 
086 

225 
106 

329 

290 

798 
611 
163 

097 
102 
337 

457 

217 

250 

560 

29 

459 
249 

403 

456 

62 

248 

241 

384 

820 
820 
613 


National     Fire     Proofing     Co.    v. 

Huntington,    81    Conn.    632  1375 

National  Foundry  &  Pipe  Works 

V.    Oconto    Water    Co.,    52    Fed. 

43  1335,  1375,  1378,  1618 

National   Life   Ins.   Co.   v.   Ayres, 

111    Iowa    200  1201,   1435 

National    Lumber    Co.    v.     Bow- 
man,  77   Iowa  706  1421,   1479 
National    Supply    Co.    v.    Strana- 

han,    161    Ind.    602  1200 

National    Valley    Bank    v.    Har- 

man,    75    Va.    604  1121 

National  Wall  Paper  Co.  v.  Sire, 

37   App.   Div.    (N.  Y.)    405  1277 

Naylor       v.       Dennle,       8       Pick. 

(Mass.)    198  865,    866,   965 

V.  Lane,    5    Civ.    Proc.    R.    (N. 

Y  )    149  214,    220,    222 

V.  Lane,   66  How.   Pr.    (N.   Y.) 


400 


217 

978 


V.  Mangles,    1    Bsp.    109 
Nazareth    Institute    v.    Lowe,     1 

B.   Mon.    (Ky.)    257  1203 

Neal  V.  Brandon,  70   Ark.   79  607 

V.  Murphey,   60   Ga.   388  lUS 

V.   Speigle,    33    Ark.    63  1086 

Neale    v.    Clautice,    7    Har.    &    J. 
(Md.)     372  622 

V.  Janney,    2    Cr.    C.    C.    188        375 

V.  Reid,    3    Dow.    &   Ry.    153        79 
Neal-Millard      Co.      v.      Chatham 

Academy,    121    Ga.    208  1375 

Neate  v.  Ball,  2  Bast  117  865,  867 
Nebraska,  The,  69  Fed.  1009  1807a 
Neeb  v.  McMillan,  98  Iowa  718  554 
Neel  v.  Clav,  48  Ala.  252  1071,  1107 
Neeley  v.   Phillips,   70   Ark.    90        607 

V.   Searight,    113    Ind.    316 

1200,   15S9,   1590 
Neely  v.   Goodwin,   91  Ala.    604      1102 

V    Ruleys,   26  W.   Va.    686  1125 

Neese   v.   Riley.    77   Tex.    348^^^^  ^^^^ 

Neifert  v.   Ames,   26   Kans.    515        617 

Neil  v.  Kinnev,   11  Ohio   St.   58     1487 

V.  Rosenthal,     120    App.    Div. 

(N.  Y.)   810  1107 

Neil     Cochran,     The,      1     Brown 

Adm.   162  _    ^    ,,.-,^^^" 

Neill  V.  Francis,  The,  21  Fed    921 

1690,    Ibyi 

Neilson  v.   Iowa  Eastern  R.   Co., 
44  Iowa  71 

1462a,    1470,     1624,   1625 
v.  Iowa    Eastern    R.    Co.,     51 

Iowa  184  777,   1201,  1236, 

1331,   1334,    1619,   1620 
Neish    V.    Graham,    8    El.    &    Bl. 

505  326 

Neith    Lodge    v.    Vordenbaumen, 

111    La.    213  1204 

Nellie    Bloomfield,    The,    27    Fed. 

524  ,,..  ^^^^ 

Nellis    V.    Bellinger,    6    Hun     (N. 

Y  )    560  1251,   1254,   1265 

Nelson  v.  Allen,   1  Yerg.    (Tenn.) 
360  1144.   1145 

V.  Association  for  Protection 
of  Wrecked  Property, 
43    L.    J.    C.    P.    218  333 

V.   Campbell,    28    Pa.    St.    156 

1310,   1372 


cxxxu 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 


Nelson    v.    Cover,    47    Iowa    250 

1262,   1264 
V.  Kelly,    91    Ala.    569  77 

V.  Wilson,   6   Bing.    56S        196,   203 
V.   Withrow,    14    Mo.    App.    270 

1309,  1323,  1365,  1408,  1419 
Nelson,  The,  1  Hagg.  Adm.  169  1796 
Nesbitt  V.    Bartlett,   14   Iowa   485 

576a,  577,  581,  582 

Nesbitt,     Ex    parte,     2     Scho.     & 

Lef.   279  122 

Nesmith   v.  Dyeing  Co.,   1   Curtis 
(U.    S.)    130  460,    461,   465 

V.   Washington   Bank,   6  Pick. 

(Mass.)    324  375,   404 

Ness  V.   Wood,    42   Minn.    427 

1239,   1243,   1280 
Nestoi-,    The,    1    Sumner    (U.    S.) 

73  1681,    1685,   1808 

Nevada,    The,    2     Sawy.     (U.    S.) 

144  1799 

Nevam  v.  Roup,  8  Iowa  207 

15,    731,    732,    745,   1000 

Neversink,    The,    5    Blatchf.     (U. 

S.)    539  1679,   1681 

New    V.    Pyle,    2    Houst.     (Del.) 

9  608 

Newbauer      v.      Newbauer,       112 

Mich.    562  712 

Newberg      v.      Schwab,      5      Civ. 

Proc.   R.    (N.   Y.)    19  222 

Newberry  v.  Detroit  &  Lake  Su- 
perior Iron  Mfg.   Co.,   17   Mich. 

141  404 

Newbert      v.      Cunningham,      50 

Maine   231  158,    165,    214,   232 

New   Castle,   N.    R.    Co.    v.    Simp- 
son,   26    Fed.    133  1665 
New     Champion,     The,     17     Fed. 

816  1680,   1686 

Newcomer  v.  Hutchings,   96  Ind. 

119  1421 

New     Ebenezer    Assn.     v.    Gress 

Lumber   Co.,    89    Ga.    125  1436 

Newell    V.    Campbell    Mach.    Co., 

17    R.    L     74  1223 

V.   Clark,  46  N.  J.  L.  363     590,   628 

V.  Haworth,   66  Pa.   St.   363        1277 

V.   West,  149  Mass.  520         115,   206 

New  England   Car  Spring  Co.   v. 

Baltimore  &  O.  R.   Co.,  11   Md. 

SI  1341,  1627,   1650 

New  England  Loan   &  Trust  Co. 

V.    Willis,    19    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

128  1110 

Newgass  v.  Atlantic  &  D.  R.  Co., 

72   Fed.    712  1671 

New    Glenwood    Canning   Co.,    In 

re,    150    Iowa    696  973 

Newhall  v.   Cent.  Pac.  R.   Co.,   51 

Cal.   345  946,   950 

V.   Kastens,   70   111.    156 

1199,   1283,  1644 
v.  Vargas,  13  Maine  93      861,   863, 
869,    878,    881,    887,   890,    931 
V.  Vargas,  15  Maine  314 

Sei,  862,  863,  869,  878,  890,  931 
New  Haven   &   Northampton    Co. 

V.  Campbell,  128  Mass.  104    316,   320 
Newhouse    v.    Morgan,    127    Ind. 

436  1200 

New    Jersey    Midland    R.    Co.    v. 

Wortendyke,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  658       74 


Newland,    Ex    parte,    L.    R.    4    Ch. 

Div.   515  119 

New  Lincoln  Hotel  Co.  v.  Shears, 

37  Nebr.   478  541 

New  London  &  Brazilian  Bank  v. 
Brocklebank,  21  Ch.  Div.  302 

387,   399 
Newman   v.    Bank   of   Greenville, 
66    Miss.    323  625 

V.   Brown,  27  Kans.  117  1397 

V.  Grant,  36  Mont.   77  1390 

V.  Moore   (Ky.).  17  S.  W.  740    1106 
V.   Ward    (Tex.    Civ.   App.),   46 

S.   W.   868  638 

New    Orleans    v.    Vaught,    12    La. 

Ann.   339  620 

New   Orleans   &   N.    E.    R.    Co.    v. 

George,  82  Miss.   710  282 

New  Orleans  Nat.  Banking  Assn. 
V.  Wiltz,  4  Woods  (U.  S.)  43 

375,    377,    381,    384 
New     Orleans     Terminal     Co.     v. 

Hanson,  ISS  Fed.   638  800,   811 

Newson  v.   Thornton,   6   East  17 

869,   964 

Newton    v.    Harland,    4   Scott    (N. 

R.)    769  122a 

V.   Hull,  90  Cal.  487  1127 

V.  Porter,  5  Lans.   (N.  Y.)    416  115 

V.   Trigg,  1  Shower  269  509 

New  York  v.  Crawford,  111  N.  Y. 

638  1299 

New  York  &  Cleveland  Gas  Coal 

Co.  V.  Plumer.  96  Pa.  St.  99         1108 
New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  San- 
ders,   134   Mass.    53  316 
New  York  Cent.  &  H.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lockwood    Mfg.    Co.,    142    Ala. 
322  311 
New  York  Cent.   &  H.   R.   R.   Co. 

V.  Davis,  86  Hun  (N.  Y.)   86  320 

New  York  Sensation,  The,  61  Hun 

(N.   Y.)    624  1756 

New    York    Weyer    v.    Beach,    79 

N.  Y.   409  1614 

Ney   v.   Dubuque  &   S.   C.   R.   Co., 

20  Iowa  347  1629 
Niagara,  The,  31  Fed.  163  1733,  1756 
Nice  V.  Walker,  153  Pa.  123  1502 
Nichol  V.  Dunn,  25  Ark.  123  1093 
Nicholls  V.  Hart,  5  Car.  &  P.  179     881 

V.  Le  Feuvre,  2  Bing.  N.  Cas. 

81  921,   922,   923 

Nichols    v.    Culver,    51    Conn.    177 

1308,   1311.   1354,   1406,   1409, 
1413,  1427,  1444,  1445,  1604 
V.  Glover,  41  Ind.  24 

89,   1092,   1098 

V.  Halliday,  27  Wis.  406     513,  515 

V.   Pool,   89   111.   491  128,  161 

V.   Speller,  120  N.  Car.  75  457 

Nicholson  v.  Bower,   1   El.   &  EL 

172  865 

V.   Chapman,  2  H.  Bl.  254     483,   484 

Nicholstone  City  Co.  v.   Smalley, 

21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  21  1238 
Nickel  V.  Blanch,  67  Md.  456  1319 
Nickelson  v.  Negley,  71  Iowa  546  616 
Nicolette  Lumber  Co.  v.  People's 

Coal  Co.,  26  Pa.  Super.  Ct.   575 

280a,   287 
Nicoll  V.  Mumford,   4   Johns.   Ch. 
(N.  Y.)    522  788 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXXlll 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.   1,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Nicoll    V.    Nicoll,    16    Wend.     (N. 

Y.)     446  209,    217,   219 

Nicrosi  v.  Roswald,  113  Ala.  592  603 
Nielsen    v.   Albert   Lea,    91   Minn. 

38S  196 

Nippert  v.  J.  B.  Williams,  The,  42 

Fed.   r)33  1699 

V.   Williams,  The,  39  Fed.  823    1699 
Nixon  V.   Cydon  Lodge  No.   5,  K. 

of  P.,  56  Ivans.  298 

1184a,    1283,    1418,    1458,    1470 
V.  Ossenbeck,   129  Ky.   588  177 

Noar   V.   Gill,    111   Pa.   St.   488 

1330,  1332 
Noble  V.  Adams,  2  Marsh.  366  910 
Noblett     V.     Harper     (Tex.     Civ. 

App.),    136   S.   W.    519  1064,   1086 

Noe    V.    Gibson,    7    Paige    (N.    Y.) 

513  591 

Noel  V.  Murray,   13  N.  Y.   167  1808 

V.   Temple,  12  Iowa  276  1201 

Noerenberg'  v.  Johnson,  51  Minn. 

75  1460 

Noftzger  v.  Moffett,  63  Kans.  354  210 
Nolan  V.  Lovelock.  1  Mont.  224  1413 
Nolander  v.  Burns,  48  Minn.  13  1249 
Nold  V.  Ozenberger,  152  Mo.  App. 

439  1211,   1270 

Nolen  V.   Royston,  36  Ark.   561  606 

Noll  V.  Swineford,  6  Pa.  St.  187 

1404,  1417 
Norcross    v.    Norcross,    53    ISIaine 

103  505,   511 

Noidemeyer  v.   Loescher,    1   Hilt. 

(N.  Y.)   499  269,   298 

Nordine  v.  Knutson,  62  Minn.  264    1452 
Nordyke  &  Marmon  Co.  v.  Hawk- 
eye  Woollen  Mills,  53  Iowa  521 

1272,  1479 
Norenberg  v.    Johnson,   51   Minn. 

75  1460 

Norfolk     &     Western     R.     Co.     v. 

Howison,  81  Va.  125       ,  1229 

Norfolk    Hardwood    Co. '  v.    New 

York    Cent.     &c.     R.     Co.,     202 

Mass.    160  811 

Norman    v.    Harrington,    62    Ala. 

107  1068 

Norman,   The.   6   Fed.    406 

1682,  1690,   1691 
Norman,  The,  28  Fed.  383  1680 

Norris     v.     Archibald,     29     Pitts. 

Leg.  J.   (N.  S.)   289  1071 

Norris'  Appeal,  30  Pa.  St.  122  1470 
Notara  v.   Henderson,  L.   R.   7   Q. 

B.   225  283,   287 

North    V.    Globe    Fence    Co.,     144 

Mich.   557  1442 

V.   La  Flesh,  73  Wis.  520 

1262,     1264,     1265,     1269, 
,      1410,    1412,    1500,    1603 
North  American  Commercial  Co. 

V.  United  States,  81  Fed.  748       1785 
North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Ack- 

ley,    58   111.    572  161 

Northcote  v.  Henrich  Bjorn,  The, 

11   App.   Cas.    (D.   C.)    270  1680 

Northern  Bank  v.  Keizer,  2  Duv. 

(Ky.)    169  400 

Northern    Light,    The,    106    Fed. 

748  1715 

Northey  v.  Field,   2  Esp.    613 

888,    890,   931,   933 


North     Presbyterian     Church     v. 

Jevne,   32   111.    214  1199 

North  River  Construction  Co.,  In 

re,  38  N.  J.  Eq.  433  73,   1632 

Northrup   v.  Hayward,  102  Minn. 

307  114,    130a,   179 

North  Shore  Boom  &  Driving  Co. 

V.  Nicomen  Boom  Co.,  52  Wash. 

564  23 

North  Star  Iron  Works  v.  Strong, 

33    Minn.    1        1369,   1421,   1423,   1425 
Norway   Plains   Co.   v.   Boston   & 

M.  R.,  1  Gray  (Mass.)  263  284 

Norway,   The,   3  Moore   P.   C.    (N. 

S.)    245  1025 

Norway,  The.  3  Ben.  (U.  S.)  163     1722 
Northwestern  Cement  Co.  v.  Nor- 
wegian    Seminary,      43     Minn. 

449  1421 

Northwestern  Loan  &  Investment 

Assn.    V.    McPherson,    23     Ind. 

App.   250  1313,   1443 

Norton   v.   Clark,    85   Maine  357     1502 

V.   Sinkhorn,  63  N.  J.  Eq.  313    1376 

V.   Switzer,    93   U.    S.    355  1729 

Norton    &    Gorman    Contracting 

Co.  V.  Unique  Const  Co.,  195  N. 

Y.   81  1355 

Nottingham    v.    McKendrick,    38 

Ore.    495  1499 

Norwich  Co.  v.  Wright,  13  Wall. 

(U.    S.)    104  1781 

Now  Then,  The,  50  Fed.  944 

1686,   1688 
Noxon    V.    Glaze,    11    Colo.    App. 

503  .565 

V.   Gregory,    5    How.    Pr.     (N. 

Y.)   339  217 

Noyes    v.    Burton,    29    Barb.     (N. 

Y.)     631  1543,     1548,,  1564 

V.   Kramer,    54    Iowa    22 

1069,   1074,   1078 
Nu.gent    V.    Priebatsch,    61    Miss. 

402  1081 

Nunan  v.  Doyle,  18  N.  Y.  S.  192  1599 
Nutt  V.  Codington,  34  Fla.  77  1196 
Nutter    V.    Fouch,    86    Ind.    451 

1069,   1076,   1098,   1099,    1100 
Nye   &c.   Co.   v.   Berger,    52   Nebr. 

758  1435 

Nvholm,     Ex     parte,     43     L.     J. 

Bank    21  333 

Nystrom  v.  London  &c.  Mtg.  Co., 

47   Minn.   31  1421 


O 


Oakes    v.    Moore,    24    Maine    214 

702,  731 
Oakford  v.  Drake,  2  F.  &  F.  493  869 
Oakland,    City    of    Sav.    Bank    v. 

State    Bank,    113    Mich.    284  406 

Oakland  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Lemieux,  98 

Maine    488  1563 

Oakley    v.    Van    Noppen,     95    N. 

Car.    60  1219 

Gates   V.    Haley,    1    Dalv    (N.    Y.) 

338  1218,   1301,   1548 

Oatfield     v.     Waring,     14     Johns. 

(N.    Y.)     188  71 

Ober  V.  Cochran,  118  Ga.  396  34 

V.   Gallagher,    93    U.    S.    199 

991,   1119 


CXXXIV 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,  §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §S   1061-1S12.] 


Obermiei-   v.   Core,   25  Ark.   562 

S06,    811,   818 
O'Brien  v.  Gooding,  194  111.  466     1559 
V.  Hanson,    9    Mo.    App.    545 

1257,    1259,   1384 
V.   Joyce,   117  Mass.   360  1142 

V.  Norris,     16    Md.     122 

884,    885,    887,   965 
V.  Perfection     Pile     Preserv- 
ing- Co.,    49   V^ash.    395        718 
V.   Pettis,    42    Iowa    293  1201 

Ocean  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rider,  22  Pick. 

(Mass.)    210  162,   165 

Ocean    Spray,    The,    4    Sawy-    (U. 

S.)    105  1705 

O'Clair  v.  Hale,  25  Misc.   (N.  T.) 

31  715a 

O'Connor  v.   Burnham,   49   Wash. 
443  718 

V.   Current    Riv.    R.    Co.,    Ill 

Mo.    185  1493,    1494,   1597 

V.   Schaeffel,  11  N.  Y.  S.  737      1608 
V.   Smith,   40  Ohio  St.   214  1071 

Odd   Fellows'  Hall  v.  Masser,   24 
Pa.    St.    507 

1329,  1330,  1408,  1532,  1538 
Odom  V.  Clark,  146  N.  Car.  544  456 
O'Donnell     v.     Kramer,     65     Cal. 

353  1287 

Odorilla,     The,     v.     Baizley,     128 

Pa.    St.    283  1726,    1760,    1810 

O'Driscoll  V.  Bradford,  171  Mass. 

231  1444,    1445 

Odum    V.    Loomis,    1    Tex.    App. 

Civ.    Cas.    §    524  1226 

O'Farrell    v.    Nance,    2    Hill     (S. 

Car.)    484  571 

Offut  V.  Trail,  4  Har.  &  J.    (Md.) 

20  622 

Ogrden  v.  Alexander,   63  Hun    (N. 

T.)   56  1393 

Og-g  V.   Tate.   52   Ind.   159  1245 

Ogle  V.  Atkinson,  1  Marsh.   323     .884 

V.  Atkinson,  5  Taunt.  759     869,  911 

V.   Ogle,  41  Ohio  St.  359   1069,   1092 

V.  Taylor,  49  Md.  158       1167.  1172 

O'Halloran    v.    Leachey,    39    Ind. 

150  1286 

O'Hara  v.   Jones,    46    111.    288 

554,   586,   588 
Ohio   &  M.   R.   Co.   v.   Kasson,   37 

N.   Y.    218  418 

Ohio  Falls  Car.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Cen- 
tral Trust  Co.,  71  Fed.  916  1011 
O.  H.  Vessels,  The,  177  Fed.  589  1722a 
O.  H.  Vessels,  The.  183  Fed.  561  1690 
Giles  V.  Green,  91  Wis.  217  719 
Oishei  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co., 

110  App.   Div.    (N.   Y.)    709  184 

O'Keef  V.    Seip,   17   Kans.   131 

1202,  1236,  1237 
O'Kelley  v.  Ferguson,  49  La.  Ann. 

1230  620 

Okisko    County    v.    Matthews,    3 

Md.  168  1434 

Olvolona   Savings    Inst.    v.    Trice, 

60    Miss.     262  554 

Old  Natchez,   The,   9   Fed.   476       1677 
Oldridge  v.  Sutton,  157  Mo.  App. 

485  34 

Olds  V.  Tucker,  35  Ohio  St.  581       147 
Old  Second  Nat.   Bank  v.  Alpena 
County    Sav.    Bank,    115    Mich. 
548  1092 


I  O'Leary  v.   Burns,   53   Miss.    171 

1210,   1600 
I  Ole   Oleson,   The,   20    Fed.    384 

1695,  1713 
Ole  Oleson.  The,  29  Fed.  264  1703 

Olga,  The,  32  Fed.  329 

1790,  1791,  1792 

Olive  V.  Smith,  5  Taunt.  56        424,  449 

Oliver  v.  Davis,   81   Iowa  287  1273 

V.  Davy,  34  Minn.  292         1458,  1460 

V.   Fowler,   22    S.   Car.   534 

1224,   1494 
V.    Macon    Hardware    Co.,    98 

Ga.  249  781 

V.  Moore,    12    Heisk.     (Tenn.) 

482  465 

V.  Phelps,    20   N.    J.   L.    180  627 

V.   Sheeley,   11   Nebr.   521  238 

V.    Woodman,    66    Maine    54 

702,   710,   727,  729 
Oliwill  V.   Verdenhalven,   7  N.   Y. 

S.    99  185,   189 

Olmstead  v.  Brush,  27  Conn.   530 

1165 
Olmsted     v.     McNall,     7     Blackf. 

(Ind.)   387  1341 

Olsen  V.  Sargent,  75  N.  Dak.  146    189a 
Olson  V.  Heath  Lumber  Mfg.  Co., 

37   Minn.    298  1455 

Olympic  Theatre,  In  re,  2  Browne 
(Pa.)   275 

1328,  1329,  1354,  1387,  1461 
Olyphant  v.  St.  Louis  Ore  &  Steel 

Co.,  28  Fed.  729  92 

O'Malley  v.  Coughlin,  3  Tenn.  Ch. 

431  1225,   1235,   1261 

Ombony   v.    Jones,    19    N.    Y.    234 

1257,  1274 
Ommen  v.  Talcott,  188  Fed.  401  462 
Onachita  Nat.  Bank  v.  Weiss,  49 

La.   Ann.   573  418,   437 

Onderdonk    v.    Voorhis,     2    Rob. 

(N.  Y.)   24  1733,  1756 

One  Hundred  Fifty-one   Tons  of 

Coal,   4  Blatchf.    (U.   S.)    368  311 

O'Neil   V.    Garrett,    6    Iowa   480 

929  940  965 
V.  Percival,  20  Fla.  937  '  1261 
V.   St.   Olaf's  School,   26  Minn. 

329  1235,    1304a,    1392 

V.   Taylor,   59   W.   Va.   370 

1310,  1421,  1442 
Onore,  The.  6  Ben.  (U.  S.)  564  1716 
Oppenheim  v.  Russell,  3  B.  &  P. 

42  267,   901,   919,   942,   965 

Oppenheimer  v.  Morrell,   118   Pa. 

St.  189  1334,   1352,  1352 

Orange  County  Irr.  Co.  v.  Orange 
Nat.  Bank  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  130 
S.  W.  869  638 

Orchard    v.    Rackstraw,    9    C.    B. 

698  •  503 

Oregon  Lumber  Co.  v.  Beckleen, 

130  Iowa  42  1275,  1278 

Orient,   The,   10   Ben.    (U.   S.)    620 

1781.  1786 
Orleans,  The,  11  Pet.    (U.   S.)  175 

169Ta,  1725 
Orleans,  The,  v.  Phoebus,  11  Pet. 

(U.    S.)    175  1706 

Orman  v.  Crystal  River  &c.  Co., 

5   Colo.  App.    493  1617 

I  Orme  v.  Roberts,   33  Tex.   768        1081 

I  Ormerod  v.  Tate,  1  East  464  142 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


CXXXV 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.   I,   §§   1-lOGOf;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Orpheus,   The,   2   Cliff.    (U.   S.)    29 

1722 
Orr  V.   Fuller,   172   Mass.    597  1317 

V.     North    Western     M.     L.     S. 

Co.,    86    111.    260  1199,   1313 

Orrick    v.    Durham,    79    Mo.    174 

1084,   1087 
Ortman  v.  Plummer,   52  Mich.   76 

1069,  1071 
Ortonville  v.  Greer,  93  Minn.  501 

1469,  1470 
Ortwine    v.    Caskey,    43   Md.    134 

1434,    1436,    1449,   1578 

Ostaorn  v.  Gantz,  60  N.  Y.  540  815 

Osborne  v.  Barnes,  179  Mass.  597     1458 

V.  Dunham  (N.  J.),  16  Atl.  231     115 

V.  Royer,  1  Lea   (Tenn.)   217     1119 

V.   Waters,    92    Ark.    388  170 

Osborn,     Succession     of,     40     La. 

Ann.    615  1063 

Osg-ood  V.  Groning-,  2  Camp.  466    332a 
Ostenson    v.    Severson,    126    Iowa 

197  1066 

Oster  V.  Rabeneau,   46  Mo.   595 

1211,  1423,  1426 
Othmer  v.  Clifton,  69  Iowa  656  1290 
Otis  V.   Dodd,   90   N.   Y.   336 

1235,  1236,  1251,  1265,  1281 
Otley  V.  Haviland,  36  Miss.  19  1210 
Ott  V.  His  Creditors,  127  La.  827  437 
Ottiwell  V.  Muxlow,  15   Daly   (N. 

Y.)    308  1251,   1254 

Ottowa,  The,  1  Brown  Adm.  356    1770 
Ouelette  v.  Fluff,  93  Maine  168  711 

Oury  V.    Saunders,   77    Tex.    278      1093 
Outcalt    V.    Durling-,    25    N.    J.    L. 

443  1036 

Outton  V.  Mitchell,   4  Bibb    (Ky.) 

239  1098 

Overall  v.  Taylor,   99   Ala.   12  1083 

Overly  v.  Tipton,  68   Ind.  410         1127 
Overton     v.     Meggs      (Tex.     Civ. 

App.)    105  S.  W.   208  1139 

Owen  V.  Bankhead.  76  Ala.  143     1101 

V.  Iglanor,  4  Cold.   (Tenn.)  15     427 

V.  Johnson,  174  Pa.  St.   99         1343 

V.  Mason,  18  How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.) 

156  203 

V.    Moore,    14    Ala.    640  1100 

V.   Reed,   27  Ark.   122  991 

Owens   V.    Ackerson,    8    How.    Pr. 
(N.   Y.)    199  1599 

V.   Atlantic   Trust   &   Banking 

Co.,    119    Ga.    924  377 

V.  Claytor,  56  Md.  129  1164 

V.  Davis,  15  La.  Ann.  22  1745 

V.  Northrup,   30   Wis.   482  1238 

V.    Weedman,    82    111.    409 

800,    807,    852 
Oxenham    v.    Esdaile,    2    Y.    &    J. 
493  1 


Pacific  Lumber  &c.  Co.  v.  Dailey, 

60   Wash.    566  1503 

Pacific  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Fisher, 

106    Cal.    224  1470 

Pacific  Rolling  Mills  Co.  v.  James 

Street  Const.  Co.,  68  Fed.  966  1672 
Pacific    States    &c.    Bldg    Co.    v. 

Dubois,  11  Idaho  319  1481 

Pacific,   The,   9   Fed.   120        1722,   1724 


Pacific,    The,    1    Blatchf.    (U.    S.) 

569  1696,  1728 

Pack    V.    Circuit    Judge    of    Iosco 
County,    70    Mich.    135  712 

V.    Simpson,    70   Mich.    135  729 

Packard  v.  The  Louisa,  2  Woodb. 

&  M.  (U.  S.)  48  1805 

Packwood    v.    Briggs,    25    Wash. 

530  71 

Paddock   v.   Stout,   121    111.    571 

1371,  1532,  1539,  1549,  1580 
Page  V.   Bettes,   17  Mo.   App.   366 

1211,   1431,   1432,   1435,   1437 

V.  Edwards,  64  Vt.  124  820 

V.  Grant,  127  Iowa  249  1290 

V.  Middleton,  118  Pa.  St.  546      564 

Paige  V.  Peters,  70  Wis.  178  1383 

Pain  V.  Isaacs,  10  Wash.  173  786b 

Paine  v.   Bonney,    4   E.    D.   Smith 

(N.   Y.)    734  1317 

V.   Dorough    (Tex.    Civ.   App.), 

132   S.   W.   369  638 

V.  Gill,  13  Wis.  561  727 

V.   Hall's  Safe  &  Lock  Co.,   64 

Miss.  175  625 

V.    Tillinghast,    52    Conn.    532 

1237,  1252,   1254 
V.   Woodworth,    15    Wis.    298      727 
Pairo   V.   Bethell,    75   Va.    825 

1229,   1372,   1559,    1577,   1612 
Palangio   v.   Wild   River  Lumber 

Co.,  86  Maine  315  1649 

Palim    V.    Cooke,    125    Ga.    442  756 

Fallen  v.  Bogy,  78  Mo.  App.  88         466 

Palmer  v.  Chandler,  47  Tex.  332  1102a 

V.    Hand,    13    Johns.     (N.    Y.) 

434  839 

V.  Harris,    100    111.    276  1126 

V.   Howard,   72   Cal.   293        812,   820 
V.  Lorillard,  16  Johns.   (N.  Y.) 

348  332a 

V.  McGinnes,  127  Iowa  118  1413 

V.  Tucker.  45  Maine  316    703,  1001 
V.   Uncas  Min.  Co.,   70  Cal.   614 

1366,  1509,  1532 
V.  Van   Orden,    17   J.   &   S.    (N. 

Y.)    89  189 

Palmer,   Ex  parte,  2  Hill  Eq.    (S. 

Car.)   215  1160 

Pamplin  v.  Rowe.  100  Ark.  144  1126 
Panama,  The,  Olcott  (U.  S.)  343  1798 
Paola    R.,    The,    32    Fed.    174 

1678,   1698,   1709 

Pape   V.    Steward,    69    Ark.    306 

579,    580 
Papineau     v.       Wentworth,     136 

Mass.   543  663,  699 

Paragon,    The,    1    Ware    (U.    S.) 

322  1778,    1787 

Parberry    v.     Johnson,     51    Miss. 

291  1520 

Pardue   v.   Missouri   Pac.    R.   Co., 

52  Nebr.   201  1513a 

Paris   V.   Vail.    18   Vt.    277  548 

Paris    Grocer    Co.    v.    Burks,    101 

Tex.   106  1066 

Parish's  Appeal,  83  Pa.  St.  Ill  1310' 
Park    V.    The    Edgar    Baxter,    37 

Fed.  219  1798 

Parke  v.  O'Conner,  36  Ind.  531  1375 
Parke   &   Lacy   Co.    v.    Inter   Nos 

Oil  &c.  Co..  147  Cal.  490     1453,  1600 
Parker  v.  Alexander,  2  La.  Ann. 

188  993 


CXXXVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.   I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,    §§   1061-1812.] 


Parker      v.      Anthony,      4      Gray 
(Mass.)    289  1242 

V.   Baxter,    86   N.   Y.    121  820 

V.  Baxter,  19  Hun  (N.  Y.)   410 

59,  60 
V.    Bell,    7    Gray    (Mass.)    429 

725,    1252,    1304,    1361,    1421 
V.  Blighton,    32    Mich.    266 

196,   203 
V.  Brancker,  22  Pick.    (Mass.) 

40  476 

V.  Byrnes,  1  Low.    (U.  S.)   539 

828  931  93  ^ 
V.  Crittenden,  37  Conn.  148  '  842 
V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  3  N.  Dak. 

87  784a 

V.  Poy.  43  Miss.  260  1083 

V.  Gossage,  2  Cr.  M.  &  R.  617  884 
V.    Kelly,    10    S.    &   M.    (Miss.) 

184  1119 

V.  McBee,  61  Miss.  134  1090,  1092 
V.  Mclver,  1  Des.  (S.  Car.)  274  917 
V.    Massachusetts    R.    Co.,    115 

Mass.  580  1651 

V.  Parker,  71  Vt.  387  191 

V.   Savage  Placer  Min.  Co.,   61 

Cal.  348  1603 

V.   Scott,   82  Iowa  266  1290 

V.  Sewell,  24  Tex.  238  1086 

V.    The   Little    Acme,    43    Fed. 

925  1680 

V.    Williams,    77    Maine    418 

710,    72S 
Parkes,     Ex    parte,     1     G.     &    J. 

(Md.)    228  1074 

Parkinson  v.  Manny,  2  Grant  Cas. 

(Pa.)   521  1760 

Parks  V.  Crockett,  61  Maine  489     710 
V.   Hall,   2   Pick.    (Mass.)    206 

800,  806,  836 
V.  Simpson,  124  Ga.  523  611 

Parrot  v.   Sweetland,   3   Mylne  & 

K.  655  1071 

Parsley    v.    David,     106    N.    Car. 

225  1594 

Parson  v.  Martin,   86  Ala.   352       1092 

Parsons  v.  Brown,  97  Iowa  699    1367 

V.   Hawlev,   92   Iowa  175  175 

V.  Hoyt,  24  Iowa  154  1114 

V.  Moses,    16    Iowa    440    11.^1,   1142 

Partridge  v.  Dartmouth  College, 

5   N.   H.    286  740 

V.    Logan,    3   Mo.   App.    509 

1080,  1086,  1088 
Paschal    v.    Brandon,    79    N.    Car. 

504  1127 

Paschal,    In    re,   10   Wall.    (U.   S.) 

483  137,  146 

Patapsco,   The,    13    Wall.    (U.    S.) 

329  1681, 1686,  1690 

Patent    Brick    Co.    v.    Moore,    75 

Cal.   205  1589,  1590 

Paton  v.  Robinson,  81  Conn.  547  4 

Patrick  v.   Hazen,   10   Vt.   183  115 

V.  Leach,  12   Fed.   661  118,  155 

V.  Leach,   17   Fed.   476  238 

V.    Leach,    2    McCrary    (U.    S.) 

635  183 

V.  Morrow,  33  Colo.  509  30 

V.  Smith,  120  Mass.  510     1400,  1421 
Patrick  Land  Co.  v.  Leavenworth, 

42  Nebr.  715  1457,  1458 

Patten   v.   Northwestern   Lumber 
Co.,  73  Wis.  233  719 


Patten   v.    Thompson,    5    M.    &   S. 
350  465,   869,   878,    884,   955 

V.  Union  Pac.   R.  Co.,  29  Fed. 

590  292,  293 

Patten   &   Danies  Lumber   Co.   v. 

Gibson,  9  Cal.  App.  23  1421 

Patten's    Appeal,    In    re,    45    Pa. 

St.  151  857,   861,  862,  864 

Patterson    v.    Edwards,    29    Miss. 
67  1071 

v.   Frazier,    123    Pa.    St.    414      1222 
V.    Hawkins,    3    Lea     (Tenn.) 


483 


636 


V.   Pennsylvania    Reform 

School,   92   Pa.   St.   229        1375 

V.    Seaton,    70    Iowa   689  792 

V.  Taylor,  15  Fla.  336  610 

Pattison  v.   Culton,   33   Ind  240         960 

Patton    V.    Matter,    21    Ind.    App. 

277  1435 

Pauer  v.  Fay,  110  Cal.  361  1493 

Paul  V.   Bark   Ilex,   2   Woods    (U. 

S.)   229  1713 

V.    Hoeft,   28   N.   J.    Eq.    11  1458 

V.  Nample,   44  Minn.   453  1209 

Paulding  v.  Ketty,  9  Mart.   (La.) 

(O.  S.)  186  585 

Paulsen  v.  Ingersoll,  62  Wis.  312     719 
V.  Manske,  126  111.  72        1257,  1504 
Pawashick,   The,   2   Low.    (U.    S.) 

142  1791 

Paxton  V.  Paxton,  38  W.  Va.  616    1101 

v.  Rich,  85  Va.  378  1120,  1123 

Payne    v.    Atterbury,    Harr.    Ch. 

414  1105 

V.  Avery,  21  Mich.  524      1063,  1071 

V.  Buford,  106  La.  83     800,  847,  859 

V.  Hathaway,  3  Vt.  212  74 

V.  Holt,   61  Ga.   355  612 

V.   Hornby,   25   Beav.    280  794 

V.  Shadbolt,  1  Camp.  427     814,  834 

v.   Spiller,   23    La.   Ann.   248  456 

V.    Wilson.    74    N.    Y.    348 

34,    77,    96,    991,   1012, 
1218,  1286,  1294,  1459 
V.  Wilson,  11  Hun  (N.  Y.)  302 

1218,   1460,   1543 
Paynter  v.   James,   L.   R.   2   C.   P. 

348  313 

Peabody    v.     Eastern    Methodist 

Society,    5  Allen    (Mass.)    540      1244 
Peacock  v.  Hammitt,  15  N.  J.  L. 

165  628 

Peak   v.   Blicott,    30   Kans.    156  37 

Peake,  Ex  parte,  1  Madd.  Ch.  191 

1082 
Pearce  v.   Foreman,    29  Ark.    563 

1082,  1085 
v.    Knapp,    71    Misc.     (N.    Y.) 

324  1218 

V.    The    Thomas    Newton,    41 

Fed.   106  1720a 

V.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  89  Mo.  App. 

437  291,  299 

Pearl    v.    Robitchek,    2    Daly    (N. 

'V'il^S  209 

Pearl,  The,  189  Fed.  540        1725,  1757 
Pearson  v.  Dawson,  El.  Bl.  &  El. 

448  844 

Pearsons  v.  Tincker,  36  Maine  383 

990,  1493,  1494,  1498 
Pease  v.  Kelly.  3  Ore.  417  1063,  lOSO 
Pease,   Ex  parte,  1   Rose   232  244 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXXVll 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Peatman  v.  Centerville  Light  &c. 

Co.,   105  Iowa  1  1412,  1494 

Peay  v.  Feild.  30  Ark.  600  105 

Peck  V.  Bridwell,  6  Mo.  App.  451    1591 
V.   Bridwell,   10  Mo.   App.   524 

1432,  1520,  1597 
V.  Glass,  6  How.  (Miss.)  195  1153 
V.    Hensley,    21    Ind.    344  1573 

V.  Hinds,   68  111.  App.  319  1389 

V.   Jenness,  7  How.  (U.  S.)  612 

10,   13,   28 
V.  Larsen,   12   Eq.   378  273 

V.    Standart,    1    Bradw.     (111.) 

228  1317 

Peckham  v.  Fox,  1  Cal.  App.  307 

1616a 
Pedesclaux  v.  Legare,  32  La.  Ann. 

380  1063 

Peebles,  In   re,  2  Hughes    (U.  S.) 

394  388 

Peeples  v.   Hayley,   89   Ark.   252       555 
Peet  V.  Beers,  4  Ind.   46  1093 

V.  McGraw,   25  Wend.    (N.  Y.) 

653  499,    504 

Peets  &  Norman  Co.  v.  Baker,  95 

Miss.    576  625 

Pell   V.    Bauer,    133    N.    Y.    377 

1492,  1568 
Pelly  V.  Wathen,  7  Hare  351     119,  130 
Peniberton,  Ex  parte,  IS  Ves.  282    126 
Pendergast  v.  Bank  of  Stockton, 
2  Sawy.  (U.  S.)  108  377 

V.   Yandes,   124   Ind.   159  758 

Pendleburg    v.    Meade,    1    E.    D. 

Smith    (N.   Y.)    728  1235 

Pendleton    v.    Franklin,    7    N.    Y. 

508  1731 

Peninsular   Lumber    Co.    v.    Feh- 

renbach,   1  Marv.    (Del.)    98         1194 
Penn  v.  McGhee,  6  Ga.  App.   631     174 
Pennock    v.    Hoover,      5      Rawle 
(Pa.)  291  1368,  1429,  1470,  1472 

V.   Locust   Realty  Co.,   224   Pa. 

437  1289 

Pennsylvania     &     D.     R.     Co.     v. 
Leuffer,    84    Pa.    St.    168 

1365,  1629,  1665 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Mehaffey,  75 
Ohio  St.  432  1664 

V.    Thatcher,    78    Ohio    St.    175 

94,   159 
Pennsylvania   R.    Co.    v.    Am.    Oil 
Works,   126   Pa.   St.    485 

265,   267,   857,   861 
Pennsylvania   Steel   Co.   v.   (Geor- 
gia   Railroad    &c.    Co.,    94    Ga. 
636  268,  321 

Penny  v.  Little,  4  111.  301  613 

Penrose  v.  Calkins.  77  Cal.  396     1422 
Pensacola  R.   Co.   v.   Schaffer,   76 

Ala.    233  1498 

People  V.   Bank   of  Dansville,    39 
Hun    (N.    Y.)    187  37 

v.   Butler,    2    Nebr.    5  1375 

V.    City  Bank,   93   N.   Y.   582         259 
V.  City  Bank,   96   N.  Y.   32  37 

V.   Crockett,    9    Cal.    112 

375,   380,   383 
V.   Hardenbergh,   8   Johns.    (N. 

Y.  )335  214233 

V.  Husband.  36  Mich.  306  '  524 

V.  Judge,   27  Mich.   138  1585 

V.     Merchant's     &    Mechanics' 

Bank,    78   N.   Y.    269  57 


People  V.  New  York  Com.  Pleas. 

13  Wend.    (N.  Y.)   649  217 

People's    Bank    v.    Cage,    40   La. 

Ann.  138  1092 

v.   Frick   Co.,    13   Okla.   179 

430,   434,   474,   1018 
People's    B.,    L.    &    S.    Assn.    v. 

Clark   (Tex.)   33  S.  W.  881  1477 

People's    Ferry    Co.    v.    Beers,    20 

How.    (U   S.)    393       1722,   1724,   1729 
People's  Ind.  Rice  Mill  Co.  v.  Be- 

noit,  117  La.  999  1204,  1382 

Peoples'  Sav.  Assn.  v.  Spears,  115 

Ind.   297  1247,   1253 

Peperday's    Appeal,    152    Pa.    St. 

621  1260,   1460,   1491 

Pepper  v.  George,   51  Ala.   190      1079 
Pequeno  v.  Taylor,   38   Barb.    (N. 

Y.)    375  911,  912 

Perdue,  In  re,  2  N.  Bank.  R.  182 

1082,   1098 

Pere  Marquette   R.   Co.  v.  Smith, 

36   Ind.   App.    439  1645 

Perez    v.    Alsop,    3    P.    &  -  F.    188     319 
Peri   v.    New    York    Cent.    &c.    R. 

Co.,  152  N.  Y.   521  184 

Perkins    v.    Boardman,    14    Gray 
(Mass.)    481  696 

V.   Boyd,    37    Colo.    265  1455 

V.    Boyd,    16    Colo.    App.    266 

1242,    1616a 
V.  Coleman,  51  Miss.  298  1520 

V.    Davis,   120   Mass.    408  1458 

V.   Emory,  55  Md.  27  1172 

V.  Gibson.  51  Miss.  699       1092,  1094 
V.   Agilvie,    140    Ky.    412  1037 

V.    Perkins,    9    Heisk.    (Tenn.) 

95  190,   230,  235 

V.   Pike,   42  Maine  141  710 

V.    Swank,    43    Miss.    349  1083 

V.  United  States  Elec.   Co.,  16 

Fed.   513  1102b 

V.  Wilson,  1  Man.  (Del.)  196  1412 
Perreault  v.  Shaw,  69  N.  H.  180  1357 
Perrine  v.  Fireman's  Ins.  Co.,  22 

Ala.    575  383,    401 

Perry  v.   Board  of  Missions,    102 
N.  Y.  99  39,  93 

V.  Bragg,  109  N.  Car.  303  457 

V.  Chester,  53  N.  Y.  240  222 

V.   Conroy,    22    Kans.    716  1429 

V.  Dowdell,  38  Tex.   Civ.   App. 

96  1015 

v.  Grant,  10  R.  I.  334         1063,  1073 

V.    Haines,    191    U.    S.    17  1756 

V.  Perrv,   127  N.   Car.   23  556 

V.  Potashinski,  169  Mass.  351    1289 

V.  Waggoner,  68  Iowa  403    557,  616 

V.   Woodson,    61   Tex.    228  1090 

Person    v.    Oberteuffer,    59    How. 

Pr.    (N.  Y.)   339  34,   67 

V.  Wright,   35  Ark.   169  542 

Peters  v.  Clements,  46  Tex.   114   1114 

V.    Newkirk,    6    Cow.     (N.    Y.) 

103  571,    592 

V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  23  Mo. 

107  1670 

V.  Tunell,  43  Minn.  473  1071,  1072 
Petersburg    Sav.    &    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Lumsden,  75  Va.  327       396,  401,  414 

Peterson  v.  Carson   (Tenn.),  48  S. 

W.  383  1073 

v.   Hall,    61   Minn.    268  125,   422 

V.   Peterson,   76   Nebr.   282  183 


cxxxvni 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Peterson  v.  Sayward,  9  Wash. 
503  71S 

V.  Struby,  25  Ind.  App.  19     174,  223 
V.    Watson,    1    Blatchf.    &    H. 

(U.  S.)  487  196,  205 

Peterson,  The,  v.  The  Nellie  and 

Annie,  37  Fed.  217  1706 

Petrel,  The,   v.   Dumont,   28   Ohio 

St.   602  1729 

Petrie  v.  Myers,  54  How.  Pr.   (N. 

y.)   513  256 

Petry  v.  Ambrosher,  100  Ind.  510 

1076 
V.  Randolph,  85  Ky.  351  619 

Pettibone  v.  Thompson,   72  Misc. 

(N.  Y.)   486  48,  52 

Petzenka  v.   Dallimore,    64  Minn. 

472  665,  691 

Peyroux  v.  Howard,  7  Pet.  (U.  S.) 

324  1002,   1535,   1729 

Pharr  v.  Collins,  35  La.  Ann.   930   266 
Phebe,  The,  1  Ware  (U.  S.)  354     1797 
Phelan  v.  Terry,  101  Minn.  454      782b 
Phelps    V.    Comber,    29    Ch.    Div. 
813  61 

V.    Conover,    25    111.    309  1098 

V.  Curts,  80  111.  109  1082 

V.  Maxwells'  Creek  Gold  Min. 
Co.,  49  Cal.  336 

1276,  1279,  1397,  1615 
V.  Seely,  22  Grat.  (Va.)  573  1178 
V.  Sinclair,  2  N.   H.   554  429 

V.  The  Camilla,  Taney   (U.  S.) 

400  1519 

Phelps  &c.  Windmill  Co.  v. 
Baker,  49  Kans.  434  1341,  1453 

V.  Shay,  32  Nebr.  19  1341,  1382 

Philadelphia  v.  Greble,  38  Pa.  St. 

339  1344 

Philadelphia  &  Reading-  R,  R. 
Co.  V.  Dows,  15  Phila.  (Pa.) 
101  320 

Philbrook    v.    Delano,    29    Maine 

410  1063 

Philips    V.    Philips,    2    Bro.    C.    C. 

273  1165 

Phillip  V.  Gallant,  62  N.  Y.  256     1599 
Phillips   V.   Adams,    78   Ala.    225     1123 
V.  Brown,    74    Maine    549  1205 

V.   Eg-gert,    133    Wis.    318  1767 

V.  Fryer,   80  Mich.   254  704 

V.  Germon,  43  Iowa  101  175 

V.    Gilbert,    101    U.    S.    721 

1313,    1317.    1511 
V.    Gilbert,     2    McAr.     (D.     C.) 

415  1504 

V.  Hog-ue,  63  Nebr.  192     48,  52.  147 
V.    Maxwell,    1    Baxt.    (Tenn.) 

25  636 

V.  Myers,  30  How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.) 

184  1725a 

V.    Rector    &c.    of    University 

of  Virginia,  97  Va.  472  1228 
V.  Roberts,  26  W.  Va.  783  1231 
V.  Rodie,  15  East  547  270 

V.  Saunderson,  1  Sm.  &  M.  Ch. 

(Miss.)   462  1080 

V.  Schall,  21  Mo.  App.  38  1061 

V.  Skinner,   6  Bush    (Ky.)    662 

1074 
V.   Stag-g-,   2   Edw.   Ch.    (N.   Y.) 

108  165,  166 

V.  The  Thomas  Scattergood,  1 

Gilpin   (U.  S.)   1  1715 


Phillips  V.  Trezevant,  67  N.  Car. 
370  788    789 

V.  Vose,  81  Maine  134         730a',  990 
V.   Wright,    5    Sandf.     (N.    Y.) 

342  1367,  1728,  1731 

Phoenix  Iron  Co.  v.  The  Hopat- 
cong,    127    N.    Y.    206  1756 

V.    Vessels,    43    Hun     (N.    Y.) 

429  1728 

Phoenix  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Batchen,     6    Bradw.     (111.)     621 

1199,  1465,  1495,  1605 
Pibble  V.   Kent,   10   Ind.   325  976 

Pickard    v.    Yencer,    21    Hun    (N. 

Y.)    403  233 

Pickens  v.  Plattsmouth  Inv.  Co., 

31  Nebr.  585  1247 

Pickert  v.  Ridgefield  Park  R.  Co., 

25  N.  J.  Eq.  316  1487 

Pickett  V.   Bullock,   52   N.   H.   354 

806,    848,    1014 
V.  Gollner,  7  N.  Y.   S.   196  1350 

V.    McCord,    62    Mo.    App.    467 

666,   691 
Pickman      v.      Woods,      6      Pick. 

(Mass.)    248  322 

Picquet     v.     McKay,     2     Blackf. 

(Ind.)   465  276,  1018,   1019 

Pierce  v.  Gardner.  83  Pa.  St.  211    1114 
V.  Jackson,  6  Mass.  242  787 

V.   Lawrence,    16   Lea    (Tenn.) 

572  230 

V.   Marple,   148   Pa.   St.    69 

1510,  1523,  1606 
V.  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  R.  Co., 

24  Wis.  551  1674 

V.  Moreman,   84  Tex.   596  1101 

V.    Scott,    4   Watts   &    S.    (Pa.) 

344  552,  590 

V.  Sweet,   33  Pa.  St.   151  731 

Pierson    v.    David,    1    Iowa   23        1063 
V.    Haddonfield,    66    N.    J.    Eq. 

180  1376 

V.    Safford,     30     Hun     (N.     Y.) 

521  185 

Pike   V.    Empfield,    21    Colo.    App. 

161  1190 

V.  Greenbaum,  12  Ky.   L.   423     818 

V.  Norrington,   82   Ind.    190         1375 

V.  Scott,  60  N.  H.  469  1215,  14G5 

Pilcher's  Succession,  39  La.  Ann. 

362  787 

Pilkington  v.  Brooklyn  Heights 
R.  Co.,  49  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
261  184 

Pilling  V.  Armitage,  12  Ves.  78     1139 
Pillow  V.   Helm,   7  Baxt.    (Tenn.) 

545  1092 

Pilz    V.     Killingsworth,     20    Ore. 

432  1348,   1370,  1555,   1588 

Pimlott  V.  Hall,   55  N.  J.  L.  192     1216 
Pinch      V.       Anthony,       8      Allen 

(Mass.)   536  30 

Pinchain  v.   Collard,   13   Tex.   333 

1063,   1074,   1094 
Pinder    v.    Morris,    3    Caines    (N. 

Y.)   165  196,  209 

Pine   Saw  Logs  v.   Sias,    43   Mich 

356  712 

Pinkerton   v.   LeBeau,    3    S.    Dak. 

440  1554 

V.  Woodward.   33  Cal.   557  511 

Pinkham    v.    Pinkham,    60    Nebr. 

600  40 


TACLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXXIX 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Pinkston  v.  Cedar  Hill  «fec.  Co., 
123  Ga.   302  1262 

V.   Young,    104    N.    Car.    102 

1219,    1290,    1470 
Pinney   v.    Wells,    10    Conn.    104 

6,  262,  322,  731,  1002 
Pinnins^-   v.    Skipper,    71    Md.    347 

1500a,  1520,  1532 
F'innock   v.   Harrison,   3   M.   &   W. 

532  731 

Pintard    v.    Goodloe,    Hemp.    (U. 

S.)    502  1061 

Pioneer  Mining-  Co.  v.  Delamotte, 

185  Fed.  752  llS7a 

Pioneer,   The,   30  Fed.   206  1677 

Pioneer,    The,    53    Fed.    279  1808 

Piper   V.    Hoyt,    61    Vt.    539  1228 

Pique  V.  Arendale,  71  Ala.  91        1075 
Pirate,    The,    32    Fed.    486 

1691,    1712,    1806 
Pirie  v.  Harkness,   3   S.  Dak.  178 

lS9d,   217 
Pirola   V.    W.    J.    Turner   Co.,    238 

111.   210  12S5a 

Pitkin   V.   Fletcher,   47   Iowa  53       587 
Pitschke   v.    Pope,    20   Colo.   App. 

328  1365 

Pitschki  V.  Anderson.  48  Tex.  1    1099 
Pittman    v.    Robbins    (Tex.    Civ. 

App.)    59    S.    W.    600  1126 

Pitts    V.    Parker,    44    Miss.    247 

1063,  1092,  1107,  1119 
Pittsburg     Const.     Co.     v.     West 

Side  Belt  R.  Co.,  232  Pa.  578      1665 
Pittsburg  Plate  Glass  Co.  v.  Pet- 
ers   Land    Co.,    123    Ga.    723 

1197,    1276,    1325 
Place    V.    Hayward,    3    How.    Pr. 

(N.    S.)     (N.    Y.)    59  220 

Planters'  &  Merchants'  Mut  Ins. 
Co.  V.  Selma  Sav.  Bank,  63 
Ala.   585  385,   3S6 

Planters'     Bank     v.     Dodson,     17 

Miss.    527  1093 

Planters'   Compress   Co.   v.   How- 
ard,  41  Tex.  Civ.  App.  285  583 
Planter  The,  7  Pet.    (U.  S.)    324     1725 
Piatt    V.    Birmingham    Axle    Co., 
41  Conn.  255                                   388,  413 
V.    Griffith,    27    N.    J.    Eq.    207 

1458,   1459 
V.    Jerome,    19    How.     (U.    S.) 

384  195 

V.    Piatt,    105    N.    Y.    488  1174 

V.  Piatt,  42  Hun   (N.  Y.)   592     1174 
V.  Piatt,  42  Hun   (N.  Y.)   659       139 
V.  The  Georgia,  34  Fed.   79       1711 
Platteville  v.  Bell,  6G  Wis.  326     1375 
Plattner  Implement  Co.  v.  Inter- 
national     Harvester      Co.      of 
America,    133    Fed.    376  418 

Pleasants  v.  Kortrecht,   5   Heisk. 

(Tenn.)   694  190,  230 

Plimpton    V.    Plimpton,    12    Cush. 

(Mass.)   458  1142 

Plowman   v.    Riddle,    14   Ala.    169 

1074,   1096 

Plummer  v.  Eckenrode,  50  Md. 
225  1310,    1319 

V.    Great   Northern    R.    Co.,    60 

Wash.  214  192 

V.  School  Dist.  No.  1,   90  Ark. 

236  1375 


Plurede    v.    Lesasseur,    89    Maine 

172  710,   711 

Plymouth,    The,    3    Wall.    (U.    S.) 

20  1770 

Plymouth  Rock,  The,  13  Blatchf. 

(U.  S.)  503  1681,  1682 

Poe  V.  Ekert.  102  Iowa  361  70 

V.    Paxton,    26    W.    Va.    607 

1061,  1069,  1076,  1079,  1081 
Poer  V.  Peebles.  1  B.  Mon.   (Ky.) 

1  572,   618 

Poerschke  v.  Kedenburg,   6  Abb. 

Pr.   (N.  S.)    (N.  Y.)   172        1218,  1564 
Poillon    V.    New    York,    47    N.    Y. 

666  1375 

Poland    V.    The   Spartan,    1    Ware 

(U.  S.)  134  1701 

Polk  V.  Kyser.  21  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
676  1119 

V.  Melenbacker,  136  Mich.   611 

499,   511,   515 
Pollock    V.    Landis,    36    Iowa    651 

513,    518 
V.   Morrison,   176  Mass.    83  1421 

V.  Morrison,  177  Mass  42  1421 

Pomeroy  v.  White  Lake  Lumber 

Co.,  33   Nebr.   243  1235 

Pond  Mach.  Tool  Co.  v.  Robinson, 

38  Minn.   272  1335,   1336,   1353 

Ponder  v.  Safety  B.  &  L.  Co.,   22 

Ky.    L.    1074  1459 

Ponti   V.    Eckels,    129   Wis.    26        1615 
Pool    V.    Sanford,    52    Tex.    621 

1226,  1556 
V.    Wedemeyer,    56    Tex.    287 

1226,   1392,   1416,   1554,    1571 
Poole  V.  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co., 
58  Tex.  134  891,  899,  952 

V.    Kermit,    59    N.    Y.    554 

1725,  1729,  1756,  lS06a 
V.    Seney,    66   Iowa   502  789 

V.  Union  Pass.  R.  Co.,  1  Monag. 

(Pa.)    170  1330 

Pooley  V.   Great   Eastern   R.    Co., 

34   L.    T.    (N.   S.)    537  843 

Poor  V.  Oakman,  104  Mass.  309     1247 
Pope  V.   Armstrong,    3    Sm.   &  M. 
(Miss.)  214  146,  158,  166,  167 

V.    Graham,    44    Tex.    196 

1226,  1382,  1533 
V.    Heckscher,    109    App.    Div. 

(N.   Y.)    495  1247 

Porch    V.    Agnew    Co.,    70    N.    J. 

Eq.    328  1238,   1342 

Porter  v.   Dubuque,   20    Iowa   440 

1063,  1081,  1086 
V.  Hanson,  36  Ark.  591  170,  229,  230 
v.  Jacksom  95  Ind.  210  1163,  1164 
V.  Lane,  8  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  357  217 
V.    Miles,    67    Ala.    130  1588 

V.   Pittsburg    Bessemer    Steel 

Co.,    120    U.    S.    649  1625a 

V.   Rice,    (Ky.),  128  S.  W.   70        619 
V.   The    Sea    Witch,    3    Woods 

(U.    S.)    75  1787 

V.   Wilder,    62   Ga.   520  1599 

V.  ^Voodruff,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  174    1063 
Porteus  V.  Watney,   3   Q.   B.  Div. 

223  274 

Portland  Lumbering   &  Mfg.   Co. 
V.    School    Dist.,    13    Ore.    283 

1221,  1375 
Portoues    v.    Badenoch,     132    111. 
377  1327,  1581,  1600 


cxl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Portsmouth     Savings     Bank     v. 
Riley,   54  Nebr.   531  1470 

V.   Yeiser,    81   Nebr.   343  1102b 

Post    V.    Campbell,    S3    N.    Y.    279 

1218,  1286 
V.   Vetter,    2   E.    D.    Smith    (N. 

Y.)    248  1276 

Post  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Lou&hran, 

12   App.   D.  C.   430  1690 

Potee     Brick     Co.     of     Baltimore 

City.  In   re,   179  Fed.   525  623 

Pothomer    v.    Dawson,    Holt    (N. 

P.)    383  1033 

Potshuisky  v.  Krempkan,  26  Tex. 

307  1382 

Potter  V.  Ajax  Min.  Co.,  19  Utah 
421  190b 

V.   Conley,    83    Kans.    676  1201 

V.    Greenleaf,    21   R.    I.    483  590 

V.  Hunt,   68   Mich.   242  213 

V  Mayo,  3  Greenl.   (Maine)   34 

155,   162,   193, 
196,   1200,   1327,   1328 
Potting-er   v.    Hecksher,    2    Grant 

Cas.    CPa.)    309  921,    965 

Potts  V.  Blackwell,   4  Jones'   Eq. 
(N.  Car.)   58  791 

V.    N.    Y.    &   N.    E.    R.    Co.,    131 
Mass.    455 

267,  268,  291,  320,  900,  901 
Pou    V.     Coving-ton    &c.     R.     Co., 

84  Ga.  311  1197 

Pouns  V.  Gartman,  29  Miss.  133     1098 
Powell   V.    Daily,    63    111.    646 

540,    542,    1127 
V.   Hunter,    204    Mo.    393  1127 

V.  Jones,   72  Ala.   392  43 

V.   Perry,   127   N.   Car.    22  631 

V.    Rogers,    105    111.    318  1617 

V.   Smith,   74  Miss.   142  625 

V.   State,   84   Ala.   444  603 

V.  Weaver,  56  Ga.   288  454 

V.  Webber,  79  111.  134  1199 

Power   v.    Kent,    1    Cow.    (N.    Y.) 
172  196,  209 

V.    McCord,    36    111.    214 

1199,    1327,    1393a 

Powers   V.    Badgers  Lumber   Co., 

75   Kans.    687  1605 

V.   Botts,   58  Mo.  App.  1        666,   699 

V.  Florence,    7   La.    Ann.    524     620 

V.  Hogan,  67  How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.) 

255  1598 

V.  Hubbell,  12  La.  Ann.  413  661 
V.    Sixty    Tons    of   Marble,    21 

La.  Ann,  402  981 

V.  Yonkers,  114  N.  Y.  145  1299 

Prather    Engineering   v.    Detroit 

&c.    R.    Co.,    152    Mich.    582  1559 

Pratt    v.    Clark,    57    Mo.    189 

1061,  1063,  1067,  1100 
v.  Duncan,  36  Minn.  545  1348 

V.  Eaton,  65  Mo.  157  999.  1074,  1090 
V.  Reed,  19  How.  (U.  S.)  395  1679 
V.  Tudor,  14  Tex.  37  1184,  1614a 
V.  Vanwyck,  6  Gill  &  J.   (Md.) 

495  1100 

Premier  Steel  Co.  v.  McElwaine- 
Richards    Co.,    144     Ind.     614 

1313,  1434 
Prentiss  v.  Garland,  67  Maine  345 

1010 
V.  Livingston,  60  How.  Pr.  (N. 

Y.)  380  115 


Presbyterian    Church   v.    Allison, 
10  Pa.  St.  413  1329,  1332,  1378 

v.   Stettler,   26  Pa.   St.   246  1538 

Presbyterian      Congregation      v. 
Carlisle   Bank,    5    Pa.    St.    345 

396,    411 
Prescott  v.  De  Forest,  16  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)   159  598 

V.  Maxwell,  48  111.  82  1287 

Preston  v.  Ellington,  74  Ala.  133 

1092,  1096,  1097,  1120 
V.    Neale,   12   Gray    (Mass.)    222 

486,   487,   968 
Prettyman  v.   Unland,  77  111.  206 

568,   580,   614 
Preusser   v.    Florence,    4   Abb.   N. 
Cas.    136  1298 

V.   Florence,    51   How.   Pr.    (N. 

Y.)    385  1298 

Prewett   v.   Dobbs,    13    Sm.    &   M. 

(Miss.)    431  570 

Price  V.  Cutts,  29  Ga.   142  77 

V.   Davis,    88   Va.    939  1122 

V.  Jennings,  62  Ind.  Ill  1239 

V.   Kirk,   90   Pa.   St.   47  1367 

V.  Lauve,   49   Tex.    74  1116 

V.    Limehouse,    4    McCord    (S. 

Car.)    544  571 

V.  McCallister,    3    Grant    Cas. 

(Pa.)     248  562 

V.  Palmer.  23  Hun  (N.  Y.)  504      93 
V.   Roetzell,    56   Mo.    500  626 

V.  Seydel.  46  Iowa  696       1262,  1264 
V.  Wisconsin    Marine    &    Fire 

Ins.  Co.,  43  Wis.  267  444 

Price,  Ex  parte,  2  Ves.  407  228,  229 
Prickett  v.  Sibert,  71  Ala.  194  1092 
Pride  v.  Smalley,   66  N.  J.  L.   578 

155,   158 
Pride    of   Ainerica,    The,    19    Fed. 

607  1798,  1808 

Pride  of  the  Ocean,  The,   3   Fed. 

162  1781 

Priebatsch      v.      Third     Baptist 

Church,    66   Miss.    345  1210 

Prime  v.  Koehler,  77  N.  Y.  91  1031 
Prince    v.    Neal-Millard    Co.,    124 

Ga.   884  1304,  1304a 

Princess,   The,   185   Fed.   218  1747 

Princeton   Bank  v.  Gibson,  20  N. 

J.   L.   138  628 

Printup  V.   Barrett,   46   Ga.   407  70 

Pritchard  v.   Pritchard,  134  App. 

Div.    (N.   Y.)    301  1039 

Pritchett  v.  Hape.  21  Ky.  L.  408    1116 

Proctor  V.  Hart,  72  Miss.  288         1121 

V.   Jones,  2  Car.  &  P.   532  808 

V.    Nicholson,    7   Car.    &   P.    67 

516,  517 
V.  Tows,  115  111.  138  1245,  1248 

Proctor   Coal   Co.   v.   Tye,   29   Ky. 

L.    804  177 

Proetzel    v.    Rabel,    21    Tex.    Civ. 

App.   559  1110 

Prospect,  The,  3  Blatchf.    (U.  S.) 

526  1799,    1800 

Provident    Inst,    for    Savings    v. 

Jersey  City.   113   U.  S.   506  102 

Provost   V.    Shirk,   223   111.    468 

1199    1397 
V.  Wilcox,  17  Ohio  359  '  1795 

Pruitt   V.   Kelley,   4  Willson   Civ. 
Cas.   Ct.   App.    (Tex.)    175  638 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxli 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.   I,   §§   1-1060£;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 

Quinn    v.    The    Mayor,    2    E.    D. 


Prutzman  v.  Bushong-,  83  Pa.  St. 

526  1257 

P.  T.  Walton  Lumber  Co.  v.  Cox, 

29   Okla.   237  1220a 

Puckett  V.   Reed,   31   Ark.   131  577 

Puett    V.    Beard,    86    Ind.    172 

174,   201a,   220 
Pugh  V.  Boyd, '38  Miss.  326  181 

V.   Holt,   27  Miss.   461  1110 

Pulis  V.  Sanborn,  52  Pa.  St.  368     1002 
Pullen  V.  Ward,  60  Ark.  90  1111 

Pullis    V.    Hoffman,    28    Mo.    App. 

606  1412 

Pullis    Bros.    &c.    Co.    v.   Natchi- 
toches Parish,  51  La.  Ann.  1377 

1301 
Pulver    V.    Harris,    52    N.    Y.    73 

187,   193,   196,    206,   209 
V.  Harris.  62  Barb  (N.  Y.)  500     207 
Purcell     V.     Lincoln,     1     Sprague 
(U.  S.)   230  196,  205 

V.    Thomas,    7    Blackf.     (Ind.) 

306  572 

Purchase  v.  Bellows,  16  Abb.  Pr. 

(N.  Y.)    103  217 

Purdy  V.  Bullard,  41  Cal.  444  llOS 

Purfel    V.    Sands,    1    Ashni.    (Pa.) 

120  632 

Purtell  V.  Chicago  &c.  Bolt   Co., 

74  Wis.  132       1378,  1618,   1622,  1673 

Putnam    v.    Ritchie,    6   Paige    (N. 

Y.)  390      1131.  1132,  1133,  1135,  1139 

V.    Ross,    55    Mo.    116  1575 

V.  Tennyson,  50  Ind.   456  174 


Q 


Quaack   v.    Schmid,    131    Ind.    185 

1200,  1421 
Quackenbush    v.    Carson,    21    111. 

99  1421 

Quale  V.  Moon,   48  Cal.   478  1514 

Queal  V.   Stradley,  117  Iowa  748 

1418 
Queen   v.   Saddlers'   Co.,   10   H.   L. 

Cas.    404  884 

Queen  of  St.  Johns,  The,  31  Fed. 

24  1682,  1789,  1808,  1810 

Quickstep,   The,    9    Wall.    (U.    S.) 

665  1781 

Quillian   v.   Central   R.    «&   Bank- 
ing Co.,  52  Ga.  374  737 
Quimby  v.  Durgin,  148  Mass.  104 

1310,  1534 
V.  Hazen.  54  Vt.  132  104,  723,  725 
V.   Sloan,    2    Abb.    Pr.    (N.    Y.) 

93  1543.  1548 

V.    Sloan,    2    B.    D.    Smith    (N. 

Y.)    594  1614 

Quinby  v.  Wilmington,   5   Houst. 

(Del.)   26  1536 

Quincey  v.  Francis,  5  Abb.  N.  C. 

(N.  Y.)   286  193,  207 

Quinlan    v.    Russell,    15    J.    &    S. 
(N.  Y.)    212  53 

V.   Russell,    94    N.    Y.    350  1377 

Quinman    v.    Clapp,    10    Abb.    N. 

Cas.   (N.  Y.)   394  189 

Quinn  v.  Allen,  S5  111.   39  1375 

V.  Logan,   67   Tex.   600  1226 

V.    New   York,    2    E.    D.    Smith 

(N.  Y.)    558  1235 


Smith    (N.    Y.)    558  1589 

V.    Wallace,    6    Whart.     (Pa.) 

452  562 

Quist  V.   Sandman,   154   Cal.   748 

25,    752  , 
R 

Rachels  v.  Doniphan  Lumber  Co. 

98  Ark.   529  •  170 

Rackley  v.   Scott,   61  N.   H.    140      1541 
Radford    v.    Carwile,    13    W.    Va. 

572  1115 

Raeder  v.   Bensberg,   6   Mo.   App. 

445  1367 

Ragsdale  v.  Estis,  8  Rich.  L.    (S. 
Car.)    429  594 

V.  Kinney,   119  Ala.   454  603 

Railway   Company  v.   Cronin,   38 
Ohio    St.    122  1664 

V.   McCoy,    42    Ohio    St.    251      1664 
V.  McKinley,  99  U.  S.  147  251 

Raitt   V.    Mitchell,    4    Campb.    146 

322,      1002,   1004 
Rakestraw  v.  Hamilton,  14  Iowa 

147  1119 

Raleigh  v.   Atkinson,   6   M.   &  W. 

670  476 

Raleigh,  The,  32  Fed.  633     1707,  1812 
Raleigh,    The,    2    Hughes    (U.    S.) 

44  1811 

Ramage  v.  Towles,  85  Ala.  588     1086 
Ramirez    v.    Smith       (Tex.      Civ. 

App.),    56   S.   W.   254  1083 

Rand  v.  Barrett,  66  Iowa  731   557,   558 

V.   Grubbs,    26   Mo.   App.   591     1507 

V.   Parker,  73  Iowa  396  1262 

Randall  v.  Roche,  30  N.  J.  L.  220 

1686,   1721,  1755 
V.   Rosenthal  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

27    S.    W.    906  638 

V.  Van    Wagenen,    115    N.    Y. 

527  209 

Randall,  Ex  parte,  149  Ala.   640     169 
Randel  v.  Brown,  2  How.   (U.  S.) 

406  23 

Randle  v.  Boyd,   73  Ala.   282  1101 

V.   Fuller,    6   T.    R.    456  215 

Randolph  v.  Builders,  &c.  Supply 

Co.,  106  Ala.  501  1187 

V.   Randolph,    34   Tex.   181  146 

Randolph,    The,    Gilp.    (U.  S.)  457 

1697a 
Ranger  Mercantile  Co.  v.  Terrett 
(Tex.     Civ.     App.),     106    S.    W. 
1145  638 

Rankin  v.  Black,  1  Head  (Tenn.) 
650  1152 

V.  Jones,     2     Jones     Eq.       (N. 

Car.)   169  791 

V.  Memphis  &c.  Packet  Co.,  9 
Heisk.    (Tenn.)    564 

284,    313,   338 
Ransom    v.    Brown,    63    Tex.    1S8 

1107,  1110 
V.  Van  Deventer,  41  Barb.   (N. 

Y.)    307  792 

Ranson   v.    Sheehan,    78    Mo.    668, 

1384,  1425,   1428 
Rapaune  Chemical  Co.  v.  Green- 
field, &c.  R.  Co.,  59  Mo.  App.  6  1655 
Rapid  Transit.   The.   11   Fed.   322 

1681,'  1683,    1688,    1772.    1773, 
1774,   1778,   1801 


cxlii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   10G1-1S12.] 


Rapp    V.    Spring    Val.    Gold    Co., 

74  Gal.   532  1190 

Rara    Avis    G.    &    S.    M.    Co.    v. 

Bauscher,    9    Colo.    3S5        1364,   1366 
Rasquin   v.  Knickerbocker  Stage 
Co.,   12   Abb.   Prac.    (N.   Y.)    324 

196,   203,   204,   233 
Ratclift'    V.    Daniel,    6    Har.    &    J. 

(Md.)    498  562 

Ratcliffe  v.  Mason,   92  Ky.  190     1069 
Rathbun     v.      Colton,      15      Pick. 
(Mass.)    471  1175 

V.   Hayford,     5    Allen     (Mass.) 

406  1312,  1313,   1315 

V.   State,   15   Idaho   273  1376 

Rauh  V.  Ritchie,   1  111.  App.  1>68 

600,   613 
Rawling-s  v.  Hunt,  90  N.  Car.  270   631 
V.  New  Memphis  Gaslight  Co., 

105  Tenn.   26S  1465 

Rawls    V.    Deshler,    4    Abb.    App. 
Dec.    (N.  Y.)   12  946,   947 

V.  Moye,  98  Ga.   564  991 

Ray  V.  Goodman,  1  Sneed  (Tenn.) 
586  1123 

V.   Hixon,   107  Ga.  768  173 

V.   Schmidt,   7  Ga.  App.  3S0  708 

Raymond    v.    Ewing-,    26    111.    329, 

1199,   1571 
V.  Palmer,  41  La.  Ann.  425  248 

V.   Post,   25   N.   J.   Eq.   447  1216 

V.   Tyson,     17     How.      (U.     S.) 

53  268,   325 

Raynes     v.     Kokomo     Ladder     & 

Furniture  Co..  153  Ind.  315  758 

R.    Connor   Co.    v.   Aetna   Indem- 
nity  Co.,   136   Wis.    13  1375 
Rea  V.  Burt,   8  La.  Ann.  509  620 
Read   v.    Amidon,    41   Vt.    15  508 
V.  Bostick,   6  Humph.    (Tenn.) 

321  137 

V.  Duppa,   6   T.   R.   361 

156,     209,     234 
V.   Gaillard,  2  Desaus.  (S.  Car.) 

552  78 

V.   Hull   of   a   New   Brig,    The, 

1    Story     (U.    S.)     244         1746 
V.   Joselyn,    Sheld.    (N.   Y.)    60     202 
Reading  v.  Hopson,  90  Pa.  St.  494 

1470,    1491 
Reading  F.    Ind.    &   Trust   Co.   v. 
Reading    Iron    "Works,    137    Pa. 
St.    282  377 

Real    Estate    Co.    v.    Phillips,    90 

Md.   515  1605 

Reardon  v.  Higgins,  39  Ind.  App. 

363  29,  68,   657 

Reaves  v.   Meredith,   123   Ga.   444 

1197 
Reavis  v.  Barnes,  36  Ark.  575  606 
Red  Bud  Realty  Co.  v.  Smith,  90 

Ark.  281  87 

Redenbaugh    v.    Kelton,    130    Mo. 

558  850 

Redfarn    v.    Sowerby,    1    Swanst. 

84  121 

Redford     v.     Gibson,     12     Leigh 

(Va.)    332  1074 

Redington  v.  Frye,  43  Maine  578 

710,   711,'  723 
Redman    v.    Williamson,    2    Iowa 

488  1235,   1245,   1257 

Red    River   Line,    In    re,    115    La. 
867  1745 


Red    River    Lumber   Co.    v.    Chil- 
dren of  Israel,  7  N.  Dak.  46         1299 
v.  Friel,  7  N.  Dak.  4G  1406 

Reece  v.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  663  611 

Reed  v.  Ash,   3  Nev.  116  21 

V.   Bartlett,   9    111.   App.   267  599 

V.   Boyd,  84  111.  66  1199 

V.   Gregory,  46  Miss.  740  1101 

V.   Insurance  Co.,   95  U.  S.  23   1800 
V.   Norton,    90    Cal.    590  1405 

V.   Pacific    Ins.     Co.,     1     Mete. 

(Mass.)    166  72,  425 

V.   Teneyck,   103   Ky.    65        513,   522 

Reeder    v.    Anderson's    Admr.,    4 

Dana    (Ky.)    193  485 

V.   Nay,  95  Ind.  164  1098 

Reed's  Appeal,   122   Pa.   St.   565     1665 

Rees  V.  Jutte,  153  Pa.  St.  56  1760 

V.  Ludington,  13  Wis.  276 

1232,  1470,   1487 
Reese  v.  Bald  Mountain,  &c.  Co., 
133    Cal.    285  1366 

V.  Bank  of  Commerce,  14  Md. 

271  375,   388,   393,  414 

V.   Burts,    39    Ga.    565  1107 

V.   Cole,  93  N.  Car.  87  457 

V.  Corlew,  60  Tex.  70        1226,   1556 
V.   Kinkead,  18  Nev.  126   1063,   1067 
Reeve  v.  Downs,  22   Kans.   330     1126 
V.   Blmendorf,   38   N.   J.   L.    125 

1216,   1287,    1289. 
1301,   1303,   1408 
Reeves   v.   Capper,    6    Scott   877        468 
V.  McKenzie,      1      Bailey      (S. 

Car.)   497  562,   571 

Refeld   v.   Ferrell,    27   Ark.    534     1063 
V.   Ferrell,   30  Ark.   465  1066 

Regulator,      The,     1     Hask.      (U. 

S.)   17  1680,   1681,   1682,   1688 

Rehrer  v.   Zeigler,   3   Watts  &  S. 

(Pa.)     258  1404 

Reichert  v.  Krass,  13   Ind.  App. 

348  1559 

Reid  v.  Bank  of  Tennessee,  1 
Sneed     (Tenn.)     262  1460 

V.   Berry,   178   Mass.    260  1348 

Reidenback  v.   Tuck,   85  N.   Y.   S. 

352  976 

Reillv   V.    Hudson,      62      Mo.      383 

1211,    1335,    1470,    1478,   1608,    1613 
V.    Stephenson.     62    Mich.     509 

721,   727 
V.   Williams,      47      Minn.      590, 

1317,   1458 
Reily    v.    Miami    Exporting    Co., 

5    Ohio   333  1091 

Reindollar  v.   Flickinger,    59   Md. 

469  1206,   1389,   1390,    1397.   1554 

Reineman  v.  Covington  C.  &c.  R. 

Co.,   51   Iowa  338  308 

Reinhardt    v.    Bianchard,    78    111. 

App.  26  580 

Reis,  In  re,  3  Woods  (U.  S.)  18  595 
Relfev.  Relfe,  34  Ala.  500  1099,  1108 
Remington     Typewriter     Co.     v. 

McArthur,   145   Iowa   57  616 

Renick  v.  Ludington,   16   W.   Va. 

378  192a,    217,    231 

Renton  v.  Conley,  49  Cal.  185  1287 
Rennard    v.    Morrison,      120      Ga. 

28  1276 

Republic  Guaranty  &  Surety  Co. 
v.  Cameron  (Tex.  Civ.  App), 
143  S.  W.  317  1382 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxliii 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.   I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Resse    v.    Planing    Mill    Co.,     55 

Kans.  518  1202 

Restrick   Lumber   Co.   v.   Wyrem- 

bolski,    164    Mich.    71  1248 

Retriever,    The,    93    Fed.    480  1709 

Revenue    Cutter    No.     2,    The,     4 

Sawy.    (U.  S.)    143  1722a 

Rewis  V.  Williamson,  51  Fla.  529 

1061,  1063 
V.   Humphery,    1   McClel.    &   Y. 

Y.    173  977,   978 

Rex  V.  Humphery,  1  McClel.  &  Y. 

194  977 

Rex  Buggy  Co.  v.   Ross,    80  Ark. 

388  885 

Reynes  v.  Dumont,  130  U.  S.  354     251 
Reynolds    v.    Boston,    &c.    R.    Co. 
43  N.  H.  580  875,   885,   887, 

888,  896,  928,  929,  940 
V.   Case,   60  Mich.  76  691 

V.   Ellis,    103    N.    Y.    115  543 

V.  Ellis,   34   Hun   (N.  Y.)   47 

544,   547 
V.   Jex,   34   L.   J.   Q.   B.    251  273 

V.   Lawrence,  147  Ala.  216  1101 

V.  Manhattan     Trust     Co.,     83 

Fed.  593  1503,   1625 

V.   Morse,  52  Iowa  155  1119 

V.  Port  Jervis  Boot  &  Shoe 
P^actory,  32  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
64  196 

V.  Reynolds,   10  Nebr.   574  23S 

V.   Shuler,  5  Cow.   (N.  Y.)  323      567 
V.   Taylor,  144  N.  Car.  165  631 

R.  Haas  Electric,  &c.  Co.  v. 
Springfield  Amusement  Park 
Co.,   236   111.   452  1335 

Rhea  v.  Revnolds,  12  Nebr.  128     1108 
Rheola,   The,    19    Fed.    926  1771 

Rhoades  v.   Rhoades,  88  111.   139    1167 
Rhodes  v.  Arthur,  19  Okla.  520       1067 
V.   Hines,  79  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.) 

379  702 

V.  Mooney,    43    Ohio   St.    421 

849,    862 
V.  Webb-Jameson  Co.,  19  Ind. 

App.    195  1532 

Rialto    Mining    &   Milling   Co.    v. 

Lowell,   23    Colo.    253  1588 

Rice  v.  Austin,   17  Mass.  197  465 

v.   Barnard,   20  Vt.   479  789,    790 

V.   Culver,   172    N.    Y.    60  1277 

v.  Garnhart,  35  Wis.   282 

192b,  222 
V.  Hall,  41  Wis.  453  1578,  1592 
V.   Hodge,   26   Kans.   164  1329 

V.   Nantasket    Co.,    140      Mass. 

256  1313,   1316 

V.   Rhone  (Colo.),  Ill  Pac.  585   1298 
V.   Rice,    36   Fed.   858 

1063,    1079,    1086 

Rich,    The,    1    Cliff.    (U.    S.)    308      1681 

Richards  v.  Bestor,  90  Ala.  352        602 

V.   Fisher,   8   W.   Va.    55  1108 

V.  Gaskill,    39    Kans.    428  422 

V.   John  Sprv  Lumber  Co.,  169 

111.    238  1266 

v.   Leaming,  27  111.  431      1086,  1092 
V.  McGrath,  100  Pa.  St.  389  632 

V.   McPherson,    74    Ind.    158 

1079,  1086 
V.  O'Brien,  173  Mass.  332  1207 
V.   Reed,    39    Ind.    330  1559 


Richards  v.  Ridgely,  8  Gill  & 
J.    (Md.)    87  1086 

V.   Symons,  15  L.  J.   (N.  S.)   Q. 

B.   35  641 

Richardson  v.  Baker,  5  J.  J. 
Marsh.    (Ky.)    323  1100 

V.   Blakemore,  11  Lea  (Tenn.) 

290  636 

V.  Bowman,   40  Miss.   782 

1063,   1069 
V.  Brooklyn    C.    &c.    R.    Co.,    7 

Hun     (N.    Y.)     69  237 

V.  Central  Lumber  Co.,  112  111. 

App.  160  1367 

V.   Goss,   3   B.   &   P.   119 

940,  941,  944,   980 
V.   Green,    46    Ark.    267  1074 

V.   Hamlett,  33Ark.  237  1119 

V.   Hickman,    32    Ark.    406  1550 

V.   Hoxie,   90  Maine  227  710 

V.   Koch,    81    Mo.    264 

1275,  1384,  1385,  13S6 
V.   Langston,   68  Ga.   658  781 

V.  McLaurin,    69    Miss.    70  625 

V.   Morton,  L.   R.   13   Eq.   123      1165 
V.  Peterson,    58    Iowa    724 

576a,  610 
V.  Reid,  50  Hun  (N.  Y.)  606  1235 
V.   Rich,    104    Mass.    156  286 

V.   Rust,   9  Paige   (N.  Y.)    243        43 
V.   Stillinger,     12     Gill     &     J. 

(Md.)   477  1100 

Richey  v.  Du  Pre,  20  S.  Car.  6  458 

Richie  v.   Brackett,  109   III.  App. 

631  967 

V.   McCauley,  4  Pa.  St.  471  633 

Richmond  v.  Duesberry,  27  Grat. 

(Va.)     210  555,    639 

Richmond  &  I.  Const.  Co.  v. 
Richmond,  N.  I.  &  R.  Co.,  68 
Fed.  105  1648 

Ricker  v.   Joy,   72   Maine   106  14i:0 

Ricks    V.    Redwine,    73    Ga.    273        781 
Riddle  v.  Welden,  5  Whart.  (Pa.) 

9  564 

RidcWer     v.     Varnum,     20     Pick. 

(Mass.)    280  836 

Rider  v.  Clark,  54  Iowa  292  32 

Ridgely     v.     Iglehart,     3     Bland 

(Md.)    540  3,    4,    21,    93,    1174 

Ridgeway  v.  Kennedy,  52  Mo.  24     820 
V.  Toram,  2  Md.   Ch.  303  1100 

Rieflin     v.     Grafton,     63     Wash. 

387  1230,   1444 

Rieser,    In   re,    137   App.   Div.    (N. 

Y.)    177  184 

Riggs  V.   Eicholz,   127  La.   745        177a 
V.  Whitney,    15    Abb.    Pr.     (N. 

Y  )   3  88  591 

Riley  v.   Watson,   3   Hun    (N.   Y.) 

568  1218 

Rinaker  v.  Freeman,  87  111.  App. 

283  1367 

Rindge  v.  Oliphant,  62  Tex.  682     1099 
Ringgold    v.    Bryan,    3    Md.    Ch. 

488  1076 

Ringle    v.     Wallis    Iron    Works, 

149   N.   Y.    439  1413 

Rinn  v.  Electric  Power  Co.  of 
Staten  Island,  3  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)    305  1367 

Ripley    v.    Gage,    3    Nebr.,    397        1375 
Ripperdon    v.    Cozine,    8    B.    Mon. 
Ky.  465  1092 


cxliv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,  §§  1-lOCOf;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Ritten    v.    Union    Pacific    R.    Co., 

16  Rep.   199  90 

Rittenhouse     v.     Swango     (Kv.), 

128    S.    W.    299  1064 

Ritter    v.    Stevenson,    7    Cal.    388 

1184,    1190,    1499 
Rivara  v.  Ohio,  3  E.  D.  Smitli  (N. 

Y.)   264  968 

Riverside  County  v.  Butcher,  133 

Cal.   324  1190 

Roach   v.   Chapin,   27   111.   194 

1199     12*»S 
V.   Chapman,   22   How.    (U.   s!) 

393  1722 

V.   Chapman,   22   How.    (U.   S.) 

129  1722,   1724,   1725 

Roanoke   Land   &c.   Co.   v.    Karn, 

80    Va.    589  1229 

Robards    v.    Robards,    27    Ky.    L. 

494  1143 

Robarts    v.    Buee,    L.    R.     8    Ch. 

Div.   198  216 

Robb  v.  Mudge,  14  Gray   (Mass.) 
534  791 

V.   Wagner,  5  La.  Ann.  Ill  620 

Robbins  v.  Arendt,  148  N.  T.  673 

1543 
V.  Blevins,   109   Mass.    219 

1207,   1286 
V.   Gray,    2    Q.    B.    501  499 

v.  Masteller,   147  Ind.   122 

1080,    1087 
Robbins,     In     re,     132     App.     Div. 

(N.    T.)    905  184 

Robert  Gaskin,   The,  9  Fed.   62     1799 
Robert  J.  Mercer,  The,  1  Spr.  (U. 

S.)  284  1712 

Roberts  v.   Austin.   26   Iowa  315        57 

V.   Campbell,   59  Iowa   675  1588 

V.  Doty,    31  Hun    (N.  Y.)    128     196 

V.  Fowler,   3   E.   D.   Smith    (N. 

Y.)     632  1493,   1495 

V.   Francis,    2    Heisk.    (Tenn.) 

127  1109 

V.   Gates,   64   111.   374  1568 

V.   Jacks,   31   Ark.    597  5,«541, 

542,  547,  606,   982,  1494 
V.  McCarty,    9    Ind.    16  798 

V.  Miller,    32    Mich.    289  1208 

V.  Mitchell,    94    Tenn.    277  190 

V.   Riggs,     84    Ky.    251  1382 

V.   Union    El.    R.    Co.,    84    Hun 

(N.    Y.)    437  184 

V.  Wilcoxson,  3  6  Ark.  355 

1013,   1014,   1521 
V.   Windermere,    The,    2    Fed. 

722  1713 

Robertson  v.  Guerin,  50  Tex.  317 

1092,   1098 
V.  Moore,    10    Idaho   115 

1390,  1608 
V.  Shutt,   9   Bush    (Ky.)    659 

177,  219,  220 
Robey  v.  Oilier,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  695  61 
Robins  v.  Bunn,  34  N.  J.  L.   322 

1184,  1578,   1586 
Robinson  v.  Appleton.  124  111.  276 

1063,   1114,   1116 
V.  Baker,      5     Cush.      (Mass.) 

137  262,   291,  304,   305 

V.  Black,   56   Tex.   215  1101 

v.   Columbia  Spinning  Co.,  31  App. 

Div.    (N.   Y.)    238  973 

V.  Dix,  18  W.  Va.   528  1126 


Robinson    v.    Harbour,    42    Miss. 
795  1119 

V.  Hays,  186  Fed.  295  192 

V.   Holt,    85    Ala.    596  603 

V.  Kaplan,    21    Misc.     (N.    Y.) 

686  673 

V.   Lehman,  72  Ala.  401        603,  1046 
V.   McWhirter,  52  Tex.  201  1087 

V.   Ridley,    6    Madd.    2  1136 

V.  Springfield     Iron      Co.,      39 

Hun    (N.    Y.)    634  1031 

V.  Staples,   5  La.  Ann.   712  620 

V.  State  Ins.  Co.,  55  Iowa  489  1289 
V.   Walter,    3    Bulst.    269  499 

V.   Wappans,   34  Misc.    (N.   Y.) 

V.   Ward,  13  Ohio  St.   293  1142 

V.  Williams,    22   N.    Y.   380  1081 

V.   Wilson,    15    Kans.    595  1382 

V.   Rob  Roy,  The.  30  Fed.  696  1702 
Robson  V.  Kemp,  4  Esp.  233  433 

Rochford  V.  Fleming,   10   S.  Dak. 
24  98 

V.   Rochford,  188  Mass.  108         1245 
V.  Rochford,  192  Mass.  231         1207 
Rochfort   V.   Metropolitan   St.    R. 
Co.,    50    App.    Div.    (N.    Y.)    261 

184 
Rockefeller       v.      Thompson,       2 

Sandf.    (N.   Y.)    395  1734 

Rock  Island  Bridge,  The,  6  Wall. 

(U.    S.)     213  1676,   1770 

Rockwood    V.    Walcott,    3    Allen 

(Mass.)    458  1299,   1568 

Rodbourn  v.   Seneca  Lake  Grape 
&   Wine   Co.,    67    N.   Y.    215 

1218,   1299 
V.   Seneca  Lake  Grape  &c.  Co., 

5  Hun  (N.  Y.)  12  1218 
Rodger   v.    Comptoir   d'Escompte 

de  Paris,  L.  R.  2  P.  C.  393 

917     921     949 
Rodgers  v.   Furse,   83   Ga.   115       '  223 
v.   Grothe,  58  Pa.  St.  414 

985,  988,  1033 
Rodick  V.  Gandell.  12  Beav.  325  50 
Rodman  v.  Sanders,  44  Ark.  504  1093 
Roe  V.  Scanlan.  98  Ky.  24  1375,  1376 
Roecliff,  The.  L.  R.  2  P.  363  1769 

Roehm  v.  Horst,  178  U.  S.  1  1215 

Rogers  V.  Blum.  56  Tex.  1     1109,  1116 
V.   Currier,    13    Gray     (Mass.) 

129  105,   1327, 

1328,  1727,   1748 
V.  Grigg    (Tex.   Civ.   App.),   29 

S.  W.   654  576a,   638 

V.  Heath,  62  Vt.  101  228 

V.  Hosack,    18   Wend.    (N.    Y.) 

319  48 

V.   Huntingdon  Bank.  12  Serg. 

6  R.  (Pa.)  77  379, 

393,   395,   402 
V.  James,  33  Ark.  77  1092,   1119 

V.   Phillips,   8  Ark.   366  1261 

V.  Powell,  1  Bradw.  (111.)  631 

1199 
V.   Thomas,   20  Conn.    53 

861,   885,   887 

V.   Tucker,    94    Mo.    346  1080 

V.   Walker,    24    Fed.    344  782 

V.   Whitehouse,  71  Maine  222      820 

Rogers       Development       Co.       v. 

Southern  Cal.  Real  Estate  Inv. 

Co.,  159  Cal.  735  1069 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


cxlv 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Roget    V.    Merritt,    2    Caines    (N. 

Y.)   117  803 

Roland  v.   Centerville,   M.   &c.   R. 

Co.,    61    Iowa  380  1289,   1290 

Rollin  V.  Cross.  45  N.  Y.  766  1244, 

1245,   1247,  1251, 

1257.   1259,   1493,   1494,   1495 

Rollins  V.  Forbes.  10  Cal.  299         1559 

V.   Proctor,  56  Iowa  326       585,   592 

Roman  v.  Thorn,  83  Ala.   443 

1571,    1572 
Romanik   v.    Rapoport,    148    Apn. 

Div.   (N.  Y.)   688  1218 

Rombeck  v.  Devorss.  19  Mo.  App. 

38  1574 

Ronald    v.    Mut.    Reserve    Fund 

Life  Assn.,  30  Fed.  228  134,  200 
Rood  V.  McCargar,  49  Cal.  117  103 
Rooker    v.    Hoofstetter,    26    Can. 

Sup.   Ct.    41  77 

Rooney  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  18 

N.  Y.  368  184,   187,  188,   193 

Roop  V.   Herron,   15   Nebr.   73  787 

Roose  V.  Billing-sley  &  N.  C.  Co., 

74  Iowa  51  1424 

V.   McDonald,  23  Ind.  157  1735 

Root  V.  Bryant,  57  Cal.  48  1460 

Roper  V.  Day,  48  Ala.  509  1119 

V.  McCook,  7  Ala.  318        1100,   1119 

Rosborough  v.  Rutland.  2  S.  Car. 

378  1163 

Rose  V.  Gray,   40  Ga.  156  577 

V.  Hart,    8    Taunt.    499  732 

V.  Munie,  4  Cal.  173  1460 

V.   Persse    &c.    Paper    Works, 

29  Conn.  256  1311, 

1338,   1537,   1578 
V.   Watson,  10  H.  L.  Cas.   672 

1105,  1106 
Rosema  v.  Porter,  112  Mich.   13      664 
Rosenback   v.    Salt   Springs   Nat. 
Bank,    53    Barb.    (N.    Y.)    495 

377,   384 

Rosenbaum  v.   Carlisle,    78    Miss. 

882  1299 

V.  Hayes,  8  N.  Dak.  461  466 

v.  Paletz,    114   N.   Y.   S.    802        1290 

Rosenberg  v.  Shaper,  51  Tex.  134 

559,   638 
Rosenberger  v.  Hallowell,  35  Pai-. 

St.  369  632 

Rosenfield     v.      Express     Co.,     1 

Woods  (U.  S.)  131  895 

Rosenkranz    v.    Wagner,    62    Cal. 

151  1287,   1594 

Ro.senstein    v.    Forester,    57    Ga. 

94  611 

Rosenthal  v.  Dessau.  11  Hun   (N. 
Y.)    49  952 

V.  Die    Gartenlaube,      The,      5 

Fed.    827  1694 

V.  Maryland  Brick  Co.,  61  Md. 

590  1206,   1458,  1470 

Rosenzv/eig    v.    Frazer,    82    Ind. 

342  1054 

Rosette  v.  Wynn,   73   Ala.   146        1083 
Rosevear     China     Clav     Co.,     Ex 
parte,    11    Ch.    Div.    560  902, 

909,   912 
Ross    v.    Adams,    13    Bush    (Ky. ) 
370  1063 

v.   Clark,    126   111.   Apn.    460 

1071,   1086,   1103 
V.  Heintzen,  36  Cal.  313  1092 


Ross  V.   Irving,   14   111.   171   1144,   1145 
V.  Laughton,   1   Ves.   &  B.   349 

122a 
V.   Simon,  16  Daly   (N.  Y.)   159 

1397 
V.   Simon,    8    N.    Y.    S.    2  1276 

V.   Swan,  7  Lea  (Tenn.)  463        1110 
V.   Whitson,    6    Yerg.    (Tenn.) 

50  1063 

Rossi   V.    MacKellar,    13    N.    Y.    S. 

827  1254 

Rotch  V.  Hussey.  52  Iowa  694  1074 
Roth    V.    Williams,    45    Ark.    447 

556,  606 
Rothe  V.  Bellingrath,  71  Ala.  55 

1272,  1273.  1274,  1276,  1280,  1490 
Rothery  v.  Wood,  3  Camp.  24  590 
Rothgerber  v.  Dupuy,  64   111.  452 

1199,  1283,  1554,  1624 
Rotzler  v.  Rotzler,  46  Iowa  189  601 
Roulet  V.  Hogan.  203  111.  525  1199 

v.   Hogan,   107    111.   App.    164      1199 
Roundell  v.  Breary,  2  Vern.  482  78 

Rousculp    V.    Ohio    Southern    R. 

Co.,    19    Ohio    Civ.    Ct.    436  1664 

Rouse    V.    Wooten,    104    N.    Car. 

229  457,    631,   784 

Rousey  v.  Mattox,  111  Ga.  883  611 

Roush  V.  Miller,  39  W.  Va.  638  1065 
Row  V.  Dawson,  1  Ves.  Jr.  332  43 

Rowe  V.  Fogle.  88  Ky.  105       177,   203 
V.  Pickford,     1    Moore    C.     P. 

526  940,   941 

V.   Pickford,   8   Taunt.   83 

904,   917,   921 

Rowell  V.   Harris,   121  Ga.     239     1287 

V.   Klein,  44  Ind.  290  1202 

Rowen  v.  Alladio,  51  Ore.   121        1387 

Rowland   v.    Day,    17   Ala.    681        1091 

v.   Dolby,    100   Md.    272  439,   466 

v.   Hewitt,   19   111.   App.   450  552 

V.  New    York,    N.    H.    &c.    R. 

Co.,   61   Conn.   103  2S0a 

Rowland,  In  re,  55  App.  Div.    (N. 

Y.)   66  184 

Row^ley   v.      Bigelow,      12      Pick. 
(Mass.)     307  857,    861,      910 

V.   James,  31  111.  298  1199 

Royal  V.  McPhail.  97  Ga.  457  1519 

Royal  Arch,  The,  1   Swab.  269        1801 
Royal     Consol.     Mining     Co.     v. 
Royal    Consol.    Mines    Co.,    157 
Cal.    737  1064,   1091 

Royal  George,  The.  1  Woods   (U. 

S.)   290  1722 

Roylance  v.   San   Luis  Hotel   Co., 

74  Cal.   273  1430 

R.  S.  Carter,  The.  38  Fed.  515  1781 
R.  S.  Carter,  The,  40  Fed.  331  1781 
Ruck    v.    Hatfield,    5    B.    &    Aid. 

632  909,   916 

Rucker    v.     Donovan,     13     Kans. 

251  262,   277,   857,   861, 

887,  888,  894,  900,  965 

Rudd    V.    Ford,    91    Ky.    183  619 

V.  Peters,    41    Ark.    177  1262 

Rude  V.  Mitchell,   97  Mo.   365 

1416,   1417,   1418 
Ruff  V.  Jarrett,  94  111.  475  1599 

Rufltin,  Ex  parte,  6  Ves.  119  788,  791 
Rugg  V.   Hoover,   28   Minn.    404 

1392,  1397 
Ruggles    V.     Blank,     15     Bradw. 
(111.)   436  1249,   1360,   1603 


cxlvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,    §§   1061-1812.] 


Ruggles   V.    Bucknor,    1    Paine    (U. 
S.)    35S  327 

V.  Muskegon     Circuit     Judge, 

124  Mich.  472  712 

V.   Walker,  34  Vt.  468  731,   983, 

986,   989,   1008 

Ruhl    V.    Ruhl,    24    W.    Va.    279     1111 

Rumbell,   The,    148   U.   S.   1  16V6 

Rumrill    v.    Huntington,    5    Day 

(Conn.)    163  217,   219,   222 

Runge    V.    Gilbrough    (Tex.    Civ. 

App.),    S7    S.    W.    832  1107 

Rusche  V.  Pittman,   34  Ind.   App. 

159  1248 

Rush  V.   Able,   90   Pa.   St.   153 

1367,  1407,  1441 
V.  Fisher,  8  Phila.  (Pa.)  44  1257 
V.   Hendley,   4   Wills.  Civ.  Cas. 

Ct.    App.    (Tex.)    §    200        638 
V.   Perot,    12    Phila.    (Pa.)    175 

1282 
Rusforth     V.     Hadfield,     6     East 

519  262,   265,   732 

V.   Hadfield,    7   East   224 

14,  19,  731 
Russell   V.   Bell,    44   Pa.   St.   47 

1416,   1585 
V.  Conway,    11   Cal.    93  160 

V.  Doty,  4  Cow.    (N.  Y.)   576        571 
V.  Hadduck,    3    Gilman     (111.) 

233  237,   260 

V.  Hayden,   40  Minn.   88  1421 

V.  Howell,  74  N.  H.  551  1550a 

V.  McCormick,  45  Ala.  587  1066 

V.  Myers  Excursion  &  Trans- 
fer  Co.,   73  N.   J.   Eq.   192 

1729,   1755 
V.  Painter,  50  Ark.  244  751a 

V.   Somerville,  10  Abb.  N.  Cas. 

(N.   Y.)   395  189,  228 

V.   Todd,    7   Blackf.    (Ind.)    26y 

1100 
V.   Watt,  41  Miss.   602        1084,  1094 
Russell  Wheel  &  Foundry  Co.  v. 

Hammond,    130    Mich.    7  377 

Russ   Lumber   Co.    v.   Garrettson, 

87  Cal.  589  1190,   1588,  1594,   1615 

Rust-Owen   Lumber   Co.   v.   Holt, 

60    Nebr.    80  1202 

Rutherford  v.  Cincinnati  &  P.  R. 
Co.,    35    Ohio    St.    559  1618,   1664 

V.   Gaines,    103    Tex.    263  1066 

v.  Mothershed,     42     Tex.     Civ. 

App.   360  1092 

Rutland     v.      Brister,      53     Miss. 

683  1094 

Rutledge     v.     Walton,     4     Yerg. 

(Tenn.)     458  636 

Ryan   v.    Desmond,   118    111.   App. 

186  1242 

Ryan  v.  Guilfoil,  13  Wash.  373         718 
V.  Kelly,    9    Mo.    App.    396  1211 

v.   Klock,   36  Hun   (N.  Y.)    104 

1218,  1407 
Ryan     Drug     Co.     v.     Rowe,     66 

Minn.    480  1325 

Ryberg  v.  Snell,  2  Wash.   (U.  S.) 

294  946 

Ryerson    v.    Quackenbush,    26    N. 

J.   L.    236  628 

V.   Smith,    152    111.    641  1301 

Ryhiner  v.   Frank,    105   111.   326     1086 

Ryman's  A.pp..  124  Pa.  St.  635         1444 


Safford  v.  McDonough,  120  Mass. 

290  805 

Sage  V.  Gittner,  11  Barb.    (N.  Y.) 

120  970 

Saginaw,   The,  32  Fed.   176  1697 

Sagmeister  v.  Foss.  4  Wash.  320  1397 
Sahll   V.    Biscoe,    18   Ark.    142  1119 

Saint  V.  Smith,   1  Coldw.    (Tenn.) 

51  641,   642 

St.    Clair    Coal    Co.    v.    Martz,    75 

Pa.   St.  384  1367 

St.  Croix  Lumber  Co.  v.  Mitchell, 

6  Dak.   215  1558 

St.    Croix    Timber   Co.    v.   Joseph, 

142  Wis.  55  719 

St.  Germans  v.  Crystal  Palace  R. 

Co.,  L.  R.  11  Eq.  568  1674 

St.  Jago  de  Cuba,  The,   9  Wheat. 
(U.    S.)    409  1519,   1680, 

1682,   1685,   1688,   1785 
St.  John  V.  Diefendorf,  12  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)   261  115,   119,   141, 

161,    165,   209,    213,  231 
V.   Hall,  41  Conn.  522  1494,  1499 

St.  Johns  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bingham, 

113  Mich.  165  98 

St.    Joseph,    The,    1    Brown   Adm. 

202  744,    1494 

St.    Joze    Indiano,    The,    In    re,    1 

Wheat.    (U.  S.)    208  884,   903 

St.    Kevin   Min.   Co.   v.   Isaacs,   18 

Colo.    400  1614 

St.  Lawrence,  The,  L.  R.  5  Prob. 

D    250  1788 

St.    Lawrence,    The,    1    Black    (U.  . 

S.)    522  1722,   1725, 

1729,   1799,   1808 
St.    Louis    v.    Ferry    Co.,    The,    11 

Wall.    (U.   S.)    423  IGSl 

St.    Louis,    A.    &   T.    H.    R.    Co.    v. 

Cleveland,  C.  C.  &c.  R.  Co.,  125 

U.  S.  658  1625a 

v.   Matthews,    75   Tex.    92  1668 

St.  Louis  &  San  Francisco  R.  Co. 

v.  Bennett,  35  Kans.  395  211 

V.  Dysart    (Tex.     Civ.      App.), 

130    S.    W.    1047  190a 

St.   Louis   Bolt   &c.    Co.    V.    Dona- 
hoe,  3  Mo.  App.  559  1655 
St.  Louis  Bridge  &  Construction 

Co.   V.   Memphis   C.    &c.   R.   Co., 

72  Mo.    664  1619 

St.    Louis    I.    M.    &    S.    R.    Co.    v. 

Lear,    54    Ark.    399  294 

St.    Louis    Nat.    Stock    Yards    v. 

O'Reilly,    85    111.    546  1199.   1286, 

1287,   1317,   1447,   1599 
St.    Louis    Perpetual    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Goodfellow,    9   Mo.   149 

377,   391,   393,   398 
St.  Louis  Type  Foundry  v.  Taylor 

(Tex.),    35    S.   W.    691  564 

St.  Louis  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  V.  Ritz, 

30   Kans.  30  1648 

St.   Louis  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Kerr,   153 

111.    182  1460 

St.  Paul  &  M.   Pressed  Brick  Co. 

V.  Stout,  45  Minn.  327  1441 

St.   Paul  Labor   Exchange   Co.   v. 

Eden,   48  Minn.   5  1323,   1542 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


cxlvii 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


St.  Paul  Roller-Mill  Co.  v.  Great 
Western  Despatch  Co.,  27  Fed. 
434  946 

St.     Peter's    Catholic    Church    v. 

Vannote,  66  N.  J.  E:q.  78  1287 

Salem  v.  Lane  &c.  Co.,  189  111. 
593  1259,   1375 

V.   Lane    &c.    Co.,    90    111.    App. 

560  1375 

Salina    State     Bank     v.     Burr,     7 

Kans.    App.    197  617 

Salmon  v.  Downs,  55  Tex.  243 

1097,   1130 

V.   Hoffman,   2  Cal.   138  1063 

Salomons  v.  Nissen,    2  T.   R.  674      946 

Salte  V.  Field,  5  T.  R.   211  865 

Salter   v.   Goldberg-,   150   Ala.    511 

1187,   1373 
Saltus   V.   Everett,    20   Wend.    (N. 

Y.)    267  304,   335,  1019 

Salvo    V.    Schmidt,    2    Speers    (S. 

Car.)    512  600 

Salzer   Lumber   Co.   v.   Claflin,    16 

N.    Dak.    601  1247 

Sampley  v.  Watson,  43  Ala.  377      1083 
Sampson  v.   Buffalo,  N.  Y.  &c.  R. 

Co.,  13  Hun   (N.  Y.)  280  1662 

Samuel  J.  Christian,  The,  16  Fed. 

796  1776,   1781,  1782,   1786 

Samuel    Marshall,    The,    49    Fed. 

754  IGSO,   1683,   1691,  1725,   1731 

Samuel    Ober,    The,    15    Fed.    621 

1700,  1704 
San    Antonio    &   A.    P.    R.    Co.    v. 
Schorn  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  127  S. 
W.  246  190a 

Sanarens    v.    True,    22    La.    Ann. 

181  620 

Sandberg  v.  Victor  Gold  &  Silver 

Min.   Co.,  18   Utah   66  190b 

Sanders  v.  Gillett,  8  Daly  (N.  Y.) 
183  217,   220 

V.   Helfrich     Lumber    &    Mfg. 

Co.,    29   Ky.   L.    466  63 

V.   Keber,  28  Ohio  St.  630  820 

V.  McAffee,   41   Ga.   684 

1086,   1090 
V.   Ohlhausen,    51    Mo.    163  626 

V.   Seelye,  128  111.  631  115,   119,   161 
Sanderson  v.  Bell,  2  Crompt.  &  M. 
304  125 

V.  Taft,  6  Gray  (Mass.)  533        1242 
San  Diego  Lumber  Co.   v.   Wool- 
dredge,    90   Cal.    574  1190 
Sands   v.    Champlin,    1    Story    (U. 
S.)   376  1163 
V.   Sands,  74  Maine  239       726,  1024 
Sandstrom    v.     Smith,     12     Idaho 

446  1607 

Sandval   v.    Ford,    55    Iowa    461 

1287,   1289 

Sanford  v.  Frost,  41  Conn.  617       1444 

v.   Kunkel,   30   Utah   379  1469 

V.   Modine,   51  Nebr.   728  548 

San     Francisco    Lumber     Co.     v. 

O'Neill,  120  Cal.   455  1190 

Sanger    v.    Magee,    29    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  397  579 

V.   Upton,   91   U.   S.    50  84 

San    Jacinto,   The,    30    Fed.    266     1797 

San   Juan    &   St.   L.   M.   &c.   Co.   v. 

Finch,  6  Colo.  214      1191,  1559,  1571 
San  Juan  Hdw.  Co.  The.,  v.  Car- 
rothers,  7  Colo.  App.   413  1588 


San   Rafael,   The,   141   Fed.    270     1738 
Santa  Anna,   The,   Blatchf.   &   H. 

(U.   S.)    79  1706a 

Santa  Clara  Val.  Mill  Co.  v.  Will- 
iams, 96  Cal.  xviii  1446,   1614 
Sarah  Cullen,  The,   49  Fed.   166      1691 
Sarah   E.   Kennedy,  The,   29   Fed. 

264  1703,   1704 

Sarah    Harris,    The,    7    Ben.     (U. 

S.)   177  1688 

Sarah  Jane,  The,   1   Low.    (U.   S.) 

203  1700 

Sarah  J.   Weed,   The,    2  Low.    (U. 

S.)    555  1681,   1687,   1707.   1798 

Sarah   Starr,   The,   1   Sprague    (U. 

S.)   453  1681 

Saranac  &  L.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Arnold, 

72  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)   620  184 

Saratoga,  The.  100  Fed.  480  1717 

Sarchet    v.    Davis,    The,    Chabbe 

(U.   S.)    185  1688 

Sarchett  v.  Legg,  60  Ore.  213         1221 
Sargent    v.    Franklin    Ins.    Co.    8 

Pick.   (Mass.)   90  375,   391 

V.   Gile,  8  N.  H.  325  820 

V.  Usher,  55  N.  H.  287  691 

Sarles  v.  Sharlow,  5  Dak.  100  1455 

Sarmiento   v.    Catherine    C,   The, 

110  Mich.   120  1749,   1808 

Sassman   v.   Brisbane,      7      Phila. 

(Pa.)    159  632 

Saulsbury  v.  Eason,  47  Ga.  617 

454,    70S 
V.   McKeller,  59  Ga.  301  584,   611 

Saunders    v.    Leslie,    2    Ba.    &    B. 

509  1090 

V.   Reilly,   6  N.  Y.  St.  452 

787,  788,  789,  792,  795 
Savage  v.  Hazard,  11  Nebr.  323  1108 
Savannah  &  Charleston  R.  Co.  v. 

Callahan,  49  Ga.  506  781 

Savannah    F.     &     W.     R.     Co.    v.      . 

Bundick,  94  Ga.  775  2S0a 

V.  Talbot,   123    Ga.   378  305 

Savannah,    G.     &    N.    R.     Co.     v. 

Grant,   56   Ga.    68  1197,   1642 

Savannah     Steam     Rice     Mill     v. 

Hull,   103    Ga.    831  967 

Saville   v.    Campion,    2    B.    &    Ad. 

503  271,   323 

Savings  Bank  v.  Creswell,  100  U. 

S.  630  758 

Savoy  v.  Dudley,  168  Mass.  538     1439 

Sawyer  v.  Fisher.  32  Maine  28         816 

V.   Hoag,  17  M^all.   (U.  S.)   610        84 

V.   Joslin,   20    Vt.   172  945 

V.   Shick,  30  Okla.  353  1220a 

Sawyer-Austin     Lumber     Co.     v. 

Clark,  82  Mo.  App.  225  1600 

Saylor  v.  Taylor,  77  Fed.  476         1787 
Sayre-Newton    L.   Co.   v.    Park,   4 

Colo.  App.   482  1574 

Scaife  v.  Stovall,  67  Ala.  237 

576a,  578,  603 
Scales  V.  Griffin,  2  Doug.   (Mich.) 

54  1245,   1247,   1248 

V.   Paine,  13  Nebr.  521  1264 

Scanlan  v.  Cobb,   85   111.   296  1580 

Scannell  v.  Beauvais,  38  La.  Ann. 

217  800 

V.  Hub  Brewery  Co.,  178  Mass. 

288  1329,   1344 


cxiviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 


Scarfe  v.  Morgan,  4  M.  &  W.  270 

334,   641,   644,  645, 
731,   742,   743a,   1021,   1025,   1032 
Scatcherd    Lumber    Co.    v.    Rike, 

113    Ala.    555  1729,   1736 

Schaefer    v.    Purviance,    160    Ind. 

63  1101 

Schaeffer     v.     Pithian,      17     Ind. 

463  793 

Schaettler  v.   Gardiner,   47   N.   Y. 

404  1613 

Schafer  v.  Reilly,  50  N.  Y.  61  1543 

Schaghticoke  Powder  Co.  v. 
Greenwich  &c.  R.  Co.,  183 
N.   Y.    306  1347a 

Schall  V.  Kinsella,  117  La.  687         620 
Schaller-Hoerr     Co.     v.     Gentile, 

153   111.  App.   458  1199 

Schallert-Ganahl    Lumber   Co.    v. 

Sheldon,    97    Cal.    xviii  1430 

Schanck   v.   Arrowsmith,    9   N.    J. 

Eq.   314  1163,  1171,   1173 

Schaper  v.  Bibb,  71  Md.  145 

1341,   1343,   1387 
Scharff    v.    Whitaker,    92    Tex.    216 

1101 
Scharlock    v.    Oland,    1    Rich.    (S. 

Car.)    207  158,  189c 

Schearff  v.  Dodge,  33  Ark.  340       1108 
Scheible    v.    Schickler,    63    Minn. 

471  1445 

Scheibner    v.    Cohnen,    108    Mich. 

165  1419 

Scheid   v.    Rapp,    121    Pa.   St.    593 

1289,   1500a 
Schenck    v.    Vannest,    4    N.    J.    L. 

329  628 

Schenley's  Appeal,   70   Pa.   St.    98 

1274 
Schermerhorn    v.    Gardenier,    184 
N.  Y.  612  65,   77 

V.  Gardepier,   107     App.     Div. 

(N.  Y.)   564  453 

Scherrer    v.    Music    Hall    Co.,    18 

N.  Y.  S.  459  1511,  1584 

Schiefer    v.    Freygang,    141    App. 

Div.    (N.   Y.)    236  184 

Schindler     v.      Green,     149      Cal. 

752  1447 

Schlosser  v.   Moores,    16   N.   Dak. 

185  457a,   784a 

Schmalz   v.   Mead,   125   N.    Y.    188 

1247,  1252a.   1262 
V.  Mead,   15   Dalv    (N.   Y.)    223 

1262 
Schmeiding  v.  Ewing,   57  Mo.   78 

1597,   1613 
Schmelzer    v.     Chicago     Ave.     S. 

&  D.   Co.,   85  111.   App.   596  1288 

Schmertz    v.    Dwyer,    53    Pa.    St. 

335  465,   886 

V.   Hammond,  51  "W.  Va.  408     192a 

Schmid  v.  Carter,  95  Ky.  1  29 

Schmidlapp    v.    Currie,    55    Miss. 

597  789     792.  794 

Schmidt  v.   Anderson,   253   111.   29 

1434 
V.   Blood,     9     Wend.      (N.     Y.) 

268  974 

V.   Gilson,  14  Wis.  514 

1532,  1608 
V.   Hennepin      County     Barrel 

Co.,  35  Minn.  511  392,  398 

Schmidt,   Ex  parte,  62  Ala.  252     1260 


Schmitt    V.    Wright,    6    Mo.    App. 

601  1267 

Schmittler    v.    Simon,    101    N.    Y. 

554  1243 

Schnebly    v.    Ragan,    7   Gill    &    J. 

(Md.)  120  1064,   1095 

Schneider    v.    Dayton,    111    Mich. 
396  968 

V.   Evans,   25   Wis.   241  294,  296 

V.   Hobein,    41    How.    Pr.     (N. 

Y.)   232  1286,   1287 

V.   Kolthoff,    59   Ind.    568 

1200,   1404,   1534 
V.  Reed,    123    Wis.    488  1138 

Schneiderhorst    v.    Luecking,    26 

Ohio   St.   47  1291 

Schnell    v.    Clements,    73    111.    613 

1271,  1573 
Scholes  v.  Hughes,  77  Tex.  482      1421 
Scholfield   V.   Bell,   14  Mass.    40        865 
School     District     v.     Conrad,     17 
Kans.    522  1375 

V.   Howell,    44    Kans.    285  1417 

Schoole    V.    Noble,     1    H.    Bl.    23 

156,   215 
Schooner  Mary  Ann  Guest,   The, 

1  Olc.  Adm.  498  898,   946 
Schorn    v.    McWhirter,     6     Baxt. 

(Tenn.)    313  1116 

V.  McWhirter,  8  Baxt.  (Tenn.) 

201  1108,  1116 

Schotsmans  v.  Lancashire  &c.  R. 

Co.,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  332  861,   911,   912 

Schouweiler    v.    McCaull,     18     S. 

Dak.  70  458a 

Schrandt  v.  Young,  62  Nebr.  254      668 
Schriever    v.    Brooklyn    Heights 

R.  Co.,  30  Misc.   (N.  Y.)  145  184 

Schriffer  v.  Saum,  81  Pa.   St.  385 

1262 
Schroeder  v.  Galland,  134  Pa.  St. 
277  1289,   1502 

V.  Mueller,     33     Mo.     App.     28 

1313,   1394,   1408,   1415 
Schukraft,   v.   Ruck,    6    Daly    (N. 

Y.)    1 
Schulenberg  v.   Havden,   146   Mo. 
583  1462 

V.  Prairie  Home  Institute,   65  Mo. 
295  1328 

Schulenburg    v.    Hawley,    6    Mo. 
App.  34  1328 

V.  Memphis,  C.   &c.  R.   Co.,   76 

Va.    180  1618 

V.   Robison,    5    Mo.    App.     561 

1323,   1526 
V.   Vrooman,    7    Mo.    App.    133 

1313,   1321,   1448 
V.  Werner,  6  Mo.  App.  292 

1211,   1404 
Schulenburg    &c.   Lumber    Co.    v. 

Strimple,   33  Mo.  App.  154  1412 

Schultz   V.   Asay,   2   Penny.    (Pa.) 
411  1313 

V.   Hay,  62  111.  157  1299 

Schultze  V.  Alamo  &c.  Brew.  Co., 

2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  236 

1248,   1443,   1470,   1554 
Schumacher    v.    Chicago    &c.    R. 
Co.,   207   111.  199  282,   283,  320 

v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  108  111. 

App.    520  284,   974 

Schuyler    v.    Hayward,    67    N.    Y. 
253  1247 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


cxlix 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 


Schuyler  v.   Leggett,    2  Cow.    (N. 

Y.)    660  571,   598 

Schwab   V.   Oatman,   56  Misc.    (N. 

Y.)   393  967 

Schwabacher    v.     Kane,     13     Mo. 

App.  126  965 

Schwartz  v.  Allen,   7  N.  Y.  S.  5     1343 
V.   Knig-ht,   74   Cal.    432 

1190,  1283,   1430,   1438 
V.   Saunders,   46   111.    18 

1264,   1487,   1539 
V.   Schwartz,    21    Hun    (N.    Y.) 

33  143,   208 

Schwarz  v.  Stein,  29  Md.  112 

1074,   1086,  1116 

Schweizer  v.   Mansfield,    14   Colo. 

App.  236  1276 

Scio,   The,   L.    R.   1   Adm.   &   Eccl. 

353  744 

Scoggin,  In  re,  5  Sawyer   (U.  S.) 

549  179,  180 

Scotia,    The,    35   Fed.    907  1790 

Scotia,   The,    35   Fed.    916  1713 

Scott  V.  Cook,   8  Mo.  App.   133        1448 

V.   Crawford,    12    Ind.    410  1100 

V.   Darling,    66   Vt.    510  137 

V.   Delahunt,   65   N.   Y.   128  1793 

V.   Delahunt,    5    Lans.    (N.    Y.) 

079  S     Y  4  4 

V.  Edgar,  159  Ind.  38  1074,  'l083 

V.   Franklin,  15  East  428      241,   244 
V.   Goldinghorst,    123    Ind.    268 

1309b,   1423,   1573,   1588 
V.   Griggs,   49  Ala.  185  1106 

V.   Guernsey,   48   N.   Y.   106  1155 

V.  Guernsey,   60  Barb.    (N.  Y.) 

163  1155 

V.   Hempel,  33  Fla.  313  1196 

V.   Jester,    13   Ark.    437  967 

V.   McEwen,      2      Phila.      (Pa.) 

176  569 

V.   McMillan,    76   N.   Y.   141  30 

V.   Mann,  36  Tex.  157  1092 

V.  Mercer,  98  Iowa  258  644 

V.  Mercer    (Iowa),    63    N.    W. 

325  658 

V.   Morris,     131     111.     App.     605 

115,   161 
V.   Nesbitt,    14    Ves.    437  1147 

V.  Orbison,  21  Ark.  202     1075,   1504 
V.   Pettit,  3  B.  &  P.  469 

882,   904,  921,   940,   941,   944 
V.  Porcher,  3  Mer.  652  46 

V.   Pound,    61   Ga.  579  611 

V.   Scott,  196  Pa.  St.   132  1222 

V.   Stebbins,    91    N.    Y.    605  1164 

V.  Ward,   4  G.   Greene    (Iowa) 

112  1532 

Scott    &    Holston    Lumber   Co.    v. 

Sharvy,    62    Minn.    528  713 

Scroggins  v.  Foster,  76  Miss.  318 

625 
V.  Hoadley,   56  Ga.   165  1108 

Scruggs  V.  Decatur,   155  Ala.  616 

1374 
V.  Gibson,    40    Ga.    511  611 

Scudder  v.   Harden,   31   N.   J.    Eq. 

503  1216.   1554 

Scull   V.   Shakespeare,    75    Pa.    St. 

297  1722 

Scull's  Appeal,  115  Pa.  St.  141  790 

Scully  V.   Porter,   57   Kans.   322 

576a,  577,   580,   617 
Seaboard,  The,  119  Fed.  375  1690 


Sealigson    v.    Mitcham,    74    Tex. 

571  1086 

Sears  v.   Smith,  2  Mich.   243 

854,   1071,  1086 
V.   Wills,   4   Allen    (Mass.)    212 

318,   997 

Seary     v.     Wegenaar,     120     App. 

Div.    (N.    Y.)    419  1615 

Sease  v.   Dobson,   34   S.  Car.   345     458 
Seaton  v.  Chamberlain,  32  Kans. 
239  1202,   1430 

V.  Hixon,  35  Kans.  '663 

1202,   1430,  1565 
Seattle  Lumber  Co.  v.  Richardson 
&  Elmer  Co.,  66  Wash.   671  1230 

V.   Sweeney,    43    Wash.    1  1236 

Seavey  v.  Godbold,  99  Miss.  113      583 
Sea  Witch,  The,  34  Fed.  654  1726 

Secomb  v.  Nutt.  14  B.  Mon.   (Ky.) 

324  884,    885,    919,   921,   960,   962 

Second  Nat.   Bank   v.  Walbridge, 

19    Ohio    St.    419  825 

Second  Nat.  Bank  of  Louisville 
V.  Nat.  State  Bank,  10  Bush 
(Ky.)    367  384 

Secret,  The.  15  Fed.  480  1691 

Secrist   v.    Delaware,   100   Ind.   59 

1375 
V.   Stivers,    35    Iowa    580  576 

Sedam  v.  Williams,  4  McLean  (U. 

S.)    51  791 

Seebaum    v.    Handy,    46    Ohio    St. 

560  641,   699 

Seely  v.  Neill,  37  Colo.  198  1458 

Seeman  v.  Biemann,  108  Wis.  365 

1232,   1289 
V.  Schultze,  100   Ga.   603  1349 

Seibel  v.   Simeon,    62   Mo.   255  1547 

Seibs   V.   Englehardt,   78   Ala.    508 

1585,  1587 
Seisel  v.  Folmar,  103  Ala.  491  602 
Seitz    V.    Union    Pac.    R.    Co.,    16 

Kans.   133  1109,   1257 

Selah,  The,  4  Sawy.  (U.  S.)  40  1792 
Selby  V.   Hurd,   51  Mich.    1  1026 

V.   Stanley,    4    Minn.    65     (Gil. 

34)  1063 

Selden    v.    Meeks,    17    Cal.    128 

1190,    1406,    1409,   1420 
Selfridge       v.       Leonard-Heffner 

Co.,    51    Colo.    314  1559 

Selina,  The,  2  Notes  Cas.  Adm.  & 

Ecc.    18  1787 

Selma      Sash      &c.      Factory      v. 

Stoddard,   116  Ala.   251  1187 

Selna   v.    Selna,    i:i5    Cal.    357  1064 

Seiner   v.   Lyons,    110   N.   Y.    S. 

1049  673 

Selph  V.  Howland,  23  Miss.  264  1261 
Selz  V.  Mayer.  151  Ind.   422  788 

Seminole,    The,    42    Fed.    924  1800 

Senator,    The,    21    Fed.    191  1713 

Senior  v.  Brebnor,  22  111.  252  1199 
Sens  v.  Trentune,  54  Tex.  218  1226 
Sensenbrenner     t.     Mathews,     48 

Wis.    250  997 

Senter  v.  Lambeth,   59   Tex.   259 

1061,   1063,    1064,   1081 
Serapis,  The,  37  Fed.  436  1798 

Sergeant  v.  Denby,  87  Va.  206  1313 
Servis  v.  Beatty,  32  Miss.  52  1107 

Sessoms    v.    Tayloe,    148    N.    Car. 
369  631 


cl 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Seventh  Avenue  Meat  &  Provi- 
sion Co.  V.  Del  Favero,  123  N. 
Y.   S.    46  184 

Sevier   v.    Shaw,    25    Ark.    417  575 

Sewall  V.  Duplessis,  2  Rob.  (La.) 
66  1272 

V.  Hull  of  a  New  Ship,  The, 
1    Ware    (U.    S.)    565 

1746,    1748 
V.   Lancaster    Bank,    17    Serg-. 
&    R.    (Pa.)    285 

379,    393,    409,   411 
Sexton      V.      Albertie,      10      Lea 
(Tenn.)    452  1261 

V.   Pike,    13    Ark.    193  212,   226 

V.   "Weaver,    141    Mass.    273 

1308,    1415,    1420,    1569 
Seymour    v.    Alkire,    47    W.    Va. 
302  1009 

V.  Canandaigua  &  Niagara 
Falls  R.  Co.,  25  Barb. 
(N.    Y.)    284  77 

V.   Hoadley,    9   Conn.    418  470 

V.   Newton,     105    Mass.     272 

841,    913,    937,    960,   965 
V.   Slide    &    Spur    Gold    Mines, 

42   Fed.    633  1064,   1090 

S.    G.    Owens,    The,    1    "Wall.    Jr. 

(U.    S.)    370  1713 

Shackleford     v.     Beck,      80     Va. 

573  1229,    1389,   1417 

Shacklett      v.      Polk,      4      Heisk. 

(Tenn.)     104  1261 

Shaeffer    v.    "Weed,    3    GiL     (IH.) 

511  1382 

Shafer  v.  Archbold,  116  Ind.  29     1286 
V.   Guest,     35     How.     Pr.     (N. 

Y.)     184  518 

V.  Hogue,   70   "^'is.   392  719 

Shaffer  v.   Stevens,   143  Ind.   295     615 
Shall    V.    Briscoe,    18    Ark.    142 

1063,   1083,    1092 
Shamokin    Val.    &    P.    R.    Co.    v. 

Malone,   85   Pa.   St.  25  1665 

Shank    v.    Shoemaker,    18    N.    Y. 

489  193,   196 

Shanks    v.    Klein.    104    U.    S.    18 

796,   799 
Shannon    v.    Cavenaugh,    12    Cal. 
App.    434  601 

v.  Rutterv    (Tex.    Civ.    App.), 

140   S.  "W.   858  1125 

V.   Shultz,    87    Pa.    St.    481  1260 

Shape  V.  Mitchell,  116  Iowa  636  1294 
Shapiro    v.    Thompson,    160    Ala. 

363  553 

Shapleigh   v.   Hull,   21   Colo.    419    1249 
Shapley  v.   Bellows,    4  N.   H.   347 

155,    166,   220 
Shappendocia      v.      Spencer,      73 

Ind.    128  758 

Sharon    Town    Co.    v.    Morris,    39 

Kans.    377  1406.   1453 

Sharp  V.   Collins,   74  Mo.   266  1080 

V.   J^lelds,     1     Keisk.     (Tenn.) 

571  "  636 

V.  Fields,  5  Lea  (Tenn.)  326  230 
V.  Fly,  9  Bax.  (Tenn.)  4  1079 
V.  Johnson,  38  Ore.  246  641,  675 
V.   Morgan,    9  Ga.   App.   487  611 

V.   "^^hipple,    1    Bosw.     (N.    Y.) 

557  423,   466,   469 

Sharpe  v.  Allen,  11  Lea  (Tenn.) 
518  230 


Sharpe   v.   Clifford,    44   Ind.    346      1262 
Sharpley  v.   South   &  East  Coast 

R.   Co.,  2   Ch.  Div.   663  1487 

Shattell    v.    Woodward,    17    Ind. 

225  1375 

Shattuck   V.   Beardsley,   46   Conn. 

386  1192,    1393,    1423 

Shaver   v.    Murdock,    36    Cal.    293 

1289,   1513 
v.  "Western   Union    Telegraph 

Co.,  57  N.  Y.   459  54 

Shaw    V.   Allen,    24    Wis.    563  1592 

V.   Berry,   31   Maine    478  498 

V.   Bradley,   59   Mich.    199  704 

V.  Ferguson,  78  Ind.  547  419,  479 
V.  FJellman,  72  Minn.  465  1444 
V.   Gookin,    7    N.   H.    16  1789 

V.   Martin,    20    Idaho    168  1602 

V.  Neale,   6   H.   L.   Cas.    581  229 

V.   Stewart,    43    Kans.    572 

1287,   1438 
V.   Tabor,   146  Mich.   544  1064 

V.   Thompson,    105   Mass.    345 

1207,   1319 
V.   Young,    87    Maine    271 

1276,  1278 
Shea  V.  Minneapolis,  St.  P.  &  S., 

Sts.   M.   R.   Co..   63  Minn.    228        315 
Shealey  v.   Clark,   117   Ga.   794  611 

V.   Livingston,   8  Ga.   App.    642   708 
Shearer  v.   Rasmussen,   102   Wis. 
585  1494 

V.  Wilder,    56   Kans.   252  1252a 

Sheble  v.  Curdt,   56  Mo.  437  626 

Shedoudy  v.  Spreckels  Bros. 
Commercial  Co.,  9  Cal.  App. 
398  981 

Sheedy    v.    McMurtry,    44    Nebr. 

499  183 

Sheehan   v.  South  River   &c.   Co.. 

Ill   Ga.   444  1235 

Sheeks-Stephens     Store      Co.     v. 

Richardson,   76   Ark.   282  778 

Sheer  v.  Cummings,  80  Tex.  294  1245 
Sheffield  v.   Loeffler,   50  Hun    (N. 

Y.)    606  1299 

Shelbourne,  The,  30  Fed.  510  1702 

Shelby  v.  Moore,  22  Ind.  App. 
371  615 

V.   Perrin,   18   Tex.    515  1080 

Sheldon  v.  Bremer,  166  Mich. 
578  1208 

V.  Parker.     3     Hun      (N.     Y.) 

498  1756 

V.   Smith.     28    Barb.     (N.     Y.) 

593  1459 

sneiiaoarger       v.       i'hayer,       la 

Kans.    619  1202,   1304 

Shelley  v.  Estes,  83  Mo.  App. 
310  1086 

V.   Tuckerman,  83  Nebr.  366       541 
Shelton  v.  Cooksey,  138  Mo.  App. 
389  1086 

V.      Jones,    4    Wash.    692 

1107,   1119 

Shenandoah     Valley     R.     Co.     v. 

Griffith.    76    Va.    913  397 

V.  Miller,    80   Va.    821  1229 

Shepard    v.    Briggs,    26   Vt.    149        547 

V.   Rice,    8  N.   Y.    S.    472  972 

Shepardson  v.   Johnson,   60  Iowa 

239  1201.   1462 

Sheppard  v.  Mesenger,  107  Iowa 
717  1244 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


cli 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§   1-lOGOf;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Sheppard  v.  Newhall,  47  Fed. 
468  946.  949,   953,   964 

V.   Steele,   43   N.  Y.   52 

1724,    1729,    1733,    1756 
V.   Taylor,      5      Pet.      (U.      S.) 

675  1701 

V.   Thomas,    26    Ark.    617    991,   1119 
Sheratz    v.    Nicodemus,    7    Yerg. 

(Tenn.)    9  1075 

Sheridan  v.  Colton,  113  Mich. 
112  '1- 

V.   Ireland,    66    Maine    65 

710,   730a 
Sheiman    v.    Dutch,    16   111.    283         598 
V.   Rugee,    55   Wis.    346  96o 

Sherry  v.   Schraage,  48  Wis.  93     1600 
Sherwood     v.     Central    Michigan 
Savings  Bank,  103  Mich.   109^         76 
V.   Seaman,    2    Bosw.     (N.    ^-J^., 
127  1'^ ' 

ShetslineV.   Keemle,   1  Ashmead 

(Pa.)    29  588 

Shewalter    v.    Missouri    Pac.    R. 

Co.,    84  Mo.   App.   589  291 

Shickle  &c.  Iron  Co.  v.  Council 
Bluffs  Water  Works  Co.,  33 
Fed.    13  1530 

Shields  v.  Dodge,  14  Lea  (Tenn.) 
356  "*'' 

"v.   Keys,   24   Iowa  298        1572,   1586 
V.   Sorg,    129    111.    App.    266         1572 
Shilling    V.    Templeton,    66    Ind. 

585  1262,   1337 

Shines     v.     Johnson,     18    Ky.     U 

853  1064 

Shingleur-Johnson  Co.  v.  Can- 
ton  Cotton   Warehouse   Co.,   78 

Miss.    875  -?.^^'.??J 

Shinn  v.  Fredericks,  56  111.  439     1119 
V.   Taylor,    28    Ark.    523  1109 

Ship    Packet,    3    Mason     (U.    S.) 

334  471 

Shippen    v.    Paul,    34    N.    J.    Eq. 

315  1487 

Shireman     v.     Jackson,     14     Ind. 

459  820 

Shirley  v.  Congress  Steam  Sugar 
Refinery,  2  Edw.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 
505  1064,   1082 

V.   Shirley,     7     Blackf.    (Ind.) 

452  1105 

Shlrling   v.   Kennon,   119   Ga.   501   611 
Shirts  V.   Irons,   54   Ind.   13  217 

Shoecraft     v.     Bailey,     25     Iowa 

533  511 

Shoener     v.     Cabeen,     15     Phila. 

(Pa.)    65  467 

Short  V.  Ames,   121   Pa.   St.   530 

1309a,    1421,   1422 
V.   Battle,    52    Ala.    456  1079 

V.   Miller,    120    Pa.    St.    470 

1309a,    1330 
Shorter   v.    Frazer,    64    Ala.    74 

1064,    1084,   1099 
Shorthill     Co.     v.     Bartlett.     131 

Iowa    259  1295 

Shreveport    Nat.     Bank     v.     Ma- 
ples,   119    La.    41  1204,   1265 
Shriver    v.    Birchall,   2   Wkly.  N. 

Cas.    172  1330 

Shropshire   v.    Duncan,    25    Nebr. 

485  1500 

V.  Lyle,    31    Fed.    694  1074 

Shryock  v.  Hensel,  95  Md.  614       1401 


Shue   V.    Ingle,    87    111.    App.    522      698 
Shuey  v.   United  States,   92   U.   S. 

73  492,    493 

Shumate    v.    Harbin,    35    S.    Car. 

521  1143 

Shurtz    V.     Colvin,     55     Ohio     St. 

274  1086 

Sibley   v.    Casev,    6    Mo.    164  1261 

V.   Pine  County,    31  Minn.   201 

226  992 
Sickman  v.  Wollett,  31  Colo.  58*1392 
Sides     V.     Cline,    19    Pa.    Co.    Ct. 

481  676 

Sidlinger   v.   Kerkow,   82   Cal.    42 

1190,   1600 
Sidwell     V.     Gen.    Leaf    Tobacco 

Warehouse  Co.,  23  Ky.  L.  1501   968 
Siebrecht  v.  Hogah,  99  Wis.  437 

1232,   1300 
Siegmund     v.     Kellogg-Mackay- 
Cameron    Co.,    38   Ind.   App.    95 

1343,   1391 

Siffken    v.    Wrav,    6    East    371 

866,  874 
Sigerson    v.    Kahmann,     39     Mo. 

206  807 

Sigler   V.    Knox   County   Bank,    8 

Ohio   St.    511  788,   793 

Sikes   V.    Page,    12   Ky.    780  1129 

Silvester  v.  Coe  Quartz  Mine 
Co.,   80   Cal.    510 

1190,    1328,    1368,    1434,   1454 
Simmons   v.    Almy,    103   Mass.    33 

115,   155,   162,   196 
V.   Carrier,    60    Mo.    581 

1310,   1328,    1404 
V.   Fielder,    46    Ala.    304  603 

V.   Swift,    5    B.    &    C.    857  836 

Simon  v.  Blocks,  16  Bradw.  (111.) 

450  1199,    1536 

V.    Brown,    38  Mich.    552  1093 

V.   Goldenberg,     15     La.     Ann. 

229  620 

Simonds   v.   Buford,   18  Ind.   176 

1200,   1586 
Simonsen  v.  Stachlewicz,  82  Wis. 

338  1293 

Simonson  Bros.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Citi- 
zens' State  Bank,  105  Iowa 
264  1201 

Simpson   v.    City,    109   La.    897        1204 
V.  Hartopp,    Willes,    512  563 

V.   Hinson,    88    Ala.    527  603 

V.   Lamb,    7    E.    &    B.    84  215 

V.  Mundee,    3    Kans.    172  1063 

Sims  V.  Bradford,  12  Lea 
(Tenn.)    434  645,   693 

V.  National  Commercial  Bank, 

73    Ala.    248  1064,   1101 

V.   Sampey,    64   Ala.   230 

1070,   1098 
Sinclair   v.   Fitch,    3   E.   D.   Smith 
(N.    Y.)    677  1543,    1614 

V.   Sinclair,     79     Va.     40 

1157,   1178 
Singerly  v.   Doerr,    62   Pa.    St.    9 

1324,   1329.   1435 

Singer    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Becket,    85 

N.    Y.    S.    301  981 

V.   Miller,    52    Minn.    516  532 

V.   Sammons,    49    Wis.    316  855 

Singletary  v.   Golman    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.).    123    S.   W.    436  990 


clii 


TADLE  OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I 

iSinnickson    v.    Lynch,    25    N.    J. 

U   317  1574 

binton    V.    Roberts,    The,    34    Ind. 
448  1722.    1725,   1743 

V.  Steamboat       Roberts,        46 

Ind.    476  1495,   1499,  1534, 

1724,    179S,    180LI,    ISUb 

Siren,   The,  7  Wall.    (U.  S.)    152        279 

Sirocco,   The,    7   Fed.    599  1704 

Siron  v.  Ruleman,  32  Grat.   (Va.) 

215  1163 

Sisson  V.  Holcomb,  58  Mich.  634  1259 
Sitton  V.  Dubois,  14  Wash.  624  786b 
Sitz    V.    Deihl,    55    Mo.    17  1109 

Skaggs  V.  Hill.   12  Ky.  L.   382 

177,    203,   230 

V.  Nelson,  25  Miss.   88      1092,    1119 

Sketoe   V.    Ellis,    14   111.    75  576 

Skillin  V.  Moore,   79  Maine  554      1247 

Skillinger,    The,    1    Flip.    (TJ.    S.) 

436  1009 

Skinner    v.     Caughey,     64    Minn. 

375  665,   689 

V.   Purnell,    52    Mo.    96  1088 

V.   Sweet,    3    Madd.    244  228 

V.    Upshaw,   2   Ld.   Raym.    752      262 

Sklpwith  V.  — ,  the  Innkeeper,   1 

Bulst.    170  499 

Skolfleld    V.    Porter,    2    Ware    (U. 

S.;    437  1704 

Skyrme    v.    Occidental    M.    &    M. 
Co.,   8  Nev.   219  1441,   1494,  1495, 

1499,    1532,    1556,    1558 
Slack    V.    Collins,    145    Ind.    569 

21,  806,   1071 
Slagle    V.    DeGooyer,     115     Iowa 

401  1502 

Slappey    v.    Charles,    7    Ga.    App. 

796  708 

Slaughter  v.   Owens,  60   Tex.   668 

1090,    1098,   1099 
V.   Winfrey,    85   N.    Car.    159        631 
Slayden     v.     Palmo      (Tex.     Civ. 

App.),    90   S.   W.    908  1060 

Sleeper  v.  Parrish,  7  Phila.  (Pa.) 

247  569,   632 

Slight   V.    Patton,    96    Cal.    384        1404 
Slingerland    v.    Binns,    56    N.    J. 

Eq.    413  1216,   1291 

-Sloan  V.  Campbell,  71  Mo.  387       1092 
V.   Hudson,    119    Ala.    27  580 

Slocum   V.   Clark,   2   Hill    (N.   Y.) 

475  577 

Slubey  v.  Heyward,   2  H.   Bl.  504 

836,    837,    962 
Sly   V.    Pattee,    58   N.   H.    102 

1215,    1235,    1243,    1465,   1468 

Smaet  v.  Sanders,  5  C.  B.   895  476 

Small     V.     Foley,     8     Colo.     App. 

435  1312 

V.   Moates,    9    Bing.    579  272 

V.   Small,    16    S.    Car.    64  1105 

V.   Stagg,    95    111.    39  1092,   1093 

Smaltz    V.    Hagy,    4    Phila.    (Pa.) 

99  1437  , 

Smalley       v.       Ashland       Brown 
Stone    Co.,    114    Mich.    104 

1208,   1532 
V.   Clark,   22  Vt.   598  191,    229 

V.   Gearing,    121    Mich.    190 

1208,    1289,   1500a 
V.  Northwestern   Terra   Cotta 

Co.,    113    Mich.    141  1208 


§§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,    §§   1061-1812.] 

Smallhouse   v.    Kentucky   &c    M 

Co.,   2    Mont.    443  1363,   1629 

Smaw   V.   Cohen,    95   N.   Car.    85      1219 
Smelker   v.   Chicago   &   N.   W.   R 

Co.,    106    Wis.    135  192b 

Smiley    v.    Jones,     3     Tenn.    Ch. 

312  1173 

Smith    V.    Atkins,    18    Vt.    461  548 

V.   Baily,    8    Daly    (N.    Y.)    128 

1218,   1548 
V.   Barnes,    38    Minn.    240 

1235,    1246 
V.   Baum,     67     How.     Pr.     (N. 

Y.)   267  189,   233 

V.   Blois,    8   La.   Ann.    10  620 

V.  Bobb,   12  Sm.   &  M.   (Miss.) 

322  600 

V.   Bow^les,    2    Esp.    578  868 

V.   Bradbury,    148    Cal.    41  1190 

V.  Brocklesby,  1  Amstr.  61  215 
V.   Bryan,   34   111.   364  108 

V.   Butts,    72    Miss.    269  1520 

V.   Cayuga   Lake    Cement   Co., 

107  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)   524  184 
V.   Central   Trust  Co.,    4   Dem. 
Sur.    (N.    Y.)    75 

184,   187,   202 
V.   Chicago      &c.      R.     Co.,    56 

Iowa  720  175 

V.   Coe,    2    Hilt.    (N.    Y.)    365 

1287,   1290 
V.   Coe,   29   N.   Y.   666  1242,   1330 

V.  Colcord,  115  Mass.  70  514,  515 
V.   Colson,    10    Johns.    (N.    Y.) 

91  572 

V.   Corey,    3    E.    D.    Smith    (N. 

Y.)    642  1608 

V.   Dayton,    94    Iowa    102  616 

V.  Dearlove,  6  C.  B.  132  503,  504 
V.   Dennie,     6     Pick.      (Mass.) 

262  814 

V.  Dodge,  59  N.  J.  Eq.  584  1291 
V.  Drake,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  302  1136 
V.   Eighth      Ward      Bank,      31 

App.    Div.    (N.    Y.)    6  245 

V.  Emerson,  126  Mass.  169  1207 
V.   Equitable    Trust    Co.,     215 

Pa.    418  77 

V.   Evans,    37    Ind.    526  796 

V.   Evans,    110   Ga.   536  217 

V.  Field,  5  T.  R.  402  865,  867 
V.   First    Nat.    Bank,    115    Ga. 

608  384 

V.   Frank  Gardener  Hdw-.  Co., 

83    Miss.    654  1286 

V.  Fvler,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.)  648  572 
V.  Goodwin,  4  B.  &  Ad.  413  589 
V.   Goss,    1    Camp.    282 

921,    936,   965 
V.   Greenup,    60    Mich.    61  21 

V.   Hague,    25    Kans.    246  1129 

V.  Headlev,  33  Minn.  384  1369 
V.   High,    85    N.    Car.    93 

1063,  1110 
V.   Hudson,    6    B.    &    S.    431 

921,   944 
V.  Iowa   City   Loan    &    Build- 
ing Assn.,  60  Iowa  164 

1287,    1289 
V.   Johnson,   2  MacAr.    (D.   C.) 

481  1258,    1393,   1532 

V.   Jones,   65   Miss.    276  62.") 

V.   Jones,    18    Nebr.    481  796 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cliii 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   1-lOGOf;  Vol.   II,    §§   1061-1812.] 


Smith    V.   Kennedy,    89    111.    485 
1185,     1348, 
V.   Keyes,   2    Thomp.   &   C.    (N. 

Y.)    650  506. 

V.   Lowden,    1    Sandf.    (N.    Y.) 

696 
V.   Lozo,    42    Mich.    6 
V.   Lynes,    5    N.    Y.    41 
V.  Marden,   60   N.   H.    509 
V.   Meanor,      16     Serg.      &     R. 

(Pa  )     375 
V.   Meri-iam,   67   Barb.    (N.   Y.) 

403  1287,    1290. 

V.   Meyer,   25   Ark.   609        556, 
V.   Mills,    145    Ind.    334 
V.  Moore,     26    111.    392 

1108,    1199, 
V.   Morris,  120  Mass.  58 
V.   Nevv-bauer,    144    Ind.    95 

1304a, 


1349 

518 

217 
820 
815 
670 

588 

1298 
576a 

1092 

1257 
1254 

1539 

V.   Norris,   120  Mass.   58 

1252a,   1413,  1415 
V.   O'Brien,    46    Misc.     (N.    Y.) 

325  967 

V.  Owen,  43  Tex.  Civ.  App.  411  1123 
V.  Owen,  49  Tex.  Civ.  App.  51  1116 
V.   Parsons,  33  W.  Va.   644  1101 

V.  Pate  (Tex.),  43  S.  W.  312  1110 
V.   Pierce,  45  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.) 

1550  628 

v.   Price,  42  111.  399  1108 

V.   Rowland,  13  Kans.  245 

1063,  1107,   1124 
V.   St.    Paul    &c.    Ins.    Co.,    106 

Iowa  225  1250 

V.   Scott,    31    Wis.    420  997,   999 

V.   Shaffer,    50   Md.    132  1609 

V.   Shell  Lake  Lumber  Co.,   68 

Wis.  89  576a.  1048 

V.  Sheriff,  1  Bay  (S.  Car.)  443  572 
V.   Sherman  Min.  Co.,  12  Mont. 

524  1212,  1404 

V.   Sieveking-,  5  E.  &  B.  589  274 

V.   Smith.  105  Ga.  717  611 

V.  Smith,    9    Abb.    Pr.    (N.    S.) 

(N.  Y.)   420      1063,   1092,   1095 
V.  Smith,    51   Hun    (N.   Y.)    164 

30,  77 
V.  Stevens,  36  Minn.  303  665,  692 
V.  Sturgis,  3  Ben.  (U.  S.)  330  1800 
V.  Taber,  46  Hun    (N.  Y.)   313 

543  548 
V.  Tate,  30  Ind.  App.  367  'l200 
V.  Turner,   50  Ind.  367  1127 

V.  Van  Hoose,  110  Ga.  633  1590 
V.   Vaughan,    78    Ala.    201  1071 

V.   Vicksburg   S.    &    T.    R.    Co., 

112  La.  985  196 

V.  Wells,    4   Bush    (Ky.)    92 

585    993 

V.  Wright,  153  Mo.  App.  719    'l81a 

V.   Young.    62    111.    210  161 

Smith  Bridge  Co.  v.  Bowman,  41 

Ohio  St.   37  1618,   1664 

V.  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.,  72  111. 

506  1199 

Smoot  V.  Shv,  159  Mo.  App.  126     181a 
V.  Strauss.   21   Fla.    611  610 

Smoyer    v.    Roth,    10    Sad.     (Pa.) 

32  562 

Smullen   v.  Hall.  13  Daly   (N.  Y.) 

392  1543 

Snead  v.  Watkins,  1  C.  B.   (N.  S.) 
267  499,   500 


Snee  v.   Prescott,   1   Atk.   245   858,   882 
Snell  V.  Clark  Const.  Co.,  16  Cal. 
App.  253  1190 

V.   Mohan,  38  Ind.  494  1559 

Snippel  V.  Blake.  80  Iowa  142       1743a 
Snitzler  v.  Filer.  135  111.  App.   61 

1199.  1445 
Snively's  Appeal,  129  Pa.  St.  250  1158 
Snodgrass  v.  Holland,  6  Colo.  596 

1571,   1585 

Snook   V.    Davidson.   2   Camp.   218    423 

Snow  V.  Council,   65  Ga.  123  1197 

Snyder    v.    Hitt,     2    Dana     (Ky.) 

204  555,   570 

V.   Kunkleman,    3    Pen.    &    W. 

(Pa.)  487  585 

V.   Snyder,  115  N.  Y.  S.  993 

1072,   1092 
V.    Sparks,    73    Nebr.    804  1275 

Snyder,   In    re.    190   N.   Y.    66  150a 

Societe  Generale  de  Paris  v. 
Tramways  Union  Co.,  14  Q.  B. 
D.     424  389 

Society  for  the  Propagation  of 
the  Gospel  v.  Wheeler,  2  Gall. 
(U.    S.)    105  1145 

Sodergren  v.  Flight.  6  East  622 

320    321 
Sodini  v.  Winter,  32  Md.  130 

1206,  1235,  1304,  1327,  1500,  1532 
Sohier  v.  Eldredge,  103  Mass.  345  1160 
Soils,  The,  35  Fed.  545  1699 

Solneig,  The.   103  Fed.   322  1680 

Solomon  v.  Franklin,  7  Idaho  316   355b 
Somes    v.    British    Empire    Ship- 
ping   Co.,    8    H.    L.    Cases    338, 
345  972 

V.   British      Empire     Shipping 

Co.,  30  L.  J.  Q.  B.  229  281 

Sontag  V.  Brennan,  75  111.  279 

1518,  1539 
V.   Doerge,  14  Mo.  App.   577       1441 
Sorg    V.    Crandall,    129    111.    App. 
255  1552 

V.  Crandall,  233  111.  79 

1368,   1369,   1403,  1588 

Souders    v.    Vansickle,    3    Halst. 

(N.    J.)    31  557 

V.  Borelli,  80  Conn.  392  1499 

V.   Dawes,  7  Cal.  575  1248,  1481 

v.  Dawes,  14  Cal.  247  1445 

V.   Hurlbut,   58   Conn.   511  1458 

Southern   Cal.   L.   Co.   v.   Schmitt, 

74  Cal.   625  1190,   1614 

Southern   Dock  Co.   v.   Gibson,   22 

La.  Ann.   623  1729 

Southei'n    Grocer    Co.    v.    Adams, 

112  Ga.   60  456 

Southern    R.    Co.    v.    Born    Steel 

Range    Co..    126    Ga.    527  332 

V.   Bouknight,    70    Fed.    442        1675 

South,   Ex  parte,  3  Swanst.   393  43 

South    Fork    Canal    Co.,    The.    v. 

Gordon,   6  Wall.    (U.   S.)    561  112 

South    Portland,     The,    100    Fed. 

494  1765 

South   Side  Lumber  Co.   v.   Date, 

156    111.    App.    430  1283 

Southwestern    Freight    &    Cotton 
Press  Co.  v.   Plant.  45  Mo.  517     807 
V.   Stanard,  44  Mo.  71 

800,   803,   807 
Southwestern    R.    Co.    v.    Bently, 
51   Ga.   311  269 


cliv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Southwick,    In    re,    1    Johns.    Ch. 

(NY.  )22  229 

Sowle  v.  Holdridgo,  63  Ind.  213     1127 

Sowles  V.   Hall,   73   Vt.    55  30 

Spafford  v.  Dodge,  14  Mass.  66       1769 

V.   True,   33    Maine    283  710 

Spalding'  v.  Chelmsford,  117  Mass. 

393  1142 

V.   Ruding-,   6  Beav,  376  953 

Spalding   Lumber   Co.    v.    Brown, 

171    111.    487  1199 

Spang-ler  v.  Green,  21  Colo.  505  '  1191 

Sparks    v.    Butte    County    Grav. 

Min.   Co..   55  Cal.  389  1190,  1283 

V.   Dunbar,   102  Ga.   129  1197 

V.   Hess,  15  Cal.  186 

1063,   1107,  1124 
V.   Ponder,    42    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

431  638 

V.  Texas  Loan   Co.    (Tex.),   19 

S.    W.    256  1067 

Spartali  v.  Benecke.  10  C.  B.   212 

850,  851 
Spaulding    v.    Adams,    32    Maine 
211  998 

V.  Thompson     Eccl.     Soc,     27 

Conn.  573  1287,  1291 

Spaulding,    The,    1    Brown    Adm. 

310  1781 

Spears  v.  Du  Rant.  76  S.  Car.  19    1599 

V.   Hartly,   3   Bsp.   81  452,   978 

V.   Taylor,  149  Ala.  180     1011,   1116 

Special   Tax   School   v.    Smith,    61 

Fla.    782  1375 

Speer  v.   Hart,   45  Ga.   113  454 

Spence    v.    Griswold,    23    Abb.    N. 
Cas.    (N.  Y.)    239  1585 

V.   Palmer.   115  Mo.  Apn.   76        1116 
Spencer    v.    Clinefelter,    101    Pa. 
St.  219  632 

V.  Doherty,  17  R.  I.  89 

1223.   1588,  1591 
V.  McGowan,  13  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

256  562 

Spengler    v.    Stiles-Tull    Lumber 

Co.,  94  Miss.   780  1498 

Speth    V.    Brangman,    27    Ky.    L. 

295  660 

Spinning   v.    Blackburn,    13    Ohio 

St.   131  1262 

Spofford    V.    True,    33    Maine    283 

729,  1024 
Spokane  Lumber  Co.  v.  McChes- 
ney,  1  Wash.  St.  609 

1230,   1234a,  1235,   1304,   1554 
Spoor    V.    Holland,    8    Wend.     (N. 

Y.)    445  1036 

Sprague  V.  Cochran,  144  N.  Y.  104        77 
V.   Drew,    3    Stew.    N.    J.    Dig. 

434  1079 

V.  Green,  18  Bradw.  (111.)  476   1614 
V.   McDougall,  172  Mass.   553 

1465,  1470 
Sprag'ue  Inv.  Co.  v.  Mouat  Lum- 
ber  &c.   Co.,   14   Colo.    App.    107 

1310,   1317,   1397,   1398.   1422.   1494 
Spring  V.  South  Carolina  Ins.  Co., 

8  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  268  469 

Springer    v.    Kroeschell,    161    111. 

358  1244 

V.   Lipsis,   110   111.   App.   109  613 

Spring-field    &c.    Co.    v.    Best,    63 

Kans.  187  1325 


Springfield   &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Stew- 
art,  51    Ark.    285  1()S6 
Springman    v.    Hawkins,    52    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  249  1116 

Sproessig  v.   Kentel,    17   N.   Y.    S. 

839  1513a 

Sproule  V.   McNulty,  7  Mo.  62  965 

Spruhen   v.   Stout,   52   Wis.    517 

1232,    1334,   1559 
Spruill  V.  Arrington,   109   N.  Car. 

192  457,   631 

Spry  Lumber  Co.  v.  Trust  Co.,  77 

Mich.    199  1235 

Spurgeon    v.    McElwain,    6    Ohio 

442  1381 

Spurlock  V.  Pacific  R.  R.,  61  Mo. 

319  377 

Squires  v.  Abbott,  61  N.  Y.  530 

1733,  1756 

V.   Fithian,  27  Mo.  134  1436 

Stabler  v.   Spencer,  64  Ala.   496      1070 

Stacy  V.  Bryant,  73  Wis.  14  719 

Stadel   V.   Aikins,    65   Kans.   82  617 

Stafford  v.   Produce  Exch.  Bank. 

Co.,  61  Ohio  St.  160  377 

v.  Van     Rensselaer,     9     Cow. 

(N.    Y.)     316  1063,    1080 

Staggs  V.   Small,   4   Bradw.    (111.) 

192  1092 

Stagner  v.  Woodward   (Ky.),  1  S. 

W.  583  1512 

Stahl  V.  Lowe,  18  Ky.  L.  946  77 

Stallman  v.   Kimberly,   121   N.   Y. 

393  967,  981 

Stamps  V.  Gilman,  43  Miss.  456 

551,  562,   625 
Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Lane,  75  Wis. 
636  1335 

V.  Sowden,   55   Ohio  St.   332       1532 
Stanford    v.    Andrews,    12    Heisk. 

(Tenn.)   664  230 

Stanhope  v.  Dodge.  52  Md.  483       1110 
Stanley  v.  Bouck.  107  Wis.  225       990 
V.   Chicago    Trust    &c.    Bank, 

165   111.   295  253 

V.   Chicago    Trust    &c.    Bank, 

61   111.  App.   257  393 

V.   Johnson,    113    Ala.    344  1069 

Stansell  v.  Roberts.  13  Ohio  148     1092 

Stanton      v.      Eager,      16      Pick. 

(Mass.)    467  861.   884.   948 

V.  Embrey.   93  U.   S.   548  44 

Stanwood,    The,    49    Fed.    577  1787 

Staples  V.  Bradlev,  23  Conn.  167     335 

V.   Somerville,  176  Mass.  237      1375 

Stapp  V.  The  Clyde,  43  Minn.   192 

1725,   1731,  1750 
Stark    V.    Starr,    1    Sawy.    (U.    S.) 

15  1133,    1134,   1146 

State  V.  Adams,  76  Mo.  605  546 

V.   Anderson,  91  U.  S.  667  1674 

V.   Bell,   136  N.  Car.  674  631 

V.   Copeland,  86  N.  Car.   691  631 

V.  Crook,   132  N.  Car.  1053  631 

V.   Eads,  15  Iowa  114         1201,   1570 
V.   Edgefield  &c.  R.  Co.,  4  Baxt. 

(Tenn.)    92  231 

V.   Fidelity    &    Guaranty    Co., 


135  Mo.  App.  160 
V.   Goll,  32  N.   J.  L.   285 
V.  Neal,   129   N.   Car.   692 
V.  Pender,  83  N.  Car.  651 
V.   Port   Roval   &c.    R.    Co., 

Fed.  67 


84 


181a 

746 
631 
631 

1675 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clv 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.   I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   lOCl-1812.] 


State  V.  Reader.  36  S.  Car.  497        635 
V.  Rose,  90  N.  Car.   712  631 

V.   Shelton,  238  Mo.   281  1414 

V.   Tiedermann,  3  McCrary  (U. 

S.)   399  1375 

V.  Vandever,  2  Har.   (Del.)  397   608 

V.   Vanler,  78  S.  Car.  103  784c 

V.   Webb,  87  N.  Car.  558  631 

State  Bank  v.  Armstrong,  4  Dev. 

(N.   Car.)   519  241 

V.   Brown,  142  Iowa  190  1119. 

V.   Lowe,    22    Nebr.    68  668,    691 

State  Sash  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Norwegian 

Seminary,   45  Minn.  254      1435,  1441 
State  Trust  Co.  v.  De  La  Vergne 
Refrigerating    Macli.    Co.,    105 
1^'ed.   468  800,   811 

Staton   V.  Bmbrey,  93  U.  S.   548  44 

Statts,  Kx  parte.  4  Cowen  (N.  Y.) 

76  150 

Steamboat     Charlotte     v.     Ham- 
mond, 9  Mo.  59  1532 
Steamboat     Rover     v.     Stiles,     5 

Blackf.    (Ind.)   483  1735 

Steamboat   Virginia  v.   Kraft,   25 

Mo.  76  301 

Steamer  Gazelle   v.   Lake,   1   Ore. 

183  1558 

Steamer     St.     Lawrence,     The,     1 

Black    (U.    S.)    522  1729 

Steamship  Co.   v.  Joliffe,   2  Wall. 

(U.   S.)    450  1558 

Steamship    Dock    Co.    v.    Heron's 

Admx.,  52  Pa.  St.  280     375,   377,  381 
Stearns  v.  Wollenberg,  51  Ore.  88 

128,    ISO 
Stebbins  v.  Culbreth.  86  Md.  656    1343 
V.   Phoenix      F.      Ins.      Co.,      3 
Paige  (N.  Y.)  350 

377,  379,   386,  391,   397 
Steel    V.    Argentine    Min.    Co.,    4 

Idaho  505  1244 

Steele     v.     McBurney,     96     Iowa 
449  1201 

V.   Steele,  64  Ala.  438  1164 

Steenbergen  v.  Gowdy,  93  Ky.  146 

1307,   1382 
Steger  v.  Artie  Refrigerating  Co., 

89   Tenn.   453  1344 

Steigleman    v.    McBride,     17     111. 

300  1257,    1312,    1539,   1610 

Stein  V.  McAuley,  147  Iowa  630  21 

Steininger    v.     Raeman,     28    Mo. 

App.  594  1402a 

Steinkamper  v.  McManus,  26  Mo. 

App.   51  1211.   1328,    1574,    1615 

Steinkemeyer  v.  Gillespie,   82  111. 

253  1119 

Steinman    v.    Henderson,    94    Pa. 
St.   313  1262 

V.  Wilkins,  7  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.) 

466  6,   320,  418,   643,   731, 

739,   967,   974,    977 
Steinmetz  v.   St.   Paul   Trust  Co., 

50  Minn.  445  1560 

Steltz    V.    Armory    Co.,    15    Idaho 

551  1599 

Stelzer  v.  La  Rose,  79  Ind.  435       1100 
Stenberg      v.      Liennemann,      20 

Mont.   457  1274 

Stephen  v.  Coster,  3  Burr.  1408        980 
V.   Coster,  1  W.  Bl.  413,  423  980 

Stephens  v.  Adams,  93  Ala.  117 

585,   602 


Stephens    v.     Anthony,     37     Ark. 
■otl  1119 

V.   Duffy,  41  Ind.  App.  385         1421 
V.   Farrar,  4  Bush   (Ky.)   13  177 

V.   Greene  County  Iron  Co.,  11 

Heisk.    (Tenn.)   71  1116 

V.  Hicks,    156   N.    Car.    239  1219 

V.   Holmes,  64  111.  336       1355,   1554 
V.  Motl,    81   Tex.    115  1110 

V.   Shannon,  43  Ark.   464 

1063,   1083,   1084,  1099 

V.   Weston,  3  B.  &  C.  535       166,   215 

Stephen's  Appeal,  38  Pa.  St.  9        1063 

Stephenson  v.  Haines,  16  Ohio  St. 

478  549 

V.   The   Francis,   21   Fed.    715 

1679,   1680,   1682,   1683, 
1685,    1688-1691,    1783 
Stepina    v.    Conklin    Lumber   Co., 

134   111.   App.   173  1603 

Sterling,   Ex  parte,   16  Ves.   258 

123,   126,   131 
Stern  v.  Simpson,   62  Ala.  194  603 

Sterner  v.  Haas,    108   Mich.   48S      1:;0S 
Stetson  &  Post  Lumber  Co.  v.  W. 

&  J.  Sloane  Co..  60  Wash.  180     1601 
Stetson  &  P.  Mill  Co.   v.  McDon- 
ald,   5    Vv^ash.    496  1330,   1452 
Stetson-Post   Mill   Co.    v.   Brown, 

21   Wash.   619  1277 

Stevens   v.    Boston    &c.    R.   Co.,    8 

Gray    (Mass.)    262  304,  305 

,v.   Burnham,  62  Nebr.  672  1274 

V.  Campbell,  21  Ind.  471  1578 

V.  Chadwick,   10   Kans.    406 

1107,  1119 
V.   Hurt,  17  Ind.  141  1100 

V.  Lincoln,  114  Mass.  476 

1245,  1313,  1316 
V.  Lodge,  7  Blackf.  (Ind.)  594  562 
V.  Ogden,  130  N.  Y.  182  1294,  1301 
V.  Rainwater,    4   Mo.   App.    292 

1086,   1090 

V.  Robins,  12  Mass.  180  449 

V.  Watson,  4  Abb.  Dec.  302  96 

V.   Wheeler,    27    Barb.    (N.    Y.) 

658  919,  938 

Stevenson  v.  Blakelock,  1  M.  &  S. 

535  6,    115,   119,   128 

V.   Crapnell,    114    111.    19  1066 

v.   Maxwell,  2  N.  Y.  408  1127 

V.  Stonehill,     5     Whart.     (Pa.) 

301  1240,   1362,   1475 

Stewart  v.  Caldwell,  54  Mo.  536  1100 
V.  Christy,  15  La.  Ann.  325  1204 
V.   Flowers,   44   Miss.   513 

21,   115,   137,   158,  181,    229 
V.   Gogoza,    3    Hughes    (U.    S.) 

489  1450 

V.   Hilton,  7  Fed.  562  224 

V.   Hopkins,    30    Ohio    St.    502        52 
V.   McCready,  24  How.  Pr.    (N. 

Y.)  62  515 

V.   McQuaide,   48   Pa.    St.   191      1307 
V.   Naud,   125  Cal.   596  981 

V.   Potomac  Ferry  Co..  12  Fed. 

296  1764a 

V.  Simmons,  101  Minn.  375         1588 
V.   Smiley,  46  Ark.  373  1174 

V.   Wood,  63  Mo.   252  1105 

V.  Wright,  52  Iowa  335 

1287,  1289 


clvi 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   1-lOGOf;  Vol.   II,    §§   1061-1812.] 


Stewart-Chute  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Missouri  Pac.  Lumber  Co.,  28 
Nebr.    39  1327,   1329 

V.   IMissouri   Pac.   Lumber   Co., 

33  Nebr.  29  1657 

Stewart  Contracting-  Co.  v.  Tren- 
ton &c.   R.   Co.,   71  N.   J.   L.   568 

1289,   1500a 
Stewartson    v.    "Watts,    8    Watts 

(Pa.)    392  1114 

Stickle    V.    High    Standard    Steel 

Co.,   78  N.  J.   Eq.   549  1116 

Stickney      v.      Allen,      10      Gray 

(Mass.)    352  745.   997,   1007 

Stidger  v.  McPhee,  15  Colo.  App. 

252  144E 

Stieff  Co.  V.  Ullrich,  110  Md.  629    1020 
Stiles  V.   Galbreath,   69  N.   J.   Eq. 

222  1045 

Stillings  V.   Gibson,   63   N.   H.    1        747 
Stimson   V.   Durham   &c.   Co.,    146 

Cal.   281  1287 

Stimson  Mill  Co.  v.  Los  Angeles 

Tract  Co.,   141   Cal.   30  1352 

Stine  V.  Austin,   9  Mo.  558  1436 

Stoaks  V.  Stoaks,  146  Iowa  61  616 

Stockton  Lumber  Co.  v.  Schuler, 

155   Cal.    411  1415 

Stockton   Malleable    Iron    Co.,    In 

re,   2  Ch.  Div.  101  393 

Stockwell  V.  Campbell,  39  Conn. 
362  1343 

V.   Carpenter,  27  Iowa  119 

1201,   1235,  1236,   1248, 
1257,   1325,  1462 
Stoddard  v.  Benton,  6  Colo.  508        222 
Stoddard     Woollen    Manufactory 

V.  Huntley,  S  N.  H.  441  1002 

Stoermer     v.      People's     Savings 

Bank,  152  Ind.  104  1579 

Stokes  V.  La  Riviere  (Eng.)    917,  921 
Stollenwerck     v.     Thacher,      115 

Mass.  224  419 

Stoltze  V.  Hurd,  20  N.  Dak.  412     1555 
Stonard  v.   Dunkin,   2   Camp.   344 

828     845 

Stone  V.   Bohm.  79  Ky.  141       577^   619 

V.   Hyde,  22  Maine  318  155,  231,  232 

V.  Juvinall,  125  111.  App.  562      143u 

V.   Smith,  3  Daly   (N.  Y.)   213     1218 

V.   Tyler,  173  111.  147  1614a 

Stoner  v.  Neff.  50  Pa.  St.  258  1458 

Stone   Land   &c.    Co.   v.    Boon,    73 

Tex.   548  1116 

Stoner's  Appeal,  135  Pa.  St.  604      1222 
Storm  V.   (3reen,   51   Miss.   103  625 

Storms  V.  Smith,  137  Mass.  201 

691a,   971 

Stornoway,  The,  46  L.  T.   773  273 

Story  V.  Buffum,  8  Allen   (Mass.) 

35  1748 

V.   Flournoy,    55   Ga.    56  585 

V.   Patton,   61  Mo.  App.   12  666 

V.  Russell,  157  Mass.  152  1705 

Stott  V.  Scott,  68  Tex.  302  690 

Stout  V.  Golden,  9  W.  Va.  231 

1231,  1289 
V.  McLachlin.  38  Kans.  120 

1 23  S  1 283 
V.  Sawyer,  37  Mich.  313  1336*.  1728 
V.   Sower,  22  111.  App.   65 

1199,  1371,  1465,  1536 
Stoveld  V.  Hughes,  14  East  308  842 
Stovell  V.  Neal,  90  Cal.  213  1190 


Stow  v.  Hamlin.  11  How.  Pr.    (N. 

Y.)    452  187 

Strahorn    v.    Union    Stock    Yards 

&c.   Co.,   43    111.   424  460 

Strandell  v.  Moran.  49  Mass.  533   1415 
Strang  v.  Pray,   89  Tex.   525  1370 

V.   Richmond    &c.    R.    Co.,    101 

Fed.  511  1628 

Strathmore  v.  Vane,  L.  R.  33  Ch. 

Div.   586  252 

Stratton  v.  Gold,  40  Miss.  778 

1092,  1110,  1114,   1119 
V.   Hussey,    62   Maine    286 

158,  165,   201a,   214.   220 
V.   Schoenbar   (Maine),  10  Atl. 

446  1205,   1391 

Strauss  v.  Baley,  58  Miss.  131  625 

Strauss'  Appeal,  49  Pa.  St.  353       1114 
Strawn  v.  Cogswell,   28   111.   457     1421 
V.   O'Hara,    80    111.    53  1199 

Strebbins  v.  Phenix  Fire  Ins.  Co., 

3   Paige   (N.   Y.)   350  376 

Streeper  v.  McKee,  86  Pa.  St.  188     1547 
Street  Lumber  Co.  v.  Sullivan.  201 

Mass.   484  1587 

Streubel     v.     Milwaukee    &c.     R. 

Co.,   12   Wis.    67  109,   1558 

Strickland     v.     Summerville,     55 
Mo.   164  1116 

V.  Thornton.  2  Ga.  App.  377  577 
Stricklin  v.  Cooper.  55  Miss.  624  1114 
Stringer.  Ex  parte.  9  Q.  B.  D.  436  394 
Stringfeilow  v.  Coons,  57  Fla.  158 

1196.   1299,   1532 

v.  Ivie,   73  Ala.  209  1064,   1072 

Strohecker  v.  Irvine,   76  Ga.   639     230 

Strohm  v.  Good,  113  Ind.   93  1076 

Strohn.   The,   191   Fed.   213  1682 

Stroma,  The,   41  Fed.  599  1690 

Stroma.   The,  53   Fed.   281  1690 

Strong  V.   Taylor,   2    Hill    (N.   Y.) 

437  820 

V.  Van   Deursen,   23   N.   J.   Eq. 

369  1252a.   1458,    1459 

Stroud  V.   Pace,   35   Ark.    100  1083 

Stryker  v.  Cassidy.  76  N.  Y.  50       1367 
V.  Cassidy,  10  Hun   (N.  Y.)  18 

725,   1365 
Stuart  V.  Broome,  59  Tex.  466 

1407,   1539 
V.   Harrison,   52  Iowa  511 

1080,  1086 
V.  Twining-,   112   Iowa  154  616 

Stubbs  V.  Clarinda  &c.  R.  Co.,  62 
Iowa  280  1293.   1593 

V.   Clarinda     &c.     R.     Co.,     65 

Iowa  513  1359,   1408,   1413 

V.  Lund,  7  Mass.  453  870,  902,  910 
Sturges  V.  Breen,  27  Kans.  235  1329 
Sturgis      V.      Slacum,      18      Pick. 

(Mass  )   36  449 

Sturtevant  v.  Orser.  24  N.  Y.  538     866 
Stnyvesant  v.   Browning,   1   J.    & 

S.    (N.   Y.)    203  1276 

Sugg  V.  Farrar.  107  N.  Car.  123       999 
Suliote,  The,  23  Fed.  919  1679 

Sulliman  v.  Short,  26  La.  Ann.  512     620 
Sullivan     v.     Brewster,     1    E.     D. 

Smith    (N.   Y.)    681  1287 

V.   Cleveland,  62  Tex.  577     554,   638 
v.   Clifton,   55   N.  J.   L.   324  691 

V.   Ellison,  20  S.  Car.  481     585,   634 
V.   McCann,      113      App.       Div. 

(N.   Y.)    61  184 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


clvii 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.   I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Sullivan  v.  O'Keefe,  53  How.   Pr. 

(N.    Y.)    426  193,    206 

V.   Park,  33  Maine  438  335 

V.   Sanders,   9   Mo.   App.   75  1211 

V.   Tuck,    1    Md.    Ch.    59  65,   464 

Sullivan's  Appeal,  77  Pa.  St.  107     725 

Sultana,    The,    19    How.     (U.    S.) 

362  1681 
Sulzer-Vogt  Machine  Co.  v.  Rush- 

ville  Water  Co.,  160  Ind.   202     1200 
Surnmeril  v.  Elder.  1  Binn.   (Pa.) 

106  880 

Summerman  v.  Knowles,  33  N.  J. 

L.    202  1216 

Summers  v.  Cook,  2S  Grant  Ch. 
(U.   C.)    179  1072 

v.   Stark,    76   111.    208  1487 

Summerville  v.  Wann,  37  Pa.  St. 

1S2  1335 

Sumner   v.   Cottey,   71   Mo.   121  820 

v.   Hamlet,    12    Pick.     (Mass.) 

76  460 

v.   Woods,    67    Ala.    139  820 

Sunbolf  v.   Alford,   3   Mees.   &   W. 

248  509 

Superintendent  of  Schools  v. 
Heath,  15  N.  J.  Eq.   22 

1216,  1287,  1301 

Superior,  The,  1  Newb.  (U.  S.) 
176  1681,   1774,   1776,   1779 

Supervisors  of  Ulster  County  v. 
Brodhead,  44  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
411  200 

Surplus  of  the  Ship  Trimountain, 
5  Ben.    (U.  S.)    246  1787 

Sutherland    v.    Harrison,    86    111. 

363  1104 
V.  Rverson,   24   111.   517  1235 

Sutton  V.  Albatross,  The,  2  Wall. 
Jr.  327  1009,   1171,   1532,   1537 

V.   Gibson,   119   Ky.   422  78 

Suwannee  Turpentine  Co.  v.  Bax- 
ter, 109  Ga.  597  173,   230 
Swain    v.    Cato,   34    Tex.    395  1066 
V.   Senate,  2  Bos.  &  Pul.  99  203 
V.   Shepherd,    1    Moody    &    R. 

223  820 

Swallow,    The,    1    Bond.     (U.    S.) 

189  1810 

Swan  V.  Benson,  31  Ark.  728  1083 

V.   Bournes,  47  Iowa  501  510 

V.   Morris,   S3  Ga.  143  611 

V.   Swan,   8   Price  518  1147 

Swank  v.  Elwert,  55  Ore.  487  631c 

Swanston   v.   Morning   Star  Min- 
ing Co.,  13  Fed.   215        159,   196,   206 
Swanwick  v.  Sothern,  9  Ad.  &  El. 

895  905 

Swarthout  v.  Curtis,  5  N.  Y.  301   1172 
Swasey  &  Co.   v.   Steamer  Mont- 
gomery,  12  La.   Ann.    800  111 
Sweeley  v.  Sieman,  123  Iowa  183     132 
Sweeny    v.    Easter,    1    Wall.     (U. 

S.)    166  258,   260 

Sweet  V.  Bartlett,  4  Sandf.  (N. 
Y.)    661  193,    203 

V.   James,  2  R.  I.  270 

1223,   1324,   1532 
V.   Pym,   1  East  4 

20,  310,  466,  745,    973 
Swettv.  Black,  1  Spr.  (U.  S.)  574     1798 
'      Swope  V.  Stantzenberger,  59  Tex. 

387  1382,   1425 


Sydney  L.  Wright,  The,  5  Hughes 

(U.   S.)    474  1690 

Syeds  v.   Hay,   4   T.  R.   260  980 

Sykes  v.   Betts,   87   Ala.   537 

1072,    1107 
Sykes   Steel   Roofing  Co.   v.   Ber- 

stein,    156    111.    App.    500  1389 

Sylvan  Glen.  The.  9  Fed.  335  1725 

Sylvan  Stream,  The.  35  Fed.  314 

1696,   1725,   1729,   1756 
Symmes  v.  Frazier,  6  Mass.  344 

493,  494 
Symns  v.  Schotten,  35  Kans.  310  935 
Syrickland  v.  Stiles,  107  Ga.  308     611 

T 

Tabor  v.  Armstrong,  19  Colo.  285    1300 
Tabor-Pierce   Lumber   Co.   v.   In- 
ternational Trust  Co.,  19  Colo. 
App.  108  1327,   1430 

Tacoma  Foundry  &c.  Co.  v.  Wolff, 

4   Wash.    S18  1405 

Tacoma  Lumber  Co.  v.  Kennedy, 

4   Wash.   305  1405 

Taggard   v.   Buckmore,   42  Maine 

77  1300 

Taggart  V.  Kern,  22  Ind.  App.  271  1270 
Talbott  V.  Goddard.  55  Ind.  496  132? 
Talcott   V.   Bronson,   4   Paige    (N. 

Y.)    501  203,   233 

Taliaferro  v.  Stevenson,  58  N.   J. 

L.  165  1521 

Talieferro  v.  Barnett,  37  Ark.  511 

991,   1119 

Tamvaco  v.   Simpson,   L.    R.   1   C. 

P.    363  323,  326 

v.   Simpson,  19  C.  B.  N.  S.  453     322 

Tancred  v.  Leyland,  16  Q.  B.  669     596 

Tangier,  The,  2  Low.   (U.  S.)   7 

1699,   1707 
Tanner    v.    Hicks,     4    Sm.     <&    M. 
(Miss.)     294  1119 

V.   Scovell,   14  M.  &  W.  28 

836,   837,    838,   905 
Tanqueray-Willaume,    In    re,    20 

Ch.  Div.  465  116G 

Tansley    v.    Turner,    2    Bing.    N. 

Cas.   151  835 

Tarborough  v.  Wood,  42  Tex.  91    1063 

Tarling  v.  Baxter,  6  B.  &  C.  360       861 

Tarpy  v.  Persing.  27  Kans.  745        617 

Tarr  v.   Muir,   107   Ky.   283  1263 

Tarver   v.   Tarver,   53   Ga.    43  173 

Tate  V.  Bush,   62  Miss.  145  1070 

V.   Meek,  8  Taunt.  280    271,   313,   323 

Tatum   V.  Cherry,   12  Ore.   135        1235 

Tavlor  V.  Alloway,   3  Litt.    (Ky.) 

216  1084 

V.  Badoux    (Tenn.),    58    S.    W. 

919  190 

V.   Baldwin,    10    Barb.    (N.    Y.) 

626  71,   1081,    1147,   1149 

V.   Burlington    &c.    R.    Co.,     4 
Dill.   (U.  S.)  570 

1201.    1470,    1524, 
1625-1627,    1646 
V.   Carryl,     20     How.     (U.     S.) 

583  1810a 

V.  Dodd,  58  N.  Y.  335  1165 

V.   Doll    Lead   &   Zinc  Co.,    131 

Wis.  348  1436 

V.   Eckford,      11      Sm.      &      M. 

(Miss.)    21  1109 


clviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   1-lOGOf;  Vol.   II,   §§   lOGl-1812.] 


Taylor  v.  Fields,  4  Ves.  396  788 

V.   Ford,  1  Bush   (Ky.)   44  1074 

V.   Foster,   22   Ohio  St.   255 

1135,  1159 
V.   Gilsdorff,  74  111.  354 

1243,   1266,   1367 
V.   Harwell,   65  Ala.   1  1164 

V.   Hathaway,   29  Ark.  597  778 

V.   Huck.   65  Tex.   238 

1185,   1226,   1382 
V.  Hunter,   5   Humph.    (Tenn.) 

569  1074 

V.  La  Bar.  25  N.  J.  Eq.  222 

1459,   1474 
V.   Mayor,  93  N.  Y.  625  1299 

V.  Murphy,  148  Pa.  St.  337 

1304,  1502 
V.  Nelson,   54  Miss.  524  625 

V.   Reed,  68  N.  J.  L.  178  1216 

V.   Robinson,    8    Taunt.    648  434 

V.  St.  Louis  Merchants'  Bridge 
Terminal  R.  Co.,  207  Mo. 
495  181a 

V.   St.    Louis    Transit    Co.,    198 

Mo.  715  181a 

V.   Smith,  87  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.) 

78  322a 

V.  StuU,  79  Nebr.  295  183 

V.   Taylor,  L.  R.  17  Eq.  324         1164 

V.   Taylor,  3  Bradf.  (N.  Y.)  54      1586 

V.   Wahl,   72   N.   .1.   L.    10  1216 

V.   Weston,   77   Cal.    534  388 

Teal  V.  Spangler,  72   Ind.  380  1534 

Teaz  V.   Chrystie,  2  Abb.   Pr.    (N. 

Y.)    109  1532 

V.   Krystie,   2   E.  D.  Smith    (N. 

Y.)    621  1532 

Tcbay  v.  Kirkpatrick.  146  Pa.  St. 

120  1289,   1502 

Tedder  v.  Steele,  70  Ala.  347  1090 

V.   Wilmington  &c.  R.  Co.,  124 

N.  Car.   342  768 

Tedford      v.      Wilson,      3      Head 

(Tenn.)    311  42 

Telfener  v.  Dillard.  70  Tex.  139  1585 
Tell  V.  Woodruff,  45  Minn.  10  1558 
Teller  v.  Hill,  18  Colo.  App.  509  171 
Tempest    v.    Fitzgerald,    3    B.    &. 

Aid.   680  809 

Templeman   v.   Gresham,   61   Tex. 

50  638.   1041 

Templeton  v.  Home.  82  111.  491 

108,   1558 
Templin    v.    Chicago    &c.    R.    Co., 

73   Iowa  548  1235,   1283 

Ten  Broeck  v.  De  Witt,  10  Wend. 

(N.    Y.)    617  209,  212 

Ten   Eyck  v.  Pontiac  &c.  R.  Co.. 

114  Mich.  494  1625a 

Tenney  v.  Sly,  54  Ark.  93  1313 

Tennis    Bros.    Co.    v.    Wetzel    &c. 
R.   Co.,   140   Fed.   193  1231,   1329 

V.  Wetzel  &c.  R.  Co.,  145  Fed. 

458  1231,   1329 

Tenth  Nat.  Bank  v.  Smith,  Const. 

Co..    218    Pa.    584  1282 

Terbo.ss   v.   Williams,    5   Cow.    (N. 

Y.)    407  593 

Terhune    v.    Colton,    10   N.   J.    Eq. 

21  1173 

Terney  v.  Wilson.  45  N.  J.  L.  282    223 

Terrell  v.  McHenry.  121  Ky.  452  1287 

Terril  v.  Rogers,  3  Hayw.  (Tenn.) 

203  308 


Terry  v.  Bamberger,  44  Conn.  558    430 
V.   George,  37  Miss.  539  1119 

V.   McClmtock,  41  Mich.  492       1023 
Tete    V.    Farmers'    &    Mechanics' 

Bank,  4  Brewst.   (Pa.)  308     375,  377 
Tewksbury    v.    Bronson,    48    Wis. 

581  982,    990,    1493,    1494 

Texarkana   Nat.    Bank    v.    Daniel 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  31  S.  W.  704     1114 
Texas   &   Pac.   R.    Co.   v.   Bayliss, 

62  Tex.  570  638 

Texas  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Allen, 
1  White  &  W.  Tex.  App.  Civ. 
Cas.   §    568  1226,   1668 

V.   McCaughey,    62   Tex.    271 

1495,   1668 
Texas  Bldg.  Co.  v.  National  Loan 
and  Inv.  Co..  22  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
349  1301 

Thacher  v.  Hannahs,  4  Rob.  (N. 
Y.)    407  449 

V.   Moors,   134   Mass.   156  419 

Thames  v.  Caldwell,  60  Ala.  644     1090 
Thames  Iron   Works  Co.   v.   Pat- 
ent Derrick  Co.,  1  Johns.  &  H. 
93  524,   1033,  1038,   1040 

Thames,  The,  10  Fed.  848  1709 

Tharpe      v.      Dunlap,      4      Heisk. 

(Tenn.)   674  1083,  1092,   1119 

Tharrett  v.  Trevor.  7  Exch.  161       150 
Thatcher     v.     Harlan,     2     Houst. 

(Del.)   178  1021 

Thaxter    v.     Williams,     14     Pick. 

(Mass.)    49  1245,   1258 

Thayer  v.  Daniels.  113  Mass.  129     162 
V.  Finnegan,    134    Mass.    62 

1163,   1166,   1169 
Thielman  v.  Carr,  75  111.  3S5 

1199,   1465 
Thigpen  v.  Leigh.  93  N.  Car.  47       457 
V.  Maget,  107  N.  Car.  39  631 

Third  Nat.  Bank  v.  Buffalo  Ger- 
man Ins.  Co.,  193  U.  S.   581  384 
Thomas  v.  Bacon,  34  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
88  545 
V.   Barber,  10  Md.  380                  1417 
v.   Board  of  Education,  71  111. 

283  1375 

V.   Bridges,   73   Mo.   530     1076,   1088 
V.   Frankfort    &c.    R.    Co.,    116 

Ky.    879        280a,   291,   300,   302 
V.   Hodge,  58  Kans.  166  1202 

V.   Huesman,  10  Ohio  St.  152 

1220,   1406,   1409,  1413,   1418 
V.  Illinois    Industrial    Univer- 
sity,  71   111.   310  1375 
V.   James,  7  Watts  &  S.    (Pa.) 

381  1404 

v.   Kiblinger.  77  Ind.  85  1200 

V.  Mowers,   27   Kans.    265  1470 

V.   Osborn,  19  How.   (U.  S.)   22 

1679,   1688,   1699 
V.   Ownby,    1    Tex.    App.    Civ. 

Cas.    §    1212  1571 

V.   Remington  Typewriter  Co., 

30   Ohio  C.   C.   691  515 

V.   Shell,    76   Miss.    556  625 

V.   Turner,    16   Md.    105  1206 

V.   Wyatt,     5     B.     Mon.     (Ky.) 

132  1092 

Thomas'    Admrs.    v.   Von    Kapff's 

Exrs.,   6   Gill   &  J.    (Md.)    372  79 

Thomas'  Estate,  76  Pa.  St.  30 

1446,  1478 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


clix 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 


Thomas    Fletcher,    The,    24    Fed.  I 

375  1680,   1681,   1796  ] 

Thomas   McManus,   The,    24    Fed. 

509  302 

Thomason  V.  Cooper,  57  Ala.  560  1090 
Thomas    Sherlock,    The,    22    P"ed. 

253  1699,   1802 

Thompkins    v.    Manner,    IS    J.    & 

S.    {N.  Y.)    511  189 

Thompson  v.  Allen,  56  Wash.  582    1756 

V.   Anderson,  86  Iowa  703    566,   581 

V.   Armstrong,  11  N.  Dak.  198     820 

V.  Baltimore    &c.    R.    Co.,    28 

Md.  396  808 

V.  Dawson,     3     Head     (Tenn.) 

384  1091 

V.  Dominy,  14  M.  &  W.  403  951 
V.   Oilman,  17  Vt.  109  1134 

V.   Gilmore,   50  Maine  428  711 

V.  Gray,  1  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  75  807 
V.  Heftner,  11  Bush  (Ky.)  353  1114 
V.  Lacy,  3  B.  &  Aid.  283  505,  518 
V.  McGill,       1        Freem.       Ch. 

(Miss.)    401  1081 

V.  Mead,  67  111.  395  554,  568,  614 
V.   Powell,    77    Ala.   391  603 

V.  Riggs,  5  Wall.  (U.  S.)  152  57 
V.   Shepard,  85  Ind.  352  1266 

V.  Sheppard,  85  Ala.  611  1074,  IIOl; 
V.   Small,   1   C.   B.   328  322 

V.   Spencer,   95   Iowa  265  1201 

V.  Spinks,    12   Ala.    155  603 

V.  Stewart,  7  Phila.  (Pa.)  187  911 
V.  Thompson,  4  Cush.   (Mass.) 

127  884 

V.   Thompson,    3    Lea    (Tenn.) 

126  1094,   1099 

V.  Trail,  2  Car.  &  P.  334  897 

V.  Wedge,  50  Wis.  642 

806,   811,   850,   855 
V.  Wickersham,     9     Baxt. 

(Tenn.)  216  1382 

V.  Wise   Bay   Min.    &c.    Co.,    9 

Idaho  363  1616a 

Thompson  Ecclesiastical  Soc,  27 

Conn.  573  1192 

Thompson's  Case,  2  Browne  (Pa.) 

297  1511,   1552 

Thompson-Starrett  Co.  v.  Brook- 
lyn Heights  Realty  Co.,  Ill 
App.  Div.    (N.  Y.)   358  1353 

Thomson  v.  Smith,  63  N.  Y.  301     1127 
V.   Smith,   111   Iowa  718  820 

V.   Tilton,   22  Ky.  L.   1004  618 

Thornton  v.  Carver,  80  Ga.  397 

576a,   577 
V.  Knox,  6  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  74 

1063,   1074,   1084 
V.   Neal,  49  Ala.  590  1101 

Thorp    Block    Sav.    &c.    Assn.    v. 

James,   13   Ind.  App.   522  1459 

Thorpe  v.  Durbon.  45  Iowa  192 

1109,   1458,   1487 

Thorsen  v.  J.   B.  Martin,  The,  26 

Wis.   488  1725 

Thostesen  v.  Doxsee,  78  Nebr.  40  574 
Threfall   v.    Berwick,   L.   R.    7    Q. 

B.    711  499,   501 

Throckmorton      v.      Shelton,      68 

Conn.    413  1499 

Thum  V.  Wolstenholme,   21  Utah 

446  72 

Thurman  v.  Pettitt.  72  Ga.  38       1197 

V.  Stoddard,   63  Ala.  336  1076 


Thurston   v.   Blanchard,   22   Pick. 

(Mass.)    18  853 

Thutakawa     v.     Kumamoto,      53 

Wash.  231  1230 

Tibbetts  v.  Moore,  23  Cal.   208 

1421,  1425,   1600 
Tice  V.   Moore,   82   Conn.   244  1290 

Tichenor  v.  Allen.  13  Grat.   (Va.) 

15  1082 

Ticonderoga,  The,   Swabey   215     1769 
Tiernan  v.  Beam,  2  Ohio  383 

1092,   1101 
V.  Thurman,  14  B.  Mon.   (Ky.) 

277  1063,   1083,   1084,   1086 

Tiffany   v.   Stewart,   60    Iowa    207 

217,   222 

Tifft    V.    Verden,    11    Sm.    &    M. 

(Miss.)   153  572 

Tiger,   The,  90  Fed.   826  1800 

Tigress,  The,  32  L.  J.  Adm.  97 

886,   895,   898,   957 

Tiley   v.    Thousand    Island   Hotel 

Co.,   9   Hun    (N.   Y.)    424  1543 

Tilford  V.  Wallace,  3  Watts  (Pa.) 

141  1554 

Tillar  V.  Clayton,   75   Ark.   446 

1116,   1127 
Tillman  v.  Reynolds,  48  Ala.  365 

132,   196 

Tilton,  In  re,  19  Abb.  Pr.   (N.  Y.) 
50  1756 

Tingley  v.  White,  17  R.  I.  533        1223 

Tinker    v.     Geraghty,     1     E.     D. 
Smith   (N.  Y.)    687  1421 

Tinsley  v.  Bovkin,  46  Tex.   592       1226 
V.  Craige,  54  Ark.  346  607 

V.   Tinsley,  52  Iowa  14     1074,  1079 

Tischendorf-Chreste  Lumber  Co. 
V.   Hegan,    134   Ky.   1  1203 

Title     Guarantee     &     T.     Co.     v. 
Wrenn,    35    Ore.    62  1221,    1459 

Titsworth  v.  Frauenthal,  52  Ark. 
254  557 

Titusville    Iron    Works    v.    Key- 
stone Oil  Co.,  130  Pa.  St.  211    1309a 

T.    L.    Wadsworth,    The,    13    Fed. 
46  1693 

Tobey  v.  McAllister,  9  Wis.  463     1088 

Tod    V.    Kentucky   Union    R.    Co., 
52  Fed.  241  1648 

Todd  V.  Davey,  60  Iowa  532  1128 

V.  Gernert,   223   Pa.  103  1432 

V.  Howell,   47    Ind.   App.    665      1200 

Toledo,  D.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Hamil- 
ton, 134  U.  S.  296    692a,    1625a,   1664 

Toledo,  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilvin, 
81    111.    511  846 

Tombs    V.    Rochester    R.    Co.,    18 
Barb.    (N.   Y.)    583  1502 

Tome   V.   Four  Cribs   of  Lumber, 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  14083  485 

Tomlinson  v.  Greenfield,  31  Ark. 
557  556 

Tommey    v.    Spartanburg   &c.    R. 
Co.,   7   Fed.   429  1618 

V.   Spartanburg   &c.    R.   Co.,    4 

Hughes    (U.    S.)    640  1663 

Tompkins  v.  Cooper,  97  Ga.  631     1103 

Tonawanda,  The,  27  Fed.  575 

1799     1803 

Tonawanda,  The,   29   Fed.   877    '   1799 

Toney    v.    Goodley,    57    Mo.    App. 
235  577 


clx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.   I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,    §5   1061-1S12.] 


Tonopah   Lumber   Co.    v.    Nevada 
Amusement  Co.,  30  Nev.  445 

1214,   1435 
Tooko    V.    Hollingworth,    5    T.    R. 

215  858    882 

Tooker   v.    Rinaldo,    11    Hun    (n! 

Y.)    154  1218 

Toole  V.  Jowers,  49  Ga.  299  454 

Tooley    v.    Gridley,    3    Sm.    &    M. 

(Miss.)    493  1070 

Toop  V.   Smith,  181   N.  Y.   283  1396 

Topp    V.    Standard   Metal    Co.,    47 

Ind.   App.    483  1200 

Topping-  V.   Brown,    63    111.   348 

1199,  1583 
Torrey  v.  Martin    (Tex.),   4  S.  W. 

642  1147,   1150 

Totten   &c.   Foundry  Co.  v.   Mun- 

cie  Nail  Co.  148  Ind.  372  1335,  1550 
Tower  v.  Moore,  104  Iowa  345  1462 
Towery  v.  Meeks,  17  Kv.  L.  248  1091 
Towle  V.  Raymond,  58  N.  H.  64  644 
Towner   v.    Remick,   19   Mo.   App. 

205  1211 

Townley  v.   Crump,   5   Nev.  &  M. 

606  823,   838 

Towns  V.  Boarman,  23  Miss.  186     625 
Townsend  v.  Brooks.  76  Ala.  308     777 
V.   Cleveland     Fire-Proofing 

Co..  18  Ind.  App.  568  28,  1375 
V.  Newell,     14     Pick.     (Mass.) 

332  1014 

Townsend    Saving-s  Bank   v.    Ep- 

ping.  3  Woods  (U.  S.)  390  109,  708 
Townsley  v.  Crump,   4  Ad.   &  El. 

58  841 

Tracy  v.  Rogers,  69  111.  662 

1199,  1245,   1257,   1258,  1368 
V.   Wetherell,   165   Mass.   113      1325 
Tradesmen's   Nat.   Bank   v.   Shef- 
field City  Co.,  137  Ala.  547  98 
Train  v.  Boston  Disinfecting  Co., 

144  Mass.  523  736 

Trak  v.  Searle,  121  Mass.  229 

1355,  1554 
Trammell  v.  Hudmon,  78  Ala.  222 

1287,  1571 
V.   Hudmon,   86  Ala.   472  1187 

v.  Mount,   68  Tex.   210 

1226,   1438,   1443,   1470 
Traphagen  v.  Hand.  3  6  N.  J.  Eq. 

384  1079 

Trapp  v.  "Watters,  6  Ga.  App.  480    708 
Trappan   v.   Morie,   18  Johns.    (N. 

Y.)   1  573 

Trask    v.    The    Dido,    1    Haz.    Pa. 

Reg.   9  205 

Travis      v.      Meredith,     2      Marv. 
(Del.)   376  1283 

v.   Thompson,  37  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

236  236,    296,  299,   304 

Treadwell    v.    Aydlett,    9    Heisk. 

(Tenn.)    388  910,  961 

Tredinnick  v.  Red  Cloud  Consol. 

Min.  Co.,  72  Cal.  78  1190,  1313,  1421 
Tr'-e  V.   The  Indiana,  Crabbe   (U. 

S.)   479  1683 

Treloar  v.  Hamilton,  225   111.   102 

1184a,    1415 
Trent  v.  Hunt,  9  Exch.  14  596 

Trescott  v.  Smyth,  1  McCord  Ch. 

(S.   Car.)    486  570 

Treusch   v.    Shryock,    51    Md.    162 

1206,   1235,   1304,  1436 


Treusch   v.  Shryock,   55   Md.   330 

1206.   1310,   1319,   1407 
Tribble  v.  Oldham,  5  J.  J.  Marsh. 

(Ky.)   137  1075 

Trieber  v.  Knabe.  12  Md.  491 

562,   564,   622 
Trimble    v.    Puckett,     14    Ky.    L. 

209  96 

Trinity  House  v.  Clarke,   4  ^L  & 

S.   288  271 

Triplett  v.  Lake.  43  W.  Va.  428  1066 
Trippito  V.  Edwards,  35  Ind.  467  1041 
Trist   V.    Child,    21    Wall.    (U.    S.) 

441  43,  48,   52 

Triumph,  The,  2  Blatchf.    (U.  S.) 

433  1676,   1776 

Trotter  v.  Erwin,  27  Miss.  772  1099 
Trout    V.    McQueen    (Tex.)    62    S. 

W.    928  594 

Trueblood   v.   Shellhouse,    19   Ind. 

App.   91  1413 

Truebody     v.     Jacobson,     2     Cal. 

269  1064 

Truesdell      v.       Gay,       13       Gray 

(Mass.)   311  1309d 

TruUinger  v.  Kofoed,  7   Ore.   228 

1519,   1520 
Trust  v.  Pirsson,  1  Hilt.    (N.  Y.) 

292  731,   968,  1002,   1003 

Trustees  v.  Greenough.  105  U.  S. 

527  201    208 

Tuck  V.  Calvert,  33  Md.  209  'll09 

V.   Moss  Mfg.  Co.,  127  Ga.  729    1197 
Tucker  v.  Adams.  52  Ala.  254  603 

V.   Gest,    46    Mo.    339  1260 

V.   Hadley,  52  Miss.  414      1076,   1081 
V.  Humphrey,   4   Bing.   516 

869,  922,   926,   940,   941 
V.   Taylor,  53  Ind.  93 

745,  747,  1054 
Tuckey  v.  Lovell,  S  Idaho  731  781a 
Tufts  V.  Sylvester,   79   Maine   213 

865,   927 
Tulane  Imp.   Co.  v.   W.    B.   Green 

Photo  Supply  Co..   124   La.   619     620 
Tullis    V.    Bushnell,    12    Daly    (N. 
Y.)     217  184,   189,    193,    203,   210 

V.   Bushnell,    65    How.    Pr.    (N. 

Y.)    465  185 

rulloch  V.  Rogers,  52  Minn.  114  1421 
Tumalty  v.  Parker,  100   111.  App. 

382  698 

Tunstall   v.   Winton,    31    Hun    (N. 
Y)219  220 

V.  Withers,    86   Va.    892  1099 

Tuperv    V.     Edmondson,     32     La. 

Ann.   1146  620 

Turk  V.  Skiles,  45  W.  Va.  82  1076 
Turkes   v.    Reis,    14   Abb.    N.    Cas. 

(N.  Y.)   26  1069 

Turner    v.     Crawford,     14     Kans. 
499  217 

V.   Deane,  18  L.  J.  Ex.  343  130 

V.   Horner,    29   Ark.    440 

1063,   1092.   1096 
V.   Horton,  18   Wyo.   281  719a 

V.   Indianapolis  R.  Co.,  8  Biss. 

(U.   S.)    315  1550 

V.  Lassiter,  27  Ark.   662  1127 

V.   Liverpool  Docks  Co..  6  Ex. 

543  869,   911,   913,   916,   953 

V.  Marriott,  L.   R.   3   Eq.   744      1105 
V.   Phelps,  46  Tex.  251  1101 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxi 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.   I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,    §§   1061-1812.] 


Turner  v.   Robbins,   78   Ala.   592 

1373,   1374,   1422 
V.  Scovell,  14  M.   &  W.   28  962 

V.   Strenzel,   70  Cal.  28     1287,   1594 
V.   Wentworth,  119  Mass.  459 

1313,  1343,  1449 
Turnes  v.  Brenckle.  249  111.  394  1199 
Turney     v.     Saunders,     4     Scam. 

(111.)   527  1257 

Turno   v.   Parks,   2   How.   Pr.    (N. 

S.)    (N.  Y.)   35  155,  185,   220 

Turrill  v.  Crawley,  13  Q.  B.  197  499 
Turwin    v.   Gibson,    3   Atk.    720 

156.  228 
Tuthill    V.    Skidmore,    12  4    N.    Y. 

148  800,   802.    857 

Tutt  V.  Davis,  13  Cal.  App.  715     1063 
Tuttle  V.  Dennis,  58  Hun   (N.  Y.) 
35  •  646 

V.   Howe,  14  Minn.  145 

1260,   1494,   1495 

V.  Walker,   69  Ala.   172  579 

V.   Walton,  1  Ga.  43  377 

Tuttle,  In  re,  21  Wkly.  Dig-.  528     198 

Twiggs  V.   Chambers,   56  Ga.   279 

173,  233 
Twitty    V.    Clarke,    14    La.    Ann. 

503  620 

Two  Hundred  and  Seventy-five 
Tons  of  Mineral  Phosphates,  9 
Fed.    209  1720 

Two  Marys,  The,  10  Fed.  919 

1723,   1798 
Tyler    v.    Blodgett    &c.    Lumber 
Co.,    78    Mich.    SI  745,   1009 

V.   Currier,     13    Gray     (Mass.) 

134  1327 

V.  Gould,    48    N.    Y.    6S2  57 

V.   Jewett,  82  Ala.  93  1327,   1382 

V.   Slemp,    124    Ky.    209  226 

V.   Slemp,   28   Ky.   L.   959  177 

V.   Superior  Court,  30  R.  L  107 

157,  164 
Tyler  Tap.   R.   Co.   v.   Drlscol,   52 

Tex.  13  1618,   1668 

Tydings  v.  Pitcher,  82  Mo.  379  1084 
Tvgart  Valley  Brew.   Co.   v.   Vil- 

ter  Mfg.    Co.,    184   Fed.    845  1231 

Tvrone  &   C.   R.   Co.  v.   Jones,   79 

Pa.  St.   60  1665 

Tvsen  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  15  Fed. 

763  89,  1094 


U 


Ufford  v.  Wells,  52  Tex.  612  1110 

Uhl   V.  Dighton,   25   111.   154  613 

Underbill  v.  Corwin.  15  111.  556     1199 
Underwood    v.    Walcott,    3    Allen 

(Mass.)    464  1415 

Underwriters'  Wrecking  Co.  v. 
The  Katie,  3  Woods  (U.  S.) 
182  1795 

Union    Bank   v.    Creamery   Pack- 
age  Mfg.   Co..    105   Iowa   136  820 
V.  Laird,  2  Wheat.   (U.  S.)   390 

376,   388,  408,   411 
Union    Express,    The,     1     Brown 

Adm.    (U.    S.)    537  1688 

Union     Hall    Assn.    v.    Morrison, 

39  Md.  281  1135 

Union  Lumber  Co.  v.  Simon,  150 
Cal.    751  1424,  1616a 


Union    National   Bank   v.   Oceana 

Co.   Bank,   80   111.   212  57 

Union  Nat.  Sav.  Assn.  v.  Helberg, 

152   Ind.  139  1564 

Union    Pac.    R.    Co.    v.    Davidson, 

21  Colo.  93  1574 

V.   United  States,  2  Wyo.  170     279 
Union    Slate    Co.     v.     Tilton,     73 

Maine    207  761.   1042 

Union  Stove  Works  v.  Klingman, 

164   Ind.   589  1309c 

Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Casserly,  127 

Mich.    183  1435 

V.   Trumbull,  137  111.  146  33,    62 

Union     Warehouse     Co.     v.     Mc- 

Intyre,  84  Ala.  78  555 

Union  Water-Power  Co.   v.   Cha- 

bot,   93   Maine   339  562,   621 

United    R.    Co.    of    St.    Louis    v. 

O'Connor,   153   Mo.  App.   128       181a 
United   States  v.   Burlington   &c. 

Ferry    Co.,    21    Fed.    331  1729 

V.  Lutz,  2  Blatch.    (U.  S.)   383      807 
V.  The    Haytian    Republic,    65 

Fed.  120  1785 

V.  Villalonga,     23     Wall.     (U. 

S  )    35  474 

V.   Wilder,  3  Sumn.  (U.  S.)  308      279 
United    States    B.    &    Loan    Assn. 

V.   Thompson,   19   Ky.   L.   424        1098 
United    States    Blowpipe    Co.    v. 

Spencer,  40  \V.  Va.   698  1552 

V.  Spencer,   61   W.  Va.   191  1389 

United     States     Express     Co.     v. 

Haines,  67  111.  137  302 

United  States  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bon- 

acum,    33   Nebr.    820  1343 

United    States   Trust   Co.    v.   New 

York    W.    S.    &    B.    R.    Co.,    25 

Fed.    800  92 

United      States      Water      Co.      v. 

Sunny    Slope    Realty    Co.,    152 

Mo.  App.   300  1211,   1442 

United    States   Wind    Engine   Co. 

v.   Oliver,   16  Nebr.    612  964 

Unity  Joint  Stock   Mut.  Banking 

Assn.  v.   King,   25   Beav.   72  1139 

University   of   Lewisburg  v.   Re- 

ber,   43    Pa.   St.   305  1378 

University  Publishing  Co.  v.  Pif- 

fet,  34  La.  Ann.   602  620 

Upland  Land  Co.  v.  Ginn,  14  Ind. 

App.   431  1061 

Upper  Appomattox  Co.  v.  Hamil- 
ton, S3  Va.  319  639 
Upshaw  V.  Hargrove,  6  Sm.  &  M. 

(Miss.)    286  1086 

Upson  V.  United  Engineering  &c. 

Co.,   72  Misc.    (N.  Y.)    541 

1218.   1293.   1307 
Urquhnrt  v.  Mclver,  4  Johns.   (N. 

Y.)    103  987 

Utility,  The,  Bl.  &  H.   (U.  S.)  218 

1800a,   1801 
Utter  V.  Crane,  37  Iowa  631  1293 

Uvalde  Asphalt  Pav.  Co.  v.  New 

York,  191   N.  Y.   244  1218 


Vail    V.    Drexel,    9    Bradw.    (111.) 
439  1100.   1126 

V.  Foster,  4  N.  Y.  312  1086 


clxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.   I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Vail   V.   Meyer,   71   Ind.    159 

1260,  1262,   1270 
Vairin  v.   Hunt,   18  La.   498  620 

Valentine  v.  Hamlett,  35  Ark.  538   606 
V.   Jackson,    9    Wend.     (N.    Y.) 

302  572 

V.   Ranson,    57    Iowa   179  1417 

Valle    V.    Cerre's    Admr.    3  6    Mo. 
575  465 

V.  Fleming-,  29  Mo.  152  1135 

N'allejo  V.  Wheeler,  1  Cowp.  143      271 
Vallett     V.     Whitewater     Valley 
Canal    Co.,    4    McLean    (U.    S.) 
192  93 

Valley    Lumber    &    Mfg-.    Co.    v. 
Driessel,    13    Idaho    662 

1432,    1442,    1448 
V.  Nickerson,    13    Idaho    682 

1444,   1448 
Valley  Pine  Lumber  Co.  v.   Hod- 
gens,    80   Ark.    516  722 
Valpy  V.  Gibson,   4  C.  B.   837 

921     938 
V.  Oakeley,   16    Q.   B.    941 

837,  852,   861 
Valverde  v.  Spottswood,  77  Miss. 

912  1690,   1751 

Van      Alen      v.      American      Nat. 

Bank.    52   N.    Y.    1  37 

Van    Allen,    In    re,    37    Barb.    (N. 

Y.)    225  241 

Vnn  Bibber  v.  Reese,  71  Md.  608  1174 
Van    Billiard   v.    Nace,    1    Grant's 

Ca.ses    (Pa.)    233  1284 

Van    Buren    Storage    &    Van    Co. 

V.   Mann,    139    111.    App.    652        976 
Van  Casteel  v.  Booker.  2  Ex.  691 

911,   916 
Vance  Shoe  Co.  v.  Haught,  41  W. 

Va.    275  1101 

Van    Cleve    Glass    Co.    v.    Erratt, 

110  Mich.   689  1325 

Van  Clief  v.  Van  Vechten,  130  N. 
Y.    571  1513,  1514 

V.   Van    Vechten,    43    Hun    (N. 

Y.  )304  1299 

Van  Court  V.  Bushnell.  21  111.  624 

1258,   1532 
Van    Denburgh    v.    Greenbush,    4 

-Hun    (N.    Y.)    795  1375 

Van    Der   Beck    v.    Thomason,    50 

Misc.    (N.    Y.)    524  184 

Vandergrift's   Appeal,   83   Pa.   St. 

126  1222 

Vanderzee   v.    Willis,    3    Bro.    Ch. 

21  251 

Vandewater  v.  Mills,  19  How.  (U. 

S.)    82  1676,    1678,   1799 

V.    &   M.    Lumber  Co.,    In    re,   182 

Fed.    231  1015 

Vandoren    v.    Todd,    2    Green    Ch. 

(N.   J.)    397  1071,   10S6,   1089 

Van  Duzor  v.  Allen,  90  111.  499  820 
Van  Dyke  v.  Cole,  81  Vt.  379  1130 
Vane  v.  Newcombe,  132  U.  S.  220 

997,   1018,   1645 
Van  Etten  v.  Cook.  54  Ark.  522     751a 
V.   State,  24   Nebr.   734  115 

Van   Every  v.  Adams,   10  J.  &  S. 

(K.    Y.)    126  187 

Van   Frank   v.   St.  Louis   C.   G.   & 
Ft.  S.  R.  Co..  93  Mo.  App.  412     1655 


Van  Kannel  Revolving  Door  Co. 

V.  'Astor,  119  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.) 

214  1495 

Van     Lone     v.     Whittemore,     19 

Bradw.    (111.)    447  1370 

Vanmeters'    Exrs.    v.   Vanmeters, 

3    Grat.    (Va.)    148  89 

Van   Namee   v.    Bank   of   Troy,    5 

How.  Pr.    (N.  Y.)   161  257 

Van    Nest    Woodworking    Co.    v. 

Winka,  116   N.   Y.  S.   619  1444 

Van   Patten   v.  Leonard,   55   Iowa 

520  616 

Van    Pelt    v.    Hartough,    31    N.    J. 

L.   331  1216 

Van   Rensselaer  v.   Snyder,   13   N. 

Y.    299  629 

Vansands    v.    Middlesex    County 

Bank,  26  Conn.  144         375,   377,   380 
Van   Sickle  v.   Belknap,   129    Ind. 

558  101 

v.   Watson,  103   Tex.   37  1117 

VanSlyck  v.  Arseneau,  140  Mich. 

154  712 

Van   Stone  v.   Stillwell  Mfg.   Co., 

142    U.    S.    128  1532,   1533,   1536 

Vantilburgh    v.    Black,     2    Mont. 

371  1421 

Van  Winkle  v.  Van  Houten,  3  N. 

J.  Eq.  172  1166 

Van     Zandt      v.      Hanover      Nat. 

Bank,  149  Fed.   27  259 

Variol     v.     Doherty,     1     McGloin 

(La.)    118  993 

Varley  v.   Bauman   Clothing  Co., 

In  re,  188  Fed.  761  750 

Varner  v.  Rice.  39  Ark.  248  606 

v.   Spencer,    72   N.    Car.    381  631 

Varney   v.   Jackson,   66   Mo.   App. 

349  666 

Vasser  v.  Buxton,  86  N.  Car.  335     820 
Vaughan    v.   Providence   &   Wor- 
cester R.  Co.,  13  R.  I.  578 

291,  294,  304,   306 
v.  Vanderstegen,   2  Drew.   408   130 
Vaughen  v.  Haldeman,  33  Pa.  St. 

522  1341 

Vaughn  v.  Davies.  2  H.  Bl.  440  215 
v.  Hopson,  10  Bush  (Ky.)  337  820 
v.  Strickland,    108    Ga.    659 

611,    612 
V.  Vaughn,  12  Heisk.    (Tenn.) 

472  190 

Vausse   v.    Russel,    2    McCord    (S. 

Car.)    329  567 

Vechte  v.   Brownell,   8  Paige   (N. 

Y.)    212  576 

Velox,  The,  21  Fed.  479 

1713,  1719,   1792 
Veltman    v.    Thompson,    3    N.    Y. 

438  1728,   1809 

Vonable    v.    Beauchamp,    3    Dana 

(Ky.)   321  1154 

Venezuela,  The,  173  Fed.   834         1688 
Venture,  The,  26  Fed.  285 

1760,   1773,   1794 
Verdome    Turkish    Bath    Co.     v. 

Schettler,  2  Wash.  St.  457  1337 

Verity    v.    Wylde.    4    Drew.    427        216 
Vermilye  v.   Adams  Express  Co., 

21   Wall.    (U.   S.)   138  482 

Vernon  v.  Smith,   5  B.  &  Aid.  1  79 

Vertue    v.    Jewell,    4    Camp.    ."51 

465,   877,    880,   885,   946,   955 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxiii 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.   I 

Vickery  v.  Richardson,  189  Mass. 

53  1236,  1413 

Victorian     No.     2.     The,     26     Ore. 

194  1"98 

Victor  Safe  &  Lock  Co.  v.  Texas 
State  Trust  Co.  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),    99    S.  W.   1049  855 

Victor,   The,    1   Lush.    72  1769 

Vigilant,  The,  151  Fed.  747  1729 

Viley  V.  Lockwood,  102  Tenn.  426  701 
Villenuve  v.  Sines,  92  Mich.  556  712 
Villere    v.    Succession    of    Shaw, 

lOS  La.   71  620 

Vilter    Mfg-.    Co.    v.    Tygart    Val- 
ley Brew.  Co.,  168  Fed.  1002        1231 
Vinal  V.  Spofford.  139  Mass.  126 

641,   697- 

Vinson  v.  Cantrell  (Tenn.),  56  S. 
W.   1034  1044 

V.   Hallowell,    10    Bush    (Ky.) 

538  542 

V.   State,  124  Ga.  19  1197 

Vinton  v.   Baldwin.   95  Ind.   433        422 
V.   Builders'  &  Manufacturers' 

Assn.  109  Ind.  351  1200 

Virginia-Carolina  Chemical  Co. 
V.  McNair  &  Pearsall,  139  N. 
Car.   326  456 

Virginia  Rulon,  The,   13   Blatchf. 

(U.   S.)    519  1719 

Virgin,  The,  8  Pet.  (U.  S.)  538  1786 
Vivion  V.  Nicholson,  54  Tex.  Civ. 

App.   43  30 

Voell   V.   Kelly,   64   Wis.    504 

204,   206,  209 

Vogel  V.  Luitweiler,  52  Hun  (N. 
Y.)    184  1283 

Vogel  &  Binder  Co.  v.  Montgo- 
mery, 133  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
836  1492 

Vogelsang  v.  Fisher,  128  Mo.  386 

808,    841,   854,   910 

Voight  Brew.  Co.  v.  Donovan,  103 
Mich.  190  178,   196 

Volker-Scowcroft  LumDer  Co.  v. 
Vance,  32  Utah  74  1227,   1382 

Volmer  v.   Wharton,  34  Ark.    691 

577,   580 

Volunteer,   The,   1    Sumn.    (U.   S.) 

551  268,   270,  327 

Von    Berg   v.    Goodman,    85    Ark. 

605  606 

Von  Platin  v.  Winterbotham,  203 

111.    198  1199,  1289 

Von   Tobel   v.   Ostrander,   158   111. 

499  1427 

Voorhis    v.    Olmstead,    66    N.    Y. 

113  843 

Vordenbaumen    v.    Bartlett,    105 

La.   752  1204 

Vose  v.  Cockcroft,  44  N.  Y.  415 

1729,  1806a 
V.  Whitney,  7   Mont.   385 

690a,   692 

Vreeland  v.  Blunt,  6  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)    182  56 

V.   Boyle.  37  N.  J.  L.  346  1216 

V.   Bramhall,  39  N.  J.  L.  1  1216 

V.   Ellsworth,    71    Iowa   347 

1201,   1293,   1303,   1574 
V.  Jersey  City,  37  N.  J.  Eq.  574    102 


§§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,    §§   1061-1812.] 

W 

Wabash  &  E.  Canal  Co.  v.  Beers, 

2  Black   (U.  S.)   448  109,   1557 

Wabash    R.    Co.    v.    Achemire,    19 

Ind.    App.    482  1645 

Wabash    St.    L.    &    P.    R.    Co.    v. 

Ham,    113   U.    S.    587  91 

Waddell  v.  Carlock,  41  Ark.  523 

5,   1099,   1123 
v.   The  Daisy,  2  Wash.  T.   76 

1722,  176ia 

Wade  v.  Greenwood,  2  Rob.  (Va. ) 
474  1102b 

v.   Hamilton,  30  Ga.   450  461 

V.   Orton,    12   Abb.    Pr.    (N.    S.) 

(N.    Y.)    444  196,   198,   203 

V.   Reitz,  IS  Ind.  307 

1200,  1404,   1455 
Wademan     v.     Thorp,     5     Watts 

(Pa.)    115  1384 

Wades  v.   Figgatt,   75  Va.   575  639 

Wadsworth     v.     Hodge,     88     Ala. 

500  1260,   1261 

Wagar  v.  Briscoe,  38  Mich.   587 

1235,    1244,    1245,    1247, 
1257,   1384,  1555 
Waggoner  v.  St.  John,  10  Heisk. 

(Tenn.)  503  1729 

Wagner  v.   Brinkerhoff,   123   Ala. 
516  1063,  1064 

v.   Citizens'  Bank  &c.  Co.,  122 

Tenn.    164  250 

v.   Darby,   49    Kans.    343  1330 

V.   Goldsmith,   51   Ore.   63  180 

Wagon  Co.  v.  Hutton,  53  W.  Va. 

154  820 

Wainwright  v.  Barclay,  12  Phila. 

(Pa.)    221  12S2 

Wait     V.     Atchison     &c.     R.     Co., 
204    Mo.    491  181a 

V.   Baker,  2  Ex.  1  913.    916 

Wakefield    v.    Johnson,    26    Ark. 
506  1127 

v.   Van    Dorn,    53    Nebr.    23        1584 
Wakefield  Bank,  Ex  parte,  1  Rose 

243  244 

Walbridge  v.  Pruden.  102  Pa.  St. 

1  593,   632 

Walcott  v.   Carpenter    (Tex.    Civ. 

App.),    132    S.    W.    981  1120 

Waldron  v.  Zacharie,  54  Tex.  503  1098 
Wales  V.  Coflin,  100  Mass.  177  1142 
Walkenhorst  v.  Coste,  33  Mo.  401  1236 
V.  Lewis.  24  Kans.  420  1108,  1119 
Walker  v.  Birch,  6  T.   R.   258 

15,   418,   426,    449 
v.   Burt.   57  Ga.   20  9,   1247 

v.   Casgrain,   101   Mich.    604        1069 
v.  Cassels,    70    S.   Car.    271  703 

V.   Daimwood,   80   Ala.    245 

1187,   1559 
V.   Equitable    Mortg.    Co.,    114 

Ga.  862  173.   223 

V.  Floyd.   30   Ga.    237  236 

V.   Fuqua,  24  Miss.  640  1070 

V.   Jessup,    43   Ark.    163  1261 

V.   Johnson,  4  McCord  (S.  Car.) 

552  564 

V.   Kee,   16  S.  Car.   76  1119 

V.   Kennedy,     20     Pa.     Co.     Ct. 

433  503 


:lxi) 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Walker    v.    Mississippi    Val.    &c. 
R.    Co.,   2   Cent.   L.   J.    481  1628 

V.   Paine,    2    E.    D.    Smith     (N. 

Y.)    662  1235,    1614 

V.   Patterson's  Estate,  33  Tex. 

Civ.  App.   650  638 

V.   Sargeant,    14    Vt.    247 

115,  191,   193,    217,   218 
V.   Sarven,    41    Fla.    210  1068 

V.   Struve,   70  Ala.   167 

1074,   1086,   1098 
V.   Syms,  118  Mich.   183  1208 

V.  Ware   &c.   R.   Co.,   35   Beav. 

52  1674 

V.   Ware    &c.    R.    Co.,    12    Jur. 

(N.   S.)    18,   pt.   1  1674 

V.   Williams,  30  Miss.  165  1092 

W'alkei-    Co.    v.     Dubuque    Fruit 

Co.,   113    Iowa   428  475 

Walkvrien,    The,    11    Blatchf.    (U. 

S.)    241  1682 

Wall  V.  Club  Land  &c.  Co.    (Tex. 
Civ.    App.),    88    S.   W.    534  1128 

V.   Garrison,  11  Colo.  515     503,  691 
V.   Robinson,  115  Mass.  429        1314 
Wallace  v.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co., 
216    Pa.    311  284 

V.   Campbell,  54  Tex.   87  1081 

V.  Chicago     &c.     R.     Co.,     112 

Iowa  565  175 

V.  Eawyer,   54   Ind.   501  154a 

V.  Melchior,    2    Browne    (Pa.) 

104  1329 

V.   Smith,   S  La.  Ann.   374  620 

V.  Woodgate,  Ry.  &  M.  193 

310,  317,   642 
V.  Woodgate,  1   Car.  &  P.   575 

468,   641,    742 
Wallach  v.  Cheley,  2  Mackey  (D. 

C.)    209  609 

Waller's  Lessee  v.   Best,   3   How. 

(U.   S.)    Ill  13 

Walley    v.    Montgomery,    3    East 

585  884,   928 

Wallis  V.   Smith,   21   Ch.   Div.   243 

1138,   1512 
Walls    V.     Ducharne,     162    Mass. 
432  1413 

V.  Long.    2    Ind.    App.    202 

22,  683,   698,   1054 
Walsh  V.  McBride,  72  Md.   45 

1086,   1093 
V.  McMenomy,    74   Cal.   356        1291 
Walter  v.  Hanson,  33  Minn.  474    1063 
V.   Ross,    2    Wash.    (U.    S.)    283 

463,   880,   946,    951 
Walters  v.  The  Mollie  Dozier,  24 

Iowa  192  1729 

-Walton    V.    Dickerson,    7    Pa.    St. 
376  137 

V.   Hargroves,    42   Miss.   18 

1081-1083 
Walworth  v.  Harris,  129  U.  S.  355  578a 
Wanamaker  v.  Yerkes,  70  Pa.  St. 

443  800,  837 

"Wangler  v.  Franklin,  70  Mo.  659     820 
Waples-Painter      Co.      v.       Ross 

(Tex.).  141   S.  W.  1027  1226 

Warbu.ton    v.    Coumbe,    34    Fla. 

212  755 

V.   Edge,   9   Sim.   508  132 

Ward   V.  Blalock,  72  Ga.   804  611 

V.   Chamberlain,    2    Black    (TJ. 

S.)    430  1676 


Ward  V.  Craig,  87  N.  Y.  550 

115,  131,   143,   146,  152 
V.   Kelly,  7  Mo.  App.  565  1305 

V.   Kilpatrick,   85  N.   Y.   413 

1218,   1274,   1345 
V.   Morr  Transfer  &c.  Co.,  119 

Mo.   App.   83  981 

V.  Sherbondy,    96   Iowa   477  175 

V.   Stark,  91  Ark.  268  5,   93 

V.   Syme,    1    E.    D.    Smith    (N. 

Y.)    598  184 

V.   Thompson,  22  How.   (U.  S.) 

330  1697a 

V.   Thorndyke,  65  Wash.  11         1537 
V.   Walker,    111    Iowa    611  616 

V.   Watson,  27  Nebr.   768  219 

V.   Wordsworth,  1  E.  D.  Smith 

(N.    Y.)    598  153 

Warden  v.  Marshall,  99  Mass.  305    813 
V.   Sabins,   36   Kans.   165 

1202,  1469,  1470,  1488 
Ware  v.  Curry,  67  Ala.  274,  1083,  1099 
Warehouse    &    Builders'    Supply 

Co.  V.  Galvin,   19  Wis.   523  1720 

Ware    River    R.    Co.    v.    Vibbard, 

114    Mass.    447  800,    841 

Warfield  v.  Campbell,  38  Ala.  527 

167,   169,   219 
v.  Oliver,  23  La.  Ann.  612  620 

Warford  v.  Hankins,  150  Ind.  489 

1063.   1066 

Waring  v.  Cox,  1  Camp.  369  875 

V.   Dewberry,   1   Str.    97  62a 

V.   SlinglufE,   G3  Md.   53  598 

V.  Waring,  3  Abb.  Pr.    (N.  Y.) 

246  1174 

Warner  v.  Bliven,  127  Mich.  665     1072 

V.  Morse,  149  Mass.  400  1179a 

V.   Scott,   63   111.   368  1086 

V.   Van    Alstyne,    3    Paige    (N. 

Y.)  513  1064,  1104 

V.   Yates,    118    Tenn.    548  1571 

Warner  Elev.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Capitol 
Invest.  &c.  Assn.,  127  Mich. 
323  1340 

Warren  v.  Barnet,  S3  Ala.  208         603 
V.   Branch,  15  W.  Va.  21 

1063,  1107,  1116 
V.   Fenn,  28  Barb.    (N.  Y.)   333 

1061,  1062,  1069,  1074,  1082 
V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  149  111.  9  466 
V.  Forney,  13  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 

52  585 

V.   Kelley,  80  Maine  512 

1680,   1682,    1725,   1729,   1746 

V.   Quade,  3  Wash.  750      1405.   1421 

V.   Smith,  44  Tex.  245  1262 

V.   Woodard,  70  N.  Car.  382         784 

Waschow    V.    Waschow,    155    111. 

App.   167  1014 

Washburn  v.  Burns,  34  N.  J.  L. 
18  1216,   1262,   1270 

V.   Kahler,    97   Cal.   58        1293,   1449 
Washington     v.     Williamson,     23 

Md.    244  552,    573 

Washington  Iron  Works  v.  Jen- 
sen,  3   Wash.    584  1559 
Wasson  v.  Davis,  34  Tex.  159 

1080,  1098 
Waterbury    Lumber     &c.     Co.     v. 

Coogan,   73   Conn.   519  1287,   1430 

Waterfleld  v.  Wilber,  64  Mich. 
642  1102 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxv 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 


"Waterman    v.    Younger,    49    Mo. 

413  1307 

Waters  v.  Goldberg,  124  App.  Div. 
(N.    Y.)    511  1393 

V.   Grace,  23  Ark.  118  146 

V.   Johnson,  134  Mich.  436  1398 

Waters-lr'ierce  uil  Co.  v.  United 
States-Mexican  Trust  Co.,  44 
Tex.    Civ.    App.    397  1627,   1668 

Wathen    v.    Russell,    20    Ky.    L. 

709  177 

Watitins  v.  Bugge,  56  Nebr.  615    1435 
Watrous   v.    Ellinendorf,    55    How. 

Pr.    (N.  Y.)    461  1590 

Watson  V.  Beatty,  10  Sad.  (Pa.) 
108  476 

V.   Bell,  45  Ala.  452  1127 

V.   Columbia  Bridge  Co.,  13  S. 

Car.    433  1224 

V.   Cross,  2  Duv.   (Ky.)   147 

508,   517 
V.  Gardner,  119  111.  312 

1272,  1585,  1587 
V.  Johnsun,  33  Ark.  737  556,  606 
V.  Lyon,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  288  128 
V.   May,    62   Ark.    435  778 

V.   New    York    Central   R.    Co., 

47    N.    Y.    157  107,    1558 

V.   Smith,    63    Iowa    228  217 

V.  Vansickle  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

114    S.    W.    1160  1117 

V.   Wellington,    1    Russ.    &    M. 

602  43,   55 

V.   Wells,  50  Conn.  468  1063 

V.   Williams,   110  Ga.   321  781 

Watson,    Ex    parte,    L.    R.    5    Ch. 

Div.    35  889,   921 

Watt  V.  Pittman,  125  Ind.  168  1163 
V.   Schofleld,    76    111.    261 

576a,   580,    614 

V.  Vezin.   15   Phila.    (Pa.)    180   1455 

V.  White,  33  Tex.   421  1092 

Waiters   v.   Parker    (Tex.),    19    S. 

W.   1022  1102 

V.  Wells,    7    Ga.    App.    778  173 

Watts  V.  Christie,  11  Beav.  546       248 

V.  Newberry,   107   Va.    233  191a 

v.   Sweeney,   127   Ind.    116 

744,    758,   1054 
V.  Ward,  1  Ore.   86  485 

V.   Whittington,   48  Md.  353 

1206,   1329 
"VVatts-Campbell    Co.    v.    Yueng- 
ling,  125  N.  Y.  1         1335,   1384,   1444 
V.   Yuengling,  51  Hun    (N.  Y.) 

302  1335 

Waubaushene,  The,  22  Fed.  109     1698 
Waugh  V.  Denham,  16  Irish  C.  L. 

405  499 

Waycross    Opera    House    Co.    v. 

Sossman,  94  Ga.  100  1346 

Weathersbee     v.     Garrar,     97     N. 

Car.   106  457 

Weathersby   v.   Sleeper,   42   Miss. 

732  70 

W^eaver  v.  Barden,  49  N.  Y.  286  1085 
V.  Brown,  87  Ala.  533  1092,  1102a 
v.   Demuth,    40   N.   J.    L.    238 

1519,     1524 
V.   Sells,    10    Kans.    609 

109,  1325,  1327,  1330,  1334,  1558 
v.   Sheeler,    118    Pa.    St.    634 

1244,  1257,  1259 
V.   Sheeler,    124    Pa.    St.    473      1257 


Webb    v.    Parker,    130    App.    Div. 
(N.   Y.)    92  184 

v.   Robinson,   14  Ga.   216 

1081,  1083,  1092 
V.  Sharp,  13  Wall.    (U.  S.)    14 

555,    577,   581,   609 

Webbe   v.    Curran,    198   111.    18        1199 

V.   Curran,    97    111.    App.    525      1199 

Webber    v.    Cogswell,    2    Canada 

Sup.    Ct.    15  738 

V.  Mackey,     4     Bradw.      (111.) 

458  1102b 

Weber   v.    Bushnell,    171    111.    587 

1184a,  1494,  1527 
V.  Bushnell,  69  111.  App.  26  1184a 
v.   Weatherby,   34  Md.   656 

1256,  1343,  1387 
V.   Werner,    138   App.   Div.    (N. 

Y.)    127  184 

V.   Whetstone,    53    Nebr.    371 

668,    694,    698 
Webster    v.    Howe    Machine    Co., 
54    Conn.    394  394 

V.   Keck,   64  Nebr.   1  128 

V.   McCollough,     61     Iowa    496 

1083,    1087 
V.  Mann,   56   Tex.    119  1109 

V.   Nichols,    104    111.    160 

542,    544,    567,    1039 
V.   Real    Estate    Improvement 

Co.,    140   Mass.   526  1356 

V.   Wakeling,  2  Wkly.  N.  Cas. 

Ill  1349 

Webster  Citv  Steel   Radiator  Co. 

V.   Chamberlin,    137   Iowa  717      1272 

Weed  V.   Hall,   101   Pa.   St.   592        1130 

V.   Standley,    12    Fla.    166  544 

V.   Tucker,    19   N.   Y.    422  105 

Weed  Sewing  Mach.   Co.  v.  Bou- 

telle,    56   Vt.    570  153,    155. 

165,   166,   191,   193,   212,   227 
Weeks  v.   Goode,    6  C.   B.    (N.   S.) 
367  1019 

V.   Little,    89    N.    Y.    566  1599 

V.  Walcott,    15    Gray    (Mass.) 

54  1252 

V.   Wavne    Circuit    Judges,    73 

Mich.    256  223 

Wees   V.    Blbon,   61   W.   Va.   380     1389 
Weeter  Lumber   Co.   v.   Fales,   20 

Idaho    255  1198 

Wegener   v.   Smith,   24  L.   J.   2   P. 

25  274 

Wehr   v.    Shryock.   55   Md.    334        1554 

Weicher  v.  Cargill,  86  Minn.  271     179 

Weichselbaum    Co.    v.     Farmers' 

Supplv  Co.,  119  Ga.  183  708 

v.    Pope,    119    Ga.    182  708,   781 

Weil  V.   Levi,   40   La.   Ann.   135  229 

V.   McWhorter,   94   xVla.   540        576a 

Weill  V.   Kent,   107  La.   322  620 

V.   Kent,   52  La.   Ann.   2139  456 

V.   Weill,  10  N.  Y.  S.  627  168 

Weinberg  .v.    Rempe,    15    W.    Va. 

829  1069,    1115 

Weis  V.  Ashlev,  59  Nebr.   494  646 

Weisman   v.   B"uffalo,   10   N.   Y.   S. 

569  1512 

Weiss    V.    Jahn,    37    N.    J.    L.    93 

573,     627 

Welch   V.    Farmers'   L.   &   T.    Co., 

91    C.    C.    A.    399  1076 

V.   Hicks,   27   Ark.   292  1102 

V.   McGrath,    59    Iowa    519         1403 


clxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.   I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Welch  V.  Porter,   63  Ala.   225 

1187,    1470,    1490 
V.   Porter,    77    Iowa    347  1462 

V.   Sherer,    93    111.    64         1292,    1599 
V.   Sullivan,    8    Cal.    16.t  1141 

V.   Sullivan,    8    Cal.    511  1141 

Welde  V.  Henderson,  53  Hun   (N. 

Y.)    633  1558 

Weldon   v.   Gould,    3    Esp.   268  732 

Welker     v.     Appleman,     44     Ind. 

App.    699  427 

Wellborn   v.   Bonner,   9  Ga.   82       1063 
V.   Williams,    9    Ga.    86  1092 

Weller      v.      McNabb,      4      Sneed 

(Tenn.)    422  1268,   1542 

Wellesley  v.   Welleslev,   4   Mylne 

&  Cr.   561  78 

Wellman  v.  Morse,   76   Fed.   573    1680 

V.   Smith,   114    La.   228  1204 

Wells  V.  Board  of  Education,   78 

Mich.   260  1514 

V.   Cahn.    51    Cal.    423  1287 

V.   Canton    Co.,    3    Md.    234 

1470,    1478 
V.   Christian,    165   Ind.   662  1344 

V.   Elsam,    40    Mich.    218 

178,  220,  223 
V.  Francis,  7  Colo.  396  1108,  1125 
V.  Harter,   56   Cal.   342  1086 

V.  Hatch,  43  N.  H.  246  140, 

145,    158,   165,   193,   200 
V.  Hornish,  3  Pen.  &  W.  (Pa.) 

30  571,   572 

V.  Mehl,  25  Kans.  205  1648 

V.   Moore,    31    Okla.    135  189b 

V.   Morrow,  38  Ala.   125    1085,  1119 
V.   Riley,  2  Dill.    (U.    S.)    566 

1142,    1146 
V.   Sequin,  14  Iowa  143  566 

V.   Smith,  44  Miss.  296  1107 

V.   Southern    Minn.    R.    Co.,    1 

Fed.    270  1629 

V.   Thompson.    .'lO    Ala.    S3  fi03 

Welsh  V.   Barnes,  5  N.  Dak.  277     698 

V.   Bell,    32    Pa.    St.    12  800,    806 

V.  Hole,    1    Doug.    ?38 

113,   137,   209,    234 
V.  The     North     Cambria,     40 

Fed.    655  1725 

V.   Woodbury,   144  Mass.  542      1465 
Welsh's  Appeal,  5  Sad.   (Pa.)    494 

1174 
Wemple  v.   Hauenstein,   46   N.   Y. 

S.   288  32 

Wendell    v.    Binninger,    132    App. 
Div.    (N.  Y.)   785  184 

V.  Pinneo,   127   111.  App.   319 

1061.    1064 
Wender    Blue    Gem    Coal    Co.    v. 
Louisville     Property     Co.,     137 
Ky.    339  618 

Wendt   V.   Martin,   89   111.    139 

1235,    1262.    1263.    1269 
Wentroth's    Appeal,     82    Pa.     St. 

469  725 

Wentworth      v.      Dav.      3      Mete. 

(Mass.)    352  487-489,    491,    493 

V.   Dow.s,  117  Mass.   14  1599 

V.   Miller,    53   Cal.    9  550 

V.   Outwaite,    10   M.    &   M^.   436 

861,    917,    921,    962 
Wentworth's    Appeal,    24    Pitts- 
burg  L.    .1.    95  1665 
Wera    v.    Bowerman,    191    Mass. 
458                                                           1361 


Werner    v.    George    Zehler    Pro. 
Co.,   31   Ohio  C.  C.   632  159 

V.   Ropiequet,    44    111.    522  613 

Wernke   v.   Hazen,    32    Ind.    431      1133 
Wert    V.   Naylor,    93    Ind.    431  1083 

Wertz   V.   Lamb,   43  Mont.   477 

1212,  1406,  1409,  1452 
Wertz's  Appeal,  69  Pa.  St.  173  1164 
Wescott     V.     Bunker,     83     Maine 

499  1205,   1235,   1416,   1418,    1420 

Wesley  v.  Wood,  73  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 

33  1 84 

West   V.   Bacon,    164   N.    Y.    425        231 
v.   Bacon,     13    App.    Div.     (N. 

Y.)   371  184 

V.   Fleming,    18   111.    248  1552 

V.   Klotz,    37    Ohio    St.    420  14S5 

V.  Martin,    51    Wash.    85  1765 

V.   Pullen,    88    111.    App.    620        1237 
V.   Reeves,  53  Nebr.   472  1487 

West     Branch     Bank     v.     Arm- 
strong,   40    Pa.    St.    278  39.8,    409 
West  Chicago  &c.  Com.  v.  West- 
ern Granite  Co.,   200   111.    527 

1285a,   1560 
West      Coast      Lumber      Co.      v. 
Knapp,   122   Cal.    79  1190 

V.  Newkirk,  80  Cal.  275     1190, 

1276,   1356,   1398,  1400,   1401 
"U^ester  v.  Long,  63  Kans.   876  617 

Western  Bank  v.  Marion  County 

Distilling  Co.,  89  Ky.   91  818 

Western      Cornice      &c.      Co.      v. 

Leavenworth,    52    Nebr.    418        1421 
Western     Iron     Works    v.    Mon- 
tana   Pulp    &c.    Co.,    30    Mont. 
550  1423 

Western   Plumbing  Co.   v.   Fried, 

33   Mont.    7  1454 

Western    Sash    &c.    Co.    v.    Gaul 

Const.   Co.,   126  N.   Y.   S.   1110      1492 

V.   Heiman,    65    Kans.    5  1605 

V.   Heiman,    71    Kans.    43  1392 

Westfield    v.    Great    Western    R. 

Co.,   52   L.   J.   Q.   B.   276  332 

Westland  v.   Goodman,   47  Conn. 

83  1606 

Westmoreland  v.   Foster,  60  Ala. 
448  990 

V.   Wooten,  51  Miss.  825     576a,   625 
W^est  Norfolk  Lumber  Co.,  In  re, 

112    Fed.    759  773,    1229 

West  of  England  Bank  v.  Batch- 

elor,   51  L.  J.    (N.   S.)   Ch.   199        117 

Weston  V.  Dunlap,  50  Iowa  183     1201 

V.   Morse,  40  Wis.  455        1729,  1767 

V.   Olsen,   55   Wis.   613        1559,    1616 

V.   Weston,    46   Wis.    130  1573 

Westport  Lumber  Co.  v.   Harris, 

131   Mo.   App.    94  1244 

Westwood    V.    Bell,    4    Camp.    349 

423,     447 
Westzynthius,  In  re,  5  B.   &  Ad. 

817  953 

Westzynthius,  In  re,  2  Nev.  &  M. 

650  859 

Wethered   v.  Garrett,   140  Pa.  St. 

224  1600 

Wetherell    v.    Thirtv-first    St.    B. 

&   L.   Assn.,   153   111.   361  381 

■^'etmore  v.  Marsh,  81  Iowa  677    1393 
Wetsel   v.    Mayers,    91    111.    497 

554,    614 
Wexford,  The,   7  Fed.   674  1799 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxvii 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.   I 

Wexler    v.    Rust,    144    App.    Div. 

(N.  Y.)   296  1296 

Weyer  v.  Beach,  79  N.  Y.   409. 

1218,    1564,    1614 
V.  Beach,     14     Hun      (N.     Y.) 

231  1287 

Weymouth  v.  Boyer,  1  Ves.  Jr. 
425  432 

V.   Sanbourn,   43   N.   H.   171  725 

Whalen     v.     Collins,     164     Mass. 

146  1310 

Whaley  v.  Jacobson,  21  S.  Car. 
51  458,    635 

Wharton   v.    Douglas,    92    Pa.    St. 

fifi  1310 

Wheaton  v.  Berg,  50  Minn.  525     1248 
V.  Newcombe,    16   J.   &    S.    (N. 

Y.)    215  187 

V.   Trimble,    145    Mass.    345 

1254,    1264 

Wheeler  v.  Almond,  46  N.  J.  L. 
161  1216,    1456,    1565 

V.   Hall,    41    Wis.    447  1589 

V.  Howell,  3  Kay  &  J.   198       1163 
V.   Schroeder,    4    R.    I.    383  1223 

V.   Scofield,    67    N.    Y.    311  1513 

V.   Scofield,     6     Hun      (N.     Y.) 

655  1254 

V.   Teetzlaff,    53    Wis.    211  820 

Wheelock  v.  Hull,  124  Iowa  752    1290 
Wheless     v.    Meyer    &c.     Grocer 

Co.,  140  Mo.  App.  572      807,  808,   810 
Whetsel   v.    Roberts,    31    Ohio    St. 

503  1094 

Whetstone     v.    Baker,    140     Ind. 

213  1069 

W.  H.  Howard  Com.  Co.  v.  Na- 
tional Livestock  Bank,  93  111. 
App.    473  656 

Whidden  v.  Toulmin,  6  Ala.  104     573 
Whigham    v.    Fountain,    132    Ga. 

277  976 

Whistler,  The,  30   Fed.  199  1756 

Whitaker  v.  Big  Sandy  Lumber 
Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  46  S. 
W.    263  1101 

V.  New  York  &c.   R.   Co.,   3  N. 

Y.    St.    537  186 

V.   Smith,    81   N.   Car.   340 

778,    784,    1362,    1366,    1663 
Whitcomb  v.  Straw,  62  N.  H.  650 

158,    165 
White   V.   Americus,    19    Fed.    848 

1697a,    1707 
V.   Bird,    23    La.    Ann.    270  456 

V.  Blakemore,    8    Lea    (Tenn.) 

49  1099.   1107.    1108,    1123 

V.   Chaffln,   32   Ark.   59 

1189,   1335,   1478,   1571,   1572 
V.   Cole,   87   Tex.  500  1126 

V.   Cole,  6  Tex.  Civ.  App.  277     1123 
V.   Downs,   40   Tex.    225 

1063,    1092,    1100.    1111 
V.   Dumpke,    45    Wis.    454 

1391,    1532 
V.   Fisher,   77   Ind.   65  1083 

V.   Gainer,    2    Bing.    23  lOlS 

V.   Gainer,    9    Moore    41  1020 

V.  Griffin,      2     Jones'     L.      (N. 

Car.)     3  791 

V.  Harlow,     5     Gray     (Mass.) 

463  122 

V.   Hovt,   7   Daly    (N.    Y.)    232      731 
V.  Jones,    92    N.    Car.    388  1063 


§§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 

White  V.   McAllister   Co.,    67    Mo. 
App.    314  576a,   579,   580 

V.  Miller,   18   Ta.   St.    52 

1304,   1305,  1329 
V.   Mitchell,    38    Mich.    390  929 

V.   Moses,    21    Cal.    34  1134 

V.  Mullens,    3    Idaho    434  1397 

V.   Parish,  20  Tex.  688  789,  791 

V.   Prior,    88   Mich.    647  712 

V.   Smith,   44  N.   J.  L.   105 

731,   733,   734,   737,   742 
V.   Solomonsky,  30  Md.   585  861 

V.   Stanton,  111   Ind.  540 

1200,   1421,    1423,    1424 
V.   Stover,    10    Ala.    441  1063 

V.   Street,    67    Tex.    177  1067 

V.   Taylor,   107  Ky.   20  1063 

V.  The  Cynthia,  2  Fed.  112  1730 
V.  The  Emma,  37  Fed.  703  1703 
V.   Vann,    6     Humph.     (Tenn.) 

70  289     298 

V.  Wakefield,   7   Sim.   401  'l084 

V.   Washington      School     Dis- 
trict, 42  Conn.  541    1192,  1287 
V.  Welsh,    38    Pa.    St.    396 

800,    857,   902,    905 
V.  Williams,    1    Paige    (N.    Y.) 

502  1074,    1092,    1096 

Whitehead   v.   Anderson,   9   M.    & 
W.   518  893, 

917,    919.    939,   940,    941,    943 
V.   Chadwell,     2     Duv.      (Ky.) 

4^2  78  9 

v.   Fisher,    64    Tex.    638  1120 

V.  Jessup,   7  Colo.  App.    460 

114,   171,   1018 
V.   O'Sullivan,  12  Misc.   (N.  Y.) 

577  30 

V.   Vaughan,    6    ii,ast    523n  265 

Whitehorn     v.    Cranz,    20     Nebr. 

392  1108 

Whitehurst    v.    Yandall,    7    Baxt. 

(Tenn.)    228  1116 

White  Lake  Lumber  Co.  v.  Rus- 
sell,   22    Nebr.    126 

1237,  1421,   1423,   1556 
v.   Stone,    19    Nebr.    402  1213 

Whitelegge  v.  De  Witt,   12   Daly 

(N.    Y.)    319  184 

Whiteley    v.    Learoyd,    L.    R.    32 
Ch.   Div.   196  1181 

V.   Learoyd,  L.   R.   33   Ch.  Div. 

347  1181 

Whitenack   v.   Noe,    11   N.    J.    Eq. 

321  1216,   1408,   1423 

White's  Appeal,   10  Pa.  St.    252 

1244,  1388 
White's   Bank   v.   Smith,    7   Wall. 
(U.    S.)    646  1681 

v.   Toledo  Ins.  Co.,  12  Ohio  St. 

601  415 

Whiteside    v.    Lebcher,    7    Mont. 
473  1286 

v.   School  Dist.,   20  Mont.   44      1375 
Whitford     v.     Newell,      2     Allen 
(Mass.)    424 

1207.   1236,   1313,    1314,   1354 
Whitham     v.    Wing,    108     Maine 

364  1205 

Whiting    V.     Coons^     2     La.    Ann. 
971  661 

V.   Eichelbergerm,      16      Iowa 

422  543 

V.   Lake,  91  Pa.  St.  349  632 

V.   Story,    54   Iowa    81  1375 


clxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I,   §§  l-1060f;  Vol.  II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Whitlock  V.  Hay,   58  N.  Y.   484        825 
Whitlock    Mach.    Co.    v.    Holway, 

92   Maine   414  968 

Wliitmore  v.  Poindexter,  7  Baxt. 
(Tenn.)    248  637 

V.   Sliiverick,   3   Nev.   288  797 

Whitney  v.  Beckford,  105  Mass. 
267  292 

V.  Joslin,    108   Mass.    103 

1207,    1415,    1516,    1573 
V.  McConnell,  29  Mich.   12  820 

V.   Richardson,   31  Vt.   300 

1134,    1145,    1146 

Whittaker  v.  Clarke,  33  Tex.  647        159 

Whitten  v.  Saunders,  75  Va.  563  1117 

Whittier      v.      Banking-      Co.,      4 

Wash.   666  1S26 

V.  Blakely,    13    Ore.    54G 

1221,  1406,  1420 
V.  Hollister,  64  Cal.  283  12S7,  1289 
V.  Puget  Sound  &c.  Bank  Co., 

4    ^Wash.    666  1327 

V.   Wilbur,  48  Cal.  175     1287,  1500a 
Whittington    v.    Farmers'    Bank, 

5  Har.  &  J.    (Md.)   489  241 

Vv^hittle  V.  Newman,  34  Ga.  377 

204a,   236,   237 
Whitwell     V.     Aurora,     139     Mo. 

App.    597  181a 

V/hitworth    v.    Benbow,    56    Ind. 

194  793 

Whole  Creek  Iron  Works  v.  Ne^w 
York  &c.  L.  &c.  Co.,  73  Misc. 
(N.    Y.)    242  1566 

Wick  V.   Ft.  Plain  &c.   R.  Co.,  27 

App.  Div.    (N.  Y.)    577  1662 

Wickham    v.    Levistones,    11    La. 

Ann.   702  111,   1745 

Wickman    v.    Robinson,    14    Wis. 

493  1105 

Wiggins    V.    Bridge,    70    Cal.    437 

12S7,    1512 
V.  Houghton,    89    Mich.    468        712 
Wight   V.   Maxwell,    4   Mich.    45      1720 
Wightman    v.    Brenner,    26    N.    J. 

Eq.    489  1216,    1286 

Wigton's  Appeal,  28  Pa.  St.  161    1538 
Wilber  v.  Baker,  24  Hun   fN.  Y.) 

24  189,  233 

V\?'ilcox  V.  Alexander  (Tex.),  32 
S.   W.   561  603 

V.   First    Nat.    Bank,    93    Tex. 

322  1111 

V.   Five      Hundred      Tons      of 

Coal,  14  Fed.  49  308 

V.   Kellogg,    11    Ohio    394 

788,   789,  793 
V.   Woodruff.    61    Conn.    578        1313 
Wilczinki   v.   Lick,    68   Miss.    596      557 
Wilder  v.  French,  9  Ciray  (Mass.) 

393  1242 

Wilder's  Sons   Co.  v.   Walker,   98 

Ga.    508  1574 

Wilds  V.   Smith,   2   Ont.   Apn.    8 

834,  867,    931 
Wildy    V.    Mid-Hants    R.    Co.,    16 

W.    R.    409  1675 

Wiley  V.  Carlisle.  93  Ala.  237  1102b 
V.  Connelly,  179  Mass.  360  1495 
V.   Smith,    1    Ont.    App.    179 

902,    931,    934,    944 
Wilkerson  v.  Rust.   57  Tnd.   172 

1257,   1272.    1276,    1310 

Wilkes  V.  Harper,   1   N.  Y.   586  73 

V.   Smith,  4  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  86    1117 


Wilkie   V.   Bray,   71   N.   Car.   205 

1219     1235 
Wilkins  v.   Abell,   26   Colo.   462* 

1273,  1276 
V.  Batterman,  4  Barb.   (N.  Y.) 

47  212,   214 

V.  Carmichael,   1  Doug.   101 

113,    156,    1706 
V.   Litchfield,    69   Iowa    465 

1245,    1247,    1248 

V.   Taliafero,    52    Ga.   208  572 

Wilkinson    v.    Hoffman,    61    Wis. 

637  1375,    1378,    1618 

V.  Ketler,    69   Ala.   885  550,   603 

V.  May,    69    Ala.    33 

1063,    1064,    1092,    1101 
V.   Parmer,   82  Ala.  367  1072 

Willamette    Steam    Mills    Co.    v. 
Kremer,    94    Cal.    205 

1190,    1372,    1421,    1600 
Willamette   Steam   Mills  Lumber 
Co.  V.  Los  Angeles  College  Co., 
94   Cal.    229  1190,    1569 

Willard   v.   Dorr,    3   Mas.    (U.    S.) 
91  1706 

V.  Magoon,    30    Mich.    273  1263 

V.  Reas,  26  Wis.  540  1063,  1088 
V.   Whinfield,  2  Kans.  App.  53 

692     698 
V.  White,  56  Hun  (N.  Y.)  58l'    430 
Wilier  V.  Bergenthal,  50  Wis.  474 

1232,  1559,  1571,  1592,  1605,  1613 

Willett   V.   Carroll,   13   Md.    459      1167 

V.   Kinney,    54    Ore.    594  716 

Willetts  V.  Earl,  53  N.  J.  L.  270    1216 

Willey    V.    Topping,    146    Pa.    St. 

427  1502 

William    and    Emmeline,    The,    1 

Blatchf.    &   H.    (U.    S.)    66  1680 

William  Cook,  The,  12  Fed.   919 

1690,    1691 
Williamette     Falls     &c.     Co.     v. 
Remick,   1  Ore.   169  1323,   1366 

V.   Riley,   1    Ore.    183  149!?,   1558 

William  Gates,  The,  48  Fed.  835  1778 
William  Law,  The,  14  Fed.  792  1712 
William    P.    Donnelly,    The,    156 

Fed.    302  1730,    1756 

Williams    v.    Alcorn    Elec.    Ligiit 
Co.,    98    Miss.    468  1365 

V.   Allsup,  10  C.  B.   (N.  S.)   417 

8,   744 
V.   Aylesbury   &   C.    R.    Co.,   21 

"W.    R.    819  1674 

V.  Baker,  100  Mo.  Aop.  284  1092 
V.  Birch,  6  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  299  434 
V.   Bradford     (N.    J.),    21    Atl. 

331  1216 

V.   Carwardine,     4     B.     &     Ad. 

621  490 

V.  Chapman,  17  111.  423  1571,  1728 
V.   Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  112  Mo. 

463  1429,    1655 

V.   Chisholm,   128   111.   115  1199 

V.   Christian,    23    Ark.    255 

1092,  1095 
V.  Controllers.  18  Pa.  St.  2V5  1375 
V.   Crow,   84  Mo.   298  1071,    1074 

v.  Cunningham,  52  Ark.  439  1109 
V.  Deiitscher   Verein   Club,   14 

N.  Y.   S.  368  1579 

V.   Edison   Elec.  Ilium.  Co.,   16 

N.   Y.    S.    857  1579 

V.   Eldorado,    etc..    Gold    Min. 

Co.,   35   Colo.   127       1249,   1273 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxix 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§   l-l()60f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1S12.] 


Williams  v.  Finley,  99  Tex.  468   1127a 
V.   Gibbes,    20     How.     (U.    S.) 

535  1 1  .S  6 

V.  Hawley,   144    Cal.    97  1366 

V.  Holmes,    8   Exch.    861  561 

V.   Ingersoll,    89    N.    Y.    508 

48,    166,    223,    1225 
V.   Ing-ersoll,    23    Hun    (N.    Y.) 

284  44,    227 

V.  Judd-Wells    Co.,     91     Iowa 

378  1315 

V.  Lowe,    4   Nebr.    382  375 

V.  McCartv,  74  Ala.  295  1074.  1098 
V.   Moore,    4   N.   H.    235  801,    837 

V.   Nichol,    47    Ark.    254  1164 

V.   Porter,  51  Mo.    441  1211, 

1422,    1425,   1607,   1613,   1615 
V.  Potter,     2     Barb.      (N.     Y.) 

316  629 

V.  Rice,    60    Mich.    102  1178 

V.  Rittenhouse     &c.     Co.,     198 

111.    602  1199 

V.  Roberts,  5  Ohio  35  1063,  1086 
V.   Roe,   59   Ala.    629  1102 

V.   Samuels,   90  Ky.  59  1069 

V.   Santa    Clara    Min.    Co.,    66 

Cal.  193  1190,   1255,  14S0 

V.   Sax    (Tenn.    Ch.    App.),    43 

S.    W.    868  1102a 

V.  The  Sirius,  65  Fed.  226  1703 
V.   Tilt,    36   N.   Y.   319  418 

V.  Uncompahgre     Canal     Co., 

13    Colo.    469  1236,    12.?S 

V.  Waldo,  3  Scam.  (111.)  264  108 
V.  Webb,  2  Dis.  (Ohio)  430  1453 
V.  Willing-ham-Tift       Lumber 

Co.,  5  Ga.  App.  533  1508 

V.  Woods,  2  Mete.    (Ky.)    41 

570,    618,    619 

V.   Young,   21   Cal.   227  1092 

Williams,  In  re,  3  Ir.  Eq.  346    241,  244 

Williamson     v.     Hogan,     46     111. 

504  1729 

V.  New    Jersey    S.    R.    Co.,    28 

N.  J.  Eq.   277  1216,   1660 

V.  New    Jersey    S.    R.    Co.,    29 

N.   J.   Eq.    311  1660 

V.   Shank,    41    Ind.    App.    513      1245 

V.  Woten,  132  Ind.  202  1067 

Williams    &c.    Co.    v.    Bailev,    68 

W.  Va.    681  1231 

V.   Rowell.    145    Cal.    259  1344 

William    T.    Graves,   The,    8    Ben. 

(U.   S.)    568  1794 

William      T.      Graves,      The,      14 

Blatchf.    (U.    S.)    189  1811 

Williard     v.     Magoon,     30     Mich. 

273  1235 

Willingham    v.    Hardin,    75    Mo. 
429  1076 

V.  Leake,      7      Baxt.      (Tenn.) 

453  1115 

V.  Long,  70  Ala.  587  1187,  1287 
V.   Rushing,    105    Ga.    72  475 

Willis   V.    Bovd.    103    Ga.    130  1197 

V.   Gay,    48   Tex.    463  1084,    1086 

V.   Searcv.    49   Ala.   222  1106 

Willison   V.   Douglas,    66  Md.    99 

1500,    1519,   1520,    1524 
Willman    v.    Friedman,    3    Idaho 

734  1108 

"Wills  V.   Barrister,   36  Vt.   220  641 

Wilmhurst    v.    Bowker,    7    M.    & 

G.    882  884 

Wilson  V.  Balfour,   2  Camp.   579        21 


Wilson  V.  Curry,  149  Ala.   368  603 

V.   Emmett,     19    Beav.     233 

122  122a 
V.   Ewing,    79    Ky.    549  "'    1072 

V.   Forder,    30    Pa.    St.    129  1434 

V.   Graham,      5      Munf.      (Va.) 

297  1086 

V.   Grand     Trunk     R.    Co.,     56 

Maine    60  262 

V.   Guyton,    8    Gill    (Md.)    213 

16,   487,   492 
V.  Heather,    5    Taunt.    695  •! 

V.  Hopkins,   51    Ind.   231  1200 

V.  House,  10  Bush   (Ky.)    406 

177,    230 
V.  Howell,    48    Kans.    150  1327 

V.  Huntingdon,    7  Watts   &   S. 

(Pa.)     197  1375 

V.  Keating,  4  De  G.  &  J.  588    1079 
V.   Kymer,   1  M.   <Sr   S.   157  309 

V.  Lawrence,    82   N.    Y.    409 

1725,    1725a 
V.   Lawrence,   18   Hun    (N.   Y.) 

56  1725a 

V.  Lyon,    51    111.    166 

1063,  1064,  1083,  1090 
V.  Martin,  40  N.  H.  88  731,  1035 
V.  Merryman,    48    Md.    328 

1206,  1310 
V.  Moore,    86    Ind.    244  1163 

V.   Moore   (Tex.),   85  S.  W.  25   1102a 
V.  Nugent,    125    Cal.    280  1356 

V.   Piper,    77    Ind.    437 

1163,    1172,    1173 
V.   Plutus    Min.    Co.,    98    C.    C. 

A.     189  1064 

V.   Proctor,    28    Minn.    13  1370 

V.  Robertson,    21    N.    Y.    587        792 
V.   Sawyer,   74  111.  473  1086 

V.   School    District,    17    Kans. 

104  1375 

V.   Seeber,   72  N.  J.  Eq.  523     34,  44 
V.   Shahane    (Mo.),    138    S.    W. 

694  1262 

V.   Shocklee,    94    Ark.    301 

1002,  1064 
V.   Simon,    91   Md.   1  1184 

V.   Sleeper,    131    Mass.    177 

1242  1324 
V.  Smith,  3  How.  (U.  S.)  763  261 
V.   Stewart,    69   Ala.   302  603 

V.   Taylor,   89  Ala.   368     777,   1032a 
V.  Walker,    46    Ga.    319  577 

V.   Wilson,   51   Md.   159  1319 

V.  Wilson,    13    Barb.     (N.    Y.) 

252  1174 

V.  Wright,   72   Ga.    848  230 

Wilson,  In  re,   12   Fed.   235 

115,  127,  132,  153,  165,  166.  200 
Wilson-Reheis-Rolfes        Lumber 

Co.  V.  Ware,  158  Mo.  App.  179  1451 
W^iltse  V.  Hurley,  11  Iowa  473  1142 
Wiltsie     V.     Harvey,     114     Mich. 

131  1208 

Wilvert    v.    Sunbury,    81    Pa.    St. 

57  1222 

Wimberly    v.    Mayberrv,    94    Ala. 

240  1462,   1462a.   1477 

Wimp  V.  Early,  104  Mo.  App.  85     586 
Winans   v.    Mason,    33    Barb.    (N. 

Y.)     522  237 

Winchester    v.    Costello,    2    Pars. 
Eq.    Cas.    (Pa.)    279  632 

V.   Heiskell,     16    Lea     (Tenn.) 

556  230 


clxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   §§   1061-1812.] 


Winchester  v.  Mid-Hants  R.  Co 

U  R.   5  Eq.   17  1674 

Winder  v.  Caldwell,  14  How.   (U 
T^r^-\i^,f  ,.,  '^25,    1195,    1206 

Windfall  Nat.   Gas  M.    &   Oil   Co 
V.   Roe,   41   Ind.   App.   687 

1200,    1372,    1421,    1601 
Windsor  v.   Brown.   15  R.   I.   1S2     151 
Windsor  Bargain  House  v.  Wat- 
son,   148   N.   Car.    295  631 
Wing-  V.  Carr,  86  111.  347       1199,  1487 
V.   Goodman,  75  111.  159    1063,   1092 
V.   Griffin,    1    E.    D.    Smith    (N. 

Y.)    162  276,   982,   983 

V.   Tottenham    &c.    R.    Co.,    L. 

R.    3    Ch.    740  1674 

Wingard  v.  Banning,  39  Cal.  543 

308,   328,   997,   1014,    1037 
Wingert    v.    Stone,    142    Pa.    St. 

258  1257 

Winkler,    In    re,     146    App.     Div. 

(N.   y.)    927  184 

Winks  V.  Hassall,   9  B.   &  C.   372 
„  823,  832 

Winn  V.  Henderson,  63  Ga.  365  1273 
Winnebago,  The,  141  Fed.  945 

1724,    1725,    1749,    1808 
Winner    v.    Lippincott    Inv.    Co., 

125   Mo.    528  1086 

Winrod  v.  Wolters,  141  Cal.  399    1190 

Winslow  V.  Central  Iowa  R.  Co., 

71   Iowa   197  175 

V.  Newell,    19    Vt.    164  1146 

V.   Urquhart,  39  Wis.  260     719,  721 

Winston    v.    Kilpatrick,    5    Daly 

(N.    Y.)    524 
Winter    v.    Anson,    1    Sim.    &    S. 
434  1073-1075 

V.   Anson,    3   Russ.   48 
V.   Coit,    7   N.    Y.    288 
V.   Drury,    5   N.   Y.   525 
V.   Hudson,  54  Iowa  336    1290,  1512 
V.   Iowa    Cent.       R.       Co.,    Ill 

Iowa    342  1646 

Wintermute   v.   Clarke,    5    Sandf. 

(N.    Y.)    242  513 

Winters  v.  Fain,  47  Ark.  493  1071 
Wipfler  V.  Warren,  163  Mich.  189  178 
Wisconsin    Marine    &c.    Bank    v. 

Filer,    83   Mich.    496  834 

Wisconsin     Planing    Mill    Co.     v. 

Grams,    72   Wis.   275  1283,    1332  , 

Wise    V.    L.    &    C.    Wise    Co.,    12 
App.    Div.    (N.   Y.)    319  98 

V.  Old,    57    Tex.    514  588  | 

V.   Wolfe,    120   Ky.    263  1099  i 

Wiseman   v.  Hutchinson,   20   Ind. 
40  1092 

V.  Vandeputt,    2   Vern.    203  858 

Wishard  v.  Biddle,   64  Iowa  526     229 
V.   The     Jos.    Nixon,    43     Fed. 

926  1715 

Wisner   v.   Ocumpaugh,   71   N.   Y 
„113  42,   542.   543 

Witch    Queen,    The,    3    Sawv.    (U 

S.)    17  ■  1797 

Withington    v.    Corey,    2    N.    H. 

115  '1145 

Witman    v.    Walker,    9    Watts    & 

S.    (Pa.)    183  1329,    1404 

Witte  V.  Meyer,  11  Wis.  295  1605 
Wittliff     V.     Biscoe      (Tex.     Civ 

App.),   128  S.  W.   1153  1002,   1116 

W.  Kimball  Co.  v,  Peyne,   9  Wy- 
oming 441  981 


106 


1074 

460 

55 


Woarms  v.  Hammond,  5  App.  D 

C.    338  77 

Woglam     V.      Cowperthwaite,     2 

Dall.    (U.  S.)   68  590 

Wolcott     V.     Ashenfelter,     5     N 

Mex.   442  592,   630 

Wolf    V.    Batcheldor,    56    Pa.    St 
87  1284,   1332 

V.   Crawford,   54  Miss.    514  282 

V.  Hough,  22  Kans.  659  294,  298 
V.  Keely,  23  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  408  1389 
V.   Summers,    2    Camp.    631 

6,   269,   509 
V.  United  R.  Co.,  155  Mo.  App. 

125  181a 

Wolf  Co.  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 

29    Pa.    Super.    Ct.    439  1222 

Wolfe    V.     Oxnard,     152     Pa.     St 

623  1262 

Wolffe  V.  Nail,   62  Ala.  24  1119 

Wolf,  In  re,  51  Hun  (N.  Y.)  407  209 
Wolford  V.  Baxter,  33  Minn.  12  1335 
Wollreich    v.    Fettretch,    51    Hun 

(N.    Y.)    640  1325 

Womble    v.    Battle,    3    Ired.    Bq. 
(N.   Car.)    182  1062,   1063 

V.   Leach,    83   N.    Car.    84  631 

V.   Womble,  14  Cal.  App.  739    1071 
Women's    Homeopathic    Assn.    v 

Harrison,   120  Pa.   St.   28  1444 

Wood    V.    Anders,    5    Bush    (Ky.) 
601  177,  196 

V.  Biddle,  7  Ohio  N.  P.  225  159 
V.  Calloway,  21  La.  Ann.  471  456 
V.   Duval,  100  Iowa  724  583 

V.   Hughes,   138  Ind.   179  174 

v.   Jones,    7   Dow.    &   Rv.    126 

875,     880 
V.  Lester,     29    Barb.     (N.     Y.) 

145  77,    1062 

V.   Mitchell,    63    Hun     (N.    Y.) 

629  48 

V.   O'Hanlon,      50      Tex.      Civ. 

App.    642  1109 

V.   Pierson,    45    Mich.    313 

487,    491,    496 
V.   Rawlings,    76    111.    206  1487 

V.   Roach,      1      Yeates       (Pa.) 

177  880 

V.  Roach,  2  Dall.  (Pa.)  180  877 
V.   St.     Paul    City    R.     Co.,     42 

Minn.   411  1452 

V.  Simons,  100  Mass.  116  1449 
V.  State,  125  Ind.  219  154a,  231 
V.   Sullens,   44   Ala.    686  1063 

V.   Tassell,   6   Q.   B.   234  905 

V.   Wilmington  Conference 

Academy,  1  Marv.    (Del.) 
416  1538 

V.   Yeatman,   15  B.  Mon.   (Ky.) 

270  919,   921,   965 

Woodall   V.    Kelly,    85   Ala.    368 

1086,    1094 
V.   The  Havana,  87  Fed.   487     1688 
Woodard  v.   Myers,   15   Ind.   App. 
„42  657 

Woodburn   v.   Gifford,    66   111.   285 

1245,    1370,    1372 
Woodbury     v.     Gcimes,     1     Colo. 

100  108,   1558 

Woodhull  V.   Rosenthal,   61  N.  Y. 

382  1134 

Wooding  V.  Grain,  11  Wash.  207     192 
Woodland   Co.  v.  Mendenhall,   82 
Minn.   483  816,   854 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxxi 


[References  are  to  Sections— Vol.  I,   §§   l-1060f;  Vol.   II,   g§   1061-1812.] 


Woodland,   The,   104  U.   S.   180 

1699,   1798,  1808 
Woodley  v.   Coventry,   2   H.   &   C. 

164  45,    843 

Woodmansie      v.      Holcomb.      34 

Kans.    35  789,    792 

Woodruff  V.  Honey,  91  Maine  116 

1444,    1445 
V.  Ives,    34   Mich.    320  712 

V.  Nashville     &c.     R.     Co.,     2 

Head    (Tenn.)     87         465,    471 
v.  Noyes,    15    Conn.    335  965 

v.   One    Scow,    30    Fed.    269        1677 
Woods  V.  Devin,   13  111.   746  269 

V.   Ellis,  85  Va.  471  1116 

V.  Verry,  4  Gray   (Mass.)   357     162 
Woodside  v.   Adams,    40   N.   J.   L. 

417  551,    552,    555,    570,    627 

Woodward     v.     Echols,     58     Ala. 

665  1116 

V.  Puller,  80  N.  Y.  312      1599 

V.  Leiby,  36  Pa.  St.  437      1282 

V.  McLaren,  100  Ind.  586 

1235,  1253,  1263 
V.  Wilson,  68  Pa.  St.  208 

1262,    1271 

Woodward,  The,   32  Fed.   639  1774 

Woodworth  v.  Morse,  18  La.  Ann. 

156  499 

Woody  V.  Pislar.  55  Ind.  592  1076 
Wooldridge  v.  Scott,  69  Mo.  669  1092 
Woollev    V.    Louisville    Banking 

Co.,  81  Ky.  527  251 

Woolsey  v.  Bohn,  41  Minn.  235     1327 
Wooten   V.    Archer,    49    Ga.    388      1235 
V.   Bellinger,    17    Pla.    289 

1063,     1129 
V.  Hill,    98    N.    Car.    48  457 

Wooters     v.     Hollingsworth,     58 

Tex.    371  1097 

Worden  v.  Hammond,  37  Cal.   61 

1247,    1257 
Work   V.  Hall,   79   111.   196  1560 

Worke  v.  Grenaugh,  2  Ld.  Raym. 

866  499 

Worrall  v.  Johnson,   2  Jac.  &  W. 

214  119,    124,    127 

Worrel  v.  Smith,   6  Colo.   141  1108 

Worrill  v.  Barnes,  57  Ga.   404  611 

Worsham  v.   McLeod    (Miss.),   11 

So.   107  585 

Worth  V.  Worth,  155  Cal.  599  1020 
Worthen       v.       Cleaveland,       129 

Mass.   570  1252a,   1448 

Worthington,  The,  133  Fed.  725  1699 
Worthley  v.  Emerson,  116  Mass. 

374  1308,    1313 

Wortman     v.     Kleinschmidt,     12 

Mont.    316  1616 

Wragg  V.  Comp.  Gen.,  2  Desaus. 

(S.    Car.)    509  1063 

Wright  V.  Beardsley,  69  Mo.  548 

1421,    1425 
V.  Bircher's  Bxr.,   72   Mo.   179 

542,  544 
V.  Blackwood,  57  Tex.  644  1261 
V.  Burroughes,  3  C.  B.  344  203 
V.   Cobleigh,   21   N.   H.    339 

115,  118,  153.  155,  165,  166 
V.  Cowie,  5  ^Vash.  341  1368,  1579 
V.  Craig,  92  Miss.   218  625 

V.  Dickey   Co.,    83   Iowa  464        583 
V.  Ellison,   1  Wall.    (U.   S.)    16 

48,    50,    52 
V.  Heffber,  57  Tex.  518  1070 


Wright  V.  Holbrook,  32  N.  Y.  587    1104 
V.   Hood,  49  Wis.  235  1263,  1266 

V.   Lawes,   4   Esp.   82  919,    939 

V.  Link,   34   Miss.    266  598 

V.   Pohls,    83    Wis.    560  1304a 

V.   Reusens,    60    Hun    (N.    Y.) 

585  1513 

V.  Roberts,    43    Hun     (N.    Y.) 

413  1218,    1287,    1299 

V.   Roberts,    55    Hun     (N.    Y.) 

610  1218 

V.   Roberts,    62    Hun     (N.    Y.) 

619  1218 

V.   Sherman,   3  S.  Dak.  290 

502,  691,  691a,  692a 
V.  Snell,  5  B.  &  Aid.  350  265,  267 
V.   Terry,    23    Fla.    160 

26,    702,    707,    722 
V.  Treadwell,    14    Tex.    255  217 

V.   Troutman,    81    111.    374 

1107,    1119 
V.  Vicker,  81  Pa.  St.  122  1158. 

V.  Williams,    5    Cow.    (N.    Y.) 

501  598 

V.  Wright,  70  N.  Y.  96         184, 
187,     188,     193,     196.     206, 

209,  211,  223 
W    W.  Brown  Const.  Co.  v.  Cen- 
tral 111.  Const.  Co.,  234  111.  397    1015 
Wyatt  V.  Stuckley,  29  Ind.  279 

1725,    1743 
WyckofE    V.    Anthony,    90    N.    Y. 
442  251 

V.   Southern  Hotel  Co.,   24  Mo. 

App.  382  515 

Wydale,   The,    37    Fed.    716  1771a 

Wylde  V.  Radford,  33  L.  J.   (Ch.) 

51  252 

Wvlie   V.   Coxe,    15   How.    (U.    S.) 

415  44,    167 

Wylly    Academy    v.    Sanford,    17 

Fla.   162  1287 

Wvman   v.    Colorado    Nat.    Bank, 
5   Colo.   30  244.   258 

V.  Lancaster,    32    Fed.    720  339 

Wvnn     V.     Flannegan,     25     Tex. 
778  1098 

V.   Tallapoosa     County    Bank, 

168  Ala.  469       241,  1033,  1038 

Wynne,  In  re.  Chase    (U.   S.)    227 

559,    639 

Wyoming,  The.   35   Fed.   548  1773 

Wyoming,    The,    36   Fed.    493 

1695,    1699,    1706,    1713,    1727,    1800 
Wyoming,   The,   37   Fed.   583  1794 

Wvthes   V.    Lee,    3    Drew.    396 

1105,  1106 


Yalden,  Ex  parte,  4  Ch.  Div.  129  122 
Yale  V.  Dederer,  68  N.  Y.  329  1265 
Yancey  v.  Mauck,  15  Grat.    (Va.) 

300  1063,    1107 

Yancy  v.  Morton,  94  Cal.  558  1190 
Yarborough  v.  Wood,  42  Tex.  91  1094 
Yaryan  v.   Shriner,  26  Ind.   364 

1063,    1086,    1089 

Yates  V.  Railston,   8  Taunt.   293     323 
V.   Smith,      11      Bradw.      (111.) 

459  1129 

Yearsley  v.   Flanigen,   22   Pa.   St. 
489  1349,  1434 


clxxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections — Vol.  I, 

Yeates   v.   Groves,   1   Ves.  Jr.   280 

43,   45,    47,    55,    56 
Yeatman   v.  King,   2  N.   Dal<.   421 

692a 
Yeats  V.  Ballantine,  56  Mo.  530  1512 
Yetter  v.  Fitts,  113  Ind.  34  1076 

York    V.    Carlisle,    19    Tex.    Civ. 

App.    269  638 

York   County    Bank's   Appeal,    32 

Pa.    St.    446  789.   790 

Yorke  v.  Grenaug-h,  2  Ld.  Raym. 

866  262,  303,  503,  504,   641 

Yorton   v.   Milwaukee   R.   Co.,   62 

Wis.    367  217 

Young      V.      Atkins,       4      Heisk. 
(Tenn.)    529  1119 

V.  Austin,      6     Pick.      (Mass.) 

280  836 

V.  Dearborn,  27  N.  H.  324 

158,   193,   194,   196,   204,   209,   212 
V.   English,   7   Beav.   10  132 

V.   Falmouth,    183    Mass.    80      1375 
V.   French,  35  Wis.   Ill  719 

V.   Haight,    69   N.    .J.   L.    453        1458 
V.   Harris,    36    Ark.    162  1071 

V.  Hawkins,   74   Ala.   370 

1094,    1096,    1101 
V.  Howell,  5   Wash.  239  1421 

V.  Kimball,  23  Pa.  St.  193 

676,   686,   698 
V.  Lyman,    9    Pa.    St.    449 

1416.  1500a 
V.  Stoutz,  74  Ala.  574  1490,  1585 
V.   Swan,    100   Iowa   323  1262 

V.   The    Orpheus,    2    Cliff.     (U. 
S  )   29 

1725,   1726,   1728,   1748,    1807 
V.  Vough,    23   N.   J.   Eq.    325 

384,   387,    401 
V.  Wilson,   44  N.  J.  L.   157  1241 

V.   Wood,    11    B.    Mon.     (Ky.) 

123  1080 

Young  America,  The,  30  Fed.  789 

1781,  1797,  1800,  1801,  1802 
Youngblood  v.  Lowry,  2  McCord 
(S.    Car.)    39  564 


§§   1-lOGOf;   Vol.   II,    §§   1061-1812.] 

Younger      v.      Louks,      7    Bradw. 

(111.)    280  1199 

Young    Mechanic,    The,    2    Curtis 

(U.   S.)    404  1676,   1731 

Yount   V.   Howell,   14   Cal.    465 

1133,    1141 
Yourie    v.    Nelson,    1    Tenn.    Ch. 

614  235 

Youse    V.     McCreary,     2     Blackf. 

(Ind.)    243  1098 


Zabriskie    v.    Exposition    Co.,    67 

Nebr.    581  1274 

Zachry  v.   Stewart,    67   Ga.   218        611 
Zaitz  v.  Metropolitan   St.   R.   Co., 

52    App.    Div.    (N.    Y.)    626  184 

Zapp  v.   Johnson,   87   Tex.   641  638 

Zartman-Thalman    Carriage    Co. 

v.    Reid,    99   Mo.    App.    415  666 

Zehner  v.  Johnston,  22  Ind.  App. 

452  1457,   1470 

Zentmire    v.     Brailey,     89     Nebr. 

158  183 

Ziegler    v.    Galvin,    45    Hun     (N. 

Y.)   44  1251,  1263,  1265 

V.  Valley   Coal   Co.,   150   Mich. 

82  1064,   1074,   1083 

Zimmer    v.    Metropolitan    St.    R. 

Co.,    32   Misc.    (N.   Y.)    262  184 

Zogbaum  v.  Parker,  55  N.  Y.  120    188 
V.   Parker,    66    Barb.     (N.    Y.) 

341  "  203 

Zoll  V.  Carnahan,  83  Mo.  35 

1074,    1099 
Zollars    V.    Snyder    &    Lacey,    43 

Tex.   Civ.  App.   120  1226 

Zook  V.  Thompson,  111  Iowa  463 

1090 
Zuimby   v.   Sloan,   2   E.   D.    Smith 

(N.   Y.)    594  1341 

Zwingle   v.   Wilkinson,    94    Tenn. 

246  1086 


THE  LAW  OF  LIENS 

AT  COMMON  LAW,  BY  STATUTE, 
EQUITABLE  AND  MARITIME 


CHAPTER  I. 

LIENS  AT  COMMON  LAW. 


Sec.  Sec. 

1.  Introductory.  15. 

2.  The  word  "lien." 

3.  Definitions.  16. 

4.  Lien  at  law  an   implied  obli-        17. 

gation.  18. 

5.  A  lien  by  contract. 

6.  Lien      where      price      agreed        19. 

upon. 

7.  Lien  by  contract.  20. 

8.  I>ien  by  operation  of  law.  21. 

9.  Lien    only    to    extent    of    in- 

terest. 22. 

10.  Lien     confers     no     right     of 

property    upon    the    holder.        23. 

11.  A  mortgage  more  than  a  lien. 

12.  An     attachment     on     process        24. 

not  a  lien. 

13.  A    judgment    only    a    general        25. 

lien. 

14.  A  lien  either  specific  or  gen- 

eral. 26. 


Limited  lien  not  to  be  ex- 
tended. 

Specific  liens. 

Definition  of  general  lien. 

Lien  for  general  balance  by 
agreement    of   parties. 

General  liens  regarded  with 
jealousy. 

Possession  necessary  to  lien. 

Possession  essential  to  cre- 
ate and  preserve  lien. 

Change  of  possession  may 
not    defeat   lien. 

The  possession  must  be 
rightful. 

Possession  need  not  be  actu- 
al or  direct. 

Mechanic  acquires  no  lien 
when  working  for  another 
mechanic. 

Lien  of  bailee  performing 
service. 


§  1.  Introductory. — The  present  chapter  is  intended 
merely  as  an  introduction  to  the  general  subject  of  common- 
law  liens.     Liens   at   common   law   naturally   introduce   the 

I 


§    I  LIENS.  2 

other  forms  of  liens  treated  of,  namely,  equitable  liens,  liens 
by  statute,  and  maritime  liens.  The  characteristic  of  these 
liens  are  generally  described  by  stating  how  they  differ  from 
liens  at  common  law. 

The  common-law  liens  attach  exclusively  to  personal  prop- 
erty,^ though  there  are  also  liens  upon  personal  property  in 
equity  and  by  statute.  The  common-law  liens  upon  personal 
property  are,  in  many  instances,  modified  or  enlarged  by 
statute;  while  also  equitable  liens,  upon  both  personal  prop- 
erty and  real  property,  are  in  many  instances  modified  or 
enlarged  by  statute.  By  statute,  moreover,  maritime  liens 
are  in  like  manner  affected.  Finally,  new  liens  have  been 
created  by  statute  which  have  never  been  asserted  at  law 
or  in  equity,  or  by  maritime  law.  It  is  impossible  therefore 
to  treat  of  all  common-law  liens  by  themselves;  to  treat  of 
all  equitable  liens  by  themselves ;  and  then  to  treat  of  all 
maritime  liens  by  themselves.  The  subject  must  be  divided 
by  reference  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  liens:  first,  by  refer- 
ence to  the  kinds  of  property  to  be  affected,  and  then  by 
reference  to  the  classes  of  persons  in  whose  favor  the  liens 
arise.  As  to  the  kinds  of  property,  there  are  the  two  natural 
divisions  of  personal  and  real;  and  maritime  property,  being 
governed  by  peculiar  laws,  forms  a  third  division.  When 
we  come  to  the  consideration  of  the  liens  pertaining  to  the 
several  trades  and  callings,  such  as  the  liens  of  attorneys, 
bankers  and  others,  within  the  division  of  liens  upon  personal 
property,  it  has  seemed  best  to  treat  of  them  in  separate 
chapters,  because  these  liens  generally  differ  from  each  other 
by  marked  peculiarities ;  and,  moreover,  as  a  matter  of  prac- 
tical convenience  in  referring  to  the  book,  it  has  seemed  bet- 
ter to  arrange  the  subjects  alphabetically,  rather  than  to  at- 
tempt an  order  of  arrangement  as  indicated  by  the  principles 
governing  these  liens. 

The     introductory     chapters     upon     common-law     liens, 

1  Oxenham  v.  Esdaile,  2  Y.  &  J.   493;  Gladstone  v.  Birley,  2  Mer.  404. 


3  LIENS  AT   COMMON   LAW,  §    2 

equitable  liens  and  statutory  liens  treat  of  some  of  the 
principal  characteristics  of  these  liens  in  a  general  manner; 
but  reference  should  be  had  to  other  parts  of  the  work  treat- 
ing of  particular  liens  for  a  fuller  development  and  illustra- 
tion of  many  points  touched  upon  in  these  general  chapters, 
and  for  others  not  referred  to  in  them.  As  regards  liens 
upon  personal  property,  there  are  some  principles  and  rules 
applicable  to  several  different  kinds  of  liens  in  respect  to  the 
assignment,  waiver  and  enforcement  of  these  liens;  and 
therefore  the  first  volume,  which  is  devoted  to  liens  upon 
personal  property,  closes  with  general  chapters  relating  to 
the  assignment  of  liens,  the  waiver  of  liens,  and  enforce- 
ment of  liens. 

§  2.  The  word  "lien." — The  word  "lien"  is  here  used  in 
its  legal  and  technical  sense."  Much  confusion  has  arisen 
from  using  the  word  in  a  loose  manner,  at  one  time  in  its 
technical  sense,  and  at  another  in  its  popular  sense.  It  is 
often  convenient  and  proper  to  speak  of  the  lien  of  a  mort- 
gage, or  of  the  lien  of  a  pledge.  Of  course  it  will  often  hap- 
pen, when  the  word  is  used  in  this  sense,  that  the  description 
of  the  lien  shows  that  the  word  is  used  merely  to  denote  the 
charge  or  incumbrance  of  a  mortgage,  pledge,  attachment  or 
judgment.  And  so  in  many  other  instances  the  word  is  used 
in  a  popular  sense  to  denote  a  charge  which  is  not  in  a  strict 
sense  a  lien  by  law,  custom,  statute  or  in  equity.  But  in  a 
treatise  upon  the  subject  it  is  imperative,  not  only  to  use  the 

2  The  word  "lien"  became  a  law  primarily  means  to  "tie,"  to 
term  at  a  comparatively  recent  "bind."  The  common-law  right  of 
date.  The  right  existed,  under  the  retainer  implies  possession;  and  a 
name  of  a  right  of  retainer,  as  common-law  lien  implies  posses- 
early  as  the  reign  of  Edward  IV.;  sion  but  the  term  is  sometimes 
but  the  name  "lien"  does  not  seem  used  in  a  broader  sense  than  the 
to  have  been  given  to  this  right  mere  right  to  retain;  it  is  often 
till  about  the  beginning  of  the  used  to  designate  rights  which  do 
eighteenth  century.  The  word  is  not  depend  upon  possession,  as  in 
derived  from  the  French,  and,  fur-  the  case  of  statutory,  equitable 
ther    back,     from    the    Latin,    and  and   maritime   liens. 


8    3  LIENS.  4 

word  in  its  proper  sense,  but  also  to  distinguish  between  the 
proper  and  improper  use  of  the  word  in  the  decisions  that  are 
used  as  authorities,  or  are  commented  upon.  In  equity  the 
word  "lien"  is  used  in  a  broader  sense  than  at  law.  It  denotes 
a  right  of  a  particular  nature  over  a  thing  constituting  incum- 
brance upon  it  and  the  lien  may  be  enforced  by  a  proceeding 
against  it  and  possession  of  the  thing  is  not  necessary  to  the 
existence  of  the  lien. 

§  3.  Definitions. — A  lien  has  been  well  defined  to  be  "a 
right  in  one  man  to  retain  that  which  is  in  his  possession  be- 
longing to  another,  till  certain  demands  of  him  the  person  in 
possession  are  satisfied."-^  The  code  of  California^  declares 
that  "a  lien  is  a  charge  imposed  in  some  mode  other  than  by  a 
transfer  in  trust,  upon  specific  property,  by  which  it  is  made 
security  for  the  performance  of  an  act." 

"The  term  'lien,'  "  says  Chancellor  Bland,^  "is  applied  in 
various  modes;  but,  in  all  cases,  it  signifies  an  obligation,  tie, 
or  claim  annexed  to,  or'attaching  upon  property,  without  sat- 
isfying which  such  property  cannot  be  demanded  by  its  own- 
er. Lien,  in  its  proper  sense,  is  a  right  which  the  law  gives. 
But  it  is  usual  to  speak  of  lien  by  contract,  though  that  be 
more  in  the  nature  of  an  agreement  for  a  pledge.  And  there 
are  liens  which  exist  only  in  equity,  and  of  which  equity  alone 
can  take  cognizance.  The  existence  of  a  lien,  however,  and 
the  benefit  which  may  be  derived  from  it,  as  well  as  the  mode 
in  which  that  benefit  may  be  obtained,  depend  upon  princi- 
ples of  law  and  circumstances  so  various,  that  it  is  always  in- 

3  Hammonds  v.   Barclay,  2  East  National    Cash    Register    Co.,    174 

227,    235,    per    Grose,    J.;    and    see  Fed.  579,  98  C.  C.  A.  425. 

McCaffrey    v.    Wooden,    62    Barb.  4  Civ.    Code    1906,   §  2872.     So    in 

(N.   Y.)   316,   328,   per  Johnson.   J..  North   Dakota,   Rev.   Code   1905,   § 

affd.  65  N.  Y.  459,  22  Am.  Rep.  644.  6123;    South    Dakota,    Rev.    Code 

Aldine    Mfg.    Co.   v.    Phillips,    118  1903     (Civ.),     §     2017;     Oklahoma, 

Mich.   162,  ie  N.  W.  371,  42  L.   R.  Comp.   Laws  1909,  §  4112. 

A.  531,  74  Am.  St.  380,  which  holds  5  Ridgely    v.    Iglehart,    3    Bland 

that  no  right  of  sale  exists;  In  re  (Md.)   540;   In  re   Maher,  169  Fed. 

997. 


5  LIENS   AT    COMMON    LAW.  §    4 

dispensably  necessary  carefully  to  attend  to  those  particulars 
by  which  its  very  substance  may  be  materially  affected." 

In  a  narrow  sense  the  term  "lien"  implies  a  right  of  one  in 
possession  of  personalty  to  hold  it  as  against  its  owner  for 
the  satisfaction  of  a  claim  due  from  the  owner.  In  a  broader 
sense  it  is  a  legal  charge  on  either  personalty  or  real  estate 
for  the  satisfaction  of  a  debt  or  an  obligation.  In  equity  and 
in  maritime  law  it  may  exist  without  possession. 

§  4.  Lien  at  law  an  implied  obligation. — A  lien  at  law  is 
an  implied  obligation  whereby  property  is  bound  for  the  dis- 
charge of  some  debt  or  engagement.  It  is  not  the  result  of 
an  express  contract;  it  is  given  by  implication  of  law.^  It  is 
true  that  we  often  speak  of  a  lien  by  contract;  but  such  an 
obligation  is  rather  in  the  nature  of  an  agreement  for  a  pledge 
or  mortgage.  In  its  strict  and  proper  sense  a  lien  is  a  right 
which  the  law  gives,  for,  to  make  a  lien  by  law,  possession 
must  be  given,  and  possession  under  a  contract  for  security 
generally  constitutes  a  pledge  or  a  mortgage,  according  to 
the  terms  of  the  contract.  A  lien  by  contract  without 
possession  is  an  equitable  lien  or  charge.     If  a  lien  be  given 

6  In   re    Leith's    Estate,   L.    R.    1  persons   applying   for   these   serv- 

P.  C.  296,  305,  per  Lord  Westbury;  ices  are  not   strangers,   the  usage 

Gladstone    v.    Birley,    2    Mer.    404,  of    their    deal    may    be    such    that 

per   Grant,    Master   of   the   Rolls;  the   law   will   create   a   lien.     For 

Wilson  V.   Heather,  5  Taunt.  695;  instance,  the  course  of  their  deal 

Ridgely  v.  Iglehart,  3  Bland  (Md.)  may  be  that  payment  for  the  serv- 

540;    Cummings    v.    Harris,    3    Vt.  ices    is    always    made    before    the 

244,  23  Am.   Dec.  206.     In  the  lat-  property  is   taken  away."     A  lien 

ter    case    Hutchinson,    C.    J.,    said :  may  only   be   created   by  contract 

"The  usual  cases  in  which  the  law  implied  or  expressed  of  the  owner 

creates  a  lien  are,  where  the  per-  of  property  or  his  agent  or  with- 

son     performing     services     would  out  the  owner's  consent  by  force 

have  no  other  sure  remedy;  as  a  of   a   positive    statute   or    rule    of 

blacksmith  shoeing  a  horse  for  a  law.     Paton  v.  Robinson,  81  Conn, 

stranger;  or  a  watchmaker  clean-  547,  71  Atl.  730.     See  also,   Garri- 

ing  a  watch  for  a  stranger;  or  an  son  v.  Vermont  Mills,  154  N.  Car. 

innkeeper  furnishing  entertainment  1,  69  S.   E.  743. 
for     travellers;     and,     where     the 


§    5  LIENS.  6 

by  express  contract  in  a  case  where  the  law  would  otherwise 
imply  a  lien,  the  express  stipulation  excludes  the  implied  lien, 
and  limits  the  rights  of  the  parties  to  the  express  contract^ 

§  5.  A  lien  by  contract. — A  lien  by  contract  exists  only 
where  it  is  expressly  agreed  that  a  party  may  retain  the  prop- 
erty as  security  for  the  work  done  or  expense  incurred  in 
respect  of  it.  There  must  be  something  more  than  a  con- 
tract for  the  payment  of  the  price.  The  law  implies  no  lien 
from  such  a  contract,  but  the  parties  may  so  form  their  con- 
tract as  to  create  a  lien,  if  they  choose.^ 

Where  an  intention  is  shown  by  the  terms  of  a  written 
contract  to  charge  particular  property,  duly  identified,  with  a 
debt  or  an  obligation,  an  equitable  lien  is  created.  Even  a 
verbal  contract  w^ill  charge  personal  property  with  a  lien.® 

A  lien  by  contract  can  not,  any  more  than  an  implied  lien, 
exist  without  possession.  The  contract  itself  is  not  equiva- 
lent to  possession,  and  it  does  not  give  possession.  Thus  a 
declaration  at  the  end  of  a  promissory  note  or  other  obliga- 
tion, that  it  constitutes  a  lien  upon  certain  property,  does 
not  amount  to  a  contract  for  a  lien,  unless  the  creditor  re- 
tains possession  of  the  property. ^'^ 

§  .6.  Lien  where  price  agreed  upon. — It  was  at  one  time 
doubted  whether  a  lien  could  exist  at  common  law  where  the 
parties  had  specially  agreed  as  to  the  price  ;^^  but  this  doubt 
was  removed  by  the  judgment  in  Chase  v.  Westmore,^^  and 
the  rule  was  there  established  that  such  agreement  does  not 

7  In  re  Leith's  Estate,  L.  R.  1  lo  Roberts  v.  Jacks,  31  Ark.  597, 
P.   C.  296.  25  Am.   Rep.   584;    Barnett  v.   Ma- 

8  Cummings  v.  Harris,  3  Vt.  244,  son,  7  Ark.  253;  Waddell  v.  Car- 
23  Am.  Dec.  206.  lock,  41  Ark.  523. 

9  Atlanta  Nat.  Bank  v.  Four  n  Brenan  v.  Currint,  Sayer  224; 
States  Grocer  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  Case  of  an  Hostler,  Yelv.  66,  note ; 
App.),  135  S.  W.  1135;  Ward  v.  Stevenson  v.  Blakelock,  I  M.  &  S. 
Stark  Bros.,  91  Ark.  268,  121  S.  W.  535. 

382.  12  5   M.   &  S.   180   (1816). 


7  LIENS  AT   COMMON   LAW.  §    6 

impair  the  right  of  lien  unless  a  future  time  of  payment  is 
fixed  by  the  parties,  or  some  other  stipulation  be  made  which 
is  inconsistent  with  the  lien.  Lord  Ellenborough,  delivering 
the  judgment  of  the  court  in  this  case,  said:  "We  believe 
the  practice  of  modern  times  has  not  proceeded  upon  any  dis- 
tinction, between  an  agreement  for  a  stipulated  price,  and  the 
implied  contract  to  pay  a  reasonable  price  or  sum ;  and  that 
the  right  of  detainer  has  been  practically  acknowledged  in 
both  cases  alike.  In  the  case  of  Wolf  v.  Summers, ^^  Mr.  J. 
Lawrence  does  not  appear  to  have  been  aware  of  any  such 
distinction.  It  is  impossible,  indeed,  to  find  any  solid  reason 
for  saying,  that  if  I  contract  with  a  miller  to  grind  my  wheat, 
at  15s.  a  load,  he  shall  be  bound  to  deliver  it  to  me,  when 
ground,  without  receiving  the  price  of  his  labor;  but  that  if  I 
merely  deliver  it  to  him  to  grind,  without  fixing  the  price, 
he  may  detain  it  until  I  pay  him,  though  probably  he  would 
demand,  and  the  law  would  give  him  the  very  same  sum. 
Certainly,  if  the  right  of  detainer,  considered  as  a  right  at 
common  law  (and  it  must  be  so  considered  in  this  case), 
exists  only  in  those  cases  where  there  is  no  manner  of  con- 
tract between  the  parties,  except  such  as  the  law  implies,  this 
court  can  not  extend  the  rule ;  and  authorities  were  quoted 
to  establish  this  proposition;  but,  upon  consideration,  we  are 
of  opinion,  that  those  authorities  are  contrary  to  reason,  and 
to  the  principles  of  law,  and  ought  not  to  govern  our  present 
decision." 

The  learned  Chief  Justice  notices  in  detail  some  of  the 
early  authorities  and  dicta  in  which  it  was  held  that  the  fixing 
of  a  price  beforehand  defeats  the  exercise  of  the  right  of 
lien.^^  But  all  this  is  now  chiefly  interesting  as  shownng  the 

13  2   Campb.   631.  a    tailor    that    he    shall    have    so 

14  In  2  Rol.  Abr.  92,  a  dictum  of  much  for  making  my  apparel,  he 
Williams,  J.,  is  quoted  in  these  cannot  keep  them  until  satisfac- 
words :  "If  I  put  my  clothes  to  tion  for  the  making."  See  also, 
a  tailor  to  make,  he  may  keep  case  of  Brenan  v.  Currint,  Sayer 
them  until  satisfaction  for  the  224.  There  are  expressions  in 
making.      But    if    I    contract   with  other   cases    to    the    effect    that   a 


LIENS. 


8 


history  of  the  doctrine,  for  since  the  judgment  in  Chase  v. 
Westmore  it  is  everywhere  held  to  be  immaterial  as  regards 
the  lien  whether  the  price  be  fixed  by  special  agreement  or 
not.i^ 

§  7.  Lien  by  contract. — A  lien  by  express  contract  super- 
sedes the  lien  impiled  at  common  law,^^  but  upon  a  failure  of 
the  owner  of  the  property  to  comply  with  the  stipulations  of 
the  contract,  so  that  a  lien  can  arise  within  its  terms,  the 


Hen  is  a  right  accompanying  an 
implied  contract,  as  by  the  Lord 
Chancellor  in  Cowell  v.  Simpson, 
16  Ves.  275.  Chief  Justice  Ellen- 
borough,  however,  in  Chase  v. 
Westmore,  5  M.  &  S.  180,  suggests 
that  Williams,  J.,  above  quoted, 
should  be  understood  to  speak  of 
a  contract  for  time,  as  well  as  the 
amount  of  payment,  and  that  the 
authorities  built  upon  his  saying 
are  founded  on  a  mistake;  for  the 
earliest  authority  on  the  subject 
makes  no  distinction  between  an 
implied  contract  and  a  contract 
for  a  fixed  price.  This  authority 
is  in  the  Year  Book,  Easter  Term, 
5  Edw.  IV.  fol.  2,  b.  "Note,  also 
by  Haydon,  that  an  hostler  may 
detain  a  horse  if  the  master  will 
not  pay  him  for  his  eating.  The 
same  law  is,  if  a  tailor  make  me 
a  gown,  he  may  keep  the  gown 
until  he  is  paid  for  his  labor.  And 
the  same  law  is,  if  I  buy  of  you 
a  horse  for  20s.,  you  may  keep 
the  horse  until  I  pay  you  the  20s. ; 
but  if  I  am  to  pay  you  at  Michael- 
mas next  ensuing,  then  you  shall 
not  keep  the  horse  until  you  are 
paid."  The  distinction  drawn  is 
where  a  future  time  of  payment 
is  fixed.  "If  so  material  a  dis- 
tinction   as    that    which     depends 


upon  fixing  the  amount  of  the 
price  had  been  supposed  to  exist 
at  that  time,  we  think,"  says  Lord 
Ellenborough,  "it  would  have  been 
noticed  in  this  place;  and,  not  be- 
ing noticed,  we  think  it  was  not 
then  supposed  to  exist."  In  a 
case  so  late  as  1809  Lord  Eldon 
speaks  of  a  lien,  except  in  the 
case  of  a  lien  for  purchase-money, 
as  prima  facie  a  right  accompany- 
ing the  implied  contract;  and  says 
that  if  possession  be  commenced 
under  an  implied  contract,  and 
afterward  a  special  contract  be 
made  for  payment,  in  the  nature 
of  the  thing  the  one  contract  de- 
stroys the  other.  But,  as  Lord 
Ellenborough  remarks  in  Chase  v. 
Westmore,  5  M.  &  S.  180,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  Lord  Chancellor  was 
speaking  of  a  special  contract  for 
a  particular  mode  of  payment, — a 
contract  inconsistent  with  the 
common-law  right. 

15  Crawshay  v.  Homfray,  4  B.  & 
Aid.  50;  Steinman  v.  Wilkins,  7 
Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  466,  42  Am.  Dec. 
254;  Mathias  v.  Sellers,  86  Pa.  St. 
486,  27  Am.  Rep.  723;  Pinney  v. 
Wells,  10  Conn.  104;  Hanna  v. 
Phelps,  7  Ind.  21,  63  Am.  Dec.  410. 

16  In  re  Leith's  Estate,  L.  R.  1 
P.   C.  296. 


9  LIENS  AT    COMMON   LAW,  g    9 

common-law  lien  may  attach.  Thus,  where  one  agreed  to 
supply  to  the  owner  of  a  sawmill  a  certain  quantity  of  logs  to 
be' sawed  into  boards  and  transported  to  market  at  a  stipu- 
lated price,  to  be  paid  upon  the  delivery  of  specified  quanti- 
ties, and  the  mill-owner  was  to  have  a  lien  for  the  price,  the 
other  party  failed  to  furnish  the  specified  quantity  of  logs, 
so  that  the  mill-owner  was  unable  to  saw  and  deliver  the 
specified  quantity  of  boards  and  claim  a  lien  within  the  terms 
of  his  contract;  but  it  was  held  his  common-law  lien  attached 
to  the  boards  in  his  hands,  notwithstanding  the  special  agree- 
ment.^'^ 

§  8.  Lien  by  operation  of  law. — A  lien  which  arises  by 
operation  of  law  may  possibly  override  all  other  rights  in  the 
property  to  which  it  attaches,  while  a  lien  which  is  created  by 
contract  or  by  statute  is  subordinate  to  all  prior  existing 
rights  therein.  Thus  the  lien  of  a  workman  who  has  repaired 
a  chattel  may  be  superior  to  an  existing  mortgage  upon  it.^^ 
But  a  farmer  who,  under  a  special  contract  with  the  owner 
of  horses,  has  kept  and  fed  them  during  the  winter,  has  no 
lien  upon  them  for  the  price  of  keeping  as  against  the  mort- 
gagee.^^ 

§  9.  Lien  only  to  extent  of  interest. — As  a  general  rule,  a 
person  can  create  a  lien  on  property  only  to  the  extent  of  his 
interest  in  it.  He  need  not  be  the  sole  and  absolute  owner  in 
order  to  give  a  lien  upon  property;  but  if  he  has  an  equitable 
title  with  possession,  or  some  legal  interest  with  possession, 
he  may  create  a  lien  upon  such  interest  as  he  has;  but  this 
lien  will  not  ordinarily  affect  rights  of  other  part  owners,  or 
of  a  mortgagee  or  other  incumbrancer.     One  who  is  merely 

17  Mount  V.  Williams,  11  Wend.  Scott  v.  Delahunt,  5  Lans.  (N.  Y.) 
(N  .Y.)   n.  Z72,  affd.   65   N.  Y.   1<28;   Jones   on 

18  See   post,   §   744;   Williams   v.  Chat.   Mort.   (5th   ed.),    §  474. 
Allsup,  10  C.  B.   N.  S.  417;   Ham-  19  See   post,    §§    691-693;    Bissell 
mond  V.  Danielson,  126  Mass.  294;  v.  Pearce,  28  N.  Y.  252. 


§    lO  LIENS.  lO 

a  conditional  purchaser,  so  long  as  the  condition  on  which 
title  was  to  vest  in  him  is  not  fulfilled,  can  not  create  a  lien 
on  the  property  so  as  to  impair  the  title  of  the  owner.^'^  One 
who  has  no  title  to  property  can  confer  no  lien  upon  it,  either 
by  his  act  or  by  express  contract. ^^ 

§   10.     Lien  confers  no  right  of  property  upon  the  holder. — 

A  lien,  whether  implied  or  by  contract,  confers  no  right  of 
property  upon  the  holder.  It  is  neither  a  jus  ad  rem  nor  a 
jus  in  re.  It  is  neither  a  right  of  property  in  the  thing,  nor  a 
right  of  action  for  the  thing.  It  is  simply  a  right  of  detain- 
er.^^  "Liens  are  not  founded  on  property,"  says  Mr.  Justice 
Buller;^-^  "but  they  necessarily  suppose  the  property  to  be  in 
some  other  person,  and  not  in  him  who  sets  up  the  right." 
Consequently  the  interest  of  the  lienholder  is  not  attachable, 
either  as  personal  property  or  as  a  chose  in  action.-^ 

^11.  A  mortgage  m.ore  than  a  lien, — A  mortgage  is  some- 
times inaccurately  called  a  lien.  "And  so  it  certainly  is,"  says 
Mr.  Justice  Story,^^  "and  something  more;  it  is  a  transfer  of 
the  property  itself,  as  security  for  the  debt.  This  must  be 
admitted  to  be  true  at  law,  and  it  is  equally  true  in  equity, 
for  in  this  respect  equity  follows  the  law.  It  does  not  con- 
sider the  estate  of  the  mortgagee  as  defeated  and  reduced 
to  a  mere  lien,  but  it  treats  it  as  a  trust  estate,  and  according 

20  Walker  v.  Burt,  57  Ga.  20.  23  Lickbarrow  v.   Mason,  6  East 

21  Conrow  v.  Little,  41  Hun  (N.  21,  24.  Notwithstanding  an  agree- 
Y.)    395.  ment  to  the  contrary,  a  lien,  or  a 

22  Brace  v.  Marlborough,  2  P.  contract  for  a  lien,  transfers  no 
W.  491;  Hammonds  v.  Barclay,  2  title  to  the  property  subject  to  the 
East  227;  Peck  v.  Jenness,  7  How.  lien.  California  Civ.  Code  1906, 
(U.  S.)  612,  12  L.  ed.  841,  per  Grier,  §  2888. 

J.;    Meany  v.   Head,   1    Mason    (U.  24  Meany  v.   Head,   I   Mason   (U. 

S.)    319,    Fed.    Cas.    No.    9379,    per  S.)  319,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  9379;  Jacobs 

Story,     J. ;     Ex     parte     Foster,     2  v.  Knapp,  50  N.  H.  71. 
Story,  131,  1'47,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  4960,         25  Conard  v.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.,  1 

per    Story,    J. ;    Jacobs    v.    Knapp,  Pet.  (U.  S.)  386,  441,  7  L.  ed.  189. 
50   N.   H.  71. 


II  LIENS  AT   COMMON   LAW.  §     12 

to  the  intention  of  the  parties,  as  a  qualified  estate  and  se- 
curity. When  the  debt  is  discharged  there  is  a  resulting 
trust  for  the  mortgagor.  It  is  therefore  only  in  a  loose  and 
general  sense  that  it  is  sometimes  called  a  lien,  and  then  only 
by  way  of  contrast  to  an  estate  absolute  and  indefeasible." 

In  like  manner  we  speak  of  the  lien  of  a  pledge.  But  a 
pledge  is  also  a  lien  and  something  more.  It  is  a  deposit  by 
a  debtor  of  personal  property  by  way  of  security,  with  an 
implied  power  in  the  creditor  to  sell  it  upon  default.  But  a 
lienholder  has  no  power  of  sale,  and  except  as  authorized  by 
statute  he  can  not  at  law  enforce  his  lien.  He  can  only  hold 
possession  of  the  property.^^ 

§  12.  An  attachment  on  process  not  a  lien. — An  attach- 
ment on  mesne  process  does  not  constitute  a  lien  in  any  pro- 
per legal  sense  of  the  term.  Though  an  attachment  is  some- 
times spoken  of  as  a  lien,  the  term  is  then  used  only  in  a  gen- 
eral sense,  by  way  of  analogy  and  illustration.  "An  attach- 
ment," says  Judge  Story,^'^  "does  not  come  up  to  the  exact 
definition,  or  meaning  of  a  lien,  either  in  the  general  sense 
of  the  common  law,  or  in  that  of  the  maritime  law,  or  in  that 
of  equity  jurisprudence.  Not  in  that  of  the  common  law,  be- 
cause the  creditor  is  not  in  possession  of  the  property:  but 
it  is  in  custodia  legis,  if  personal  property;  if  real  property, 
it  is  not  a  fixed  and  vested  charge,  but  it  is  a  contingent,  con- 
ditional charge,  until  the  judgment  and  levy.  Not  in  the  sense 
of  the  maritime  law,  which  does  not  recognize  or  enforce  any 
claim  as  a  lien,  until  it  has  become  absolute,  fixed,  and  vested. 
Not  in  that  of  equity  jurisprudence,  for  there  a  lien  is  not  a 
jus  in  re  or  a  jus  ad  rem.  It  is  but  a  charge  upon  the  thing, 
and  then  only  when  it  has,  in  like  manner,  become  abso- 
lute, fixed,  and  vested." 

26  Jones    on    Collateral    Securi-  27  Ex  parte  Foster,  2  Story  (U. 

ties,  §§  1,  2.  S.)   131.  Fed.  Cas.   No.  4960. 


§    13  LIENS.  12 

s?  13.  A  judgment  only  a  general  lien. — Even  a  judgment 
does  not  constitute  a  lien  upon  the  real  estate  of  the  debtor. 
It  is  only  a  general  charge  upon  all  his  real  estate  to  be  en- 
forced by  an  execution  and  levy  upon  some  part  or  the  w^hole 
of  it.  It  is  not  a  common-law  lien,  for  it  is  not  supported  by 
possession.  It  had  its  origin  in  the  statute  of  2  West- 
minster, 13  Edw.  I.,^®  giving  the  right  to  an  elegit, ^^  though 
a  judgment  charging  the  lands  of  the  debtor  is  called  a  lien 
in  the  courts  of  equity  in  England,  and  in  the  courts  of  law  of 
many  of  our  states. ^*^  Lien  upon  a  judgment  is  a  vague  and 
inaccurate  expression,"  said  Mr.  Justice  Erle.^^ 

§  14.  A  lien  either  specific  or  general. — A  lien  is  either 
specific  or  general.  The  former  attaches  to  specific  property 
as  security  for  some  demand  which  the  creditor  has  in  respect 
to  that  property,  such  as  a  demand  for  the  unpaid  price  of 
work  done,  or  materials  furnished  in  repairing  or  construct- 
ing a  specific  chattel.  The  code  of  California^^  declares  that 
a  special  lien  is  one  which  the  holder  thereof  can  enforce  only 
as  security  for  the  performance  of  a  particular  act  or  obliga- 
tion, and  of  such  obligations  as  may  be  incidental  thereto. 

A  specific  lien  may  arise  by  implication  of  law,  by  usage  of 
trade,  by  the  contract  of  the  parties,  or  by  statute.  This  im- 
plied lien  was  doubtless  the  first  in  the  order  of  development 
in  English  jurisprudence;  and  in  this  country  it  was  adopted 
as  a  part  of  the  common  law.  "It  is  not  to  be  doubted,"  said 
Chief  Justice  Gibson  of  Pennsylvania,-*^^  that  the  law  of  parti- 
cular or  specific  lien  on  goods  in  the  hands  of  a  tradesman  or 
artisan  for  the  price  of  work  done  on  them,  though  there  is 
no  trace  of  its  recognition  in  our  own  books,  was  brought 

28  St.  1,  ch.  18.  V.  Fales,  5  N.  H.  527;  Kittredge  v. 

29  Ex  parte   Foster,  2  Story   (U.       Bellows,  7  N.  H.  399. 

S.  Cir.),  131,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  4960.  si  Brunsdon   v.   Allard,   2   El.    & 

30  Peck  V.   Jenness,  7   How.   (U.       El.  19. 

S.)  612,  12  L.  ed.  841,  per  Grier,  J.;  32  Civ.  Code  1906,  §  2875. 

Waller's    Lessee   v.    Best,   3   How.  33  Mclntyre  v.   Carver,  2  Watts 

(U.  S.)  Ill,  11  L.  ed.  518;  Dunklee      &  S.  (Pa.)  392,  395,  Zl  Am.  Dec.  519. 


13  LIENS   AT    COMMON    LAW.  §     1 5 

hither  by  our  ancestors,  and  that  it  is  a  part  of  our  common 
law.  It  was  as  proper  for  their  condition  and  circumstances 
here  as  it  had  been  in  the  parent  land;  and  though  a  general 
lien  for  an  entire  balance  of  accounts,  was  said  by  Lord  Ellen- 
borough^^  to  be  an  encroachment  on  the  common  law,  yet 
it  has  never  been  intimated  that  a  particular  lien  on  specific 
chattels  for  the  price  of  labor  bestowed  on  them  does  not 
grow  necessarily  and  naturally  out  of  the  transactions  of 
mankind  as  a  matter  of  public  policy.  Originally  the  remedy 
by  retainer  seems  to  have  been  only  coextensive  with  the 
workman's  obligation  to  receive  the  goods;  a  limitation  of 
it  which  would,  perhaps,  be  inconsistent  with  its  existence 
here,  for  we  have  no  instance  of  a  mechanic  being  compelled 
to  do  jobs  for  another.  But  even  the  more  recent  British 
decisions  have  extended  it  to  the  case  of  every  bailee  who 
has,  by  his  labor  or  skill,  conferred  value  on  the  thing  bailed 
to  him." 

The  principal  specific  or  particular  liens  upon  personal 
property  at  common  law  are  those  of  mechanics  and  arti- 
sans,^'' of  inkeepers,^^^  of  carriers, ^^"^  of  sellers  or  vendors,'^^° 
and  of  landlords  under  the  process  of  distress. ^'"^ 

§  15,  Limited  lien  not  to  be  extended. — A  lien  expressly 
or  impliedly  limited  to  a  particular  debt  will  not  be  extended 
to  cover  another  debt,  except  by  express  agreement  or  plain 
intention  of  the  parties.^*^  Thus,  where  certain  dyers  who  had 
a  lien  on  goods  dyed  by  them  for  the  price  of  the  dyeing  of 
the  same,  also  claimed  a  lien  upon  them  for  other  goods  dyed 
and  returned  by  them  at  a  prior  time,  it  wa's  held  that  the 
lien  could  not  be  thus  extended,  because  it  was  to  be  inferred 

34Rushforth  V.  Hadfield,  7  East  ssb  See  post,  ch.  VII. 

224.    So  North  Dakota:  Rev.  Code  35c  See  post,  ch.  XVII. 

1905,   §  6126;   South   Dakota:   Rev.  ssdSee  post,  ch.   XII. 

Code    (Civ.)    1903,    §   2020;     Okla-  36  jarvis    v.    Rogers,     15    Mass. 

homa:  Comp.  Laws   1909,  §  4115.  389,    per    Wilde,     J.;     Walker     v. 

35  See   post,   ch.   XV.  Birch,  6  T.  R.  258. 

35a  See  post,  ch.  XI. 


§    1 6  LIENS.  14 

from  the  manner  of  dealing  between  the  parties  that  the 
dyers  relied  upon  the  personal  credit  of  the  owners  of  the 
goods  for  the  price  of  dyeing  those  which  had  been  re- 
turned.^'^ 

One  who  has  a  specific  lien  upon  property  can  not  retain 
it  for  the  payment  of  other  debts  due  him  by  the  owner  with- 
out a  special  agreement  to  that  efTect.^^ 

§  16.  Specific  liens. — Specific  liens  have  always  been  fav- 
ored by  the  courts.  Lord  Mansfield,  in  a  case  where  he  was 
obliged  to  decide  against  a  general  lien,  said:^®  "The  con- 
venience of  commerce,  and  natural  justice,  are  on  the  side  of 
liens;  and  therefore,  of  late  years,  courts  lean  that  way."  In 
a  later  case  Chief  Justice  Best  said  i^*'  "As  between  debtor 
and  creditor  the  doctrine  of  lien  is  so  equitable  that  it  can  not 
be  favored  too  much." 

Similar  declarations  have  been  made  by  the  courts  in  this 
country.  Thus,  in  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  Maryland,  Chief 
Justice  Dorsey  said  :*^  "The  doctrine  of  lien  is  more  favored 
now  than  formerly;  and  it  is  now  recognized  as  a  general 
principle,  that  wherever  the  party  has,  by  his  labor  or  skill, 
improved  the  value  of  property  placed  in  his  possession,  he 
has  a  lien  upon  it  until  paid.  And  liens  have  been  implied 
when,  from  the  nature  of  the  transaction,  the  owner  of  the 
property  is  assumed  as  having  designed  to  create  them,  or 
when  it  can  be  fairly  inferred,  from  circumstances,  that  it  was 
the  understanding  of  the  parties  that  they  should  exist.  The 
existence  of  liens  has  also  been  sustained  where  they  con- 
tributed to  promote  public  policy  and  convenience." 

§  17.  Definition  of  general  lien. — A  general  lien  is  one 
which  the  holder  thereof  is  entitled  to  enforce  as  a  security 

37  Green  v.  Farmer,  4  Burr.  2214.  -lo  Jacobs  v.  Latour,  5  Bing.  130. 

38  Nevan  v.  Roup,  8  Iowa  207.  4i  Wilson     v.      Guyton,     8     Gill 

39  Green  V.  Farmer,  4  Burr.  2214;  (Md.)    213. 
I.  W.   Black.  651. 


1-5  LIENS  AT   COMMON   LAW.  §     l8 

for  the  performance  of  all  the  obligations,  or  all  of  a  particu- 
lar class  of  obligations,  which  exist  in  his  favor  against  the 
owner  of  the  property.^^  A  general  lien  is  one  which  does 
not  necessarily  arise  from  some  demand  which  the  creditor 
has  in  respect  to  the  property  upon  which  the  lien  is  claimed, 
but  is  one  for  a  general  balance  of  accounts.  A  general  lien 
may  exist:  First,  where  there  is  an  express  contract;  sec- 
ond, where  it  is  implied  from  the  usage  of  trade;  third,  from 
the  manner  of  dealing  between  the  parties  in  the  particular 
case;  fourth,  or  where  the  defendant  has  acted  as  a  factor. ^^ 
Lord  Mansfield  made  this  statement  of  the  general  rule  of 
law  in  a  case  where  he  decided  that  a  dyer  had  no  lien  on 
goods  delivered  to  him  in  the  course  of  trade,  except  for  the 
price  of  the  dyeing,  because  there  was  no  express  contract  to 
give  a  lien  for  a  general  balance,  and  none  could  be  inferred 
from  any  usage  of  trade  or  manner  of  dealing  between  the 
parties;  but  on  the  contrary  the  manner  of  dealing  showed 
that  the  dyer  relied  solely  upon  the  personal  credit  of  the 
owner. 

The  principal  general  liens  are  those  of  factors  and  brok- 
ers,^* of  bankers,*^*  of  attorneys  upon  their  clients'  papers  and 
moneys,^^*"  and  of  warehousemen  and  wharfingers.^^'' 

§  18.    Lien  for  general  balance  by  agreement  of  parties. — 

A  lien  for  a  general  balance  may  arise  by  agreement  of 
parties,  or  by  a  usage  which  implies  an  agreement.  In  1788 
certain  dyers,  bleachers  and  others,  in  Manchester,  at  a  public 
meeting,  agreed  not  to  receive  goods  to  be  dyed  or  bleached, 
except  upon  the  condition  that  they  should  respectively  have 
a  lien  upon  them,  not  only  for  work  done  upon  the  particular 
goods,  but  also  for  a  general  balance  of  account.  In  trover, 
by  the  assignee  of  a  bankrupt,  for  a  quantity  of  yarn  which 

42  California      Civ.      Code     1906,  44  See  post.  ch.   IX. 
§   2874;   North    Dakota   Rev.    Code  44a  See  post,  ch.  VI. 

1905,  §  6125.  44b  See  pogt^  chaps.  IV,  V. 

43  Green  v.  Farmer,  4  Burr.  2214.  44c  See  post,  ch.  XIX. 


§    19  LIENS.  l6 

the  owner,  with  notice  of  this  agreement,  delivered  to  a 
bleacher,  it  was  held  that  the  latter  had  the  right  to  hold  the 
yarn  for  a  general  balance  of  account  due  him  from  the  bank- 
rupt.^^  It  was  contended  that  though  one  individual  might 
impose  such  an  agreement  upon  his  customers,  it  was  not 
competent  for  a  class  of  men  to  do  so.  But  Lord  Kenyon 
said:  "It  seems  to  me  that  that  is  a  distinction  without  a 
difference;  there  is  no  reason  why  a  body  of  persons  should 
not  make  such  an  agreement  as  (it  is  admitted)  the  defend- 
ant himself  might  have  made."  And  Lawrence,  J.,  upon  this 
point  said:  "The  question  here  is  whether  an  agreement, 
which  is  on  the  side  of  natural  justice  be  or  be  not  illegal,  it 
having  been  made  by  a  number  of  persons.  But  I  can  not 
say  that  it  is  illegal,  when  it  is  supported  on  such  a  founda- 
tion: and  if  it  be  not  illegal,  it  must  be  binding  upon  the 
parties." 

§  19  General  liens  regarded  with  jealousy. — General 
liens  are  regarded  by  courts  of  law  with  jealousy.  Lord 
Ellenborough,  speaking  of  such  liens  in  a  case  where  it  was 
sought  to  establish  liens  for  carriers  for  a  general  balance  of 
account  by  force  of  usage,  said  :^*^  "They  are  encroachments 
upon  the  common  law.  If  they  are  encouraged,  the  practice 
will  be  continually  extending  to  other  traders  and  other  mat- 
ters. The  farrier  will  be  claiming  a  lien  upon  a  horse  sent  to 
him  to  be  shod.   Carriages  and  other  things  which  require  fre- 

45  Kirkman    v.    Shawcross,    6    T.  inns,   and  are  also  bound   to   pro- 

R.    14.     "We    are    now    desired    to  tect  the  property  of  those  guests, 

abrogate  an  agreement  which  the  They    have    no    option    either    to 

parties  themselves  have  made,  and  receive    or    reject    guests;    there- 

which    the    courts    have    said    that  fore  I  said  it  was  a  material   cir- 

justice    requires;    and    it    is    said  cumstance  in  the  present  case  that 

that,    unless    we    do    so,    the    inn-  these  persons  had  an  option  either 

keepers    will     enter    into     similar  to   work  or  not  as  they  pleased." 

resolutions.       But     their     case     is  Per    Lord    Kenyon. 

widely  different  from  the  present;  46  Rushforth  v.   Hadfield,  7  East 

for  they  are  bound  by  law  to  re-  224,    229;    and    see    same    case,    6 

ceive    guests    who    come    to    their  East    519. 


17  LIENS  AT   COMMON   LAW.  §    21 

quent  repair  will  be  detained  on  the  same  claim;  and  there  is 
no  saying  where  it  is  to  stop.  It  is  not  for  the  convenience  of 
the  public  that  these  liens  should  be  extended  further  than 
they  are  already  established  by  law.  But  if  any  particular 
inconvenience  arise  in  the  course  of  trade  ,the  parties  may, 
if  they  think  proper,  stipulate  with  their  customers  for  the  in- 
troduction of  such  a  lien  into  their  dealings." 

§  20.  Possession  necessary  to  lien. — A  hen  in  its  proper 
legal  sense  imports  that  one  is  in  possession  of  the  property 
of  another,  and  that  he  detains  it  as  security  for  some  demand 
which  he  has  in  respect  of  it.  "The  question  always  is, 
whether  there  be  a  right  to  retain  the  goods  till  a  given  de- 
mand shall  be  satisfied. "'^''^  A  lien,  therefore,  implies :  First, 
possession  by  the  creditor;  second,  title  in  the  debtor;  third, 
a  debt  arising  out  of  the  specific  property. 

A  lien  being  a  right  to  detain  goods  until  a  certain  demand 
in  respect  to  them  is  satisfied,  possession  is  implied  in  the 
beginning  of  the  lien ;  and,  as  a  general  rule,  a  continuance 
of  possession  is  equally  implied.  Lord  Kenyon"*^  expressed 
the  general  rule  when  he  declared  that :  "The  right  of  lien 
has  never  been  carried  further  than  while  the  goods  continue 
in  possession  of  the  party  claiming  it."  Mr.  Justice  Buller^^ 
observes  that  "liens  at  law  exist  only  in  cases  where  the  party 
entitled  to  them  has  the  possession  of  the  goods;  and  if  he 
once  part  with  the  possession  after  the  lien  attaches,  the  lien 
is  gone." 

§  21.    Possession  essential  to  create  and  preserve  lien. — 

Possession  is  essential  to  the  creation  and  preservation  of 
liens  under  the  common  law,^**  and  the  rule  is  not  different 

^"^  Gladstone    v.    Birley,    2    Mer.  ^9  Lickbarrow  v.   Mason,  6  East 

404,   per   Grant,    M.    R.  21. 

48  Sweet  V.   Pym,   1    East   4,  ap-  ^o  Reed     v.     Ash,    3     Nev.     116; 

proved   by   Lord    Ellenborough    in  Clemson     v.     Davidson,     5     Binn. 

McCombie  v.  Davies,  7  East  7.  (Pa.)   392;   Stewart  v.   Flowers,  44 


§21  LIENS.  l8 

with  many  of  the  statutory  liens. ^^  "A  lien,"  said  Lord  Ellen- 
borough,  "is  a  right  to  hold;  and  how  can  that  be  held  which 
was  never  possessed  ?"^^  The  right  begins  and  ends  with 
possession.  It  attaches  only  while  the  property  actually  re- 
mains in  possession  of  the  creditor.  If  he  suffers  it  to  go  out 
of  his  possession,  he  can  not  regain  it  by  any  judicial  proceed- 
ing. But  where  one  is  deprived  of  the  possession  of  person- 
alty upon  which  he  has  a  lien  for  work  or  labor,  he  may,  in 
West  Virginia,  recover  in  trover  or  detinue  or  he  may  have 
the  property  sold  under  attachment  or  execution.  The  lien 
which  he  has,  however,  gives  him  only  right  of  possession. ^^ 
A  lien  is  only  a  mode  of  enforcing  satisfaction  by  the  mere 
passive  holding  of  the  creditor.  He  thus  prevents  the  debtor 
from  deriving  any  benefit  from  his  own  until  he  pays  the  debt 
he  owes  in  respect  to  the  property. 

As  illustrating  the  necessity  of  possession  to  sustain  a  lien, 
may  be  instanced  the  case  of  a  trainer  of  race-horses,  who 
has  the  benefit  of  the  general  principle  that  the  person  exer- 
cising care  and  skill  in  the  improvement  of  a  chattel  is  en- 
titled to  a  lien  for  his  services.  But  to  perfect  a  lien  he  must, 
in  accordance  with  another  general  principle,  retain  exclu- 
sive and  continuous  possession  of  the  horse.  If  by  usage  or 
agreement  the  owner  may  send  the  horse  to  run  at  any  race 
he  chooses,  and  may  select  the  jockey,  the  trainer  has  no  con- 
tinuing right  of  possession,  and  consequently  no  lien.  Cole- 
ridge, J.,  in  a  case  involving  the  question  of  a  trainer's  lien 
under  such  usage  or  agreement,  said:     "Now  a  good  test  of 

Miss.   513.    7  Am.    Rep.   707;    Slack  547,  18  Atl.  717,  6  L.  R.  A.  82;  Smith 

V.    Collins,    145    Ind.   569,   42   N.    E.  v.  Greenop,  60  Mich.  61,  26  N.  W. 

910.      Possession    can    not    be    sur-  832. 

rendered    and    the    lien    thereafter  ^^  Heywood  v.  Waring,  4  Camp, 

asserted.      Stein    v.    McAuley,    147  291.     And   see   Wilson  v.    Balfour, 

Iowa  630,  125  N.  W.   336,  27  L.   R.  2  Camp.   579;  Ridgely  v.   Iglehart, 

A.    (N.    S.)    692;    Buckner    v.    Lan-  3  Bland   (Md.)  540,  per   Bland   Ch. 

caster   (Tex.   Civ.  App.),  40  S.   W.  53  Burrough    v.    Ely,    54    W.    Va. 

631.  118,  46  S.  E.  371,  102  Am.  St.  926. 
51  Fishell    V.    Morris,    57    Conn. 


19  LIENS  AT    COMMON   LAW.  §    2.2. 

the  existence  of  such  right  of  possession  is  to  consider  in 
whose  possession  the  race-horse  is  when  it  is  employed  in 
doing  that  for  which  it  has  been  trained.  The  evidence 
showed  that  the  horse,  during  the  race,  was  in  the  owner's 
possession,  and  in  his  possession  rightfully  and  according  to 
usage  or  contract.  The  horse,  before  the  race,  is  placed  for 
convenience  in  the  stable  of  the  trainer;  but  during  the  race 
it  is  in  the  care  of  the  jockey  nominated  by  the  owner.  It 
appears,  too,  that  if  on  any  occasion  the  jockey  were  selected 
by  the  trainer,  the  trainer,  pro  hac  vice,  would  have  only  the 
delegated  authority  of  the  owner.  I  think  it  is  part  of  the 
understanding  that  the  owner  shall  have  the  possession  and 
control  of  the  horse  to  run  at  any  race.  This  is  quite  incon- 
sistent with  the  trainer's  continuing  right  of  possession. "^^ 

§  22.  Change  of  possession  may  not  defeat  lien. — As  be- 
tween the  immediate  parties,  a  change  of  possession  may  not 
defeat  the  lien.  It  is  only  between  the  claimant  and  third 
persons  that  continued  possession  is  essential.  As  between 
the  claimant  and  the  owner,  possession  is  by  no  means  essen- 
tial, except  when,  by  surrendering  the  possession,  the  claim- 
ant can  be  fairly  understood  to  have  surrendered  his  lien;  and 
then  the  question  is,  not  whether  he  has  yielded  his  posses- 
sion, but  whether  he  has  surrendered  his  lien.  When  the 
lienholder  has  parted  with  possession,  it  is  a  question  for  the 
jury  whether  he  has  so  far  voluntarily  parted  with  the  pos- 
session as  to  warrant  the  conclusion  that  he  intended  to  aban- 
don his  lien.  If  the  owner  of  the  property  has  obtained  pos- 
session without  the  knowledge  or  consent  of  the  lienholder, 
the  latter  is  not  divested  of  his  lien.  The  lien  would  continue 
in  such  case  after  the  change  of  possession. ^^ 

A  lienholder  may  so  part  with  the  possession  as  to  lose  his 
lien  with  respect  to  third  persons,  though  not  as  against  the 

54  Forth    V.    Simpson,    13    Q.    B.       Cas.    (N.   Y.)    117;   Walls   v.    Long, 
680.  2  Ind.  App.  202,  28  N.  E.  101. 

55  Allen  V.  Spencer,  1   Edm.   Sel. 


§    '2}^  LIENS.  20 

owner  of  the  property.  Thus,  where  the  owners  of  a  saw- 
mill permitted  boards,  sawed  by  them  at  a  stipulated  price, 
to  be  removed  from  their  mill-yard  to  the  bank  of  a  canal  at 
the  distance  of  half  a  mile  from  the  mill,  it  was  held  that  they 
lost  their  lien  in  respect  to  third  persons,  though  not  against 
the  owner  of  the  boards,  it  being  expressly  stipulated  be- 
tween the  parties  that  the  lien  should  continue  notwithstand- 
ing the  removal. ^^ 

§  23.  The  possession  must  be  rightful. — A  lien  can  not 
arise  in  favor  of  a  person  who  has  received  possession  of  the 
property  for  a  purpose  inconsistent  with  the  notion  of  a 
lien.^"  Thus,  if  he  has  received  certificates  of  stock  for  the 
purpose  of  raising  money  upon  them  for  the  owner,  he  can 
not  retain  them  for  an  indebtedness  to  himself.  His  posses- 
sion of  the  certificates  in  such  case  is  in  trust.  "To  create  a 
lien  on  a  chattel,  the  party  claiming  it  must  show  the  just  pos- 
session of  the  thing  claimed;  and  no  person  can  acquire  a 
lien  founded  upon  his  own  illegal  or  fraudulent  act,  or  breach 
of  duty:  nor  can  a  lien  arise,  where,  from  the  nature  of  the 
contract  between  the  parties,  it  would  be  inconsistent  with 
the  express  terms,  or  the  clear  intent  of  the  contract. "'^^  The 
mere  fact  that  a  creditor  has  possession  of  his  debtor's  goods 
gives  him  no  lien  upon  them.^^ 

§  24.  Possession  need  not  be  actual  or  direct. — While  pos- 
session is  essential  to  a  lien  at  law,  the  possession  need  not 
be  actual  and  direct  possession  of  the  creditor,  but  may  be 
that  of  his  agent,  servant  or  warehouse-keeper,  acting  under 
his  authority.^*^    A  lien  may  be  protected  by  placing  the  prop- 

56  McFarland  v.  Wheeler,  26  ley,  J.;  North  Shore  Boom  & 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  467,  reversing  10  Driving  Co.  v.  Nicomen  Boom 
Wend.   (N.  Y.)  318.  Co.,  52  Wash.   564,  101   Pac.  48. 

57  Randel  v.  Brown,  2  How.  (U.  ^9  Allen  v.  Megguire,  15  Mass. 
S.)  406,  11  L.  ed.  318.  490;    Jarvis    v.    Rogers,    15    Mass. 

58  Randel  v.   Brown,  2  How.   (U.  389,  per   Parker,   C.  J. 

S.)  406.  11   L.  de.  318,  per    McKin-  go  Allen  v.  Spencer,  1   Edm.   Sel. 


21  LIENS  AT   COMMON   LAW.  §    26 

erty  in  the  hands  of  a  third  person,  with  notice  of  the  lien, 
although  such  person  may  not  be  expressly  the  agent  of  the 
lienholder. 

§  25.  Mechanic  acquires  no  lien  when  working  for  another 
mechanic. — A  mechanic  who  works  for  another  upon  the 
premises  of  the  latter  acquires  no  lien  upon  the  articles  manu- 
factured or  repaired,  because  he  has  no  sufficient  possession 
to  support  a  lien.  One  who  works  in  peeling  tanbark  for  a 
contractor  on  the  lands  of  a  third  person  has  no  lien  on  the 
property  for  the  payment  of  his  labor,  for  he  has  no  posses- 
sion sufficient  to  create  such  lien.^^  One  who  makes  and 
burns  brick  upon  the  land  of  another  without  a  lease  of  the 
land,  or  other  interest  than  a  right  to  enter  and  make  the 
brick  for  a  stipulated  price  per  thousand,  has  no  such  pos- 
session of  the  brick  as  to  give  him  a  lien  for  his  labor.  If  the 
right  exists  in  such  case  in  the  absence  of  any  express  con- 
tract, it  must  rest  on  the  common-law  right  of  mechanics  and 
artisans  to  retain  property  upon  which  they  have  bestowed 
labor.  For  the  maintenance  of  such  a  lien  possession  is  es- 
sential, and  the  possession  must  be  actual,  without  relinquish- 
ment or  abandonment.  One  who  has  merely  a  license  to  use 
the  brickyard  and  materials  of  another  for  the  purpose  of 
making  and  burning  brick,  in  the  case  mentioned,  has  no  such 
possession  of  the  ward  as  will  support  a  lien.  His  possession 
of  the  brick  manufactured  is  only  a  qualified  and  mixed  pos- 
session, which  can  form  no  valid  basis  for  a  lien.®^ 

§  26.  Lien  of  bailee  performing  service. — A  lien  at  com- 
mon law  belongs  strictly  to  the  bailee  who  by  contract  per- 
forms the  service  for  which  the  lien  is  claimed,  and  who  re- 
ceives into  his  custody  the  thing  upon  which  the  skill  and 

Cas.    (N.    Y.)    117;    McFarland    v.  <52  King  v.  Indian  Orchard  Canal 

Wheeler,  26  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  467.  Co.,   11    Ciish.    (Mass.)   231. 

61  Quist    V.    Sandman,     154    Cal. 
748.  99  Pac.  204. 


§    26  LIENS.  ,  22 

labor  are  to  be  expended.  Inasmuch  as  an  exclusive  right 
to  the  possession  of  the  thing  is  the  basis  of  the  lien,  a 
servant,  or  laborer,  or  journeyman,  or  subcontractor  of  such 
bailee,  can  not  claim  to  retain  the  thing  for  his  own  services, 
except  as  such  a  lien  is  provided  for  by  statute;  for  the  pos- 
session of  the  laborer  or  other  person  employed  by  the  bailee 
is  the  possession  of  such  bailee.^^  Thus,  if  the  ow^ner  of  a 
machine  employs  a  mechanic  to  make  repairs  upon  it,  and  the 
mechanic,  w^ithout  the  owner's  authority,  employs  another  to 
perform  the  entire  work,  the  latter  can  not  claim  a  lien  for 
the  work,  although  he  has  performed  the  entire  work,  and 
claims  a  lien  in  accordance  with  the  contract  with  the  owner. 

63  Hollingsworth     v.      Dow.      19  Zl  Am.  Dec.  519,  per  Gibson,  C.  J.; 

Pick.      (Mass.)      228;      Jacobs      v.  Wright    v.    Terry.    23    Fla.    160,    2 

Knapp,  50  N.   H.  71;   Mclntyre  v.  So.   6. 
Carver,   2   Watts    &   S.    (Pa.)    392, 


CHAPTER  II. 


EQUITABLE    LIENS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

27.  Equitable  liens  in  general.  48. 

28.  Possession    not    required    in 

equitable  liens. 

29.  Lien     effective     without        49. 

change  of  possession. 

30.  Lien  created  by  agreement.  50. 

31.  Equitable   lien   created. 

32.  Intention    to    create    lien.  51. 

33.  Property   to    be   designated.  52. 

34.  Property  must  be  identified. 

35.  Agreement    between    several        53. 

persons. 

36.  Lien    on    changing    stock    of 

goods.  54. 

37.  Equitable    lien    distinguished 

from   a   trust. 

38.  Equitable       lien      agreement        55. 

fulfilled. 

39.  Lien  given  to  save  rights.  56. 

40.  Lien  for  purchase-money  re- 

served. 57. 

41.  Equitable    lien    arises     from 

conditional    delivery.  58. 

42.  Equitable      lien      on      future 

property. 

43.  Equitable    lien    arises     from        59. 

order  to  pay  out  of  partic- 
ular   fund. 

44.  Rule   applying    to    attorneys        60. 

and   clients. 

45.  An  order  on  specific  fund  ef- 

fectual to  create  lien.  61. 

46.  Assignment  of  lien   effectual 

on  notice  to  creditor.  62. 

47.  Equitable  assignment  not  re- 

vocable. 

23 


Agreement  to  pay  out  of 
designated  fund  will  not 
create  equitable  lien. 

Creditor's  lien  on  money  in 
hands  of  debtor's  agent. 

Appropriation  necessary  to 
constitute   equitable   lien. 

Rule    strictly   held    to. 

Promise  to  pay  out  of  par- 
ticular fund  not  sufficient. 

Workmen  have  no  lien  on 
money  retained  from  funds 
due  contractor. 

Designation  of  particular 
fund  must  be  clear  and 
definite. 

Bill  of  exchange  not  an  equi- 
table  assignment. 

Bill  of  exchange  against  con- 
signment   as    lien. 

A  check  not  an  equitable  as- 
signment. 

Lien  of  holder  of  bill  of  ex- 
change based  on  agree- 
ment. 

Reference  in  a  draft  to  ap- 
propriation of  proceeds 
held  to  create  lien. 

Lien  created  when  consignee 
receives  goods  under  ex- 
press  direction. 

General  lien  of  consignee  of 
goods. 

Delivery  of  bill  of  lading 
sufficient  to  create  equita- 
ble lien. 


§    27 


LIENS. 


24 


Sec.  Sec. 

63.  Lien     of     one     making     ad-        80. 

vances     to    purchase     mer- 
chandise. 81. 

64.  Executory  agreement  to  pur- 

chase    and     consign     prop-        82. 
erty. 

65.  Lien    on    crop    to    be    raised. 

66.  Equitable    lien    arises    under        83. 

contract   on   crop    lien. 

67.  Liens  for  advances  to  manu-        84. 

facturers   on  goods. 

68.  No   implied  lien  on  personal        85. 

property     on     account     of 
money   advanced. 

69.  Contract      betw^een      planter 

and   factor.  86. 

70.  Equitable  lien  will  not  arise 

from    advancement    to    im- 
prove property. 

71.  Lien    not    created    by    volun-        87. 

tary  payment. 

12.     Voluntary  payment  of  insur-        88. 
ance   premiums   creates    no 
liens. 

12>.     No   equitable   subrogation  to        89. 
one    paying    a    debt    of    an- 
other. 90. 

74.  One  paying  debt  of  railroad 

company  entitled  to  subro- 
gation. 91. 
74a.  Equitable  lien  on  legacy. 

75.  Mere  loan  of  money.  92. 

76.  Surety  has  no  lien  on  estate 

of   his   principal.  93. 

n.     Lien  by  agreement  to  give  a 
mortgage. 

78.  Agreement  to  give  other  se-        94. 

curity. 

79.  Debtor's     agreement     to     in-        95. 

sure     for     benefit     of     his 
creditor.  96. 


Agreement  to  build  and  con- 
vey a  mill  as  security. 

For  debt  omitted  from  mort- 
gage by  mistake. 

Agreement  of  purchaser  of 
land  to  pay  debt  which  is 
lien  on  the  land. 

Verbal  contract  to  pay  the 
debt  of  another. 

Creditor's  lien  on  capital 
stock  of  corporation. 

Lien  of  creditors  of  a  corpo- 
ration upon  its  property 
transferred  to  another  cor- 
poration. 

Superiority  of  lien  of  cor- 
porate creditor  after  trans- 
fer of  stock  to  another 
corporation. 

Lien  of  minority  sharehold- 
ers   of    corporation. 

Shareholder's  equitable  lien 
on  funds  specially  depos- 
ited. 

Liens  created  by  assumption 
of  mortgage  or  other  liens. 

Consolidated  company  sub- 
ject to  liens  of  original  cor- 
poration. 

Bonds  of  original  corpora- 
tion not  a  lien. 

Equitable  lien  against  rail- 
road company. 

Court  of  equity  appropriate 
tribunal  for  enforcing  eq- 
uitable  liens. 

Lien  at  law  not  enforcible 
in    equity. 

Disposition  of  property 
subject  to  equitable  lien. 

Priorities. 


§  27.  Equitable  liens  in  general. — An  equitable  lien  arises 
either  from  a  written  contract  which  shows  an  intention  to 
charge  some  particular  property  with  a  debt  or  obligation,  or 


25  EQUITABLE  LIENS.  §    2.^ 

is  declared  by  a  court  of  equity  out  of  general  considerations 
of  right  and  justice  as  applied  to  the  relations  of  the  parties 
and  the  circumstances  of  their  dealings.  Equitable  liens  by 
contract  of  the  parties  are  as  various  as  are  the  contracts 
which  parties  may  make.  Equitable  liens  by  contract  can  not 
be  classified  under  any  of  the  common  divisions  of  equitable 
liens,  and  therefore  are  treated  of  in  the  present  chapter. 
Of  implied  equitable  liens,  those  arising  by  orders  and  as- 
signments, those  arising  from  advances  made  and  money 
paid  for  others,  those  arising  from  agreements  to  give  mort- 
gages, and  those  arising  in  favor  of  creditors  and  stockhold- 
ers of  corporations,  are  also  treated  of  in  the  present  chapter. 
But  this  second  division  of  equitable  liens,  that  is,  liens  im- 
plied and  declared  by  courts  of  equity  from  equitable  con- 
siderations, is  necessarily  subdivided  into  several  other  dis- 
tinct subjects,  v^hich  are  so  well  defined  and  so  important  that 
it  has  seemed  best  to  treat  of  them  in  several  separate  chap- 
ters of  this  work.  Whether  an  attorney's  special  lien  upon 
a  judgment  recovered  is  purely  an  equitable  lien  seems  to  be 
a  matter  of  dispute,  and  the  nature  and  origin  of  this  lien  are 
discussed  in  the  chapter  devoted  to  it.^  Partnership  liens, 
which  arise  from  general  equitable  principles  applied  to  the 
relations  of  the  parties,  are  treated  in  a  separate  chapter;^ 
and  so  are  liens  of  grantors  of  real  property  for  purchase- 
money,  and  of  vendees  for  purchase-money  paid  before  ob- 
taining title;  liens  of  joint  owners  of  real  property  for  repairs 
and  improvements  made  by  one  for  the  joint  benefit;  liens 
of  trustees  for  improvements  which  permanently  enhance  the 
value  of  the  trust  property ;  and  liens  of  purchasers  and  others 
for  improvements  upon  real  estate  under  void  contracts  of 
purchase,  or  under  parol  gifts,  or  under  the  erroneous  belief 
that  they  are  the  real  owners  of  the  property.' 

1  See  post,   ch.   V.  s  See  post,  chaps.  XXIII-XXIX. 

2  See  post,  ch.  XVI. 


§    28  LIENS.  26 

§  28.  Possession  not  required  in  equitable  liens. — Equit- 
able liens  do  not  depend  upon  possession  as  do  liens  at  law. 
Possession  by  the  creditor  is  not  essential  to  his  acquiring 
and  enforcing  a  lien.  But  the  other  incidents  of  a  lien  at  com- 
mon law  must  exist  to  constitute  an  equitable  lien.  In  courts 
of  equity  the  term  "lien"  is  used  as  synonymous  with  a 
charge  or  incumbrance  upon  a  thing,  where  there  is  neither 
jus  in  re,  nor  ad  rem,  nor  possession  of  the  thing.^  The  term 
is  applied  as  well  to  charges  arising  by  express  engagement 
of  the  owner  of  property,  and  to  a  duty  or  intention  implied 
on  his  part  to  make  the  property  answerable  for  a  specific 
debt  or  engagement.^ 

Mr.  Justice  Erie  once  remarked  that  "the  words  equitable 
lien  are  intensely  undefined."*^  It  is  necessarily  the  case  that 
something  of  vagueness  and  uncertainty  should  attend  a  doc- 
trine that  is  of  such  a  wide  and  varied  application  as  is  this 
of  equitable  lien.  And  yet  the  principles  are  as  well  defined 
as  other  equitable  principles,  and  their  application  to  certain 
well-established  classes  of  liens  is  well  settled.  To  apply 
them  to  that  undefined  class  of  liens  which  arises  from  the 
contracts  of  parties  may  be  more  difficult,  because  these  liens 
are  as  various  as  are  the  contracts,  and  precedents  which 
exactly  apply  may  not  be  found.  This  wide  application  of  the 
doctrine  is  one  element  of  the  importance  of  this  branch  of 
equity  jurisprudence.  "There  is  perhaps  no  doctrine,"  says 
Mr.  Pomeroy,'^  "which  more  strikingly  shows  the  difference 
between  the  legal  and  the  equitable  conceptions  of  the  juri- 

4  Peck    V.    Jenness,    7    How.    (U.  burn  v.   Snyder,  3   Pa.   St.  72.     No 

S.)    612,    12   L.    ed.   841,   per    Grier,  equitable    lien    acquired    by    fur- 

J. ;  Donald  v.  Hewitt,  33  Ala.  534,  nishing   materials    used    in    public 

73   Am.    Dec.   431;    Field    v.    Lang,  buildings.    Townsend  v.  Cleveland 

87   Maine  441,  32  Atl.   1004.  Fire-Proofing    Co.,    18    Ind.    App. 

•">  Equitable    liens    arising    from  568,   47   N.    E.    707. 

the  equitable  circumstances  of  the  c  Brunsdon  v.  Allard,  2  El.  &  El. 

case  are  unknown  to  the  jurispru-  19. 

dence     of     Pennsylvania.       In     re  ^  Pomeroy's   Eq.   Jur.,   §    1234. 
Cross'  Appeal,  97  Pa.  St.  471 ;  Hep- 


27  EQUITABLE  LIENS.  §    28 

dical  results  which  flow  from  the  dealings  of  men  with  each 
other,  from  their  express  or  implied  undertakings." 

Equitable  liens  have  commonly  been  regarded  as  having 
their  origin  in  trusts.  Perhaps  they  are  better  described  as 
analogous  to  trusts.  Remedies  at  law  are  for  the  recovery 
of  money.  Remedies  in  equity  are  specific.  "Remedies  in 
equity,  as  well  as  at  law,"  says  Mr.  Pomeroy,^  "require  some 
primary  right  or  interest  of  the  plaintifT  which  shall  be  main- 
tained, enforced  or  redressed  thereby.  When  equity  has  jur- 
isdiction to  enforce  rights  and  obligations  growing  out  of  an 
executory  contract,  this  equitable  theory  of  remedies  can  not 
be  carried  out,  unless  the  notion  is  admitted  that  the  con- 
tract creates  some  right  or  interest  in  or  over  specific  prop- 
erty, which  the  decree  of  the  court  can  lay  hold  of,  and  by 
means  of  which  the  equitable  relief  can  be  made  efficient. 
The  doctrine  of  'equitable  liens'  supplies  this  necessary  ele- 
ment;  and  it  was  introduced  for  the  sole  purpose  of  furnish- 
ing a  ground  for  the  specific  remedies  which  equity  confers, 
operating  upon  particular  identified  property,  instead  of  the 
general  pecuniary  recoveries  granted  by  courts  of  law.  It 
follows,  therefore,  that  in  a  large  class  of  executory  contracts, 
express  and  implied,  which  the  law  regards  as  creating  no 
property  right,  nor  interest  analogous  to  property,  but  only 
a  mere  personal  right  and  obligation,  equity  recognizes,  in 
addition  to  the  personal  obligation,  a  peculiar  right  over  the 
thing  concerning  which  the  contract  deals,  which  it  calls  a 
'lien,'  and  which,  though  not  property,  is  analogous  to  prop- 
erty, and  by  means  of  which  the  plaintiff  is  enabled  to  follow 
the  identical  thing,  and  to  enforce  the  defendant's  obligation 
by  a  remedy  which  operates  directly  upon  that  thing.  The 
theory  of  equitable  liens  has  its  ultimate  foundation,  there- 
fore, in  contracts,  express  or  implied,  which  either  deal  with, 
or  in  some  manner  relate  to,  specific  property,  such  as  a  tract 

8  Pomeroy's   Eq.  Jur.,   §    1234. 


§    29  LIENS.  28 

of  land,  particular  chattels  or  securities,  a  certain  fund,  and 
the  like." 

§  29.    Lien  effective  without  change  of  possession. — An 

agreement  which  creates  a  charge  upon  specific  property  is 
in  equity  an  effectual  lien  as  between  the  parties  without  a 
change  of  possession,  even  though  void  as  against  subsequent 
purchasers  in  good  faith,  without  notice,  and  creditors  levy- 
ing executions  or  attachments;  and  if  the  agreement  be  fol- 
lowed by  a  delivery  of  possession,  before  the  rights  of  third 
persons  have  intervened,  it  is  good  absolutely.^ 

Thus  the  owner  of  a  tannery,  in  consideration  of  money 
advanced  by  another  for  the  purchase  of  skins,  agreed  to  tan 
them  and  place  the  leather  in  the  hands  of  his  creditor  for 
sale  upon  commission,  and  that  the  skins,  whether  tanned  or 
not,  should  be  considered  as  security  for  the  payment  of  the 
money  advanced.  After  several  months  the  tanner  became 
financially  embarrassed,  and  was  also  disabled  by  illness  from 
continuing  his  business.  The  parties  then  entered  into  a  new 
contract  whereby  the  creditor  was  to  take  possession  of  the 
tannery  and  use  it  with  such  materials  as  might  be  necessary 
to  finish  the  skins  and  sell  them  as  previously  agreed.  Four 
days  afterward  the  debtor  filed  his  petition  in  bankruptcy. 
The  creditor  having  taken  possession  of  the  tannery,  tke 
debtor's  assignee  in  bankruptcy  brought  replevin  for  the 
skins.  It  was  held  that  the  creditor  had  an  equitable  lien 
upon  them  which  was  binding,  not  only  upon  the  debtor  but 
upon  his  assignee,  and  that  the  second  contract,  though  made 
in  contemplation  of  bankruptcy,  was  not  fraudulent,  inas- 
much as  it  was  made  in  good  faith  to  secure  the  benefits  of 
the  first  contract,  which  created  a  valid  charge  upon  the  prop- 
erty.*^ 

9  Hauselt  v.   Harrison,  105  U.  S.  Hovey  v.  Elliott,  118  N.  Y.  124,  23 

401,    26    L.    ed.    1075;    Gregory    v.  N.  E.  475;  Reardon  v.  Higgins,  39 

Morris,    96    U.    S.    619,    24    L.    ed.  Ind.  App.  363,  79  N.  E.  208. 
740;  Knott  v.  Shepherdstown  Mfg.  10  Hauselt    v.    Harrison,    105    U. 

Co..   30  W.   Va.   790,   5   S.    E.   266;  S.  401,  26  L.   ed.  1075;  Goodnough 


29  EQUITABLE  LIENS.  §  30 

The  court,  Mr.  Justice  Matthews  delivering  the  opinion, 
said  in  substance  that,  while  it  is  true  that  the  creditor  could 
not  have  compelled  his  debtor,  by  an  action  at  law  to  deliver 
to  him  the  possession  of  his  tannery  and  its  contents,  and 
could  not  have  recovered  possession  of  the  skins,  tanned  or 
untanned,  by  force  of  a  legal  title;  yet  it  is  equally  true  that 
in  equity  he  could,  by  injunction,  have  prevented  the  debtor 
from  making  any  disposition  of  the  property  inconsistent 
with  his  obligations  under  the  contract;  and  upon  proof  of 
his  inability  or  unwillingness  to  complete  the  performance 
of  his  agreement,  the  court  would  not  have  hesitated,  in  the 
exercise  of  a  familiar  jurisdiction,  to  protect  the  interests  of 
the  creditor  by  placing  the  property  in  the  custody  of  a  re- 
ceiver for  preservation,  with  authority,  if  such  a  course 
seemed  expedient,  in  its  discretion,  to  finish  the  unfinished 
work,  and  ultimately,  by  a  sale  and  distribution  of  its  pro- 
ceeds, to  adjust  the  rights  of  the  parties. 

§  30.  Lien  created  by  agreement. — A  charge  in  the  nature 
of  a  lien  upon  real  as  well  as  personal  estate  may  be  created 
by  the  express  agreement  of  the  owner,  and  it  will  be  en- 
forced in  equity,  not  only  against  such  owner,  but  also  against 
third  persons  who  are  either  volunteers,  or  who  take  the  es- 
tate on  which  the  lien  is  given,  with  notice  of  the  stipula- 
tion.^^    "Such  an  agreement  raises  a  trust  which  binds  the 

Mercantile  &  Stock  Co.  v.  Gallo-  22,  N.  E.  475,  reversing  21  J.  &  S. 
way,  171  Fed.  940.  See  also,  Na-  (N.  Y.)  331;  Fresno  Canal  Co. 
tional  Bank  v.  Rogers,  166  N.  Y.  v.  Dunbar,  80  Cal.  530,  34  Pac.  275 ; 
380,  59  N.  E.  922,  affg.  44  App.  Div.  Smith  v.  Smith,  51  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
(N.  Y.)  357,  61  N.  Y.  S.  155.  As  to  164,  20  N.  Y.  St.  597,  4  N.  Y.  S.  669, 
the  eflfect  of  a  mere  statement  in  a  affd.  125  N.  Y.  224,  26  N.  E. 
note  that  an  attorney  holds  a  lien  259.  Where  an  attorney  has 
on  property,  see  Schmid  v.  Car-  rendered  services  as  counsel  for 
ter's  Admr.,  95  Ky.  1,  15  Ky.  L.  a  temporary  receiver  and  the  re- 
402,  23  S.  W.  364.  ceiver  is  discharged  and  the  prop- 
yl Clarke  v.  Southwick,  1  Curt.  erty  held  by  him  is  turned  back 
(U.  S.)  297,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  2863 ;  to  the  corporation  and  it  is  agreed 
Hovey   v.    Elliott,    118    N.    Y.    124,  between  the  attorney,  the  receiver 


LIENS. 


30 


estate  to  which  it  relates;  and  all  who  take  title  thereto,  with 
notice  of  such  trust,  can  be  compelled  in  equity  to  fulfil  it.  It 
is  obvious  that  the  law  gives  no  remedy  by  which  such  a  lien 
can  be  established,  and  the  trust  thereby  created  be  declared 
and  enforced.  Equity  furnishes  the  only  means  by  which  the 
property  on  which  the  charge  is  fastened  can  be  reached  and 
applied  to  the  stipulated  purpose."^-  The  basis  of  an  equitable 
lien  is  a  contract,  express  or  implied,  dealing  with  specific 
property.  It  may  be  implied  from  the  acts  of  the  owner  no 
less  than  from  his  express  contract. ^^ 

If  the  owner  of  land  agrees,  in  writing,  for  a  valuable  con- 
sideration, to  pay  to  another  person  a  certain  sum  "out  of 
the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  said  lands,  if  the  same  shall 
be  sold,  or,  if  the  said  lands  shall  not  be  sold,  and  a  com- 
pany shall  be  formed  for  the  purpose  of  working  the  mines 
thereon,"  then  to  convey  stock  to  that  amount,  it  being  un- 
derstood and  agreed  that  such  amount  is  to  be  a  charge  on 
the  estate  of  the  owner,  a  charge  in  the  nature  of  a  lien  upon 
the  land  is  thereby  created,  which  may  be  enforced  in  equity 
against  all  who  take  title  to  the  lands  with  notice  of  the 
charge. ^^ 


and  the  corporation  that  the  lat- 
ter -would  assume  the  receiver's 
debt  to  the  attorney  and  that  he 
might  have  a  lien  for  the  debt,  an 
equitable  enforceable  lien  was 
thereby  created  against  the  corpo- 
ration's property  in  the  hands  of 
a  permanent  receiver  thereof. 
Whitehead  v  O'Sullivan,  12  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  577,  33  N.  Y.  S.  1098,  67 
N.  Y.  St.  801;  Dufur  Oil  Co.  v. 
Enos,  59  Ore.  528,  117  Pac.  457; 
Patrick  v.  Morrow,  33  Colo.  509, 
81  Pac.  242,  108  Am.  St.  107.  When 
a  child  pays  money  to  its  father 
under  his  agreement  to  buy  a 
home  which  shall  belong  to  the 
child  after  the   death   of  the  par- 


ent and  he  buys  property  using 
such  money  and  his  own  money 
for  the  purpose  and  takes  title  in 
his  own  name,  at  his  death  the 
child  will  have  an  equitable  lien 
on  the  property  for  the  sum  ad- 
vanced by  her.  Leary  v.  Corvin, 
181  N.  Y.  222,  73  N.  E.  984,  106 
Am.    St.    542. 

12  Pinch  V.  Anthony,  8  Allen 
(Mass.)  536,  per  Bigelow,  C.  J. 
And  see  Hovey  v.  Elliott,  118 
N.  Y.  124,  23  N.  E.  475;  Scott  v. 
McMillan,  76  N.  Y.  141;  Milliman 
V.   Neher,  20  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  37. 

isVivion  V.  Nicholson,  54  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  43,  116  S.  W.  386. 

!-»  Pinch     V.     Anthony,    8    Allen 


31  EQUITABLE   LIENS.  §31 

§  31.  Equitable  lien  created.— To  create  an  equitable  lien 
by  agreement,  it  must  appear  that  the  parties  to  it  intended 
to  create  a  charge  upon  the  property.^^  Thus,  a  clause  in  a 
charter-party,  whereby  the  freighter  bound  the  goods  to  be 
taken  on  board  for  the  performance  of  every  covenant  there- 
in contained,  does  not  give  the  ship-owner  any  lien  in  equity 
on  the  goods  brought  home  in  the  ship,  either  for  dead 
freight  or  for  demurrage  that  became  due  by  virtue  of  the 
provisions  of  the  charter-party.  The  Court  of  King's  Bench 
determined  that  there  was  no  lien  at  law.^^  The  ground  of 
the  judgment  was,  not  that  a  lien  might  not  have  been  con- 
tracted for,  but  that  the  clause  of  the  charter-party  did  not 
contain  a  contract  to  that  effect. 

In  the  subsequent  suit  in  equity,  the  Master  of  the  Rolls, 
Sir  William  Grant,  delivering  the  judgment,  said  :^'^  "The 
plaintififs  however  suppose,  that  although  a  court  of  law 
has  said  that  the  clause  does  not  give  them  a  lien,  a  court  of 
equity  may  say  that  it  gives  them  what  is  precisely  tanta- 
mount to  a  lien,  namely,  a  right  to  have  their  demand  satis- 
fied out  of  the  produce  of  the  goods  in  preference  to  any 
other  creditors  of  the  bankrupt  freighter.  Putting  this  clause 
out  of  the  question,  it  was  not  contended  that  equity  gives 
the  ship-owner  any  lien  for  his  freight  beyond  that  which  the 
law  gives  him.  There  are,  to  be  sure,  liens  which  exist  only 
in  equity,  and  of  which  equity  alone  can  take  cognizance :  but 
it  can  not  be  contended  that  a  lien  for  freight  is  one  of  them. 
As  to  liens  on  the  goods  of  one  man  in  the  possession  of  an- 
other, I  know  of  no  difference  between  the  rules  of  decision 
in  courts  of  law,  and  in  courts  of  equity.  The  question  that 
so  frequently  occurs,  whether  a  tradesman  has  a  lien  on  the 

(Mass.)    536;    Sowles    v.    Hall,    11  16  Birley   v.    Gladstone,   3    M.    & 

Vt.  55,  50  Atl.  550.  S.  205. 

15  Knott  V.  Shepherdstown  Mfg.  ^^  Gladstone   v.    Birley,   2    Meri- 

Co.,   30   W.   Va.   790,   5   S.    E.   266;  vale,  401,  403. 
In    re    Farmers'    Supply    Co.,    170 
Fed.  502. 


§    3-  LIENS.  32 

goods  in  his  hands  for  the  general  balance  due  to  him,  or 
only  for  so  much  as  relates  to  the  particular  goods,  is  decided 
in  both  courts  in  the  same  way,  and  on  the  same  grounds. 
To  extend  the  lien,  the  party  claiming  it  must  show  an  agree- 
ment to  that  effect,  or  something  from  which  an  agreement 
may  be  inferred,  such  as  a  course  of  dealing  between  the 
parties,  or  a  general  usage  of  the  trade.  Lien,  in  its  proper 
sense,  is  a  right  which  the  law  gives.  But  it  is  usual  to  speak 
of  lien  by  contract,  though  that  be  more  in  the  nature  of  an 
agreement  for  a  pledge.  Taken  either  way,  however,  the 
question  always  is,  whether  there  be  a  right  to  detain  the 
goods  till  a  given  demand  shall  be  satisfied.  That  right  must 
be  derived  from  law  or  contract." 

§  32.  Intention  to  create  lien. — The  intention  must  be  to 
create  a  lien  upon  the  property,  as  distinguished  from  an 
agreement  to  apply  the  proceeds  of  a  sale  of  it  to  the  pay- 
ment of  a  debt.  A  debtor  verbally  agreed  that  his  creditot 
should  have  a  lien  upon  a  certain  stock  of  cattle,  and  that 
the  cattle  should  be  placed  in  charge  of  a  third  person  to 
hold  until  they  should  be  in  a  suitable  condition  to  be  sold. 
The  debtor  placed  his  cattle  in  charge  of  his  sons,  as  herders, 
without  declaring  any  lien  or  trust  upon  the  property,  and 
afterward  died.  The  creditor  sought  to  charge  with  a  lien 
the  funds  arising  from  a  sale  of  the  cattle  by  the  executor. 
But  the  court  held  that  the  evidence  merely  showed  an  inten- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  debtor  to  apply  the  proceeds  of  the 
property  to  the  payment  of  his  debt  to  the  plaintiff,  but  that 
there  was  no  lien.^^ 

18  Cook    V.    Black,    54    Iowa   693,  paid  directly  to  the  bank  and  be- 

7   N.   W.    121 ;   Wemple   v.    Hauen-  long   to    it    so    far  as    required    to 

stein,  46  N.  Y.  S.  288,  19  App.  Div.  pay  it  back,  the  bank  has  a  valid 

(N.    Y.)    552.      But   where   a    bank  lien   as    between   the   parties    and 

furnishes     money     to     buy     cattle  persons  having  notice  of  the  trans- 

upon   which    it    is   agreed    it    shall  action.     Gardner  v.  Planters'  Nat. 

have   a   lien   and   the    proceeds    of  Bank    of    Honey    Grove,    54    Tex. 

the   sale  of  the  cattle  were  to  be  Civ.  App.  572,  118  S.  W.  1146. 


33 


EQUITABLE   LIENS. 


§  33 


A  written  agreement  made  by  a  son  to  his  father,-  whereby 
the  son  undertook  to  pay  a  mortgage  on  the  lands  of  his 
father,  does  not  create  a  lien  upon  the  son's  interest  in  such 
lands  as  heir  after  his  father's  death,  the  agreement  showing 
no  intent  that  such  a  lien  should  be  created. ^^ 

§  33.  Property  to  be  designated. — The  instrument  creat- 
ing the  lien  is  not  effectual  unless  it  plainly  designates  the 
property  to  be  charged,^"  though  only  such  an  identification 
is  required  as  is  essential  to  an  enforcement  of  the  lien.^^  By 
a  marriage  settlement,  the  husband  provided  for  an  annuity 
to  his  wife  in  case  she  should  survive  him,  from  and  after 
his  decease,  for  her  natural  life;  and  for  the  payment  of  such 
annuity  he  did  "promise,  covenant  and  agree,  that  the  same 
shall  be  and  the  same  is  hereby  made  and  constitutes  a  lien 
and  charge  upon  all  the  property  and  estate,  real  and  personal 
of  every  name  and  nature,  kind  and  description,  which  he 
may  own  and  to  which  he  may  be  entitled  at  the  time  of  his 
decease."  His  estate,  though  ample  at  the  date  of  the  settle- 
ment, was  insolvent  at  the  time  of  iiis  decease.  In  a  suit  by 
the  widow  to  enforce  the  lien  it  was  held  that  the  settlement 


19  Rider  v.  Clark,  54  Iowa  292, 
6  N.  W.  271. 

20  Burn  v.  Burn,  3  Ves.  Jr.  573; 
Bank  of  Rome  v.  Haselton,  15  Lea 
(Tenn.)  216;  Bank  v.  Brooks,  42 
Leg.  Int.  26;  Union  Trust  Co.  v. 
Trumbull,  137  111.  146,  27  N.  E.  24; 
Hazenwinkle  Grain  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Comb,  116  111.  App.  541. 

21  Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Trumbull, 
137  111.  146,  27  N.  E.  24.  In  this 
case  a  wool  merchant  leased  part 
of  his  store  to  a  warehouse  com- 
pany, who,  without  taking  posses- 
sion, issued  to  him  warehouse  re- 
ceipts for  wool,  which  he  placed 
on  the  leased  premises.  He  re- 
tained   control    of    the    wool,    and 

3 


removed  or  changed  it  at  pleas- 
ure. The  wool  called  for  by  the 
various  receipts  was  not  set  apart 
or  marked  in  any  way,  and  the 
wool  in  the  store  was  of  different 
grades,  which  were  not  specified 
in  the  receipts.  The  merchant 
made  an  assignment  for  the  ben- 
efit of  his  creditors,  and  his  as- 
signee took  possession  of  the 
wool.  It  was  held  that  the  ware- 
house company  had  no  lien  on  the 
wools,  the  receipts  being  void  for 
indefiniteness  and  want  of  pos- 
session. See  also,  Higgins  v.  Hig- 
gins,  121  Cal.  487,  53  Pac.  1081,  66 
Am.    St.    57. 


§  33  LIENS.  34 

did  not  •  create  an  equitable  lien,  as  against  the  hus- 
band's creditors,  either  upon  the  property  which  he  owned  at 
the  time  of  making  the  agreement,  or  that  which  he  owned 
at  the  time  of  his  death,  for  the  reason  that  it  failed  to  desig- 
nate, with  sufficient  certainty,  the  property  to  be  charged 
therewith.^-  Mr.  Justice  Boardman,  delivering  the  opinion 
of  the  court,  said:  "The  charge  or  lien  must  have  taken  ef- 
fect, if  at  all,  at  the  date  of  the  contract,  and  must  plainly 
designate  the  property  charged.  In  the  present  case  that 
was  impossible.  The  property  to  be  charged  was  not  known 
to  the  contracting  parties.  The  intestate  may  not  then  have 
owned  it.  It  was  utterly  uncertain  what  property,  if  any,  he 
would  own  at  his  death.  The  contract  could  not  have  been 
enforced  specifically  as  to  such  property  in  his  lifetime,  be- 
cause the  court  could  not  possibly  ascertain  the  property  to 
be  bound  by  its  decree.  If  the  property  had  been  then  owned 
by  him  and  described  the  equitable  lien  would  have  attached. 
*  *  *  But  it  does  not  appear  that  the  property  owned  by 
the  intestate  at  his  death  was  owned  by  him  twelve  years 
before  when  this  contract  was  made.  It  was  wholly  uncer- 
tain whether  property  owned  by  him  [then]  would  remain 
his  at  his  death.  Between  the  parties  to  the  contract  there 
was  no  obligation  to  retain  it.  As  to  such  property  the  in- 
testate owed  no  duty  to  the  plaintiff.  We  apprehend  this 
does  not  constitute  that  degree  of  certainty  in  designating  the 
property  to  be  charged  which  the  law  requires.  *  *  *  j^ 
is  not  enough  that  at  some  future  time  the  descriptions  will 
become  certain.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that,  as  against 
the  party  himself,  his  heirs-at-law  and  those  claiming  under 
him  voluntarily,  such  an  agreement  may  raise  a  trust  which 
will  be  enforced  in  equity.  But  as  to  the  purchasers  and 
others  acting  in  good  faith  and  without  notice,  a  different 
rule  applies." 

22  Mundy  V.  Munson,  40  Hun  (N.    Y.)   304. 


35  EQUITABLE   LIENS.  §    34 

§  34.  Property  must  be  identified. — It  is  essential  to  an 
equitable  lien  that  the  property  to  be  charged  should  be 
capable  of  identification,  so  that  the  claimant  of  the  lien  may 
say,  with  a  reasonable  degree  of  certainty,  what  property  it 
is  that  is  subject  to  his  lien.^^  Though  possession  is  not 
necessary  to  the  existence  of  an  equitable  lien,  it  is  necessary 
that  the  property  or  funds  upon  which  the  lien  is  claimed 
should  be  distinctly  traced,  so  that  the  very  thing  which  is 
subject  to  the  special  charge  may  be  proceeded  against  in 
an  equitable  action,  and  sold  under  decree  to  satisfy  the 
charge.  A  fund  is  not  thus  traced  when  it  has  gone  into  the 
general  bank  account  of  the  recipient,  or  after  it  has  been 
mixed  with  funds  from  other  sources.^^  Money  which  has 
been  intermixed  with  other  money  can  not  be  the  subject  of 
an  equitable  lien  after  the  money  itself,  or  a  specific  substi- 
tute for  it,  has  become  incapable  of  identification.^^ 

A  firm  of  merchants  furnished  to  a  firm  of  silk  manufac- 
turers raw  materials,  for  silk  goods,  and  funds  to  purchase 
such  materials,  upon  an  agreement  whereby  the  goods  when 
manufactured  were  to  be  delivered  to  and  sold  by  the  mer- 
chants, who  were  authorized  to  deduct  from  the  proceeds  of 
the  sales  the  amount  due  them  for  advances  and  insurance 
and  for  commissions.  Some  two  years  afterward  the  manu- 
facturers failed,  and  made  a  general  assignment  of  their  prop- 
erty.    The  assignee  took  possession  of  the  debtors'  stock, 

23  Payne  v.  Wilson,  74  N.  Y.  348;  when    proceeds    come    into    exist- 

Hazenwinkle     Grain     Co.    v.     Mc-  ence.     Wilson  v.   Seeber,   72  N.  J. 

Comb,    116    111.    App.    541.      When  Eq.   523,   66   Atl.   909.     As    to   lost 

a  note  is  sent  to  a  bank  for  col-  identity  of  property,  see  Oldridge 

lection    there    is    no    lien    for    at-  v.    Sutton.    157    Mo.    App.    485,    137 

torney  on  amount  collected.    Ober  S.   W.  994. 

V.    Cochran,    118   Ga.   396,  45   S.    E.  24  Grinnell    v.    Suydam,    5    N.    Y. 

382,  98  Am.  St.  118.     A  contract  of  Super.    Ct.    132;    Goodnough    Mer- 

an  attorney  whereby  he  is  to  re-  cantile   &   Stock   Co.  V.    Galloway, 

ceive    one-third    of    the    proceeds  156  Fed.  504. 

resulting  from  a  suit  conducted  by  25  Drake    v.    Taylor,    6    Blatchf. 

him,   gives   him   an    equitable   lien  (U.   S.)    14,  Fed.   Cas.   No.  4067. 
upon     the    proceeds    of    the    suit 


§    35  LIENS.  36 

among  which  were  nineteen  pieces  of  silk  finished,  and  about 
forty-five  pieces  unfinished.  The  merchants  claimed  an  equit- 
able lien  upon  these  goods  for  a  balance  due  them,  and 
brought  suit  to  enforce  the  lien;  but  it  was  held  they  could 
not  recover,  because  they  did  not  trace  their  advances  to 
these  particular  goods.^^ 

§  35.  Agreement  between  several  persons. — An  equitable 
lien  is  created  by  an  agreement  between  several  persons  that 
the  cost  of  certain  improvements  shall  be  a  lien  on  their  re- 
spective estates,  though  these  are  not  immediately  connected 
with  the  improvements.  Certain  mill-owners  associated 
themselves  for  the  purpose  of  building  reservoirs,  and  agreed 
that  there  should  be  a  lien  on  their  respective  estates  for  the 
share  of  the  expenses  which  each  was  to  pay.  This  agree- 
ment was  held  to  create  an  equitable  lien  which  each  member 
who  had  paid  more  than  his  proportion  might  enforce  against 
the  property  of  any  other  member  who  had  paid  less  than  his 
proportion.^'^  Such  an  agreement  is  not  executory  merely, 
but  executed.  It  creates  a  trust  which  a  court  of  equity  will 
work  out  so  as  to  secure  the  payment  of  the  obligations  in  the 
manner  the  parties  intended  they  should  be  paid.  The  lien  is 
created  in  behalf  of  each  member  of  the  association,  and  not 
in  behalf  of  the  association  collectively,  because  such  appears 
to  be  the  intent  of  the  agreement.  The  covenant  is  a  several 
covenant  of  each  with  each  member.  The  other  members 
of  the  association  need  not  be  joined  in  a  suit  by  one  member 
against  the  purchaser  of  the  property  of  another  for  contri- 
bution, because  the  others  have  no  interest  in  the  suit.^^  Mr. 
Justice  Curtis,  delivering  judgment,  said: 

"If  there  was  any  property  of  this  association  capable  of 

26  Person  -v.  Oberteuffer,  59  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  334,  8  Am.  Dec. 
How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)   339.  570. 

27  Clarke  v.  Southwick,  1  Curt.  28  Clarke  v.  Southwick,  1  Curt. 
(U.  S.)  297,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  2863.  (U.  S.)  297,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  2863,  per 
And    see    Campbell    v.    Mesier,    4  Curtis,  J. 


37  EQUITABLE   LIENS.  §    36 

being  applied,  and  which  equitably,  ought  to  be  applied  in 
payment  of  its  debts,  before  resorting  to  the  lien  asserted  by 
the  bill,  all  the  members  would  be  necessary  parties,  because 
they  would  then  have  an  interest,  both  in  the  account  of  the 
debts  and  of  the  property,  and  in  its  application.  But  there 
is  no  such  property.  The  works  which  the  association  has 
erected  for  the  improvement  of  these  mills  can  not  be  sold 
without  defeating  the  very  object  for  which  the  association 
was  formed.  Every  member  has  a  right  to  have  them  pre- 
served, and  to  have  every  other  member  pay  his  contributory 
share,  in  order  that  they  may  be  preserved.  So  far  from 
these  works  constituting  a  fund  to  be  resorted  to  in  relief  of 
the  contributors,  they  are  the  very  object  of  the  contribution, 
and  equity  requires  it  to  be  made  in  order  that  the  original 
purposes  of  the  parties  may  be  fulfilled.  It  is  objected  that 
the  defendant  may  hereafter,  by  other  suits,  have  other  debts 
of  the  association  charged  on  his  estates,  so  that  he  is  ex- 
posed to  pay  more  than  his  just  share,  and  thus  be  forced  to 
seek  for  contribution  himself  in  another  suit.  If  this  were  so, 
it  would  be  a  fatal  objection ;  but  the  defendant  not  being  a 
member  of  the  association,  and  so  not  being  personally  liable, 
can  never  be  forced  to  pay  any  more  than  three  sixths  of  any 
debt,  and  so  can  never  have  any  claim  for  contribution;  for 
this  proportion  is  what  is  justly  and  ultimately  chargeable  on 
his  estates." 

§  36.  Lien  on  changing  stock  of  goods. — An  equitable 
lien  may  be  imposed  upon  a  changing  stock  of  goods  by 
agreement  of  the  parties.  Persons  who  have  been  induced  to 
execute  a  bond  to  release  an  attachment  on  a  stock  of  goods 
belonging  to  a  business  firm,  upon  a  promise  that  the  goods 
so  released  shall  be  held  for  the  obligors'  indemnity  and  se- 
curity, have  an  equitable  lien  on  such  stock  of  goods  for  the 
amount  they  have  been  compelled  to  pay  by  reason  of  having 
executed  such  bond;  and  such  lien  may  be  enforced  as  against 
the  general  assignee  of  the  firm  for  the  benefit  of  their  credi- 


§    Z7  LIENS.  38 

tors.^^  The  fact  that  it  was  agreed  that  the  owners  of  the 
stock  of  goods  should  keep  it  replenished  up  to  its  value  at 
that  time,  and  the  further  fact  that,  without  knowledge  or 
consent  of  the  obligors,  the  owners  disposed  of  parts  of  the 
stock  and  put  in  other  stock  to  supply  its  place,  do  not  affect 
the  lien;  but  this  will  attach  to  the  mingled  goods  in  the  con- 
dition they  are  in  at  the  time  the  lien  is  enforced.^*^ 

§  37.  Equitable  lien  distinguished  from  a  trust. — An  equit- 
able lien  is  distinguished  from  a  trust  in  this  respect:  A  bank 
which  receives  a  draft  for  collection  holds  the  proceeds  when 
collected  as  trustee  of  the  depositor,  and  upon  the  failure  of 
the  bank  the  depositor  is  entitled  to  have  the  amount  paid 
by  a  receiver  of  the  bank's  property  in  preference  to  the  gen- 
eral creditors.  The  receiver  of  the  bank  takes  its  assets  sub- 
ject to  the  same  equities  under  which  the  bank  held  them. 
It  is  immaterial  whether  the  identical  moneys  collected  by 
the  bank  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  receiver  or  not,  for  in 
some  shape  they  went  to  swell  the  assets  which  fell  into  the 
receiver's  hands. ^^  "It  is  not  to  be  supposed  the  trust  fund 
was  dissipated  and  lost  altogether,  and  did  not  fall  into  the 
mass  of  the  assignor's  property;  and  the  rule  in  equity  is  well 
established  that  so  long  as  the  trust  property  can  be  traced 
and  followed  into  other  property  into  which  it  has  been  con- 
verted, that  remains  subject  to  the  trust ;  *  *  *  -yve  do  not 
understand  that  it  is  necessary  to  trace  the  trust  fund  into 
some  specific  property  in  order  to  enforce  the  trust.  If  it 
can  be  traced  into  the  estate  of  the  defaulting  agent  or  trus- 
tee, this  is  sufficient. "^^ 

29  Arnold  v.  Morris,  7  Daly  (N.  McLeod  v.   Evans,  66  Wis.  401,  28 
Y.)  498.  X.   W.   173,  214,  57  Am.   Rep.   287; 

30  Arnold  v.   Morris,  7  Daly   (N.  Peak   v.    F:ilicott,    30   Kans.    156,    1 
Y.)   498.  Pac.  499,  46  Am.  Rep.  90. 

31  People  V.   Bank  of   Dansville,  ^-  Per  Cole,  C.  J.,  in  McLeod  v. 
39  Hun  (N.  Y.)  187;  People  v.  City  Evans,  66  Wis.  401.  28  N.   W.   173, 
Bank,  96   N.    Y.   11;   Van  Alen   v.  214,  57  Am.  Rep.  287. 
American  Nat.   Bank,  52   N.  Y.   1 : 


39  EQUITABLE   LIENS.  §    39 

The  discussion  of  this  matter  is  not  followed  farther,  be- 
cause the  principle  involved  is  one  of  trust  rather  than  lien. 
A  lien  is  a  charge  on  some  specific  thing,  as  lands,  goods  or 
bonds;  but  a  trust  may  exist  with  reference  to  any  funds  or  a 
mere  credit. 

§  38.  Equitable  lien  agreement  fulfilled. — An  equitable 
lien  under  an  agreement  of  the  parties  arises  only  when  the 
terms  and  conditions  contemplated  by  the  agreement  are  ful- 
filled. A  contractor  about  to  furnish  certain  manufactured 
articles  to  the  government  agreed  that  advances  to  be  made 
him  by  a  bank,  to  enable  him  to  carry  out  his  contract,  should 
be  a  lien  on  the  drafts  to  be  drawn  by  him  on  the  govern- 
ment for  the  proceeds  of  the  articles  manufactured.  The  gov- 
ernment afterv^ard  annulled  the  contract,  the  contractor 
being  at  the  time  largely  indebted  to  the  bank  for  advances 
made.  The  contractor  many  years  afterward  recovered  a 
judgment  in  the  court  of  claims  against  the  government  for 
a  violation  of  the  contract.  It  was  held  that  the  bank  had 
no  lien  on  this  judgment.  The  lien,  by  its  terms,  only  at- 
tached to  the  proceeds  of  sales  of  the  manufactured  goods. 
There  was  no  lien  on  the  contract  itself;  and  there  could  be 
none  on  the  damages  for  a  breach  of  the  contract. ■'^•^ 

§  39.  Lien  given  to  save  rights. — It  is  sometimes  declared 
to  be  a  general  doctrine  of  equity  that  a  lien  will  be  given 
when  the  plaintiff's  rights  can  be  secured  in  no  other  way. 
This  doctrine  was  asserted  in  a  recent  case  by  the  Court  of 
Appeals  of  New  York."^  The  plaintiff  was  chairman  of  a 
committee  appointed  by  a  convention  of  the  Episcopal  Church 

33  Bank  of  Washington  v.  Nock,  St.  169.  See  also,  Finnell  v.  Hig- 
9  Wall.  (U.  S.)  Z7i,  19  L.  ed.  717;  ginbotham,  97  Ky.  21,  16  Ky.  L. 
and  see  Kelly  v.  Kelly,  54  Mich.  758,  29  S.  W.  740;  Leary  v.  Corvin, 
30,   19  N.   W.   580.  92  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  544.  88  N.  Y. 

34  Perry  v.  Board  of  Missions.  S.  109.  modified  181  N.  Y.  222,  72, 
102  N.  Y.  99,  6  N.   E.  116,  1   N.  Y.  N.   E.  984.  106  Am.  St.  542. 


§    39  LIENS.  40 

to  procure  a  residence  for  the  bishop  of  the  diocese  of  Al- 
bany. With  the  advice  of  the  bishop  and  consent  of  the  com- 
mittee, he  purchased  certain  premises,  and,  at  the  request  of 
the  bishop,  commenced  making  necessary  repairs  and  im- 
provements. The  committe  reported  to  the  convention  at 
its  annual  meeting,  which  adopted  a  resolution  directing  a 
transfer  of  the  title  to  the  defendant,  and  requiring  the  latter 
to  execute  a  bond  and  mortgage  to  secure  the  payment  of  an 
existing  mortgage  and  of  the  sum  advanced  for  repairs.  At 
this  time  the  repairs  vv^ere  in  progress,  and  the  plaintiff  went 
on  and  completed  the  work,  advancing  the  money  required 
for  the  purpose.  The  premises  were  conveyed  to  the  de- 
fendant, who  executed  a  mortgage,  and  applied  the  mon- 
eys obtained  upon  it  as  directed,  but  they  were  insufficient  to 
pay  the  whole  amount  advanced  by  the  plaintiff.  The  plain- 
tiff, having  completed  the  repairs,  demanded  payment  of  the 
balance  due  him,  and,  upon  the  defendants'  refusal  to  reim- 
burse him,  brought  an  action  for  equitable  relief,  asking  to 
have  a  lien  in  the  nature  of  a  mortgage  declared  upon  the 
property,  and  that  he  be  allowed  to  foreclose  the  same.  It 
was  held  that  he  was  entitled  to  this  relief,  as  his  rights 
could  be  secured  in  no  other  way.  Judge  Danforth,  deliver- 
ing the  judgment  of  the  court,  said:  ''The  advances  were 
directly  for  the  benefit  of  the  real  estate.  They  were  ap- 
proved by  the  convention,  by  whose  directions  the  title  was 
conveyed  to  the  defendant,  but  neither  the  convention  nor 
the  defendant  have  incurred  any  corporate  liability;  and, 
while  it  may  be  said  that  the  advances  were  made  on  the 
promise,  of  or  in  the  just  and  natural  expectation  that,  a 
mortgage  would  be  given,  it  is  also  true  that  they  were  made 
on  the  credit  of  the  property,  for  the  improvement  of  which 
they  were  expended.  The  repairs  and  improvements  were 
permanently  beneficial  to  it;  made  in  good  faith,  with  the 
knowledge  and  approbation  of  the  parties  interested,  and  ac- 
cepted by  them,  not  as  a  gratuity,  but  as  services  for  which 


41  EQUITABLE  LIENS.  §    4I 

compensation  should  be  given.  The  plaintiff's  right  to  re- 
muneration is  clear,  and,  unless  the  remedy  sought  for  in  this 
action  is  given,  there  will  be  a  total  failure  of  justice." 

§  40.  Lien  for  purchase-money  reserved. — Upon  a  sale  of 
real  and  personal  property  together  for  one  price,  a  lien  for 
the  purchase-money  reserved  in  the  conveyance  will  be  en- 
forced in  a  court  of  equity,  both  upon  the  real  and  upon  the 
personal  property.  Thus,  where  a  lease  of  certain  coal  prop- 
erty, with  all  the  personal  property  of  the  lessee  upon  the 
demised  premises,  was  sold  and  transferred  for  a  gross  sum 
for  both,  and  in  the  instrument  of  transfer  a  lien  was  re- 
served for  the  payment  of  the  purchase-money,  the  lien  was 
declared  to  be  valid  as  between  the  parties  and  as  against 
those  having  actual  notice  of  it,  and  was  enforced  by  a  sale 
of  both  the  real  and  personal  property. ^^  Of  course,  there  is 
no  implied  equitable  lien  for  purchase-money  in  favor  of  a 
vendor  of  personal  property  ;^^  but  there  is  no  reason  why  the 
lien  should  not  exist  by  contract  or  reservation,  or  why  a  lien 
upon  both  real  and  personal  property,  reserved  by  the  same 
contract,  should  not  be  enforced  against  all  the  property. 

§  41.     Equitable  lien  arises  from  conditional  delivery. — An 

equitable  lien  arises  from  a  conditional  delivery  of  goods  upon 
a  sale,  the  condition  being  that  the  goods  shall  be  paid  for 
before  the  title  passes.  Thus,  where  goods  were  sold  at  auc- 
tion to  be  paid  for  in  approved  indorsed  notes,  and,  in  accord- 
ance with  a  usage,  the  goods  were  delivered  to  the  buyer 

35  Cole  V.  Smith,  24  W.  Va.  287.  so  Lupin  v.    Marie,  6  Wend.    (N. 

Where  one  accepts  a  deed  stipu-  Y.)   11,  21   Am.   Dec.   256;   Cole  v. 

lating   that    he   will   pay   annually  Smith,  24  W.  Va.  287;  McCandlish 

to  another  a  certain  sum,  such  sum  v.    Keen,    13    Grat.    (Va.)    615,    per 

becomes  an   equitable   lien  on   the  Lee,    J.;    James    v.    Bird's    Admr., 

real  estate  conveyed.     Pmkham  v.  8  Leigh  (Va.)  510,  31  Am.  Dec.  668; 

Pinkham,  60   Nebr.   600,  83    N.   W.  Beam  v.   Blanton,  38  N.   Car.  59. 
837.     See  also,  Lee  v.  Lee's  Admr., 
30  Ky.  L.  619,  99  S.  W.  306. 


§   4^ 


LIENS. 


42 


when  called  for,  the  notes  being  left  for  subsequent  adjust- 
ment, and,  before  the  notes  were  delivered,  the  purchaser 
stopped  payment  and  assigned  the  goods  so  bought,  with 
other  property,  for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors,  it  was  held 
that  the  vendee  was  a  trustee  for  the  goods  until  the  notes 
should  be  delivered;  that  the  vendor  had  an  equitable  lien 
upon  them  for  the  purchase-money,  and  a  better  right  than 
the  voluntary  assignee."" 

One  may  have  an  equitable  lien  upon  a  boat  for  work  and 
material  furnished  under  an  agreement  for  such  a  lien.  Thus, 
where  one  built  and  put  up  an  engine  in  a  boat  under  an  ex- 
press contract  with  the  owner  that  he  should  have  a  lien  upon 
the  boat  for  the  price  of  the  engine,  it  was  held  that  he  had 
an  equitable  lien  upon  the  boat,  not  dependent  for  its  validity 
upon  his  retaining  possession.^^ 

§42.  Equitable  lien  on  future  property. — There  may  be 
equitable  lien  upon  future  property."^  ^\'henever  a  positive 
lien  or  charge  is  intended  to  be  created  upon  real  or  personal 
property  not  in  existence,  or  not  owned  by  the  person  who 
grants  the  lien,  the  contract  attaches  in  equity  as  a  lien  or 
charge  upon  the  particular  property  as  soon  as  he  acquires 
title  and  possession  of  the  same.'*''     An  equitable  lien  upon 


"''  Haggerty  v.  Palmer,  6  Johns. 
Ch.  (N.  Y.)  437. 

28  Donald  v.  Hewitt,  33  Ala.  534, 
73  Am.  Dec.  431. 

39  Under  the  Codes  of  Califor- 
nia, North  Dakota  and  South  Da- 
kota, an  agreement  may  be  made 
to  create  a  lien  upon  property  not 
yet  acquired  by  the  party  agree- 
ing to  give  the  lien,  or  not  yet  in 
existence.  In  such  case  the  lien 
agreed  for  attaches  from  the  time 
when  the  party  agreeing  to  give 
it  acquires  an  interest  in  the 
thing,  to  the  extent  of  such  in- 
terest. California:  Civ.  Code,  1906, 


§  2883;  North  Dakota:  Rev.  Code 
1905,  S  6130;  South  Dakota:  Rev. 
Code  (Civ.j,  1904,  §  2024.  A  lien 
ma}'  be  created  by  contract,  to 
take  immediate  effect,  as  security 
for  the  performance  of  obliga- 
tions not  then  in  existence.  Cali- 
fornia: Civ.  Code  1906,  §  2884; 
North  Dakota:  Rev.  Code  1905, 
§  6132;  South  Dakota:  Rev.  Code 
(Civ.),  1904,  §  2025. 

■10  Wisner  v.  Ocumpaugh,  71  N. 
Y.  113;  Coates  v.  Donnell,  16  J.  & 
S.  (N.  Y.)  46;  Barnard  v.  Norwich 
&  W.  R.  Co.,  4  CliflF.  (U.  S.)  351, 
Fed.   Cas.   No.   1007;   Coe  v.   Hart, 


43 


EQUITABLE  LIENS. 


§    43 


future  property  may  be  even  more  effectual  than  such  a  lien 
upon  property  in  existence,  for  the  registration  laws  apply  to 
liens  upon  property  in  existence,  but  not  to  liens  upon  future 
property.  Therefore  it  happens  that,  while,  as  against  credit- 
ors, lien  can  not  be  created  by  contract  upon  a  personal  chat- 
tel in  existence  at  the  time  of  such  contract  without  registra- 
tion, yet,  as  this  rule  does  not  apply  to  a  contract  in  regard 
to  future  property,  a  lien  effectual  as  against  creditors  may 
be  created  by  agreement  upon  future  property,  such,  for  in- 
stance, as  the  products  of  a  farm,  or  the  profits  of  the  farm, 
not  then  in  existence.*^ 

§  43.  Equitable  lien  arises  from  order  to  pay  out  of  par- 
ticular fund. — An  equitable  lien  arises  from  an  order  given  by 
a  debtor  to  his  creditor  to  receive  payment  out  of  a  particular 
fund,  and  this  is  effectual  from  the  time  the  creditor  receives 
the  order  or  assignment,  though  the  debtor  become  bankrupt 
before  the  order  is  received  by  the  drawee.  Thus,  a  mer- 
chant at  Liverpool,  having  property  in  the  hands  of  an  agent 
at  Bahia,  agreed  with  a  creditor  to  apply  such  property  to 
the  discharge  of  his  indebtedness  to  him,  and  sent  directions 
to  his  agent  to  convert  the  property  and  apply  the  proceeds 
to  that  purpose;  but,  before  such  instructions  could  reach  his 
agent,  he  became  bankrupt. "*-     The  chancellor,  Lord  Cotten- 


6  Am.  L.  Reg.  27;  Kirksey  v. 
Means,  42  Ala.  426;  Bibend  v.  Liv- 
erpool &  London  Fire  &  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  30  Cal.  78. 

41  Jones  on  Chattel  Mortgages, 
fSth  ed.)  §  157;  Tedford  v.  Wilson, 
3  Head  (Tenn.)  311. 

42  Burn  V.  Carvalho,  4  Mylne  & 
Cr.  690.  In  Ex  parte  South,  3 
Swanst.  393,  Lord  Eldon  says:  "It 
has  been  decided  in  bankruptcy, 
that  if  a  creditor  gives  an  order 
on  his  debtor  to  pay  a  sum  in 
discharge  of  his  debt,  and  that  or- 


der is  shown  to  the  debtor,  it 
binds  him;  on  the  other  hand  this 
doctrine  has  been  brought  into 
doubt,  by  some  decisions  in  the 
courts  of  law,  who  require  that 
the  party  receiving  the  order 
should  in  some  way  enter  into  a 
contract.  That  has  been  the  course 
of  their  decisions,  but  is  certainly 
not  the  doctrine  of  this  court." 
See  also,  Fitzgerald  v.  Stewart,  2 
Sim.  333,  2  Russ  &  Mylne,  457; 
Lett  v.  Morris,  4  Sim.  607;  Watson 
v.    Wellington,    1    Russ.    &    Mylne, 


§  44  LIENS.  44 

ham,  held  that,  notwithstanding  the  assignment  by  the  bank- 
rupt, the  creditor  had  an  interest  in  the  goods,  in  the  nature 
of  a  lien,  which  equity  would  protect.  He  stated  the  rule  to 
be  that,  in  equity,  an  order  given  by  a  debtor  to  his  creditor 
upon  a  third  person  having  funds  of  the  debtor,  to  pay  the 
creditor  out  of  the  same,  is  a  binding,  equitable  assignment 
of  so  much  of  the  funds. 

A  part  of  a  particular  fund  may  thus  be  assigned  by  an 
order,  and  the  holder  may  enforce  payment  against  the 
drawee.  No  particular  form  of  words  is  necessary  to  effect 
an  equitable  assignment.  Any  words  which  show  an  inten- 
tion of  transferring  or  appropriating  a  chose  in  action  to  the 
use  of  the  assignee,  and  which  place  him  in  control  of  the 
same,  are  sufficient. ^^ 

§  44.  Rule  applying  to  attorneys  and  clients. — This  rule 
applies  to  agreements  made  by  attorneys  with  their  clients, 
whereby  they  are  to  receive  a  share  of  the  fund  to  be  re- 
covered as  a  contingent  compensation  for  professional  ser- 
vices, for  such  agreements,  when  made  for  the  prosecution  of 
certain  classes  of  claims,  of  which  may  be  instanced  claims 
against  a  government,  or  in  one  of  the  executive  departments 
of  a  government,  are  not  in  violation  of  public  policy.'*^  Such 
agreements,  if  they  virtually  assign  a  part  of  the  claim,  or 
an  interest  in  it,  create  a  lien  upon  the  fund  recovered. ^^ 
602,  605;  Malcolm  v.  Scott,  3  Hare  ^3  Row    v.    Dawson,    1    Ves.    Jr. 

39;    Crowfoot    v.    Gurney,    2    Moo.       332,  per   Lord   Hardwicke. 
&    Scott   473;    Row   v.    Dawson,    1  44  Stanton   v.    Embrey,   93   U.    S. 

Ves.  Jr.  332,  per  Lord  Hardwicke;  548,  23  L.  ed.  983;  Fairbanks  v. 
Yeates  v.  Groves,  1  Ves.  Jr.  280,  Sargent,  39  Hun  (N.  Y.)  588,  revd. 
per  Lord  Thurlow;  Trist  v.  Child,  104  N.  Y.  108,  9  N.  E.  870,  6  L.  R. 
21  Wall.  (U.  S.)  441',  22  L.  ed.  623,  A.  475,  58  Am.  Rep.  490;  V^illiams 
per  Swayne,  J. ;  Field  v.  New  v.  Ingersoll,  23  Hun.  (N.  Y.)  284, 
York,  6  N.  Y.  179,  57  Am.  Dec.  435;  affd.  89  N.  Y.  508;  Brown  v.  New 
Richardson  v.  Rust,  9  Paige  (N.  York,  11  Hun  (N.  Y.)  21. 
Y.)  243;   Powell  v.   Jones,  72  Ala.  45  Stanton  v.    Embrey,  93   U.    S. 

392.  548,  23  L.  ed.  983 ;  Dowell  v.  Card- 


45  EQUITABLE  LIENS.  §    45 

Thus,  where  professional  services  were  rendered  by  an  at- 
torney under  such  an  agreement,  in  prosecuting  a  claim 
against  the  Republic  of  Mexico,  and  the  claim  was  finally, 
through  his  efforts,  allowed,  it  was  held  that  he  had  a  lien 
upon  the  fund  recovered,  and  that  a  court  of  equity  would 
exercise  jurisdiction  to  enforce  the  lien,  if  it  appeared  that 
equity  would  give  him  a  more  adequate  remedy  than  he  could 
obtain  in  a  court  of  law.'*^ 

§  45.  An  order  on  specific  fund  effectual  to  create  lien. — 
An  order  upon  a  specific  fund,  of  which  the  drawee  has  notice, 
though  he  has  not  accepted  it,  or  though  he  may  have  re- 
fused to  accept  it,  is  effectual,  not  only  as  between  the 
parties,  but  also  as  against  the  drawer's  assignee  in  bank- 
ruptcy, or  his  voluntary  assignee,  for  the  benefit  of  his  credit- 
ors.^''' A  debtor,  being  about  to  sell  some  leasehold  prop- 
erty, gave  to  a  creditor  an  order  for  the  payment  of  the  pur- 
chase-money.    The    order    was    not    accepted,    though    the 

well,    4    Sawy.    (U.    S.)    217,    Fed.  and     thereafter     the     amount     of 

Cas.   No.   4039;   Wilson  v.   Seeber,  counsel's     fee     was     adjusted     by 

72  N.  J.  Eq.  523,  66  Atl.  909;  Deer-  an  agreement  between  him  and  the 

ing  V.  Schreyer,  58  App.  Div.    (N.  attorney.     It  was  held,   in  an  ac- 

Y.)   322,  68  N.  Y.  S.   1015.  tion  by  counsel  against  the  attor- 

46  Wylie   V.    Coxe,    15    How.    (U.  ney     and     the     trustee,     that     the 

S.)    415,    14    L.    ed.    753;    Staton   v.  agreement    for    a    contingent    fee 

Embrey,  93  U.  S.  548,  23  L.  ed.  983.  impressed    an    equitable    lien    for 

Where   the   amount    of   compensa-  plaintiff's   compensation   upon   the 

tion    to    be    paid    the    attorney    in  trust    fund,    and    that    a    judgment 

such      case      is      not      fixed,      evi-  for  the  same,  as  adjusted,  effectu- 

dence      of      what      is      ordinarily  ated     the     lien.      Harwood    v.    La 

charged     by     attorneys     in    cases  Grange,    62    Hun    (N.    Y.)    619,    42 

of     the     same     character     is     ad-  N.    Y.    St.    905,    16    N.    Y.    S.    689, 

missible.     An    attorney,    prosecut-  revd.  137  N.  Y.  538,  32  N.   E.   1000. 

ing     certain     actions     under     an  47  Ex  parte  Alderson,  1  Mad.  53, 

agreement  that  his  fees  should  be  affd.     nom.     Ex     parte     South,     3 

a   proportionate   share   of   the   re-  Swanst.    392;    Lett    v.    Morris,    4 

covery,     employed     counsel,     and  Sim.    607;     Burn    v.     Carvalho,    4 

agreed    to    divide    the    fees    with  Mylne     &     Cr.     690;     Yeates     v. 

him.    The  proceeds  of  the  actions  Groves,    1    Ves.    Jr.   280;    Clark   v. 

were    deposited    with    a    trustee,  Mauran,  3   Paige   (N.  Y.)   Z7Z. 


§    46  LIENS.  46 

drawees  had  notice  of  it.  Before  the  transaction  was  com- 
pleted by  payment  of  the  order,  the  debtor  became  bankrupt. 
Lord  Thnrlow,  in  holding  that  the  order  was  an  equitable 
assignment  of  the  purchase-money,  said:^^  ''This  is  noth- 
ing but  a  direction  by  a  man  to  pay  part  of  his  money  to  an- 
other for  a  foregone  valuable  consideration.  If  he  could 
transfer,  he  has  done  it;  and  it  being  his  own  money,  he 
could  transfer.  The  transfer  w^as  actually  made.  They 
were  in  the  right  not  to  accept  it,  as  it  was  not  a  bill  of  ex- 
change. It  is  not  an  inchoate  business.  The  order  fixed 
the  money  the  moment  it  was  shown  to  [the  parties  upon 
whom  it  was  drawn]." 

The  assignment  of  a  mail  contract,  accompanied  by  an 
agreement  that  the  assignee  should  receive  all  the  moneys 
that  might  become  payable  under  the  contract  for  carrying 
the  mail,  constitutes  an  equitable  lien  on  the  funds  which  is 
superior  to  a  subsequent  order  given  by  the  assignor  upon 
the  same  fund.^^ 

§  46.     Assignment  of  lien  effectual  on  notice  to  creditor. — 

But  the  assignment  is  not  effectual  until  the  creditor  is  noti- 
fied of  the  assignment  to  himself.  Though  a  consignment 
be  made  with  directions  to  apply  the  proceeds  to  a  creditor  of 
the  consignor,  that  is  no  effectual  appropriation  or  lien  in 
favor  of  the  creditor  until  the  creditor  is  notified  of  the  ap- 
propriation. Until  such  notice  the  directions  amount  to  no 
more  than  a  mandate  revocable  at  the  pleasure  of  the  c 
signor,  who  may  make  any  disposition  of  the  property  or  of 
its  proceeds  that  he  may  see  fit  to  make.^^ 

§  47.  Equitable  assignment  not  revocable. — An  order 
whicli  amounts  to  an  equitable  assignment  can  not  be  re- 
voked.    An  order  given  by  a  landlord  on  his  tenant  to  pay 

■1^  Yeates    v.    Groves,    1    Ves.    Jr.  -lo  Bradley  v.  Root,  5   Paige   (N. 

280.  Y.)  632. 

5f^  Scott   V.   Porcher,   3   Mer.  652. 


47  ,  EQUITABLE   LIENS.  •  §    48 

to  another  the  rents  to  accrue  during  a  certain  time,  and 
assented  to  by  the  tenant,  operates  as  an  equitable  assign- 
ment of  such  rents,  which  is  effectual  not  only  as  against 
third  persons,  but  also  against  the  landlord  himself.^^  Al- 
though he  revokes  the  order,  the  tenant  is  not  only  justified 
in  paying  the  rents  in  accordance  with  the  order,  but  may  be 
compelled  to  do  so.  The  order  itself  amounts  to  an  assign- 
ment of  the  fund  without  any  formal  acceptance,  whether 
written  or  verbal. ^^  Such  an  order  differs  in  this  respect 
from  a  bill  of  exchange  or  check,  inasmuch  as  these  do  not 
specify  a  particular  fund,  whereas  the  order  mentioned  does 
specify  a  particular  fund. 

§  48.  Agreement  to  pay  out  of  designated  fund  will  not 
create  equitable  lien. — A  mere  agreement,  whether  by  parol 
or  in  writing,  to  pay  a  debt  out  of  a  designated  fund,  when 
received,  does  not  give  an  equitable  lien  upon  that  fund,  or 
operate  as  an  equitable  assignment  of  it.^^  The  agreement 
is  personal  merely.  There  must  be  an  order,  or  something 
that  places  the  creditor  in  a  position  to  demand  and  receive 
the  amount  of  the  debt  from  the  holder  of  the  fund  without 
further  action  on  the  part  of  the  debtor;  something  that 
would  protect  the  holder  of  the  fund  in  making  the  payment. 

51  Morton  v.  Naylor,  1  Hill  (N.  reversing  6  Paige  (N.  Y.)  415; 
Y.)  583;  Bradley  v.  Root,  5  Paige  Morton  v.  Naylor,  1  Hill  (N. 
(N.   Y.)    632.  Y.)      583;      Hauselt      v.      Vilmar, 

52  Lett  V.  Morris,  4  Sim.  607;  2  Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  222, 
Yeates  v.  Groves,  1  Ves.  Jr.  280;  43  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  574,  af- 
Ex  parte  Alderson,  1  Mad.  53.  firmed    76    N.    Y.    630;    Wood    v. 

53  Wright  V.  Ellison,  1  Wall.  (U.  Mitchell,  63  Hun  (N.  Y.)  629,  44 
S.)  10,  17  L.  ed.  555;  Christmas  v.  N.  Y.  St.  694,  17  N.  Y.  S.  782;  Ad- 
Russell,  14  Wall.  (U.  S.)  69,  20  L.  dison  v.  Enoch,  168  N.  Y.  658,  61 
ed.  762;  Trist  v.  Child,  21  Wall.  N.  E.  1127;  Phillips  v.  Hogue,  63 
(U.  S.)  441,  22  L.  ed.  623;  Dillon  Nebr.  192,  88  N.  W.  180;  De  Win- 
v.  Barnard,  21  Wall.  (U.  S.)  430,  ter  v.  Thomas,  34  App.  D.  C.  80; 
22  L.  ed.  673;  Williams  v.  Inger-  Pettibone  v.  Thomson,  72  Misc. 
soil,  89  N.  Y.  508;  Rogers  v.  Ho-  (N.  Y.)  486,  30  N.  Y.  S.  284. 
sack's  Exrs.,  18  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  319, 


§    48  .  LIENS.  48 

A  covenant  by  a  debtor  to  pay  certain  debts  out  of  a  particu- 
lar fund,  when  the  same  should  be  received,  is  merely  a 
personal  covenant. ^^  Thus,  to  create  in  favor  of  a  con- 
tractor a  lien  upon  particular  funds  of  his  employer,  there 
must  be  not  only  an  express  promise  of  the  employer  upon 
v^hich  the  contractor  relies,  to  apply  them  in  payment  of 
such  services,  but  there  must  be  some  act  of  appropriation 
on  the  part  of  the  employer  relinquishing  control  of  the 
funds,  and  conferring  upon  the  contractor  the  right  to  have 
them  thus  applied  when  the  services  are  rendered.  A  con- 
tractor entered  into  an  agreement  with  a  railroad  company 
to  build  a  portion  of  its  road,  which  had  just  been  mortgaged 
by  the  company  to  raise  money  to  pay  its  existing  debts  and 
to  complete  and  equip  the  road.  The  mortgage  provided, 
among  other  things,  that  the  expenditure  of  all  sums  of 
money  realized  from  the  sale  of  the  bonds  should  be  made 
with  the  approval  of  at  least  one  of  the  mortgage  trustees, 
and  that  his  assent  in  writing  should  be  necessary  to  all  con- 
tracts made  by  the  company  before  the  same  should  be  a 
charge  upon  any  of  the  sums  received  from  such  sales.  The 
contractor  obtained  the  assent  of  two  of  the  trustees  to  his 
contract;  and,  having  completed  the  work,  upon  the  bank- 
ruptcy of  the  company  claimed  a  lien  upon  the  property  in 
the  hands  of  the  assignees  in  bankruptcy  acquired  or  re- 
ceived from  the  mortgage  bonds.  It  was  held,  however, 
that  he  acquired  no  lien,  because  he  was  never  given  control 
of  the  funds  to  be  received  from  the  bonds. ^^  Upon  this 
point  Mr.  Justice  Field  said:  "Before  there  can  arise  any 
lien  on  the  funds  of  the  employer,  there  must  be,  in  addition 
to  such  express  promise,  upon  which  the  contractor  relies, 
some  act  of  appropriation  on  the  part  of  the  employer  de- 
priving himself  of  the  control  of  the  funds,  and  conferring 
upon  the  contractor  the  right  to  have  them  applied  to  his 

5-1  Rogers   v.    Hosack's    Exrs.,    18  55  Dillon    v.    Barnard,    21    Wall. 

Wend.  (N.  Y.)  319;  Hoyt  v.  Story,       (U.  S.)  430,  22  L.  ed.  673. 
3   Barb.    (N.  Y.)   262. 


49  EQUITABLE   LIENS.  §    49 

payment  when  the  services  are  rendered  or  the  materials  are 
furnished.  There  must  be  a  relinquishment,  by  the  em- 
ployer, of  the  right  of  dominion  over  the  funds,  so  that  with- 
out his  aid  or  consent  the  contractor  can  enforce  their  appli- 
cation to  his  payment  when  his  contract  is  completed.  *  *  * 
In  the  case  at  bar  there  is  no  circumstance  impairing  the 
dominion  of  the  corporation  over  the  funds  received  from 
the  bonds;  there  is  only  its  covenant  with  the  trustees  that 
the  expenditure  of  those  funds  shall  be  made  with  the  ap- 
proval of  one  of  them,  and  that  one  of  them  shall  give  his 
written  assent  to  its  contractors  before  they  are  paid  out  of 
such  funds.  There  is  no  covenant  with  the  contractor  of 
any  kind  in  the  instrument,  and  no  right  is  conferred  upon 
him  to  interfere  in  any  disposition  which  the  corporation  may 
see  fit  to  make  of  its  moneys.  The  essential  elements  are 
wanting  in  the  transaction  between  him  and  the  corporation 
to  give  him  any  lien  upon  its  funds.  No  right,  therefore, 
exists  in  him  to  pursue  such  funds  into  other  property  upon 
which  they  have  been  expended.  The  case,  as  already  inti- 
mated, is  on  his  part,  one  of  simple  disappointed  expectation, 
against  which  misfortune,  equity  furnishes  no  relief." 

§  49.     Creditor's  lien  on  money  in  hands  of  debtor's  agent- 

— A  creditor  has  no  lien  on  money  in  the  hands  of  the  debt- 
or's agent  until  the  debtor  has  given  an  order  upon  the  agent 
to  pay  it  to  the  creditor.  A  tax  was  levied  for  the  amount 
of  the  subscription  of  a  county  to  a  railroad  company,  and  an 
agent  was  appointed  in  behalf  of  the  county  to  receive  the 
money  when  collected,  and  to  pay  it  over  when  ordered.  It 
was  held  that  the  railroad  company  had  no  specific  or  other 
lien  on  money  collected  and  in  the  hands  of  the  agent  before 
he  had  been  ordered  to  pay  it  over.  The  county  could  recall 
the  money  in  the  hands  of  its  agent  at  any  time  before  pay- 
ment to  the  company. ^^ 

56  Henry     County    v.     Allen,     50    Mo.  231. 

4 


§    5^  LIENS.  50 

§  50.  Appropriation  necessary  to  constitute  equitable 
lien. — To  constitute  an  equitable  lien  on  a  fund,  there  must 
be  some  distinct  appropriation  of  the  fund  by  the  debtor, 
such  as  an  assignment  or  order  that  the  creditor  should  be 
paid  out  of  it.  It  is  not  enough  that  the  fund  may  have  been 
created  through  the  efforts  and  outlays  of  the  party  claiming 
the  lien.^"  It  is  not  enough  that  a  debtor  authorizes  a  third 
person  to  receive  a  fund  and  to  pay  it  over  to  a  creditor.'^^ 
One  who  was  largely  indebted  to  his  banker,  being  pressed 
for  payment,  wrote  to  the  solicitor  of  a  railroad  company 
which  was  indebted  to  him,  authorizing  the  solicitor  to  re- 
ceive the  money  so  due  to  him,  and  to  pay  it  to  the  banker. 
The  solicitor,  by  letter,  promised  the  banker  to  pay  him  such 
money  on  receiving  it.  The  solicitor  received  the  amount, 
but  paid  it  over  to  the  debtor  instead  of  the  banker.  It  was 
held  that  the  transaction  did  not  amount  to  an  equitable  as- 
signment, because  there  was  no  order  or  assignment  by  the 
debtor  placing  the  fund  in  the  control  of  the  creditor.  There 
was  nothing  more  than  a  promise  or  undertaking  on  the  part 
of  the  solicitor,  for  the  breach  of  which  he  may  be  responsi- 
ble in  law,  but  not  in  equity.'^^  Lord  Truro,  delivering  the 
judgment  upon  appeal,  said:^''  'T  believe  I  have  adverted 
to  all  the  cases  cited  which  can  be  considered  as  having  any 
bearing  upon  the  present  case:  and  the  extent  of  the  prin- 
ciple to  be  deduced  from  them  is,  that  an  agreement  between 
a  debtor  and  a  creditor  that  the  debt  owing  shall  be  paid 
out  of  a  specific  fund  coming  to  the  debtor,  or  an  order  given 
by  a  debtor  to  his  creditor  upon  a  person  owing  money  or 
holding  funds  belonging  to  the  giver  of  the  order,  directing 
such  person  to  pay  such  funds  to  the  creditor,  will  create  a 
valid  equitable  charge  upon  such  fund  ;  in  other  words,  will 

5"  Wright  V.  Ellison,  1  Wall.  (U.  "^9  Rodick    v.    Gandell,    12    Beav. 

S.)  16,  17  L.  ed.  555;  Hoyt  v.  Story,  325. 

3  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  262.  60  Rodick   v.    Gandell    1    De    G., 

58  Rodick    V.    Gandell,    12    Beav.  M.  &  G.  76-3,  111. 
325.  affirmed  1  De  G..  M.  &  G.  763. 


51  EQUITABLE  LIENS.  g    52 

Operate  as  an  equitable  assignment  of  the  debts  or  fund  to 
which  the  order  refers."  He  then  proceeds  to  examine  the 
letters  referred  to,  with  reference  to  determining  whether 
they  come  within  the  principle  declared.  He  says  that  the 
debtor's  letter  to  the  solicitor  does  not  come  within  the  prin- 
ciple, because  it  was  not  an  order  upon  one  owing  money  to 
him,  nor  upon  one  having  funds  of  his.  It  was  not  an  order 
upon  the  railway  company,  nor  upon  any  officer  of  the  com- 
pany, such  as  to  make  it  available  against  the  company.  He 
concludes,  after  a  full  examination  of  all  the  circumstances, 
that  the  letter  was  not  intended  to  be,  and  did  not,  according 
to  the  law  applicable  to  the  subject,  operate  as  an  equitable 
assignment  to  the  banker  of  the  debt  due  from  the  railway 
company.  It  was  a  mere  authority  to  the  solicitor  to  re- 
ceive, which  might  or  might  not  be  acted  upon. 

§51.  Rule  strictly  held  to. — The  rule  that  an  equitable 
assignment  can  be  effected  only  by  a  surrender  of  control 
over  the  funds  or  property  assigned  is  one  that  is  strictly 
held  to.  A  promise  that  certain  goods  shall  be  held  in  trust 
for  the  benefit  of  another,  and  that  the  proceeds  shall  be 
paid  to  him,  does  not  amount  to  an  equitable  assignment  of 
the  goods  or  specific  lien  upon  them ;  for  in  such  case  the 
owner  retains  control  of  the  goods,  and  may  appropriate 
them  or  their  proceeds  to  the  payment  of  other  creditors, 
and  the  holder  of  such  promise  cannot  follow  the  goods  any 
more  than  he  could  follow  their  proceeds.  He  has  no  lien 
either  upon  the  goods  or  their  proceeds.  The  owner  has 
violated  his  promise,  and  for  this  he  is  personally  respon- 
sible.^^ 

§  52.     Promise  to  pay  out  of  particular  fund  not  sufficient. 

— The  promise  of  a  debtor  to  pay  a  debt  out  of  a  particular 
fund  is  not  sufficient.     There  must  be  an  appropriation  of 

61  Gibson  v.  Stone,  43  Barb.   (N.    Y.)   285,  28  How.   Pr.    (N.   Y.)   468. 


§    53  LIENS.  52 

the  fund  pro  tanto,  either  by  giving  an  order  on  the  specific 
5und,  or  by  transferring  the  amount  otherwise  in  such  a  man- 
ner that  the  holder  of  the  fund  is  authorized  to  pay  the 
amount  directly  to  the  creditor  without  the  further  interven- 
tion of  the  debtor.^-  Thus,  a  mere  personal  agreement  by  a 
claimant  against  the  United  States,  whereby  he  promises  to 
pa)'  an  attorney  a  percentage  of  whatever  sum  may  be  appro- 
priated by  Congress  through  his  efiforts  to  secure  the  pay- 
ment of  the  claim,  does  not  constitute  a  lien  on  the  fund  to 
be  appropriated;  there  being  no  order  on  the  government  to 
pay  the  percentage  out  of  the  fund  so  appropriated,  nor  any 
assignment  to  the  attorney  of  such  percentage.*^^  The  rem- 
edy for  the  breach  of  such  an  agreement  is  at  law,  and  not  in 
equity. 

A  sale  of  goods  upon  the  mere  promise  of  the  purchaser 
to  pay  for  them  out  of  the  avails  of  their  sale,  and  of  a  stock 
of  other  goods  then  owned  by  the  purchaser,  does  not  give 
the  seller  a  lien  on  the  goods  after  their  delivery,  nor  on  the 
avails  of  their  sale,  that  can  be  specifically  enforced.^*  Such 
an  agreement  merely  creates  the  relation  of  debtor  and 
creditor,  and  does  not  effectually  appropriate  the  funds  to 
the  payment  of  the  specific  debt. 

§  53.  Workmen  have  no  lien  on  money  retained  from 
funds  due  contractor. — Workmen  have  no  lien  on  money  re- 

•52  Trist  V.  Child,  21  Wall.(U.  S.)  S.)  441,  22  L.  ed.  623.     In  this  case, 

441,  22  L.  ed.  623;  Wright  v.  Elli-  Congress    having    appropriated    a 

son,   1   Wall.    (U.   S.)    16,   17  L.   ed.  sum     for     the     payment     of     the 

555;  Hoyt  v.  Story,  3  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  claim,  the  attorney  obtained  an  in- 

262;  Gibson  v.  Stone,  43  Barb.  (N.  junction  against  the  claimant  from 

Y.)   285,  28  How.   Pr.   (N.  Y.)  468;  withdrawing    this    sum    from    the 

Addison   v.    Enoch,   168   N.  Y.  658,  treasury    until    he    had    complied 

61  N.  E.  1127;  Phillips  v.  Hogue,  63  with  his  agreement  about  compen- 

Nebr.  192,  88  N.  W.  180;  De  Win-  sation;  but  the  Supreme  Court  re- 

ter  V.  Thomas,  34  App.   D.   C.  80;  versed   the   order. 

Pettibone    v.    Thomson,    72    Misc.  64  Stewart  v.    Hopkins,   30   Ohio 

(N.  Y.)  486,  130  N.  Y.  S.  284.  St.  502,  affd.  104  U.  S.  303,  26  L.  ed. 

63  Trist   v.    Child,   21    Wall.    (U.  769. 


53  EQUITABLE  LIENS.  §    54 

tained  by  the  owner  of  property  out  of  sums  due  to  a  con- 
tractor, for  the  owner's  own  protection  against  claims  for 
labor  and  materials.  A  provision  in  a  contract  for  work  and 
the  furnishing  of  materials  whereby  the  employer  is  author- 
ized to  retain,  out  of  the  moneys  that  may  be  due  to  the  con- 
tractor, such  amount  as  may  be  necessary  to  meet  the  claims 
of  all  persons  who  have  done  work  or  furnished  materials, 
and  who  shall  have  given  notice  of  their  claims  within  a  lim- 
ited time,  until  such  liability  shall  be  discharged,  creates  no 
equitable  lien  upon  the  fund  retained,  and  raises  no  equitable 
assignment  of  it  in  favor  of  laborers  or  material-men.  The 
contract  does  not  provide  for  any  application  of  the  moneys 
retained  to  the  payment  of  claims  contained  in  the  notice. 
The  only  benefit  a  laborer  or  material-man  could  secure  by 
filing  such  notice  would  be,  that  he  would  stop  the  payment 
of  the  amount  to  the  contractor,  and  he  would  know  where 
his  debtor  had  funds  wherewith  to  pay  the  claim ;  but  he 
could  reach  these  funds  only  by  trustee  process,  or  some 
other  form  of  attachment.*^ 

§  54.  Designation  of  particular  fund  must  be  clear  and 
definite. — The  designation  of  the  particular  fund  must  be 
clear  and  definite  to  give  effect  to  an  order  as  an  equitable 
assignment,  in  distinction  from  an  order  drawn  against  a 
general  credit.  The  president  of  a  company  wrote  a  letter 
stating  that,  if  a  certain  person  in  its  employ  would  make  an 
order  on  its  treasurer  for  any  portion  of  his  salary,  and  the 
payee  would  file  it  with  the  treasurer,  the  sum  would  be  paid 
monthly  so  long  as  the  employe  remained  with  the  com- 
pany and  the  order  "remained  unrevoked."  The  employe 
accordingly  drew  an  order  for  three  hundred  dollars  in 
monthly  payments  of  fifty  dollars,  closing  the  order  with  the 
words,  "and  charge  the  same  to  my  salary  account."  The 
order  and  letter  were  filed  with  the  treasurer,   but  before 

65  Quinlan  v.  Russell,  15  J.  &  S.    (N.  Yj   212,  affd.  94  N.  Y.  350. 


§  55  LIENS.  54 

anything  was  paid  upon  the  order  the  drawer  wrote  the 
treasurer  countermanding  the  order.  In  a  suit  against  the 
company  to  recover  the  amount  of  the  order,  it  was  held 
that  the  plaintiff  could  not  recover;  that,  treating  the  order 
as  a  bill  of  exchange,  the  company  accepted  it  only  condi- 
tionally that  it  "remained  unrevoked;"  and  that  it  did  not 
operate  as  an  equitable  assignment,  inasmuch  as  the  order 
was  not  a  requirement  to  pay  out  of  a  designated  fund  or 
from  a  particular  source.  Upon  this  point  the  court  said: 
"The  order  does  not,  in  terms,  direct  the  payment  of  the 
salary  or  wages  or  any  part  thereof  to  the  payee.  It  is  a 
request,  or  at  most  a  direction,  by  the  drawer,  to  pay  certain 
specific  s-ums  of  money,  generally,  for  a  certain  period  and  on 
particular  days,  without  the  designation  therein  of  any  claim 
for  a  debt  due  or  to  become  due  to  him,  unless  it  is  contained 
in  the  further  direction  to  charge  the  amounts  paid  to  his 
salary  account.  This,  it  is  true,  recognizes  the  fact  that 
there  was  a  relation  betwen  the  parties  at  the  time  which 
entitled  the  drawer  to  a  cerdit  for  services  rendered  by  him, 
and  for  which  a  salary  was  payable,  but  the  direction  would 
have  been  as  proper  if  the  sums  thus  to  be  charged  were  for 
moneys  lent  and  advanced  previous  to  the  earning  of  the 
salary,  as  for  a  salary  actually  earned,  and  for  which  an 
indebtedness  had  accrued.  It  was  not  a  requirement  that 
the  payment  should  be  made  out  of  a  designated  fund,  or 
from  a  particular  source,  but  it  was  a  provision  made  for  the 
reimbursement  of  what  should  be  paid  in  compliance  with 
the  request  or  direction. "^'^ 

§  55.     Bill  of  exchange  not  an  equitable  assignment. — A 

bill  of  exchange  does  not  of  itself  constitute  an  equitable  as- 
signment of  the  sum  named,  unless  it  specifies  a  particular 
fund  upon  which  the  order  or  bill  is  drawn,  and  the  drawer 
has  divested  himself  of  all  right  to  control  the  fund.^^     A  bill 

<"'*»  Shaver  v.  Western  Union  Tel-  ^'~  Yeates    v.    Groves,    1    Ves.    Jr. 

egraph   Co.,  57   N.   Y.  459.  280;  Watson  v.  Wellington,  1  Russ. 


55  EQUITABLE   LIENS.  §    56 

of  exchange  in  the  ordinary  form  does  not  specify  any  par- 
ticular fund  upon  which  it  is  drawn,  and  therefore  does  not 
constitute  an  equitable  assignment  of  any  sum  in  the  hands 
of  the  drawee;  and  an  order  which  is  payable  out  of  a  par- 
ticular fund  is  not  a  negotiable  bill  of  exchange,  for  such  an 
instrument  must  be  payable  absolutely,  and  not  contingently 
out  of  a  particular  fund.  Even  after  an  unconditional  ac- 
ceptance of  a  bill,  it  cannot  in  strictness  be  held  to  operate  as 
an  assignment  to  the  payee  of  the  drawer's  funds  in  the 
hands  of  the  drawee,  since  the  latter  becomes  bound  by  the 
consent  of  acceptance,  irrespective  of  the  funds  in  his 
hands.^^ 

§  56.  Bill  of  exchange  against  consignment  as  lien. — If  a 
bill  of  exchange  drawn  against  a  consignment  does  not  itself 
refer  to  the  consignment,  and  the  consignee  is  not  otherwise 
instructed  to  hold  the  consignment  or  the  proceeds  of  it  for 
the  payment  of  the  bill,  there  is  no  appropriation  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  bill  which  will  constitute  a  lien.®^ 

A  mere  letter  of  advice  from  the  consignor  to  the  con- 
signee that  a  bill  of  exchange  has  been  drawn  against  the 
consignment  does  not,  it  seems,  operate  as  a  specific  appro- 
priation of  the  proceeds  to  the  payment  of  the  bill.  Even 
if  the  letter  of  advice  amounts  to  a  specific  direction  to  apply 
the  proceeds  of  the  consignment  to  the  payment  of  such  bill, 
it  does  not  operate  as  a  specific  appropriation  of  the  proceeds 
to  the  payment  of  the  bill  unless  it  be  shown  that  the  pur- 
chaser or  holder  of  the  bill  took  it  on  the  faith  that  the  pro- 

&    M.   602,  605;    Lett   v.    Morris,   4  Sheffield,   3    N.    Y.    Super.    Ct.   416, 

Sim.     607;     Burn     v.     Carvalho,     4  affd.  3  N.  Y.  243;  Harris  v.  Clark, 

Mylne  &  C.  690;  Malcolm  v.  Scott,  3  N.  Y.  93,  51  Am.  Dec.  352. 

3   Hare   39;    Chapman  v.   White,  6  ^-s  Cowperthwaite   v.   Sheffield.  3 

N.  Y.  412,  57  Am.  Dec.  464;  Marine  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  416,  affd.  3  N.  Y. 

&  Fire  Ins.  Bank  v.  Jauncey,  5  N.  243. 

Y.  Super.  Ct.  257;  Winter  v.  Drury,  «»  Frith    v.    Forbes,   4    De    G.,    F 

5    N.    Y.    525;    Cowperthwaite    v.  &  J.  409,  421,  per  Turner,  J. 


57 


LIENS. 


56 


ceeds  of  the  shipment  were  to  be  applied  to  its  payment. ''^^ 
But  a  draft  or  order  made  payable  out  of  a  particular  fund 
is  an  assignment  of  the  fund  pro  tanto.'^^ 


§  57.  A  check  not  an  equitable  assignment. — A  check 
drawn  upon  a  bank  does  not  operate  as  an  equitable  assign- 
ment of  the  funds  of  the  drawer  to  the  amount  of  the  check, 
nor  does  it  create  any  lien  upon  such  funds,'^^  if  it  is  drawn 
in  the  ordinary  form.  In  such  form  it  does  not  describe  any 
particular  fund,  or  use  any  words  of  transfer  of  the  whole  or 
a  part  of  any  particular  amount  standing  to  the  credit  of  the 
drawer.  Such  a  check  is  in  legal  effect  like  an  unaccepted 
bill  of  exchange  in  the  ordinary  form.  It  does  not  operate 
as  an  equitable  assignment  of  any  part  of  the  funds  of  the 
drawee  in  the  hands  of  the  drawer;  and  it  is  immaterial  that 
the  drawer  is  not  a  bank."^^     Accordingly,  where  an  insur- 


"0  Cowperthwaite  v.  Sheffield.  3 
N.  Y.  243.  affg.  3  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct. 
416. 

'1  Yeates  v.  Groves,  1  Ves.  Jr. 
280;  Hall  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  1 
Keyes  (N.  Y.)  193,  2  Abb.  Dec.  301 ; 
Vreeland  v.  Blunt,  6  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
182.  The  fund  drawn  upon  in  this 
case  had  been  set  apart  for  certain 
specified  purposes,  among  which 
was  the  payment  of  the  sum  men- 
tioned in  the  order,  and  the  order 
itself  specified  the  fund.  It  was 
of  course  an  equitable  appropria- 
tion of  the  amount  so  drawn. 

"2  Hopkinson  v.  Forster,  L.  R.  19 
Eq.  74;  Christmas  v.  Russell,  14 
Wall.  (U.  S.)  69,  20  L.  ed.  762; 
Thompson  v.  Riggs,  S  Wall.  (U. 
S.)  663,  18  L.  ed.  704;  Bank  of  Re- 
public V.  Millard.  10  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
152,  19  L.  ed.  897;  First  National 
Bank  V.  Whitman,  94  U.  S.  343,  24 
L.   ed.  229.     New  York:    Chapman 


V.  White,  6  N.  Y.  412,  57  Am.  Dec. 
464;  People  v.  Merchants'  &  Me- 
chanics' Bank,  78  N.  Y.  269,  34  Am. 
Rep.  532;  Duncan  v.  Berlin,  60  N. 
Y.  151 ;  Aetna  Nat.  Bank  v.  Fourth 
Nat.  Bank,  46  N.  Y.  82,  7  Am.  Rep. 
314;  Tyler  v.  Gould,  48  N.  Y.  68Z 
Missouri:  Dickinson  v.  Coats,  79 
Mo.  250,  49  Am.  Rep.  228;  Mer- 
chants'Nat.  Bank  v.  Coates,  79  Mo. 
168;  Coates  v.  Doran,  83  Mo.  337. 
The  former  case  expressly  dissents 
from  AIcGrade  v.  German  Savings 
Inst.,  4  Mo.  App.  330.  Pennsyl- 
vania :  Loyd  v.  McCaffrey.  46  Pa. 
St.  410.  Maryland :  Moses  v. 
Franklin  Bank,  34  Md.  574.  Mas- 
sachusetts :  Carr  v.  Nat.  Security 
Bank.  107  Mass.  45,  9  m.  Rep.  6; 
Dana  v.  Third  Nat.  Bank,  13  Allen 
(Mass.)  445,  90  Am.  Dec.  216;  Bul- 
lard  v.  Randall,  1  Gray  (Mass.) 
605,   61   Am.    Dec.   433. 

"3  Attornev-General      v.      Conti- 


57  EQUITABLE   LIENS.  §    58 

ance  company  gave  its  check  in  the  ordinary  form  upon  a 
trust  company  in  payment  of  a  loss,  but  before  its  presenta- 
tion a  receiver  of  the  company  was  appointed,  who  withdrew 
all  the  funds  on  deposit,  it  was  held  that  the  payee  was  not 
entitled  to  have  the  amount  of  the  check  paid  out  of  funds 
in  the  receivers  hands  in  preference  to  the  claims  of  other 
creditors.  The  fact  that  there  was  a  receipt  upon  the  back 
of  the  check,  intended  to  be  signed  by  the  payee  was  held 
not  to  create  a  lien  upon  the  fund  drawn  upon.  A  state- 
ment of  the  consideration  for  a  draft  or  check,  either  gen- 
erally or  specifically,  whether  on  the  back  or  in  the  body  of 
the  instrument,  does  not  create  a  lien  or  appropriation  of 
the  particular  fund  without  some  expression  to  that  effect. '^^ 

§  58.  Lien  of  holder  of  bill  of  exchange  based  on  agree- 
ment.— The  lien  of  the  holder  of  a  bill  of  exchange  upon  the 
fund  in  the  hands  of  the  drawee  has  its  foundation  in  a 
special  agreement  or  implied  understanding  of  the  parties, 
entered  into  at  the  time  of  discounting  or  purchasing  the 
bill,  that  the  fund  in  the  hands  of  the  drawee  is  appropriated 
to  the  payment  of  the  bill."^^  In  upholding  the  lien  and  de- 
voting the  fund  to  the  payment  of  the  bill,  the  court  executes 
the  agreement  and  carries  out  the  understanding  of  the 
parties.  Even  a  verbal  understanding  between  the  drawer 
and  a  person  discounting  the  bill,  that  it  is  founded  on  a  ship- 

nental  Life   Ins.  Co.,  71   N.  Y.  325,  Bank  v.   Oceana   Co.    Bank,  80  111. 
27  Am.   Rep.  55;   Lunt  v.   Bank  of  212,  22  Am.  Rep.   185;   Iowa:  Rob- 
North    America,   49   Barb.    (N.   Y.)  erts  v.  Austin,  26  Iowa  315,  96  Am. 
221.      There    are    some    authorities  Dec.   146;   South   Carolina:   Fogar- 
to   the   effect    that   a   check   in   the  ties  v.  State  Bank,  12  Rich.  L.   (S. 
usual  form  is  an  equitable  assign-  Car.)  518,  78  Am.  Dec.  468. 
ment  of  so  much  of  the  drawer's  "^  Attorney-General      v.     Conti- 
deposit  as  the  check  calls  for.  Such  nental  Life  Ins.  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  325, 
is  the  rule  adopted  in  the  follow-  27  Am.  Rep.  55.           : 
ing     States :      Illinois :     Munn     v.  ''■J  Burn  v.  Carvalho,  4  Mylne  & 
Burch,  25  111.  35;   Chicago   Marine  C.   690;    Flour    City    Nat.    Bank   v. 
&  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stanford,  28  111.  Garfield,  30  Hun  (N.  Y.)  579. 
168,  81   Am.   Dec.  270;  Union  Nat. 


§    58  LIENS.  58 

ment  of  goods,  and  that  their  proceeds  shall  be  applied  to 
the  payment  of  the  bill,  is  sufficient  to  effect  an  equitable 
transfer  or  lien."^  A  merchant  shipped  a  cargo  of  wheat  to 
commission  merchants  in  New  York,  and  the  next  day  drew 
a  draft  upon  the  consignees  and  procured  a  discount  of  it  at 
a  bank,  upon  the  representation  that  the  cargo  had  been 
shipped  to  the  drawees,  and  with  the  understanding  that  the 
draft  was  drawn  against  the  proceeds  of  the  shipment.  The 
drawer  at  the  same  time  wrote  to  the  consignees  that  the 
draft  had  been  drawn,  and  requested  them  to  accept  it.  The 
next  day  the  drawer,  being  insolvent,  made  a  general  assign- 
ment for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors.  The  assignee  seized 
the  wheat  before  it  reached  the  consignees  and  sold  it.  In 
an  action  by  the  bank,  a  lien  was  established  in  its  favor  as 
against  the  assignee.  The  court  say  that  the  evidence 
showed  that  the  draft  was  discounted  by  the  bank  upon  the 
credit  of  the  wheat  which  had  been  shipped  by  the  drawer, 
and  relied  upon  the  avails  of  the  same  for  the  acceptance 
and  payment  of  the  draft.  The  bank  was  told  that  the  wheat 
had  been  shipped,  and  that  the  draft  was  drawn  against  the 
shipment,  and  this  justified  the  conclusion  that  the  draft  was 
discounted  upon  the  credit  of  the  shipment.'^^ 

"*j  Flour  City  Nat.  Bank  v.  Gar-  ating  the  bill  of  exchange.  If  the 
field,  30  Hun  (N.  Y.)  579.  This  is  goods  or  their  proceeds  after- 
contrary  to  some  expressions  to  be  wards  come  into  the  drawer's 
found  in  earlier  cases.  Marine  &  hands,  the  holder  of  the  bill  will 
Fire  Ins.  Bank  v.  Jauncey,  5  N.  have  no  equitable  lien  upon  them. 
Y.  Super.  Ct.  257,  is  perhaps  the  The  consignee,  moreover,  has  the 
case  most  directly  in  conflict  with  right  to  apply  the  proceeds  to  the 
the  above.  It  is  there  said  that  a  payment  of  any  general  balance 
bill  of  exchange,  though  under-  due  him  from  the  consignor,  or 
stood  to  be  drawn  against  certain  in  any  other  way  that  the  con- 
goods  or  their  proceeds,  makes  no  signor  and  consignee  might  agree 
special  appropriation  of  either  to  upon.  This  decision  in  effect  over- 
the  payment  of  the  bill.  The  ruled  the  same  case  before  the 
drawer  has  the  same  legal  con-  equity  court  in  1  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  486. 
trol  of  the  goods  or  of  their  pro-  '''^  Flour  City  Nat.  Bank  v.  Gar- 
ceeds  in  the  hands  of  the  con-  field,  30  Hun  (N.  Y.)  579. 
signee  that  he  had  before  negoti- 


59  EQUITABLE   LIENS.  §    59 

§  59.  Reference  in  a  draft  to  appropriation  of  proceeds 
held  to  create  lien, — A  brief  reference  in  a  draft  against  a 
consignment  to  an  appropriation  of  tlie  proceeds  has,  to- 
gether with  other  evidence  of  the  appropriation,  been  lield  to 
create  a  lien."^  Thus,  in  one  case,  it  appeared  that  the 
draft  against  a  consignment  of  corn  directed  the  amount  to 
be  charged  "as  advised,''  and  the  consignee  was  advised  by 
letter  of  the  drawing  of  the  draft.  This  reference  made  in 
the  draft  was  regarded  by  the  court  as  extending  the  nature 
of  the  transaction  beyond  that  of  tlie  mere  discounting  of  a 
bill  of  exchange;  for  the  bankers  discounting  the  bill  were 
justified  in  concluding  that  property  had  been  shipped  to  the 
consignee,  and  that  he  had  been  directed  to  pay  the  draft  out 
of  the  proceeds  of  the  shipment.  It  was  a  fact  found  that 
the  discount  was  made  with  the  knowledge  of,  and  in  re- 
liance upon,  that  arrangement.  Direct  evidence  of  this  was 
not  given,  but  circumstances  were  proved  from  which  that 
conclusion  was  reasonably  drawn,  and  they  were  sufficient 
to  establish  the  fact  that  when  the  bill  was  discounted  it  was 
done  on  the  understanding  that  its  payment  had  been  pro- 
vided for  from  the  proceeds  of  the  shipment.  The  letter  and 
the  bill,  and  the  understanding  of  the  parties,  so  far  qualified 
the  nature  of  the  direction  and  request  made  in  the  bill  as 
substantially  to  render  it  an  order  for  a  corresponding  amount 
of  the  proceeds  of  the  shipment.  That  created  a  charge  or 
lien  upon  the  corn  and  its  proceeds  in  favor  of  the  bankers 
discounting  the  bill  under  these  circumstances.  There  was 
something  more  than  a  simple  direction  by  the  shipper  to 
the  consignee  to  apply  the  property  to  the  payment  of  the 
bill,  for  the  bill  itself  was  negotiated  and  discounted  on  the 
distinct  understanding  that  the  proceeds  of  the  corn  should 
be  applied  to  its  payment.^'' 

"8  Parker  v.  Baxter,  19  Hun  (N.  "^  Per   Daniels,   J.,    in    Parker   v. 

Y.)   410,  aflfd.  86  N.   Y.  586.  Baxter,  19  Hun  (N.  Y.)  410. 


§    6o  LIENS.  60 

§  60.  Lien  created  when  consignee  receives  goods  under 
express  direction. — If  a  consignee  receives  goods  under  an 
express  direction  to  apply  the  proceeds  to  the  payment  of 
a  particular  bill  of  exchange,  an  equitable  lien  is  created  in 
favor  of  the  holder  of  the  bill,  if  he  took  it  relying  upon  such 
appropriation,  and  this  will  prevail  against  the  general  lien 
of  the  consignee. 

In  general  it  may  be  said  that  if,  at  the  time  a  consignment 
is  made,  the  consignee  be  notified  that  a  draft  has  been  drawn 
against  it,  and  the  draft  is  discounted  on  the  faith  of  the  con- 
signment and  instructions,  then  the  nature  of  the  trans- 
action is  extended  beyond  the  mere  discounting  of  a  bill  of 
exchange  drawn  against  a  consignment.^*^  The  party  dis- 
counting the  bill  has  an  equitable  lien  upon  the  goods  or 
their  proceeds  to  the  extent  of  his  advances. 

§61.  General  lien  of  consignee  of  goods. — The  general 
lien  of  a  consignee  can  not  be  set  up  against  the  express 
directions  of  the  consignor  given  at  the  time  when  the  con- 
signment is  of¥ered  and  accepted,  whereby  a  lien  is  created 
in  favor  of  the  payee  of  a  draft  drawn  against  the  consign- 
ment.^^ If  a  consignee  thinks  proper  to  accept  a  consign- 
ment with  express  directions  to  apply  it  or  the  proceeds  in  a 
particular  mode,  he  can  not  set  up  his  general  lien  in  oppo- 
sition to  those  directions.  In  such  a  case,  only  what  re- 
mains after  answering  the  particular  directions  becomes  sub- 
ject to  the  general  lien.^^  If  the  consignee  be  notified  that 
a  bill  of  exchange  in  favor  of  a  third  person  is  to  be  paid  out 

80  New  York:  Parker  v.  Baxter,  &  J.  409;  Cayuga  Co.  Nat.  Bank 
19  Hun  (N.  Y.)  410,  affd.  86  N.  Y.  v.  Daniels,  47  N.  Y.  631 ;  Bailey  v. 
586;  Morton  v.  Naylor,  1  Hill  '(N.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  70. 
Y.)  583;  Hoyt  v.  Story,  3  Barb.  82  Frith  v.  Forbes,  4  De  G.,  F. 
(N.  Y.)  262;  Marine  &  Fire  Ins.  &  J.  409,  per  Turner,  J.  See,  how- 
Bank  V.  Jauncey,  1  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  ever,  Robey  v.  Oilier,  L.  R.  7  Ch. 
486;  Lowery  v.  Steward,  25  N.  Y.  695;  Phelps  v.  Comber,  29  Ch.  D. 
239,  82  Am.  Dec.  346.  813;    Brown   v.    Kough,   29   Ch.    D. 

81  Frith   V.    Forbes,  4   De   G.,   F.  848. 


6l  EQUITABLE   LIENS.  §    62 

of  the  proceeds  of  the  consignment,  this  direction,  in  con- 
nection with  the  bill  of  exchange,  amounts  to  an  appropria- 
tion of  the  consignment  to  the  payment  of  the  bill  of  ex- 
change, and  the  holder  of  the  bill  has  a  lien  upon  the  con- 
signment or  the  proceeds  of  it.  The  lien  exists  whether  the 
bill  be  accepted  or  not.  If  it  be  not  accepted,  the  consign- 
ment is  subject  to  the  lien  in  favor  of  the  holder  of  the  bill ; 
if  it  be  accepted,  the  consignee  becomes  personally  liable 
upon  the  acceptance,  and  the  lien  also  attaches  to  the  con- 
signment or  the  proceeds  of  it,  so  long  as  the  proceeds  can 
be  traced. 

But  a  mere  direction  of  "Advice  of  draft"  on  a  bill  does 
not  operate  as  an  appropriation  of  the  consignment ;  and  the 
case  of  Frith  v.  Forbes,  so  far  as  it  goes  to  establish  a  gen- 
eral principle  of  law  to  this  effect,  is  impugned  by  the  later 
English  cases.^^ 

§  62.  Delivery  of  bill  of  lading  sufficient  to  create  equi- 
table lien. — The  delivery  of  a  bill  of  lading  to  one  who  dis- 
counts a  draft  drawn  against  the  shipment  is  a  sufficient  ap- 
propriation of  the  property  to  give  the  holder  of  the  draft  an 
equitable  lien  upon  the  property.  Ordinarily  the  question 
of  an  equitable  lien  does  not  arise  in  such  a  case,  because  the 
delivery  of  the  bill  of  lading  amounts  to  a  pledge  and  de- 
livery of  the  property  itself.  But  an  equitable  lien  might  be 
declared  in  such  a  case.^*  The  fact  that  the  discount  of  the 
draft  is  obtained  on  the  delivery  of  the  bill  of  lading  is  con- 

S3  Phelps     V.     Comber,     29     Ch.  the     bank    which     discounted     the 

D.   813;    Brown   v.    Kough,   29    Ch.  draft  had  filed  a  bill  in  equity  for 

D.  848;    Robey   v.   Oilier,    L.   R.   7  relief,   it  was  clear  that  the  bank 

Ch.    695;    In    re    Entwistle,    3    Ch.  would  have  been  entitled  to  a  de- 

D.  477.  cree  declaring  its  demand  against 

84  Bank   of    Rochester    v.    Jones,  the  consignor  who  drew  the  draft 

4  N.  Y.  497,  55  Am.  Dec.  290.     In  an    equitable    lien    on    the    goods 

this    case,    which    was    a    discount  consigned.      And    see    Cayuga    Co. 

of    a    draft    on    the    security   of   a  Nat.    Bank    v.    Daniels,    47    N.    Y. 

bill    of    lading    delivered    at    the  631. 
time,    Paige,    J.,    declared    that,    if 


g    63  LIENS.  62 

elusive  that  an  assignment  of  the  property,  either  legal  or 
equitable,  was  made  for  the  security  of  the  draft. 

There  is  no  equitable  lien  upon  moneys  advanced  to  the 
drawer  of  a  bill  of  exchange  on  the  security  of  a  bill  of  lading 
of  goods  against  which  the  bill  of  exchange  is  drawn,  upon 
the  failure  of  the  consignee  and  the  sale  of  the  goods  for  a 
sum  insufficient  to  repay  the  advances  upon  them.  When 
the  borrower  receives  the  money  upon  such  a  bill  of  ex- 
change and  bill  of  lading,  the  money  is  his,  and  not  the 
money  of  the  lender;  nor  is  it  clothed  wnth  a  trust,  or  subject 
to  a  lien  in  his  favor.  The  lender  has  parted  with  his  money, 
and  has  in  place  of  it  the  security  he  bargained 'for.^^ 

A  warehouse  receipt,  like  a  bill  of  lading,  gives  the  holder 
a  lien  upon  the  goods  named  in  the  receipt,  provided  it  is 
issued  by  a  public  warehouseman,  and  the  goods  can  be 
identified.^^ 

§  63.  Lien  of  one  making  advances  to  purchase  mer- 
chandise.— Where  in  terms  the  parties  agree  that  one  mak- 
ing advances  for  the  purchase  of  merchandise  to  be  shipped 
to  him  shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  same,  the  lien  arises  upon 
the  purchase  of  the  merchandise  before  it  is  consigned  to 
the  creditor.  The  lien  in  such  case  attaches  to  the  mer- 
chandise purchased  and  in  the  hands  of  the  debtor  at  the 
time  of  his  bankruptcy,  and  may  be  asserted  as  against  the 
debtor's  assignee  in  bankruptcy.  Jndge  Story  said  that  the 
possession  of  the  property  by  the  debtor  was  not  a  badge  of 
fraud,  or  against  the  policy  of  the  law,  or  in  any  manner  to 
be  deemed  inconsistent  with  the  just  rights  of  his  general 
creditors;  and  therefore  the  agreement  to  give  a  lien  or  equi- 
table charge  was  binding  upon  the  property  in  the  hands  of 
the  assignee. ^''^ 

s-^  Grinnel    v.    Suydam,    5    N.    Y.  86  Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Trumbull, 

Super,   Ct.   132;   National    Bank  of  137  111.  146,  27  N.  E.  24. 

Deposit  V.  Sardy,  26  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  8"  Fletcher     v.     Morey,    2    Story 

555,  57  N.  Y.  S.  625,  affd.  44  App.  (U.    S.)    555,    Fed.    Cas.    No.    4864; 

Div.    (N.  Y.)   357,  61   N.   Y.   S.    155.  Cincinnati      Tobacco      Warehouse 


63  EQUITABLE   LIENS.  §    64 

Such  lien  is  a  specific  lien  on  the  merchandise  shipped  to 
the  person  making  the  advances,  and  not  a  general  lien  as 
against  an  equitable  owner  of  a  share  of  the  merchandise, 
though  the  debtor  to  whom  the  advances  were  made  agreed 
that  any  surplus  in  the  merchandise  or  the  proceeds  thereof, 
after  satisfying  the  advances  upon  the  same,  should  stand 
as  security  for  any  other  indebtedness  of  his  to  the  person 
who  made  the  advances,  the  latter  at  the  time  knowing  of 
the  rights  of  the  equitable  owner  of  a  part  of  the  merchan- 
dise. The  agreement  for  a  general  lien,  after  satisfying  the 
specific  lien,  was  a  valid  one  as  between  the  parties  to  it,  but 
it  could  not  afiford  the  rights  of  an  equitable  owner  of  a  part 
of  the  merchandise  who  did  not  consent  to  such  agreement. ^^ 
Where  one  who  has  advanced  money  for  the  development  of 
mining  property  entered  into  a  contract  by  which  he  was 
given  the  right  to  manage  the  property  and  pay  himself  out 
of  the  profits  or  out  of  the  money  received  from  a  sale  of  the 
property,  such  a  contract  gives  him  an  equitable  lien  on  the 
property  which  he  may  foreclose  when  it  has  been  shown 
that  no  profits  may  be  derived  from  the  operation  of  the 
mine.^^ 

§  64.  Executory  agreement  to  purchase  and  consign 
property. — Under  an  executory  agreement  to  purchase  and 
consign  property,  no  lien  arises  until  the  property  is  actually 
acquired  by  the  debtor,  and  perhaps  not  till  it  is  actually  con- 
signed to  the  creditor  in  accordance  with  the  agreement.  A 
merchant  accepted  a  draft  under  an  agreement  that  the 
drawer  would  invest  the  proceeds  in  cotton,   and  ship  the 

Co.  V.  Leslie  117  Ky.  478,  78  S.  W.  rich   Lumber   &   Mfg.   Co.,  29  Ky. 

413,   25    Ky.    L.    1570,   64   L.    R.   A.  L.  466,  93  S.  W.  54. 

219.      In    the    absence    of    a    valid  S8  Drexel  v.  Pease,  133  N.  Y.  129, 

agreement  to  that  effect  the  mere  30   N.   E.  732. 

advancement  by  a  third  person  of  89  Connolly    v.    Bouck,    174    Fed. 

the  money  with  which  property  is  312.  98  C.  C.  A.  184.     See  also,  Du- 

purchased    gives    him    no    lien    on  fur   Oil   Co.   v.   Enos,  59  Ore.  528, 

such   property.      Sanders    v.    Helf-  117  Pac.  457. 


§    65  LIENS.  64 

same  to  the  merchant  for  sale.  The  drawer  obtained  a  dis- 
count of  the  draft  at  his  bank,  and  the  proceeds  were  placed 
to  his  credit.  Two  days  afterward,  the  money  still  stand- 
ing to  his  credit,  he  died.  In  a  contest  between  the  acceptor 
and  the  creditors  of  the  drawer  it  was  held  that  at  law  the 
money  raised  on  the  bill  became  unconditionally  the  property 
of  the  drawer,  and  at  his  death  passed  to  his  administrator, 
and  that  in  equity  the  acceptor  had  no  lien  upon  the  proceeds 
of  the  draft. ''^  If  there  was  any  lien,  it  arose  out  of  the 
agreement  of  the  parties, — the  agreement  that  the  proceeds 
of  the  draft  should  be  used  for  the  purchase  of  cotton  to  be 
consigned  to  the  acceptor.  Until  the  cotton  was  purchased, 
the  thing  did  not  come  into  being  upon  which  the  lien  could 
attach.  Whether  the  agreement  to  consign  created  a  lien 
at  all,  or  merely  a  personal  covenant,  might  be  a  question  of 
doubt.  But  certainly  no  lien  could  attach  to  the  money,  be- 
cause there  was  no  contract  in  regard  to  the  money  under 
which  a  lien  could  arise.  Any  lien  implied  by  the  contract 
was  upon  the  cotton.  While  the  drawer  lived,  a  lien  upon 
the  cotton  was  a  possible  thing;  it  would  arise  upon  the  pur- 
chase and  consignment  of  it  in  accordance  with  the  agree- 
ment. Whether  the  lien  would  arise  upon  the  purchase  be- 
fore the  consignment,  is  a  question  which  did  not  arise  in 
this  case,  though  the  court  incidentally  discussed  the  ques- 
tion, and  expressed  a  doubt  whether  the  lien  would  attach 
upon  the  purchase  of  the  cotton. 

§  65.  Lien  on  crop  to  be  raised. — A  lien  by  express  con- 
tract upon  a  crop  to  be  raised  prevails  against  the  debtor's 
assignee  in  insolvency.  The  creditor  having  the  earliest 
lien  by  contract  has  an  equity  superior  to  that  of  the  general 
creditors. ^^  The  maxim,  qui  prior  est  tempore,  potior 
est  in  jure,  applies. 

»o  Holt   V.    Bank  of   Augusta,    13  9i  Kirksey  v.  Means,  42  Ala.  426. 

Ga.  341. 


65  EQUITABLE  LIENS.  §    6/ 

A  farmer  entered  into  a  contract  with  a  firm  of  traders  by 
which  they  were  to  become  his  agents  for  the  sale  of  his 
crops,  advance  him  money,  and  accept  his  drafts,  for  the  pay- 
ment of  which  he  pledged  his  crops  on  hand,  and  the  grow- 
ing crops  of  the  year.  Upon  the  faith  of  this  agreement  the 
traders  made  large  advances  to  the  farmer,  who  died  at  the 
close  of  the  year  largely  indebted  to  them.  His  executor 
took  possession  of  the  crops,  and  resisted  the  claim  of  lien  on 
the  part  of  the  traders,  upon  the  ground  that  they  were  in 
no  better  condition  as  to  the  crops  than  the  other  creditors 
of  the  deceased.  It  was  held,  however,  that  the  agreement 
constituted  a  lien  which  a  court  of  equity  would  enforce. ^^ 

§  66.     Equitable  lien  arises  under  contract  on  crop  lien. — 

An  equitable  lien  arises  under  a  contract  whereby  a  creditor 
is  to  receive  half  the  proceeds  of  a  certain  crop  upon  which 
the  contract  gives  a  lien.  Thus,  where  a  mortgagor,  in  con- 
sideration of  the  mortgagee's  forbearance  in  foreclosing  the 
mortgage,  agreed  to  cultivate  the  mortgaged  land  in  cotton 
for  one  year,  and  to  give  the  mortgagee  one  half  of  the  cot- 
ton raised,  the  value  of  the  same  to  be  credited  on  the  mort- 
gage notes,  and  gave  a  lien  on  the  whole  crop  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  one  half,  the  debtor  having  died  during  the  year, 
and  his  estate  having  been  declared  insolvent,  it  was  held 
that  the  mortgagee  obtained  an  equitable  lien  on  the  cotton, 
which  he  could  enforce  in  a  court  of  equity,  and  that  his  lien 
was  superior  to  the  equity  of  the  general  creditors. ^^ 

§  67.     Liens  for  advances  to  manufacturers  on  goods. — 

A  firm  of  merchants  entered  into  an  agreement  with  a 
firm  of  silk  manufacturers,  whereby  the  former  agreed 
to  furnish  the  latter  with  raw  materials  for  the  manu- 
facture of  silk  goods,  and  to  advance   funds  for  purchase 

92  Sullivan  v.  Tuck,  1  Md.  Ch.  59;  93  Kirksey  v.  Means,  42  Ala.  426. 

Schermerhorn  v.  Gardenier,  184  N. 
Y.  612,  n  N.   E.   1196. 

6 


§  68  LIENS.  66 

thereof;  and  the  goods  when  manufactured  were  to  be  de- 
livered to  and  sold  by  the  merchants,  and  the  balance  of  the 
proceeds  of  each  sale,  after  deducting  commissions,  insur- 
ance, and  advances,  was  to  be  paid  to  the  manufacturers. 
After  this  arrangement  had  continued  some  years  the  manu- 
facturers failed,  and  made  a  general  assignment  for  the  bene- 
fit of  their  creditors.  The  assignee  took  possession  of  all 
the  stock  and  machinery  of  the  debtors,  and  among  the 
stock  were  many  pieces  of  silk  goods,  finished  and  un- 
finished. The  merchants  who  had  made  the  advances  claimed 
an  equitable  lien  on  these  for  the  balance  due  them  from  the 
manufacturers,  and  brought  suit  to  enforce  the  same.  It 
was  held,  however,  that  the  plaintiffs  were  not  entitled  to 
recover,  for,  assuming  that  a  lien  was  created  by  the  agree- 
ment, there  was  no  sufficient  evidence  to  identify  the  prop- 
erty or  its  proceeds  as  that  which  the  plaintiffs  had  ad- 
vanced.^* 

An  agreement  whereby  a  merchant  was  to  advance  money 
to  a  tanner,  to  enable  him  to  buy  hides  for  his  tannery,  pro- 
vided that  the  advances  should  be  charged  to  the  tanner,  and 
that  the  hides  bought  by  him  with  such  money  should  be 
bought  in  the  merchant's  name  and  should  be  his  as  security 
for  all  sums  due  him.  The  hides  were  in  fact  bought  in  the 
tanner's  own  name.  It  was  held  that,  while  the  merchant 
had  a  lien  on  the  hides,  this  lien  was  not  valid  against  a 
bona  fide  purchaser  from  the  tanner  without  notice  of  the 
merchant's  lien.^^ 

§  68.  No  implied  lien  on  personal  property  on  account  of 
money  advanced. — There  is  no  implied  lien  upon  personal 
property  in  favor  of  one  who  has  advanced  money  for  it, 
without   having    either   the    title    or   possession.^®     Thus,    a 

94  Person      v.      Oberteuffer,      59  96  Allen   v.   Shortridge,     1     Duv. 
How.   Pr.    (N.   Y.)   339.  (Ky.)    34;    Macmanus    v.    Thurber, 

95  Marsh  v.  Titus,  3  Hun  (N.  Y.)  50  Hun  (N.  Y.)  604,  20  N.  Y.  St.  92, 
550,  6  Thomp.   &  C.   (N.  Y.)  29.  3  N.  Y.  S.  33.     An  advancement  of 


6/  EQUITABLE   LIENS.  §    68 

merchant  received  from  another  merchant  a  sum  of  money, 
for  which  he  gave  a  receipt  stating  that  he  received  it  as  an 
advance  on  a  shipment  of  flour  then  making  on  board  a  cer- 
tain ship,  to  be  consigned  to  the  house  of  the  merchant  mak- 
ing the  advances.  The  flour  was  afterwards  purchased  by 
the  merchant  who  received  the  advances,  and  was  delivered 
by  the  seller  on  board  a  ship  freighted  by  this  merchant. 
The  latter,  having  stopped  payment  about  the  same  time, 
agreed  with  the  seller  of  the  flour,  who  was  ignorant  of  the 
agreement  with  the  merchant  who  made  the  advances,  to 
rescind  the  sale,  and  gave  him  back  the  bill  of  parcels.  It 
was  held  that  the  merchant  who  made  the  advances  had  no 
lien  on  the  flour  that  could  prevent  the  merchant  who  re- 
ceived the  advances  from  rescinding  the  contract  with  the 
seller  of  the  flour,  and  redelivering  to  him  the  flour.  To 
constitute  a  lien  upon  a  corporeal  chattel  at  common  law, 
possession  is  essential;  and  while  in  equity  a  fund  may  be 
appropriated  by  an  assignment  without  delivery  of  the  fund 
itself,  yet  this  is  only  where,  from  the  nature  of  the  fund,  a 
transfer  of  possession  is  impossible.  There  can  be  no  ap- 
propriation of  a  chattel  susceptible  of  delivery  which  will 
prevail  against  third  persons,  without  a  delivery  good  at 
common  law.^^  Chief  Justice  Tilghman  upon  this  point 
said :  "Any  order,  writing,  or  act  which  makes  an  appropria- 
tion of  a  fund,  amounts  to  an  equitable  assignment  of  that 
fund.  The  reason  is  plain,  the  fund  being  neither  assignable 
at  law  nor  capable  of  manual  possession,  an  appropriation  of 
it  is  all  that  the  case  admits.  A  court  of  equity  will  there- 
for protect  such  appropriation,  and  consider  it  as  equal  to  an 
assignment.     But  very  different  is  the   case  of  a  parcel  of 

money   to    the    owner    of    a    horse  debt  was  not  paid  in  a  reasonable 

with  an  agreement  that  the  horse  time,  will  create  an  equitable  lien 

should  be  delivered  to  the  lender  on  the  horse.     Reardon  v.  Higgins, 

and  be  delivered  to  him  as  securi-  39  Ind.  App.  363,  19  N.  E.  208. 

ty    and    empowering    him    to    sell  ^7  Clemson   v.    Davidson,    5    Bin. 

the  horse  and   pay  himself   if  the  (Pa.)  392. 


§  6g  LIENS.  68 

flour,  which  admits  of  actual  delivery.  Every  man  who  pur- 
chases an  interest  in  property  of  this  kind,  ought  to  take  im- 
mediate possession;  if  he  does  not,  he  is  guilty  of  negligence, 
and  can  have  no  equity  against  a  third  person,  who  contracts 
with  the  actual  possessor  without  notice  of  a  prior  right. "^^ 

§  69.  Contract  between  planter  and  factor. — A  contract 
whereby  a  planter  agrees  to  ship  his  crop  of  cotton  to  his 
factor,  to  reimburse  him  for  advances  and  supplies,  does  not 
create  a  lien  upon  the  cotton  raised.^^ 

A  merchant,  in  the  spring  of  the  year,  made  advances  to  a 
planter  on  his  verbal  promise  to  give  a  lien  on  his  crops  for 
the  year  to  secure  the  advances.  In  June,  the  planter  died 
suddenly  without  having  given  the  lien,  and  his  estate  was 
insolvent.  On  a  bill  in  equity  by  the  merchant  to  marshal 
the  assets  of  the  estate,  it  was  held  that  he  had  no  equitable 
ground  for  relief.  To  entitle  one  to  the  benefit  of  an  agri- 
cultural lien  under  the  statute,  he  must  comply  strictly  with 
the  conditions  of  the  statute.  When  one  comes  into  a  court 
of  equity  to  compel  specific  performance  of  a  contract,  he 
must  first  show  that  all  has  been  done  that  could  be  done 
to  comply  with  the  law.  If  he  has  been  negligent  in  the 
matter,  the  court  will  not  lend  its  aid  to  complete  the  con- 
tract, for  this  would  be  to  encourage  negligence  in  parties 
making  contracts.^ 

In  like  manner  an  agreement  between  an  owner  and  a 
builder,  that  a  balance  of  account  due  the  builder  should  be 
paid  out  of  the  income  of  the  building,  does  not  create  a  lien 
upon  such  income  which  can  be  enforced  in  equity.^ 

§  70.  Equitable  lien  will  not  arise  from  advancement  to 
improve  property. — An  equitable  lien  does  not  arise  in  favor 

98  Clemson   v.    Davidson,   5    Bin.  i  Cureton   v.    Gilmore,  3   S.    Car. 
(Pa.)  392,  398.  46. 

99  Allen  V.  Montgomery,  48  Miss.  2  Alexander    v.    Berry,    54    Miss. 
101.  422. 


69  EQUITABLE  LIENS.  §    70 

of  one  who  has  made  advances  to  another  to  enable  him  to 
make  improvements  upon  his  property,  though  there  was  an 
understanding  at  the  time  that  a  lien  should  be  given  upon 
the  property  improved.  Thus,  where  one  loaned  money  to 
a  mill-owner  to  be  used  in  rebuilding  a  certain  mill  which 
had  been  destroyed,  and  it  was  understood  that  the  lender 
was  to  have  a  lien  on  the  mill  to  secure  him,  but  no  writing 
was  made  except  a  note  for  the  money,  upon  the  death  of 
the  borrower  and  the  insolvency  of  his  estate,  it  was  held 
that  equity  would  not  sustain  a  lien  on  the  mill  in  favor  of 
the  lender,  to  the  prejudice  of  other  creditors  of  the  bor- 
rower.^ 

Had  there  been  a  written  agreement  that  a  mortgage 
should  be  given,  equity  might  have  declared  such  agreement 
to  be  an  equitable  mortgage;  or  had  there  been  an  express 
oral  agreement  that  a  mortgage  should  be  given,  and  it 
could  be  shown  that  the  failure  to  execute  the  mortgage  was 
by  reason  of  some  fraud  or  accident,  there  might  be  good 
ground  for  relief  in  equity.  But  mere  neglect  to  execute  the 
mortgage,  or  neglect  to  execute  a  written  agreement  for  a 
mortgage,  is  not  such  an  accident  as  equity  will  relieve 
against.  "It  does  not  come  to  the  aid  of  the  sleeper,  but  of 
him  who,  though  awake,  has  been  entrapped  by  fraud  or 
been  prevented  from  getting  his  agreement  put  into  writing 
by  inevitable  accident."^ 

Money  advanced  by  one  person  to  enable  another  to  make 
improvements  upon  his  property,  as  for  instance  to  erect 
upon  his  own  land  a  steam  mill  with  machinery,  creates  no 
lien  upon  the  mill  and  machinery.  The  advances  constitute 
merely  a  debt  from  the  party  to  whom  the  money  is  ad- 

3  Printup  V.  Barrett,  46  Ga.  407.  as  against  the  land  owner's  cred- 

Where  one  advanced  money  to  a  itors    where    the    owner    dies    and 

land  owner  to  put   improvements  does  not  make  such  devise.  Beach 

on  the  land  under  a  contract  that  v.  Bullock,  19  R.  I.  121,  32  Atl.  165. 
the  owner  would  devise  the  land  4  Printup  v.   Barrett,  46  Ga.  407, 

to   him,   has   no   lien   on    the    land  per   McCay,  J. 


§    /I  LIENS.  70 

vanced.'^  Where  advances  are  made  to  a  husband  to  make 
improvements  on  his  wife's  land  the  lender  can  not  enforce 
an  equitable  lien  against  the  land.'^* 

§  71.  Lien  not  created  by  voluntary  pa5mient. — A  lien 
upon  the  property  of  another  is  not  created  by  a  voluntary 
payment  of  a  liability  of  his  w^ithout  request.^  But  a  request 
might  be  inferred  from  circumstances.^  Under  special  cir- 
cumstances, a  joint  ow^ner  of  property  may  have  a  lien  upon 
the  interest  of  the  other  part  owners  for  advances  made  for 
repairing  and  preserving  the  property,  especially  if  such  re- 
pairs were  necessary,  and  their  consent  to  make  them  was 
unreasonably  withheld.  But  in  such  case  the  party  asserting 
the  lien  must  show  the  special  circumstances  which  will  give 
him  such  lien.^  Constructive  liens  will  not  now  be  extended 
and  applied  to  cases  where  by  the  rules  of  law  they  are  not 
already  clearly  established :  for  such  liens  are  not  now  en- 
couraged.^ 

§  72.  Voluntary  payment  of  insurance  premiums  creates 
no  lien. — One  who  voluntarily  pays  premiums  of  insurance 
for  another,  in  the  absence  of  any  agreement  or  understand- 
ing that  for  such  payments  he  should  have  a  lien  upon  the 
policy  or  its  proceeds,  has  no  lien  upon  the  proceeds  collected 
by  him  as  the  agent  of  the  insured. ^^ 

^  Weathersby      v.      Sleeper,      42  taxes      with      interest      on      such 

Miss.  732.     To  like  effect  see  Gar-  amount  decreed  as  a  prior  lien  on 

land    V.    Hull,    13    Smedes    &    M.  such   land,   superior  to   such  prior 

(Miss.)  76,  51  Am.  Dec.   140.  incumbrance.  Packwood  v.  Briggs, 

•-■^Poe    V.    Ekert.    102    Iowa    361,  25   Wash.   530,   65    Pac.   846. 

71  N.  W.  579.  7  Oatfield    v.    Waring,    14    Johns. 

6  Taylor    v.    Baldwin,    10    Barb.  (N.  Y.)  188. 

(N.    Y.)    626.      But    where    one    in  8  Taylor    v.     Baldwin,    10    Barb, 

good  faith  pays  taxes  on  the  land  (N.    Y.)    626.      And    see    Doane    v. 

of  another,  believing  that  he  has  a  Badger,  12  Mass.  65. 

lien  on  the  land,  but  which  is  af-  9  Taylor    v.    Baldwin,    10    Barb, 

terward  declared  to  be  subject  to  (N.  Y.)  626,  per  Allen,  J. 

a  prior  lien,  he  is  entitled  to  have  10  Meier  v.    Meier,   15   Mo.   App. 

the    amount    so    paid    by    him    as  68,  affd.  88  Mo.  566. 


71  EQUITABLE  LIENS.  §    73 

One  who  procures  insurance  for  another  in  pursuance  of  a 
request  to  do  so  and  to  forward  the  policy,  and  not  as  a 
broker  or  general  agent,  has  no  lien  on  the  policy.  By  under- 
taking to  execute  the  order,  he  binds  himself  to  comply  with 
the  terms  and  forward  the  policy,  and  this  precludes  the 
supposition  that  he  was  to  have  any  lien  upon  it  or  interest 
in  it.  And  though  such  person  be  the  ship's  husband  for  the 
general  management  of  a  vessel  which  is  the  subject  of  the 
insurance,  yet  he  has  no  lien  on  the  policy  for  the  balance  of 
his  account. ^^ 

§  73.  No  equitable  subrogation  to  one  paying  a  debt  of 
another. — There  is  no  equitable  subrogation  in  favor  of  one 
who  pays  a  debt  for  which  he  is  not  personally  bound,  and 
which  is  not  a  charge  upon  his  property,  so  as  to  entitle  him 
to  be  subrogated  to  a  lien  which  the  creditor  had  upon  the 
estate  of  the  debtor.  ^^ 

A  stranger,  by  voluntarily  paying  the  wages  of  workmen 
who  are  entitled  to  a  lien,  obtains  no  right  in  equity  to  a  sub- 
rogation to  their  lien,  in  the  absence  of  any  assignment,  or  of 
an  agreement  that  he  should  have  the  benefit  of  their  lien. 
The  superintendent  of  the  work  of  constructing  a  railroad, 
without  an)^  obligation  on  his  part,  voluntarily,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  befriending  the  workmen,  advanced  his  own  money 
to  pay  them  their  wages,  supposing  the  railroad  company  to 
be  solvent.  He  had  no  assignment,  legal  or  equitable,  of 
the  wages  paid,  and  there  was  no  understanding  that  he  was 
to  have  the  benefit  of  their  lien.  It  was  held  that  he  was  not 
entitled,   by   subrogation,   to   the   workmen's   statutory   lien 

11  Reed    v.     Pacific    Ins.     Co.,     1  policy,  equity  will  give  a  lien  on 

Mete.      (Mass.)    166.      Where     the  the  proceeds  of  the  policy  to  the 

owner  of  an  insurance  policy  uses  bank.     Thum  v.  Wolstenholme,  21 

funds  of  a  bank  to  pay  premiums  Utah  446,  61   Pac.  537. 

on  his  policy  and  he   is  the  man-  12  Jones   on    Mortgages,    §    874a; 

ager   of   the    bank,   and    the    funds  Wilkes  v.  Harper,  1   N.  Y.  586. 
used  by  him  can  be  traced  into  the 


§    74  LIENS.  'J 2 

for  such  wages. ^^  "The  statutory  lien  given  to  workmen  is 
to  be  confined  within  its  legitimate  limits.  It  is  not  to  be 
extended  by  a  forced  application  of  the  principle  of  subroga- 
tion in  equity  to  cases  not  within  the  mischief  which  the  law 
was  designed  to  remedy.  The  object  of  the  legislature  was 
to  secure  to  a  very  meritorious  but  helpless  class  of  persons 
the  payment  of  the  wages  of  their  toil,  and  to  that  end  to 
give  them  personally  a  paramount  lien  on  the  assets  of  the 
employer.  It  did  not  contemplate  giving  to  creditors  from 
whom  the  company  might  borrov^  money  on  its  own  credit 
with  which  to  pay  its  workmen,  such  a  lien  on  the  assets  for 
their  reimbursement."^* 

§  74,  One  paying  debt  of  railroad  company  entitled  to 
subrogation. — But  one  who  pays  a  debt  of  a  railroad  com- 
pany for  rolling-stock  under  a  contract  with  the  com- 
pany for  security  by  subrogation  to  the  rights  of  the 
vendor,  under  his  contract  with  the  company,  is  entitled  to 
such  subrogation  to  the  vendor's  lien,  and  can  not  be  con- 
sidered a  mere  volunteer  in  making  the  payment. ^^ 

§  74a.  Equitable  lien  on  legacy. — There  is  an  equitable  lien 
upon  a  legacy  in  favor  of  the  testator's  estate  for  the  amount 

13  In  re   North   River   Construe-  pany's    bookkeeper    by    the    bank 

tion  Co.,  38  N.  J.  Eq.  433,  affd.  40  who  is  to  pay  the  money  collected 

N.  J.  Eq.  340.     "It  has  never  been  on  them  to  the  bank,  the  bank  ac- 

held    that    one    vi^ho    lends    or    ad-  quired  a  lien  on  the  accounts.  At- 

vances  money  to  a  corporation  to  lantic    Trust    Co.    v.     Carbondale 

enable  it  to  pay  laborers,  w^ho,  if  Coal   Co.,  99   Iowa  234,   68   N.   W. 

their  wages  had  remained  unpaid.  697. 

would   have   been    entitled   to    the  14  in  re    North   River   Construc- 

lien  therefor,  is,  merely  by  virtue  tion  Co.,  38  N.  J.  Eq.  433,  afifd.  40 

of  such  loan  or  advance,   entitled  N.  J.   Eq.  340,  per  Runyon,   Chan- 

to  that  lien  by  equitable  subroga-  cellor. 

tion."     But  where  a  bank  advances  15  Coe    v.    New   Jersey    Midland 

money   for   a   pay   roll    to   a   coal  R.   Co.,  27  N.  J.   Eq.  110,  revd.  27 

company  under  an  agreement  that  N.  J.   Eq.  658.     And  see   Payne  v. 

the    com.pany's    accounts    shall    be  Hathaway,  3  Vt.  212;  New  Jersey 

assigned    to   it   and   such  accounts  Midland  R.  Co.  v.  Wortendyke,  27 

are  loft  in  the  hands  of  the  com-  N.   J.    Eq.  658. 


yi)  EQUITABLE  LIENS.  §    76 

of  a  debt  due  from  the  legatee  to  the  testator.  Such  a  lien 
may  be  spoken  of  as  an  equitable  right  of  set-ofif.  "The  right 
to  retain  is  grounded  upon  the  principle  that  it  would  be  in- 
equitable that  a  legatee  should  be  entitled  to  his  legacy 
while  he  retains  in  his  possession  a  part  of  the  funds  out  of 
which  his  and  other  legacies  are  to  be  paid.  He  should  not 
receive  anything  out  of  such  a  fund  without  deducting  there- 
from the  amount  of  that  fund  which  he  has  in  his  hands  as  a 
debt  to  the  estate.  An  assignee  of  the  legatee  takes  his 
legacy  subject  to  the  same  equity  which  exists  against  it  in 
his  hands."  Such  lien  is  prior  to  that  of  a  judgment  creditor 
of  the  legatee.^® 

§  75.  Mere  loan  of  money. — A  mere  loan  of  money  to  be 
used  in  the  purchase  of  land  does  not  create  a  lien  upon  the 
land  for  its  repayment. ^^ 

§  76.    Surety  has  no  lien  on  estate  of  his  principal. — A 

surety  as  such  has  no  lien  on  the  estate  of  his  principal.  The 
fact  that  this  money  has  gone  to  increase  his  principal's  estate 
raises,  perhaps,  a  natural  equity  that  it  should  be  returned  to 
the  surety  out  of  the  estate.  But  this  natural  equity  yields 
to  legal  rights.  Thus,  if  one  accepts  drafts  for  the  accom- 
modation of  another  under  an  agreement  that  the  drawer 
shall  use  the  proceeds  of  the  drafts  in  the  purchase  of  mer- 
chandise to  be  consigned  to  the  acceptor,  and  the  drawer 
dies  before  using  the  proceeds  in  the  purchase  of  such  mer- 
chandise, the  acceptor  can  not  maintain  a  lien  upon  the 
money  raised  upon  the  drafts,  although  this  still  stands  to  the 
credit  of  the  drawer  at  his  banker's.  The  fact  that  the  money 
was  raised  on  the  credit  of  the  acceptor,  and  that  he  accepted 
for  accommodation,  gives  him  no  lien  on  the  money.  The 
money  is  the  property  of  the  drawer,  and  passes  upon  his 
death   to   his    executor    or    administrator    without    charge. 

16  Irvine    v.     Palmer,    91    Tenn.  i7  Collinson    v.    Owens,    6    Gill 

463,   19  S.  W.  326,  30  Am.   St.  893.      &  J.    (Md.)   4. 


§  77 


LIENS. 


74 


Money  collected  on  notes  received  by  a  bank  for  collection  is 
impressed  with  a  trust  in  favor  of  the  owner  of  the  notes  in 
the  event  the  bank  fails. ^^ 


§  77.  Lien  by  agreement  to  give  a  mortgage. — An  agree- 
ment, on  a  sufficient  consideration,  to  give  a  mortgage  on 
specific  property,  creates  an  equitable  lien  upon  such  prop- 
erty, which  takes  precedence  of  the  claims  of  the  promisor's 
general  creditors,  and  of  the  claims  of  subsequent  purchasers 
and  incumbrances  with  notice  of  the  lien.^^ 

If  the  written  agreement  shows  a  clear  intention  to  make 
some  particular  property  a  security  for  a  debt  or  obligation, 
equity  will  treat  the  instrument  as  an  executory  agreement 
to  give   security.-''     The   agreement   creates   a   specific  lien 


18  Holt  V.  Bank  of  August,  13 
Ga.  341,  per  Nisbet,  J. ;  Sherwood 
V.  Central  Michigan  Savings  Bank. 
103  Mich.  109,  61  N.  W.  352. 

19  Jones  on  Mortgages,  §§  163- 
167.  New  York:  Husted  v.  In- 
graham,  75  N.  Y.  251 ;  Payne  v. 
Wilson,  74  N.  Y.  348;  Chase  v. 
Peck,  21  N.  Y.  581;  In  re  Howe, 
1  Paige  (N.  Y.)  124,  19  Am.  Dec. 
395;  Wood  v.  Lester,  29  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  145;  Seymour  v.  Canandaigua 
&  Niagara  Falls  R.  Co.,  25  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  284,  14  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y. ) 
531;  Smith  v.  Smith,  51  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  164,  4  N.  Y.  S.  669,  20  N.  Y. 
St.  597,  affd.  125  N.  Y.  224.  26  N. 
E.  259;  Sprague  v.  Cochran,  144 
N.  Y.  104,  38  N.  E.  1000. 
South  Carolina:  Dow  v.  Ker, 
Speers'  Ch.  (S.  Car.)  413;  Mas- 
sey  V.  Mcllwain,  2  Hill's  Eq.  (S. 
Car.)  421,  428.  In  Price  v.  Cutts. 
29  Ga.  142,  74  Am.  Dec.  52,  how- 
ever, it  is  said  that  an  agreement 
to  execute  a  mortgage  in  prae- 
senti,    the    actual    execution    of    it 


failing  through  inadvertence  or 
other  cause,  does  not  constitute 
such  a  lien  as  will  prevail  against 
subsequent  judgment  creditors. 
When  the  maker  of  a  note  con- 
tracts in  writing  that  if  the  note 
is  not  paid  he  will  execute  a  deed 
of  trust  as  security  covering  all 
his  real  estate,  the  payee  is  en- 
titled to  assert  an  equitable  lien 
on  such  real  estate  upon  the  note 
not  being  paid  when  due.  Woarms 
V.  Hammond,  5  App.  D.  C.  338.  See 
also.  Rooker  v.  Hoofstetter,  26 
Can.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  41. 

■-i^  Pom.  Eq.  Jur.  1235;  Seymour 
V.  Canandaigua  &  Niagara  Falls 
R.  Co.,  25  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  284;  Kelly 
v.  Kelly,  54  Mich.  30,  19  N.  W.  580; 
Nelson  v.  Kelly,  91  Ala.  569,  8  So. 
690.  No  equitable  lien,  attempted 
to  be  created  by  a  verbal  promise 
to  mortgage  tobacco  not  yet  plant- 
ed can  be  enforced  where  the  to- 
bacco is  exempt  from  execution. 
Stahl  V.  Lowe,  18  Ky.  L.  946,  19 
Ky.  L.  210.  38  S.  W.  862. 


75  EQUITABLE   LIENS.  §    78 

upon  the  property,  which  takes  precedence  of  the  claims  of 
subsequent  creditors  and  purchasers  with  notice.^^ 

Where  the  agreement  was  that  a  mortgage  should  be 
given  upon  one  building  and  lot  out  of  several  buildings  and 
lots,  which  were  together  sufficiently  identified,  and  after- 
wards a  mechanic's  lien  was  filed  against  all  the  houses  and 
lots,  the  fact  that  the  original  agreement  did  not  point  out 
the  particular  premises  to  be  mortgaged  was  held  not  to  im- 
pair its  effect  as  an  equitable  lien,  at  least  as  against  the 
claimant  of  a  mechanic's  lien,  who  could  not  be  afifected  by 
the  application  of  the  lien  to  any  one  of  the  houses  and  lots, 
his  lien  being  upon  all.^^ 

§  78.  Agreement  to  give  other  security. — An  agreement 
to  give  any  other  security  rests  upon  the  same  principle.  If 
one  borrows  a  promissory  note  from  a  friend  to  obtain  a  dis- 
count at  a  bank,  and  promises  by  letter  to  give  his  friend  a 
bill  of  sale  of  a  schooner  as  security,  and  the  borrower  dies 
without  giving  the  bill  of  sale,  and  the  lender  of  the  note  is 
obliged  to  take  it  up,  he  has  an  equitable  lien  on  the  schooner 
in  preference  to  the  general  creditors  of  the  deceased.  The 
bill  of  sale  must  be  considered  as  made  at  the  time  of  the 
giving  of  the  note.^^ 

In  like  manner,  if  a  person  covenant  that  he  will,  on  or  be- 
fore a  certain  day,  secure  an  annuity  by  a  charge  upon  free- 
hold estates,  or  by  investment  in  the  funds,  or  by  the  best 
means  in  his  power,  such  covenant  will  create  a  lien  upon  any 

2iLanning      v.      Tompkins,      45  22  Payne  v.  Wilson  74  N.  Y.  348. 

Barb.     (N.     Y.)     308;     See     also.  23  Read    v.    Gaillard,    2     Desaus 

Falmouth  Nat.  Bank  v.  Cape  Cod  (S.  Car.)  552,  2  Am.  Dec.  696.    See 

Ship   Canal   Co.,   166  Mass.   550,  44  similar  case  in  regard  to  undeliv- 

N.     E.    617;     Smith    v.     Equitable  ered    deed    to    land    to    pay    debt 

Trust  Co.,  215  Pa.  418,  64  Atl.  594;  where   grantor   died.       Sutton     v. 

Galbraith   v.    First    State    Bank   &  Gibson.  119  Ky.  422,  27  Ky.  L.  HI, 

Trust    Co.,    (Tex.    Civ.    App.)    133  84  S.   W.   335. 
S.  W.  300;  Schermerhorn  v.  Gard- 
enier,  184  N.  Y.  612,  11  N.  E.  1196. 


§    79  LIENS.  76 

property  to  which  he  becomes  entitled  between  the  date  of 
the  covenant  and  the  day  so  limited  for  its  performance.^^ 
The  deposit  of  title  deed  does  not  give  a  lien  on  them.^^ 

§  79.  Debtor's  agreement  to  insure  for  benefit  of  his  cred- 
tor. — In  this  way  a  debtor's  agreement  to  insure  for  the  ben- 
efit of  a  creditor  may  give  the  latter  an  equitable  lien  upon 
an  insurance  obtained  in  the  debtor's  name,  to  the  extent  of 
the  creditor's  interest.^^  Thus,  where  a  mortgagor  cove- 
nants to  keep  the  premises  insured  for  the  benefit  of  the 
mortgagee,  and  obtains  a  policy  of  insurance  in  his  own 
name,  upon  the  happening  of  a  loss  the  mortgagee  has  an 
equitable  lien  upon  the  fund  payable  under  the  policy.^^ 

But  the  mere  fact  that  one  is  a  mortgagee  of  premises 
which  the  mortgagor  has  insured  in  his  own  name  gives  him 
no  lien  upon  the  money  payable  upon  the  policy.  The  con- 
tract of  insurance  is  a  personal  contract  of  indemnity  be- 
tween the  insured  and  the  underwriter.  The  mortgagor  has 
an  insurable  interest,  and  he  may  insure  for  his  own  benefit; 
and  the  mere  fact  that  he  is  personally  liable  to  pay  a  debt 
which  is  a  lien  upon  the  property  insured  does  not  afifect  his 
right  to  claim  the  full  benefit  of  the  insurance.  A  mortga- 
gee's equitable  right  to  claim  the  benefit  of  such  insurance 
arises  only  where  he  has  a  contract  with  the  mortgagor  for 
insurance  as  a  further  security.  The  mortgagee's  equitable 
lien  in  such  case  rests  wholly  upon  contract.^^ 

Where  a  life  insurance  policy  is  taken  out  by  a  creditor  on 
the  life  of  his  debtor,  but  by  mistake  the  policy  is  made  paya- 

24Wellesley     v.     Wellesley,     4  27  Thomas'      Admrs.      v.       Von 

Mylne    &    Cr.    561;    Roundell    v.  Kapff's   Exrs.,  6  Gill.   &  J.    (Md.) 

Breary,     2    Vern.     482;     Lyde     v.  372;    Carter    v.    Rockett,   8    Paige 

Mynn,  4  Sim.  505,   1   Mylne   &  K.  (N.  Y.)  437,  per  Walworth,  Ch. 

683.  28  Neale  v.  Reid,  3  Dow.  &  Ry. 

25  Atlantic  Trust  &  Banking  Co.  158;  Carter  v.  Rockett,  8  Paige  (N. 
V.  Nelms,  115  Ga.  53,  41'  S.  E.  247.  Y.)    437;    Jones    on    Mortgages,    § 

26  Vernon  v.  Smith,  5  B.  &  Aid.  1.  401. 


y'j  EQUITABLE  LIENS.  §    8l 

able  to  the  estate  of  the  insured,  the  creditor,  in  case  of  the 
death  of  the  insured,  has  no  lien  on  the  policy.^" 

§  80.    Agreement  to  build  and  convey  a  mill  as  security. — 

A  written  contract  was  made  by  the  owners  of  timber  land 
for  the  sale  of  the  standing  timber  at  an  agreed  price,  the 
purchaser  agreeing  to  build  a  sawmill  worth  nine  thousand 
dollars  upon  a  forty-acre  tract,  the  title  to  which  the  vendors 
were  to  convey  to  him.  It  was  also  agreed  that  the  pur- 
chaser might  mortgage  the  mill  site  and  mill  to  a  third  per- 
son for  the  sum  of  sixty-five  hundred  dollars,  and  should  give 
a  second  mortgage  to  the  vendors  to  secure  the  performance 
of  the  contract.  The  purchaser,  by  means  of  the  contract, 
borrowed  about  ten  thousand  dollars,  and,  after  the  mill  was 
built,  conveyed  the  mill  and  mill  site  to  the  lender  by  way  of 
mortgage  to  secure  the  advances,  before  the  vendors  had 
conveyed  the  title  of  the  mill  lot  to  the  vendee.  It  was  held 
that  under  the  circumstances  the  mortgagee  was  equitably 
entitled  to  a  lien  upon  the  mill  lot,  but  that  the  amount  of 
such  lien  could  not  exceed  the  sum  mentioned  in  the  con- 
tract.3° 

§  81.  For  debt  omitted  from  mortgage  by  mistake. — An 
equitable  lien  can  not  be  claimed  for  a  debt  omitted  by  a 
debtor  in  securing  his  creditor  by  a  chattel  mortgage  for  the 
supposed  amount  of  his  indebtedness.  Thus,  where  personal 
property  was  exchanged  for  land  of  less  value,  and  the  dif- 
ference in  value  was  secured  by  a  chattel  mortgage  upon  the 
personalty  exchanged,  and  it  was  afterwards  discovered  that 
the  land  was  subject  to  taxes  for  a  considerable  amount 
which  the  mortgagor  should  have  included  in  the  amount 
of  his  mortgage,  it  was  held  that  the  mortgagee  was  not  en- 
titled to  an  equitable  lien  upon  the  goods  for  the  amount  of 

29  Johnson  v.  Coney,  120  Ga.  767,  so  Hubbard    v.    Bellew,    10    Fed. 

48  S.   E.  nz.  849. 


§    82  LIENS.  78 

such  taxes.  Certainly  such  a  Hen  will  not  be  established  as 
against  other  creditors  of  the  mortgagor  after  his  insol- 
vency.^^ The  mortgagee  might  have  ascertained  at  the  time 
of  the  transacton  whether  the  taxes  had  been  paid,  had  he 
exercised  ordinary  care  and  diligence.  The  mortgagee  hav- 
ing chosen  to  take,  without  examination,  the  statement  of 
the  mortgagor  and  his  covenant  in  his  deed  of  the  land,  a 
court  of  equity  will  not  give  him  relief.  Whether,  in  case  the 
mortgage  note  had  by  fraud  or  mistake  been  made  for  an 
amount  less  than  a  certain  liquidated  sum  which  by  agree- 
ment the  mortgage  was  to  secure,  the  mortgagee  would  have 
an  equitable  lien  upon  the  proceeds  of  the  goods  in  the  hands 
of  an  assignee  for  the  benefit  of  creditors,  is  a  question  which 
the  court  did  not  consider. 

§  82.  Agreement  of  purchaser  of  land  to  pay  debt  which 
is  lien  on  the  land. — A  covenant  or  agreement  of  a  purchaser 
of  land  to  pay  a  debt  which  is  supposed  to  be  a  lien  on  the 
land  binds  the  land  with  a  trust  for  the  payment  of  such  lien. 
Thus,  a  debtor  confessed  judgment  to  his  creditor,  but  by 
mistake  the  judgment  was  not  docketed  in  the  county  where 
the  debtor's  land  was  situated.  The  debtor  afterwards  sold 
the  land  to  one  who  agreed  to  pay  the  supposed  judgment 
lien  as  a  part  of  the  consideration.  Afterward,  on  learning 
that  the  judgment  had  not  been  docketed  so  as  to  make  it  a 
lien  on  the  land,  the  purchaser  refused  to  pay  it.  On  a  bill 
filed  by  the  creditor  against  the  purchaser,  it  was  held  that 
the  latter  took  the  land  charged  with  an  equitable  lien  or 
trust  for  the  payment  of  the  judgment;  and  the  fact  that  the 
amount  of  the  judgment  was  greater  than  the  parties  sup- 
posed was  held  to  constitute  no  defense.^^ 

An  agreement,  not  under  seal,  given  by  a  grantor  of  land 
at  the  time  of  the  conveyance,  stipulating  that  he  would  sup- 

-^  Chamberlin    v.    Peltz,    1     Mo.  ''2  Haverly    v.    Becker,    4    N.    Y. 

App.  183.  169. 


79  EQUITABLE  LIENS.  §    84 

port  and  maintain  the  grantor,  and  pledging  for  that  purpose 
the  product  of  the  land,  and,  should  that  prove  insufficient, 
appropriating  the  entire  fee,  is  an  equitable  lien  upon  the 
land  in  the  nature  of  a  mortgage.^^ 

§  83.  Verbal  contract  to  pay  the  debt  of  another. — A 
verbal  contract  by  one  person  to  pay  the  debts  of  another, 
who  should  thereupon  convey  to  the  former  certain  lands,  is 
void  under  the  statute  of  frauds,  and  can  support  no  rights, 
either  legal  or  equitable. ^^  If  a  party  pays  money  under  such 
a  void  contract,  he  may,  perhaps,  recover  it  back  in  assump- 
sit; but  a  court  of  equity  will  not  create  a  lien  upon  real  es- 
tate in  favor  of  the  party  paying,  unless,  from  the  nature  of 
the  transaction,  rights  have  sprung  up  which  ought  to  be 
held  binding  upon  the  specific  property.^^  That  the  parties 
to  such  contract  are  father  and  son  does  not  afiford  any  equit- 
able ground  for  declaring  a  lien. 

§  84.    Creditor's  lien  on  capital  stock  of  corporation. — The 

creditors  of  a  corporation  have  an  equitable  lien  upon  the 
capital  stock  for  the  payment  of  its  debts. ^^  When  debts  are 
incurred  a  contract  arises  with  the  creditors  that  the  capital 
stock  shall  not  be  withdrawn  or  applied,  otherwise  than  upon 
their  demands,  until  these  are  satisfied.  'Tf  diverted,  they 
may  follow  it  as  far  as  it  can  be  traced,  and  subject  it  to  the 
payment  of  their  claims,  except  as  against  holders  who  have 
taken  it  bona  fide  for  a  valuable  consideration  and  without 
notice.  It  is  publicly  pledged  to  those  who  deal  with  the 
corporation,  for  their  security."^'^     Therefore  a  corporation 

33  Chase   V.    Peck.   21    N.    Y.   581.  Bartlett    v.    Drew,    57    N.    Y.    587; 

34  Kelly  V.  Kelly,  54  Mich.  30,  Hastings  v.  Drew,  76  N.  Y.  9; 
19  N.  W.  580.  Clapp  v.  Peterson,  104  111.  26;  He- 

35  Per  Champlin,  J.,  in  Kelly  v.  man  v.  Britton,  88  Mo.  549;  Gill 
Kelly,  54  Mich.  30,  19  N.  W.  580.  v.  Balis,  72  Mo.  424. 

36  Sanger  v.  Upton,  91   U.   S.  56,  37  Sanger  v.  Upton,  91   U.  S.  56, 
23  L.  ed.  220;  Sawyer  v.   Hoag,  17  60,  23  L.  ed.  220,  per  Swayne,  J. 
Wall.    (U.   S.)   610,   21    L.   ed.    731; 


§    85  LIENS.  80 

is  not  allowed  to  injuriously  affect  the  rights  of  a  creditor  by 
purchasing  its  own  stock  and  retiring  it.  Every  stockholder 
is  conclusively  charged  with  notice  of  the  trust  character 
which  attaches  to  its  capital  stock;  and.  therefore,  if  a  stock- 
holder takes  from  the  corporation  other  property  in  exchange 
for  such  stock,  he  takes  such  property  subject  to  an  equity 
in  favor  of  a  creditor  of  the  corporation  to  have  the  property 
in  place  of  the  stock  applied  to  the  payment  of  the  debt  to 
himself.^* 

The  creditor  of  a  corporation  has  also  an  equitable  lien 
upon  its  property  and  assets;  and  if  the  corporation  distrib- 
utes these  among  its  stockholders,  leaving  a  creditor  unpaid, 
he  may,  after  obtaining  judgment  against  the  corporation, 
and  the  execution  has  been  returned  unsatisfied,  maintain  a 
creditor's  bill  against  a  stockholder  to  reach  whatsoever  he 
has  received  in  the  distribution.^^  But  as  against  a  prior 
attaching  creditor  of  the  corporation  no  superior  equitable 
lien  exists.'*® 

A  claim  of  the  corporation  against  a  stockholder  for  his 
unpaid  subscription  for  shares  is  an  asset  of  the  company, 
and  a  creditor  has  the  same  right  to  look  to  it  as  to  any  other 
asset  of  the  company,  and  the  same  right  to  insist  upon  its 
payment  as  upon  the  payment  of  any  other  debt  due  the  com- 
pany.*^ 

§  85.  Lien  of  creditors  of  a  corporation  upon  its  property 
transferred  to  another  corporation. — A  corporation  to  which 
all  the  property  of  another  corporation  is  transferred,  which 
is  thereupon  dissolved  without  providing  for  the  payment  of 
its  debts,  takes  the  property  subject  to  a  lien  in  favor  of  the 
creditors  of  the  old  corporation  to  the  amount  of  the  prop- 

38  Clapp  V.  Peterson,  104  111.  26.      &    Mechanics'    Bank,    11    Colo.   97, 

39  Bartlett  v.  Drew,  57  N.  Y.  587;      17  Pac.  280. 

Hastings  v.  Drew,  76  N.  Y.  9.  4i  Sanger  v.  Upton,  91  U.  S.  56, 

40  Jones   V.    Bank,    10   Colo.   464,      23   L.   ed.  220. 
17  Pac.  272;  Breene  v.  Merchants' 


8r  EQUITABLE  LIENS.  §    86 

erty  transferred.^^  Any  arrangement  whereby  one  corpora- 
tion takes  from  another  all  its  property,  so  that  the  old  cor- 
poration is  deprived  of  the  means  of  paying  its  debts,  and  is 
enabled  to  dissolve  its  corporate  existence  and  place  itself 
practically  beyond  the  reach  of  creditors,  is  unconscionable 
unless  the  new  corporation  pays  the  debts  of  the  old.  It  mat- 
ters not  whether  the  stockholders  of  the  two  "corporations 
are  the  same  or  different,  only  that  the  equity  is  all  the 
stronger  where  the  stockholders  of  both  are  the  same.  Equity 
certainly  can  not  permit  the  owners  of  one  corporation  to 
organize  another,  and  transfer  from  the  former  to  the  latter 

all  the  corporate  property,  without  paying  all  the  corporate 
debts.^3 

A  life  insurance  company,  being  about  to  close  up  its  busi- 
ness, reinsured  its  policies  in  another  company,  to  which  it 
assigned  certain  bonds  for  the  protection  of  sureties  upon  an 
indemnifying  bond,  under  a  contract  that,  after  the  liability 
of  the  sureties  should  be  at  an  end,  such  bonds  should  be  ap- 
portioned among  the  stockholders  of  the  company  effecting 
the  reinsurance.  It  was  held  that  the  bonds  became  the 
property  of  the  stockholders  as  against  all  the  world,  except 
the  creditors  of  the  company;  but  that  in  favor  of  such  credi- 
tors they  constituted  a  trust  fund  for  the  payment  of  the 
debts  of  the  company,  and  in  the  hands  of  such  stockholders, 
or  of  any  depositary,  such  bonds  w^ere  subject  to  an  equitable 
lien  in  favor  of  the  creditors,  w^hich  might  be  enforced  upon 
the  failure  of  the  company  reinsuring  to  comply  with  its  con- 
tract.-** 

§  86.  Superiority  of  lien  of  coqjorate  creditor  after  trans- 
fer of  stock  to  another  corporation. — And  so  where  the  stock- 

^-  Brum  V.  Merchants'  Mut.  Ins.  43  Hibernia  Ins.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis 

Co.,  4  Woods  (U.  S.)   156,  16  Fed.  &  N.  O.  Transp.  Co.,  13  Fed.  516, 

140;  Hibernia  Ins.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  per  McCrary,  C.  J. 

&  N.  O.  Transp.  Co.,  13  Fed.  516:  44  Heman  v.  Britton.  88  Mo.  549. 
Harrison  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  Co., 
13  Fed.  522. 

6 


§    87  LIENS.  82 

holders  of  a  corporation  which  is  in  debt  transfer  all  its  assets 
to  another  corporation  in  consideration  of  receiving  stock  of 
such  other  corporation,  and  of  its  assuming  the  liabilities  of 
the  old  corporation,  a  creditor  of  such  old  corporation  has  a 
lien  upon  the  property  so  transferred  which  is  superior  to 
that  of  a  mortgagee  of  the  property  made  by  the  new  cor- 
poration, if  t-he  mortgagee  had  notice  of  the  debt  at  the  time 
of  taking  the  mortgage.*^  Treat.  J.,  delivering  the  opinion, 
said :  "The  transferred  assets  were  greater  than  the  assumed 
obligations  by  the  new  corporation.  Hence  all  persons  subse- 
quent in  interest  with  notice  of  such  equitable  lien  take  sub- 
ordinate thereto.  The  evidence  discloses  that,  although  the 
transfer  from  the  old  to  the  new  corporation  was  not  for- 
mally recorded,  all  the  parties  were  sufficiently  informed  with 
respect  thereto.  The  equitable  doctrine  applies,  viz.,  that 
they  took  subject  to  the  prior  equitable  lien." 

§  87.  Lien  of  minority  shareholders  of  corporation. — The 
minority  shareholders  of  a  corporation  have  an  equitable  lien 
upon  its  property  which  the  majority  have  sold  to  themselves, 
in  breach  of  their  fiduciary  relation.  "The  majority  can  not 
sell  the  assets  of  the  company,  and  keep  the  consideration, 
but  must  allow  the  minority  to  have  their  share  of  any  con- 
sideration which  may  come  to  them."^^  There  is  an  implied 
contract  in  the  association  together  of  the  members  of  a  cor- 
poration, that  its  powers  shall  be  exercised  only  for  the  pur- 
pose of  accomplishing  the  objects  for  which  the  corporation 

45  Blair  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.   Co.,  ors  of  the  selling  company  do  not 

24  Fed.  148,  affg.  22  Fed.  36;  Fogg  thereby  acquire  an   equitable   lien 

V.    St.    Louis    &c.    R.    Co.,    17   Fed.  upon    the    property    sold    for    the 

871.  The  case  of  Hervey  v.  Illinois  payment  of  their  claims,  but  they 

Midland  R.   Co.,  28  Fed.  169,  is  in  merely  acquire   the   right    to   look 

contradiction  of  this  view.     It   is  for    payment     to     the    purchasing 

there  held  that,  where  a  railroad  company. 

company    purchases    the    property  46  Menier  v.  Hooper's  Telegraph 

of  another  railroad  company,  and  Works,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  App.  Cas.  350, 

assumes    its    indebtedness,    credit-  354,  per  Mellish,  L.  J. 


83  EQUITABLE  LIENS.  §    87 

was  formed.'*'^  The  majority  of  the  members  are  in  fact  the 
corporation,  so  far  as  its  management  is  concerned:  they  can 
bind  the  whole  body  of  the  associates  in  all  transactions  with- 
in the  scope  of  the  corporate  powers.  But  when  they  assume 
to  control  the  corporation,  they  assume  the  trust  relation  oc- 
cupied by  the  corporation  towards  its  stockholders.^^  Al- 
though stockholders  are  not  partners,  nor  strictly  tenants  in 
common,  they  are  the  beneficial  joint  owners  of  the  corporate 
property,  having  an  interest  and  power  of  legal  control  in 
exact  proportion  to  their  respective  amounts  of  stock.  The 
corporation  itself  holds  its  property  as  a  trust  fund  for  the 
stockholders  who  have  a  joint  interest  in  all  its  property  and 
eflfects,  and  the  relation  between  it  and  its  several  members 
is,  for  all  practical  purposes,  that  of  trustee  and  cestui  que 
trust.  When  several  persons  have  a  common  interest  in 
property,  equity  will  not  allow  one  to  appropriate  it  exclu- 
sively to  himself,  or  to  impair  its  value  to  the  others.  Com- 
munity of  interest  involves  mutual  obligation.  Persons  oc- 
cupying this  relation  towards  each  other  are  under  an  obliga- 
tion to  make  the  property  or  fund  productive  of  the  most  that 
can  be  obtained  from  it  for  all  who  are  interested  in  it;  and 
those  who  seek  to  make  a  profit  out  of  it,  at  the  expense  of 
those  whose  rights  in  it  are  the  same  as  their  own,  are  un- 
faithful to  the  relation  they  have  assumed,  and  are  guilty  at 
least  of  constructive  fraud.  Among  the  disabilities  imposed 
by  courts  of  equit}^  upon  those  who  occupy  a  fiduciary  rela- 
tion toward  others,  respecting  property  which  is  to  be  ad- 

47  Abbot  V.  American  Hard  Rub-  and  applied  by  him  to  pay  a  lien 
ber  Co.,  33  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  578.  21  upon  his  individual  property,  will 
How.   Pr.    (N.   Y.)    193.  be  followed  by  equity  and  it  will 

48  Ervin  v.  Oregon  R.  &  Nav.  impress  upon  such  officer's  prop- 
Co.,  27  Fed.  625,  23  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  erty,  into  which  the  fund  went,  a 
517.  See  also,  Atkins  v.  Wabash,  lien  for  its  repayment,  if  the  prop- 
St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  29  Fed.  161,  21  erty  is  still  held  by  him.  Red  Bud 
Am.  L.  Rev.  104.  And  funds  of  Realty  Co.  v.  South,  96  Ark.  281, 
the   corporation  wrongfully  taken  131   S.   W.  340. 

by    an    officer    of    the    corporation 


§    88  LIENS.  84 

ministered  for  beneficiaries,  is  that  which  precludes  the  fidu- 
ciary from  purchasing-  the  property  on  his  own  account,  with- 
out such  a  full  and  complete  understanding  in  advance  with 
the  beneficiaries  as  will  repel  all  inferences  that  the  fiduciary 
intended  to  derive  any  peculiar  advantage  for  himself.  *  *  * 
The  fiduciary  can  not  retain  his  bargain  by  showing  that  the 
sale  was  public,  or  that  the  price  was  fair,  or  that  there  was 
no  intention  on  his  part  to  gain  an  unfair  advantage.  Where 
he  has  a  duty  to  perform  which  is  inconsistent  with  the  char- 
acter of  a  purchaser,  he  can  not  divest  himself  of  the  equities 
of  the  beneficiaries  to  demand  the  profits  that  may  arise  from 
the  transaction."** 

An  equitable  lien  may  be  decreed  to  exist  in  favor  of  such 
minority  shareholders  upon  the  property  of  the  old  corpora- 
tion in  the  hands  of  the  new  corporation  to  the  extent  of  the 
value  of  the  property  which  they  have  been  deprived  of.  Such 
lien  is  prior  to  the  lien  of  the  stockholders  of  the  new  cor- 
poration, but  is  subject  to  the  lien  of  the  holders  of  its  mort- 
gage bonds. 

§  88.  Shareholder's  equitable  lien  on  funds  specially  de- 
posited.— The  shareholders  of  a  corporation  have  an  equit- 
able lien  upon  a  fund  specially  deposited  for  the  payment  of  a 
dividend  declared  by  the  company.  Each  shareholder  has  a 
lien  upon  the  fund  to  the  extent  of  the  dividend  to  which  he 
is  entitled.  The  Erie  Railway  Company,  having  declared  a 
dividend  of  one  per  cent,  upon  its  stock,  deposited  the  money 
to  pay  the  same  with  Duncan,  Sherman  &  Co.,  bankers.  Some 
three  months  afterwards  the  money  remaining  with  the  bank- 
ers was  withdrawn  by  the  company,  and  subsequently  passed, 
with  its  other  property,  to  a  receiver  of  the  road.  Upon  the 
application  of  a  stockholder  entitled  to  such  dividend,  it  was 
held  that  he  had  an  equitable  lien  upon  the  fund  deposited 

40  Per   Wallace,   J.,    in   Ervin   v.    Oregon    R.    &    Nav.    Co..   27    Fed. 
625. 


85  EQUITABLE   LIENS.  |    89 

for  its  payment,  and  that  this  lien  followed  the  fund  into  the 
hands  of  the  receiver,  who  held  it  as  trustee  for  the  benefit  of 
the  stockholders  who  had  not  been  paid.^° 

In  like  manner  a  lien  was  declared  in  a  case  where  an  in- 
surance company  had  declared  a  dividend,  and  given  notice 
of  it  to  the  stockholders,  and  had  prepared  checks  upon  a 
fund  in  bank  for  delivery  to  the  stockholders  as  they  should 
call.  A  great  fire  occurred  before  all  the  stockholders  had 
been  paid,  whereby  the  company  was  rendered  insolvent  and 
its  property  passed  into  the  hands  of  a  receiver.  The  divi- 
dend was  regarded  as  so  far  appropriated  to  the  stockholders 
that  they  were  entitled  to  it  as  against  the  general  creditors 
of  the  company.^^ 

§  89.  Liens  created  by  assumption  of  mortgage  or  other 
liens. — Liens  may  be  created  by  the  assumption  of  a  mort- 
gage or  other  lien  upon  property.  An  equitable  lien  is  created 
in  behalf  of  a  creditor  by  an  agreement  made  with  the  debtor 
by  a  third  person  whereby  the  latter  undertakes  to  pay  the 
debt,  or  to  secure  the  payment  of  it.  A  common  instance  of 
the  creation  of  such  a  lien  occurs  where  the  consideration  for 
the  conveyance  of  property  is  the  assumption  of  the  payment 
by  the  vendee  of  an  existing  lien  upon  the  property,  or  debt 
of  the  vendor  in  respect  of  the  property.^^  Thus,  where  two 
or  more  railroad  companies  consolidate,  and  part  of  the  con- 
sideration for  the  transfer  of  the  property  of  one  of  the  roads 
to  the  consolidated  company  is  the  payment  by  it  of  certain 
unsecured  equipment  bonds  issued  by  the  company  making 
the  transfer,  and  the  consolidated  company  agrees  to  "pro- 
tect" such  bonds,  the  bondholders  thereby  acquire  an  equit- 

50  In  re  Le  Blanc,  14  Hun  (N.  Vanmeters'  Exrs.  v.  Vanmeters,  3 
Y.)  8,  4  Abb.  N.  C.  221.  affd.  75  Grat.  (Va.)  148;  Clyde  v.  Simp- 
N.   Y.   598.  son,    4    Ohio    St.    445;    Nichols    v. 

51  Le  Roy  v.  Globe  Ins.  Co..  2  Glover,  41  Ind.  24;  Harris  v.  Fly, 
Edw.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  657.  7    Paige    (N.    Y.)    421 ;    Hallett    v. 

52  Jones    on    Mortgages,    §    162;  Hallett,  2  Paige   (N.  Y.)   15. 


§    90  LIENS.  86 

able  lien  on  the  property  of  the  consolidated  company  for  the 
payment  of  their  bonds. ^^ 

§  90.  Consolidated  company  subject  to  liens  of  original 
corporation. — A  consolidated  corporation  may  be  subject  to 
liens  existing  against  original  corporation.  The  holder  of  the 
bonds  of  a  railroad  corporation,  which  are  a  specific  lien  upon 
the  income  of  property  which  has  passed  by  consolidation 
from  the  hands  of  the  original  debtor  corporation  to  another 
corporation,  can  enforce  his  lien  against  the  latter  corpora- 
tion, when  it  receives  such  income.  He  has  a  lien  on  the  in- 
come of  the  property  in  whosesoever  hands  it  may  come  with 
notice  of  the  lien,  and  he  has  the  right  to  enforce  this  lien  in- 
dependently of  any  proceeding  he  may  have  at  law  to  reach 
other  property  in  the  hands  of  the  debtor  corporation.  He 
has  the  right  to  pursue  the  debtor,  or  to  enforce  his  lien 
against  the  income;  or  he  may  pursue  all  his  remedies  at  the 
same  time.^^  But  the  lien  does  not  attach  in  favor  of  a  stock- 
holder of  a  railroad  company  upon  its  consolidation  with 
another  company,  though  the  consolidated  company  gave 
him  notes  for  his  interest  in  the  old  company  instead  of  stock, 
which  the  agreement  of  consolidation  provided  should  be  is- 
sued to  the  stockholders  in  the  old  corporation.  The  stock- 
holder had  no  interest  in  the  lands  of  the  old  company.  These 
belonged  to  the  corporation,  and  the  stockholder  merely  had 
an  interest  in  the  corporation.  The  corporation,  and  not  the 
stockholders,  sold  and  transferred  the  lands  to  the  consoli- 
dated company.  An  individual  stockholder  had  nothing  to 
sell  but  his  stock.*"* 

§  91.  Bonds  of  original  corporation  not  a  lien. — But  if  the 
bonds  of  the  original  corporation  were  neither  a  lien  upon  its 

53  Tysen    v.    Wabash    R.    Co.,    15  54  Rjtten    v.     Union     Pacific    R. 

Fed.  763,  11  Biss.  (U.  S.)  510,  revd.  Co.,  16  Rep.  199. 
114  U.   S.  587,  5   Sup.   Ct.   1081,  29  55  Cross  v.   Burlington  &  S.   W. 

L.   ed.   235.  R.  Co.,  58  Iowa  62,  12  N.  W.  71. 


87  EQUITABLE   LIENS.  §    92 

property  nor  its  income,  though  it  is  agreed  that  they  shall 
be  protected  "as  to  the  principal  and  interest  as  they  shall  re- 
spectively fall  due"  by  the  consolidated  company,  and  the 
bonds  were  issued  after  the  passage  of  statutes  authorizing 
the  consolidation,  the  holders  have  no  lien  upon  the  property 
of  the  consolidated  company,  nor  upon  the  proceeds  of  a  sale 
of  such  property  made  under  a  mortgage  executed  by  the 
consolidated  company.  The  agreement  to  protect  the  bonds 
created  only  a  personal  obligation  to  see  that  they  should  be 
paid  at  maturity.  It  was  claimed  also  that  the  payment  of 
the  bonds  was  a  part  of  the  consideration  of  the  transfer,  and 
that  the  case  came  within  the  principle  of  a  vender's  lien  for 
unpaid  purchase-money.  But  the  court,  by  Mr.  Justice  Gray, 
upon  this  point  declared:  "We  are  unable  to  perceive  any 
analogy  between  the  two  cases.  The  doctrine  of  vendor's 
lien  applies  only  to  sales  of  real  estate.  The  consolidation  of 
the  stock  and  property  of  several  corporations  into  one  was 
not  a  sale;  and  it  did  not  effect  real  estate  only,  but  included 
franchises  and  personal  property."^^ 

§  92.  Equitable  lien  against  railroad  company. — x\n  equit- 
able lien  can  not  be  declared  against  railroad  property  in  the 
hands  of  a  receiver,  to  secure  the  payment  for  necessary  sup- 
plies furnished  the  company  before  the  appointment  of  the 
receiver,  as  against  a  mortgage  then  subsisting  upon  the 
property.^'^  The  creditor  in  such  case  only  holds  the  relation 
of  a  general  creditor  of  the  corporation,  with  no  lien  upon 
anything  to  secure  his  claim.  The  mere  act  of  appointing  a 
receiver  to  preserve  the  property  pendente  lite  does  not 
change  the  character  of  the  debt  from  an  unsecured  to  a  se- 
cured claim.  The  court  may  require  the  receiver  to  pay  the 
current  expenses  of  the  road  out  of  the  current  earnings  be- 

56  Wabash,  St.  Louis  &  Pac.  R.  New  York,  W.  S.  &  B.  R.  Co.,  25 
Co.  V.  Ham,  114  U.  S.  587,  29  L.  Fed.  800;  Olyphant  v.  St.  Louis 
ed.  235,  5  Sup.  Ct.  1081.  Ore  &  Steel  Co.,  28  Fed.  729. 

57  United     States     Trust    Co.    v. 


§  93  LIENS.  88 

fore  anything  is  paid  upon  the  mortgage.  The  current  run- 
ning expenses  ma}^  include,  by  order  of  court,  expenses  in- 
curred within  a  certain  time  prior  to  the  date  of  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  receiver.  But  if  the  current  earnings  are  insuffi- 
cient to  pay  the  current  debts  incurred  within  the  time  speci- 
fied, the  court  will  not  declare  a  debt  not  incurred  within  that 
limited  time  a  lien  upon  property  previously  pledged  to  the 
payment  of  the  mortgage. 

§  93,  Court  of  equity  appropriate  tribunal  for  enforcing 
equitable  liens. — A  court  of  equity  is  the  appropriate  tribunal 
for  enforcing  an  equitable  lien.^^  "In  equity,  there  is  no  dif- 
ficulty in  enforcing  a  lien  or  any  other  equitable  claim,  con- 
stituting a  charge  in  rem,  not  only  upon  real  estate,  but  also 
upon  personal  estate,  or  upon  money  in  the  hands  of  a  third 
person,  whenever  the  lien  or  other  claim  is  a  matter  of  agree- 
ment, against  the  party  himself  and  his  personal  representa- 
tives, and  against  any  persons  claiming  under  him  voluntarily 
or  with  notice,  and  against  assignees  in  bankruptcy,  who  are 
treated  as  volunteers;  for  every  such  agreement  for  a  lien  or 
charge  in  rem  constitutes  a  trust,  and  is  accordingly  governed 
by  the  general  doctrine  applicable  to  trusts. "^^ 

A  court  of  equity,  whose  powers  are  limited  to  certain  mat- 
ters strictly  defined,  may  be  without  jurisdiction  to  enforce 
an  equitable  lien.  Such  was  formerly  the  case  in  Massachu- 
setts when  there  was  only  a  very  limited  equity  jurisdiction. 
But  wherever  there  is  full  equity  jurisdiction — that  is.  an 
equity  jurisdiction  coincident  and  coextensive  with  that  exer- 
cised by  the  Court  of  Chancery  in  England — there  is  jurisdic- 
tion for  the  enforcement  of  any  equitable  lien  or  charge  f^ 

o8  Vallette   v.    Whitewater    Val-  •"'f'  Fletcher  v.    Morey,  Fed.    Cas. 

ley    Canal    Co..    4    Fed.    Cas.    No.  No.  4864,  2  Story  (U.  S.)  555.  565. 

16820.     4     McLean     (U.     S.)     192;  60  Fletcher  v.    Morey,   Fed.   Cas. 

Ridgely  V.  Iglehart,  3  Bland  (Md.)  No.  4864,  2  Story  (U.  S.)  555,  565; 

540;   Brown  v.  Truax,  58  Ore.  572,  Los  Angeles  County  v.  Winans,  13 

115  Pac.  597.  Cal.  App.  234,  109  Pac.  640.    Equity 


89  EQUITABLE   LIENS.  §    95 

and,  unless  there  be  a  special  remedy  provided  by  statute, 
this  jurisdiction  should  be  invoked  for  the  enforcement  of  any 
equitable  lien. 

The  usual  mode  of  enforcing  an  equitable  lien  is  by  an  or- 
der of  sale  of  the  property  to  which  it  is  attached. ^^ 

§  94.  Lien  at  law  not  enforcible  in  equity. — A  lien  at  law 
or  by  statute  can  not  be  enforced  in  equity.  Except  as  rem- 
edy in  equity  is  expressly  provided  by  statute,  a  court  of 
equity  can  enforce  an  equitable  lien,  either  upon  a  legal  or 
equitable  estate  in  lands;  but  a  lien  which  is  purely  legal, 
which  is  created  by  statute  and  is  dependent  upon  statutory 
provisions  for  its  enforcement,  can  not  be  aided  in  equity  if 
the  lien  fails  at  law.^^  In  the  absence  of  statutory  provisions 
no  lien  will  be  foreclosed  in  equity  except  in  conformity  with 
established  rules  of  equitable  jurisprudence.  Thus,  a  general 
lien  of  a  judgment  will  not  be  turned  into  the  specific  lien  of 
a  decree  in  equity  and  enforced  by  a  sale  under  such  decree. 
Equity  will  not  interfere  where  there  is  a  full  and  complete 
remedy  by  statute.  The  foreclosure  of  a  lien  is  either  a  statu- 
tory or  an  equitable  proceeding.  At  law  there  is  no  remedy 
beyond  retaining  possession. 

§  95.  Disposition  of  property  subject  to  equitable  lien. — 
If  the  owner  of  property  subject  to  an  equitable  Hen  disposes 
of  it,  in  hostility  to  the  lien,  to  a  bona  fide  purchaser  without 
notice  of  the  lien,  so  that  the  lien  is  destroyed,  the  lienor  has 
a  cause  of  action  against  the  person  so  selling  the  property 
for  the  restoration  of  such  equitable  lien.^^    This  right  is  im- 

will  look  to  the   substance   to  as-  ^2  Buchan    v.    Sumner,    2    Barb, 

certain  whether  a  lien  is  created  Ch.   (N.  Y.)   165,  47  Am.  Dec.  305; 

by  it.    Ward  v.  Stark,  91' Ark.  268,  Douglass   v.   Huston,  6  Ohio   156; 

121  S.  W.  382.  Howe    Machine    Co.   v.    Miner,   28 

61  Perry  v.    Board   of   Missions,  Kans.    441;    Pennsylvania    Co.    v. 

102  N.  Y.  99,  106,  1  N.  Y.  St.  169;  Thatcher,  78  Ohio  St.  175,  85  N.  E. 

Price  V.   Palmer,  23  Hun   (N.  Y.)  55. 

504,  507.  63  Husted  v.  Ingraham,  75  N.  Y. 


§  95 


LIENS. 


90 


portant  where  the  lienor  has  no  personal  claim  against  such 
owner,  as  where  by  contract  one  is  to  have  a  share  of  the 
property  or  fund  recovered  by  another,  and  has  by  a  contract 
a  lien  upon  the  property  or  fund  so  recovered.  In  such  case 
the  creditor's  only  claim  is  against  the  fund  recovered,  and, 
it  being  a  lien  by  contract,  its  maintenance  does  not  depend 
upon  possession.  It  is  an  equitable  charge  enforcible  only  in 
a  court  of  equity.  The  person  who  recovers  the  fund  or  prop- 
erty and  holds  it  in  his  own  name  can  transfer  it  to  a  pur- 
chaser for  value  and  in  good  faith  without  notice  of  the  lien; 
but  in  so  doing  he- inflicts  a  special  injury  upon  the  lienor, 
for  which  an  action  lies  for  damages  for  the  destruction  of  the 
lien,  or,  perhaps,  an  action  in  the  nature  of  an  action  for 
money  had  and  received  for  the  proceeds  of  his  interest.  The 
cause  of  action  in  either  case  arises  at  the  time  of  the  wrong- 
ful sale  of  the  property,  and  the  statute  of  limitations  com- 
mences to  run  from  that  time.^^ 


251 ;  Hale  v.  Omaha  Nat.  Bank,  49 
N.  Y.  626,  64  N.  Y.  550,  555 ;  Hovey 
V.  Elliott,  21  J.  &  S.  (N.  Y.)  331,  118 
N.  Y.  124,  137,  23  N.  E.  475. 

64  Hovey  v.  Elliott,  21  J.  &  S. 
331,  118  N.  Y.  124,  23  N.  E.  475.  In 
this  case  the  plaintiffs  made  an 
agreement  with  a  person  who  had 
a  large  claim  pending  before  the 
mixed  commission  on  British  and 
American  claims,  under  the  treaty 
of  1871,  for  the  value  of  certain 
cotton,  by  which  the  plaintiffs 
were  to  aid  the  claimant,  and  he 
was  to  pay  them  for  their  serv- 
ices twenty-five  per  cent,  of  any 
amount  allowed  on  the  claim,  and 
this  amount  was  made  a  lien  upon 
any  money,  draft,  or  evidence  of 
indebtedness,  which  might  be  paid 
or  issued  thereon.  A  large  sum 
was  recovered,  and  a  receiver  was 
appointed    for    one    half    of    the 


award,  and  he  was  directed  to  in- 
vest the  money  in  certain  bonds, 
and  this  he  did.  A  suit  to  estab- 
lish the  lien  was  dismissed,  and 
the  receiver  was  directed  to  pay 
the  funds  to  the  claimant.  The  re- 
ceiver, under  instructions  of  the 
court,  turned  over  the  bonds  to 
the  claimant,  who  sold  them  to 
purchasers  who  were  chargeable 
with  notice  of  the  plaintiff's 
claim  to  a  lien;  and  these  pur- 
chr.sers,  in  turn,  sold  them  to  bona 
fi'^'e  purchasers  who  had  no  notice 
of  the  claim.  Thereafter  the 
judgment  dismissing  the  action  to 
establish  the  lien  was,  on  appeal, 
reversed,  and  judgment  was  en- 
tered that  the  plaintiffs  had  a  lien 
on  the  award,  or  the  proceeds 
thereof.  It  was  held  that  this  last 
judgment  created  no  lien,  for 
there    was    then    no    property    on 


91 


EQUITABLE  LIENS. 


96 


A  purchaser  of  property  in  which  there  is  an  equitable  lien, 
when  chargeable  with  knowledge  of  it,  is  liable  to  the  lien- 
holder  for  the  amount  of  his  lien.^^ 

§  96.  Priorities. — A  specific  equitable  lien  upon  land  is 
preferred  to  a  subsequent  judgment  lien.^^  If  the  equitable 
lien  and  the  judgment  lien  come  into  existence  at  the  same 
time,  the  former  is  not  entitled  to  preference  in  case  it  was 
created  to  secure  an  antecedent  indebtedness,  with  no  new 
consideration  advanced  at  the  time  on  the  faith  of  it.'^'^ 

Subsequent  purchasers  and  creditors  are  bound  by  equit- 
able liens  if  they  acquire  their  rights  with  either  actual  or 
constructive  notice  of  them.  Thus  a  purchaser  of  land  may, 
by  written  agreement,  create  an  equitable  lien  in  favor  of  a 
surety  upon  the  purchase-money  note  for  it  who  pays  the 
note,  and  such  lien  will  prevail  against  a  creditor  with  no- 
tice.^®    In  like  manner  if  a  purchaser  of  land  borrows  money 


which  a  lien  could  be  established: 
but  it  established  the  fact  that  a 
lien  had  existed  on  the  bonds  be- 
fore they  were  sold  to  bona  fide 
purchasers  without  notice  and  the 
lien  destroyed;  that  the  pur- 
chasers of  the  bonds  with  notice 
of  the  claim  of  lien  were  liable 
to  action  for  their  wrongful  act 
in  destroying  the  lien,  but  that 
the  cause  of  action  accrued  at  the 
time  of  such  wrongful  sale,  and 
was  barred  by  the  six  years'  lim- 
itation under  the  statute  of  lim- 
itations. This  holding  of  the 
court  below  was  upon  appeal  (118 
N.  Y.  124),  declared  erroneous  ;  that 
the  purchasers  of  the  bonds  hav- 
ing made  the  purchase  pendente 
lite  were  chargeable  with  knowl- 
edge of  the  plaintiffs'  claim,  and 
were  bound  by  the  result  as  ef- 
fectually as  if  they  had  been  made 
parties    to    the    suit,    and    for    the 


purposes  of  the  lien  might  be 
deemed  to  have  held  the  bonds, 
and  upon  the  sale  thereof  to  hold 
the  proceeds  in  trust  for  the  plain- 
tiffs; that  when  the  decree  was 
obtained  they  were  bound  to  pay 
the  plaintiffs  an  amount  sufficient 
to  satisfy  their  lien,  and  concur- 
rently in  time  with  the  arising  of 
such  duty  the  right  to  demand  its 
performance  accrued;  that  prior 
to  said  decree  the  plaintiffs'  lien 
was  simply  equitable,  to  be  en- 
forced only  by  suit  in  equity;  that, 
therefore,  during  the  pendency  of 
the  former  action  the  statute  of 
limitations   did   not   run. 

65  Hovey    v.    Elliott,    118    N.    Y. 
124,  23  N.  E.  475. 

66  Stevens    v.     Watson,    4    Abb. 
Dec.  302. 

67  Dwight  V.  Newell,  3  N.  Y.  185. 

68  Bailey   v.    Welch,   4   B.    Mon. 
(Ky.)   244. 


§    96  LIENS.  92 

to  pay  the  purchase-money  and  agrees  with  the  lender  that 
he  shall  have  a  purchase-money  lien  upon  the  land,  the  pur- 
chaser has  an  equitable  lien  for  the  money  advanced  which  is 
superior  to  the  rights  of  creditors  or  purchasers  with  actual 
notice.®^ 

A  prior  equitable  lien  is  preferred  to  a  mechanic's  lien  upon 
the  same  property,  though  the  claimant  under  the  latter  had 
no  notice  of  the  equitable  lien  at  the  time  his  lien  took  ef- 
fectJ^* 

But  a  specific  equitable  lien  upon  lands  is  not  preferred  to 
a  prior  lien  by  judgment  thereon;  and  this  is  so  although  the 
lands  be  acquired  by  the  debtor  after  the  recovery  of  the 
judgmentJ^ 

A  mechanic's  lien  is  subject  to  an  equitable  lien  existing  at 
the  time  the  claimant  files  his  notice  of  claiming  a  lien.  Until 
he  files  his  notice  he  has  no  greater  equities  than  other  gen- 
eral creditors,  and  is  affected  by  all  equities  existing  at  that 
time  in  favor  of  others  dealing  with  his  debtor.  His  lien  at- 
taches only  to  the  estate  and  interest  of  the  debtor  as  it  then 
exists,  which  is  the  estate  and  interest  left  to  the  debtor  after 
satisfying  prior  liens  and  equities.'^^ 

f'9  Trimble  v.  Puckett,  14  Ky.  L.  bought  from  P.,  it  being  the  farm 

209,  19  S.  W.  591.     The  agreement  I  now  live  on." 

was    in    a    note    as    follows  :      "On  "o  Payne  v.  Wilson,  74  N.  Y.  348. 

I  promise  to  pay  P.  dol-  '^1  Cook  v.  Banker,  50  N.  Y.  655. 

lars  as  purchase-money  furnished  72  Payne  v.  Wilson,  74  N.  Y.  348, 

by  P.,  and  to  have  the  same  effect  affg.   11   Hun   (N.  Y.)  302. 
as     though     the     land     had     been 


97. 

Introductory. 

105. 

98. 

Taxes  a   lien  on   real   estate. 

99. 

State's  statutory  lien  on  real 
estate. 

106. 

100. 

Lien    of    state    on    criminal's 
property. 

107. 

101. 

Improvement    liens. 

108. 

102. 

Water  rates  as  liens. 

109. 

103. 

Liens    upon    animals    damage 

110. 

feasant. 

111. 

104. 

Possession    not    required    to 

support    statutory    liens. 

112. 

CHAPTER  III. 

LIENS  BY   STATUTE. 

Sec.  Sec. 

Character,  operation  and  ex- 
tent of  lien. 

Statutory  lien  —  How  ac- 
quired. 

Statutory  lien  may  be  modi- 
fied by  statute. 

Repeal   of   statutory   lien. 

Rule    in   other   courts. 

Revival    of    lien. 

Statutory  liens  governed  by 
the   law   of   forum. 

Statutory  liens  legal  rather 
than  equitable. 

§  97.  Introductory. — By  legislation  many  of  the  liens  rec- 
ognized by  the  common  law,  and  many  of  those  asserted  in 
equity,  have  been  materially  enlarged  in  their  scope,  or  made 
more  effectual  by  provisions  for  their  enforcement;  while 
only  in  one  instance,  that  of  distress  for  rent,  has  the  com- 
mon-law right  been  modified  or  restricted.  But  modern  leg- 
islation has  in  many  instances  gone  beyond  the  liens  prev- 
iously recognized  at  law  or  in  equity,  and  has  created  a  great 
number  of  new  liens;  and  the  tendency  of  legislation  in  this 
country  is  to  extend  this  remedy  for  the  protection  of  all  per- 
sons who  labor  or  supply  materials  for  others,  and  for  the 
protection  of  the  state  and  of  municipal  corporations  in  the 
enforcement  of  taxes  and  other  claims.  Of  the  liens  created 
for  the  protection  of  individuals,  those  known  as  "mechanics' 
liens"^  are  the  most  familiar;  for  statutes  of  this  kind  have 
been  enacted  in  all,  or  nearly  all,  the  states  and  territories. 
Laborers  upon  plantations  are  protected  by  agricultural  liens 

1  See  post,  chaps.  XXX-XL. 

93 


§    9^  LIENS.  94 

upon  the  crops  raised.  Laborers  and  contractors  upon  rail- 
roads are  protected  by  liens  upon  the  roads.  In  the  mining 
states  liens  are  given  to  miners  and  others  upon  the  mines 
and  their  products.  In  states  where  lumbering  is  an  import- 
ant industry,  lumbermen  are  protected  by  liens  upon  logs. 
Livery-stable  keepers  and  agisters  of  cattle  are  protected  by 
liens.  Corporations  are  given  liens  upon  the  shares  of  their 
members  for  debts  due  from  them.  In  many  states  liens 
have  been  given  to  landlords  in  place  of  the  common-law 
remedy  of  distress.  In  many  states,  also,  attorneys  have 
been  given  complete  protection  by  effectual  liens  upon  judg- 
ments obtained  by  them,  and  upon  the  causes  of  action,  in 
place  of  the  somewhat  indefinite  and  restricted  rights  they 
had  under  the  general  equity  jurisdiction  of  the  courts. 

For  the  details  of  legislation  upon  all  these  subjects,  and  its 
application,  reference  may  be  had  to  the  chapters  treating  of 
these  particular  matters. 

In  the  dififerent  states  many  different  liens  have  been 
created,  which  it  is  impossible  to  notice  in  detail  in  this 
treatise.  The  law  governing  them,  so  far  as  it  is  not  declared 
by  the  statutes  creating  them,  may  generally  be  determined 
by  analogy  to  the  more  common  statutory  liens,  the  con- 
struction and  interpretation  of  which  are  settled  by  adjudica- 
tions. Only  a  few  of  the  statutory  liens,  other  than  those 
before  referred  to,  which  are  made  the  subjects  of  separate 
chapters,  will  be  briefiy  mentioned  in  this  chapter. 

§  98.  Taxes  a  lien  on  real  estate. — Taxes  are  generally 
made  a  lien  upon  the  real  estate  assessed,  but  a  right  of  prior 
payment  does  not  constitute  a  lien.  A  statute  which  pro- 
vides that  taxes  shall  be  preferred  to  all  payments  and  in- 
cumbrances, and  shall  be  a  lien  upon  the  real  estate  of  the 
person  assessed,  does  not  create  a  lien  upon  his  personal 
property.  A  right  of  prior  payment  is  a  preference  in  the 
appropriation  of  the  proceeds  of  the  debtor's  property.  It  is 
not  a  qualified  right  which  may  be  exercised  over  his  prop- 


95 


LIENS    BY    STATUTE. 


§  99 


erty.  It  does  not  attach  to  the  specific  article  of  property. 
Hence,  if  the  personal  property  of  the  person  assessed  be  at- 
tached or  assigned  before  it  is  seized  by  the  tax-collector,  the 
right  of  prior  payment  given  by  the  statute  is  lost.^ 

§  99.  State's  statutory  lien  on  real  estate. — A  statutory  lien 
in  favor  of  the  state  upon  the  land  of  a  collector  of  taxes  and 
his  sureties  attaches  not  only  to  the  lands  owned  by  him  at 
the  time  of  the  approval  and  recording  of  his  bond,  but  also 

to  after-acquired  lands,  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  a  judgment.^ 
The  lien  of  the  state  is  not  discharged  upon  lands  sold  by  the 


2  Anderson  v.  Mississippi,  23 
Miss.  459.  See  also,  Tradesmen's 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Sheffield  City  Co., 
137  Ala.  547,  34  So.  625.  But  in 
Washington,  where  the  statute 
makes  taxes  assessed  on  personal 
property,  a  lien  on  such  property, 
the  lien  can  not  be  avoided  be- 
cause a  portion  of  the  property 
has  been  sold  and  other  goods 
added  to  take  their  place  since 
the  levy  for  taxes  was  made. 
Laws  1895,  p.  520.  §  21;  Mills  v. 
County  of  Thurston,  16  Wash.  378, 
47  Pac.  759.  Where  taxes  on  per- 
sonalty are  not  made  a  lien  there- 
on by  statute,  a  specific  lien  held 
by  a  creditor  before  the  taxes  be- 
came due  is  superior  to  the  gen- 
eral tax  lien.  Wise  v.  L.  &  C.  Wise 
Co.,  12App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  319,  42  N. 
Y.  S.  54,  affd.  153  N.  Y.  507,  47  N. 
E.  788.  See  also,  St.  Johns  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Bingham,  113  Mich.  165, 
71  N.  W.  588;  Gifford  v.  Callaway, 
8  Colo.  App.  359,  46  Pac.  626.  A 
tax  lien  is  superior  to  the  lien 
for  a  local  improvement.  City  of 
Ballard  v.  Ross,  38  Wash.  209,  80 
Pac.  439.  Under  an  Iowa  stat- 
ute  a   lien    for   taxes    on    personal 


property  is  not  superior  to  the 
lien  of  a  previous  mortgage  exe- 
cuted by  the  owner.  Iowa  Code, 
§  865;  Bibbins  v.  Polk  County,  100 
Iowa  493,  69  N.  W.  1007.  The 
county's  lien  for  taxes  is  not 
destroyed  when  it  buys  in  the  land 
at  a  tax  sale.  Rochford  v.  Flem- 
ing, 10  S.  Dak.  24,  71  N.  W.  317. 
In  Indiana  a  tax  lien  is  superior 
to  an  individual  claim  on  prop- 
erty. Brownell  Improvement  Co. 
v.  Nixon,  48  Ind.  App.  195,  92  N. 
E.  693. 

3  Crawford  v.  Richeson,  101  111. 
351 ;  Kerr  v.  Hoskinson,  5  Kans. 
App.  193,  47  Pac.  172.  A  judicial 
sale  of  property  in  a  proceeding 
to  which  the  state  is  not  a  party 
will  not  divest  the  state's  lien  for 
taxes.  Huckleby  v.  State,  57  Fla. 
433,  48  So.  979.  The  lien  for  taxes 
is  not  affected  by  the  change  of 
ownership  of  the  real  estate  as- 
sessed. Jacobs  v.  Union  Trust 
Co.,  155  Mich.  233,  118  N.  W.  921. 
The  lien  of  a  school  fund  mort- 
gage is  superior  to  the  lien  of 
taxes.  Hood  v.  Baker,  165  Ind. 
562,  75  N.  E.  608,  76  N.  E.  243. 


§     lOO  LIENS.  96 

collector  after  the  approval  of  his  bond,  although  the  legisla- 
ture has  extended  the  time  of  payment  of  taxes  to  the  col- 
lector. Sureties  upon  the  collector's  bond,  who  have  given 
written  consent  to  such  extension,  are  not  discharged  there- 
by, and,  upon  answering  for  the  collector's  default,  are  sub- 
rogated in  equity  to  the  lien  of  the  state  upon  his  lands,  the 
lands  he  has  conveyed,  and  the  land  he  has  acquired  since 
the  approval  of  his  bond.* 

Such  a  Hen  is  a  general  lien  like  the  lien  of  a  judgment,  and 
is  subject  to  the  equity  of  third  persons.  It  is  subject  to  a 
prior  unrecorded  mortgage,  in  accordance  with  the  well-es- 
tablished doctrine  of  equity  that  prior  equitable  interests  in  a 
specific  piece  of  real  property  have  priority  over  a  general 
statutory  lien  created  subsequent  to  the  transaction  with  the 
owner,  which  gives  a  party  an  interest  in  the  particular  piece 
of  land  in  question.^ 

§  100.  Lien  of  state  on  criminal's  property. — A  lien  is 
sometimes  given  to  a  state  upon  the  property  of  a  defendant 
in  a  criminal  prosecution  for  the  payment  of  the  costs  of  the 
prosecution  in  case  of  conviction,  from  the  time  of  the  arrest 
or  indictment  found;  and  such  lien  can  not  be  divested  by 
any  subsequent  assignment  by  the  defendant,  though  this  be 
an  assignment  to  counsel  to  assist  him  in  his  defense.^ 

§  101.  Improvement  liens. — Statutes  authorizing  cities 
and  towns  to  make  improvements  in  streets  generally  pro- 
vide that  the  expense  thereof,  or  some  part  of  such  expense, 
may  be  assessed  upon  the  land  fronting  upon  such  streets, 
and  such  assessments  are  made  a  lien  upon  the  property.''' 

4  Crawford  v.  Richeson,  101  111.  c  McKnight  v.  Spain,  13  Mo.  534. 
351.  "^  Fitch    V.    Creighton,    24    How. 

5  Crisfiel  V.  Murdock,  55  Hun  (U.  S.)  159,  16  L.  ed.  596.  In  a 
(N.  Y.y  143,  8  N.  Y.  S.  593,  28  N.  Y.  suit  by  a  contractor  to  enforce 
St.  460,  modified  127  N.  Y.  315,  27  a  lien  for  street  improvement  on 
N.    E.    1046.  the    abutting    lots,    the    complaint 


97 


LIENS    BY    STATUTE. 


§     I02 


§  102.  Water  rates  as  liens. — Water  rates  are  sometimes 
made  a  lien  upon  the  premises  where  the  water  is  used.  An 
act  which  makes  water  rates  a  charge  upon  lands  in  a  muni- 
cipality, with  a  lien  prior  to  all  incumbrances,  in  the  same 
manner  as  taxes  are,  gives  them  priority  over  mortgages  on 
such  lands  made  after  the  passage  of  the  act,  whether  the 
water  be  introduced  on  the  mortgaged  land  before  or  after 
the  giving  of  the  mortgage,^  if  the  mortgage  was  made  after 
the  enactment  of  the  statute  making  such  rates  a  lien  upon 
the  property.^  Such  an  act  does  not  deprive  the  mortgagee 
of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law.  The  mortgagee, 
in  such  case,  takes  the  mortgage  subject  to  the  statute.  He 
voluntarily  consents  to  making  the  water  rates  a  first  lien 
upon  the  property  in  accordance  with  the  statute. 

A  lien  may  be  given  for  the  expense  of  placing  a  water- 
meter  in  a  building,  and  the  charge  for  extra  consumption  of 
water  over  and  above  the  quantity  covered  by  the  usual 
water  rate  for  the  building  may  be  made  a  lien  upon  the 
land.^*'  Such  a  lien  is  given  by  virtue  of  the  taxing  power  of 
the  state. 


is  sufficient  if  it  pleads  all  the 
acts  done  by  the  municipal  offi- 
cers, and  all  facts  essential  to 
show  their  authority,  and  need 
not  set  forth  their  proceedings, 
nor  incorporate,  by  reference  or 
otherwise,  the  contract  under 
which  the  work  was  done,  nor  any 
other  instrument,  except  the  final 
estimate  or  assessment.  Van 
Sickle  V.  Belknap.  129  Ind.  558, 
28  N.  E.  305.  The  lien  created  by 
assessments  for  local  improve- 
ments is  inferior  to  the  lien  of 
general  taxes.  City  of  Ballard  v. 
Ross,  38  Wash.  209,  239,  80  Pac. 
439. 

8  Provident   Inst,   for  Savings  v. 
Jersey    City,    113   U.    S.   506,   28   L. 

7 


ed.  1102,  5  Sup.  Ct.  612.  The  court, 
by  Bradley,  J.,  even  says  that  they 
are  not  prepared  to  assert  that 
an  act  giving  preference  to  mu- 
nicipal water  rates  over  existing 
mortgages  or  other  incumbrances 
would  be  unconstitutional:  for  the 
providing  of  water  for  a  city  is 
one  of  the  highest  functions  of 
municipal  government,  and  tends 
to  enhance  the  value  of  all  real 
estate  within  its  limits;  and  the 
charges  for  the  use  of  the  water 
may  well  be  entitled  to  rank  as  a 
first  lien,  without  regard  to  ex- 
isting liens. 

9  Vreeland  v.  Jersey  City,  Zl  N. 
J.    Eq.   574. 

10  Laws   of  New  York.   1873.  ch. 


§103  '  LIENS.  98 

§  103.  Liens  upon  animals  damage  feasant. — By  the  com- 
mon law,  a  person  finding  upon  his  land  animals  belonging  to 
another,  doing  injury  by  treading  down  his  grass  or  grain  or 
the  like,  was  entitled  to  distrain  them  until  satisfaction  should 
be  made  him  for  his  loss.^^  In  the  American  States  this  right 
has  existed  from  a  very  early  period  in  the  history  of  the 
country.  It  is  now  generally  conferred  by  statutes  which 
also  prescribe  and  regulate  the  remedies  for  enforcing  the 
right.  Such  statutes,  it  has  been  judicially  determined,  are 
not  in  excess  of  the  legislative  power,  or  in  violation  of  any 
principle  of  constitutional  law.  These  statutes,  in  fact,  create 
a  lien  in  favor  of  the  injured  party  upon  the  animals  found 
trespassing,  and  provide  remedies  for  enforcing  the  lien.  Such 
remedies  are  clearly  within  the  province  of  legislation.  It  is 
competent  to  provide  that  the  owner  of  the  lands  shall  be 
indemnified  for  the  actual  damages  sustained,  and  shall  be 
paid  a  reasonable  compensation  for  keeping  the  animals  and 
for  making  the  seizure.  The  sums  so  awarded  are  not  in  the 
nature  of  a  penalty  for  the  trespass,  but  merely  indemnity  to 
the  party  injured.  The  temporary  seizure  and  detention  of 
the  property  awaiting  judicial  action,  is  not  in  violation  of  the 
constitutional  provision  directing  that  no  person  shall  be  de- 
prived of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law.^- 

§  104.    Possession  not  required  to  support  statutory  liens. 

— Some  statutory  liens  differ  from  common-law  liens  in  not 
requiring  possession  to  support  them.  The  protection  af- 
forded at  common  law  by  possession  is,  in  case  of  statutory 
liens,  afforded  by  notice  to  the  owner,  or  by  attachment  of 
the  property  within  a  limited  time.^^  A  statutory  lien  with- 
out possession  may  by  force  of  the  statute  have  the  same 

335,  §  73;  Mofat  v.  Henderson,   18  12  Cook  v.  Gregg,  46  N.  Y.  439; 

J.  &  S.  (N.  Y.)  211.  Rood  V.  McCafgar,  49  Cal.  117. 

113   Black.    Com.   7.  is  Quimby  v.  Hazens,  54  Vt.  132, 

per  Powers,  J. 


99 


LIENS    BY    STATUTE.  §     I06 


operation  and  efficacy  that  a  common-law  lien  has  with  pos- 
session.^* 

§  105.  Character,  operation  and  extent  of  lien. — The 
character,  operation,  and  extent  of  the  lien  must  be  ascertain- 
ed by  the  terms  of  the  statute  creating  and  defining  it ;  and  the 
courts  can  not  extend  the  statute  to  meet  cases  for  which 
the  statute  itself  does  not  provide,  though  these  may  be  of 
equal  merit  with  those  provided  for.^^  Thus  where  a  Hen  for 
taxes  is  given  by  statute^*'  to  every  agent,  guardian,  or  execu- 
tor who,  being  seized  or  having  the  care  of  lands,  pays  the 
taxes  thereon  for  the  benefit  of  the  owner,  in  order  to  main- 
tain such  lien,  he  must  show  that  he  was  seized  of  the  land 
or  had  the  care  of  it.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  he  advanced 
the  money  for  the  payment  of  the  taxes.  A  note  given  by 
the  owner  of  land  to  his  agent  for  money  advanced  for  the 
payment  of  taxes,  in  which  he  declares  that  he  recognizes  the 
existence  of  the  statutory  lien,  does  not  create  a  Hen  where 
none  would  exist  by  statute. ^'^ 

It  is,  nevertheless,  a  sound  rule  of  construction,  that  a  stat- 
ute giving  a  lien  is  regarded  as  a  remedial  statute,  and  is  to 
be  liberally  construed  so  as  to  give  full  eft'ect  to  the  remedy, 
in  view  of  the  beneficial  purpose  contemplated  by  it.^^ 

§  106.  Statutory  Hen — How  acquired. — A  statutory  lien  can 
exist  only  when  it  has  been  perfected  in  the  manner  pre- 
scribed by  the  statute  authorizing  it.  Thus,  under  an  act 
which  created  a  building  association,  and  provided  that  the 
shares  of  stock  should,  from  the  date  thereof,  be  a  lien  on  the 

1-1  B call  V.   White,  94  U.   S.  382,  le  Arkansas    Dig.   of   Stats.    1904, 

24    L.    ed.    173,     per    Clifford,    J.;  §   7131. 

Grant   v.   Whitwell,  9   Iowa   152.  17  Peay  v.   Feild,  30  Ark.  600. 

15  Copeland    v.    Kehoe,    67    Ala.  is  Eckhard   v.    Donohue,   9   Daly 

594;    Rogers    v.    Currier,    13    Gray  (N.  Y.)  214;  Hudler  v.  Golden,  36 

(Mass.)  129,  per  Metcalf,  J.;  Mur-  N.  Y.  446;  Weed  v.  Tucker,  19  N. 

phy    V.    Brown,    12    Ariz.    268,    100  Y.  422,  433;   Murphy  v.   Brown,  12 

Pac.  801.  Ariz.  268,  100  Pac.  801. 


§    loy  LIENS.  lOO 

real  and  personal  estate  of  the  corporation,  it  was  held  that 
the  mere  payment  of  the  subscription  for  shares,  without 
their  being  actually  issued,  did  not  create  a  lien  on  the  prop- 
erty of  the  association.^^  The  subscriber  became  entitled  to 
the  rights  of  a  stockholder  in  the  association  by  such  pay- 
ment, but  the  lien  did  not  necessarily  flow  from  the  relation 
of  stockholder  to  the  association.  It  was  necessary  under 
the  statute  that  the  stock  should  be  actually  issued  in  order 
to  create  a  lien  which  could  be  enforced  against  other  incum- 
brancers, for  the  statute  declared  that  the  stock  should  be  a 
lien  only  from  the  date  of  the  certificate. 

§  107.  Statutory  lien  may  be  modified  by  statute.— A  lien 
created  by  statute  may  be  taken  away  or  modified  by  a  sub- 
sequent statute.^*^  Such  a  lien  is  no  part  of  the  contract,  but 
merely  an  incidental  accompaniment  of  it.  It  derives  its 
validity  from  the  positive  enactment,  and,  therefore,  a  subse- 
quent statute  modifying  or  removing  the  lien  can  not  be  con- 
sidered as  in  any  manner  impairing  the  obligation  of  the  con- 
tract itself.  ''The  lien  is  but  a  means  of  enforcing  the  con- 
tract, a  remedy  given  by  law,  and,  like  all  matters  pertaining 
to  the  remedy,  and  not  to  the  essence  of  the  contract,  until 
perfected  by  proceedings  whereby  rights  in  the  property  over 
which  the  lien  is  claimed  have  become  vested,  it  is  entirely 
within  the  control  of  the  law-making  power  in  whose  edict  it 
originated.^^  A  repeal  of  a  statute  giving  a  lien  is  merely  the 
taking  away  of  a  remedy  afforded  by  the  statute;  it  does  not 
impair  the  obligation  of  the  contract. 

Thus,  the  lien  of  a  judgment  upon  real  estate  is  purely 
statutory,  and  it  is  within  the  power  of  the  legislature  to 
abolish  the  lien  at  any  time  before  it  has  ripened  into  a  title  by 
a  sale.     A  statute  abolishing  such  a  lien  does  not  take  away 

19  Winston  v.  Kilpatrick,  5  Daly  -O  Frost  v.  Ilsley,  54  Maine  345. 

(N.  Y.)  524,  affd.   in  the  Court  of      See  post,  chaps.  XXX-XL. 
Appeals,  1   N.  Y.  Week.   Dig.  569.  21  Frost  v.  Ilsley,  54  Maine  345, 

per   Barrows,  J. 


lOI  LIENS    BY    STATUTE.  §     Io8 

any  property,  or  affect  the  obligation  of  contracts,  but  simply 
affects  a  legal  remedy.^" 

§  108.  Repeal  of  statutory  lien. — The  repeal  of  a  statutory 
lien  defeats  the  lien  remedy,  although  at  the  time  of  the  re- 
peal the  proceedings  prescribed  by  the  statute  for  enforcing 
the  lien  had  been  instituted  and  were  pending  in  court. ^^ 
The  repeal  of  the  lien  remedy  does  not,  however,  impair  any 
personal  remedy  the  creditor  may  have  by  virtue  of  the  obli- 
gation of  the  contract  between  the  parties.  The  remedy  which 
the  law  affords  for  the  enforcement  of  contracts  constitutes 
no  part  of  the  contract  itself,  and  any  change  of  the  law 
which  does  not  amount  to  a  deprivation  of  all  effectual  rem- 
edy does  not  in  any  just  sense  impair  the  obligation  of  the 
contract.  A  lien  is  onh?^  a  cumulative  remedy  to  enforce  a 
contract,  and  is  as  much  within  legislative  control  as  any 
other  remedy  afforded  by  law.^^ 

But  if  a  lien  be  given  by  statute  to  be  enforced  as  another 
statutory  lien  is  enforced,  the  repeal  of  the  remedy  in  the 
latter  case  does  not  repeal  the  remedy  applicable  to  the  for- 
mer, if  there  be  no  words  in  the  repealing  act  which  include 
the  former.  It  was  so  held  where  a  statute  gave  a  lien  on  ani- 
mals for  feeding  and  sheltering  them,  the  lien  "to  be  enforced 
in  the  same  manner  as  liens  on  goods  and  personal  baggage 
by  innkeepers  or  keepers  of  boarding-houses. "^^  Chief  Justice 
Peters,  delivering  the  judgment  of  the  court,  said:  "That 
meant  enforcement  in  the  manner  then  existing, — not  as  it 
might  be  in  the  future  by  a  new  enactment.  A  reference  was 
the  readiest  way  to  describe  the  process  to  be  employed  for 

22  Watson   V.    N.   Y.    Central    R.       Scam.  (111.)  264;  Hall  v.  Bunte,  20 
Co.,  47   N.   Y.    157.  Ind.  304;  Martin  v.  Hewitt,  44  Ala. 

23  Bangor    v.    Coding,    35    Maine      418.     See  post,  §   1558. 

12),  56  Am.  Dec.  688;  Gray  v.  Carle-  24  Templeton   v.    Home    82    111. 

ton,   35    Maine  481 ;   Woodbury   v.  491.  per  Scott,  J. 

Grimes,  1  Colo.  100;  Templeton  v.  25  Collins    v.     Blake,    79    Maine 

Home,  82  111.  491;  Smith  V.  Bryan,  218,    9   Atl.    358;    Lord    v.    Collins, 

34  111.  .364;  Williams  v.   Waldo,  3  76  Maine  443. 


§    I09  LIENS.  102 

enforcement.  The  repeal  of  the  process  in  the  one  case  does 
not  repeal  the  process  in  the  other,  there  being  no  words  in 
the  act  of  repeal  including  the  latter.  Suppose  the  inn-hold- 
ers' lien  had  been  wholly  abrogated,  would  it  be  pretended 
that  the  lien  on  animals  would  fall  with  it?  There  is  no  de- 
pendency between  the  two  classes  of  liens  or  their  enforce- 
ment." 

§  109.  Rule  in  other  courts. — Other  courts,  however,  hold 
that  liens  which  have  become  fixed  rights  under  the  statutes 
creating  them  can  not  be  taken  away  by  repealing  the  stat- 
utes. If  the  lien  arises  directly  upon  the  performing  of  labor, 
or  the  doing  of  any  other  act,  the  lien  can  not  be  defeated  by 
subsequent  repeal.  If  the  lien  arises  upon  the  taking  of  some 
preliminary  step  to  enforce  it,  then  the  lien  can  not  be  de- 
feated after  such  step  has  ben  taken.^^  Thus,  a  mechanic's 
lien  which  has  attached  through  the  giving  of  notice,  or 
otherwise  complying  with  the  statute,  can  not  be  destroyed 
by  the  legislature  by  a  repeal  of  the  statute.  The  lien  in 
such  case  has  become  a  part  of  the  obligation  of  the  contract 
between  the  parties,  which  the  legislature  can  not  impair.^'^ 
Whenever  a  mechanic's  lien  is  created  for  material  furnished 
under  a  contract  for  the  erection  of  a  building,  the  right  to 
the  lien  becomes  a  vested  right  at  the  time  the  material  is 
furnished,  and  it  is  not  within  the  power  of  the  legislature  to 
afterwards  destroy  such  right  by  repealing  the  statute  under 
which  the  right  has  accrued. ^^     In  like  manner,   where  by 

26  Wabash  &  Erie  Canal  Co.  v.  the  state  declared  this  lien  was 
Beers,  2  Black  (U.  S.)  448,  17  L.  deemed  an  additional  reason  why 
ed.  327;  Streubel  v.  Milwaukee  &  the  statute  providing  for  the  en- 
Miss.  R.  Co.,  12  Wis.  67;  Hallahan  forcement  of  the  lien  should  be 
V.  Herbert,  11  Abb.  Pr.  N.  S.  (N.  regarded  as  entering  into  and 
Y.)  326,  4  Daly  (N.  Y.)  209,  affd.  forming  part  of  the  contract.  See 
57   N.   Y.   409;    Chowning   v.    Bar-  §  1558. 

nett,  30  Ark.  560.  2S  Weaver  v.  Sells,  10  Kans.  609; 

27  Handel  v.  Elliott,  60  Tex.  145.      Hoffman  v.  Walton,  36  Mo.  613. 
The   fact  that   the  constitution  of 


I03  LIENS    BY    STATUTE.         '  §     112 

statute  a  lien  is  acquired  by  performing  labor  in  carrying  on 
a  quartz  mill,  a  repeal  of  the  statute  after  the  lien  has  attached 
by  performance  of  the  work  does  not  defeat  the  lien.^^ 
Upon  this  principle  a  lien  is  not  affected  by  a  homestead  ex- 
emption, created  by  a  statute  subsequently  enacted,  or  by  a 
state  constitution  subsequently  adopted.  To  enforce  such  ex- 
emption as  against  an  existing  lien  would  be  obnoxious  to 
the  objection  of  impairing  the  validity  of  contracts,  and  in 
violation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.^*^ 

§  110.  Revival  of  a  lien. — A  lien  which  has  already  ex- 
pired by  limitation  is  not  revived  by  the  enactment  of  a  stat- 
ute enlarging  the  time  for  perfecting  such  a  lien.  The  legis- 
lature can  not  create  a  cause  of  action  out  of  an  existing 
transaction,  for  which  there  was  no  remedy  at  the  time  of  the 
enactment. ^^ 

§  111.    Statutory  liens  governed  by  the  law  of  forum. — 

Statutory  liens  are  regulated  by  the  law  of  the  forum,  and 
can  not  be  claimed  by  virtue  of  the  law  of  another  state.^- 
Not  only  is  the  enforcement  of  the  lien  dependent  upon  the 
law  of  the  forum,  but  its  existence  also.^^  The  statute  has  no 
extraterritorial  operation. ^^  The  lien  has  no  binding  opera- 
tion in  another  state  as  against  a  purchaser  of  the  property 
in  that  state  in  good  faith  for  a  valuable  consideration. 

§  112.  Statutory  liens  legal  rather  than  equitable. — Statu- 
tory liens  are  in  their  nature  legal  rather  than  equitable,  and 

29  In  re  Hope  Mining  Co.,  1  Montgomery  12  La.  Ann.  800;  Lee 
Sawy.  (U.  S.)  710,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  v.  Creditors,  2  La.  Ann.  599,  600; 
6681.  Wickham    v.    Levistones,    11     La. 

30  Townsend  Savings  Bank  v.  Ann.  702;  Cause  v.  Bullard,  16  La. 
Epping,  3  Woods  (U.  S.)  390,  Fed.  Ann.    107. 

Cas.  No.  14120;  Gunn  v.  Barry,  15  33  Cause  v.  Bullard,  16  La.  Ann. 

Wall.  (U.  S.)  610,  21  L.  ed.  212.  107. 

31  Thompson,  The  J.  R.  v.  Lewis,  34  Marsh's  Admr.  v.  Elsworth, 
31  Ala.  497.  2,1  Ala.  85. 

32  Swasey     &     Co.     v.     Steamer 


§112  ■  LIENS.  104 

legal  rather  than  equitable  proceedings  are  generally  pro- 
vided for  their  enforcement.  A  common  form  of  remedy  is  a 
legal  attachment.  Yet  in  some  states  the  statutory  remedy 
is  by  an  equitable  action  similar  to  an  equitable  action  for  the 
foreclosure  of  a  mortgage.  The  jurisdiction  of  a  court  of 
equity  invoked  to  enforce  a  statutory  lien  rests  upon  the 
statute,  and  can  extend  no  further.  Thus,  in  some  states, 
mechanic's  liens  are  enforced  by  ordinary  equitable  proceed- 
ings, resulting  in  a  decree  for  the  sale  of  the  property.  The 
equitable  jurisdiction  is  in  such  cases  created  by  statute,  and 
the  remedy  can  not  be  enlarged  by  the  exercise  of  the  gen- 
eral equity  jurisdiction  of  the  court.^^ 

35  The  South  Fork  Canal  Co.  v.    Gordon,  6  Wall.   (U.  S.)  561,  18  L. 
ed.  894.     See  post,  §§  1559-1561. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


AN  ATTORNEY'S  GENERAL  OR  RETAINING  LIEN. 


Sec.  Sec. 

113.  Attorney's     general     lien      a       131. 

common-law  lien. 

114.  General  lien  declared  by  stat-       132. 

utes. 

115.  Attorney's     lien     on     client's       133. 

papers. 

116.  Attorney's      lien      does      not       134. 

amount  to  a  pledge. 

117.  Attorney's    lien    on    life    in-       135. 

surance  policy. 

118.  Lien  extends  to  an  execution      136. 

in  attorney's  hands. 

119.  Lien  attaches  only  when  cli-      137. 

ent's  papers  come  into   at- 
torney's hands.  138. 

120.  Lien   may  attach   to  articles. 

121.  No   lien   on   client's  will.  139. 

122.  Presumption      of      attorney's 

lien. 
122a.  Inspection      of      papers      on      140. 
which   attorney   has   lien. 

123.  Lien    covers   general    balance       141. 

of  account. 

124.  Lien  limited  to  debts  due  him      142. 

as  attorney. 

125.  None  but  attorneys  can  have       143. 

Hen. 

126.  Lien  special  under  some  cir-      144. 

cumstances.  145. 

127.  Attorney's    general     lien     on 

papers.  146. 

128.  Discharge  of  attorney's   lien. 

129.  Agent    of    attorney    has    no       147. 

lien. 

130.  Lien    of    member    of    attor-      148. 

ney's   firm. 

lo; 


Lien  not  affected  by  clienf's 
assignment  in  bankruptcy. 

Lien  on  papers  can  not  be 
actively  enforced. 

Lien  enforced  by  execution 
or  order. 

Court  may  determine  exist- 
ence and  amount  of  lien. 

Application  for  surrender  of 
papers  to  client. 

Court  may  order  papers  of 
client    surrendered   to    him. 

Attorney's  lien  on  money  col- 
lected. 

Does  not  attach  to  money 
deposited   specially. 

Does  not  attach  to  papers  for 
services  rendered  to  an 
executor. 

Lien  on  money  recovered  on 
judgment. 

No  lien  until  money  collect- 
ed. 

Lien  on  money  collected  by 
award. 

Lien  prevails  over  claim  of 
assignee  of  judgment. 

Lien    of   associate    counsel. 

Whether  a  lien  or  right  of 
set-oflf. 

Lien  for  general  balance  of 
account. 

Attorney's  special  lien  on 
fund  in  court's  hands. 

Rule   in    Pennsylvania. 


113 


LIENS.  I06 


Sec.  Sec. 

149.  No  general  lien  upon  a  fund      151.     Attorney  can  not  hold  entire 

in  court.  sum  of  money  of  his  client 

150.  Court's   jurisdiction    over  at-                     for  his  fee. 

torneys.  152.     How  a  lien  may   be  pleaded 

I50a.  Summary       jurisdiction  of                      in  defense, 
courts   over  attorneys. 

§   113.     Attorney's  general  lien  a  common-law  lien. — An 

attorney's  general  lien  is  a  common-law  lien  founded  upon 
possession,  and  is  a  right  on  the  part  of  an  attorney  to  retain 
papers  or  other  property  that  may  have  come  into  his 
possession,  or  moneys  that  he,  in  the  course  of  his  pro- 
fessional employment,  has  collected,  until  all  his  costs  and 
charges  against  his  client  are  paid.  Like  other  common-law 
liens  springing  from  possession,  it  is  a  passive  lien,  a  mere 
right  of  retainer,  without  any  power  of  enforcement  by  sale. 
For  this  reason  it  is  frequently  called  the  attorney's  retain- 
ing lien. 

An  attorney's  lien  upon  papers  was  enforced  as  early  as 
1734.  In  a  case  where  an  attorney  had  been  employed  by 
one  who  became  bankrupt,  the  assignee  petitioned  that  this 
attorney  should  be  required  to  deliver  up  the  papers,  and 
come  in  and  prove  his  demand  pari  passu  with  the  other 
creditors.  Lord  Chancellor  Talbot  said:^  "The  attorney 
hath  a  lien  upon  the  papers  in  the  same  manner  against  as- 
signees as  against  the  bankrupt,  and  though  it  does  not  arise 
by  any  express  contract  or  agreement,  yet  it  is  as  effectual, 
being  an  implied  contract  by  law;  but  as  to  papers  received 
after  the  bankruptcy  they  can  not  be  retained,  and  there- 
fore if  the  assignees  desire  it  let  the  bill  be  taxed,  and,  upon 
payment,  papers  delivered  up." 

The  practice  of  protecting  an  attorney  by  a  lien  upon  the 
papers  and  moneys  of  the  client  in  his  hands  was  an  estab- 
lished one  in  1779.  In  that  year,  in  a  suit  before  Lord 
Mansfield,  in  which  it  was  sought  to  establish  a  lien  in  favor 
of  the  captain  against  the  ship  for  his  wages,  the  counsel 
1  Ex  parte   Bush,  7  Viner's  Abr.    74. 


I07  ATTORNEYS    GENERAL    OR    RETAINING    LIEN.  §     114 

instanced  the  case  of  attorneys  who  cannot  be  compelled  to 
deliver  up  their  client's  papers  until  their  fees  are  paid; 
whereupon  Lord  Mansfield,  interrupting  the  argument,  ob- 
served that  "the  practice,  in  that  respect,  was  not  very 
ancient,  but  that  it  was  established  on  general  principles  of 
justice,  and  that  courts  both  of  law  and  equity  have  now  car- 
ried it  so  far  that  an  attorney  or  solicitor  may  obtain  an 
order  to  stop  his  client  from  receiving  money  recovered  in 
a  suit  in  which  he  has  been  employed  for  him,  till  the  bill  is 
paid."^  Again,  in  the  same  year,  in  a  case  directly  involving 
the  question,  the  same  judge  said:  "An  attorney  has  a  lien 
on  the  money  recovered  by  his  client,  for  his  bill  of  costs;  if 
the  money  come  to  his  hands,  he  may  retain  it  to  the  amount 
of  his  bill.  He  may  stop  it  in  transitu  if  he  can  lay  hold  of 
it.  If  he  apply  to  the  court,  they  will  prevent  its  being  paid 
over  till  his  demand  is  satisfied.  I  am  inclined  to  go  still 
further,  and  to  hold  that,  if  the  attorney  gave  notice  to  the 
defendant  not  to  pay  till  his  bill  should  be  discharged,  a 
payment  by  the  defendant  after  such  notice  would  be  his 
own  wrong,  and  like  paying  a  debt  which  has  been  assigned, 
after  notice."^ 

This  lien  has  its  origin  in  the  inherent  power  of  courts 
over  the  relations  between  attorneys  and  their  clients  ap- 
pearing before  them.  The  same  power  which  authorizes 
courts  summarily  to  enforce  the  performance  by  attorneys 
of  their  duties  toward  their  clients  intervenes  to  protect  the 
rights  of  attorneys  as  against  their  clients.* 

§  114.  General  lien  declared  by  statutes. — In  this  country 
this  general  lien,  in  several  states,  is  declared  by  statute. 
Thus,  in  Alabama,^  attorneys  have  a  lien  on  all  papers  and 

2  Wilkins       V.       Carmichael,       1  v.  Crescent  City  Live  Stock  Land- 
Dougl.    101,   104   (1779).  ing    &c.    Co.,   41    La.    Ann.   355,   6 

3  Welsh  V.  Hole,  1  Dougl.  238.  So.  508. 

4  Butchers'      Union       Slaughter-  5  Civ.    Code   1907,   §  3011. 
house    &   Live   Stock   Landing   Co. 


§     114  LIENS.  1 08 

money  of  their  clients  in  their  possession,  for  services  rend- 
ered to  them,  in  reference  thereto,  and  may  retain  such 
papers  until  said  claims  are  satisfied,  and  may  apply  such 
money  to  the  satisfaction  of  said  claim.  In  Colorado,*'  a  lien 
is  given  to  attorneys  upon  any  money  or  property  in  their 
hands  belonging  to  their  clients  for  any  fee  or  balance  of  fee 
due  them.  In  Georgia,^  attorneys  have  a  lien  on  all  papers 
and  moneys  of  their  clients  in  their  possession,  for  services 
rendered  to  them,  and  may  retain  such  papers  until 
said  claims  are  satisfied,  and  may  apply  such  money  to  the 
satisfaction  of  their  claims.  In  lowa,^^  an  attorney  has  a 
lien  for  a  general  balance  of  compensation  upon  any  papers 
belonging  to  his  client  which  have  come  into  his  hands  in 
the  course  of  his  professional  employment  and  money  in  his 
hands  belonging  to  his  client.  It  has  been  held  that  this 
statute  is  not  extended  by  the  provisions  of  the  common  law 
but  is  in  lieu  thereof  and  fixes  the  rights  of  the  parties.  The 
statute  provides  for  the  only  lien  to  which  an  attorney  is 
entitled  and  to  obtain  it  the  requirements  of  the  statute 
must  be  observed. ^"^  In  Kansas, ^^  an  attorney  has  a 
lien  for  a  general  balance  of  compensation  upon  any  papers 
of  his  client  which  have  come  into  his  possession  in  the 
course  of  his  professional  employment,  and  upon  money  in 
his  hands  belonging  to  his  client.  In  Kentucky,^^  attorneys 
at  law  have  a  lien  upon  all  claims  or  demands  including  all 
claims  for  unliquidated  damages,  put  into  their  hands  for 
suit  or  collection,  or  upon  which  suit  has  been  instituted, 
for  the  amount  of  any  fee  which  may  have  been  agreed  upon 
by  the  parties,  or.  in  the  absence  of  such  agreement,  for  a 

c  Mills'   Ann.    Stats.   1912,    §   294.  lO^Ward  v.  Sherbondy,  96  Iowa 

See   Whitehead  v.  Jessup,  7   Colo.      477,  65  N.  W.  413. 
App.  460,  43  Pac.  1042.  n  Gen.  Stats.  1909,  §  435. 

»Code    1911,   §   3364.  12  Carroll's  Stats.  1909,  §  107.    T. 

10  Code  Ann.  1897,  §  321.  Harlan  v.   Bennett,  32  Ky.  L.  473, 

106  S.  W.  287. 


I09  attorney's  general  or  retaining  lien.         §   114 

fair  and  reasonable  fee  for  their  services.  In  Minnesota^^ 
and  Oregon,^*  an  attorney  has  a  lien  for  his  compensation, 
whether  specially  agreed  upon  or  implied,  upon  the  papers 
of  his  client  which  have  come  into  his  possession  in  the 
course  of  his  professional  employment,  and  also  upon  money 
in  his  hands  belonging  to  his  client.  The  Minnesota  statute 
makes  this  provision,  however;  whenever  an  attorney  refuses 
to  deliver  money  or  papers  upon  which  he  claims  a  lien,  the 
court  may  order  him  to  do  so,  conditional  upon  the  giving 
of  security  by  the  client,  or  it  may  inquire  into  the  facts,  or 
direct  a  trial  of  the  controversy  by  a  jury.^^^  In  North  Dako- 
ta,^^  an  attorney  has  a  lien  for  a  general  balance  of  compensa- 
tion in  and  for  each  case  upon  any  papers  belonging  to  his 
client  which  have  come  into  his  hands  in  the  course  of  his  pro- 
fessional employment  in  the  case  for  which  the  lien  is  claimed 
and  for  money  in  his  hands  belonging  to  his  client  in  the 
case.  In  Nebraska, ^^  Washington,^^  and  Wyoming,^^  an  at- 
torney has  a  lien  for  a  general  balance  of  compensation  upon 
the  papers  of  his  client  which  have  come  into  his  possession 
in  the  course  of  his  professional  employment,  and  upon 
money  in  his  hands  belonging  to  his  client.  In  South  Da- 
kota,^^  an  attorney  has  a  lien  for  a  general  balance  of  com- 
pensation in  and  for  each  case  upon  any  papers  belonging  to 
his  client  which  have  come  into  his  hands  in  the  course  of  his 
professional  employment  in  the  case  for  which  the  lien  is 
claimed,  and  for  money  in  his  hands  belonging  to  his  client  in 
the  case.  It  has  been  held  that,  under  the  statute,  the  right 
of  an  attorney  to  a  lien  is  dormant  until  actively  assert- 
ed.^^^ 

13  Gen.  Stats.  1913,  §  4955.  North-       Lewis     v.     Omaha     St.     Ry.     Co. 
rup  V.  Hayward,  102  Minn.  307,  113       (Nebr.),  114  N.  W.  281. 

N.   W.  701.  17  Remington      and      Ballinger's 

14  Ballinger  and   Cotton's   Codes      Ann.  Codes  and  Stats.  1910,  §  136. 
and  Stats.  1902,  §  1063.  is  Comp.   Stats.   1910,   §  3821. 

14a  Gen.   Stats.    1913,   §   4956.  19  Rev.  Code   (Pol.)    1903,   §   702. 

15  Rev.  Code  1905,  §  6293.  19a  Pirie  v.   Harkness,  3  S.   Dak. 

16  Ann.      Stats.      1911,      §      3607;      178. 


§  115 


LIENS. 


IIO 


In  Alaska,^*^  an  attorney  has  a  lien  for  his  compensation, 
whether  specially  agreed  upon  or  implied,  upon  the  papers 
of  his  client  which  have  come  into  his  possession  in  the 
course  of  his  professional  employment,  upon  money  in  his 
hands  belonging  to  his  client. 

§  115.  Attorney's  lien  on  client's  papers. — An  attorney 
has  a  lien  upon  his  client's  papers  for  a  general  balance  due 
him  for  services,  not  only  in  the  suit  or  matter  to  which  such 
papers  relate,  but  for  other  professional  matters.-^     Thus  he 


20  Carter's    Ann.    Code    1900,    ch. 
It,  §  742. 

21  Hollis  V.  Claridge,  4  Taunt. 
807;  Hughes  v.  Mayre,  3  T.  R. 
275;  Howell  v.  Harding,  8  East 
362;  Stevenson  v.  Blakelock,  1  M. 
&  S.  535;  McPherson  v.  Cox,  96 
U.  S.  404,  24  L.  ed.  746;  Leszyn- 
sky  V.  Merritt,  9  Fed.  688. 
Georgia:  Jones  v.  Morgan,  39  Ga. 
310,  99  Am.  Dec.  458.  Wisconsin: 
Howard  v.  Osceola,  22  Wis.  453; 
Chappell  V.  Cady,  10  Wis.  Ill; 
In  re  Wilson,  12  Fed.  235,  per 
Brown,  J.  New  Hampshire:  Den- 
nett V.  Cutts,  11  N.  H.  163;  Wright 
V.  Cobleigh,  21  N.  H.  339.  New 
York:  In  re  Knapp,  85  N.  Y.  284 
Ward  V.  Craig,  87  N.  Y.  550^ 
Prentiss  v.  Livingston,  60  How 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  380;  St.  John  v 
Diefendorf,  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
261.  Nebraska:  Elliott  v 
Atkins,  26  Neb.  403,  42  N.  W 
403;  Van  Etten  v.  State,  24  Neb 
734,  40  N.  W.  289;  Comp.  Stat 
1887,  ch.  708.  Illinois:  Sanders  v 
Seelye,  128  111.  631,  21  N.  E.  601 
Scott  v.  Morris,  131  111.  App 
605.  Louisiana:  Butchers'  Union 
Slaughterhouse  &c.  Co.  v.  Cres- 
cent City  Live  Stock  Land- 
ing      &c.       Co.,       41       La.      Ann. 


355,  6  So.  508.  \'ermont:  Hurl- 
bert  v.  Brigham,  56  Vt.  368; 
Hooper  v.  Welch,  43  Vt.  169,  5 
Am.  Rep.  267;  Hutchinson  v.  How- 
ard, 15  Vt.  544;  Walker  v.  Sar- 
geant,  14  Vt.  247;  Patrick  v.  Ha- 
zen,  10  Vt.  183.  Ohio:  Longworth 
V.  Handy,  2  Dis.  (Ohio)  75,  13 
Ohio  Dec.  47.    Texas:  Able  v.  Lee, 

6  Tex.  427;  Casey  v.  March,  30 
Tex.  180.  Arkansas:  Gist  v.  Han- 
ly,  33  Ark.  233.  Mississippi: 
Stewart  v.   Flowers,  44   Miss.   513, 

7  Am.  Rep.  707.  In  Arkansas  the 
statute  in  relation  to  the  attor- 
ney's lien  upon  judgments  is 
merely  declarative  of  the  law  as 
it  stood  at  the  time  of  its  enact- 
ment. It  does  not  have  the  ef- 
fect to  take  away  the  lien  upon 
papers  and  securities  which  the 
law  previously  gave.  In  Pennsyl- 
vania an  attorney  has  no  lien  for 
professional  compensation  on  a 
fund  paid  into  court,  but  he  may 
retain  papers  or  money  in  his 
hands  owned  by  his  client  until 
his  fees  in  the  particular  case  are 
paid  or  he  may  deduct  his  fees 
from  his  client's  money  before  he 
can  be  compelled  to  pay  over  the 
money  to  his  client.  Cain  v.  Hock- 
ensmith  Wheel  &  Car  Co.,  157  Fed. 


Ill 


ATTORNEY  S    GENERAL    OR    RETAINING    LIEN. 


§    ii6 


/  has  a  lien  upon  a  bond  or  mortgage  delivered  to  him  for  the 
purpose  of  obtaining  a  foreclosure  of  the  mortgage,  not 
only  for  his  costs  and  charges  in  that  proceeding,  but  for  any 
sum  due  him  from  the  client  for  other  professional  busi- 
ness;'" and  he  has  a  lien  upon  a  bond,  a  promissory  note,  or 
other  negotiable  paper,  or  upon  a  town  warrant,  or  other 
municipal  obligation  in  his  hands  for  collection.^^ 

§  116.     Attorney's  lien  does  not  amount  to  a  pledge. — 

But  although  the  documents  in  an  attorney's  hands  be  bonds 
or  notes,  payable  to  bearer,  his  lien  does  not  amount  to  a 
pledge;  for  the  only  right  he  has  over  them  is  a  right  to  re- 
tain them  till  his  reasonable  charges  against  his  client  are 
paid.  He  has  no  right  of  sale  as  a  pledgee  has.  His  lien 
upon  such  documents  is  valuable  in  proportion  to  their  value 
to  the  client.  The  more  embarrassing  the  attorney's  posses- 
sion is  to  the  client,  the  greater  the  leverage  the  possession 
gives  the  attorney.  In  the  case  of  the  ordinary  papers  in  a 
suit,  the  attorney's  lien  is  not  of  great  value,  except  in  case 
the  papers  are  of  intrinsic  value.     A  workman's  lien  upon  a 


992.  It  seems  to  be  uncertain 
whether  such  a  lien  exists  in  Mas- 
sachusetts. Simmons  v.  Almy,  103 
Mass.  33,  per  Colt,  J.  In  Newell 
V.  West,  149  Mass.  520,  21  N.  E. 
954,  it  was  held  that  an  agree- 
ment by  a  client  that  he  will  pay 
his  attorney  for  his  services  in 
collecting  certain  claims  a  fixed 
sum  of  money,  to  be  paid  out  of 
the  proceeds  of  such  claims  when 
collected,  does  not  operate  to 
transfer  to  the  attorney  any  inter- 
est in  the  claims.  In  this  case  it 
was  said,  however,  that  an  attor- 
ney receiving  moneys  for  his  cli- 
ent might  set  off  his  claim  for  serv- 
ices against  the  client's  claim  for 
the  money  collected;  but  in  this 
case   the   attorney,   having   collect- 


ed the  money  in  his  capacity  as 
administrator  of  his  client,  could 
not    assert   any   attorney's    liens. 

22  Bowling  Green  Sav.  Bank  v. 
Todd,  52  N.  Y.  489;  Newton  v. 
Porter,  5  Lans.  416,  affd.  69  N.  Y. 
133,  25  Am.  Rep.  152;  Osborne 
V.  Dunham,  (N.  J.),  16  Atl. 
231.  In  New  York  an  attorney 
has  a  lien  for  services  upon  his 
client's  cause  of  action  which  at- 
taches to  a  verdict,  etc.,  and  this 
is  true  even  where  the  client  is 
the  administrator  of  an  estate.  In 
re  Ross,  123  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  74, 
107  N.  Y.  S.  899. 

23  Howard  v.  Osceola,  22  Wis. 
453;  Sanders  v.  Seelye,  128  111.  631, 
21    N.   E.  601. 


§    117  LIENS.  112 

chattel  upon  which  he  has  labored  is  a  valuable  and  direct 
security,  because  the  owner  wants  the  chattel,  and  must  pay 
the  amount  of  the  lien  before  he  can  get  it  from  the  work- 
man. But  in  the  case  of  an  attorney,  his  lien  is  very  fre- 
quently upon  papers  which  have  no  intrinsic  value,  and  are 
not  even  indispensable  to  the  prosecution  of  the  suit  to  which 
they  relate. 

§117.  Attorney's  lien  on  life  insurance  policy. — Such  a 
paper,  however,  as  a  life-insurance  policy  belonging  to  a 
client,  would  seem  to  be  a  valuable  security  in  his  attorney's 
hands.  Thus,  a  solicitor  acted  for  his  client  in  obtaining  a 
re-assignment  to  his  client  of  a  life  policy  which  the  client 
had  mortgaged,  and  the  policy  and  re-assignment  came  into 
the  attorney's  hands  and  remained  there,  his  charges  not 
being  paid.  The  client  afterward  wished  to  borrow  money 
upon  the  policy,  but,  as  he  stated,  forgot  where  the  policy 
was.  Upon  application  to  the  insurance  office  a  certified 
copy  of  the  policy  was  issued,  and  the  client  executed  an 
assignment  to  the  person  who  loaned  him  the  money.  Due 
notice  of  the  assignment  was  given  to  the  insurance  com- 
pany, which  had  no  notice  of  the  attorney's  lien.  The 
lender  afterwards,  apparently  wanting  to  enforce  his  secur- 
ity, discovered  that  the  policy  was  in  the  hands  of  the  at- 
torney, and  that  he  claimed  a  lien  upon  it.  The  lender 
brought  suit  in  equity  to  have  the  policy  delivered  up  to  him, 
claiming  that  the  assignment  to  him  constituted  a  first 
charge  on  the  policy  and  had  priority  over  the  claim  of  the 
solicitor.  But  the  court  dismissed  the  suit.  Mr.  Justice 
Fry  observed  in  the  first  place,  that  the  assignee  prima  facie 
took  the  policy  subject  to  all  the  equities  under  the  general 
rule  applicable  to  every  assignee  of  a  chose  in  action.  He 
disposed  of  the  objection  that  the  solicitor  should  have  given 
notice  to  the  insurance  office  of  his  lien  by  pointing  out  that 
the  solicitor  had  no  right  to  the  fund  represented  by  the 
policy,    and   no   right    to    constitute    the    insurance    office    a 


113 


ATTORNEY  S    GENERAL    OR    RETAINING    LIEN. 


§   ii8 


trustee  in  his  behalf;  that  the  solicitor  had  merely  a  passive 
right  to  hold  the  policy,  the  piece  of  paper  constituting  the 
instrument,  until  his  claim  should  be  paid;  and  that  this  was 
in  fact  merely  a  right  to  embarrass  the  person  who  might 
claim  the  fund,  by  the  nonproduction  of  this  piece  of  paper. 2"* 
Finally  the  learned  judge  commented  upon  the  laches  of  the 
lender  in  not  requiring  the  production  of  the  policy  at  the 
time  of  the  assignment,  saying  that  he  ran  the  risk  of  its 
being  in  the  hands  of  some  person  who  might  have  a  lien 
upon  it. 

§  118,     Lien  extends  to  an  execution  in  attorney's  hands. 

— This  lien  extends  to  an  execution  or  a  copy  of  a  judgment 
in  the  attorney's  hands,  but  it  does  not  reach  to  the  judg- 
ment itself.^^  This  lien  rests  upon  possession,  and  there  can 
be  no  possession  of  a  judgment.^^  "It  is  but  a  decision  of  a 
court  upon  a  claim  made  by  one  party  against  another.     It 


24  West  of  England  Bank  v. 
Batchelor,  51  L.  J.  (N.  S.)  Ch. 
199. 

25  Wright  V.  Cobleigh,  21  N.  H. 
339.  A  clerk  of  court  who  has 
possession  of  the  papers  could  not 
probably  have  any  lien  upon  them, 
because  the  papers  are  public  and 
part  of  a  public  record.  In  a  note 
to  King  V.  May,  1  Doug.  193 
(1779),  Lord  Mansfield  desired  the 
bar  would  take  a  note  of  this,  that 
it  might  be  publicly  known.  "A 
case,  in  some  respects  similar,  oc- 
curred in  this  term,  when  I  hap- 
pened not  to  be  in  court,  but  I 
have  seen  a  very  accurate  note  of 
it.  It  came  on  upon  a  rule  to 
show  cause  why  an  attachment 
should  not  issue  against  the  de- 
fendant, who  was  clerk  of  assize 
on  the  Norfolk  circuit,  for  not 
obeying  a  writ  of  certiorari  to  re- 
move   an    indictment    for    murder, 

8 


and  a  special  verdict  founded  upon 
it.  The  defendant  insisted  that  he 
had  a  right  to  retain  the  record 
till  he  should  be  paid  his  fees  for 
drawing,  engrossing,  etc.,  which 
the  attorney  for  the  prisoner  re- 
fused to  do,  on  the  ground  of  their 
being  exorbitant.  However,  on 
the  attorney's  undertaking  to  pay 
as  much  as  should,  on  a  reference 
to  the  master,  be  reported  to  be 
due,  the  record  was  returned  into 
court,  upon  which  the  rule  was 
discharged."  Lord  Mansfield  said 
he  would  be  very  unwilling  to  de- 
termine that  a  clerk  of  assize  has 
a  lien  on  the  records  of  the  court 
for  his  fees,  for  that  he  foresaw 
great  inconvenience  from  such  a 
doctrine. 

26  Hough  V.  Edwards,  1  H.  & 
N.  171,  per  Martin,  B. ;  Patrick  v. 
Leach,  12  Fed.  661,  2  McCrary, 
(U.   S.)   635. 


§     119  LIENS.  114 

exists  but  in  intendment  of  law.  The  records  of  the  courts 
are  the  evidence  of  such  judgments;  but  these  are  public,  pre- 
served in  the  custody  of  public  officers,  over  which  neither 
the  attorney  nor  his  client  has  any  control,  and  of  which 
neither  has  any  rightful  possession.  The  execution  is  no 
such  representative  of  the  judgment,  as  to  give  to  the  holder 
any  control  over  the  judgment.  Neither  does  the  possession 
of  the  execution,  or  of  a  copy  of  the  judgment  by  the  at- 
torney, or  any  third  person,  disable  a  creditor  from  exercis- 
ing any  of  his  rights  as  such.  The  indispensable  requisite 
to  any  ordinary  lien,  possession,  is  wanting."^''' 

§  119.  Lien  attaches  only  when  client's  papers  come  into 
attorney's  hands. — This  lien  attaches  only  when  the  client's 
papers  come  into  the  attorney's  hands,^^  and  come  to  him, 
moreover,  in  the  course  of  his  professional  business. ^^  The 
lien  must  arise  from  professional  employment.^*^  Thus  he 
has  no  lien  on  papers  which  he  has  received  as  mortgagee^^ 
or  trustee  ;^^  but,  if  he  receives  the  papers  in  his  professional 
capacity,  it  does  not  matter  that  he  sustains  some  other  busi- 
ness relation  to  his  client.^^ 

Where  an  attorney  has  prosecuted  a  suit  and  recovered 
land  for  his  client,  and  the  latter  has  afterwards  sold  it  and 
taken  a  deed  of  trust  and  bond  for  the  purchase-money,  and 
has  made  the  attorney  a  trustee  in  the  deed  of  trust  and  de- 
livered the  papers  to  him,  the  attorney  has  a  lien  upon  the 
papers  for  his  services  in  the  suit;  and  if  the  client  brings  a 
bill  in  equity  for  the  removal  of  such  trustee  and  the  delivery 
of  the  papers,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  decide  upon  the 

27  Wright  V.  Cobleigh,  21  N.  H.  30  Worrall  v.  Johnson,  2  Jac.  & 
339,  per  Bell.  W.  218. 

28  St,  John  V.  Diefendorf,  12  3i  Pelly  v.  Wathen,  7  Hare  351, 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  261.  18  L.  J.     Ch.  281. 

29  Stevenson  v.  Blakelock,  1  M.  32  Ex  parte  Newland,  L.  R.  4 
&   S.   535;   Sanders   v.    Seelye,    128  Ch.  Div.  515. 

111.  631,  21   N.  E.  601.  33  King   v.    Sankey,   6    N.    &    M. 

839. 


115  attorney's    general    or    retaining    lien.  §    122 

existence  and  amount  of  the  lien  claimed  by  the  attorney, 
and  to  decree  such  delivery  on  payment  of  the  amount  of 
the  lien  found  to  exist;  and  it  is  proper  for  the  court  to 
decree  such  delivery  on  the  performance  of  this  condition, 
though  the  attorney,  by  neglecting  to  file  a  cross  bill,  can 
have  no  decree  for  affirmative  relief.^^ 

§  120.  Lien  may  attach  to  articles. — The  lien  attaches 
not  only  to  papers,  but  to  other  articles  which  come  into  the 
attorney's  hands  professionally,  such  as  articles  delivered 
to  him  to  be  exhibited  to  witnesses. ^^ 

§  121.  No  lien  on  client's  will. — An  attorney  has  no  lien 
on  his  client's  will,^^  nor  on  original  records  of  court.^'^ 

§  122.  Presumption  of  attorney's  lien. — There  is  a  pre- 
sumption in  every  case  that  an  attorney  has  a  lien  on  the 
papers  in  his  hands,  for  compensation  for  his  services  rend- 
ered. If  he  has  given  up  his  employment  and  withdrawn 
from  the  case,  he  will  be  entitled  to  such  lien,  unless  it  is 
shown  that  he  has  agreed  to  make  no  claim  to  compensation, 
or  to  claim  no  lien  for  his  services.^^     The  client  has  a  right 

34  McPherson  v.  Cox,  96  U.  S.  charge  of  the  solicitor  by 
404,  24  L.  ed.  746.  the    client.    In    the    former    case 

35  Friswell  v.  King,  15  Sim.  191.  it  is  said  that  the  client  is 
In  this  case  the  lien  was  enforced  entitled  to  an  order  for  the  de- 
upon  certain  copies  of  a  very  ex-  livery  of  the  necessary  papers  in 
pensive  book  used  in  evidence.  the   case    for   the    further   prosecu- 

36  Redfarn  v.  Sowerby,  1  Sw^nst.  tion  of  the  action,  subject  to  the 
84;  Balch  v.  Symes,  1  T.  &  R.  87.  solicitor's  lien,   and   subject   to   re- 

37  Clifford  V.  Turrill,  2  De  G.  delivery  after  the  hearing.  Cole- 
&  Sm.  1.  grave    v.    Manley,    T.    &    R.    400; 

38  Leszynsky  v.  Merritt,  9  Fed.  Wilson  v.  Emmett,  19  Beav.  233; 
688;  Finance  Co.  v.  Charleston  C.  Cane  v.  Martin,  2  Beav.  584.  But 
&  C.  R.  Co.,  48  Fed.  45.  By  in  case  the  client  discharges  the 
the  English  authorities  a  distinc-  solicitor,  the  latter  is  under  no 
tion  is  made  between  the  case  of  obligation  to  produce  the  papers, 
a  solicitor  withdrawing  from  a  or  to  allow  the  client  to  inspect 
case    and    the    case    of    the    dis-  them.     "The  discharged  solicitor," 


§     1 22a  LIENS.  Il6 

to  change  his  attorney  if  he  likes,  but  if  he  does  so  the  law 
imposes  certain  terms  in  favor  of  the  attorney;  namely,  that 
the  papers  in  the  suit  cannot  be  taken  out  of  his  hands  until 
his  reasonable  charges  are  paid.  The  things  upon  which  he 
claims  a  lien  are  things  upon  which  he  has  expended  his  own 
labor  or  money;  and  he  should  have  a  lien  in  the  same  way 
as  any  other  workman  who  is  entitled  to  retain  the  things 
upon  which  he  has  worked  until  he  is  paid  for  his  work.^® 

§  122a.     Inspection  of  papers  on  which  attorney  has  lien. 

• — Whether,  during  such  retention,  the  client  or  the  succeed- 
ing attorney  has  the  right  to  inspect  the  papers  is  a  ques- 
tion upon  which  the  authorities  are  not  in  harmony,  though 
the  weight  of  authority  seems  to  be  in  favor  of  such  right.*^ 
But  none  of  the  decisions  permit  an  inspection  of  the  papers, 
except  when  a  particular  suit  is  in  progress  and  the  papers 
pertain  to  that  suit.  Upon  an  application  for  an  order  of 
court  requiring  the  attorney  holding  the  papers  to  submit 
them  to  the  inspection  of  his  client  or  the  succeeding  at- 
torney, it  must  be  shown  that  a  particular  suit  to  which  the 
papers  pertain  is  in  progress.  A  general  allegation  that  the 
attorney  is  prosecuting  actions  against  his  former  client,  and 
that  in  such  actions  he  would  have  great  advantage  in  hold- 
ing possession  of  the  papers  which  he  had  received  as  attor- 

said  Lord  Eldon,  "ought  to  be  able  Oldfieid,    4    T.    R.    123;    Ex    parte 

to  make  use  of  the  nonproduction  Nesbitt,  2  Scho.  &  Lef.  279. 
of   the   papers    in   order   to   get   at  ^o  Ross   v.    Laughton,    1    Ves.    & 

what     is     due     him."       In     Massa-  B.   349;    Commerell   v.    Poynton,    1 

chusetts     it     is    held    that,     if    an  Swanst.    1.      Both    cases    are   much 

attorney      voluntarily     withdraws  shaken  by  Lord  v.  Wormleighton, 

from    a    suit,    he    is    not    entitled  Jac.    580;    Newton    v.    Harland,    4 

to      withhold     a     paper      in     his  Scott    (N.    R.)    769.      But    see,    in 

possession  and  prevent  it  from  be-  support     of     them,     Colegrave     v. 

ing  used  in  evidence  until  his  fees  Manley,   1  T.  &  R.  400;  Heslop  v. 

are  paid.    White  v.  Harlow,  5  Gray  Metcalfe,  3  Mylne  &  C.  183;  Cane 

(Mass.)    463.  v.   Martin,  2  Beav.  584;  Wilson  v. 

39  Ex  parte    Yalden,   4   Ch.    Div.  Emmett,  19  Beav.  233;  Finance  Co. 

129,  per  James,  L.  J.;   Mitchell  v.  v.   Charleston  C.   &  C.   R.   Co.,  48 

Fed.  45,  46  Fed.  426. 


117  ATTORNEYS    GENERAL    OR    RETAINING    LIEN.  §     I23 

ney  of  such  client,  and  that  an  inspection  of  such  papers  is 
necessary  for  the  proper  conduct  of  such  cases,  is  insuffi- 
cient, as  against  the  denial  of  the  attorney  that  there  is  any 
suit  pending  in  which  he  had  acquired  knowledge  as  attor- 
ney, or  to  which  the  papers  retained  by  him  relate,  and 
which  suit  he  is  now  prosecuting  against  the  client.  If  it 
were  shown  to  the  court  that  such  a  misuse  of  papers  was 
threatened,  contemplated,  or  made,  the  papers  would  be  at 
once  impounded  and  lodged  with  the  clerk.'*^ 

§  123.  Lien  covers  general  balance  of  account. — This 
lien  covers  the  attorney's  general  balance  of  account  as 
against  his  client,  and  is  not  limited  to  the  services  rendered 
in  the  particular  matter  in  which  the  papers  were  received. ^^ 
Upon  a  petition  by  an  assignee  in  bankruptcy  to  have  deeds 
and  papers  belonging  to  the  bankrupt  delivered  up  by  an 
attorney  who  claimed  a  lien  upon  them  for  his  general  bill, 
it  Y^as  objected  that  the  bill  should  be  limited  to  the  services 
rendered  in  the  particular  matter  in  which  the  papers  were 
received.  But  Eldon,  Lord  Chancellor,  said:^^  "The  gen- 
eral lien  must  prevail.  Different  papers  are  put  into  the 
hands  of  an  attorney,  as  different  occasions  for  furnishing 
them  arise.  In  the  ordinary  case  of  lien  I  never  heard  of  a 
question,  upon  what  occasion  a  particular  paper  was  put  into 
his  hands:  but  if  in  the  general  course  of  dealing  the  client 
from  time  to  time  hands  papers  to  his  attorney,  and  does  not 
get  them  again  when  the  occasion  that  required  them  is  at  an 
end,  the  conclusion  is  that  they  are  left  with  the  attorney 
upon  the  general  account.  If  the  intention  is  to  deposit 
papers  for  a  particular  purpose,  and  not  to  be  subject  to  the 
general  lien,  that  must  be  by  special  agreement:  otherwise 
they  are  subject  to  the  general  lien,  which  the  Attorney  has 
upon  all  papers  in  his  hands. 

■*i  Finance   Co.  v.   Charleston   C.  -^2  Finance   Co.   v.    Charleston    C. 

&  C.  R.  Co.,  48  Fed.  45.  &  C.  R.   Co.,  46  Fed.  426. 

43  Ex  parte  Ste^-ling,  16  Ves.  258. 


§    124  LIENS.  Il8 

§  124.     Lien  limited  to  debts  due  him  as  attorney. — But 

the  attorney's  hen  is  hmited  to  debts  due  to  him  in  the  char- 
acter of  attorney.  It  does  not  extend  to  general  debts.'** 
Accordingly,  the  hen  of  the  solicitor  of  a  railway  company 
for  his  costs  does  not  include  costs  incurred  in  relation  to  the 
promotion  of  the  company  before  incorporation,  such  costs, 
by  the  usual  clause  in  the  act,  having  been  made  a  statutory 
debt  to  be  paid  by  the  company.*^ 

§  125.     None  but  attorneys  can  have  lien. — No  one  who  is 

not  an  attorney,  solicitor,  or  barrister,  can  maintain  this  lien 
upon  papers.  A  real  estate  broker  has  no  hen  on  papers  and 
plans  placed  in  his  hands  for  the  purpose  of  effecting  a  sale 
of  the  property,  though  he  has  rendered  services  and  incur- 
red expenses  in  an  ineffectual  attempt  to  make  a  sale.^^  It 
was  claimed  that  the  position  of  a  real  estate  broker  in  re- 
gard to  papers  placed  in  his  hands  is  the  same  as  that  of  an 
attorney  or  solicitor  or  other  bailee  who  expends  time^or 
money  upon  the  property  of  a  bailor.  But  it  may  be  said, 
in  answer  to  this  claim,  that  the  lien  of  an  attorney  or 
solicitor  is  peculiar  to  his  profession.  It  is,  moreover,  a 
general  lien  for  his  balance  of  account,  and  not  a  particular 
lien  for  his  labor  or  expense  upon  that  particular  article,  such 
as  is  given  by  the  common  law  to  any  bailee  who  expends 
time  and  money  upon  the  property  of  another  at  his  request. 
The  real  estate  broker  does  not  perform  any  labor  upon  the 
papers  themselves,  such  as  would  give  a  particular  lien  at 
common  law.  Every  one,  whether  an  attorney  or  not,  has 
by  the  common  law  a  lien  on  a  specific  deed  or  paper  de- 
livered to  him  to  do  any  work  or  business  thereon,  but  not 
on  other  muniments  of  the  same  party,  unless  the  person 
claiming  the  lien  be  an  attorney  or  solicitor.^^ 

44  Worrall  v.  Johnson,  2  Jac.  &  4C  Arthur   v.    Sylvester,    105    Pa. 
W.  214,  per  Plumer,  M.  R.  St.  233. 

45  In   re    Galland,    L.   R.   31    Ch.  47  Hollis    v.    Claridge,    4    Taunt. 
Div.  296.  807. 


119  attorney's  general  or  retaining  lien.         §   126 

A  conveyancer  who  has  not  been  admitted  as  an  attorney 
or  solicitor  can  not  have  the  benefit  of  the  law  and  custom 
which  gives  the  latter  a  general  lien;  but  such  conveyancer, 
like  any  other  person,  may  have  a  lien  for  services  done  upon 
any  particular  paper. 

The  case  of  a  real  estate  broker  is  like  that  of  an  auctioneer 
to  whom  a  mortgage  was  delivered  for  the  purpose  of  ob- 
taining the  money  due  thereon,  and  he  made  several  applica- 
tions to  the  mortgagor,  but  received  no  money.  The  court 
of  Exchequer  held  that  he  had  no  lien  on  the  deed  in  respect 
of  the  charges  for  making  the  application.  Baron  Bolland 
said:^^  "The  distinction  is,  that,  where  any  work  is  to  be 
done  on  a  chattel  to  improve  it,  or  to  increase  its  value,  the 
lien  attaches;  but  where  it  is  merely  delivered,  as  in  this  case, 
to  make  a  demand  upon  it,  no  such  right  can  be  supported. 
My  opinion  does  not  rest  upon  principle  alone,  but  is  illus- 
trated by  the  cases  cited  of  the  trainer  and  the  livery-stable 
keeper.  A  livery-stable  keeper  is  easily  contradistinguished 
from  a  trainer  or  a  breaker.  The  breaker  or  trainer,  by 
the  exercise  of  his  labour  and  skill,  gives  to  the  horse,  de- 
livered to  him  to  be  broken  or  trained,  qualities  and  powers 
which  are  not  given  by  the  livery-stable  keeper." 

The  auctioneer  and  the  real  estate  broker  do  not  come 
within  the  rule  of  the  common  law  giving  a  lien,  unless  they 
show  work  done  upon  the  papers  upon  which  they  claim 
a  lien;  and  they  certainly  do  not  come  within  the  rule  giving 
a  lien  to  attorneys  upon  papers  in  their  hands. 

§  126.  Lien  special  under  some  circumstances. — Under 
some  circumstances  the  attorney's  lien  upon  papers  is  special, 
instead  of  being  general,  as  is  ordinarily  the  case.  The  at- 
torney has  a  lien  only  upon  such  papers  as  are  delivered  to 

48  Sanderson  v.  Bell,  2  Crompt.  tion  has  a  lien  on  the  proceeds  for 
&  M.  304.  A  broker  entrusted  with  his  commission.  Peterson  v.  Hall, 
a  note  and  mortgage   for  negotia-       61   Minn.  268,  63   N.   W.  733. 


§    127  *  LIENS.  I20 

him  for  use  in  his  professional  employment. ^^  If  he  has  re- 
ceived the  papers  for  a  specific  purpose,  not  connected  with 
his  professional  employment,  he  can  have  no  lien  on  them  for 
his  general  balance  of  account.  If  it  be  agreed  or  under- 
stood that  the  papers  are  delivered  for  a  specific  professional 
purpose,  a  specific  instead  of  a  general  lien  may  arise  for  the 
specific  service  rendered. ^^ 

§  127.  Attorney's  general  lien  on  papers. — An  attorney's 
general  lien  upon  papers  may  be  followed  by  a  particular 
lien  upon  the  judgment  recovered  by  the  use  of  them.  The 
former  lien  is  not,  however,  transferred  or  transmuted  into 
the  latter.  The  former  passive  lien  remains,  though  it  may 
be  of  no  value  after  judgment,  and  a  new  active  lien  arises 
upon  the  judgment.  Thus,  if  a  solicitor,  having  in  his 
possession  a  deed  belonging  to  his  client,  who  has  ceased  to 
employ  him,  produces  the  deed  in  a  suit  which  is  prosecuted 
by  another  solicitor,  the  former  solicitor  is  not  entitled  to  a 
lien  upon  the  fund  recovered  in  the  suit  for  his  general  pro- 
fessional charges  against  the  client,  but  at  most  only  for  his 
costs  in  that  suit.  So  long  as  he  held  the  deed,  he  had  by 
means  of  it  a  lien  for  his  general  professional  demands.  The 
lien  upon  the  deed  he  could  never  actively  enforce;  but,  hav- 
ing possession  of  it,  he  might  make  advantageous  terms  with 
the  client  who  wants  to  produce  it  in  evidence.  But  if  he 
voluntarily  produces  the  deed,  and  a  fund  is  secured  by  the 
use  of  it,  the  solicitor  is  not  entitled  to  a  lien  upon  the  fund 
so  obtained  for  his  general  professional  demands,  but  only 
for  his  costs  in  the  cause.  If  the  doctrine  were  otherwise, 
the  attorney's  lien  would  in  most  cases  extend  to  the  general 
balance  of  his  account  against  his  client,  and  would  not  be 
confined  to  his  costs  in  the  particular  cause  in  which  he  ob- 
tains judgment;  for  it  generally  happens  that  the  solicitor 

49  Balch  V.  Symes,  1  T.  &  R.  87;       See  also,   Ex  parte  Pemberton,   18 
Lawson  v.  Dickenson,  8  Mod.  306.       Ves.  282. 

50  Ex  parte  Sterling,  16  Ves.  258. 


121  attorney's  general  or  retaining  lien.         §   128 

has  in  his  hands  the  documents  necessary  to  establish  his 
client's  title.^^  The  lien  upon  the  fund  is  newly  created  and 
is  a  new  lien.  It  is  a  lien  for  the  solicitor's  costs  in  the  cause 
only,  but  a  lien  which  can  be  actively  enforced.  The  passive 
lien  upon  the  papers  used  in  a  cause  may,  perhaps,  continue 
as  before,  but  very  likely  may  be  of  no  value.^^ 

§  128.  Discharge  of  attorney's  lien. — An  attorney's  lien 
upon  papers  is  discharged  by  his  taking  security  for  his 
whole  demand,  or  by  his  agreeing  to  postpone  payment  for 
a  definite  time.  A  client,  after  having  settled  his  solicitor's 
bill  for  services  by  giving  notes  payable  in  three  years,  ap- 
plied to  him  before  the  notes  were  due  for  the  papers  in  his 
hands,  wishing  to  employ  another  solicitor.  The  solicitor 
declined  to  give  up  the  papers  unless  the  client  would  also 
pay  for  services  the  solicitor  had  rendered  him  in  his  capacity 
as  executor,  though  the  client  had  no  assets  with  which  to 
discharge  the  debt.  It  was  decreed  that  the  solicitor  should 
give  up  the  papers  upon  the  client's  paying  for  the  services 
rendered  after  the  time  of  the  settlement  and  the  taking  of 
the  notes.  Lord  Eldon  said  a  lien  on  the  papers  in  favor 
of  the  solictor  was  inconsistent  with  the  giving  of  credit  for 
three  years  by  means  of  the  notes. °^  Looking  at  the  gen- 
eral doctrine  of  lien.  Lord  Eldon  said:  "It  may  be  described 
as  prima  facie  a  right  accompanying  the  implied  contract." 
That  there  could  be  a  lien  when  there  is  a  special  agreement 
to  give  credit  upon  security  would  involve  a  contradiction  of 
the  agreement.     "My  opinion  therefore  is,  that  where  these 

51  Bozon  V.  Bolland,  4  Myl.  &  Todd,  52  N.  Y.  489,  aflfg.  64  Barb. 
C.  354.  Lord  Chancellor  Gotten-  (N.  Y.)  146,  seems  at  first  view  to 
ham  said  he  found  no  decision  to  sustain  a  contrary  doctrine.  This 
the  contrary  except  Worrall  v.  case  is  criticised  in  In  re  Wilson, 
Johnson,  2  Jac.   &  W.  214,   which  12  Fed.  235,  by  Brown,  J. 

he    could    not    reconcile    with    any  53  Cowell    v.    Simpson,    16    Ves. 

sound   principle.  275. 

52  Bowling    Green    Sav.    Bank   v. 


§    129  LIENS.  122 

special  agreements  are  taken,  the  lien  does  not  remain;  and 
whether  the  securities  are  due  or  not,  makes  no  difference."^* 

But  the  attorney's  lien  upon  papers  is  not  extinguished  by 
his  taking  a  note  or  acceptance  from  his  client  for  the 
amount  due  him,  unless  it  appear  that  the  note  or  acceptance 
was  given  or  received  in  payment  of  such  balance. ^° 

This  lien  is  lost  by  the  attorney's  voluntary  surrender  of 
the  papers  to  his  client;  for  possession  is  indispensable  to 
this  lien.^^  The  lien  is  lost  when  the  attorney  has  parted 
with  the  possession  of  the  papers  by  his  own  act,  even  though 
this  was  a  mistake  on  his  part.^'^  But  it  is  not  lost  by  a 
transfer  of  possession  to  an  agent,  for  the  possession  of  the 
agent  is  the  possession  of  the  principal;  and  it  is  not  lost  by 
a  transfer  to  another,  subject  to  the  lien.^^  If  the  papers 
are  obtained  from  him  wrongfully,  his  lien  remains,  and  he 
may  maintain  trover  for  them.^^ 

§  129.  Agent  of  attorney  has  no  lien. — An  attorney's 
agent  or  correspondent  has  no  lien  upon  the  papers  of  the 
client  for  the  balance  of  his  own  account  against  the  attor- 
ney, but  he  has  a  lien  upon  the  papers  in  his  hands  in  the 
particular  case,  for  the  amount  due  him  by  the  attorney  in 
that  particular  case  only.  To  this  extent  the  agent's  lien 
is  good  against  the  client.®* 

§  130.  Lien  of  member  of  attorney's  firm. — One  member 
of  a  firm  of  attorneys  has  no  lien  for  an  individual  demand 

54  Cowell    V.    Simpson,    16    Ves.      Dubois'  Appeal,  38  Pa.  St.  231,  80 
275;  also  Balch  v.  Symes,  T.  &  R.      Am.  Dec.  478. 

87;  Watson  v.  Lyon,  7  De   G.,  M.  57  Dicas   v.   Stockley,   7   C.    &   P. 

&  G.  288;   Stearns  v.  Wollenberg,  587. 

51   Ore.  88,  92  Pac.  1079;   Webster  58  Watson  v.  Lyon,  7  De   G.,   M. 

V.  Keck,  64  Neb.  1,  89  N.  W.  410.  &  G.  288. 

55  Stevenson  v.   Blakelock,   1    M.  59  Dicas   v.   Stockley,   7  C.   &   P. 
&  S.  535;  Dennett  v.  Cutts,   11   N.  587. 

H.  163.  60  Dicas   v.   Stockley,   7   C.   &  P. 

56  Nichols   V.    Pool,   89    111.   491;      587. 


123  attorney's  general  or  retaining  lien.         §   132 

upon  papers  of  a  client  in  the  hands  of  the  firm.  The  firm 
alone  has  a  right  to  hold  and  retain  the  papers,  in  such  case, 
and  the  firm  alone  has  a  right  of  lien  thereon."^  And  so  a 
solicitor  having  a  lien  for  his  account  upon  papers  which 
have  come  into  his  hands  professionally  from  a  client  acting 
in  his  individually  capacity,  cannot  retain  them  for  a  debt 
due  him  from  a  firm  of  which  the  client  is  a  member.^^  An 
attorney  cannot  have  a  lien  upon  papers  to  a  greater  extent 
than  his  client's  interest  in  them. 

§  131.  Lien  not  affected  by  client's  assignment  in  bank- 
ruptcy.— An  attorney's  lien  upon  papers  is  not  affected  by 
his  client's  assignment  in  bankruptcy  or  insolvency,  or  for 
the  benefit  of  creditors.  The  assignee  in  either  case  takes 
subject  to  the  attorney's  equitable  right  at  the  date  of  the 
assignment. ^^  The  lien  is  good  against  all  persons  claiming 
under  the  client. ^^  He  must  therefore  satisfy  an  attorney's 
lien  existing  at  that  time  either  upon  papers  or  money  col- 
lected, before  he  can  claim  the  papers  or  moneys  then  in 
the  attorney's  hands.^^ 

The  lien  is  not  lost  because  the  debt  in  respect  of  which 
the  lien  is  claimed  is  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations.^^ 

§  132.  Lien  on  papers  can  not  be  actively  enforced. — This 
lien  of  the  attorney  upon  his  client's  papers  can  not  be 
actively  enforced.  It  is  a  passive  lien.  It  amounts  to  a 
mere  right  to  retain  the  papers,  as  against  the  client,  until 
he  is  fully  paid.^^     The  papers  can  not  be  sold,  neither  can 

ci  Pelly  V.  Wathen,  7  Hare  351,  64  In  re  Gregson,  26  Beav.  87. 

14  Jur.  9;  In  re  Forshaw,  16  Sim.  65  18  Alb.  L.  J.  214. 

121;   Vaughan   v.   Vanderstegen,   2  66  in  re  Murray,  3  W.  N.  (1867) 

Drew    408;     Bowling    Green    Sav.  190. 

Bank  v.  Todd,  52  N.  Y.  489.  67  Bozon   v.    Bolland,   4   Myl.    & 

62  Turner  V.  Deane,  18  L.  J.  Ex.  C.  354,  per  Cottenham,  L.  C; 
343.  Heslop   v.   Metcalfe,   3    Myl.   &   C. 

63  Ex  parte  Bush,  7  Vin.  Abr.  183;  Colegrave  v.  Manley,  T.  &  R-. 
74;  Ex  parte  Sterling,  16  Ves.  258;  400;  Brown  v.  Bigley,  3  Tenn.  Ch. 
Ward  V.   Craig,  87   N.  Y.  550.  618,    per    Cooper,    C;    In    re    Wil- 


§     133  LIENS.  124 

the  possession  of  them  be  parted  with,  without  loss  of  the 
lien.  No  active  proceedings  of  any  kind  can  be  taken  either 
at  law  or  in  equity  to  enforce  the  lien  for  which  the  papers 
are  held. 

The  lien,  however,  continues  till  the  debt  for  which  the 
lien  exists  is  paid.^^ 

An  attorney's  lien  upon  a  promissory  note  in  his  hands 
for  collection  gives  him  no  right  to  a  judgment  against  the 
defendant  for  the  amount  of  his  fees  after  the  defendant  has 
paid  the  note  to  the  attorney's  client.^^ 

§  133.  Lien  enforced  by  execution  or  order. — Indirectly 
an  attorney's  lien  upon  papers  in  a  suit  for  his  fees  may, 
under  some  circumstances,  be  enforced  by  order  and  execu- 
tion. Thus,  where  the  plaintiff  in  a  suit  petitioned  the 
court  for  an  order  substituting  other  attorneys  in  place  of 
the  attorney  who  had  been  conducting  it,  and  directing  him 
to  turn  over  the  papers  in  his  hands  pertaining  to  the  action, 
and  there  being  a  dispute  in  regard  to  the  amount  of  the 
compensation  due  the  attorney,  the  court  ordered  the  plain- 
tiff to  file  a  bond  conditioned  to  pay  the  sum  that  should  be 
found  due  him,  and  referred  the  question  of  the  compensa- 
tion to  a  referee.  Upon  the  coming  in  of  the  referee's  re- 
port the  court  confirmed  it,  and  ordered  that  the  attorney 
should  have  execution  for  the  amount.  Upon  appeal  it  was 
held  that  the  court  had  power  to  compel  compliance  with  its 
own  order  in  this  manner,  though  it  might  also  have  pro- 
son,  12  Fed.  235,  per  Brown,  J.,  26  Sweeley  v.  Sieman,  123  Iowa  183, 
Alb.  L.  J.  271';  Cones  v.  Brooks,  60  98  N.  W.  571;  In  re  Gillespie,  190 
Neb.  698,  84  N.  W.  85;  Sweeley  v.      Fed.  88. 

Sieman,    123    Iowa    183,   98    N.    W.  68  Warburton    v.    Edge,    9    Sim. 

571;  Foss  v.  Cobler,  105  Iowa  728,      508;    Young    v.    English,    7    Beav. 
75  N.  W.  516.     There  is  no  equity       10;  In  re  Gillaspie,  190  Fed.  88. 
jurisdiction  of  suit  for  fees,  in  an  ^'^  Tillman   v.    Reynolds,  48   Ala. 

attempt  to  enforce  attorney's  lien.       365. 


125  attorney's  general  or  retaining  lien.         §   134 

ceeded  to  enforce  the  order  by  proceedings  in  the  nature  of 
contempt. '^'^ 

Where  the  cHent  offers  to  give  security  for  the  amount 
that  may  be  found  due  to  his  attorney,  the  latter  should  be 
ordered  to  deliver  up  the  papers  on  security  being  given, 
especially  if  there  be  any  doubt  in  regard  to  the  validity  of 
his  claim.''^^ 

§  134.  Court  may  determine  existence  and  amount  of 
lien. — It  is  sometimes  proper  for  the  court  to  determine  the 
existence  and  amount  of  the  lien,  and  to  establish  the  condi- 
tion upon  which  the  attorney  shall  deliver  up  the  property. 
Upon  a  bill  in  equity  for  the  removal  of  a  trustee  in  a  deed 
of  trust,  and  for  the  surrender  of  the  bond  secured  by  such 
deed  where  the  trustee  claimed  a  lien  upon  it  for  professional 
services,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  decide  on  the  existence 
and  amount  of  the  lien,  and  to  decree  such  delivery  on  pay- 
ment of  the  amount  of  the  lien,  if  one  be  found  to  exist.  If 
the  attorney  has  neglected  to  file  a  cross  bill,  he  can  have  no 
decree  for  afifirmative  relief;  but  it  is  proper  for  the  court  to 
establish  the  condition  on  which  the  delivery  of  the  bond  to 
the  complainant  shall  be  made,  and  to  require  such  delivery 
on  the  performance  of  that  condition.'''- 

A  litigant  is  not  debarred  of  his  right  to  change  his  at- 
torney by  having  agreed  to  pay  a  fee  contingent  upon  the 
amount  recovered.  Such  agreement  is  regarded  as  provid- 
ing for  the  mode  of  compensation  only.  On  a  motion  for  a 
substitution  the  court  will  grant  it  upon  the  client's  filing  a 
stipulation,  and  the  entry  of  an  order  declaring  the  atorney's 
claim  a  lien  to  the  extent  of  the  services  rendered,  the 
amount  to  be  afterwards  determined,  should  any  moneys  or 
judgment  be  recovered;  and  that  notice  of  the  lien  be  given 
to  the  other  party  to  the  suit.'''^ 

TO  Greenfield    v.    New    York,  28          72  McPherson   v.    Cox,   96   U.   S. 

Hun   (N.  Y.)  320.  404,  24  L.  ed.  746. 

71  Cunningham      v.      Widing,  5           73  Ronald  v.  Mut.  Reserve  Fund 

Abb.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)   413.  Life  Assn.,  30  Fed.  228. 


§    135  LIENS.  126 

§  135.     Application  for  surrender  of  papers  to   client. — 

Where  an  attorney's  lien  is  questioned  b)^  a  client,  upon  a 
summary  application  to  the  court  requiring-  the  attorney  to 
surrender  papers  intrusted  to  his  care,  the  question  of  the 
existence  and  amount  of  the  lien  may  be  determined  by  the 
court  or  a  referee  upon  a  proper  investigation.  The  court 
can  not,  upon  such  application,  disregard  the  attorney's 
claim  of  a  lien,  and  without  investigation  order  the  sur- 
render of  the  papers.  The  court  will  never  disregard  the 
right  of  the  attorney  or  deny  him  his  lien  where  it  has  justly 
attached.'^  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  if 
the  client  claims  that,  by  contract  with  his  attorney,  the  lat- 
ter upon  giving  up  his  employment  has  no  claim  for  compen- 
sation, and  therefore  should  surrender  the  papers  in  his 
hands,  the  fact  in  controversy  can  not,  except  by  consent,  be 
determined  by  the  court  in  a  summary  way.  It  must  be 
left  to  be  determined  in  a  suit  to  be  brought  by  the  attorney 
for  his  compensation;  the  lien,  if  any,  remaining  in  statu 
quo  meanwhile.  If  such  suit  be  not  brought  within  a  time 
limited,  or  be  not  then  diligently  prosecuted,  the  court  would 
order  the  papers  to  be  given  up.'^^ 

§  136.  Court  may  order  papers  of  client  surrendered  to 
him. — A  court  has  jurisdiction  to  order  a  solicitor  to  deliver 
up  his  client's  papers,  upon  the  client's  paying  into  court,  or 
upon  his  giving  security  in  a  sum  sufficient  to  answer  the 
solicitor's  demand,  before  this  is  adjusted,  where  his  reten- 
tion of  the  papers  on  which  he  claims  a  lien  would  embarrass 
the  client  in  the  prosecution  or  defense  of  pending  actions.'^* 
There  is  a  dictum  of  Lord  Romilly,  who  as  Master  of  the 
Rolls  was  very  conversant  with  these  matters,  in  these 
words:""     "Where  a  solicitor  sends  in  his  bill,   and  claims 

74  In  re  Attorney,  87  N.  Y.  521,  tg  In    re    Galland,    L.    R.   31    Ch. 

63  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  152.  Div.  296. 

"^5  Leszynsky  v.    Merritt,  9   Fed.  "^  In  re  Bevan,  33  Beav.  439. 

688. 


127  attorney's  general  or  retaining  lien.         §   137 

a  stated  balance  to  be  due  to  him,  the  cHent  is  entitled, 
as  a  matter  ahnost  of  course,  to  have  his  papers  de- 
Hvered  over  to  him  on  payment  of  the  amount  claimed 
into  court."  In  another  case  Lord  Romilly  again  states  his 
practice:''^  "The  course  I  adopt  in  all  these  cases  is  this: 
Where  a  sum  is  claimed  by  a  solicitor  to  be  due  to  him,  and 
some  delay  occurs  in  the  taxation  imputable  to  the  fault  of 
no  one,  I  order  the  papers  to  be  delivered  over  on  the  amount 
being  secured,  and  on  an  undertaking  to  produce  them  as 
required  in  the  course  of  the  taxation."  Mr.  Justice  Chitty 
stated  the  result  reached  in  the  case  before  cited  as 
follows  i"^^  "The  court,  in  the  exercise  of  its  discretion  says 
that  if  the  solicitor  is  completely  secured,  and  it  takes  care 
not  to  enter  upon  a  matter  of  controversy  as  to  the  amount, 
but  to  give  him  the  amount  which  he  claims  and  a  sum  to 
answer  the  costs  of  the  taxation,  it  is  inequitable  that  he 
should  be  allowed  to  embarrass  the  client  further  by  holding 
the  papers." 

§  137.  Attorney's  lien  on  money  collected. — An  attorney 
also  has  a  lien  upon  moneys  collected  by  him  on  his  client's 
behalf,  in  the  course  of  his  employment,  whether  upon  any 
judgment  or  award  or  not.^"     It  does  not  matter  that  there 

78  In  re  Jewitt,  34  Beav.  22.  v.  Bostick,  6  Humph.  (Tenn.)  321; 

79  In  re  Galland,  L.  R.  31  Ch.  Hurlbert  v.  Brigham,  56  Vt.  368; 
Div.  296.  Casey  v.  March,  30  Tex.  180;  Kin- 

80  Welsh  V.  Hole,  1  Doug.  238;  sey  v.  Stewart,  14  Tex.  457;  Able 
In  re  Paschal,  10  Wall.  U.  S.  483, 19  v.  Lee,  6  Tex.  427;  Stewart  v. 
L.  ed.  992;  In  re  Knapp,  85  N.  Y.  Flowers,  44  Miss.  513,  7  Am.  Rep. 
284;  Bowling  Green  Savings  Bank  707;  Lewis  v.  Kinealy,  2  Mo.  App. 
V.  Todd,  52  N.  Y.  489;  Longworth  33.  Contra,  Lucas  v.  Campbell,  88 
V.  Handy,  2  Dis.  (Ohio)  75,  13  III.  447.  It  seems  not  to  exist  in 
Ohio  Dec.  47;  Diehl  v.  Friester,  37  Pennsylvania  under  the  name  of 
Ohio  St.  473,  per  Okey,  C.  J.;  lien,  but  rather  under  the  name  of 
Cooke  V.  Thresher,  51  Conn,  a  right  of  defalcation.  Walton  v. 
105;  Burns  v.  Allen,  1  New  Eng.  Dickerson,  7  Pa.  St.  376;  Dubois' 
Rep.  143 ;  Dowling  v.  Eggemann,  Appeal,  38  Pa.  St.  231,  80  Am.  Dec. 
47  Mich.  171,  10  N.  W.  187;   Read  478. 


§     138  LIENS.  128 

is  no  express  agreement  as  to  the  rate  or  measure  of  com- 
pensation, or  as  to  the  source  from  which  this  should  be 
paid.  A  lien  upon  the  moneys  collected  may  be  implied 
from  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case.  Where  the 
client  is  insolvent  and  unable  to  contribute  to  the  disburse- 
ments in  the  proceedings,  it  can  not  be  doubted  that  there 
is  an  understanding  that  the  attorney  is  to  look  to  the  fund 
ultimately  recovered  for  reimbursement  of  the  money  paid 
by  him,  and  for  compensation  for  his  services.^^ 

§  138.     Does  not  attach  to  money  deposited  specially. — 

Such  lien  does  not,  how^ever,  attach  to  money  delivered  to 
the  attorney  by  his  client  for  a  specific  purpose,  such  as  the 
payment  of  a  mortgage,  to  which  the  attorney  agrees  to 
apply  it.^^  So,  if  the  money  is  delivered  to  him  to  apply  to 
the  settlement  of  a  suit,  he  can  not  retain  his  fees  out  of  it. 
Thus,  where  a  guardian  for  minors,  being  plaintifif  in  an 
ejectment  suit,  agreed  with  the  defendant  to  discontinue  the 
action,  and,  leave  of  the  Probate  Court  being  had,  to  convey 
to  him  the  interest  of  his  wards  in  the  land,  in  consideration 
of  the  payment  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  dollars,  and  the 
costs  of  the  petition  to  the  Probate  Court,  and  the  defendant 
deposited  with  his  attorney  in  the  ejectment  suit  one  hun- 
dred dollars,  taking  from  him  a  paper  acknowledging  the  re- 
ceipt of  the  money  as  "towards  the  settlement,"  such  de- 
posit is  a  special  one,  for  a  special  purpose,  and  the  attorney 
cannot  retain  his  fees  out  of  it.  The  plaintiff  having  peti- 
tioned the  court  in  which  the  ejectment  suit  was  pending  for 
an  order  requiring  the  attorney  to  pay  over  this  money,  the 
order  was  made  accordingly.^'  Chief  Justice  Durfee  re- 
marked that  the  money  was  left  with  the  attorney  and  re- 
ceived by  him  for  a  special  purpose.  He  could  not,  there- 
si  In  re  Knapp,  85  N.  Y.  284;  82  In  re  Larner,  20  Weekly  Dig. 
Scott  V.  Darling,  66  Vt.  510,  29  Atl.       (N.  Y.)  72. 

993.  83  Anderson  v.   Bosworth,   15   R. 

I.  443,  8  Atl.  339,  2  Am.  St.  910. 


129  attorney's  general  or  retaining  lien.         §   141 

fore,  consistently  with  his  agreement  or  duty,  apply  it  to  any 
other  purpose  without  leave  of  his  client.  The  equity  of 
this  view  was  the  stronger,  because  the  attorney,  by  giving 
the  receipt,  put  it  in  the  power  of  his  client  to  use  it,  in  effect- 
ing the  settlement,  as  so  much  money  in  the  attorney's 
hands. 

§  139.  Does  not  attach  to  papers  for  services  rendered  to 
an  executor. — Such  lien  does  not  attach  for  professional 
services  rendered  to  an  executor,  in  the  administration  of 
the  estate  of  the  decedent,  upon  property  belonging  to  the 
deceased  which  was  in  the  attorney's  hands  at  the  time  of 
the  decease  and  upon  which  he  then  had  no  lien.  The  at- 
torney's claim  in  such  case  is  against  the  executor  who  em- 
ployed him,  and  not  against  the  deceased  or  his  estate.^^ 

§  140.  Lien  on  money  recovered  on  judgment. — The  lien 
of  an  attorney  attaches  to  money  recovered  or  collected  by 
him  upon  a  judgment.^^  Upon  the  judgment  before  it  was 
collected,  he  had  a  lien  for  his  costs;  but  when  he  has  actual- 
ly collected  the  money  upon  the  judgment,  this  lien  is  satis- 
fied, and  a  new  lien  attaches  for  any  claim  he  may  have 
against  his  client  for  his  services  or  disbursements,  either  in 
the  cause  in  which  the  judgment  was  obtained  or  any  other.^^ 

§  141.  No  lien  until  money  collected. — The  attorney  has 
no  lien  upon  a  judgment  for  damages  until  he  has  collected 
the  money  ;^^  and  until  such  a  collection  his  client  may  re- 
ceive the  money  and  give  an  effectual    discharge    of    the 

84  Delamater      v.      M'Caskie,     4  4  N.  Y.  St.  631,  on  appeal,  12  N.  E. 

Dem.  Sur.  (N.  Y.)  549.     See  In  re  22.    Contra,  Burleigh  v.  Palmer,  74 

Knapp,  85  N.  Y.  284,  revg.  8  Abb.  Nebr.  122,  103  N.  W.  1068. 

N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  308;  In  re  Lamberson,  85  Wells  v.  Hatch,  43  N.  H.  246; 

63    Barb.    (N.   Y.)    297;    Barnes   v.  Bowling      Green     Sav.      Bank     v. 

Newcomb,  11  Weekly  Dig.  (N.  Y.)  Todd,  52  N.  Y.  489. 

505;  Matter  of  Robinson,  125  App.  S6  Wells  v.  Hatch,  43  N.  H.  246. 

Div.  (N.  Y.)  424,  109  N.  Y.  S.  827;  8T  See  Chapter  V. 
Piatt  V.  Piatt,  42  Hun  (N.  Y.)  659, 

9 


§    142  LIENS.  130 

judgment.     The  attorney's  general  lien   is  rendered  effect- 
ual by  his  possession  and  onh^  by  possession.^® 

§  142.  Lien  on  money  collected  by  award. — The  lien  of 
an  attorney  extends  to  money  collected  upon  an  award  as 
well  as  that  collected  upon  a  judgment.  Chief  Justice  Ken- 
yon,  so  deciding,  placed  his  decision  upon  "the  convenience, 
good  sense,  and  justice  of  the  things."  He  further  says, 
''The  public  have  an  interest  that  it  should  be  so;  for  other- 
wise no  attorney  will  be  forward  to  advise  a  reference."^* 

§  143.  Lien  prevails  over  claim  of  assignee  of  judgment. 
— This  lien  prevails  against  one  to  wdiom  the  client  has  as- 
signed the  claim  while  suit  is  pending,  if  the  consideration 
of  the  assignment  be  a  pre-existing  debt,  and  the  assignment 
be  made  in  a  state  where  a  pre-existing  debt  is  not  regarded 
as  a  valuable  consideration,  as,  for  instance,  in  New  York.^^ 
It  also  prevails  against  the  client's  assignment  for  the  bene- 
fit of  his  creditors.^^ 

§  144.  Lien  of  associate  counsel. — Associate  counsel  em- 
ployed by  the  attorney  in  a  suit  also  have  a  lien  for  their 
fees  where  the  attorney  has  such  a  lien;  or,  if  the  attorney 
collects  the  judgment,  he  may  deduct  not  only  his  own  fees, 
but  is  protected  in  the  payment  of  like  reasonable  fees  to 
other  attorneys  or  counsel  employed  in  the  suit.^^  But  coun- 
sel have  no  lien  on  a  judgment  recovered.  This  is  confined 
to  the  attorney  of  record. ^^ 

§  145.  Whether  a  lien  or  right  of  set-off. — It  is  a  matter 
in  dispute  whether  the  attorney's  claim  upon  moneys  col- 

88  St.  John  V.  Diefendorf.  12  9 1  Ward  v.  Craig,  87  N.  Y.  550, 
Wend.     (N.     Y.)     261 ;     Casey     v.      9  Daly  (N.  Y.)  182. 

March,   30  Tex.    180.  !»2  Jackson    v.    Clopton,    66    Ala. 

89  Ormerod  v.  Tate,  1  East,  464.      29. 

90  Schwartz  v.  Schwartz,  21  ^3  Brown  v.  New  York,  9  Hun 
Hun   (N.  Y.)  33.  (X.  Y.)  587. 


131 


ATTORNEY  S    GENERAL    OR    RETAINING    LIEN. 


146 


lected  for  his  client,  for  the  payment  of  any  indebtedness  of 
the  cHent  to  him,  rests  upon  the  law  of  Hen  or  the  law  of 
set-off.  The  courts  generally  declare  that  the  right  results 
from  the  law  of  lien;  but  some  courts  hold  that  it  results 
from  the  law  of  set-off.^^  Thus,  in  a  Pennsylvania  case,  it  is 
said  to  be  a  right  to  defalcate,  rather  than  a  right  of  lien.^^ 

§  146.  Lien  for  general  balance  of  account. — An  attor- 
ney's lien  upon  moneys  collected  extends  not  only  to  his 
services  and  disbursements  in  the  case  wherein  the  moneys 
are  collected,  but  also  to  pay  the  general  balance  due  him 
for  professional  services  and  disbursements.^^  He  may  re- 
tain money  to  a  reasonable  amount  to  cover  a  stipulated  fee 
in  another  case,  in  which  he  has  performed  only  a  part  of 
the  services,  if  in  good  faith  he  intends  to  perform  the  re- 
mainder.^''' 

In  some  cases,  however,  it  has  been  held  that  the  lien  of 
an  attorney  upon  moneys  of  his  client  secures  only  his  serv- 
ices in  the  matter  in  which  he  collected  the  money,  not  his 
services  about  other  business  of  his  client,^®  unless,  perhaps, 


94  Wells  V.  Hatch,  43  N.  H.  246. 

95  Dubois'  Appeal,  38  Pa.  St. 
231,  80  Am.  Dec.  478;  Balsbaugh  v. 
Frazer,  19  Pa.  St.  95;  McKelvy's 
Appeal,  108  Pa.  St.  615. 

96  Hurlbert  v.  Brigham,  56  Vt. 
368;  In  re  Attorney,  87  N.  Y.  521, 
63  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  152;  In  re 
Knapp,  85  N.  Y.  284;  Ward  v. 
Craig-,  87  N.  Y.  550;  Cooke  v. 
Thresher,  51  Conn.  105.  In  the  lat- 
ter case  the  client  had  orally 
agreed  that  the  attorney  should 
have  a  lien,  not  only  for  his  serv- 
ices in  that  case,  but  for  previous 
services.  Contra,  Pope  v.  Arm- 
strong, 3  Sm.  &  M.   (Miss.)  214. 

9"  Randolph  v.  Randolph,  34 
Tex.    181.    In    In    re    Paschal,     10 


Wall.  (U.  S.)  483,  19  L.  ed.  992, 
which  was  a  case  from  the  state  of 
Texas,  and  was  regarded  as  gov- 
erned by  the  laws  of  that  state 
on  this  subject,  the  lien  of  an  at- 
torney was  conferred  for  his  fees 
and  disbursements  in  the  cause  in 
litigation  and  in  proceedings 
brought  to  recover  other  moneys 
covered  by  the  same  retainer.  But 
the  court  did  not  undertake  to  de- 
cide whether  an  attorney's  lien  ex- 
tends to  the  whole  balance  of  his 
account  for  professional  services. 
98  Waters  v.  Grace,  23  Ark.  118; 
McDonald  v.  Napier,  14  Ga.  89; 
Pope  V.  Armstrong,  3  Sm.  &  M. 
(Miss.)  214;  Cage  v.  Wilkinson, 
3  Sm.  &  M.  (Miss.)  223. 


§    147  LIENS.  132 

in  case  such  other  business  is  covered  by  the  same  retainer.^^ 
The  lien  which  an  attorney  has  upon  his  cHent's  papers  is 
commensurate  with  the  client's  right  and  title  to  them.  If 
the  client  has  taken  to  his  attorney,  for  his  opinion,  papers 
which  the  client  has  received  from  another  person  for  in- 
spection pending-  negotiations  for  a  sale  of  property  or  other 
business  transaction,  the  attorney  can  not,  upon  a  claim  of 
lien,  retain  the  papers  as  against  the  person  to  whom  they 
belong.  Judge  Gibbs,  of  the  Court  of  Common  Pleas,  states 
a  similar  case,^  "suppose  one  having  a  diamond  offers  it  to 
another  for  sale  for  £100,  and  gives  it  to  him  to  examine, 
and  he  takes  it  to  a  jeweler,  who  weighs  and  values  it;  he 
refuses  to  purchase,  and,  being  asked  for  it  again,  he  says 
the  jeweler  must  be  first  paid  for  the  valuation;  as  between 
the  jeweler  and  purchaser,  the  jeweler  has  a  lien;  but  as 
against  the  lender,  he  has  no  right  to  retain  the  jewel." 

§  147.    Attorney's  special  lien  on  fund  in  court's  hands. 

— An  attorney  may  have  a  special  lien  upon  a  fund  in  court 
or  in  the  hands  of  a  receiver,  recovered  by  him,  and  a  court 
of  equity,  having  such  a  fund  in  its  possession,  will  protect 
the  attorney  in  retaining  out  of  it  a  reasonable  compensa- 
tion for  his  services.^  The  lien  in  such  cases,  however,  is 
not  one  for  a  balance  due  the  attorney  for  services  generally, 
but  only  for  his  services  in  recovering  that  particular  fund.^ 
There  may  be  circumstances,  however,  under  which  an  at- 
torney may  in  effect  be  given  a  general  lien  upon  money  in 
court  recovered  by  him.     Thus  where  the  amount  due  on  a 

99  In   re    Paschal,    10   Wall.    (U.  worth  v.  Handy,  2  Dis.  (Ohio)  75, 

S.)  483,  19  L.  ed.  992.  13  Ohio  Dec.  47;  Spencer's  Appeal, 

1  Hollis  V.  Claridge,  4  Taunt.  6  Sad.  (Pa.)  488,  9  Atl.  523;  Fowler 
807.  V.  Lewis'  Admr.,  36  W.  Va.  112,  14 

2  Central  Railroad  v.  Pettus,  113  S.  E.  447,  per  Brannon,  J.  As  to 
U.  S.  116,  28  L.  ed.  915,  5  Sup.  Ct.  the  law  in  Georgia,  see  Morrison 
387;  Cowdrey  v.  Galveston,  &c.,  R.  v.  Ponder,  45  Ga.  167. 

Co.,  93  U.  S.  352,  23  L.  ed.  950;  Olds  3  Fowler    v.    Lewis'    Admr.,    36 

V.  Tucker,  35  Ohio  St.  581;  Long-      W.  Va.  112,  14  S.  E.  447, 


133  ATTORNEY  S    GENERAL    OR    RETAINING    LIEN.  §    I49 

judgment  recovered  for  the  purchase-price  of  property  sold 
by  plaintiff  to  defendant  is  paid  into  a  court  of  equity  for 
distribution,  plaintiff's  attorneys  are  entitled  to  receive 
therefrom  the  money  due  them  from  plaintiff  for  meritorious 
services  rendered  by  them  to  him  in  other  suits  growing 
out  of  said  purchase,  where  such  services  were  rendered, 
with  the  expectation  that  they  would  be  paid  for  out  of  the 
proceeds  of  such  judgment.^  But  the  attorney  for  defendant 
has  no  lien  upon  a  fund  garnisheed  by  the  plaintiff.^* 

§  148.  Rule  in  Pennsylvania. — Even  in  Pennsylvania, 
where  an  attorney's  lien  upon  moneys  collected  is  hardly 
recognized  under  that  name,  but  is  called  rather  a  right  of 
defalcation,  a  court  of  equity  will  protect  an  attorney  who  is 
entitled  to  a  compensation  out  of  a  fund  within  its  control. 
Thus,  where  a  fund  was  brought  into  a  court  of  equity  by 
the  services  of  an  attorney,  who  looked  to  that  alone  for 
his  compensation,  the  court,  though  declaring  his  interest 
not  to  be  a  lien,  yet  regarded  him  as  the  equitable  owner  of 
the  fund  to  the  extent  of  the  value  of  his  services,  and  in- 
tervened for  his  protection,  awarding  him  a  reasonable  com- 
pensation to  be  paid  out  of  the  fund.^  What  is  a  reasonable 
compensation  the  court  may  determine  by  itself,  or  through 
an  auditor,  without  referring  the  matter  to  a  jury.^ 

§  149.  No  general  lien  upon  a  fund  in  court. — But  an  at- 
torney has  no  general  lien  upon  a  fund  in  court  recovered  by 

4  Claflin  V.  Bennett,  51  Fed.  pensation  to  the  counsel  engaged, 
693,  affd.  57  Fed.  257,  6  C.  C.  A.  in  his  sound  discretion,  according 
326.  to  his  estimate,  of  what  they  rea- 

4a  Phillips     V.     Hogue,     63     Neb.  sonably  deserve  to  have."   See,   to 

192,  88  N.  W.  180.  the  same  effect,  Dubois'  Appeal,  38 

5  Spencer's  Appeal,  6  Sad.  (Pa.)  Pa.  St.  231,  80  Am.  Dec.  478; 
488,  9  Atl.  523;  McKelvy's  Appeal,  Irwin  v.  Workman,  3  Watts  (Pa.) 
108  Pa.  St.  615;  Freeman  V.  Shreve,  357.  In  the  latter  case  the  fund 
86  Pa.  St.  135.  In  the  latter  case  Mr.  was  in  the  hands  of  the  sheriff. 
Justice  Sharswood  said:  "It  is  true  ^  McKelvy's  Appeal,  108  Pa.  St. 
that    a    chancelor    will,    out    of    a  615. 

fund    for    distribution,    order    com- 


§150  LIENS.  134 

him  for  his  client.  His  lien  in  such  case  is  a  lien  upon  the 
judgment,  and  is  a  special  lien  confined  to  his  costs  or  serv- 
ices in  the  particular  proceeding  which  produced  the  fund.'^ 
His  general  lien  depends  upon  possession,  and  does  not  at- 
tach to  a  fund  recovered  until  he  obtains  actual  possession 
of  that  fund.  If  the  attorney  collects  the  whole  fund,  then 
this  becomes  subject  to  his  general  lien;  if,  however,  he  col- 
lects only  such  part  of  the  fund  as  is  sufficient  to  pay  his 
costs  or  services,  for  which  he  had  a  lien  upon  the  judgment, 
then  the  amount  he  receives  is  applicable  to  such  costs  or 
services,  and  not  to  his  general  balance  of  account  against 
the  client. 

§  150.  Court's  jurisdiction  over  attorneys. — A  court  has 
summary  jurisdiction  over  attorneys  to  order  the  payment 
of  money  wrongfully  withheld  from  clients.  ''The  summary 
jurisdiction,"  said  Chief  Justice  Durfee  in  one  case,^ 
''evidently  originates  in  the  disciplinary  power  which  the 
court  has  over  attorneys  as  officers  of  the  court.  The  opin- 
ion seems  to  have  been  prevalent  at  one  time  that  the  juris- 
diction extended  only  to  attorneys  employed  as  such  in  suits 
depending  in  court,  to  hold  them  to  their  duty  in  such  suits; 
but  a  more  liberal  view  has  obtained,  and  it  is  now  well  set- 
tled that  the  jurisdiction  extends  to  any  matter  in  which  an 
attorney  has  been  employed  by  reason  of  his  professional 
character.^  In  general,  the  jurisdiction  applies  only  between 
attorney  and  client,  but  it  is  not  confined  strictly  to  that  rela- 
tion."^°  In  the  case  in  which  the  decision  was  rendered, 
from  which  this  quotation  is  taken,  the  petition  was  made, 
not  by  the  client,  but  by  the  opposite  party.     The  attorney 

">  Bozon  V.  Bolland,  4  Myl.  &  C.  357;  Ex  parte  Statts,  4  Cowen  (N. 

354;  Lann  v.  Church.  4  Madd.  391.  Y.)  76;  Ex  parte  Cripwell.  5  Dowl. 

8  Anderson    v.    Bosworth,    15    R.       Pr.   Cas.  689;   De   Wolf  v.  ,  2 

I.  443,  8  Atl.  339,  2  Am,.  St.  910.  Chit.  68;  In  re  Knight,  1  Bing.  91. 

9  In  re  Aitkin,  4  B.  &  Aid.  47;  10  In  re  Aitkin,  4  B.  &  Aid.  47; 
Grant's   Case,  8  Abb.   Pr.    (N.   Y.)  Tharrett  v.  Trevor,  7  Exch.  161. 


135  attorney's  general  or  retaining  lien.       §   150a 

had  received  money  from  his  client,  the  defendant  in  a  suit, 
to  be  applied  "towards  the  settlement"  of  the  suit,  and  the 
attorney  had  given  a  receipt  for  the  money  to  this  efifect. 
This  receipt  the  client  passed  over  to  the  plaintiff  as  so  much 
money  in  the  client's  hands  applicable  to  the  settlement. 
The  client  claimed  the  right  to  retain  his  fees  out  of  this 
money;  and  the  plaintiff  accordingly  petitioned  the  court  in 
which  the  suit  was  pending  for  an  order  requiring  the  at- 
torney to  pay  over  the  money.  The  court  held  that  a  case 
was  presented  for  the  summary  jurisdiction  of  the  court, 
and  that  it  had  discretionary  power  to  order  the  money 
paid  into  its  registry  by  a  day  named. ^^ 

In  an  early  case  in  New  York,  the  plaintiff's  attorney,  in 
a  qui  tam  action,  claimed  and  received  certain  costs  from  the 
defendant  in  partial  settlement  of  the  same.  The  costs  were 
taken  in  the  mistaken  supposition  that  the  defendant  was 
liable  to  pay  them.  Nearly  four  years  afterwards,  upon  his 
petition,  the  court  ordered  the  attorney  to  refund  them.^^ 

§  150a.    Summary  jurisdiction  of  courts  over  attorneys. — 

While  the  summary  jurisdiction  of  the  court  over  its  at- 
torneys is  sometimes  exercised  to  force  them  to  pay 
over  to  their  clients  money  wrongfully  withheld  from 
them,  it  is  also  exercised  by  the  courts  to  protect  attorneys 
in  their  rights  to  liens  on  the  client's  money,  property  or 
choses  in  actions  secured  and  upheld  by  the  services  of  the 
attorney.  While  litigants  have  an  undoubted  right  to  settle 
their  suits  and  dismiss  them,  the  courts  will  preserve  the 
liens  of  their  attorneys  against  fraudulent  and  collusive  set- 
tlements and  dismissals. ^-'' 


11  Anderson  v.  Bosworth,  15  R.  12a  Miedreich  v.  Rank,  40  Ind. 
I.  443,  8  Atl.  339,  2  Am.  St.  910.  App.    39,    82    N.    E.    117;    Kelly    v. 

12  Moulton  V.  Bennett,  18  Wend.  New  York  City  Ry.  Co.,  122  App. 
(N.  Y.)  586,  cited  in  Anderson  v.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  467,  106  N.  Y.  S.  894; 
Bosworth,  15  R.  I.  443,  8  Atl.  339,  2  In  re  Snyder,  190  N.  Y.  66,  82 
Am.  St.  910.  N.  E.  742,  14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  llOln, 


§     151  LIENS.  136 

§  151,  Attorney  can  not  hold  entire  sum  of  money  of  his 
client  for  his  fee. — An  attorney  who  has  collected  money  for 
a  client  can  not  hold  the  entire  amount,  and  refuse  to  pay 
it  over,  because  a  small  part  is  due  to  him  as  fees.  He  will 
be  allowed  to  retain  enough  to  cover  these,  but  no  more.^'^ 

If  an  attorney  retains  money  collected  for  a  client,  upon  a 
disagreement  as  to  the  amount  due  him  for  services,  and  the 
client  obtains  a  judgment  for  a  part  of  the  amount  retained, 
the  client  is  not  then  entitled  to  an  order  of  court  requiring 
the  attorney  to  pay  over  the  amount  of  the  judgment.  He 
has  by  obtaining  judgment  waived  the  right  to  a  summary 
process;  for  the  parties  no  longer  stand  in  the  relation  of 
attorney  and  client,  but  in  that  of  debtor  and  creditor.^* 
The  client's  remedy  is  either  by  suit  or  by  summary  process. 
"If  the  client  is  dissatisfied  with  the  sum  retained,"  says 
Chief  Justice  Black,  "he  may  either  bring  suit  against  the 
attorney,  or  take  a  rule  upon  him.  In  the  latter  case,  the 
court  will  compel  immediate  justice,  or  inflict  summary  pun- 
ishment on  the  attorney,  if  the  sum  retained  be  such  as  to 
show  a  fraudulent  intent.  But  if  the  answer  to  the  rule  con- 
vinces the  court  that  it  was  held  back  in  good  faith,  and  be- 
lieved not  to  be  more  than  an  honest  compensation,  the  rule 
will  be  dismissed,  and  the  client  remitted  to  a  jury  trial. "^' 

123  Am.  St.  533;  Northrup  v.  Hay-  bill,  was  ordered  to  give  up  a  por- 

ward,  102  Minn.  307,  113  N.  W.  701.  tion    of   them.    Charboneau   v.    Or- 

But    a    contract    for    a    contingent  ton,    43    Wis.   96;    Burns   v.    Allen, 

fee     providing     that     the     client  15  R.  I.  32,  23  Atl.  35. 

should  not  settle  the  case  w^ithout  i4  Windsor    v.    Brown.    15    R.    I. 

the    attorney's    consent   is    invalid.  182,    9   Atl.    135.      See    also,    In    re 

In  re  Snyder,  190  N.  Y.  66,  82  N.  Davies,    15    Weekly    Rep.   46;    Bo- 

E.  742,   14  L.   R.  A.    (N.   S.)    llOln,  hanan    v.    Peterson,    9    Wend.    (N. 

123  Am.  St.  533.  Y.)    503;    Cottrell    v.    Finlayson,   2 

13  Miller  V.   Atlee,   3   Exch.   799,  Code  Rep.  (N.  Y)  116,  4  How.  Pr. 

13   Jur.   431;    Conyers   v.    Gray,    67  (N.  Y.)  242. 

Ga.  329.   Under  the    English   prac-  i^  Balsbaugh    v.    Frazer,    19    Pa. 

tice,  a  solicitor  having  a  lien  upon  St.    95.      See    also,    In    re    Harvey, 

deeds  of  property  greatly  exceed-  14  Phila.    (Pa.)   287. 
ing    in    value    the    amount    of    his 


137  ATTORNEYS    GENERAL    OR    RETAINING    LIEN,  §    I52 

§  152.  How  a  lien  may  be  pleaded  in  defense. — In  a  pro- 
ceeding by  a  client  to  recover  money  collected  by  his  attor- 
ney, the  latter  need  not  set  up  in  his  answer  a  technical 
counterclaim  for  the  value  of  his  services;  but  it  is  suffi- 
cient that  he  alleges  the  performances  of  the  services  and 
their  value,  and  his  right  to  retain  this  sum  from  the  amount 
collected.  If  the  value  of  the  services  is  equal  to  or  exceeds 
the  sum  collected,  he  may  retain  the  whole  amount.^® 

10  Ward  v.  Craig,  87  N,  Y.  550. 


CHAPTER  V. 

AN  ATTORNEY'S   SPECIAL  OR   CHARGING  LIEN  ON  JUDGMENTS. 


Sec. 

Sec. 

153. 

Attorney's  lien  upon  a  judg- 

176. 

ment. 

177. 

154. 

Attorney's    lien    upon    judg- 

177a. 

ment  may  be  made  a  gen- 

177b. 

eral    lien. 

177c. 

154a. 

Prosecuting  attorney   has   no 

178. 

lien. 

179. 

155. 

Attorney's     lien    not     recog- 

180. 

nized  at   common  law. 

181. 

156. 

Time    and   manner   of   origin 

181a. 

of  attorney's   lien. 

182. 

157. 

Origin  of  lien  is  obscure. 

183. 

158. 

Attorney's  lien  on  judgment 

184. 

— General  rule. 

185. 

159. 

No  lien  in   several  states. 

186. 

160. 

California. 

187. 

161. 

Illinois. 

188. 

162. 

Massachusetts. 

189. 

163. 

Missouri. 

189a. 

164. 

Rhode    Island. 

189b. 

165. 

Attorney's     lien     limited     to 

189bb. 

taxable   costs. 

189c. 

166. 

Attorney's    lien    on    a    judg- 

189d. 

ment. 

190. 

167. 

Rule  in  United  States  courts. 

190a. 

168. 

Rule  extended  by  statutes. 

190b. 

169. 

Alabama. 

191. 

169a. 

Alaska. 

191a. 

170. 

Arkansas. 

192. 

171. 

Colorado. 

192a. 

171a. 

Connecticut. 

192b. 

171b. 

District   of  Columbia. 

192c. 

172. 

Florida. 

.  193. 

173. 

Georgia. 

173a. 

Idaho. 

194. 

173b. 

Illinois. 

195. 

174. 

Indiana. 

175. 

Iowa. 

Kansas. 

Kentucky. 

Louisiana. 

Maine. 

Massachusetts. 

Michigan. 

Minnesota. 

Oregon. 

Mississippi. 

Missouri. 

Montana. 

Nebraska. 

New  York. 

Present   code   of   New    York. 

Lien   on   cause   of  action. 

Ownership  of  costs. 

Attorney's    undefined    lien. 

Action  to   establish   lien. 

North    Dakota. 

Oklahoma. 
.  Oregon. 

South    Carolina. 

South    Dakota. 

Tennessee. 

Texas. 

Utah. 

Vermont. 

Virginia. 

Washington. 

West   Virginia. 

Wisconsin. 

Wyoming. 

No     lien     until    judgment    is 
entered. 

Default   not   a  judgment. 

Pending  appeal  will  not  pre- 
vent dismissal. 


138 


139 


ATTORNEY  S    SPECIAL   OR    CHARGING    LIEN. 


§    153 


Sec.  Sec. 

196.  Client      may    .settle      before  215. 

judgment. 

197.  Action    for    damages    settled  .    216 

by  parties.  217 

198.  Settlement     by     parties     will  218 

not    affect    attorney's    lien.  219 

199.  Attorney's    withdrawal    from 

case.  220, 

200.  Only  attorney   is   entitled   to  221 

a  lien.  222 

201.  Lien   by   contract.  223 
201a.  Attorney's    lien    on    fund    re- 
covered. 224 

201b.  Defendant's       attorney      can  225 

have    no    lien    on    fund.  226 

202.  No   lien   where   court    is    not  227 

court  of  record. 

203.  Settlement    in    fraud    of    at-  228 

torneys.  229 

204.  Collusion      between      debtor  230 

and   creditor.  231 

204a.  Waiver    of  attorney's    lien.  232 

205.  Court   of  admiralty. 

206.  Assignment    of    judgment.  233 

207.  Actions    not    assignable.  234 

208.  Action    founded    on    negotia-  235 

ble    instrument.  236 

209.  Notice    of    attorney's    lien.  237 

210.  Statutory    provisions     as     to  238 

notice    of    lien. 

211.  Notice    to    adverse    party.  239 

212.  Actual   notice   not   necessar3\ 

213.  Lien  on   damages   recovered.  240 

214.  Judgment   for  costs   only. 


Rule  in  court  of  the  king's 
bench. 

Rule    in    equity. 

Rule  in  the  United  States. 

Judgment  as  set-off. 

When  set-off  good  against 
the    attorney's    lien. 

Rule   in   some   of  the   states. 

Delay  in  objecting  to  set-off. 

Assignment   of  judgment. 

Equitable  assignment  of  the 
judgment. 

Lien    by   agreement. 

Lien    created   by  parol. 

Attornej'-'s    lien   assignable. 

Lien  superior  to  lien  of  at- 
tachment. 

Not  defeated  by  bankruptcy. 

Attorney's   lien   on   lands. 

Rule    in    some    states. 

Waiver   of   attorney's    lien. 

Attorney's  process  to  secure 
rights. 

Settlement   by  parties. 

The    English   practice. 

Application    to    protect    lien. 

Money   paid    into    court. 

Delay  in  asserting  Hen. 

Attorney  need  not  be  a  party 
to    the    record. 

Action  to  dissolve  partner- 
ship. 

Proceeding  to  wind  up  in- 
solvent insurance  com- 
pany. 


§  153.  Attorney's  lien  upon  a  judgment. — The  lien  of  an 
attorney  upon  a  judgment  is  properly  denominated  a  lien  in 
the  broad  sense  of  the  term,  although  it  rests  merely  on  the 
equity  of  the  attorney  to  be  paid  his  fees  and  disbursements 
out  of  the  judgment  which  he  has  obtained.  It  is  not  a  lien 
that  depends  upon  possession,  as  liens  ordinarily  do.  There 
can  be  no  possession  of  a  judgment,  for  this  exists  only  in 


§154  LIENS.  140 

intendment  of  law.  The  execution  issued  upon  a  judgment 
does  not  represent  the  judgment,  and  the  "possession  of  the 
execution  is  not  a  possession  of  the  judgment.^  In  regard 
to  possession,  this  lien  of  an  attorney  resembles  the  mari- 
time lien  of  a  seaman  upon  the  vessel  for  his  wages.  Both 
liens  are  exceptions  to  the  general  rule  as  respects  the  ele- 
ment of  possession. 

This  lien,  therefore,  not  arising  from  a  right  on  the  part 
of  the  attorney  to  retain  something  in  his  possession,  but 
being  a  right  to  recover  for  his  services  in  obtaining  a  judg- 
ment for  his  client,  is  called  the  attorney's  charging  lien.  It 
is  so  called  because  the  costs  and  fees  of  the  attorney  are 
made  a  charge  upon  the  judgment  recovered,  and  this  charge 
is  enforced  by  the  court.  Some  confusion  has  arisen  in  the 
decisions  on  this  subject  from  a  failure  in  many  cases  to  ob- 
serve the  distinction  between  the  retaining  lien  and  the 
charging  lien.  The  latter  lien  never  extends  beyond  the 
costs  and  fees  due  the  attorney  in  the  suit  in  which  the  judg- 
ment is  recovered;  but  a  retaining  lien  extends  to  the  gen- 
eral balance  due  the  attorney  from  the  client  for  professional 
services  and  his  disbursements  in  connection  therewith.^  In 
other  words,  the  charging  lien  is  a  special  lien,  and  the  re- 
taining lien  is  a  general  lien.^ 

§  154.  Attorney's  lien  upon  judgment  may  be  made  a  gen- 
eral lien. — By  agreement,  however,  the  attorney's  lien  upon 
a  judgment  may  be  made  a  general  lien  in  equity,  and  an 
oral  agreement  is  sufificient  for  this  purpose.  Thus,  where 
an  attorney  had  rendered  services  and  expended  money  in 
instituting  and  conducting  several  suits  for  a  client,  and  it 

1  Wright  V.  Cobleigh,  21  N.  H.  821;  In  re  Wilson.  12  Fed.  235,  per 
339;  Ward  v.  Wordsworth,  1  E.  Brown,  J.;  Goodrich  v.  McDonald, 
D.  Smith  (N.  Y.)  598;  Fowler  v.  41  Hun  (N.  Y.)  235;  Fowler  v. 
Lewis,  36  W.  \'a.  112,  14  S.  E.  447,  Lewis,  36  W.  Va.  112,  14  S.  E. 
quoting  text.  447,    quoting  text. 

2  Weed  Sewing  Machine  Co.  v.  3  Bozon  v.  Bolland,  4  Myl.  &  C. 
Boutelle,  56  Vt.  570,  48  Am.  Rep.  354. 


141  ATTORNEYS    SPECIAL   OR    CHARGING    LIEN.  §    155 

was  orally  agreed  between  them  that  the  attorney  might 
retain  so  much  of  the  avails  of  a  particular  suit  as  should  be 
sufficient  to  pay  for  all  his  services,  not  only  in  that  suit  but 
his  previous  services  in  other  matters,  and  the  attorney  had 
conducted  the  suit  to  a  favorable  conclusion  and  obtained 
judgment,  and  after  the  client's  insolvency  collected  the 
same  upon  execution,  it  was  held  that  he  had  an  equitable 
lien  upon  the  avails,  both  for  his  services  and  expenses  in 
the  suit  and  for  the  previous  services  covered  by  the  agree- 
ment,^ 

The  attorney's  lien  arises  generally  without  an  express 
agreement  therefor.  It  is  founded  upon  the  idea  of  a  con- 
tract implied  by  law,  and  is  as  effectual  as  if  it  resulted  from 
an  express  agreement.^ 

§  154a.  Prosecuting  attorney  has  no  lien. — The  lien  does 
not  exist  in  favor  of  a  prosecuting  attorney  who  in  his  offi- 
cial capacity  has  obtained  a  judgment  in  behalf  of  a  state  or 
municipal  corporation.  It  is  not  consistent  with  public  pol- 
icy to  allow  public  property  or  public  funds  to  be  detained 
or  seized  to  pay  the  debt  of  an  individual.^ 

§  155.    Attorney's  lien  not  recognized  at  common  law. — 

An  attorney's  lien  for  his  costs  is  not  recognized  at  common 
law,  but  only  in  equity,   unless   declared  by  statute."     The 

4  Cooke  V.  Thresher,  51  Conn.  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  511;  24  Am.  Rep. 
105.  327;    Merwin    v.    Chicago,    45    111. 

5  Ex  parte  Bush,  7  Vin.  Abr.  74;       133,  92  Am.  Dec.  204. 

Cowell   V.    Simpson,    16   Ves.    279;  "^  Simmons   v.    Almy,    103    Mass. 

Massachusetts    &    So.    Const.    Co.  33;   Baker  v.   Cook,   11   Mass.  236; 

V.    Gill's    Creek,   48   Fed.    145,    per  Getchell  v.  Clark,  5  Mass.  309;  Hill 

Simonton,    J.  v.    Brinkley,    10    Ind.    102;    Potter 

6  Wood  V.  State,  125  Ind.  219,  v.  Mayo,  3  Greenl.  (Maine)  34,  14 
25  N.  E.  190;  Wallace  v.  Lawyer,  Am.  Dec.  211;  Stone  v.  Hyde,  22 
54  Ind.  501,  23  Am.  Rep.  661;  Maine  318;  Hobson  v.  Watson,  34 
Bradley  v.  Richmond,  6  Vt.  121;  Maine  20,  56  Am.  Dec.  632;  For- 
Jenks  V.  Osceola  Township,  45  sythe  v.  Beveridge,  52  111.  268,  4 
Iowa    554;    Memphis    v.    Laski,    9  Am.   Rep.  612;   Compton  v.   State, 


§     155  LIENS.  142 

common  law  recognizes  only  liens  acquired  by  possession. 
A  lien  at  law  is  not  in  strictness  either  a  jus  in  re,  or  a  jus  ad 
rem,  but  simply  a  right  to  possess  and  retain  property  until 
some  charge  attaching  to  it  is  paid.  The  lien  of  an  attorney 
upon  a  judgment  is  an  equitable  lien. 

In  a  strict  sense,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  lien  upon  a 
thing  not  in  possession.  Baron  Parke  says  :^  "The  lien  which 
an  attorney  is  said  to  have  on  a  judgment  (which  is,  perhaps, 
an  incorrect  expression)  is  merely  a  claim  to  the  equitable 
interference  of  the  court  to  have  that  judgment  held  as  a 
security  for  his  debt."  More  recently  Chief  Justice  Cock- 
burn  expressed  the  same  view,  saying:*'  "Although  we  talk 
of  an  attorney  having  a  lien  upon  a  judgment,  it  is  in  fact 
only  a  claim  or  right  to  ask  for  the  intervention  of  the  court 
for  his  protection,  when,  having  obtained  judgment  for  his 
client,  he  finds  there  is  a  probability  of  the  client  depriving 
him  of  his  costs." 

Again,  Mr.  Justice  Erie  said:  "Lien,  properly  speaking, 
is  a  word  which  applies  only  to  a  chattel;  lien  upon  a  judg- 
ment is  a  vague  and  inaccurate  expression ;  and  the  words 
equitable  lien  are  intensely  undefined. "^^ 

An  attorney's  lien  upon  a  judgment,  as  by  force  of  usage 
we  are  permitted  to  designate  his  claim  upon  the  judgment 
recovered,  is  founded  upon  the  same  equity  which  gives 
to  every  person  who  uses  his  labor  and  skill  upon  the  goods 
of  another,  at  his  request,  the  right  to  retain  the  goods  till 
he  is  paid  for  his  labor. ^^    This  equitable  principle  is  derived 

38  Ark.  601;   Patrick  v.   Leach,   12  nWeed  v.   Boutelle,  56  Vt.  570, 

Fed.   661,   2    McCrary    (U.    S.)    635,  48  Am.  Rep.  821;  Turno  v.   Parks, 

per    McCrary.    J.;    Pride    v.    Smal-  2    How.    Pr.    (N.    S.)    (N.    Y.)    35; 

ley,  66  N.  J.  L.  578,  52  Atl.  955.  Shapley   v.   Bellows,   4   N.    H.  347, 

8  Barker  v.  St.  Quintin,  12  M.  &  per  Richardson,  C.  J.  The  lien  of 
W.   441.  an  attorney  upon  a  judgment  was 

9  Mercer  v.  Graves,  L.  R.  7  Q.  established  in  New  Hampshire  by 
B.    499.  the     above     decision.      Wright    v. 

10  Brunsdon   v.   Allard,   2   El.    &      Cobleigh,  21  N.  H.  339. 
El.    19. 


143  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §   156 

from  the  civil  law.  It  is  considered  reasonable  and  proper 
that  an  attorney,  by  whose  labor  and  at  whose  expense  a 
judgment  has  been  obtained  for  his  client,  should  have  an 
interest  in  that  judgment  which  the  law  will  regard  and 
protect. ^2  Lord  Kenyon  declared  "that  the  convenience, 
good  sense,  and  justice  of  the  thing  required  it." 

§  156.    Time  and  manner  of  origin  of  attorney's  lien. — 

The  time  and  manner  of  the  origin  of  this  lien  are  not  shown 
by  any  reported  case.  Probably  it  had  been  the  practice  of 
judges  to  aid  attorneys  in  securing  their  costs  out  of  judg- 
ments obtained  for  their  clients  before  the  right  to  the  lien 
had  been  formally  adjudicated.^^  It  was  doubtless  recog- 
nized upon  the  ground  of  justice  that  the  attorney  had  con- 
tributed by  his  labor  and  skill  to  the  recovery  of  the  judg- 
ment, and  the  court,  wishing  to  protect  its  own  officers, 
exercised  its  power  to  that  end;  or,  as  Lord  Kenyon  puts 
JJ..14  ''The  party  should  not  run  away  with  the  fruits  of  the 
cause  without  satisfying  the  legal  demands  of  his  attorney, 
by  whose  industry,  and  in  many  instances  at  whose  expense, 
those  fruits  are  obtained."  In  the  argument  of  a  case  before 
the  King's  Bench  in  1779,  before  Lord  Mansfield,^^  in  which 
it  was  sought  to  establish  a  lien  in  favor  of  a  captain  against 
the  ship  for  his  wages,  the  counsel  instanced  the  case  of  at- 
torneys, who  can  not  be  compelled  to  deliver  up  their  client's 
papers  until  they  are  paid;  upon  which  Lord  Mansfield  said 
that  the  practice  in  this  respect  was  not  very  ancient,  but 
that  courts  both  of  law  and  of  equity  had  then  carried  it  so 
far  that  an  attorney  might  obtain  an  order  to  stop  his  client 
from  receiving  money  recovered  in  a  suit  till  his  bill  should 
be  paid.  Sir  James  Burrough,  who  was  present,  mentioned 
to  the  court  that  the  first  instance  of  such  an  order  of  court 

12  In  re   Knapp,  85  N.  Y.  284.  Doug.  101,  104.     Some  years  after- 

13  Ex  parte  Bush,  7  Vin.  Abr.  74.  wards  this  lien  was  recognized  by 

14  Read  v.   Duppa,  6   T.    R.   361.  Chief   Justice    Wilmot    in    Sclioole 
i5Wilkins      V.       Carmichael,       1  v.  Noble,   1   H.   Bl.  23   (1788). 


§    157  LIENS.  144 

was  in  the  case  of  one  Taylor  of  Evesham,  about  the  time 
of  a  contested  election  for  that  borough;  and  Lord  Mans- 
field said  he  himself  had  argued  the  question  in  the  Court  of 
Chancery. 

Doubtless  the  lien  was  first  established  in  the  courts  of 
chancery.  Lord  Hardwicke,  in  a  case  before  him,  in  1749, 
said:^*^  "I  am  of  opinion  that  a  solicitor,  in  consideration  of 
his  trouble,  and  the  money  in  disburse  for  his  client,  has  a 
right  to  be  paid  out  of  the  duty  decreed  for  the  plaintiff,  and 
a  lien  upon  it.  *  *  *  and  it  is  constantly  the  rule  of  this 
court." 

§  157.  Origin  of  lien  is  obscure. — It  must  be  confessed 
that  the  origin  of  this  lien  is  obscure  and  uncertain.  The 
attempts  to  account  for  it  are  many  and  diverse.  It  seems 
from  Comyn's  Digest^^  that  it  was  founded  on  an  old  rule 
of  court,  that  a  client  should  not  discharge  his  attorney 
without  leave.  Lord  Kenyon  said  the  lien  depended  on  the 
general  jurisdiction  of  the  court  over  the  suitors. 

Baron  Parke  refers  to  Welsh  v.  Hole^®  as  the  first  case 
establishing  an  attorney's  lien  on  a  judgment.  This  lien  is 
declared  to  be  merely  a  claim  to  the  equitable  interference 
of  the  court  to  have  the  judgment  held  for  his  debt.^^  Baron 
Martin,  adopting  and  explaining  this  view,  says  the  right  of 
the  attorney  is  merely  this,  that,  if  he  gets  the  fruits  of  the 
judgment  into  his  hands,  the  court  will  not  deprive  him  of 
them  until  his  costs  are  paid.-"  These  definitions  are  adopted 
and  further  developed  in  a  recent  decision  in  Rhode  Island, 
Chief  Justice  Durfee  saying :^^     "Primarily,  without  doubt, 

le  Turwin  v.  Gibson,  3  Atk.  720.  21  Horton  v.   Champlin,   12  R.   I. 

1"^  Attorney,  B.  11;  also,  Bacon's  550,    34  Am.    Rep.    722.       And    see 

Abr.  Attorney  E.  Massachusetts  &  So.  Const.  Co.  v. 

18  1    Doug.    238    (1779).  Gill's    Creek,    48    Fed.    145.      The 

19  Barker  v.  St.  Quintin,  12  M.  attorney's  lien  includes  only  his 
&  W.  441.  taxable     fees     and     disbursements 

20  Hough  V.  Edwards,  1  H.  &  and  not  his  general  compensation. 
N.    171.  Tyler  v.   Superior   Court,  30  R.   I. 


145  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §   158 

the  lien  originates  in  the  control  which  the  attorney  has  by 
his  retainer  over  the  judgment,  and  the  processes  for  its 
enforcement.  This  enables  him  to  collect  the  judgment  and 
reimburse  himself  out  of  the  proceeds.  It  gives  him  no 
right,  how^ever,  to  exceed  the  authority  conferred  by  his  re- 
tainer. But  inasmuch  as  the  attorney  has  the  right,  or  at 
least  is  induced,  to  rely  on  his  retainer  to  secure  him  in  this 
way  for  his  fees  and  disbursements,  he  thereby  acquires  a 
sort  of  equity,  to  the  extent  of  his  fees  and  disbursements, 
to  control  the  judgment  and  its  incidental  processes  against 
his  client  and  the  adverse  party  colluding  with  his  client, 
which  the  court  will,  in  exercise  of  a  reasonable  discretion, 
protect  and  enforce.  And  on  the  same  ground,  the  court 
will,  when  it  can,  protect  the  attorney  in  matters  of  equit- 
able set-ofT.  We  think  this  is  the  full  scope  of  the  Hen,  if 
lien  it  can  be  called." 

§   158.     Attorney's  lien   on  judgment — General   rule. — It 

may  be  stated  as  a  general  rule  that  an  attorney  has  a  lien 
upon  a  judgment  obtained  for  his  client  for  his  costs  in  the 
suit.  In  most  of  the  states  this  rule  was  first  established  by 
the  courts.  In  some  states  the  lien  did  not  exist  till  it  was 
declared  by  statute;  and  in  several  states,  in  which  the  courts 
had  established  the  lien,  this  has  by  statute  been  extended 
or  modified  so  that  it  is  quite  a  different  thing  from  the  lien 
which  the  courts  established  and  enforced.  A  summary 
statement  in  a  note  hereto  annexed  shows  in  what  states 
this  lien  prevails  in  some  form;^-  but  it  will  be  necessary 

107,   73  Atl.  467,  23   L.   R.   A.    (N.  Gager   v.    Watson,    11    Conn.    168; 

S.)  1045.    The  lien  does  not  attach  Andrews   v.    Morse,    12    Conn.   444, 

until  judgment  is  rendered.     Tyler  31  Am.  Dec.  752;  Benjamin  v.  Ben- 

V.  Superior  Court,  30  R.  I.  107,  7Z  jamin,     17    Conn.     110;    Cooke    v. 

Atl.  467,  23  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   1045.  Thresher,    51    Conn.    105.      District 

22  The    lien   exists   in — Alabama:  of  Columbia:    see  §  171b.     Florida: 

see  §169.     Alaska:  see  §  169a.    Ar-  see    §    172.      Georgia:     see    §    173. 

kansas:  see  §   170.     Colorado:    see  Idaho:     see    §    173a.      Illinois:    see 

§    171.      Connecticut:     see    §    171a;  §  173b.     Indiana:    see  §  174.    Iowa: 

10 


§  159 


LIENS. 


146 


hereafter  to  refer  in  detail  to  the  legislation  and  the  adjudi- 
cations in  those  states  where  the  attorney's  lien  on  a  judg- 
ment has  been  materially  changed. 

§  159.     No  lien  in  several  states. — In  several   states  the 
lien  does  not  exist.''^     In  most  of  these  states  an  attorney  is 


see  §  175.  Kansas:  see  §  176. 
Kentucky:  see  §  177.  Louisiana: 
see  §  177a.  Maine:  see  §  177b; 
Hobson  V.  Watson,  34  Maine  20, 
56  Am.  Dec.  632;  Newbert  v.  Cun- 
ningham, 50  Maine  231,  79  Am. 
Dec.  612;  Stratton  v.  Hussey,  62 
Maine  286.  The  lien  extends  to 
fees  in  suits  incidental  to  the  judg- 
ment obtained.  Newbert  v.  Cun- 
ningham), 50  Maine  231,  79  Am. 
Dec.  612.  Maryland:  In  Marshall 
V.  Cooper,  43  Md.  46  (1875),  the 
court  said  that  no  case  involving 
the  question  of  the  attorney's  lien 
had  arisen  or  been  decided  in  the 
appellate  court.  In  Stokes's  Case, 
1  Bland  (Md.)  98,  the  Chancellor 
said  that  contracts  between  solici- 
tors and  suitors  must  be  decided 
like  other  contracts.  Massachu- 
setts: see  §§  162,  177c.  Michigan: 
see  §  178.  Minnesota:  see  §  179. 
Mississippi:  see  §  1'81 ;  Stewart  v. 
Flowers,  44  Miss.  513,  7  Am.  Rep, 
707;  Pope  v.  Armstrong,  3  Sm.  & 
M.  (Miss.)  214;  Cage  v.  Wilkinson, 
3  Sm.  &  M.  (Miss.)  223.  Missouri: 
see  §  181a.  Montana:  see  §  182. 
Nebraska:  see  §  183.  New  Hamp- 
shire: Young  V.  Dearborn,  27  N. 
H.  324;  Currier  v.  Boston  &  M.  R. 
Co.,  37  N.  H.  223;  Wells  v.  Hatch, 
43  N.  H.  246;  Whitcomb  v.  Straw, 
62  N.  H.  650.  New  Jersey:  Barnes 
V.  Taylor,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  467;  Braden 
V.  Ward,  42  N.  J.  L.  518;  Heister 
V.  Mount,  17  N.  J.  L.  438;  Johnson 


V.  Johnson  Railroad  Signal  Co., 
57  N.  J.  Eq.  79,  40  Atl.  193;  Pride 
V.  Smalley,  66  N.  J.  L.  578,  52  Atl. 
955;  Hudson  Trust  &  Savings  Inst. 
V.  Carr-Curran  Paper  Mills  (N. 
J.).  44  Atl.  638;  Campbell  v. 
Terney,  7  N.  J.  L.  J.  189; 
Bracher  v.  Olds,  60  N.  J.  Eq.  449, 
46  Atl.  770.  New  York:  see  §§ 
184-189.  North  Dakota:  see  § 
189a.  Oklahoma:  see  §  189b. 
Oregon :  see  §  180.  Rhode  Island : 
see  §  164.  South  Carolina:  see 
§  189c ;  Scharlock  v.  Oland,  1  Rich. 
(S.  Car.)  207;  Miller  v.  New- 
ell, 20  S.  Car.  123,  128,  47  Am.  Rep. 
833.  South  Dakota:  see  §  189d. 
Tennessee:  see  §  190.  Texas:  see 
§  190a.  Utah:  see  §  190b.  Ver- 
mont: see  §  191.  Virginia:  see 
191a.  Washington:  see  §  192.  West 
Virginia:  see  §  192a.  Wisconsin: 
see  §  192b.  Wyoming:  see  §  192c. 
23  The  lien  does  not  exist  in: 
California:  see  §  160.  Nevada:  Ap- 
parently the  lien  does  not  exist. 
North  Carolina:  Apparently  the 
lien  does  not  exist.  Ohio:  Does 
not  exist.  Diehl  v.  Friester,  37 
Ohio  St.  473.  But  it  is  held  in 
the  absence  of  a  statute  that  the 
attorney  has  a  lien  on  a  judgment 
obtained  by  him  for  his  client  for 
reasonable  fees  agreed  to  be  paid 
and  that  an  assignment  of  the 
judgment  will  not  defeat  the  at- 
torney. Hinman  v.  Rogers,  4  Ohio 
Dec.  303.     He  may  have  a  lien  for 


147 


ATTORNEY  S    SPECIAL    OR    CHARGING    LIEN. 


l6l 


not  entitled  to  any  taxable  costs,  and,  the  lien  being  in  gen- 
eral limited  to  such  costs,  it  can  not  exist  except  by  force 
of  special  statutes  where  there  are  no  such  costs.  Gener- 
ally there  can  be  no  lien  for  unliquidated  fees,  or  for  fees 
agreed  upon,  unless  the  right  be  conferred  by  statute.^^ 


§  160.  California. — There  is  no  statute  giving  costs  to 
the  attorneys;  and,  inasmuch  as  the  lien  can  not  be  extended 
to  cover  a  quantum  meruit  compensation,  an  attorney  in 
this  state  has  no  lien  on  a  judgment  recovered  by  him.^^ 

§  161.  Illinois. — Formerly  an  attorney  had  no  lien  upon 
a  judgment  for  his  fees  in  the  litigation  resulting  in  its  re- 
covery ;^'^  but  a  recent  statute-'^  gives  attorney's  liens  upon  all 
claims,  demands  and  causes  of  action  placed  in  their  hands 


his  fees  on  a  fund  in  the  hands 
of      his       client.  Pennsylvania 

Co.  V.  Thatcher,  78  Ohio  St.  175, 
85  N.  E.  55.  He  can  not  recover 
for  his  services  in  a  personal  in- 
jury case  from  the  defendant  vv^hen 
settlement  has  been  agreed  upon  by 
the  parties  directly  and  the  money 
has  been  paid  to  his  client.  Wer- 
ner V.  George  Zehler  Pro.  Co.,  31 
Ohio  C.  C.  632.  As  to  enforce- 
ment of  attorney's  lien  where  set- 
tlement has  been  made  without  his 
consent,  see  Hurd  v.  Wheeling  & 
L.  E.  R.  Co.,  4  Ohio  N.  P.  404; 
Connell  v.  Brumback,  18  Ohio  C. 
C.  502,  10  Ohio  C.  D.  149.  The 
court  will  protect  an  attorney's 
lien  on  a  fund  brought  into  court 
as  a  result  of  his  services.  Wood 
V.  Biddle,  7  Ohio  N.  P.  225,  8 
Ohio  Dec.  707.  Pennsylvania:  This 
lien  does  not  exist.  Texas:  An 
attorney  has  no  lien  for  his  services 
upon  a  judgment.  Casey  v.  March, 


30  Tex.  180;  Able  v.  Lee,  6  Tex. 
427;  Whittaker  v.  Clarke,  33  Tex. 
647.  United  States  Court  of 
Claims:  No  lien  is  allowed  to  an 
attorney  who  has  prosecuted  a 
case  to  judgment  against  the 
United  States.  Brooke's  Case  12 
Opin.   Atty.-Gen.  216. 

24  Swanston  v.  Morning  Star 
Mining  Co.,  13  Fed.  215,  4  Mc- 
Crary  (U.  S.)  241. 

25  Ex  parte  Kyle,  1  Cal.  331; 
Mansfield  v.  Borland,  2  Cal.  507; 
Russell  v.  Conway,  11  Cal.  93;  Ho- 
gan  V.  Black,  66  Cal.  41,  4  Pac.  943. 

26  Forsythe  v.  Beveridge,  52  111. 
268,  4  Am.  Rep.  612;  Nichols  v. 
Pool,  89  111.  491;  Sanders  v.  See- 
lye,  128  111.  631,  21  N.  E.  601;  Scott 
v.  Morris,  131  111.  App.  605.  But 
see  North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ackley,  58  111.  572,  revd.  171  111. 
100,  49  N.  E.  222,  44  L.  R.  A.  177. 

27  See  post,  §  173b,  post,  and 
Rev.   Stat.   1913,  p.   1571. 


§    l62  LIENS.  148 

for  suit  or  collection,  for  the  amount  of  fees  agreed  upon  or 
for  a  reasonable  fee  where  no  amount  has  been  agreed  upon. 
It  seems  that,  where  the  employment  is  by  a  special  con- 
tract, the  attorney  has  an  equitable  lien  upon  the  proceeds 
of  the  litigation.  Thus,  where  an  attorney  undertook  the 
collection  of  a  debt  secured  upon  land  under  a  special  con- 
tract whereby  he  was  to  receive  one-fifth  of  the  proceeds 
whether  the  same  might  be  in  land  or  money,  and  the  suit 
was  prosecuted  to  a  decree  and  sale  of  the  land,  and  the  client 
purchased  the  land  at  the  sale,  it  was  held  that  the  attorney 
was  entitled  to  an  equitable  lien  under  the  contract,  and  a 
decree  in  his  favor  was  entered  accordingly.^'^ 

§  162.  Massachusetts.-^ — An  attorney  has  no  lien  at  com- 
mon law  on  a  judgment  recovered  by  him;^^  but  it  is  pro- 
vided by  statute  that  an  attorney  lawfully  possessed  of  an 
execution,  or  who  has  prosecuted  a  suit  to  final  judgment 
in  favor  of  his  client,  shall  have  a  lien  thereon  for  the  amount 
of  his  fees  and  disbursements  in  the  cause ;  but  this  does  not 
prevent  the  payment  of  the  execution  or  judgment  to  the 
judgment  creditor  without  notice  of  the  lien.  This  statutory 
lien  covers  only  taxable  costs,  and  does  not  extend  to  coun- 
sel fees.^^  Under  this  statute  an  attorney  has  no  lien  before 
judgment  which  will  prevent  his  client  from  settling  with 
the  opposite  party  without  the  attorney's  knowledge  or  con- 
sent. Even  after  judgment,  the  attorney's  lien  does  not  pre- 
vent a  settlement  if  this  be  made  without  notice  of  the  lien.^^ 

The  attorney  of  the  defendant  having  recovered  a  judg- 

28  Smith  V.  Young,  62  III.  210.  3 1  Ocean  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rider,  22 
And  see  Morgan  v.  Roberts,  3S  Pick.  (Mass.)  210;  Thayer  v. 
III.  65.  Daniels,  113  Mass.  129. 

29  Pub.  Stats.  1882,  p.  913,  §  42.  32  Simmons  v.  Almy,  103  Mass. 
This  was  evidently  derived  from  33;  Getchell  v.  Clark,  5  Mass.  309; 
the  statute  of  1810,  ch.  84.  Rev.  cited  in  Potter  v.  Mayo,  3  Greenl. 
Laws  1902,  ch.  165,  §  48.  (Maine)   34,  14  Am.   Dec.  211. 

30  Baker  v.   Cook,   11   Mass.  236: 
Dunklee  v.  Locke,  13  Mass.  525. 


149  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §   164 

ment  for  costs  is  entitled  to  them  as  against  the  plaintiff 
who  has  recovered  a  judgment  against  the  defendant.  The 
plaintiff's  judgment  should  be  for  the  balance  after  deduct- 
ing the  attorney's  claim  for  costs.^^  The  attorney  may  en- 
force his  lien  upon  a  judgment  by  an  action  on  the  judgment 
in  the  name  of  the  client.^* 

§  163.  Missouri. — It  was  formerly  held  that  attorneys 
had  no  lien  for  their  fees  upon  judgments  recovered  by  them. 
They  were  not  allowed  under  the  laws  of  this  state  any  fees 
which  were  taxed  as  costs.^^  The  statute^®  now  provides 
that  from  the  commencement  of  an  action  or  the  service  of 
an  answer  containing  a  counterclaim  the  attorney  has  a  lien 
upon  his  client's  cause  of  action  which  attaches  to  a  verdict, 
report,  decision  or  judgment  in  the  client's  favor  and  the 
proceeds  thereof,  and  his  lien  is  not  affected  by  any  settle- 
ment between  the  parties  before  or  after  judgment  to  which 
he  does  not  consent. 

§  164.  Rhode  Island. — An  attorney  probably  has  a  lien 
for  his  costs  upon  the  judgment  recorded,  but  it  is  regarded 
only  as  a  sort  of  equity  to  control  the  judgment  and  its  inci- 
dental processes,  against  his  client  and  the  adverse  party 
colluding  with  his  client.  The  court  will,  in  the  exercise  of 
a  reasonable  discretion,  protect  and  enforce  this  equity. 
Though  the  judgment  be  for  costs  only,  it  does  not  belong 
to  the  attorney  absolutely,  so  that  he  is  authorized  to  bring 
suit  upon  it  without  the  client's  consent.^''' 

33  Little     V.     Rogers,     2     Mete.  550,  34  Am.  Rep.  722,  per  Durfee, 
(Mass.)    478.  C.   J.:    "We   think  this   is   the   full 

34  Woods      V.      Verry,     4      Gray  scope  of  the  lien,  if  lien  it  can  be 
(Mass.)    357.  called."     The    attorney's    charging 

35  Frissell  v.  Haile,  18  Mo.  18.  lien  attaches   only  after  judgment 

36  See    post,    §     181a,    and    Rev.  is     entered.       Tyler     v.     Superior 
Stat.    1909,   §  964.  Court,  30  R.  I.  107,  7Z  Atl.  467,  23 

37  Horton  v.  Champlin,   12  R.  I.  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   1045.     See   §   157. 


§  i65 


LIENS. 


150 


§  165.  Attorney's  lien  limited  to  taxable  costs. — It  is  also 
a  general  rule  that  an  attorney's  lien  upon  a  judgment  for 
his  fees  is  limited  to  the  taxable  costs  in  the  case,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  any  statute  extending  the  lien.^^  The  costs  for 
which  he  has  a  lien  are  the  taxable  costs  in  the  suit  in  which 
the  judgment  is  rendered.  The  lien  does  not  extend  to  costs 
in  any  other  suit.^^ 

His  lien  is  limited  to  the  taxable  costs  included  in  the 
judgment,  and  does  not  extend  to  fees  accruing,  and  ad- 
vanc-es  made  subsequently;**'  nor  to  commissions  on  the 
amount  of  the  judgment  collected,  though  a  charge  of  such 
commissions  might  properly  be  allowed  as  between  attorney 
and  client;*^  nor  to  disbursements  or  incidental  expenses 
not  taxable  as  costs  ;*^  nor  to  costs  in  other  suits. *^  The 
lien  upon  the  fruits  of  a  suit  is  limited  to  the  services  ren- 
dered therein;  and,  although  a  number  of  separate  suits  in- 
volve the  same  questions,  and  are  argued  and  determined 


38  Newbert  v.  Cunningham,  50 
Maine  231,  79  Am.  Dec.  612;  Hoop- 
er V.  Brundage,  22  Maine  460; 
Ocean  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rider,  22  Pick. 
(Mass.)  210;  Currier  v.  Boston  & 
M.  R.  Co.,  37  N.  H.  223;  Wright 
V.  Cobleigh,  21  N.  H.  339;  Wells 
V.  Hatch,  43  N.  H.  246;  Whitcomb 
V.  Straw,  62  N.  H.  650;  Weed  Sew- 
ing Machine  Co.  v.  Boutelle,  56  Vt. 
570,  48  Am.  Rep.  821;  Phillips  v. 
Stagg,  2  Edw.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  108; 
Ex  parte  Kyle,  1  Cal.  331;  Mans- 
field V.  Borland,  2  Cal.  507;  Massa- 
chusetts &  So.  Const.  Co.  V.  Gill's 
Creek,  48  Fed.  145.  This  was  the 
rule  in  England,  until  the  statute 
of  18  Victoria.  This  was  the  rule  in 
New  York,  until  the  Code  of  Civil 
Procedure  provided  that  the  meas- 
ure of  the  attorney's  compensa- 
tion, for  which  he  should  have  a 
lien,   should   be   left   to    the   agree- 


ment, express  or  implied,  of  the 
attorney  and  his  client.  Stover's 
Ann.  Code  Civ.  Proc.  1902,  §  66. 
Coughlin  v.  New  York  Central  & 
Hud.  Riv.  R.  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  443,  27 
Am.  Rep.  75. 

39  Phillips  V.  Stagg,  2  Edw.  Ch. 
(N.  Y.)   108. 

40  In  re  Wilson,  12  Fed.  235; 
Newbert  v.  Cunningham,  50  Maine 
231,  79  Am.  Dec.  612;  Cooley  v. 
Patterson,  52  Maine  472;  Currier 
v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  Co.,  Zl  N. 
H.  223;  Wells  v.  Hatch,  43  N.  H. 
246;  Ex  parte  Kyle,  1  Cal.  331; 
Mansfield   v.   Dorland,   2   Cal.   507. 

41  Wright  v.  Cobleigh,  21  N.  H. 
339. 

42  Wells  v.   Hatch,  43  N.  H.  246. 

43  St.  John  v.  Diefendorf,  12 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  261;  Massachusetts 
&  So.  Const.  Co.  V.  Gill's  Creek, 
48  Fed.  145. 


151  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §   166 

together,  the  fruits  of  one  are  not  subject  to  a  lien  for  serv- 
ices rendered  in  the  others. ^^ 

The  lien  does  not  extend  to  prospective  services  in  the 
hearing  of  an  appeal. ^^ 

This  lien  can  not  be  defeated  by  the  discharge  of  the  at- 
torney by  the  client.^*'  The  lien  exists  equally  whether  the 
services  are  rendered  by  one  attorney  or  more ;  or  whether 
the  suit  be  commenced  by  one  attorney,  and  prosecuted  to 
final  judgment  by  another.'*^ 

§  166.  Attorney's  lien  on  a  judgment. — An  attorney's  lien 
upon  an  uncollected  judgment  is  confined  to  the  judgment 
in  the  very  action  in  which  the  services  were  rendered. ^^ 
The  theory  upon  which  the  lien  is  founded  is  that  the  attor- 
ney has,  by  his  skill  and  labor,  obtained  the  judgment,  and 
hence  should  have  a  lien  upon  it  for  his  compensation,  in 
analogy  to  the  lien  which  a  mechanic  has  upon  any  article 
which  he  manufactures.  When,  therefore,  an  attorney  has 
several  actions  for  a  client,  and  recovers  judgment  in  but 
one  of  them,  he  can  not,  in  the  absence  of  a  special  agree- 
ment, have  a  lien  upon  that  judgment  for  his  compensation 
in  all  the  actons. ^^     And,  so,  where  an  attorney  recovered 

■i^  Massachusetts    &    So.     Const.  27  How.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  409,  reversed 

Co.  V.  Gill's  Creek,  48  Fed.  145.  40  N.  Y.  577;  Phillips  v.  Stagg,  2 

■15  Massachusetts    &    So.    Const.  Edw.  Ch.   (N.  Y.)   108;  Shapley  v. 

Co.  V.  Giirs  Creek,  48  Fed.  145.  Bellows,   4   N.   H.   347;    Wright   v. 

40  Gammon      v.      Chandler,      30  Cobleigh,    21    N.    H.    339;    McWil- 

Maine  152.  Hams  v.  Jenkins,  72  Ala.  480;  For- 

^~  Stratton  v.   Hussey,  62  Maine  bush  v.  Leonard,  8  Minn.  (Gil.  267) 

286.  303;  Weed  Sewing  Machine  Co.  v. 

48Lann  v.  Church,  4  Madd.  391;  Boutelle,  56  Vt.  570,  48  Am.   Rep. 

Bozon  V.  Bolland,  4  Myl.  &  C.  354;  821;  Pope  v.  Armstrong,  3  S.  &  M. 

Lucas  V.  Peacock,  9  Beav.  177;  Ste-  (Miss.)  214;  Cage  v.  Wilkinson,  3 

phens  V.  Weston,  3  Barn.  &  Cress.  S.    &    M.    (Miss.)    223;    Fowler   v. 

535;    In    re    Wilson,    12    Fed.    235,  Lewis'   Admr.,  36  W.   Va.   112,    14 

26  Alb.  L.  J.  271;  Williams  v.  In-  S.  E.  447,  quoting  text, 
gersoll,  89  N.  Y.  508;   St.  John  v.  49  Williams    v.    Ingersoll,   89    N. 

Diefendorf,  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  261;  Y.    508,    per    Earl,    J.;    Johnson    v. 

Adamsv.  Fox,40Barb.  (N.  Y.)   442,  Story,  1   Lea   (Tenn.)   114;   Massa- 


§167  LIENS.  152 

three  judgments  for  his  clients,  who  afterwards  became 
bankrupts,  and  their  assignee  selected  other  attorneys,  to 
whom  the  first  attorney  transferred  all  the  papers  upon  an 
agreement  that  his  lien  should  not  be  waived,  but  should 
be  satisfied  out  of  the  first  moneys  coming  into  the  assignee's 
hands  out  of  the  suits,  it  was  held  that  his  lien  in  each  case 
was  limited  to  the  funds  collected  upon  the  particular  judg- 
ment in  obtaining  which  the  services  were  rendered;  and, 
money  having  been  collected  upon  two  of  the  judgments, 
there  was  no  lien  upon  this  for  services  rendered  in  recover- 
ing the  third  judgment,  upon  which  nothing  was  collected. ^° 
When  several  attorneys  have  rendered  services  for  the 
complainant  in  a  suit,  they  are  equally  entitled  to  a  lien  for 
compensation  on  the  fruits  of  the  judgment;  but  if  one  of 
them  has  obtained  an  assignment  of  such  fruits,  his  posses- 
sion can  not  be  disturbed  in  favor  of  another.  The  equities 
of  all  the  attorneys  are  equal,  but  where  one  of  them  has  ob- 
tained an  assignment  of  the  judgment  he  has,  so  to  speak, 
the  legal  title  in  addition  to  his  equity,  and  his  legal  title 
must  prevail.^^ 

§  167.    Rule    in    U.    S.    courts. — In    the    United    States 
courts^^  and  in  those  of  several  states,  however,  there  are 

chusetts  &  So.  Const.  Co.  v.  Gill's  and  charges  in  the  cause  itself,  and 
Creek,  48   Fed.   145.  not   to  services  in  any  other  mat- 
so  In  In  re  Wilson,  12  Fed.  235,  a  ter.      In    re    Wilson,    12    Fed.    235, 
well-considered     case,     Brown,    J.,  per   Brown,  J. 

says:    "Neither    principle    nor    au-  si  Massachusetts     &    So.    Const, 

thority  can  sanction  an  increase  in  Co.  v.  Gill's  Creek,  48  Fed.  145. 

the  amount  of  a  lien  upon  an  un-  ^2  United  States  :  Wylie  v.  Coxe, 

collected  judgment  through  subse-  15    How.    (U.    S.)    415,    14    L.    ed. 

quent  services  in  independent  mat-  753;    Cowdrey   v.    Galveston    H.    & 

ters."     The  same  rule  undoubtedly  H.  R.  Co.,  93  U.  S.  352,  23  L.  ed. 

prevails     under     the     provision     of  950;       McPherson      v.       Cox,      96 

Stover's  Ann.  Code  Civ.  Proc.  1902,  U.   S.   404,   24   L.    ed.   746.     These 

§   66,   which   gives   an   attorney   "a  arose  under  express  contracts.    As 

lien  upon  his  client's  cause  of  ac-  the    statutes   of   the   United   States 

tion"     from     its      commencement.  expressly  recognize  the  right  of  at- 

This   refers,   doubtless,   to   services  torneys     to     charge     their    clients 


153  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §   167 

adjudications  that  an  attorney's  lien  upon  a  judgment  cov- 
ers his  services  without  regard  to  taxable  costs  in  obtaining 
the  judgment,  though  there  be  no  agreement  between  the 
attorney  and  his  client  as  to  the  amount  which  the  attorney 
is  entitled  to  charge  for  his  services. ^-^  The  lien  exists  for  a 
reasonable  compensation,  which  may  be  determined  by  the 
court,  or  by  a  referee,  upon  a  summary  application.  The 
extent  of  the  lien  is  to  be  ascertained  upon  the  basis  of  a 
quantum  meruit.  It  is  argued  that  the  rule  restricting  the 
lien  to  the  amount  of  the  taxed  costs  arose  from  the  fact 
that  in  England  these  costs  are  the  only  charges  for  which 
an  action  might  be  maintained,  the  services  of  barristers  be- 
ing in  theory  gratuitous,  and  their  charges  only  an  honorary 
obligation  of  quiddam  honorarium;  and,  consequently,  where 
the  payment  of  the  fees  and  charges  of  an  attorney  may  be 
legally  enforced,  as  is  the  case  in  this  country,  the  reason 
for  the  restriction  fails,  and  the  lien  should  cover  fees  other 
than  the  taxed  costs,  and  should  include  the  charges  of  coun- 
sel. The  taxed  costs  of  the  attorney  in  England  had  no 
merit  or  justice  superior  to  the  claim  of  counsel  in  this  coun- 
try for  a  reasonable  compensation;  and,  therefore,  the  lien 
should  here  be  extended  so  as  to  secure  such  compensa- 
tion 


54 


reasonable  compensation  for  their  444,  31  Am.  Dec.  752.  Florida: 
services,  in  addition  to  taxable  Carter  v.  Davis,  8  Fla.  183;  Car- 
costs  (1  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  §  823),  ter  v.  Bennett,  6  Fla.  214.  Ala- 
it  would  seem  that  the  United  bama:  Warfield  v.  Campbell,  38 
States  will  also  protect  the  implied  Ala.  527,  82  Am.  Dec.  724.  Missis- 
contract.  Massachusetts  &  So.  sippi:  Pope  v.  Armstrong,  3  b.  & 
Const.  Co.  V.  Gill's  Creek,  48  Fed.  M.  (Miss.)  214.  Georgia:  McDon- 
145.  aid  V.  Napier,  14  Ga.  89.  In  lili- 
es Illinois:  Henchey  v.  Chicago,  nois  and  Georgia  there  is  no  allow- 
41  111.  136;  Humphrey  v.  Brown-  ance  of  taxable  costs, 
ing,  46  111.  476,  95  Am.  Dec.  446,  5^  Warfield  v.  Campbell,  38  Ala. 
per  Breese,  C.  J.  Indiana:  Hill  v.  527,  82  Am.  Dec.  724,  per  Walker, 
Brinkley,  10  Ind.  102.  Connecti-  C.  J.;  McDonald  v.  Napier,  14  Ga. 
cut:   Andrews   v.   Morse,   12   Conn.  89,  per  Nisbet,  J. 


§     l68  LIENS.  154 

§  168.  Rule  extended  by  statutes. — In  other  states  and 
territories  the  lien  has  been  extended  by  statute  or  adjudi- 
cation so  as  to  cover  not  merely  taxable  costs,  but  a  reason- 
able compensation  to  the  attorney  for  his  services  in  obtain- 
ing the  judgment.  The  adjudications  and  statutes  whereby 
the  lien  has  been  made  to  cover  fees  and  disbursements  in- 
stead of  costs  are  so  different  in  the  several  states  that  it  is 
necessary  to  state  the  law  for  several  of  the  states  in  detail. 

But  even  in  states  which  have  adopted  the  rule  that  the 
lien  covers  the  attorney's  compensation  it  does  not  apply 
when  the  decree  is  for  alimony  in  a  suit  by  a  wife  for  divorce 
or  separation.  The  alimony  is  intended  for  the  support  of 
the  wife,  and  the  greater  the  necessity  for  such  an  allow- 
ance, the  greater  the  reason  why  the  courts  should  dis- 
countenance its  appropriation  for  any  other  purpose.  Coun- 
sel must  rely  upon  the  costs  and  counsel  fee  awarded  for  his 
compensation,  and  therefore  no  claim  to  the  alimony  or  any 
part  of  it,  or  to  the  enforcement  of  it  by  any  process  issued 
or  otherwise,  can  inure  to  the  benefit  of  her  attorneys. ^^ 

§  169.  Alabama. — The  attorney  by  the  statute  of  Ala- 
bama is  given  a  lien  upon  suits,  judgments  and  decrees  for 
money,  which  lien  is  superior  to  all  liens  but  tax  liens,  and 
no  person  shall  be  at  liberty  to  satisfy  said  suit,  judgment  or 
decree  until  the  lien  or  claim  of  the  attorney  for  his  fees  is 
fully  satisfied.^® 

55  Branth     v.     Branth,     57    Hun  client.       German    v.     Browne,     137 

(N.   Y.)    592,    10   N.   Y.   S.   638,   19  Ala.    429,    34    So.   985.      An    attor- 

Civ.    Proc.   R.   28;    Weill   v.    Weill,  ney's  lien  may  be  enforced  on  the 

10  N.  Y.   S.  627,   18   Civ.   Proc.   R.  amount  of  a  decree  paid  into  court 

241.  by  petition  to  the  chancellor.  Ful- 

50  Code  1907,  §  3011.     Such  stat-  ler  v.   Clemmons,  158  Ala.  340,  48 

ute  is  not  retroactive  in  its  opera-  So.    101.     A   client   has   a   right   to 

tion.      Leahart   v.    Deedme;j^er,    158  compromise    and    dismiss    his    case 

Ala.  295,  48  So.  371.    Attorney  will  whether  he  has  an  attorney  or  not. 

waive   his   lien   on   funds   colletced  Ex  parte  Randall,  149  Ala.  640,  42 

on    a    judgment    for    his    client    by  So.  870.     The  attorney's  lien  does 

voluntarily   paying    it    over   to    the  not  extend  to  land  or  other  simi- 


155 


ATTORNEY  S    SPECIAL    OR    CHARGING    LIEN. 


170 


§  169a.  Alaska. — An  attorney  has  a  lien  for  his  compen- 
sation, whether  specially  agreed  upon  or  implied,  upon 
money  in  the  hands  of  the  adverse  party  in  an  action  or 
proceeding  in  which  the  attorney  was  employed,  from  the 
time  of  giving  notice  of  the  lien  to  that  party,  and  upon  a 
judgment  to  the  extent  of  the  costs  included  therein,  or,  if 
there  be  a  special  agreement,  to  the  extent  of  the  compensa- 
tion agreed  on  or  from  the  giving  notice  thereof  to  the  party 
against  whom  the  judgment  is  given,  and  filing  the  original 
with  the  clerk  where  such  judgment  is  entered  and  dock- 
eted. This  lien  is,  however,  subordinate  to  the  rights  exist- 
ing between  the  parties  to  the  action  or  proceeding.^^ 

§  170.  Arkansas.^^ — An  attorney  has  a  lien  from  the  com- 
mencement of  his  client's  cause  of  action,  claim  or  counter- 
claim, which  attaches  to  a  verdict,  report,  decision,  judg- 
ment or  final  order  in  his  client's  favor  and  the  proceeds 
thereof  in  whosoever  hands  they  may  come.  The  court 
where  the  action  was  instituted  shall  determine  and  enforce 
the  lien.  When  the  judgment  is  for  the  recovery  of  real  or 
personal  property,  his  lien  amounts  to  an  interest  to  the 
extent  of  it  in  the  property  so  recovered.  His  lien  covers 
not  only  his  costs,  but  compensation  for  his  services  to  the 


lar  property  recovered  for  the  cli- 
ent. Carroll  v.  Draughon,  154  Ala. 
430,  45  So.  919.  The  lien  seems  to 
have  been  first  established  in  this 
state  by  the  decision  in  Warfield 
V.  Campbell,  38  Ala.  527,  82  Am. 
Dec.  724.  See  also,  McCaa  v. 
Grant,  43  Ala.  262;  Ex  parte  Leh- 
man, 59  Ala.  631 ;  Jackson  v.  Clop- 
ton,  66  Ala.  29;  Mosely  v.  Nor- 
man, 74  Ala.  422;  Central  R.  Co. 
V.  Pettus.  112  U.  S.  116,  28  L.  ed. 
915,  5  Sup.  Ct.  387. 

5T  Carter's  Ann.  Code  1900,  ch. 
l(i,  §  742. 

58  Kirby's   Digest  of  Stats.   1904, 


§§  4458-4462,  as  amended  by  Kir- 
by's Supp.  1911,  §  4458a;  Lane  v. 
Hallum,  38  Ark.  385;  Gist  v.  Han- 
ly,  ZZ  Ark.  233.  In  the  latter  case, 
Harrison,  J.,  said:  "The  attorney  is 
virtually  an  assignee  of  a  portion 
of  the  judgment,  or  of  the  debt  or 
claim,  equal  to  his  fee,  and  the  ad- 
vances which  he  has  made  for  his 
client.  For  the  parties  then  to 
make  any  arrangement  or  settle- 
ment between  themselves,  without 
his  consent,  by  which  his  right 
might  be  defeated,  would  be  a 
fraud  upon  him,  against  which  he 
is    entitled    to    protection." 


§    I/O  LIENS.  156 

amount  agreed  upon,  if  there  be  any  agreement,  otherwise 
to  a  reasonable  amount.  But  the  Hen  is  Hmited  to  cases 
where  there  has  been  an  actual  recovery,  and  can  not  be 
extended  to  professional  services,  which  merely  protect  an 
existing  title  or  right  of  property.^''  His  lien  for  services 
does  not  prevail  against  one  who,  in  good  faith  and  without 
notice  of  his  lien,  has  made  payments  on  account  of  the  judg- 
ment. The  attorney  may  assert  his  lien,  however,  by  filing 
a  written  statement  of  it  with  the  clerk  of  the  court  within 
ten  days  of  the  rendition  of  the  judgment;  whereupon  the 
clerk  makes  upon  the  record  a  memorandum  of  the  lien, 
which  he  also  indorses  upon  the  execution,  and  such  memor- 
andum is  made  actual  notice  of  the  lien  to  all  persons.  This 
is  necessary,  however,  only  for  the  protection  of  those  who, 
in  good  faith  and  without  notice,  have  made  payments  to 
the  judgment  creditor  upon  or  in  consequence  of  the  judg- 
ment. The  notice  is  not  necessary  to  protect  the  attorney 
against  a  purchaser  of  the  judgment.^*^  It  is  now  provided 
by  statute  that  an  attorney  has  a  lien  on  real  or  personal 
property  recovered  for  his  client  and  this  lien  amounts  to  an 
interest  in  the  property  so  recovered  and  whether  the  lien 
exists  may  be  determined  in  a  suit  to  foreclose  it.^^ 

•^»  Hershy  v.  Du  Val,  47  Ark.  86,  658.  See  also,  DeGraffenreid  v. 
14  S.  W.  469.  St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.,  66  Ark. 
CO  McCain  v.  Portis,  42  Ark.  402;  260,  50  S.  W.  272.  An  attorney 
Porter  v.  Hanson,  36  Ark.  591.  having  a  lien  on  his  client's  prop- 
yl Dig.  of  Stats.,  1904,  §§  4457,  erty  for  services  rendered  cannot 
4458, 4460.  Greenlee  v.  Rowland,  85  add  thereto  a  debt  due  him  from 
Ark.  101,  107  S.  W.  193;  Osborne  the  client  for  services  theretofore 
V.  Waters,  92  Ark.  388,  123  S.  W.  rendered  in  another  case.  Davis 
374.  Where  persons  have  notice  v.  Webber,  66  Ark.  190,  49  S.  W. 
of  an  attorney's  lien  on  property  822,  45  L.  R.  A.  196.  An  allotment 
they  are  bound  to  act  according-  of  land  in  a  partition  suit  is  not  a 
ly  and  in  a  compromise  relative  to  recovery  of  the  land  so  as  to  give 
the  disposition  of  such  property  the  attorney  a  right  to  a  lien  there- 
the  attorney's  lien  will  not  be  lost  on  under  a  statute  giving  a  lien  to 
when  not  accomplished  by  his  con-  an  attorney  on  real  estate  recov- 
sent.  Rachels  v.  Doniphan  Lum-  ered  for  his  client.  Gibson  v. 
ber    Co.,   98   Ark.    529,    136    S.    W.  Buckner,  65  Ark.  84,  44  S.  W.  1034. 


157 


ATTORNEY  S    SPECIAL    OR    CHARGING    LIEN. 


171a 


§  171.  Colorado. — In  Colorado  it  is  provided  by  statute 
that  all  attorneys  and  counselors  at  law  shall  have  a  lien 
upon  any  mone}',  property,  choses  in  action,  or  claims  and 
demands  in  their  hands,  and  upon  any  judgment  they  may 
have  obtained  or  assisted  in  obtaining,  in  whole  or  in  part, 
and  on  any  and  all  claims  and  demands  in  suit,  for  any  fees 
or  balance  of  fees  due  or  to  become  due  from  any  client. 
This  lien  may  be  enforced  by  the  proper  civil  action. ''- 

It  is  held  where  the  judgment  defendant  pays  the  judg- 
ment without  any  notice  that  the  attorney  intends  to  claim 
such  a  lien,  the  debtor  will  be  discharged  from  any  liability.^^ 

§  171a.  Connecticut. — In  Connecticut  under  a  statute 
which  provides  that  a  plaintiff  in  an  action  may  dismiss  or 
withdraw  his  suit  at  any  time  before  verdict,  it  is  held  that 
where  an  action  has  been  compromised  and  withdrawn  by 
the  plaintiff  it  will  not  be  redocketed  on  the  motion  of  plain- 


C2  Mills'  Ann.  Stats.  1912,  §  293. 
This  invests  the  attorney  with  a 
lien  immediately  upon  the  render- 
ing of  a  judgment  in  his  client's 
favor.  As  betwreen  him  and  his 
client  nothing  is  required  to  ren- 
der such  lien  complete,  though  to 
make  it  valid  as  against  the  judg- 
ment debtor,  notice  must  be  given 
to  him  prior  to  the  settlement  of 
the  judgment.  Johnson  v.  Mc- 
Millan, 13  Colo.  423,  22  Pac.  769. 
No  particular  form  of  notice  is  re- 
quired. Fillmore  v.  Wells,  10  Colo. 
228,  IS  Pac.  343;  Boston  &  Colo- 
rado Smelting  Co.  v.  Pless,  9  Colo. 
112,  10  Pac.  652. 

C3  Colorado  State  Bank  v.  Da- 
vidson, 7  Colo.  App.  91,  42  Pac. 
687.  See  also  Whitehead  v.  Jes- 
sup,  7  Colo.  App.  460,  43  Pac. 
1042.  As  to  enforcement  of  at- 
torney's lien,  see  Davidson  v. 
La  Plata  County,  26  Colo.  549,  59 


Pac.  46.  Notice  to  a  bank's  at- 
torney of  an  attorney's  lien  on  a 
judgment  is  notice  to  the  bank. 
Davidson  v.  La  Plata  County,  26 
Colo.  549,  59  Pac.  46.  Where  an 
attorney,  under  an  agreement  with 
his  client  in  an  action  to  enforce 
a  vendor's  lien,  purchases  the 
property  at  the  sale  and  takes  title 
in  his  own  name  as  trustee  to  de- 
velop and  sell  the  property  to  pay 
attorney's  fees  and  expenses  of 
the  litigation,  the  agreement  will 
amount  to  a  waiver  of  the  attor- 
ney's lien.  Teller  v.  Hill,  18  Colo. 
App.  509,  12  Pac.  811.  A  filing  of 
notice  by  an  attorney  with  the 
clerk  of  his  lien,  not  being  pro- 
vided for  by  the  statute,  will  not 
be  held  to  be  notice  to  the  judg- 
ment debtor  of  such  lien  or  of  the 
attorney's  intention  to  hold  a  lien. 
Colorado  State  Bank  v.  Davidson, 
7   Colo.   App.  91,  42  Pac.  687. 


§    171b  LIENS.  158 

tiff's  attorney  who  moves  to  redocket  it,  charging  that  if 
was  withdrawn  to  defraud  him  and  to  defeat  him  in  the  col- 
lection of  his  fees.^* 

§  171b.  District  of  Columbia. — In  the  District  of  Colum- 
bia it  is  held  that  a  mere  recital  in  a  deed  of  conveyance  to 
the  effect  that  the  grantee  takes  the  land  conveyed  subject 
to  a  pending  suit  in  equity  will  not  charge  such  grantee  with 
notice  of  a  contract  between  the  grantor  and  his  attorney, 
giving  the  attorney  a  contingent  interest  in  the  land  for  his 
services  and  compensation  in  conducting  the  pending  suit.*'"* 

§  172.  Florida. — A  lien  is  allowed  upon  a  judgment  for 
the  reasonable  and  fair  remuneration  of  the  attorney,  the 
statutes  not  providing  for  any  taxable  costs. ^'^  This  lien  is 
superior  to  any  equitable  set-off  of  the  judgment  debtor. 

§  173.  Georgia.*^^ — It  is  provided  that  an  attorney,  upon 
suits,  judgments  and  decrees  for  money,  shall  have  a  lien 
superior  to  all  liens,  except  tax  liens,  and  no  person  shall  be 
at  liberty  to  satisfy  the  suit,  judgment  or  decree  until  the 
lien  or  claim  of  the  attorney  for  his  fees  is  fully  satisfied. 
Attorneys  at  law  have  the  same  right  and  power  over  such 
suits,  judgments  and  decrees,  to  enforce  their  liens,  as  their 
clients  had  or  may  have  for  the  amount  due  thereon  to  them. 
Upon  all  suits  for  the  recovery  of  real  or  personal  property, 

64  Gen.   Stats.    1902,   §§   595,   596.  at    the    moment    when    the    judg- 

De  Wandelaer  v.  Sawdey,  78  Conn.  ment    is    entered    and    is    superior 

654,   63   Atl.   446.  to    other    liens    attaching    to    such 

C5  Bendheim  v.  Pickford,  31  App.  judgment.     Hutchinson  v.   Worth- 

D.    C.   488.     A    contract   providing  ington,  7  App.  D.  C.  548.  See  also, 

that  an  attorney  shall  receive   for  Kappler  v.  Sumpter,  33  App.  D.  C. 

his  compensation  a  portion  of  the  404. 

sum  recovered  in  an  action  which  60  Carter  v.   Bennett,   6  Fla.  214, 

he    brings    and    prosecutes    for    his  257;  Carter  v.  Davis,  8  Fla.  183. 

client   will    constitute    a   valid    lien  67  Code    1911,    §    3364.      And    see 

on    any    fund    recovered    in    such  Morrison  v.  Ponder,  45   Ga.   167. 
case,   and   such   a   lien   will    attach 


159  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §   173 

and  upon  all  judgments  or  decrees  for  the  recovery  of  the 
same,  attorneys  have  a  lien  on  the  property  recovered,  for 
their  fees,  superior  to  all  liens  but  liens  for  taxes,  which  may 
be  enforced  by  such  attorneys  or  their  representatives  as 
liens  on  personal  and  real  estate,  by  mortgage  and  foreclo- 
sure; and  the  property  recovered  remains  subject  to  such 
liens,  unless  transferred  to  bona  fide  purchasers  without  no- 
tice. If  an  attorney  files  his  assertion  claiming  a  lien  on 
property  recovered  on  a  suit  instituted  by  him,  within  thirty 
days  after  a  recovery  of  the  same,  then  his  lien  binds  all 
persons.  The  same  liens  and  modes  of  enforcement  thereof, 
which  are  allowed  to  attorneys  who  are  employed  to  sue  for 
any  property,  upon  the  property  recovered,  are  equally  al- 
lowed to  attorneys  employed  and  serving  in  defense  against 
such  suits,  in  case  the  defense  is  successful. *^^ 

If  no  notice  of  the  lien  be  given,  a  settlement  by  the 
parties  can  be  set  aside  by  the  attorney  only  in  case  he 
shows  that  it  was  made  with  the  intent  to  defeat  his  lien.®® 
The  lien,  however,  attaches  as  soon  as  the  suit  is  com- 
menced; and  the  client  can  not  defeat  the  lien  by  dismissing 
the  action  before  trial  against  the  attorney's  objections.^** 
The  only  notice  necessary  to  a  defendant  in  a  pending  action 
of  the  lien  of  the  plaintiff's  attorney  on  the  suit  and  its  pro- 
ceeds for  his  fees  in  that  case  is  knowledge  of  the  fact  that 
the  suit  has  been  instituted  and  is  pending.  A  settlement 
made  directly  with  the  plaintiff,  though  without  other  no- 
tice of  the  attorney's  lien,  will  leave  the  defendant  liable  in 
the  action  to  a  recovery  for  the  benefit  of  the  attorney  to  the 
extent  of  his  fees,  if  there  was  a  cause  of  action  between  the 
parties;  and  the  attorney  may  prosecute  the  suit,  and  re- 
cover accordingly."^^ 

After  judgment  the  attorney  may  proceed  to  enforce  his 

68  Code  1911,   §  3364.  7o  Twiggs   v.    Chambers,    56    Ga. 

69  Hawkins    v.    Loyless,    39    Ga.      279. 

5;  Green  v.  Southern  Exp.  Co.,  39  "i  Little   v.    Sexton,   89   Ga.   411, 

Ga.  20.  15  S.  E.  490. 


173 


LIENS. 


1 60 


lien  upon  it  by  levy,  and  the  judgment  debtor  can  not  arrest 
the  levy  on  the  ground  that  the  judgment  creditor  has 
agreed  with  him  for  value  to  give  indulgence;  nor  can  he 
set  up  the  claim  that  the  attorney  has  been  paid,  and  that 
therefore  he  has  no  lien,  unless  he  himself  has  made  such 
payment.'^^ 

Under  the  statute  of  Georgia  a  lien  is  created  on  the 
lands  of  an  attorney's  client  for  the  fees  of  the  attorney,  and 
it  is  also  provided  that  a  lien  for  attorney's  fees  attaches  in 
favor  of  the  attorney  upon  a  suit  filed  by  him  and  that  the 
client  can  not  settle  the  same  where  to  do  so  will  defeat  the 
attorney's  lien.  He  is  also  given  a  lien  for  his  services  on 
property  recovered  by  him  for  his  client  and  on  property  of 
his  client  where  he  has  successfully  defended  the  title,  but 
to  defeat  bona  fide  purchasers  he  is  required  to  file  a  notice 
of  his  lien,  although  as  between  the  attorney  and  client  no 
such  notice  is  necessary.'^^ 


''-  Tarver   v.    Tarver,    53    Ga.   43. 

■^3  Coleman  v.  Austin,  99  Ga. 
629,  27  S.  E.  763.  The  lien  of  an 
attorney  is  created  by  recovering 
judgment  for  his  client  and  re- 
cording a  notice  of  his  lien.  Lovett 
V.  Moore,  98  Ga.  158,  26  S.  E.  498. 
See  also,  Colorado  .State  Bank  v. 
Davidson,  7  Colo.  App.  91,  42  Pac. 
687.  Where  a  client  compromises 
his  suit  but  a  nonsuit  is  awarded 
on  grounds  other  than  the  terms 
of  the  compromise,  the  suit  ends 
and  the  lien  of  the  attorney  is  ex- 
tinguished. Brown  v.  Georgia  C. 
&  N.  R.  Co.,  101  Ga.  80,  28  S.  E. 
634.  An  attorney  has  no  lien  for 
making  an  application  to  have  a 
homestead  set  apart.  Haygood  v. 
Dannenberg  Co.,  102  Ga.  24,  29  S. 
E.  293.  An  attorney's  lien  may  be 
enforced  in  the  same  manner  as 
mortgages  are   foreclosed.     Ray  v. 


Hixon,  107  Ga.  768,  33  S.  E.  692. 
The  lien  need  not  be  enforced  by 
foreclosure.  Burgin  &  Sons  Glass 
Co.  v.  Mclntire,  7  Ga.  App.  755,  68 
S.  E.  490.  An  attorney's  lien  can- 
not be  enforced  as  against  a 
surety,  where  the  action  is  against 
a  principal  and  surety  and  the 
surety  does  not  assert  his  defense 
because  of  the  assurances  made  by 
the  plaintiff  that  no  claim  would 
be  enforced  against  him.  Hall  v. 
Lockerman,  127  Ga.  537,  56  S.  E. 
759.  Where  attorneys  have  liens 
against  separate  properties  for 
different  amounts  and  the  suits  to 
enforce  them  are  consolidated,  the 
judgment  of  the  court  is  irregular 
but  not  void.  Suwannee  Turpentine 
Co.  v.  Baxter,  109  Ga.  597,  35  S.  E. 
142.  A  plaintiff  cannot  withdraw 
his  case  so  as  to  defeat  his  attor- 
neys'   lien,    where    if    the    suit    had 


i6i 


attorney's  special  or  charging  lien. 


173b 


§  173a.  Idaho. — The  measure  and  mode  of  compensation 
of  attorneys  and  counsellors  at  law  is  left  to  the  agreement, 
express  or  implied,  of  the  parties,  which  is  not  restrained  by 
law.  From  the  commencement  of  an  action,  or  the  service  of 
an  answer  containing  a  counterclaim,  the  attorney  who  ap- 
pears for  a  party  has  a  lien  upon  his  client's  cause  of  action  or 
counterclaim,  which  attaches  to  a  verdict,  report,  decision  or 
judgment  in  his  client's  favor  and  the  proceeds  thereof  in 
whosoever  hands  they  may  come ;  and  can  not  be  efTected  by 
any  settlement  between  the  parties  before  or  after  judgment; 
but  parties  to  actions  or  proceedings  are  entitled  to  costs 
and  disbursements,  as  herein  provided.*^* 

§  173b.  Illinois. — Attorneys  at  law  shall  have  a  lien  upon 
all  claims,  demands  and  causes  of  action,  including  all  claims 
for  liquidated  damages,  which  may  be  placed  in  their  hands 
by  their  clients  for  suit  or  collection,  or  upon  which  suit  or 


proceeded  it  would  have  resulted 
in  a  recovery  upon  which  the  at- 
torney would  have  had  a  lien. 
Walker  v.  Equitable  Mortg.  Co., 
114  Ga.  862,  40  S.  E.  1010.  See 
also,  Florida  Cent.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ragan,  104  Ga.  353,  30  S.  E.  745; 
Johnson  v.  McCurry,  102  Ga.  471, 
31  S.  E.  88.  But  in  a  case  for  a 
divorce  and  alimony,  where  the 
parties  resume  marital  relations, 
the  attorney  cannot  press  the  case 
and  have  recovery  of  his  feds. 
Chastain  v.  Lumpkin,   134  Ga.  219, 

67  S.  E.  818.  An  attorney  may  be 
estopped  from  asserting  a  lien. 
Waiters  v.  Wells,  7  Ga.  App.  778, 

68  S.  E.  450.  No  notice  need  be 
filed  of  the  attorney's  lien  as  be- 
tween himself  and  client.  Such  a 
lien  will  attach  upon  the  attorney's 
employment.  Burgin  &  Sons  Glass 
Co.    V.    Mclntire,   7    Ga.   App.   755, 

11 


68  S.  E.  490.  A  party  will  not  be 
chargeable  with  notice  that  an  at- 
torney will,  under  his  contract 
with  his  client,  be  entitled  to  a 
part  of  the  property  involved  in 
a  suit  if  he  succeeds  in  the  suit. 
Hodnett  v.  Stewart,  131  Ga.  Gl ,  61 
S.  E.  1124. 

74Sess.  Laws  1911,  ch.  167. 
Dahlstrom  v.  Featherstone,  18 
Idaho  179,  110  Pac.  243.  When 
the  defendant  or  his  attorney  has 
no  notice  that  plaintiff's  attorney 
claims  to  hold  a  lien  on  a  judg- 
ment, the  judgment  debtor  may 
pay  the  judgment  or  he  may  settle 
it  with  the  holder  of  the  judgment 
and  be  entirely  discharged  from 
any  liability  to  plaintiff's  attor- 
ney who  procured  the  judgment 
for  his  client.  Dahlstrom  v. 
Featherstone,  18  Idaho  179,  110 
Pac.  243. 


§     174  LIENS.  162 

action  has  been  instituted,  for  the  amount  of  any  fee  which 
may  have  been  agreed  upon  by  and  between  such  attorneys 
and  their  clients,  or,  if  in  the  absence  of  such  agreement,  for 
a  reasonable  fee,  for  the  services  rendered  or  to  be  rendered 
for  their  clients  on  account  of  such  suits,  claims,  demands  or 
causes  of  action:  provided,  however,  such  attorneys  shall 
serve  notice  in  writing  upon  the  party  against  whom  the 
clients  may  have  such  suits,  claims,  or  causes  of  action, 
claiming  such  lien  and  stating  therein  the  interest  they  have 
in  such  suits,  claims,  demands,  or  causes  of  action,  and  such 
lien  shall  attach  to  any  verdict,  judgment  or  decree  entered 
and  to  any  money  or  property  which  may  be  recovered,  on 
account  of  such  suits,  claims,  demands  or  causes  of  action, 
from  and  after  the  service  of  the  aforesaid  notice.  On  peti- 
tion filed  by  such  attorneys  or  their  clients  any  court  of  com- 
petent jurisdiction  shall,  on  not  less  than  five  days'  notice 
to  the  adverse  party,  adjudicate  the  rights  of  the  parties  and 
enforce  such  lien  in  term  time  on  vacation."^^ 

§  174.  Indiana. — It  is  provided  by  statute  that  any  attor- 
ney practicing  his  profession  in  any  court  of  record  in  this 
state  shall  be  entitled  to  hold  a  lien,  for  his  fees,  on  any 
judgment  rendered  in  favor  of  any  person  or  persons  em- 
ploying such  attorney,  to  obtain  the  same:  provided,  that 
such  attorney  shall  at  the  time  such  judgment  shall  have 
been  rendered,  enter,  in  writing,  upon  the  docket  or  record 
wherein  the  same  is  recorded,  his  intention  to  hold  a  lien 
thereon,  together  with  the  amount  of  his  claim.'^^ 

•^5  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  p.  1571,  §  55.  tered.      Blair   v.    Lanning,    61    Ind. 

76  Burns'   Rev.   Stat.   1914,   §8274.  499;  Day  v.  Bowman,  109  Ind.  383, 

The      statute      applies      only      to  10  N.  E.  126;  Alderman  v.  Nelson, 

a  "judgment  rendered."     Hanna  v.  Ill   Ind.  255,  12  N.  E.  394;   Wood 

Island   Coal   Co.,   5   Ind.   App.   163,  v.  Hughes,   138  Ind.   179,  11   N.   E. 

31   N.  E.  846,  51  Am.  St.  246.     Un-  588.      Such    lien    has    priority    over 

der  this  statute  it  is  held  that  the  the  claims   of  persons   against  the 

lien  must  be  entered  within  a  rea-  judgment    plaintiff    and    cannot    be 

sonable  time  after  judgment  is  en-  defeated   by   setting   off   one   judg- 


1 63 


ATTORNEY  S    SPECIAL    OR    CHARGING    LIEN. 


174 


This  lien  extends  to  a  judgment  for  alimony  obtained  by 
an  attorney  in  proceedings  for  divorce  on  behalf  of  the  wife. 

ment  against  another.  Johnson  v.  X.  E.  615;  Koons  v.  Beach,  147 
Ballard,  44  Ind.  270;  Adams  v.  Lee,  Ind.  137,  45  N.  E.  601,  46  N.  E. 
82    Ind.    587;    Puett    v.    Beard,    86      587;  Alden  v.  White,  32  Ind.  App. 


Ind.  172,  44  Am.  Rep.  280.  Such 
liens  cannot  be  discharged  without 
the  consent  of  the  attorney.  Mc- 
Cabe  V.  Britton,  79  Ind.  224.  The 
assignee  of  such  a  judgment  does 
not  become  liable  for  the  lien 
when  nothing  is  collected  on  the 
judgment.  Peterson  v.  Struby,  25 
Ind.  App.  19,  56  N.  E.  72>Z,  57  N.  E. 


393,  68  N.  E.  913.  Where  an  at- 
torney under  a  written  contract 
fixing  the  amount  of  his  contin- 
gent fee  brings  a  suit  on  a  life  in- 
surance policy  and  the  defendant's 
attorney'  with  knowledge  of  such 
contract  secures  the  plaintiff  to 
sign  a  dismissal  of  the  suit,  and 
the  suit  is  dismissed  over  the  pro- 


599.    An  attorney  cannot  have  a  lien       test    of   the    plaintiff's    attorney,    it 


declared  in  his  favor  on  a  judg- 
ment after  his  claim  is  barred  by 
the  statute  of  limitations.  Mc- 
Nagney  v.  Frazer,  1  Ind.  App.  98, 
27  N.  E.  431.  Liens  of  attorneys 
can  only  be  taken  upon  judgments 
rendered,  and  clients  may  settle 
their  claims  at  any  time  before 
judgment,  without  the  consent  of 
their  attorneys.  Hanna  v.  Island 
Coal  Co.,  5  Ind.  App.  163,  31  N.  E. 
846,  51  Am.  St.  246.  Where  an 
attornej^  with  the  consent  of  his 
client  takes  a  lien  for  debts  due 
that   are   not   a   lien    on    the   judg- 


is  held  to  be  a  fraud  by  the  parties 
to  the  suit  for  which  plaintiff's  at- 
torney may  have  redress.  Mied- 
reich  v.  Rank,  40  Ind.  App.  Z9:i, 
82  N.  E.  117.  While  an  attorney 
has  no  lien  on  a  fund  secured  for 
his  client  under  the  statute,  he 
may  have  an  equitable  lien.  He 
can  have  no  lien  on  a  fund  secured 
for  his  client  by  compromise  where 
no  judgment  is  entered.  Koons  v. 
Beach,  147  Ind.  137,  45  N.  E.  601, 
46  N.  E.  587.  Where,  before  sum- 
mons is  served  on  a  defendant  in 
an   injury  case,   the  defendant  set- 


ment,    creditors   who   have   no   lien       ties  with  claimant  without  any  no- 


on such  judgment  cannot  com- 
plain. Harshman  v.  Armstrong, 
119  Ind.  224,  21  N.  E.  662.  In  an 
action  to  enforce  an  attorney's 
lien  the  amount  thereof  must  be 
stated.  Day  v.  Bowman,  109  Ind. 
383,  10  N.  E.  126.  The  lien  an  at- 
torney holds  on  a  judgment  may 
be  assigned.  Day  v.  Bowman,  109 
Ind.  383,  10  N.  E.  126.  Attorneys 
also  have  equitable  liens  for  their 


tice  of  the  filing  of  a  complaint, 
plaintiff's  attorney  is  not  entitled 
to  a  lien  and  cannot  successfully 
prosecute  an  action  to  recover. 
Lumpkin  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co., 
36  Ga.  135,  70  S.  E.  1101.  As  to 
recovery  of  lien  to  pay  conditional 
fees,  see  Penn  v.  McGhee,  6  Ga. 
App.  631,  65  S.  E.  686.  For  en- 
forcement of  liens  by  two  law 
firms  in  same  case,  see  Merchants 


fees  upon  funds  that  they  secure  Nat.  Bank  v.  Armstrong,  107  Ga. 
by  their  services  for  their  clients.  479,  33  S.  E.  473.  Generally  an 
Justice  v.  Justice,  115  Ind.  201,   16      attorney    may    continue    an    action 


§  175 


LIENS. 


164 


If  she  knows  of  the  lien  and  assents  to  the  amount  of  the 
fee  claimed,  she  is  bound  for  such  amountJ''^ 

§  175.  Iowa.'''® — An  attorney  has  a  lien  for  a  general  bal- 
ance of  compensation  on  money  due  his  client  in  the  hands 
of  the  adverse  party,  or  attorney  of  such  party,  in  an  action 
or  proceeding  in  which  the  attorney  claiming  the  lien  was 
employed,  for  the  time  of  giving  notice  in  writing  to  such 
adverse  party,  or  attorney  of  such  party,  if  the  money  is  in 
the  possession  or  under  the  control  of  such  attorney,  which 
notice  shall  state  the  amount  claimed,  and,  in  general  terms, 
for  what  services. 

After  judgment  in  any  court  of  record,  such  notice  may 
be  given  and  the  lien  made  effective  against  the  judgment 
debtor,  by  entering  the  same  in  the  judgment  docket  oppo- 
site the  entry  of  the  judgment.'^^ 


for  his  fees  where  the  action  is 
settled  and  compromised  by  the 
client  without  the  consent  of  at- 
torney. Collier  v.  Hecht-Britting- 
ham  Co.,  7  Ga.  178,  66  S.  E.  400. 
An  attorney  having  taken  no  steps 
to  perfect  a  statutory  lien  on  a 
judgment  obtained  by  him,  and  the 
statute  of  limitations  having  run 
against  his  action  at  law,  he  can- 
not sue  in  equity  to  establish  a 
lien  on  the  judgment  for  services 
rendered  under  an  agreement  that 
they  should  be  paid  for  out  of  any 
judgment  obtained.  McNagney  v. 
Frazer,  1  Ind.  App.  98,  27  N.  E. 
431. 

7"  Putnam  v.  Tennyson,  50  Ind. 
456.  Prior  to  this  statute,  attor- 
neys had  no  lien  on  the  judgment 
for  their  fees.  Hill  v.  Brinkley,  10 
Ind.  102.  Entry  of  notice  is  es- 
sential. Alderman  v.  Nelson,  111 
Ind.  255,  12  N.  E.  394.  Strictly 
speaking,   a  judgment   is   rendered 


when  it  is  announced  by  the  court; 
yet  under  this  statute,  which  is 
loosely  drawn,  it  appears  that  it 
was  intended  that  the  judgment 
should  be  entered  on  the  docket  or 
court  records  before  the  entry  of 
the  attorney's  intention  to  claim 
lien  upon  it;  and  it  follows  that 
the  entry  of  notice  of  such  lien 
can  be  made  at  any  time  within  a 
reasonable  time  after  the  record- 
ing of  the  judgment;  and  the  en- 
trj--  of  such  notice  upon  the  day 
following  the  entry  of  the  judg- 
ment is  within  a  reasonable  time. 
Blair  v.  Lanning,  61  Ind.  499;  Day 
V.  Bowman,  109  Ind.  383,  10  N.  E. 
126. 

T8  Code   1897,  §§  321,  322. 

"9  Where  the  plaintiff,  in  an  ac- 
tion for  damages  for  a  personal 
injury,  agrees  in  writing  with  his 
attorney  to  pay  him  one-third  of 
the  amount  that  may  be  ultimately 
recovered,    and   a   judgment   is   re- 


i65 


ATTORNEY  S    SPECIAL    OR    CHARGING    LIEN. 


175 


Any  person  interested  may  release  such  lien  by  executing 
a  bond  in  a  sum  double  the  amount  claimed,  or  in  such  sum 


covered  for  $2,000,  and  the  attor- 
ney enters  on  the  judgment  docket 
notice  of  "an  attorney's  lien  on 
this  judgment  for  $2,000  for  serv- 
ices rendered  plaintiff  in  this 
cause,"  and  the  judgment  is  re- 
versed, and  the  claim  compromised 
by  the  parties  for  $1,650,  the  lien 
so  entered  is  binding  upon  the  de- 
fendant to  the  extent  of  one-third 
the  amount  agreed  upon  in  the 
settlement.  Winslow  v.  Central 
Iowa  R.  Co.,  71  Iowa  197,  32  N.  W. 
330.  Rothrock,  J.,  said :  "Counsel 
for  appellant  contend  that  the  lien 
entered  of  record  was  on  the  judg- 
ment, and  not  upon  money  in  the 
possession  of  the  adverse  party 
due  the  plaintiff  in  action.  It  is 
true  that  the  entry  made  upon  the 
judgment  docket  states  that  a  lien 
is  claimed  on  the  judgment.  We 
think,  however,  that  the  plaintiffs 
had  no  right  to  make  any  claim 
other  than  that  provided  by  stat- 
ute, and  the  section  of  the  code 
above  cited  does  not  provide  for 
a  lien  on  the  judgment,  as  such. 
It  expressly  provides  for  a  lien  on 
money  in  the  hands  of  the  adverse 
party  or  his  attorney.  It  is  fur- 
ther claimed  that  as  the  statute 
provides  where  notice  of  the  lien 
is  placed  upon  the  judgment 
docket,  and  thus  made  effective 
against  the  judgment  debtor,  the 
notice  ceased  or  expired  when  the 
judgment  was  reversed,  because 
there  was  then  no  'judgment 
debtor.'  We  think,  however,  that 
the  words  'judgment  debtor,'  as 
used   in    the    fourth    subdivision    of 


the  section  above  quoted,  are 
merely  descriptive  of  the  person 
against  whom  the  lien  may  be  en- 
forced. It  will  be  observed  that 
notice  of  the  lien  upon  money  in 
the  hands  of  the  adverse  party  is 
not  required  to  be  personally 
served  after  judgment.  The  ad- 
verse party  is  charged  with  notice 
by  the  entry  on  the  judgment 
docket.  From  the  time  of  such 
entry  he  cannot  prejudice  the 
rights  of  the  attorney  claiming 
the  lien  by  a  settlement  with  his 
client;  and  as  the  law  does  not 
place  the  lien  upon  the  judgment, 
but  upon  the  claim  against  the  ad- 
verse party,  or  the  money  in  his 
hands,  we  think  the  notice  re- 
mained binding  upon  the  defend- 
ant as  long  as  the  money  remained 
in  its  hands.  If  the  plaintiffs  had 
merely  stated  in  the  entry  upon 
the  judgment  docket  their  lien 
upon  the  money  claimed  of  the 
railroad  company,  and  in  its  hands, 
due  to  [the  defendant]  for  the  in- 
jury of  which  he  complained,  the 
notice  would  have  been  in  strict 
conformity  with  the  statute,  and 
would  have  been  binding  on  the 
railroad  company  through  all  the 
further  progress  of  the  case,  and 
up  to  the  actual  payment  of  the 
demand.  We  do  not  think  the  fact 
that  the  word  'judgment'  was  used 
in  the  entry  instead  of  'suit,'  'ac- 
tion,' or  'claim,'  or  some  other 
equivalent  word,  was  a  matter  of 
any  consequence  in  fixing  the 
rights  of  the  parties." 


§175  LIENS.  1 66 

as  may  be  fixed  by  a  judge,  payable  to  the  attorney,  with 
security  to  be  approved  by  the  clerk  of  the  court,  condition- 
ed to  pay  the  amount  finally  due  the  attorney  for  his  serv- 
ices, which  amount  may  be  ascertained  by  suit  on  the  bond. 
Such  lien  will  be  released  unless  the  attorney,  within  ten 
days  after  demand  therefor,  files  with  the  clerk  a  full  and 
complete  bill  of  particulars  of  the  services  and  amount  claim- 
ed for  each  item,  or  written  contract  with  the  party  for 
whom  the  services  were  rendered. ^*^ 

Under  these  statutes  the  attorney's  lien  attaches  before 
judgment.  Even  in  case  the  suit  is  for  damages  in  an  action 
of  tort,  though  the  lien  may  not  be  enforcible  until  the  dam- 
ages are  determined  by  judgment,  yet  the  lien  attaches  from 
the  time  of  the  service  of  notice.  This  notice  must  be  in 
writing.®^  It  may  be  served  at  the  commencement  of  the 
action;  and  such  notice  is  sufficient  to  cover  all  services  ren- 
dered in  the  action,  whether  before  or  after  the  service  of 
the  notice.®^  The  lien  attaches  from  the  time  of  the  notice, 
and  has  priority  to  any  lien  of  attachment  obtained  by  pro- 
ceedings in  garnishment  subsequently  commenced. ^^  Before 
notice  of  the  lien  the  parties  may  settle  without  reference 
to  the  claim  of  the  attorney  for  his  fees;^^  but  not  after- 
wards.^^ A  right  of  set-off  existing  at  the  time  the  notice  is 
given  is  superior  to  the  attorney's  liens;  but  the  lien  is  su- 
perior to  a  right  of  set-ofF  subsequently  arising.^^  Before 
notice  of  the  attorney's  lien,  it  is  competent  for  the  parties, 
acting  in  good  faith  without  collusion,  to  settle  the  suit  with- 
out reference  to  the  attorney's  claim  for  his  fees.^^ 

80  Cross  V.  Ackley,  40  Iowa  493.  381;   Brainard  v.   Elwood,  53   Iowa 

SI  Phillips    V.    Germon,    43    Iowa  30,  3  N.  W.  799. 

101.  86  Hurst  V.  Sheets,  21  Iowa  501. 

82  Smith  V.  Chicago,  &c.,  R.  Co.,  87  Casar  v.  Sargeant,  7  Iowa  317. 
56  Iowa  720,  10  N.  W.  244.  Where  an  attorney  contracts  with 

S3  Myers    v.    McHugh,    16    Iowa  his  client  in  a  suit  for  damages  to 

335.  accept  one-half  of  the  sum  recov- 

84  Casar  v.  Sargeant,  7  Iowa  317.  ered,    he   is    entitled   to    a   lien    for 

83  Fisher  v.   Oskaloosa,  28   Iowa  one-half    of    the    money    paid    his 


1 67 


ATTORNEY  S    SPECIAL    OR    CHARGING    LIEN. 


176 


§  176.    Kansas.^'- — An   attorney   has   a  lien   for  a  general 
balance  of  compensation  upon  money  due  to  his  client,  and 


client  in  a  compromise. 
V.    Des    Moines    City    R 


Chesliire 
Co.,    153 

Iowa  88,  133  N.  W.  324.  The  at- 
torney is  entitled  to  a  lien  for  a 
general  balance  of  his  compensa- 
tion whether  his  contract  with  his 
client  be  oral  or  written  or  upon 
a  contingency.  Cheshire  v.  Des 
Moines  City  R.  Co.,  153  Iowa  88, 
133  N.  W.  324.  An  attorney  under 
the  common  law  has  a  lien  upon 
a  judgment  procured  by  him  for 
his  client  for  his  compensation, 
and  the  Iowa  Code  giving  such  a 
lien  is  but  a  declaration  of  the 
common  law,  with  certain  addi- 
tions added,  as  to  the  giving  of 
notice,  etc.  Brown  v.  Morgan,  163 
Fed.  395.  The  execution  of  a  bond 
will  release  a  lien  of  an  attorney, 
and  where  an  attorney  on  demand 
being  made  on  him  fails  to  file  a 
bill  of  particulars  of  his  lien  and 
claim  he  will  lose  his  lien.  Jami- 
son V.  Ranck,  140  Iowa  635,  119  N. 
W.  1^.  As  to  the  sufficiency  of  no- 
tice to  fasten  a  lien  by  an  attorney 
upon  funds  in  the  hands  of  his 
client's  adversary,  see  Barthell  v. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  138 
Iowa  688,  116  N.  W.  813.  When 
a  judgment  directs  a  claim  of  a 
named  creditor  to  be  first  paid,  his 
right  is  superior  to  the  attorney 
claiming  under  his  lien.  Ward  v. 
Sherbondy,  96  Iowa  477,  65  N.  W. 
413.  An  attorney's  lien  on  papers 
is  a  possessory  one  and  is  lost 
when  he  loses  possession  of  such 
papers.  Foss  v.  Cobler,  105  Iowa 
728,  75  N.  W.  516.  The  clerk  of 
the  court  who  receives  the  amount 
of     a     judgment     from     defendant 


upon  which  an  attorney  has  a  lien 
is  required  to  pay  the  lien  to  the 
attorney.  Hubbard  v.  Ellithorpe, 
135  Iowa  259,  112  N.  W.  796,  124 
Am.  St.  271.  An  attorney  in  the 
absence  of  a  statute  has  no  equit- 
able lien  for  his  compensation. 
Ward  v.  Sherbondy,  96  Iowa  477, 
65  N.  W.  413.  Where  after  an  ap- 
peal is  taken  from  a  judgment,  the 
judgment  is  reduced  by  agreement 
and  compromise,  the  amount  ac- 
tually received  forms  the  basis 
upon  which  the  attorney's  lien 
must  be  estimated.  Parsons  v. 
Hawley,  92  Iowa  175,  60  N.  W. 
520.  See  also,  Wallace  v.  Chicago, 
M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  112  Iowa  565, 
84  N.  W.  662.  An  attorney  who 
has  secured  a  judgment  in  the  fed- 
eral court  may  sue  in  equity  the 
parties  to  the  judgment  to  enforce 
his  lien.  Brown  v.  Morgan,  163 
Fed.  395. 

f^s  Dasslers'  Gen.  Stats.  1909, 
§  435.  Where  a  suit  is  brought  in 
Kansas  and  also  in  Missouri  on 
the  same  cause  of  action  by  dif- 
ferent attorneys  and  the  general 
attorney  for  the  defendant  settles 
the  suit  in  Missouri  without  know- 
ing about  the  Kansas  suit  or  that 
any  notice  had  been  given  by 
plaintiff's  attorney  in  the  Kansas 
suit  that  he  held  a  lien  for  his  fees, 
it  is  held  that  the  Kansas  attorney 
can  enforce  a  lien  against  the  de- 
fendant for  his  fees.  Anderson  v. 
Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.,  86  Kans. 
179,  119  Pac.  379.  An  attorney  is 
entitled  to  a  lien  out  of  a  fund  re- 
covered by  him  in  a  bastardy  suit, 
where    he    has    been    employed    by 


§1/6  LIENS.  l68 

in  the  hands  of  the  adverse  party,  in  an  action  or  proceeding 
in  which  the  attorney  was  employed,  from  the  time  of  giving 
notice  of  the  lien  to  that  party.  Such  notice  must  be  in 
writing,  and  may  be  served  in  the  same  manner  as  a  sum- 
mons, and  upon  any  person,  officer  or  agent  upon  whom  a 
summons  under  the  laws  of  this  state  may  be  served,  and 
may  also  be  served  upon  a  regularl)^  employed  salaried  at- 
torney of  the  party.^^  Any  person  interested  in  such  mat- 
ter may  release  such  lien  by  giving  security  in  a  penalty 
equal  to  the  amount  claimed  by  the  attorney,  and  condition- 
ed to  pay  the  amount  that  may  finally  be  found  due  for  his 
services. 

Under  this  statute  the  lien  exists  even  when  the  only 
claim  in  suit  is  one  for  damages  for  personal  injuries,  un- 
liquidated and  undetermined  by  judgment  or  verdict.^"  The 
notice  need  not  state  all  the  amount  for  which  a  lien  is  claim- 
ed. The  lien  is  given  for  the  amount  agreed  to  be  paid  by  the 
client,  or,  in  the  absence  of  any  agreement,  for  the  reason- 
able value  of  the  services.®^  ''The  lien  of  the  attorneys  at- 
taches to  the  fruits  of  the  judgment.  It  attaches  to  the 
money  payable  to  the  client,  if  it  is  the  proceeds  of  the 
labor  and  skill  of  the  attorneys.  If  attaches  also  on  moneys 
received  by  way  of  compromise  by  the  client  in  the  cause,  for 
the  money  is  regarded  as  the  fruit  of  the  attorneys'  labor 
and  skill.     And  if  the  client  settles  the  case  after  judgment, 

the  mother  of  the  child  to  prose-.  Service,  17  Kans.  316,  94  Pac.  262, 

cute  the  proceeding  and   is  prom-  14   L.   R.  A.    (N.   S.)    1105. 

ised  a  fee  for  so  doing.     Costigan  89  Leavenson     v.     Lafontane,     3 

V.  Stewart,   76   Kans.   353,  91    Pac.  Kans.  523.     Service  upon  a  station 

83.     It   is   held   to   be   contrary   to  agent  of  a  railroad  company  is  not 

public  policy  for  an   attorney  and  sufficient.      Kansas    Pacific    R.    Co. 

his   client  to  agree  that  the   client  v.  Thacher,  17  Kans.  92. 

shall    not    settle,     compromise    or  so  Kansas      Pacific      R.      Co.      v. 

otherw^ise  adjust  a  cause  of  action  Thacher,  17  Kans.  92. 

vi'ithout   first   procuring,  the    attor-  f*!  Kansas      Pacific      R.      Co.     v. 

ney's    written    consent    to    do    so.  Thacher,  17  Kans.  92. 

Kansas    City    Elevated    R.    Co.    v. 


169 


ATTORNEY  S    SPECIAL    OR    CHARGING    LIEN. 


177 


SO  as  to  deprive  the  attorneys  of  their  costs  and  fees,  the  lat- 
ter have  an  action  against  the  former. "^^ 

§  177.    Kentucky.-'"^ — Attorneys     have     a     lien     upon     all 
claims    or   demands,    including   all    claims    for    unliquidated 


92  Lindner  v.  Hine,  84  Mich.  511, 
48  N.  W.  43,  per  Champlin,  C.  J. 

93  Carroll's  Stats.  1909,  §  107. 
Under  this  statute  the  institution 
and  prosecution  of  a  suit  to  judg- 
ment is  sufficient  notice  to  the 
judgment  debtor  that  the  plaintiff's 
attorney  has  a  lien  upon  it  for  his 
reasonable  compensation.  If  the 
debtor,  after  such  implied  notice 
or  after  actual  notice,  pays  the 
amount  of  the  judgment  to  the 
plaintiff  in  person,  he  is  still  liable 
to  the  attorney  for  the  amount  of 
his  lien.  Stephens  v.  Farrar,  4 
Bush  (Ky.)  13,  and  see  Robertson 
V.  Shutt,  9  Bush  (Ky.)  659.  An 
attorney  cannot  claim  a  lien  on  a 
judgment  recovered  for  a  taxpayer 
on  account  of  money  having  been 
illegally  appropriated  by  the  coun- 
ty. Marion  County  v.  Rives,  133 
Ky.  477,  118  S.  W.  309.  The  only 
way  a  plaintiff  and  defendant  may 
compromise  a  case  w^ithout  the 
consent  of  the  plaintiff's  attorney 
is  by  follovvfing  the  provisions  of 
the  statute,  and  where  they  do  so 
compromise  and  a  consideration  is 
paid  the  defendant,  plaintiff's  at- 
torney may  prosecute  his  claim  for 
lien  against  the  defendant,  and  it 
is  not  necessary  to  plead  bad  faith 
or  make  plaintiff  a  party  to  the 
action.  Proctor  Coal  Co.  v.  Tye, 
29  Ky.  L.  804,  96  S.  W.  512.  An  at- 
torney for  plaintiff  under  contract 
to  prosecute  a  cause  is  entitled  to 
enforce    his    Hen    even    where    his 


name  does  not  appear  on  the  rec- 
ord. Tyler  v.  Slemp,  28  Ky.  L.  959, 
90  S.  W.  1041.  Where  a  compro- 
mise is  entered  into  by  parties 
without  the  consent  of  plaintiff's 
attorney  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
frauding him  of  his  lien,  it  will 
not  defeat  his  lien.  Hubble  v. 
Dunlap,  101  Ky.  419,  41  S.  W.  432. 
As  to  effect  of  good-faith  compro- 
mises between  parties  under  the 
statute  on  the  lien  of  plaintiff's 
attorney  where  he  does  not  con- 
sent to  the  compromise,  see  Wa- 
then  V.  Russell,  20  ,Ky.  L.  709,  47 
S.  W.  437;  Martin  v.  Smith,  33  Ky. 
L.  582,  110  S.  W.  413;  Louisville  & 
N.  R.  Co.  V.  Proctor,  21  Ky.  L. 
447,  51  S.  W.  591.  Where  plain- 
tiff's attorney  has  employed  addi- 
tional counsel  with  the  plaintiff's 
consent,  he  is  also  entitled  to  a 
lien.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Proctor,  21  Ky.  L.  447,  51  S.  W. 
591.  An  attorney  cannot  appeal  a 
case  against  his  client's  consent  in 
order  to  secure  his  fee  and  lien 
therefor.  Nixon  v.  Ossenbeck,  129 
Ky.  588,  112  S.  W.  645.  An  attor- 
ney's lien  under  the  statute  where 
in  a  replevin  suit  an  alternative 
judgment  is  entered  for  the  prop- 
erty or  its  value  and  damages  is 
not  prior  to  defendant's  lien  on 
such  property  or  its  proceeds. 
Montgomery  v.  Carr,  18  Ky.  L. 
607,  37  S.  W.  580.  Defendant's 
attorney  cannot  assert  a  lien  on 
property  which  he  has  successfully 


§177  LIENS.  170 

damages,  put  into  their  hands  for  suit  or  collection,  or  upon 
which  suit  has  been  instituted,  for  the  amount  of  any  fee 
which  may  have  been  agreed  upon  by  the  parties,  or,  in  the 
absence  of  such  agreement,  for  a  reasonable  fee  for  the 
services  of  such  attorneys;  in  any  action  which  is  prosecuted 
to  recover,  they  shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  judgment  for 
money  or  property,  which  may  be  recovered  in  such  action — 
legal  costs  excepted — for  such  fee;  and  if  the  records  show 
the  name  of  the  attorney,  the  defendant  in  the  action  shall 
have  notice  of  the  lien;  but  if  the  parties  before  judgment, 
in  good  faith,  compromise  or  settle  their  differences  without 
the  payment  of  money  or  other  thing  of  value,  the  attorney 
shall  have  no  claim  against  the  defendant  for  any  part  of  his 
fee. 

Under  this  statute,  an  attorney  has  no  lien  before  judg- 
ment on  a  claim  for  unliquidated  damages  in  actions  of  tort; 
and  such  an  action  may  be  compromised  and  dismissed  by 
agreement  of  the  parties,  against  the  objection  of  the  attor- 
ney.^^  If  no  judgment  is  recovered  in  a  suit,  there  is  noth- 
ing to  which  an  attorney's  lien  can  attach.^^ 

But  it  has  been  held  that  where  a  plaintifif  in  an  action  to 
recover  land  dismisses  the  suit  upon  a  compromise,  by  vir- 

defended  for  his  client.     Forrester  608.     An  attorney  has  a  lien  on  a 

V.    Howard,   30   Ky.    L.    375,   98    S.  recovery  of  property   under  a  set- 

W.    984.      Attorney    can    have    no  off    or    counterclaim.       Harlan    v. 

liens   on  claims  in  their  hands  for  Bennett,  32  Ky.   L.  473,   106  S.  W. 

the  state.     Hendrick  v.  Posey,  104  287.     The  attorney's  lien  does  not 

Ky.     8,     41     S.     W.     702,     45     S.  apply  to  money  or  property  recov- 

W.      525.        An      assignment       of  ered   by  them   for   clients   through 

property      and      rights      by      plain-  legislative  appropriations.     Hallam 

tiff    will    not    defeat    the    lien    of  v.  Coulter,  24  Ky.  L.  2200,  73  S.  W. 

plaintiff's  attorney.     Central  Trust  772. 

Co.  of  N.  Y.  V.  Richmond,  N.  I.  &  9^  Wood  v.  Anders,  5  Bush  (Ky.) 

B.   R.   Co.,   105   Fed.  803,  45   C.   C.  601. 

A.   60.       Attorneys    for    defendant  ^^  Wilson     v.     House.     10     Bush 

who  successfully  defend   a  suit   to  (Ky.)   406.     It   is  for  the  attorney 

recover  land  from  their  client  can  to  show   the  nature  and  extent  of 

assert  no  lien  on  the  land.     Lytle  his  recovery.     Martin  v.  Kennedy, 

v.    Bach,  29  Ky.   L.  424,  93   S.   W.  S3  Ky.  335,  7  Ky.   L.  311. 


lyi  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.        §   177b 

tue  of  which  the  defendant  pays  off  certain  claims  against 
him,  plaintiff's  attorney  does  not  by  such  compromise  lose 
his  statutory  lien  on  the  land  sued  iov.^^ 

If  by  agreement  of  the  parties  the  action  is  dismissed, 
each  party  paying  his  own  costs,  and  it  does  not  appear  that 
there  was  any  intention  to  defeat  the  claim  of  the  plaintiff's 
attorney,  he  can  enforce  no  lien  against  the  defendant.^'^ 

§  177a.  Louisiana.''^ — A  special  privilege  is  granted  in 
favor  of  attorneys  at  law  for  the  amount  of  their  profes- 
sional fees  on  all  judgments  obtained  by  them,  and  on  the 
property  recovered  by  the  said  judgment,  either  as  plain- 
tiff or  defendant,  to  take  rank  as  a  first  privilege  thereon. 
This  privilege  can  not  be  extended  so  as  to  effect  property 
which  the  creditor  may  have  acquired  in  execution  or  in  sat- 
isfaction of  the  judgment.^^ 

§  177b.  Maine. — Executions  shall  not  be  set  off  against 
each  other,  when  the  sum  due  on  one  of  them  has  been  law- 
fully and  in  good  faith  assigned  to  another  person,  before 
the  creditor  in  the  other  execution  became  entitled  to  the 
sum  due  thereon;  nor  when  there  are  several  creditors  or 
debtors  in  one  execution,  and  the  sum  due  on  the  other  is 
due  to  or  from  a  part  of  them  only;  nor  to  so  much  of  the 
first  execution  as  is  due  to  the  attorney  in  the  suit  for  his 
fees  and  disbursements  therein.^ 

9C  Skaggs  V.  Hill,  12  Ky.   L.  382,  compensation   for  his   services   out 

14  S.  W.  '363.  of   a    fund    secured    for   his    client, 

^"^  Rowe  V.  Fogle,  88  Ky.  105,  10  and    where    the    sum    recovered    is 

S.  W.  426.  attached   by   the   client's   creditors, 

^^  Const,  and  Rev.  Law^s  1904,  §  the   attachment   lien   is   inferior   to 

2897,  as  amended  by  Act  No.   124,  the    claim    of   the    attorney.      First 

Acts    1906,   p.   210.     See    Butchers'  Nat.   Bank  v.  Martin,  127  La.  744, 

Union     &    Slaughterhouse    Co.    v.  53    So.    977.      See    amendment     in 

Crescent  City  Live  Stock  &c.  Co.,  41  Const,  and  Rev.  Laws  1908,  p.  641. 

La.  Ann.  355,  362,  6  So.  508;  Riggs  99  Luneau    v.    Edwards,    39    La. 

v.  Eicholz,  127  La.  745,  53  So.  977.  Ann.  876,  6  So.  24. 

An  attorney  is  entitled   to   receive  1  Stats.  1903,  p.  768,  §  28. 


//' 


LIENS.  172 


§  177c.  Massachusetts. — An  attorney  by  statute  is  given 
a  lien  on  any  judgment  he  may  procure  for  his  cHent  for  his 
fees  and  disbursements,  but  this  provision  does  not  prevent 
the  payment  of  the  execution  or  judgment  to  the  judgment 
creditor  by  a  person  without  notice.^ 

§  178.  Michigan. — In  1867,  all  laws  restricting  or  con- 
trolling the  right  of  parties  to  agree  with  their  attor- 
neys for  compensation  were  repealed,  and  the  taxable  costs 
were  made  payable  to  the  parties.^  Since  that  date  the  taxa- 
ble costs  form  no  part  of  the  attorney's  compensation,  but 
this  is  left  wholly  to  agreement,  express  or  implied.  A  lien 
for  such  compensation  is  in  some  sort  recognized  by  the  pro- 
vision that,  in  setting  off  executions,  one  against  another, 
the  set-off  shall  not  be  allowed  as  to  so  much  of  the  first 
execution  as  may  be  due  to  the  attorney  in  that  suit  for  his 
taxable  costs  and  disbursements.^  The  result  is  that,  al- 
though no  lien  is  expressly  given  to  attorneys  by  statute, 
the  courts  recognize  their  lien  to  the  extent  of  their  taxable 
costs,  at  least,^  and  probably  to  the  extent  of  the  compen- 

2  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  165,  §  48.  363,  85  N.  E.  171.  Under  an  agree- 
Where  an  attorney's  client  assigns  ment  between  an  attorney  and  his 
a  judgment  which  the  attorney  has  client  where  it  is  stipulated  that 
obtained  for  him,  the  attorney  may  the  attorney  is  to  conduct  a  case 
still  collect  on  such  judgment  the  to  contest  a  will,  he  to  receive  for 
amount  of  his  fees,  but  he  has  no  his  services  a  certain  sum  out  of 
authority  to  collect  more  than  is  the  sum  recovered  for  his  client, 
due  him  for  such  fees.  Bruce  v.  he  has  an  equitable  lien  for  such 
Anderson,  176  Mass.  161,  57  N.  E.  sum  in  the  event  the  litigation 
354.  Where  an  attorney  is  sued  succeeds  in  securing  a  sum  of 
by  his  client  for  an  accounting  and  money  for  such  client.  Coram  v. 
for  money  retained  which  is  Ingersoll,  148  Fed.  169,  78  C.  C.  A. 
claimed  by  him  for  debts  he  has  303;  Ingersoll  v.  Coram,  211  U.  S. 
incurred  for  expert  witnesses  but  335,  53  L.  ed.  208,  29  Sup.  Ct.  92. 
he  fails  to  bring  such  witnesses  in  3  Laws  1867,  p.  83. 
as  parties,  he  will  lose  his  lien  and  ■*  Howell's  Stats.  Ann.  1912,  § 
claim    to   retain   such   money   with  13049. 

which  to  pay  such  witnesses.    Fal-  ^  Kinney    v.    Robison,    52    Mich, 

ardeau    v.    Washburn,     199    Mass.  389,  18  N.  W.  120. 


^7Z 


attorney's  special  or  charging  lien. 


178 


sation  agreed  upon,^  or,  in  case  there  is  no  agreement,  to  the 
extent  of  a  reasonable  compensation. 


6  Wells  V.  Elsam,  40  Mich.  218. 
Where  under  a  contract  between 
an  attorney  and  his  client  it  is 
agreed  that  the  attorney  shall  re- 
ceive for  his  services  a  fee  con- 
tingent on  his  recovering  judg- 
ment for  his  client  in  litigation 
proposed  and  to  be  prosecuted, 
such  fee  to  constitute  a  lien  on 
any  money  or  judgment  obtained 
to  the  extent  of  such  fee  and  the 
contract  is  made  in  good  faith  and 
a  judgment  or  money  is  recovered, 
such  contract  amounts  to  and  oper- 
ates as  an  assignment  to  the  at- 
torney to  the  extent  of  his  agreed 
lien.  Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cheboygan  Circuit  Judge,  161 
Mich.  181,  126  N.  W.  56,  137  Am. 
St.  495.  Where  one  purchases 
property  knowing  that  the  attor- 
ney for  the  seller  under  an  agree- 
ment has  a  lien  for  his  services  on 
such  property,  the  property  is 
bought  subject  to  such  lien,  and  the 
lien  may  be  foreclosed  in  equity. 
Kilbourne  v.  Wiley,  124  Mich.  370, 
83  N.  W.  99.  A  notice  given  by 
plaintiff's  attorney  to  a  defendant 
stating  that  he  holds  a  lien  on  any 
money  which  his  client  may  ob- 
tain by  settlement  or  judgment 
from  said  defendant  and  that  if  any 
settlement  was  made  without  his 
consent  he  would  hold  the  defend- 
ant liable  for  his  claim  is  equiva- 
lent to  a  notice  that  there  was  a 
contract  between  said  attorney  and 
his  client  for  such  a  lien.  Grand 
Rapids   &  I.   R.   Co.  v.  Cheboygan 


Circuit  Judge,  161  Mich.  181,  126  X. 
W.  56,  137  Am.  St.  495.  Where  a 
client  has  agreed  with  his  attorney 
to  give  him  a  contingent  fee  and  a 
lien  on  the  money  or  property  re- 
covered in  litigation  prosecuted,  he 
cannot  give  a  valid  discharge  of 
such  lien  to  the  prejudice  of  the 
attorney  where  the  opposite  party 
has  notice  of  such  lien.  Grand 
Rapids  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Cheboygan 
Circuit  Judge,  161  Mich.  181,  126  N. 
W.  56,  137  Am.  St.  495.  A  dis- 
missal will  not  be  set  aside  because 
made  without  the  consent  of  plain- 
tiff's attorney.  Voigt  Brewery  Co. 
V.  Donovan,  103  Mich.  190,  61  N. 
W.  343.  But  see  Heavenrich  v.  Al- 
pena Circuit  Judge,  111  Mich.  163, 
69  N.  W.  226.  An  attorney  called 
in  to  assist  another  attorney  by 
consent  of  the  client  has  a  lien  for 
his  services  on  a  judgment  ob- 
tained by  his  client  in  the  action. 
People  V.  Pack,  115  Mich.  669,  74 
N.  W.  185.  See  also  Bigelow  v. 
Sheehan,  161  Mich.  667,  126  N.  W. 
707.  The  court  having  charge  of  a 
fund  may  direct  a  payment  to  an 
attorney  for  his  services  and  that 
he  have  a  lien  on  such  fund.  Wip- 
fler  V.  Warren,  163  Mich.  189,  128 
N.  W.  178.  An  agreement  between 
a  client  and  his  attorney  to  pay  an 
attorney  fee  and  giving  the  attor- 
ney a  lien  therefor  amounts  to  an 
assignment  of  a  portion  of  th'e 
judgment  or  thing  obtained.  Drei- 
band  v.  Candler,  166  Mich.  49,  131 
N.  W.  129. 


§   1/9 


LIENS. 


174 


§  179.  Minnesota.' — An  attorney  has  a  lien  for  his  com- 
pensation, whether  specially  agreed  upon  or  implied,  upon 
money  in  the  hands  of  the  adverse  party  to  an  action  or  pro- 
ceeding in  which  the  attorney  was  employed,  from  the  time 
of  giving  notice  of  the  lien  to  that  party;  and  upon  a  judg- 
ment to  the  extent  of  the  costs  included  therein,  or,  if  there 
is  a  special  agreement,  to  the  extent  of  the  compensation 
specially  agreed  on,  from  the  time  of  giving  notice  to  the 
party  against  whom  the  judgment  is  recovered.'^     This  lien 


'  Gen.  Stats.  1913,  §  4955.  Under 
this  statute  the  attorney  has  no 
lien  until  he  gives  notice  of  it  to 
the  judgment  debtor.  Dodd  v. 
Brott,  1  Gil.  (Minn.)  205,  66  Am. 
Dec.  541.  If  the  attorney's  com- 
pensation has  been  agreed  upon, 
the  writ  must  specify  the  amount 
of  the  lien  claimed.  Forbush  v. 
Leonard,  8  Gil.  (Minn.)  267.  Statu- 
tory costs  having  been  abolished  in 
Minnesota,  by  Laws  of  1860,  p.  244, 
the  lien  can  exist  only  in  case  there 
has  been  a  special  agreement  as  to 
compensation.  Forbush  v.  Leon- 
ard, 8  Gil.  (Minn.)  267.  The  attor- 
ney has  no  lien  upon  a  judgment 
for  compensation,  unless  he  has 
made  a  special  agreement  with  -bis 
client  as  to  the  amount  of  it.  In  re 
Scoggin,  5  Sawyer  (U.  S.)  549,  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  12511.  But  a  differ- 
ent view  was  taken  in  a  later 
case,  and  it  was  held  that  under  an 
implied  contract  it  is  sufficient  if 
the  notice  fairly  inform  the  party 
that  a  lien  is  claimed,  what  it  is 
for,  and  upon  what  it  is  to  be  in- 
dorsed. Crowley  v.  Le  Due,  21 
Minn.  412. 

8  Under  this  provision  an  attor- 
ney's lien  upon  a  judgment  is  su- 
perior to  the  claim  of  a  creditor  in 


whose  favor  execution  has  been 
levied.  The  clause  respecting  no- 
tice was  not  intended  to  affect  at- 
taching creditors  of  the  judgment 
creditor,  but  was  rather  intended 
to  regulate  the  conduct  of  and  to 
protect  the  judgment  debtor, 
Henry  v.  Traynor,  42  Minn.  234, 
44  N.  W.  11 ;  First  State  Bank  v.  Sib- 
ley County  Bank,  96  Minn.  456,  105 
N.  W.  485;  Habegger  v.  Kipp,  96 
Minn.  456,  105  N.  W.  489.  An  at- 
torney has  a  lien  upon  a  cause  of 
action  of  his  client,  for  his  fees 
from  the  service  of  the  summons, 
and  no  notice  to  the  adverse  party 
is  necessary.  Rev.  Laws  1905,  § 
2288;  Desaman  v.  Butler,  114  Minn. 
362.  131  N.  W.  463.  A  compromise 
of  such  a  cause  without  the  attor- 
ne3''s  consent  will  be  set  aside  and 
the  court  will  redocket  the  cause  to 
protect  the  attorney's  lien.  Desa-- 
man  v.  Butler,  114  Minn.  362,  131 
N.  W.  463.  See  also.  Farmer  v. 
Stillwater  Co.,  108  Minn.  41,  121  N. 
W.  418;  Lindholm  v.  Itasca  Lum- 
ber Co.,  64  Minn.  46,  65  N.  W.  931; 
Weicher  v.  Cargill,  86  Minn.  271, 
90  X.  W.  402;  Anderson  v.  Itasca 
Lumber  Co.,  86  Minn.  480,  91  N.  W. 
12,  291.  An  attorney  can  have  no 
lien   on   a   right   of  action   for   tort. 


175 


ATTORNEYS    SPECIAL    OR    CHARGING    LIEN. 


1 80 


is,  however,  subordinate  to  the  rights  existing  between  the 
parties  to  the  action  or  proceeding. 

§  180.  Oregon.^ — The  statute  is  the  same  as  the  above, 
with  the  exception  that  it  is  also  provided  that  the  original 
notice  shall  be  filed  with  the  clerk  where  the  judgment  is 
entered  or  docketed.  Under  this  statute  the  attorney  can 
not  have  a  lien  for  his  compensation,  unless  he  has  a  special 
agreement  as  to  the  amount  of  it.^^ 

Under  such  a  statute  giving  a  lien  upon  "money  in  the 
hands  of  the  adverse  party,"  something  more  is  required  in 
order  to  give  a  lien  than  a  mere  debt  from  such  party  to  the 
client.  Money,  in  this  connection,  means  some  specific  fund 
which  has  actually  come  into  the  party's  possession  as  cus- 
todian or  trustee,  to  obtain  which  the  suit  is  brought.  After 
judgment  is  obtained  on  the  demand,  or  for  the  money,  the 
lien  can  be  acquired  upon  the  judgment  only  by  giving  notice 
in  the  manner  provided  by  statute. ^^ 


Boogren  v.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co.,  97 
Minn.  51,  106.  N.  W.  104.  3  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  379.  114  Am.  St.  691.  See 
also,  Northrup  v.  Hayward,  102 
Minn.  307,  113  N.  W.  701. 

9  Bellinger  &  Cotton's  Codes  and 
Stats.  1902.  §  1063.  The  attorney 
may  waive  his  lien  by  taking  other 
security.  Stearns  v.  Wollenberg, 
51  Ore.  88,  92  Pac.  1079. 

10  In  re  Scoggin,  5  Sawyer  (U. 
S.)  549,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  12511,  8  Rep. 
330. 

11  In  re  Scoggin,  5  Sawyer  (U.  S.) 
549,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  12511,  8  Rep.  330. 
This,  case  arose  upon  the  statute  of 
Oregon.  The  right  to  the  lien  de- 
pends on  the  notice.  Stearns  v. 
Wollenberg,  51  Ore.  88,  92  Pac. 
1079.  See  also,  Morrell  v.  Miller, 
36   Ore.  412,   59   Pac.   710.     Under 


Bellinger  &  Cotton's  Ann.  Codes 
and  Stats.  1902,  §  1063,  an  attorney 
emploj^ed  for  a  contingent  fee  can 
have  no  lien  before  judgment  is 
obtained.  Jackson  v.  Stearns,  48 
Ore.  25,  84  Pac.  798,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
.S.)  390.  Parties  may  settle  a  suit 
at  any  time  before  notice  of  lien 
by  an  attorney.  Day  v.  Lar^en,  30 
Ore.  247,  47  Pac.  101.  See  also, 
Wagner  v.  Goldschmidt,  51  Ore. 
63.  93  Pac.  689.  The  remedy  of  an 
attorney  seeking  to  enforce  his  lien 
is  in  equity.  Alexander  v.  Munroe, 
54  Ore.  500,  101  Pac.  903,  103  Pac. 
514.  An  assignment  for  costs  be- 
fore judgment  entered  is  valid  as 
against  the  right  of  set-off  held  by 
the  defendant  against  such  judg- 
ment. Ladd  V.  Ferguson,  9  Ore. 
180. 


§     l8l  LIENS.  176 

§  181.  Mississippi. — Doubt  has  been  expressed  whether 
an  attorney  has  a  lien  for  his  fees  on  a  fund  collected  under 
a  judgment  recovered  by  him,  where  the  amount  of  his  fees 
has  not  been  fixed  by  special  contract,  or  by  established  pro- 
fessional usage;  and  it  seems  that  a  lien  would  not  exist  for 
fees  resting  wholly  upon  the  principle  of  quantum  meruit. 
But,  however  this  might  be,  it  was  held  that  such  a  lien  could 
not  be  asserted  on  the  trial  of  a  motion  against  the  sheriff 
for  failure  to  pay  over  money  collected  on  execution  issued 
upon  such  a  judgment.  The  attorney's  claim  should  be  as- 
serted directly,  and  not  in  this  collateral  way.^^  It  is  clearly 
settled  that  the  lien  of  the  attorney  attaches  upon  judgments 
recovered  by  him,  with  their  incidents  and  fruits;  but  it  is 
difficult  to  make  out,  from  the  decided  cases,  the  various 
limitations,  conditions,  and  incidents  of  such  lien.^^ 

§  181a.  Missouri. — The  compensation  of  an  attorney  or 
counselor  for  his  services  is  governed  by  agreement,  express 
or  implied,  which  is  not  restrained  by  law.  From  the  com- 
mencement of  an  action  or  the  services  of  an  answer  con- 
taining a  counterclaim,  the  attorney  who  appears  for  a  party 
has  a  lien  upon  his  client's  cause  of  action  or  counterclaim, 
which  attaches  to  a  verdict,  report,  decision  or  judgment  in 
his  client's  favor,  and  the  proceeds  thereof  in  whosesoever 
hands  they  may  come ;  and  can  not  be  afTected  by  any  settle- 
ment between  the  parties  before  or  after  judgment. ^^ 

12  Pugh  V.  Boyd,  38  Miss.  326.  S.  W.  262;  Taylor  v.  St.  Louis 
And  see  Stewart  v.  Flowers,  44  Transit  Co.,  198  Mo.  715,  97  S.  W. 
Miss.  513,  7  Am.  Rep.  707.  155.    The  liability  of  a  defendant  is 

13  See  Stewart  v.  Flowers,  44  created  by  the  service  of  a  notice 
Miss.  513,  7  Am.  Rep.  707.  by  plaintiff's  attorney  of  his  lien  as 

14  Rev.  Stats.  1909,  §§  964,  965.  provided  by  the  statute.  Wait  v. 
Wolf  V.  United  R.  Co.  of  St.  Louis,  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  204 
155  Mo.  App.  125,  133  S.  W.  1172;  Mo.  491,  103  S.  W.  60.  The  statute 
Laughlin  V.  Excelsior  Powder  Mfg.  giving  an  attorney  a  lien  will  be 
Co.,  153  Mo.  App.  508, 134  S.  W.  116 ;  liberally  construed.  Wait  v.  Atchi- 
United  R.  Co.  of  St.  Louis  v.  son,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  204iMo.  491, 
O'Connor,    153   Mo.  App.    128,   132  103  S.  W.  60.     Where  after  an  at- 


1/7 


attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.        §   i8ia 


torney  has  been  employed  by 
plaintiff  and  he  has  given  the  no- 
tice to  the  plaintiff's  adv^ersary  of 
his  lien  on  any  sums  recovered  in 
the  action  which  he  brings  and  a 
settlement  is  afterwards  made  be- 
tween the  parties  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  attorney,  he  may  follow 
the  proceeds  into  the  hands  of  his 
client  or  any  other  person,  or  he 
maj"  recover  from  the  defendant,  or 
in  case  judgment  is  entered  he  may 
enforce  his  lien  against  the  judg- 
ment. Curtis  v.  Metropolitan  St. 
R.  Co.,  118  Mo.  App.  341,  94  S.  W. 
162.  See  also,  Whitwell  v.  Aurora. 
139  Mo.  App.  597,  123  S.  W.  1045. 
It  is  held  to  be  a  violation  of  the 
confidential  relations  between  an 
attorney  and  his  client  for  the  at- 
torney to  be  permitted  to  hold  a 
lien  on  a  certificate  of  stock  which 
he  has  been  instrumental  in  having 
placed  in  his  name,  when  he  must 
have  known  that  it  belonged  to  a 
third  party.  He  can  have  no  lien 
upon  the  stock  even  as  against  his 
client.  Lindsley  v.  Caldwell,  234 
Mo.  498,  137  S.  W.  983,  37  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  161n.  Filing  a  motion  to 
set  aside  a  sale  of  real  estate  is  the 
commencement  of  an  action  within 
the  meaning  of  the  statute  giving 
an  attorney  a  lien  for  his  services. 
Smoot  V.  Shy,  159  Mo.  App.  126, 
139  S.  W.  239.  A  settlement  of  a 
suit  between  the  parties  may  only 
be  set  aside  by  the  attorney  who 
has  complied  with  the  statute  in 
giving  his  notice  to  the  defendant, 
and  even  where  there  has  been  a 
subsequent  satisfaction  of  a  judg- 
ment entered  by  plaintiff  without 
his  attorney's  consent,  the  attor- 
ney to  recover  must  show  fraud  on 
the  part  of  his  client.     Stephens  v. 

12 


Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.,  157  Mo. 
App.  656,  138  S.  W.  904.  The  pay- 
ment of  a  judgment  by  a  defendant 
to  plaintiff  with  the  consent  of 
plaintiff's  attorney  will  estop  the 
attorney  from  seeking  any  relief 
against  the  defendant  where  he 
fails  to  get  his  fees  from  plaintiff. 
Compher  v.  Missouri  &  K.  Tel. 
Co.,  137  Mo.  App.  89,  119  S.  W.  493. 
An  attorney  who  is  employed  by 
plaintiff's  attorney  with  his  consent 
to  assist  in  the  case  is  wtihin  the 
statute  allowing  a  lien  in  favor  of 
attorneys.  Smith      v.      Wright, 

153  Mo.  App.  719,  134  S.  W.  683. 
A  client  may  settle  or  as- 
sign his  judgment,  subject  to 
the  lien  of  his  attorney,  without  the 
consent  of  the  attorney.  Boyle  v. 
Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.,  134  Mo. 
App.  71,  ,114  -S.  W.  558.  See  also 
Boyd  V.  G.  W.  Chase  &  Son  Mer- 
cantile Co.,  135  Mo.  App.  115,  115 
S.  W.  1052.  An  attorney  can  have 
no  lien  for  services  rendered  in  the 
collection  of  a  minor's  inheritance. 
Kersey  v.  O'Day,  173  Mo.  560,  73 
S.  W.  481.  Where  an  attorney  has 
a  contract  with  his  client  for  a  cer- 
tain per  cent,  of  a  recovery  of  dam- 
ages and  the  client  conveys  the 
land  for  which  damages  are 
claimed  and  the  attorney  fails  to 
notify  the  grantee  of  his  lien,  he 
can  not  hold  a  lien  on  such  land. 
Hull  V.  Phillips,  128  Mo.  App.  247, 
107  S.  W.  21.  Under  the  provisions 
of  the  act  of  1901  (Ann.  Stats.  1906, 
pp.  876,  879),  it  was  held  that  the 
notice  an  attorney  gives  to  a  de- 
fendant of  his  lien  when  the  de- 
fendant is  a  corporation  must  be 
served  personally  on  the  officer  of 
the  corporation  and  that  a  notice 
by  registered  letter  is  not  sufificient. 


§   i82 


LIENS. 


178 


§  182.  Montana.^^ — The  compensation  of  an  attorney  and 
counselor  for  his  services  is  governed  by  agreement,  express 
or  implied,  which  is  not  restrained  by  law.  From  the  com- 
mencement of  an  action  or  the  service  of  an  answer  con- 
taining a  counterclaim,  the  attorney  who  appears  for  a  party 
has  a  lien  upon  his  client's  cause  of  action  or  counterclaim, 
which  attaches  to  a  verdict,  report,  decision  or  judgment  in 
his  client's  favor  and  the  proceeds  thereof  in  whosever  hands 
they  may  come ;  and  can  not  be  affected  by  any  settlement 
between  the  parties  before  or  after  judgment. 

§  183.  Nebraska.^^ — An  attorney  has  a  lien  for  a  general 
balance  of  compensation  upon  money  in  the  hands  of  the 


Abbott  V.  United  R.  Co.  of  St. 
Louis,  138  Mo.  App.  530,  119  S.  W. 
964.  See  also  as  to  liability  of  de- 
fendant for  plaintiff's  attorney  fee 
after  notice,  Carter  v.  CJiicago,  B. 
&  Q.  R.  Co.,  136  Mo.  App.  719,  119 
S.  W.  35.  An  administrator  who  is 
a  defendant  does  not  become  liable 
for  plaintiff's  attorney  fees  where 
such  attorney  only  files  a  copy  of 
his  agreement  as  to  fees  in  the  pro- 
bate court.  Bland  v.  Robinson,  148 
Mo.  App.  164,  127  S.  W.  614.  As  to 
effect  of  set-off  of  defendant  to 
plaintiff's  cause  of  action  where 
plaintiff's  attorney  claims  a  lien  for 
fees  under  his  contract  see  State  v. 
Fidelity  &  Guaranty  Co.,  135  Mo. 
App.  160,  115  S.  W.  1081.  The 
statute  giving  attorneys  a  lien  on 
the  client's  cause  of  action  from  the 
beginning  of  a  suit  is  constitu- 
tional. Taylor  v.  St.  Louis  Mer- 
chants' Bridge  Terminal  R.  Co., 
207  Mo.  495.  105  S.  W.  740. 

15  Code  Civ.  Proc.  1895,  §  430. 
The  lien  of  an  attorney  may  exist 
without  the  amount  of  his  fee  hav- 
ing been  agreed  /Upon.     In  the  ab- 


sence of  an  agreed  sum  he  is  en- 
titled to  the  reasonable  value  of  his 
services.  Coombe  v.  Knox,  28 
Mont.  202,  12  Pac.  641.  See  also 
Gilchrist  v.  Hore,  34  Mont.  443,  87 
Pac.  443.  In  an  action  to  foreclose 
his  lien  on  a  judgment  obtained  by 
him  for  his  client  he  should  make 
the  judgment  debtor  a  party. 
Coombe  v.  Knox,  28  Mont.  202,  72 
Pac.  641. 

10  Cobbey's  Ann.  Stats.  1911,  § 
3607.  An  attorney  has  a  lien  from 
the  time  of  giving  a  notice  to  the 
adverse  party.  Zentmire  v.  Brailey, 
89  Nebr.  158,  130  N.  W.  1047.  It  is 
not  necessary  that  the  notice  to  be 
served  on  defendant  should  be  in 
writing.  Any  actual  notice  will 
render  him  personally  liable.  Cones 
v.  Brooks,  60  Nebr.  698,  84  N.  W. 
85.  In  an  action  followed  by  judg- 
ment against  an  insurer  for  a  total 
loss,  an  endorsement  by  the  clerk 
on  the  summons  that  if  defendant 
failed  to  appear  the  plaintiff  would 
take  judgment  for  a  designated 
sum  with  attorney's  fees  and  costs 
is  held  not  sufficient  to  give  plain- 


179 


ATTORNEY  S    SPECIAL    OR    CHARGING    LIEN. 


183 


adverse  party  in  an  action  or  proceeding  in  which  the  at- 
torney was  employed,  from  the  time  of  giving  notice  of  the 
lien  to  that  party. 

Under  the  statute  it  w^as  regarded  as  doubtful  by  the  cir- 
cuit court  of  the  United  States  whether  an  attorney  can 
enforce  a  lien  upon  a  judgment  obtained  by  him  for  his  client 
against  a  third  person,  for  a  judgment  is  not  money  in  the 
hands  of  the  judgment  debtor  belonging  to  his  client. ^'^ 

There  can  be  no  lien  before  judgment  upon  a  cause  of 
action  for  tort  which,  in  case  of  the  death  of  either  of  the 
parties,  would  not  survive. ^^ 


tiff's  attorneys  a  lien  on  such  judg- 
ment. Cobbey  v.  Borland,  50|  Nebr. 
Z72>,  69  N.  W.  951.  As  to  what  is 
sufficient  notice  to  the  debtor  of 
attorney's  lien  see  Greek  v.  Mc- 
Daniel,  68  Nebr.  569,  94  N.  W.  518. 
Where  after  the  beginning  of  a 
divorce  plaintiff's  attorney  applies 
for  an  order  requiring  the  defend- 
ant to  pay  temporary  alimony  and 
the  plaintiff  dismisses  her  case,  the 
attorney  is  not  entitled  to  revive 
the  action  and  prosecute  for  his 
ow^n  use.  Peterson  v.  Peterson,  76 
Nebr.  282,  107  N.  W.  391,  124  Am. 
St.  812.  An  attorney's  lien  is  in- 
ferior to  the  right  of  the  defendant 
to  a  proper  set-off.  Field  v.  Max- 
well, 44  Nebr.  900,  63  N.  W.  62. 
Where  plaintiff's  right  has  been  ex- 
tinguished prior  to  the  time  his  at- 
torney files  notice  of  his  lien,  there 
is  nothing  in  the  possession  of  de- 
fendant upon  which  such  lien 
could  attach.  Sheedy  v.  McMurtry, 
44  Nebr.  499,  63  N.  W.  21.  An  at- 
torney's lien  is  not  effected  by 
plaintiff's  assignment  of  a  judgment 
where  the  lien  has  attached  before 
such  assignment.  Taylor  v.  StuU, 
79  Nebr.  295,  112  N.  W.  577.    Only 


attorneys  entitled  to  practice  law 
can  have  a  lien  on  money  in  the 
hands  of  the  defendant.  Gordon  v. 
Hennings,  89  Nebr.  252,  131  N.  W. 
228.  Where  a  defendant  is  a  non- 
resident of  the  state  a  notice  of  his 
lien  may  be  served  on  defendant's 
attorney  by  plaintiff's  attorney. 
Zentmire  v.  Brailey,  89  Nebr.  158, 
130  N.  W.  1047.  A  compromise 
and  satisfaction  of  a  judgment 
upon  which  plaintiff's  attorney  has 
a  lien  in  fraud  of  his  rights  will  not 
prevent  the  attorney  from  filing  an 
intervening  petition  and  from  hav- 
ing his  rights  determined.  Jones  v. 
Duff  Grain  Co.,  69  Nebr.  91,  95  N. 
W.  1.  An  attorney  bringing  a  suit 
for  his  client  for  personal  injuries 
has  a  lien  on  the  claim  of  his  client. 
Lewis  V.  Omaha  St.  R.  Co.  (Nebr.), 
114  N.  W.  281. 

1"  Patrick  v.  Leach,  2  McCrary 
635,  12  Fed.  661.  But  see  Taylor  v. 
Stull,  79  Nebr.  295,  112  N.  W.  577, 
where  it  is  held  that  an  attorney 
has  a  lien  on  a  judgment  in  a  bas- 
tardy case  which  his  services  have 
procured. 

18  Abbott  V.  Abbott,  18  Nebr. 
503,  26  N.  W.  361. 


§    l84  LIENS.  i8o 

The  notice  required  by  this  statute  is  a  personal  notice, 
and  it  should  be  in  writing.^^ 

This  lien  covers  the  attorney's  reasonable  fees  and  dis- 
bursements in  the  suit,  and  is  paramount  to  the  right  of  the 
parties  in  the  suit.  But  the  lien  is  restricted  to  the  claim  set 
forth  in  the  notice.^*' 

§  184.  New  York. — In  New  York,  prior  to  the  Code 
of  1848,^^  an  attorney  had  a  lien  upon  a  judgment  re- 
covered by  him,  but  the  amount  of  his  lien  was  lim- 
ited to  his  taxable  costs.  By  that  code  the  taxation  of  costs 
was  abolished,  and  the  compensation  of  the  attorney  was 
left  to  be  determined  by  the  contract  of  the  parties,  either 
expressly  or  impliedly  made.  The  implied  equitable  lien 
was  consequently  extended  to  cover  the  agreed  compensa- 
tion, whatever  the  amount,  in  all  cases  w^here  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion was  assignable  or  judgment  was  obtained.  To  the  extent 
of  his  compensation  the  attorney  was  deemed  an  equitable 
assignee  of  the  judgment,  and  had  a  lien  upon  it  when  re- 
covered.^2  In  the  absence,  however,  of  any  agreement  on 
the  subject,  it  was  at  one  time  thought  that  the  amount  of 
the  taxable  costs  continued  to  be  the  measure  of  compensa- 
tion allowed  to  the  attorney,  and  consequently  the  extent  of 
his  lien. 22*    But  the  rule  seems  afterwards  to  have  been  well 

19  Patrick  V.  Leach,  12  Fed.  661,  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  54;  Tullis  v. 
2  McCrary  (U.  S.)  635.  Bushnell,   12  Daly   (N.  Y.)   217,  65 

20  Griggs  V.  White,  5  Nebr.  467;  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  465;  Hall  v.  Ayer, 
Beyer  v.  Clark,  3  Nebr.  161.  9  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  220,    19   How.    Pr. 

21  See  post,  §  303.  (N.  Y.)  91;  Smith  v.  Central  Trust 

22  Rooney  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  Co.,  4  Dem.  Sur.  (N.  Y.)  75;  Mat- 
18  N.  Y.  368;   Marshall  v.   Meech,  ter  of  Regan,  58  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 


51  N.  Y.  140,  10  Am.  Rep.  572 
Wright  V.  Wright,  70  N.  Y.  96 
Ward  V.  Syme,  1  E.  D.  Smith  (N 
Y.)  598,  9  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  16 
Coughlin  V.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  Hud 
R.  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  443,  27  Am.  Rep 


1,  68  N.  Y.  S.  527,  31  Civ.  Proc.  R. 
387,  reversed,  167  N.  Y.  338,  60  N. 
E.  658.  The  case  of  Haight  v.  Hol- 
comb,  7  Abb.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  213,  16 
How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  173,  is  overruled. 
22  a  Rooney  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co., 


75;      Crotty      v.      Mackenzie,      52      IS  X.  Y.  368,  per  Harris,  J.;  Adams  v. 


i8i 


ATTORNEY  S    SPECIAL    OR    CHARGING    LIEN. 


184 


settled  that  the  attorney  might,  in  the  absence  of  a  definite 
agreement  as  to  the  amount  of  his  fees,  recover  the  reason- 
able value  of  his  services;  and  such  value  is  a  fact  to  be  estab- 
lished, like  any  other  fact,  by  evidence.^^ 


Fox,  40  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  442.  27  How. 
Prac.  (N.  Y.)  409,  reversed  40  N.  Y. 
577.  It  was  thought  that,  if  a  lien 
were  allowed  for  an  attorney's  serv- 
ices where  his  compensation  was 
not  agreed  upon,  the  effect  might 
be  to  tie  up  the  collection  of  the 
judgment  until  the  attorney  could 
go  into  court  and  recover  another 
judgment  against  his  client  fixing 
the  amount  of  his  compensation  in 
the  original  suit.  This  seemed  to 
be  an  extraordinary  proceeding, 
and  one  for  which  there  was  no 
precedent. 

23  Whitelegge  v.  De  Witt,  12 
Daly  (N.  Y.)  319;  Garr  v.  Mairet,  1 
Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  498;  Gallup  v.  Perue, 
10  Hun  (N.  Y.)  525.  In  re  Row- 
land, 55  App.  Div.  66,  66  N.  Y.  S. 
1121,  8-N.  Y.  Ann.  Cas.  397,  afifd. 
166  N.  Y.  641,  60  N.  E.  1120.  The 
lien  of  an  attorney  is  on  a  claim  of 
his  client  as  well  as  on  a  cause  of 
action  or  counterclaim.  Adee  v. 
Adee,  55  App.  Div.  63,  66  N.  Y.  S. 
1101.  The  lien  attaches  to  an 
award.  Wendell  v.  Binninger,  132 
App.  Div.  785,  117  N.  Y.  S.  616, 
See  also,  In  re  Robbins,  132  App. 
Div.  905,  116  N.  Y.  S.  1146.  An  at- 
torney has  a  lien  on  money  in  his 
hands  belonging  to  his  client  and 
this  is  not  determined  because  of  a 
showing  by  the  attorney  that  he 
still  preserves  and  has  the  money 
intact.  In  re  Farrington,  146  App. 
Div.  590,  131  N.  Y.  S.  312.  An  at- 
torney for  a  client,  though  not 
shown  of  record  as  such,  who  has 


charge  of  his  case,  is  entitled  to  a 
lien  the  same  as  if  he  were  appear- 
ing of  record.  Harding  v.  Conlon, 
146  App.  Div.  842,  131  N.  Y.  S.  903. 
Land  is  subject  to  an  attorney's 
lien.  West  v.  Bacon,  13  App.  Div. 
371,  43  N.  Y.  S.  206.  As  to  liability 
of  defendant  for  plaintiff's  attor- 
ney's fees  when  he  has  (been  noti- 
fied of  such  lien  but  settles  with 
and  pays  the  plaintiff,  see  Peri  v. 
New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
152  N.  Y.  521,  46  N.  E.  849.  The 
attorney,  independently  of  his  stat- 
utory lien,  has  a  lien  under  the 
common  law  on  the  papers  and  se- 
curities of  his  client,  given  into  his 
possession  by  his  client  where  no 
action  is  pending,  and  on  the  ap- 
plication of  the  client  the  court 
may  hear  and  determine  the  lien 
and  require  the  attorney  to  return 
such  property.  In  re  Edward  Ney 
Co.,  114  App.  Div.  467,  99  N.  Y.  S. 
982.  See  also  In  re  Bender's  Will, 
111  App.  Div.  23,  97  N.  Y.  S.  171. 
An  attorney  has  a  lien  on  property 
held  by  an  executor  for  his  services 
rendered.  In  re  Bender's  Will,  111 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  23,  97  N. 
Y.  S.  171.  See  also,  as  to 
lien  and  enforcement.  Agricul- 
tural Ins.  Co.  V.  Smith,  112  App. 
Div.  840,  98  N.  Y.  S.  347;  Oishei  v. 
Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.,  110  App. 
Div.  709,  97  N.  Y.  S.  447,  35  Civ. 
Proc.  R.  240,  18  N.  Y.  Ann.  Cas.  91. 
The  attorney  can  have  no  lien  on 
property  to  which  his  client  has  no 
claim   or   in   which   he  has   no    in- 


§  i84 


LIENS. 


182 


terest.  In  re  Brackett,  114  App. 
Div.  257,  99  N.  Y.  S.  802.  Plalntifif 
may  release  his  cause  of  action 
without  his  attorney's  consent.  Van 
Der  Beek  v.  Thomason,  SO  Misc. 
524,  99  N.  Y.  S.  538.  Where  one 
attorney  is  substituted  for  another, 
he  still  has  a  first  lien  on  the  re- 
sults of  the  litigation.  Johnson  v. 
Ravitch,  113  App.  Div.  810,  99  N. 
Y.  S.  1059.  As  to  the  effect  of  a 
client  dismissing  his  case  without 
consent  of  his  attorney  with  whom 
he  has  a  contract  to  give  a  part  of 
the  recovery,  see  Sullivan  v.  Mc- 
Cann,  113  App.  Div.  61,  98  N.  Y.  S. 
947,  37  Civ.  Proc.  R.  113.  Where 
suit  is  adjusted  and  dismissed  by 
the  parties  and  nothing  is  paid  to 
the  plaintiff,  the  attorney  cannot 
prosecute  the  action  in  favor  of  his 
own  lien.  Burpee  v.  Tov/nsend,  29 
Misc.  681,  67  N.  Y.  S.  467.  See  also 
as  to  liability  of  defendant  after 
notice,  Schriever  v.  Brooklyn 
Heights  R.  Co.,  30  Misc.  145,  30 
Civ.  Proc.  R.  67,  61  N.  Y.  S.  644, 
890,  63  N.  Y.  S.  217;  Bollar  v. 
Schoenwirt,  30  Misc.  224,  63  N.  Y. 
S.  311.  An  attorney  has  a  lien  on 
proceeds  derived  from  a  judgment 
obtained  by  him  for  his  client.  In 
re  Gates,  51  App.  Div.  350,  64  N.  Y. 
S.  1050,  31  Civ.  Proc.  R.  88.  See 
generally  on  attorney's  lien  on 
client's  cause  of  action  under  §  66, 
Stover's  Ann.  Code  of  Civ.  Proc; 
Rochfort  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R. 
Co.,  50  App.  Div.  261,  63  N.  Y.  S. 
1036,  30  Civ.  Proc.  R.  285;  Pilking- 
ton  V.  Brooklyn  Heights  R.  Co., 
49  App.  Div.  261,  63  N.  Y.  S.  211, 
30  Civ.  Proc.  R.  276;  Dolliver  v. 
American  Swan  Boat  Co.,  32  Misc. 
264,31  Civ.  Proc.  R.  94,8  N.  Y.  Ann. 
Cas.  74,  65  N.  Y.  S.  978;  Meighan 


V.  American  Grass  Twine  Co.,  154 
Fed.  346,  83  C.  C.  A.  124;  Zaitz  v. 
Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.,  52  App. 
Div.  626,  65  N.  Y.  S.  395;  Jeffards 
V.  Brooklyn  Heights  R.  Co.,  49 
App.  Div.  45,  63  N.  Y.  S.  530;  Zim- 
mer  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.,  32 
Misc.  262,  65  N.  Y.  S.  977.  An  at- 
torney can  have  no  lien  on  his  cli- 
ent's papers  secured  by  him  from 
his  client  for  a  fraudulent  purpose. 
Hey  ward  v.  Maynard,  119  App. 
Div.  66,  103  N.  Y.  S.  1028.  An 
attorney's  lien  will  not  be  affected 
by  any  settlement  made  between 
the  parties.  Kuehn  v.  Syracuse 
Rapid  Transit  R.  Co.,  186  N.  Y. 
567,  79  N,  E.  1109;  Roberts  v. 
Union  El.  R.  Co.,  84  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
437,  65  N.  Y.  St.  592,  32  N.  Y.  S. 
387.  The  assignee  of  an  attor- 
ney's claim  and  lien  has  the  same 
rights  therein  as  had  his  assignor. 
Muller  V.  New  York,  23  Civ.  Proc. 
R.  261,  29  N.  Y.  S.  1096.  An  at- 
torney who  refuses  to  prosecute 
his  client's  cause  has  no  lien  on 
the  results  of  such  prosecution. 
Halbert  v.  Gibbs,  16  App.  Div.  126, 
45  N.  Y.  S.  113.  Where  an  an- 
swer sets  up  no  counterclaim  or 
new  or  affirmative  matter  and  the 
parties  agree  to  a  settlement,  de- 
fendant's attorney  is  not  entitled 
to  any  lien.  Saranac  &  L.  P.  R. 
Co.  V.  Arnold,  72  App.  Div.  620, 
76  N.  Y.  S.  1032.  Where  plain- 
tiff's attorney  after  bringing  a  suit 
for  injuries  to  his  client  serves  a 
notice  on  defendant  as  required  by 
the  statute  and  the  parties  settle 
the  case  between  themselves  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  attorney,  he 
may  be  allowed  to  continue  the 
prosecution,  and  if  he  recover  an 
amount  in   excess  of  a  reasonable 


i83 


ATTORNEYS    SPECIAL    OR    CHARGING    LIEN. 


§     184 


fee  or  the  fee  he  has  agreed  upon 
it  may  be  remitted.  Herman  v. 
Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.,  121  Fed. 
184.  Where  a  cause  is  submitted 
to  arbitration  and  the  report  is 
that  awards  are  made  for  and 
against  each  of  the  parties,  which 
are  to  be  set  oflf  against  each 
other,  the  attorney  for  one  of 
the  parties  must  go  to  his 
own  client  for  his  pay  before 
resorting  to  the  other  party,  or  he 
must  show  that  she  is  insolvent. 
Webb  V.  Parker,  130  App.  Div.  92, 
114  N.  Y.  S.  489.  The  attorney 
can  have  no  lien  on  the  printed 
record  used  on  appeal  to  the  court 
of  appeals.  In  re  Bergstrom,  131 
App.  Div.  794,  116  N.  Y.  S.  247. 
But  see  order,  Coakley  v.  Rickard, 
120  N.  Y.  S.  1118,  reversed  In  re 
Hollins,  197  N.  Y.  361,  90  N.  E.  997. 
The  statute  giving  an  attorney  a 
lien  on  his  client's  cause  of  action 
will  include  an  action  for  tort 
which  is  unassignable.  Astrand  v. 
Brooklyn  Heights  R.  Co.,  24  Misc. 
92,  52  N.  Y.  S.  294.  Where  an 
agreement  is  to  pay  an  attorney 
his  disbursements,  such  disburse- 
ments may  be  included  in  his  lien 
on  a  judgment  obtained.  Ander- 
son V.  DeBraekeleer,  25  Misc.  343, 
55  N.  Y.  S.  721.  Where  a  defend- 
ant pays  a  claim  and  takes  a  re- 
ceipt on  the  day  the  action  thereon 
is  returnable  but  before  the  court 
meets,  the  attorney  can  not  con- 
tinue to  prosecute  on  the  theory 
that  he  has  a  lien  for  his  costs. 
Seventh  Ave.  Meat  &  Provision 
Co.  v.  Del  Favero,  123  N.  Y.  S. 
46.  An  attorney  who  accepts  a 
retainer  to  prosecute  or  defend  an 
action  and  who  withdraws  from 
the  case  without  just  cause  can  not 


claim  the  common-law  right  to  a 
lien  on  the  papers  and  pleadings. 
In  re  Rieser,  137  App.  Div.  177, 
121  N.  Y.  S.  1070.  An  attorney 
may  have  a  lien  upon  the  pro- 
ceeds obtained  by  him  for  his  cli- 
ent as  compensation  for  premises 
taken  by  a  city.  Ferris  v.  Law- 
rence, 138  App.  Div.  541,  123  N. 
Y.  S.  209.  The  lien  of  an  attor- 
ney on  a  judgment  becomes 
merged  when  the  judgment  is  as- 
signed to  him.  McDonogh  v. 
Sherman,  138  App.  Div.  291,  122 
N.  Y.  S.  1033.  An  attorney's  lien 
can  not  be  secured  by  an  attor- 
ney's agreement  to  furnish  evi- 
dence or  facts  where  the  attorney 
is  not  acting  as  attorney  for  the 
party.  Holmes  v.  Bell,  139  App. 
Div.  455.  124  N.  Y.  S.  301.  An 
attorney  representing  a  guardian 
releases  his  lien  on  a  check  re- 
ceived by  him  by  turning  the  same 
over  to  the  guardian.  Weber  v. 
Werner,  138  App.  Div.  127,  122  N. 
Y.  S.  943.  The  payment  of  com- 
pensation to  one  of  the  attorneys 
of  record  where  several  attorneys 
appear  with  him  will  satisfy  the 
lien  for  attorney's  fees  and  release 
the  parties  from  liability.  Schiefer 
V.  Freygang,  141  App.  Div.  236, 
125  N.  Y.  S.  1037.  Only  an  attor- 
ney can  secure  a  lien  and  an  at- 
torney's lien  can  not  be  acquired 
by  a  corporation.  In  re  Bensel, 
68  Misc.  70,  124  N.  Y.  S.  726.  An 
attorney  has  a  lien  on  his  client's 
money  in  his  possession  for  his 
services  rendered  the  client  in  a 
different  proceeding  than  the  one 
in  which  the  money  is  collected. 
Krone  v.  Klotz,  3  App.  Div.  587, 
25  Civ.  Proc.  R.  320,  38  N.  Y.  S. 
225.     An   attorney   has   no   lien   on 


i85 


LIENS. 


184 


§  185.  Present  code  of  New  York. — Under  the  present 
code  of  New  York,^'*  the  compensation  of  an  attorney  or 
counselor  for  his  services  is  governed  by  agreement,  express 
or  .implied,  which  is  not  restrained  by  law.^^  From  the  com- 
mencement of  an  action,  or  the  service  of  an  answer  contain- 
ing a  counterclaim,^'^  the  attorney  who  appears  for  a  party 
has  a  lien  upon  his  client's  cause  of  action,  claim,  or  counter- 
claim, which  attaches  to  a  verdict,  report,  decision,  judg- 
ment, or  final  order  in  his  client's  favor,  and  the  proceeds 


action  pending  in  the  municipal 
court  of  Bufifalo.  Drago  v.  Smith, 
92  Hun  (N.  Y.)  536,  72  N.  Y.  St. 
418.  36  N.  Y.  S.  975.  A  settle- 
ment between  the  parties  without 
the  consent  of  the  attorney  claim- 
ing a  lien  will  be  vacated  and  a 
judgment  entered  thereon  will  be 
cancelled  to  permit  the  attorney  to 
enforce  his  lien.  Knickerbocker 
Inv.  Co.  V.  Voorhees,  128  App.  Div. 
639,  112  N.  Y.  S.  842.  Where  an 
attorney  has  a  lien  against  prop- 
erty, a  part  of  which  has  been 
sold,  the  attorney  in  enforcing  his 
lien  must  resort  first  to  the  un- 
sold part  of  the  property.  Butts 
V.  Carey,  143  App.  Div.  356,  128 
N.  Y.  S.  533.  An  attorney  can 
have  no  lien  on  his  client's  cause 
of  action  where  he  enters  suit 
against  the  direction  of  his  client. 
Mitchell  V.  Mitchell,  143  App.  Div. 
172,  127  N.  Y.  S.  1065,  3  N.  Y.  Ann. 
Cas.  36,  73  N.  Y.  St.  719.  An  attor- 
ney's lien  is  assignable.  Leask  v. 
Hoagland,  64  Misc.  156,  118  N.  Y. 
S.  1035.  An  attorney's  lien  on  a 
judgment  obtained  by  him  for  his 
client  is  superior  to  an  ofTset  of 
the  adverse  party,  who  holds  a 
judgment  against  plaintifiE.  Wes- 
ley v.  Wood,  73   Misc.  33,   132  N. 


Y.  S.  248.  Both  plaintiff  and  de- 
fendant should  be  made  defendants 
to  a  proceeding  by  an  attorney  to 
ascertain  and  enforce  his  lien.  In 
re  Winkler,  146  App.  Div.  927,  131 
N.  Y.  S.  124.  Where  the  judgment 
for  plaintiff  is  wholly  based  on  dis- 
bursements incurred  and  for  com- 
pensation of  his  attornej\  and  the 
plaintiff  is  not  a  resident  of  the 
state  and  is  not  solvent,  the  de- 
fendant can  not  defeat  the  collec- 
tion of  the  judgment  by  setting  up 
as  a  set-off  a  judgment  in  his  favor 
against  the  plaintiff  in  another 
court  in  the  same  action.  Smith 
V.  Cayuga  Lake  Cement  Co.,  107 
App.  Div.  524,  95  N.  Y.  S.  236. 

2-1  Stover's  Ann.  Code  Civ.  Proc. 
1902,   §   66. 

25  Turno  v.  Parks,  2  How.  Pr. 
(N.  S.)    (N.  Y.)  35. 

2<->  The  defendant's  attorney  has 
no  lien  where  the  claim  set  up  by 
the  defendant  does  not  constitute 
a  cause  of  action,  so  as  properly 
to  constitute  a  counterclaim  with- 
in the  meaning  of  the  term  as 
used  in  the  statute,  but  is  a  claim 
which  could  only  be  set  up  in  re- 
duction of  the  damages  which  the 
plaintiff  might  recover.  Pierson  v. 
Safford,  30  Hun   (N.  Y.)   521. 


185  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §  186 

thereof,  in  whosesoever  hands  they  may  come,  and  can  not 
be  affected  by  any  settlement  between  the  parties  before  or 
after  judgment  or  final  order. 

This  provision  gives  full  and  complete  protection  to  the  at- 
torney. His  lien  extends  to  both  costs  and  services,  and 
can  not  be  affected  by  a  settlement  between  the  parties, 
though  no  notice  of  the  lien  be  given.^''^ 

§  186.  Lien  on  cause  of  action. — In  New  York  the  lien  is 
now  upon  the  cause  of  action,  and  continues  till  a  final  judg- 
ment is  reached.  It  is  not  in  terms  upon  the  judgment.  It 
attaches  to  every  verdict,  report,  decision,  or  judgment  in 
the  client's  favor.^^  The  lien,  being  upon  the  cause  of  action, 
continues  until  a  judgment  is  rendered  which  is  final.  It 
does  not  cease  upon  the  first  judgment  rendered,  if  this  be 
not  final.  If  such  a  judgment  be  rendered  against  the  plain- 
tiff, this  may  be  reversed,  and  the  cause  of  action  established 
in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  by  another  judgment.  If  the  first 
and  erroneous  judgment  destroyed  the  lien,  there  could  be, 
no  lien  thereafter,  for  the  lien  is  created  by  the  commence- 
ment of  the  action.  It  follows  that  the  lien  must  continue 
until  the  judgment  is  final,  either  for  want  of  power  to  ap- 
peal,  or   for   failure   to   appeal   in   time.     A   final  judgment 

2T  Albert  Palmer  Co.  v.  Van  Or-  Civ.  Proc.  R.  141;  Lewis  v.  Day,  10 

den,  64  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  79,  modi-  Week.    Dig.   49,   afifd.    by   Court   of 

fied  4   N.   Y.   Civ.   Proc.    R.  44,  49  Appeals,  31   Alb.  L.  J.  305;  Moore 

N.    Y.    Super.    Ct.    89;    McCabe    v.  v.    Bowen,    9    Rep.    588;    Goodrich 

Fogg,    60    N.    Y.    488;    Lansing    v.  v.  McDonald,  41  Hun  (N.  Y.)  235, 

Ensign,  62  How.   Pr.   (N.  Y.)   363;  11    Civ.    Proc.    R.   147,  2   N.   Y.    St. 

In  re  Bailey,  66  How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)  144,  reversed  112  N.  Y.   157,  19  N. 

64,    affd.    31    Hun    (N.    Y.)    608,    5  E.  649;  Oliwill  v.  Verdenhalven,  7 

Civ.  Proc.  R.  253;  Tullis  v.  Bush-  N.  Y.  S.  99,   17  Civ.  Proc.  R.  362, 

nell,    65    How.    Pr.     (N.    Y.)    465;  26   N.   Y.   St.   115. 
Kehoe  v.  Miller,  10  Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  2S  Goodrich     v.      McDonald.     41 

Y.)  393;  Murray  v.  Jibson,  22  Hun  Hun  (N.  Y.)  235,  11   Civ.  Proc.  R. 

(N.  Y.)  386;  ;Coster  V.   Greenpoint  147,    2    N.    Y.    St.    144;    Whitaker 

Ferry   Co.,   5   N.  Y.    Civ.   Proc.    R.  v.    X.   Y.    &   Harlem   R.    Co.,  3   N. 

146;    Dimick   v.    Cooley,    3    N.    Y.  V.  St.  537. 


§    187  LIENS.  186 

against  the  plaintiff  determines  that  there  was  no  cause  of 
action,  and,  therefore,  nothing  to  support  a  Hen.  It  follows, 
also,  that  a  client  has  not  an  absolute  right  to  stop  the  litiga- 
tion after  a  judgment  against  the  plaintiff  upon  the  merits ; 
but  this  right  is  subject  to  the  attorney's  lien  for  his  costs  and 
the  attorney's  approval.  While  that  judgment  remains  the 
plaintiff  has  no  cause  of  action,  and  the  attorney  has  prac- 
tically, by  the  judgment,  lost  the  benefit  of  his  lien.  If  the 
attorney  is  not  content  with  the  judgment,  and  wishes  to 
remove  the  adverse  judgment  as  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of 
enforcing  his  lien,  his  only  remedy  is  to  appeal  and  prosecute 
the  action  to  final  judgment.  And  this  he  may  do.  He 
may,  at  his  own  expense,  prosecute  the  appeal  against  the 
wishes  of  the  client  in  order  to  obtain  a  reversal  of  the  judg- 
ment, so  that,  upon  a  new  trial  and  a  favorable  judgment, 
he  may  have  the  chance  of  collecting  his  costs  from  the  oppo- 
site side  by  means  of  such  judgment.^^ 

§  187.  Ownership  of  costs. — Under  the  code  of  New  York 
the  costs  recovered  in  a  suit  belong  to  the  party  and  not  to 
the  attorney.^*^  He  simply  has  a  lien  for  his  compensation, 
whether  this  exceeds  in  amount  the  costs  taxed  in  the  judg- 
ment, or  falls  short  of  the  amount  of  such  costs.^^     Thus  the 

29  Adsit  V.  Hall,  3  How.  Pr.  (N.  termined  by  the  provision  of  the 
S.)   (N.  Y.)  Z7i.  code  as  it  previously  stood,  which 

30  Wheaton  v.  Newcombe,  16  declared  that  "the  compensation 
J.  &  S.  (N.  Y.)  215;  Stow  v.  Ham-  of  the  attorney  is  governed  by 
lin,  11  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  452;  Garr  agreement,  express  or  implied, 
V.  Mairet,  1  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  498;  which  is  not  restrained  by  law." 
Easton  v.  Smith,  1  E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Smith  v.  Central  Trust  Co.,  4  Dem. 
Y.)    318;    Moore   v.    Westervelt,    1  Sur.  (N.  Y.)  75. 

Code  R.   (N.  S.)    131,  3  Sandf.  ;(N.  3i  Wheaton  v.   Newcombe,   16  J. 

Y.)    762;    Bartle   v.    Oilman,    18   N.  &  S.   (N.  Y.)  215;  Rooney  v.  Sec- 

Y.  260;   Van   Every  v.   Adams,    10  ond    Ave.    R.    Co.,    18    N.    Y.   368; 

J.  &  S.   (N.  Y.)   126.     The  amend-  McGregor  v.    Comstock,   28  N.   Y. 

ment  in  1879  of  §  66  of  the   Code  237;   Marshall  v.   Meech,  51    N.  Y. 

of  Civil  Procedure  does  not  state  140,   10  Am.   Rep.   572;   Wright  v. 

in  words  what  the  attorney's  lien  Wright,    70    N.    Y.    96;    Pulver    v. 

is    for,    but   leaves    this    to    be    de-  Harris,  52  N.  Y.  72;  Crotty  v.  Mc- 


187  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §   188 

attorney  may  agree  with  his  client  to  receive  a  share  of  the 
recovery  in  addition  to  his  costs  and  disbursements,  in  lieu 
of  all  charges  for  his  services,  and  his  interest  in  the  action 
can  not  be  affected  by  any  compromise  made  between  the 
parties. ^^  But  it  seems  that  there  can  be  no  lien  for  com- 
pensation, beyond  the  taxed  costs  based  upon  an  express 
agreement,  unless  the  agreement  be  made  before  or  pending 
the  action.  It  can  not  be  based  upon  an  agreement  made 
after  judgment.^^  An  attorney  who  appears  and  answers 
for  the  defendant  after  notice  that  the  parties  have  settled 
acquires  no  lien  for  costs.^^ 

§  188.  Attorney's  undefined  lien. — Under  the  code  the 
amount  of  the  attorney's  compensation  for  which  he  has  a 
lien  is  undefined,  unless  there  be  an  express  agreement  of 
the  parties.^^  When  the  right  is  clear  and  only  the  amount 
is  in  question,  this  may  be  determined  upon  a  petition  and 
reference,  or  by  the  judge,  or  by  a  jury  passing  upon  an  issue 
sent  to  it.  Upon  a  summary  application  by  a  client  to  com- 
pel the  attorney  to  pay  over  moneys  collected,  the  court  has 
jurisdiction  to  determine  the  question  of  the  amount  of  his 
compensation,  where  this  is  the  only  matter  in  dispute,  al- 
though the  items  of  his  account  are  such  as  in  ordinary  cases 
would  subject  them  to  taxation.^® 

Kenzie,    10  J.    &   S.    (N.   Y.)    192;  Y.   C.  &  H.  R.   Co.,  71   N.  Y.  443, 

Creighton    v.    Ingersoll,    20    Barb.  27    Am.     Rep.     75;    Ackerman    v. 

(N.  Y.)  541;  Brown  v.  New  York,  Ackerman,    14    Abb.    Pr.    (N.    Y.) 

11   Hun   (N.  Y.)   21.  229;  Brown  v.  New  York,  11  Hun 

32Forstman     v.     SchuHing,     35  (N.   Y.)    21,   9   Hun    (N.   Y.)    587; 

Hun    (N.   Y.)   504.  Rooney  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  18 

33  Smith  V.  Central  Trust  Co.,  4  N.  Y.  368;  McGregor  v.  Comstock, 
Dem.  Sur.   (N.  Y.)   75.  28   N.    Y.   237;    Crotty  v.    McKen- 

34  Howard     v.     Riker,       11  Abb.  zie,   10  J.  &  S.   (N.  Y.)   192. 

N.   Cas.   (N.  Y.)    113.  36  in   re    Knapp,   85    N.   Y.   284; 

35  In  re  Knapp,  85  N.  Y.  284;  Commercial  Telegram  Co.  v. 
Wright  V.  Wright,  70  N.  Y.  96;  Smith,  57  Hun  (N.  Y.)  176,  10  N. 
Zogbaum  v.  Parker,  55  N.  Y.  120;  Y.  S.  433,  19  Civ.  Proc.  R.  32,  32 
Marshall  v.   Meech,  51   N.  Y.   140,  N.   Y.   St.  445. 

10  Am.   Rep.   572;   Coughlin  v.   N. 


§    189  LIENS.  188 

§  189.  Action  to  establish  lien. — In  New  York  the  attor- 
ney must  take  the  same  steps  to  estabHsh  his  lien  upon  the 
cause  of  action  that  he  was  previously  required  to  take  to 
establish  it  upon  the  judgment ;  that  is,  he  must  obtain  leave 
of  court  to  prosecute  the  action  for  the  purpose  of  determin- 
ing his  right  of  recovery  in  the  suit,  and  for  the  purpose  of 
establishing  his  lien  upon  the  subject-matter  of  the  action; 
though  it  would  seem  that  he  is  not  required  to  show  that 
the  settlement  was  a  fraud  upon  him,  but  only  that  it  in- 
equitably affected  his  lien  upon  the  cause  of  action.^'''  After 
a  settlement  between  the  parties,  the  lien  can  not  be  enforced 
upon  a  mere  motion  to  compel  the  defendant  to  pay  the 
plaintiff's  attorney  his  taxable  cost  by  awarding  a  judgment 
therefor.^^ 

No  notice  of  a  lien  on  a  judgment  which  is  exclusively  for 
costs  and  disbursements  is  required,  as  the  record  itself  is 
sufficient  notice  of  the  existence  of  the  lien  and  a  discharge 
obtained  by  payment  of  the  judgment  to  the  client,  and  not 
to  the  attorney,  may  be  set  aside  on  motion.^^ 

3-  AlcCabe  v.  Fogg,  60  How.  Pr.  17     Civ.      Proc.      R.     362,     26     N. 

(N.    Y.)    488;    Smith   v.    Baum.   67  Y.    St.    115;    Kehoe    v.    Miller,    10 

How.    Pr.    (N.    Y.)    267;    Tullis   v.  Abb.  N.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  393;  Deutsch 

Bushnell,   12  Daly  (N.  Y.)  217,  65  v.  Webb,  10  Abb.  N.  Cas.  (N.  Y.) 

How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  465;  Albert  Pal-  393;  Quinnan  v.  Clapp,  10  Abb.  N. 

mer  Co.  v.  Van  Orden,  64  How.  Pr.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  394;  ussell  v.  Somer- 

(N.  Y.)   79;   Goddard  v.  Trenbath,  ville,  10  Abb.  N.  Cas.   (N.  Y.)  395; 

24   Hun    (N.    Y.)    182,    afifd.    85    N.  Commercial       Telegram       Co.       v. 

Y.  647;   Wilber  v.    Baker,   24  Hun  Smith,    57    Hun    (N.    Y.)     176,    10 

(N.  Y.)   24;  Jenkins  v.  Adams,  22  N.  Y.  S.  433,   19  Civ.   Proc.  R.  32, 

Hun  (N.  Y.)  600;  Dimick  v.  Cool-  32  N.  Y.  St.  445.     Under  the  pres- 

ey,    3    N.    Y.    Civ.    Proc.    R.    141;  ent   code   it   seems   that  the   attor- 

Ackerman    v.    Ackerman,    14    Abb.  ney  may  proceed  without  leave  of 

Pr.    (N.    Y.)    229;    Palmer    v.    Van  court. 

Orden,    17    J.    &    S.    (N.    Y.)    89;  38  Smith  v.    Baum,   67    How.   Pr. 

Thompkins    v.    Manner,    18    J.     &  (N.  Y.)   267. 

S.       (X.       Y.)       511;     Oliwill       v.  so  Kaufman  v.   Keenan,  2   N.   Y. 

Verdenhalven,     7     N.     Y.     S.     89,  S.  395,  18  N.  Y.  St.  933. 


189  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.        §   189b 

§  189a.  North  Dakota.'*" — An  attorney  has  a  lien  upon 
money  due  his  client  in  the  hands  of  the  adverse  party,  or 
attorney  of  such  party,  in  an  action  or  proceeding  in  which 
the  attorney  claiming  the  lien  was  employed  from  the  time 
of  giving  notice  in  writing  to  such  adverse  party  or  the  at- 
torney of  such  party,  if  the  money  is  in  the  possession  or 
under  the  control  of  such  attorney,  which  notice  shall  state 
the  amount  claimed  and  in  general  terms  for  what  services. 
After  judgment  in  any  court  of  record  such  notice  may  be 
given  and  the  lien  made  effective  against  the  judgment 
debtor  by  entering  the  same  in  the  judgment  docket  oppo- 
site the  entry  of  the  judgment. 

§189b.  Oklahoma. ^^ — From  the  commencement  of  an  ac- 
tion at  law  or  in  equity  or  from  the  filing  of  an  answer  con- 
taining a  counterclaim,  the  attorney  or  attorneys  who  repre- 
sent the  party  in  whose  behalf  such  pleading  is  filed,  shall 
have  a  lien  upn  his  client's  cause  of  action  or  counterclaim, 
and  same  shall  attach  to  any  verdict,  report,  decision,  finding 
or  judgment  in  his  client's  favor,  and  the  proceeds  thereof, 
wherever  found,  shall  be  subject  to  such  lien  and  no  settle- 
ment between  the  parties  without  the  approval  of  the  attor- 
ney shall  effect  or  destroy  such  lien.  Such  lien  shall  attach 
from  and  after  such  attorney  is  contracted  with,  provided 
such  attorney  serves  notice  upon  the  defendant  or  defend- 
ants, or  proposed  defendant  or  defendants,  in  which  he  shall 
set  forth  the  nature  of  the  lien  he  claims  and  extent  thereof, 

40  Rev.  Code  1905,  §  6293.  Plain-  power  him  to  prevent  a  bona  fide 
tiff  may  settle  and  dismiss  his  settlement  by  the  parties.  Wells 
suit  without  notice  to  his  attor-  v.  Moore,  31  Okla.  135,  120  Pac. 
ney.  Olsen  v.  Sargent,  75  N.  Dak.  612.  An  attorney  may  bring  an 
146,    107    N.    W.    43.  action    against    the    defendant    for 

41  Comp.  Laws  1909,  §  274.  colluding  with  plaintiff  to  defraud 
The  lien  may  be  disolved  by  the  attorney  out  of  his  fees.  As 
bond.  Comp.  Laws  1909,  §  263.  to  evidence  held  sufficient  to  prove 
Before  judgment  is  entered  the  at-  collusion  see  Wells  v.  Moore,  31 
torney  has  no  such  interest  in  his  Okla.   135,   120  Pac.  612. 

client's    cause    of    action    to    em- 


§   i89bb  LIENS.  190 

or  from  and  after  the  service  of  such  notice.  Such  notice 
shall  not  be  necessary,  provided  such  attorney  has  filed  such 
pleading  in  a  court  of  record,  and  endorsed  thereon  his  name, 
together  with  the  words  "lien  claim." 

§  189bb.    Oregon.— See  ante,  §  180. 

§  189c.  South  Carolina. — In  South  Carolina  an  attorney's 
lien  is  limited  to  his  disbursements  and  the  costs  taxed;  and 
therefore  a  federal  court  sitting  in  that  state  can  not  declare 
a  lien  on  the  fruits  of  its  judgment  for  services  rendered  in 
the  state  courts  in  litigation  concerning  the  same  subject- 
matter.  There  is  no  provision  by  statute  on  the  subject,  and 
that  rule  of  the  English  courts  is  followed  strictly.^^ 

§  189d.  South  Dakota.^^  An  attorney  has  a  lien  for  a 
general  balance  of  compensation  in  and  for  each  case  upon 
money  due  his  client  in  the  hands  of  the  adverse  party,  or 
attorney  of  such  party,  in  an  action  or  proceeding  in  which 
the  attorney  claiming  the  lien  was  employed,  from  the  time 
of  giving  notice  in  writing  to  such  adverse  party,  or 
attorney  of  such  party,  if  the  money  is  in  the  posses- 
sion or  under  the  control  of  such  attorney,  which  notice  shall 
state  the  amount  claimed,  and,  in  general  terms,  for  what 
services.  After  judgment  in  any  court  of  record  such  notice 
may  be  given,  and  the  lien  made  efifective  against  the  judg- 

42  Scharlock  v.  Oland,  1  Rich.  L.  Serveson,  8  S.  Dak.  350,  66  N.  W. 
(S.  Car.)  207;  Miller  v.  New-  938.  An  attorney's  lien  on  plain- 
ell,  20  S.  Car.  123,  47  Am.  Rep.  tifif's  appealed  judgment  for  costs 
833;  Massachusetts  &  So.  Const.  is  not  superior  to  the  rights  of 
Co.  V.  Gill's  Creek,  48  Fed.  145.  the    parties    where    defendant    also 

43  Rev.  Code  (Pol.)  1903,  §  702.  has  a  judgment  for  costs  on  ap- 
By  filing  his  lien  an  attorney  se-  peal,  and  will  not  prevent  the 
cures  an  interest  in  the  judgment  plaintiff  from  setting  off  his  judg- 
and  the  cause  of  action  on  appeal  ment  against  defendant's  judg- 
which  is  not  disturbed  by  the  as-  ment.  Garrigan  v.  Huntimer,  21 
signment  of  interest.     Leight'on  v.  S.  Dak.  269,   111   N.  W.  563. 


ipi  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §   190 

ment  debtor,  by  entering  the  same  in  the  judgment  docket 
opposite  the  entry  of  the  judgment. 

The  statutes  also  provide  that  mutual  final  judgments  may 
be  set  off  pro  tanto,  one  against  the  other,  upon  application 
and  notice.  Under  them  both  the  right  to  set-of¥  and  the 
right  to  attorney's  lien  are  dormant  until  actively  asserted. 
The  judgment  creditor  may  not  ask  for  a  set-ofT,  and  the 
attorney  may  not  take  any  steps  to  perfect  his  lien.  The 
attorney's  lien  attaches  and  becomes  an  active  instead  of  a 
potential  right,  "from  the  time  of  giving  notice  in  writing  to 
the  adverse  party;"  and  proceedings  regularly  initiated, 
though  not  concluded,  in  court,  to  set  off  mutual  final  judg- 
ments, will  not  be  affected  by  a  subsequent  notice  by  the  at- 
torney of  his  claim  for  lien.^* 

§  190.  Tennessee*^ — Any  attorney  who  is  employed  to 
prosecute  a  suit  that  has  already  been  brought  in  anv  court 
of  record  in  this  state  shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  plaintiff's 
right  of  action  from  the  date  of  his  employment  in  the  case; 
provided,  the  record  of  the  case  will  first  be  made  to  show 
such  employment  by  notice  upon  the  rule  docket  of  such 
court,  or  a  written  memorandum  filed  with  the  papers  in  the 
case,  or  by  notice  served  upon  the  defendant  in  the  case. 
The  attorney's  lien  attaches  not  only  to  the  judgment  but 
to  the  property,  whether  real  or  personal,  which  is  the  sub- 

44  Pirie    v.    Harkness,   3    S.    Dak.  given  and  [the  judgment  holder's] 

178,   52   N.    W.   581.     In   this   case,  right  to  set-off  was  so  acted  upon, 

before  the  attorney  had  given  no-  the  attorney's  claim   for   lien  was 

tice    to    the    adverse    party    of    his  still  only  a  possibility. — an  inchoate 

claim    of    a    lien,    this    party    "had  right.      He    had    not   yet   done    the 

openly  asserted  and  begun  to  ex-  very  thing  which,  under  the   stat- 

ercise    their    right    to    have    these  ute,    was    required    to    make    it    an 

judgments    set    off,    by    giving   no-  operative   lien,   and   did   not   do   it, 

tice    of    such    application     to     the  nor  attempt  to  do  it,  until  another 

court,  as  provided  by  statute.  The  and  adverse   right  had  attached,   a 

attorney    claiming    the    lien    knew  right  which  the  subsequent  notice 

of  this,  for  the  notice  was  served  did   not    displace." 

upon  him.     When  this  notice  was  ^.^  Supp.  1903,  p.  615. 


§  I90 


LIENS. 


192 


ject  of  the  litigation.*'^  The  attorney  is  entitled  to  an  equit- 
able lien  on  the  property  or  thing  in  litigation  for  his  just 
and  reasonable  fees,  and  the  client  can  not,  while  the  suit  is 
pending,  so  dispose  of  the  subject-matter  in  dispute  as  to 
deprive  the  attorney  of  his  lien."*^  If  property  be  attached 
in  the  suit,  the  attorney  has  a  lien  upon  such  property  for  his 
fees.*^  The  lien  dates  from  the  commencement  of  the  suit, 
and  its  pendency  is,  of  itself,  notice  to  all  persons  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  lien.  It  may  be  preserved  and  extended  by 
stating  its  existence  in  the  judgment  or  decree.  Notice  from 
the  pendency  of  the  suit  affects  not  only  the  client,  but  his 


46  Hunt  V.  McClanahan,  1  Heisk. 
(Tenn.)  503;  Brown  v.  Bigley,  3 
Tenn.  Ch.  618;  Garner  v.  Garner, 
1  Lea  (Tenn.)  29;  Vaughn  v. 
Vaughn,  12  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  472; 
Perkins  v.  Perkins,  9  Heisk. 
(Tenn.)  95.  Where  a  defendant 
after  notice  of  the  employment  of 
an  attorney  to  prosecute  a  claim 
against  him  settles  the  claim  with 
claimant  it  may,  in  defense  of  a 
suit  by  the  attorney  against  it  to 
recover  his  fee,  show  that  the  em- 
ployment of  the  attorney  was  in- 
valid. Ingersoll  v.  Coal  Creek 
Coal  Co.,  117  Tenn.  263,  98  S.  W. 
178,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  282n,  119 
Am.  St.  1003n.  Where  an  attor- 
ney is  employed  to  prosecute  a 
suit  for  minors  and  married  wo- 
men to  recover  property  conveyed 
by  their  ancestor  and  succeeds  in 
recovering  it,  he  is  entitled  to  a 
lien  thereon  for  his  reasonable 
compensation.  Boring  v.  Jobe 
(Tenn.),  53  S.  W.  763.  But 
where  no  lien  is  declared  either 
in  a  judgment  or  in  a  chancery 
suit  which  he  has  brought  to  sub- 
ject  lands    to    a    sale    to    satisfy   a 


judgment  at  law,  the  attorney  can 
have  no  lien  for  his  services. 
Gribble  v.  Ford  (Tenn.),  52 
S.  W.  1007.  An  attorney  who  has 
prosecuted  a  suit  for  a  minor  is 
entitled  to  a  lien  on  his  recovery 
for  his  reasonable  compensation. 
American  Lead  Pencil  Co.  v.  Da- 
vis, 108  Tenn.  442,  67  S.  W.  864. 
An  attorney  may  waive  his  lien 
on  a  judgment  by  taking  the 
promise  of  the  creditor  to  pay  his 
fees.  Cantrell  v.  Ford  (Tenn.), 
46  S.  W.  581.  An  attorney's 
lien  may  be  adjudged  at  any  time 
while  the  cause  is  still  under  the 
control  of  the  court  and  an  assign- 
ment of  the  judgment  will  not  de- 
feat the  lien.  Taylor  v.  Badoux 
(Tenn.),  58  .S.  W.  919.  Where 
there  is  no  recovery  there  can  be 
no  lien  for  the  attorney.  Land- 
reth  V.  Powell,  122  Tenn.  195.  121 
S.  W.  500. 

4'!'  Hunt  V.  McClanahan,  1  Heisk. 
(Tenn.)  503;  Pleasants  v.  Kort- 
recht,    5    Heisk.    (Tenn.)    694. 

48  Pleasants  v.  Kortrecht,  5 
Heisk.   (Tenn.)  694. 


193 


ATTORNEY  S    SPECIAL   OR    CHARGING    LIEN. 


§    190a 


creditors  and  purchasers,  and  the  defendant  as  well.^*^  Under 
the  present  statutes  attorneys  beginning  a  suit  have  a  lien  on 
plaintiff's  cause  of  action  for  their  charges  where  the  charges 
are  fixed  by  contract  or  by  legal  proceedings/'^ 

§  190a.  Texas.''^ — In  an  action  against  unknown  owners 
to  recover  land,  on  service  by  publication,  the  court  is  au- 
thorized to  appoint  an  attorney  to  represent  such  unknown 
owners  and  allow  his  compensation,  and  such  attorney  has 
a  lien,  but  it  can  not  be  foreclosed  as  against  interested 
parties  not  made  parties  to  the  action.  Such  a  lien  can  only 
be  enforced  in  an  equitable  suit  and  on  due  notice. 

An  attorney  has  a  lien  on  goods  in  a  store  for  preparing 
and  defending  a  deed  of  trust  thereof  without  knowing  that 
the  vendor  had  bought  the  goods  on  credit  by  means  of  false 
representations,  and  the  lien  of  the  attorney  is  superior  to 
the  claim  of  the  seller  attempting  to  rescind  the  contract  of 
sale. 


49  Covington  v.  Bass,  88  Tenn. 
496,  12  S.  W.  1033. 

50  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Wells, 
104  Tenn.  706,  59  S.  W.  1041.  A 
defendant  cannot  set  of?  a  judg- 
ment held  by  him  so  as  to  defeat 
the  attorney's  lien  on  the  judg- 
ment. Roberts  v.  Mitchell,  94 
Tenn.  277,  29  S.  W.  5,  29  L.  R. 
A.  705.  The  attorney's  lien  can 
not  be  defeated  by  a  compromise 
of  the  parties  in  fraud  of  his  rights. 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Wells,  104 
Tenn.  706,  59  S.  W.  1041.  The 
attorney  in  a  suit  for  a  stockhold- 
er to  vacate  a  fraudulent  convey- 
ance has  a  lien  on  the  property 
recovered  in  the  w^rit.  Grant  v. 
Lookout  Mountain  Co.,  93  Tenn. 
691,  28  S.  W.  90,  27  L.  R.  A.  98. 

51  Acts    1866,    p.    125.      Middles- 


worth  v.  Houston  Oil  Co.  of  Tex- 
as, 184  Fed.  857,  107  C.  C.  A.  181; 
Meyers  v.  Bloon,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
554,  50  S.  W.  217.  An  attorney 
has  no  general  lien  on  a  judgment 
obtained  to  secure  his  fees  in  pro- 
curing same.  Button  v.  Mason, 
21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  389,  52  S.  W. 
651.  An  attorney  who  has  con- 
tracted with  his  client  in  a  per- 
sonal injury  suit  to  receive  a  part 
of  the  sum  recovered  for  his  serv- 
ices, where  the  defendant  has  ac- 
tual knowledge  of  the  terms  of 
such  contract,  can  not  be  defraud- 
ed out  of  his  compensation  by  a 
settlement  between  his  client  and 
the  defendant.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F. 
R.  Co.  V.  Dysart  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
130  S.  W.  1047.  See  also,  Marschall 
V.   Smith    (Tex.   Civ.  App.),   132  S. 


13 


§    190b  LIENS.  194 

§  190b.  Utah.^2 — The  compensation  of  an  attorney  and 
counselor  for  his  services  is  governed  by  agreement,  express 
or  implied,  which  is  not  restricted  by  law.  From  the  com- 
mencement of  an  action,  or  the  service  of  an  answer  con- 
taining a  counterclaim,  the  attorney  who  appears  for  a  party 
has  a  lien  upon  his  client's  cause  of  action  or  counterclaim, 
which  attaches  to  a  verdict,  report,  decision,  or  judgment  in 
his  client's  favor  and  the  proceeds  thereof  in  whosoever 
hands  they  may  come,  and  can  not  be  vacated  by  any  settle- 
ment between  the  parties  before  or  after  judgment. 

§  191.  Vermont. — In  Vermont  an  attorney  has  a  lien  for 
his  costs  upon  a  judgment  recovered  by  him  in  favor  of  his 
client;  but  this  lien  does  not  bind  the  opposite  party  so  as  to 
prevent  his  settling  or  discharging  the  suit  and  cause  of  ac- 
tion.°^  In  the  early  decisions  this  lien  was  confined  to  the 
taxable  costs  in  this  suit.^^  But  in  a  later  decision  the  rule 
was  established  that  the  lien  extends  to  the  attorney's  rea- 
sonable fees  and  disbursements  in  the  suit  in  which  the  judg- 
ment was  recorded.  "No  good  reason  can  be  given,"  say 
the  court,^^  "for  limiting  an  attorney's  charging  lien  to  what 
under  our  law  are  the  taxable  costs  in  favor  of  his  client  in 

W.  812;   San  Antonio   &  A.   P.   R.  for     his     client,     as     against     his 

Co.    V.    Sehorn    (Tex.    Civ.    App.),  client    or   his    assignee.     Parker   v. 

127   S.    W.   246;    Mays   v.    Sanders,  Parker,    71    Vt.    387,    45    Atl.    756. 

90  Tex.   132,  Zl  S.  W.  595.  Where   a   suit   is   brought   and   the 

52  Comp.  Laws  1907,  §  135.  Pot-  cause  is  submitted  to  a  committee 
ter  V.  Ajax  Min.  Co.,  19  Utah  421,  of  award,  plaintiff's  attorney  has  a 
57  Pac.  270;  Sandberg  v.  Victor  lien  on  the  recovery  by  such 
Gold  &  Silver  Min.  Co.,  18  Utah  award.  Plutchinson  v.  Howard,  15 
66,  55   Pac.  74.  Vt.  544. 

53  Hutchinson  v.  Pettes,  18  Vt.  54  Heartt  v.  Chipman,  2  Aik. 
614;  Walker  v.  Sargent,  14  Vt.  247;  (Vt.)    162. 

Beech  v.  Canaan,  14  Vt.  485;  Smal-  50  Weed     Sewing     Mach.    Co.    v. 

ley  V.  Clark,  22  Vt.  598;  Fairbanks  Boutelle,  56  Vt.  570,  48  Am.   Rep. 

V.  Devereaux,  58  Vt.  359,  3  Atl.  500.  821;  Hooper  v.  Welch,  43  Vt.  169, 

An   attorney   is   entitled   to    a   lien  5    Am.    Rep.    267;    Hutchinson    v. 

on   a   judgment   obtained    by   him,  Howard,    15    Vt.    544. 


195  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.        §  191a 

the  suit.  If  he  is  to  be  given  a  lien  at  all  upon  a  judgment 
recovered  by  his  services,  it  should  be  to  the  extent  of  the 
value  of  his  services  in  the  suit.  His  services  are  presumed 
to  have  been  skilfully  performed,  and  valuable  because  so 
performed.  They  enhance  his  client's  claim  presumably  to 
the  extent  of  the  value  of  his  services,  the  same  as  the  tailor's 
services,  in  manufacturing  a  patron's  cloth  into  a  coat,  en- 
hance the  value  of  the  materials  to  the  extent  of  the  value  of 
the  services.  We  are  aware  that  the  decisions  in  this  country 
are  not  uniform  on  the  extent  of  an  attorney's  charging  lien. 
In  some  states  it  is  held  to  cover  his  reasonable  charges  and 
disbursements  in  the  suit,  while  in  others  it  is  limited  to  the 
amount  of  costs  taxable  in  favor  of  his  client  in  the  suit. 
But  these  are  what  the  law  allows  to  be  recovered  in  favor 
of  the  prevailing  part}^  They  are  taxed  between  party  and 
party,  and  not  between  attorney  and  client,  and  are  in  no 
sense  the  measure  of  the  value  of  the  attorney's  services  and 
disbursements  in  the  suit.  They  include  frequently  court, 
clerk,  witness,  and  ofificer's  fees,  in  the  suit,  which  the  client 
has  advanced.  I  can  not  help  thinking  that  this  class  of  de- 
cisions has  their  origin  in  not  observing  the  distinction  be- 
tween taxable  costs  which,  at  the  common  law,  was  a  taxa- 
tion between  the  attorney  or  solicitor  and  his  client,  and 
taxable  costs  under  our  statutes,  which  is  a  taxation  in  favor 
of  the  recovering  party  against  the  defeated  party." 

§  191a.     Virginia.^^ — Any    person    having    or    claiming    a 
right  of  action  sounding  in  tort,  or  for  unliquidated  damages 

^>c<  Code    1904,     §    3201a.      Where  of  his  client.     Watts  v.  Newberry, 

drafts    or    other    evidences    of    in-  107  Va.  233,  57  S.  E.  657.     Where 

debtedness   are  given  to   an  attor-  a    defendant    assigns    a    debt    from 

ney    by    his    client    to    be    applied  the  collection   of  which   the  attor- 

to   the  payment  of  the  client's  in-  ney    expected    to    collect    his    fees 

debtedness,  such  property  so  pos-  the  attorney  may  intervene  by  pe- 

sessed  by  the  attorney  is  not  sub-  tition.     Fitzgerald's  Exrx.  v.  Irby, 

ject   to   a  lien   of  the  attorney  for  99  Va.  81,  37  S.  E.  777. 
his    services    in    paying    the    debts 


192 


LIENS. 


196 


on  contract,  may  contract  with  any  attorney  at  law  to  prose- 
cute the  same,  and  such  attorney  shall  have  a  lien  upon  such 
cause  of  action  as  security  for  his  fees  for  any  services  rend- 
ered in  relation  to  said  cause  of  action  or  claim.  And  when 
any  such  contract  shall  be  made  and  written  notice  of  the 
claim  of  such  lien  shall  be  given  to  the  opposite  party,  his 
attorney  or  agent,  any  settlement  or  adjustment  of  such 
cause  of  action  shall  be  void  against  the  lien  so  created,  ex- 
cept as  proof  of  liability  on  such  cause  of  action:  provided 
that  nothing  herein  contained  shall  affect  the  existing  law 
in  respect  to  champertous  contracts. 

§  192.  Washington.^^ — It  is  provided  by  statute  that  an 
attorney  may  have  a  lien  on  money  in  the  hands  of  the  ad- 
verse party  in  an  action  or  proceeding  in  which  the  attorney 
was  employed  from  the  time  of  giving  notice  of  the  lien  to 


•^^  Remington  &  Ballinger's 
Code  1910,  §  136.  Where  parties 
enter  into  collusion  to  defeat 
the  attorney's  lien  and  the  col- 
lection of  his  feeSj  the  court, 
upon  a  proper  showing,  will 
order  the  case  to  proceed  in  order 
to  protect  his  lien.  Cline  Piano 
Co.  V.  Sherwood,  57  Wash.  239, 
106  Pac.  742.  But  where  under 
the  statute  an  attorney  is  required 
to  file  a  notice  of  his  lien  on  a 
judgment  and  before  he  does  so 
the  judgment  is  assigned  in  good 
faith  without  any  collusion  be- 
tween the  assignor  and  assignee, 
such  judgment  will  not  be  subject 
to  a  lien  filed  after  the  assignment. 
Humptulips  Driving  Co.  v.  Cross, 
65  Wash.  636,  118  Pac.  827,  37 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  226n.  An 
attorney  who  has  advanced  money 
to  his  client  with  which  to  pay 
costs  under  a  contract  with  his 
client  that  he  is  to  be  repaid  can 


have  no  lien  on  a  judgment  for 
costs  recovered  in  the  action.  Rob- 
inson V.  Hays,  186  Fed.  295,  108 
C.  C.  A.  Z7Z.  An  attorney  may 
have  a  lien  on  the  subject-matter 
of  an  action  which  will  attach  on 
money  in  possession  of  the  adverse 
party,  after  written  notice  of  the 
lien  is  given  such  adverse  party, 
and  where  such  notice  is  given, 
if  the  defendant  settles  with  the 
client  without  consent  of  the  at- 
torney, he  is  still  liable  to  such 
attorney  to  satisfy  the  lien.  Mc- 
Rea  V.  Warehime,  49  Wash.  194, 
94  Pac.  924.  See  also,  Plummer 
V.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  60 
W^ash.  214,  110  Pac.  989.  An  at- 
torney has  a  lien  for  services  ren- 
dered in  an  action  on  a  judgment 
from  the  time  of  filing  notice  of 
such  a  lien  with  the  clerk  of  the 
court  where  such  action  is  pend- 
ing. Wooding  v.  Crain,  11  Wash. 
207,  39  Pac.  442. 


197 


ATTORNEY  S    SPECIAL    OR    CHARGING    LIEN. 


192a 


that  party,  and  upon  a  judgment  to  the  extent  of  the  value 
of  any  services  performed  by  him  in  the  action,  and  it  is  held 
in  such  a  case  that  the  lien  will  not  attach  until  the  judgment 
is  formerly  entered. 

§  192a.  West  Virginia.^^ — Attorneys  are  authorized  to 
make  contracts  with  their  clients  for  their  fees,  and  their 
liens  on  judgments  received  cover  not  merely  their  taxable 
costs,  but  their  services  and  disbursements.  While  the  lien 
is  a  special  lien  for  services  rendered  in  obtaining  the  par- 
ticular judgment  or  decree,  yet  it  extends  to  all  services 
rendered  in  obtaining  that  judgment  or  decree,  though  the 
services  may  have  been  rendered  in  other  suits,  if  these  are 
so  connected  with  the  principal  cause  as  to  form  the  basis  on 
which  the  judgment  or  decree  is  rendered,  or  is  essential  to 
the  rendering  of  such  judgment  or  decree. 

192b.  Wisconsin.''^ — It  is  provided  by  statute  that  one 
having  or  claiming  a  right  of  action  in  tort  or  for  unliquidated 


58  Ann.  Code  1906,  §  1112; 
Renick  v.  Ludington,  16  VV.  Va. 
378;  Fowler  v.  Lewis'  Admr., 
36  W.  Va.  112,  14  S.  E.  447. 
An  attorney's  lien  on  a  judgment 
he  has  obtained  for  his  client  may- 
be assigned  by  him  and  a  suit 
thereon  be  maintained  by  the  as- 
signee. Fisher  v.  Mylius,  62  W. 
Va.  19,  57  S.  E.  276.  An  attorney 
can  have  no  lien  on  a  fund  result- 
ing from  a  sale  of  property  where 
the  whole  of  such  fund  is  required 
to  pay  a  prior  lien.  Schmertz  v. 
Hammond,  51  W.  Va.  408,  41  S.  E. 
184.  The  lien  on  an  attorney  on  a 
judgment  obtained  by  his  efiforts 
for  his  client  is  good  against  an 
assignee  of  svich  judgment  whether 
the  assignee  had  notice  or  not. 
Bent  V.  Lipscomb,  45  W.  Va.  183, 
31  S.  E.  907.  Where  an  attorney 
has  brought  a  suit  under  an  agree- 


ment with  his  client  that  he  is  to 
receive  as  his  compensation  a  cer- 
tain per  cent,  of  the  judgment,  he 
has  a  right  in  the  chose  in  action 
and  can  prevent  a  collusive  set- 
tlement between  the  parties  made 
to  defeat  him  in  collecting  his  fee 
and  he  may  apply  to  the  court  in 
the  action  between  such  parties  to 
have  the  cause  go  on  to  final  judg- 
ment for  his  benefit.  Burkhart  v. 
Scott,  69  W.  Va.  694,  72  S.  E.  784. 
The  attorney's  charging  and  re- 
taining liens  apply  only  to  the  per- 
sonal relation  between  attorneys 
and  their  clients,  and  will  not  be 
extended  so  as  to  disturb  the 
rights  of  third  persons,  interested 
in  the  litigation  but  who  have  not 
employed  the  attorneys.  In  re 
Gillaspie,  190  Fed.  88. 

59  Rev.    Stats.    1898    §    2591a,    as 
amended   by   Laws    1907,    §§   2591a, 


§    192b  LIENS.  198 

damages  on  contract  may  contract  with  an  attorney  to  prose- 
cute his  action  and  give  him  a  Hen  thereon  and  upon  the  pro- 
ceeds or  damages  derived  in  any  action  brought  for  the  en- 
forcement of  such  cause  of  action,  as  security  for  his  fees  and 
he  may,  by  giving  notice  to  the  opposite  party,  or  his  attor- 
ney, make  any  settlement  between  the  parties  without  the 
attorney's  consent  invahd  as  against  the  lien.  If  any  such 
cause  of  action  shall  have  been  settled  by  the  parties  thereto 
after  judgment  has  been  procured  without  notice  to  the  at- 
torney claiming  such  lien,  such  lien  may  be  enforced  and  it 
shall  only  be  required  to  prove  the  facts  of  the  agreement  by 
which  such  lien  was  given,  notice  to  the  opposite  party  or 
his  attorney  and  the  rendition  of  the  judgment,  and  if  any 
such  settlement  of  the  cause  of  action  is  had  or  effected  be- 
fore judgment  therein,  then  it  shall  only  be  necessary  to  en- 
force said  lien  to  prove  the  agreement  creating  the  same 
notice  to  the  opposite  party  or  his  attorney  and  the  amount 
for  which  said  case  was  settled,  which  shall  be  the  basis  for 
said  lien  and  it  shall  at  no  time  be  necessary  to  prove  up  the 
original  cause  of  action  in  order  to  enforce  said  lien  and  suit. 

§  192c.  Wyoming.^" — An  attorney  has  a  lien  for  a  general 
balance  of  compensation  upon  money  due  to  his  client,  and 
in  the  hands  of  the  adverse  party,  in  an  action  or  proceeding 
in  which  the  attorney  was  employed,  from  the  time  of  giving 
notice  of  the  lien  to  that  party. 

§  193.  No  lien  until  judgment  is  entered. — An  attorney 
has  no  lien  for  costs  until  a  judgment  is  entered,  or  at  least 

2591m,  p.  570.     But  a  notice  to  de-  v.   Chicago   &   N.   W.   R.    Co.,   106 

fendant  that  the  attorney  has  been  Wis.  135,  81  N.  W.  994.     See  also, 

given  a  lien  by  contract  with  the  Rice    v.    Garnhart,    35    Wis.    282; 

plaintiflF  is  not  enough   to  amount  Smelker   v.    Chicago    &   N.    W.    R. 

to  a  notice  of  the  assignment  to  Co..  106  Wis.  135,  81  N.  W.  994. 
the   attorney  of  a   certain    interest  60  Comp.  Stat.  1910,  §  3821. 

in    the    cause    of   action.      Smelker 


199 


ATTORNEY  S    SPECIAL    OR    CHARGING   LIEN. 


193 


until  after  the  verdict;  unless  it  is  given  upon  the  cause  of 
action  by  statute,  as  is  now  the  case  in  New  York  under  the 
present  code;*^^  and,  until  the  lien  attaches,  the  parties  can 
settle  the  suit  regardless  of  his  claim  for  costs. °^  The  re- 
taining of  an  attorney  to  prosecute  an  action,  and  the  com- 
mencement of  it  by  him,  give  him  no  lien  upon  what  may  in 
the  event  of  a  trial  be  recovered  therein  ;^^  for  otherwise  it 
would  not  be  in  the  power  of  the  parties  to  settle  their  con- 
troversy until  such  lien  should  be  satisfied,  and  it  would  be 
in  the  power  of  the  attorney  to  continue  the  litigation  for  his 
own  benefit  in  case  of  a  favorable  result,  without  incurring 


♦51  Stover's  Ann.  Code  Civ.  Proc. 
1902,  §  66.    See  §  186,  supra. 

62  Nevir  York:  Coughlin  v.  N.  Y. 
C.  &  Hud.  Riv.  R.  Co.,  71  N.  Y. 
443.  27  Am.  Rep.  75;  Wright  v. 
Wright,  70  N.  Y.  96,  7  Daly  (N. 
Y.)  62;  Rooney  v.  Second  Ave.  R. 
Co.,  18  N.  Y.  368;  Marshall  v. 
Meech,  51  N.  Y.  140,  10  Am.  Rep. 
572;  Crotty  v.  MacKenzie,  52  How. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  54,  42  N.  Y.  Super. 
Ct.  192;  Shank  v.  Shoemaker,  18 
N.  Y.  489;  Sweet  v.  Bartlett,  4 
Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  661;  Tullis  v.  Bush- 
nell,  12  Daly  (N.  Y.)  217,  65  How. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  465;  Brown  v.  New 
York,  11  Hun  (N.  Y.)  21;  Sullivan 
V.  O'Keefe,  53  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
426;  Christy  v.  Perkins,  6  Daly 
(N.  Y.)  237;  Quincey  v.  Francis,  5 
Abb.  N.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  286.  Vermont: 
Foot  v.  Tewksbury,  2  Vt.  97; 
Walker  v.  Sargeant,  14  Vt.  247; 
Hutchinson  v.  Howard,  15  Vt.  544; 
Hooper  v.  Welch,  43  Vt.  169,  5 
Am.  Rep.  267;  Weed  Sewing 
Mach.  Co.  v.  Boutelle,  56  Vt.  570. 
New  Hampshire:  Wells  v.  Hatch, 
43  N.  H.  246;  Young  v.  Dearborn, 


27  N.  H.  324.  Maine:  Potter  v. 
Mayo,  3  Greenl.  (Maine)  34,  14 
Am.  Dec.  211;  Gammon  v.  Chand- 
ler, 30  Maine  152;  Hobson  v.  Wat- 
son, 34  Maine  20,  56  Am.  Dec. 
632;  Averill  v.  Longfellow,  66 
Maine  237.  Indiana:  Hanna  v.  Is- 
land Coal  Co.,  5  Ind.  App.  163,  31 
N.  E.  846.  Other  States:  Lamont 
V.  Washington  &  G.  R.  Co.,  2 
Mack.  (D.  C.)  502,  47  Am.  Rep. 
268;  Getchell  v.  Clark,  5  Mass. 
309;  Brown  v.  Bigley,  3  Tenn.  Ch. 
618;  Henchey  v.  Chicago,  41  111. 
136;  Mosely  v.  Norman,  74  Ala. 
422.  Contra:  That  an  attorney's 
lien  for  compensation  attaches  to 
the  cause  of  action.  Keenan  v. 
Dorflinger,  19  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
153.  In  New  York,  since  the  Code 
of  1879,  the  lien  attaches  to  the 
cause  of  action.  So  also  in  Geor- 
gia, Tennessee  and  a  few  other 
states,  the  lien  by  statute  dates 
from  the  commencement  of  the 
action.  See  §§  173,  175,  186,  190, 
supra. 

63  Kirby   v.    Kirby,    1    Paige    (N. 
Y.)   565. 


§    194  LIENS.  200 

any  liability  should  the  result  be  adverse/''*  Accordingly,  in 
a  case  where  a  judgment  was  recovered  by  a  plaintiff  in  an 
action  for  assault  and  battery,  and  he  assigned  this  to  his 
attorney  as  security  for  costs,  giving  notice  of  the  assignment 
to  the  defendant,  but  upon  appeal  the  judgment  was  reversed 
and  a  new  trial  was  granted,  and  before  the  new  trial  was 
had  the  parties  settled,  and  the  plaintiff  executed  a  release 
to  the  defendant,  it  was  held  that,  the  assignment  of  the  judg- 
ment having  become  a  nullity  by  the  reversal,  the  attorney 
had  no  lien,  either  legal  or  equitable,  and  could  not  proceed 
with  the  action  and  obtain  a  further  judgment.  The  defend- 
ant, after  a  reversal  of  the  judgment,  had  a  right  to  settle 
with  the  plaintiff,  and  was  not  bound  to  take  care  of  the 
interests  of  the  attorney,  though  knowing  that  the  attorney 
relied  upon  the  fruits  of  the  action  as  security  for  his  services. 
The  defendant  owed  no  duty  to  the  attorney,  even  so  far  as 
to  inform  him  of  the  settlement,  so  as  to  save  him  from  ex- 
pending labor  and  money  in  preparing  for  a  new  trial. ^^ 

§  194.  Default  not  a  judgment. — The  entry  of  a  default 
does  not  constitute  a  perfected  judgment,  and  the  parties 
may  after  that,  and  before  an  actual  entry  of  judgment,  make 
a  bona  fide  settlement  of  the  claim  and  costs  of  suit  without 
reference  to  the  attorne3^'s  fees.  He  has  then  no  lien  that 
can  stand  in  the  way  of  such  a  settlement.*''*^ 

An  order  of  court  after  verdict,  that  judgment  be  entered 
the  attorney  his  lien.  Such  order  is  a  final  determination  of 
the  case,  and  is  the  end  of  all  litigation  as  to  the  merits  of  the 
case.  The  time  when  the  judgment  is  entered  up  in  form  is 
immaterial.^''^ 

When  exceptions  are  taken  in  the  trial  court,  and  these 

64Pulver  V.  Harris,  52  N.  Y.  1Z,  «"  Hooper  v.  Welch,  43  Vt.   169. 

per  Grover,  J.     And  see   Henchey  5  Am.  Rep.  267. 

V.    Chicago,   41    111.    136.  67  Young  v.   Dearborn,  27  N.  H. 

or.  Pulver  v.  Harris,  52  N.  Y.  IZ,  324. 
affirming  62  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  500. 


20I  attorney's   SrECIAL   OR    CIIAR(}ING   LIEN.  §     1 96 

are  overruled  or  sustained  by  the  law  court,  the  certificate 
of  that  court  making-  a  final  disposition  of  the  cause  is  the 
final  judgment  of  the  court,  and  the  attorney's  lien  attaches 
when  the  certificate  is  received  by  the  clerk  of  the  court  in 
which  the  suit  is  pending-,  and  a  subsequent  settlement  of  the 
parties  can  not  be  allowed  to  defeat  it.^^ 

Whether  a  final  judgment  has  been  rendered  or  not  de- 
pends upon  the  records  of  the  court  in  which  the  trial  was 
pending.  Whether  an  appeal  has  been  taken  from  the  judg- 
ment must  be  shown  from  the  records. ^^  When  the  judg- 
ment is  against  several  defendants,  an  appeal  taken  by  one  of 
them  operates  in  his  favor  alone,  and  as  to  the  defendants 
who  have  not  appealed,  the  attorney's  lien  may  be  enforced 
by  issuing  execution  against  tliem."^^ 

When  a  judgment  is  nullified  on  a  review,  the  attorney's 
lien  for  costs  on  such  judgment  is  lost.'''^ 

§  195.  Pending  appeal  will  not  prevent  dismissal. — While 
a  suit  is  pending  on  a  writ  of  error  in  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States,  the  court  will  not  prevent  the  parties  from 
agreeing  to  dismiss  the  case,  though  in  the  court  below  there 
was  a  judgment  for  costs  and  the  attorney  claims  a  lien  upon 
the  judgment.  "To  permit  the  attorney  to  control  them 
[the  proceedings.]"  say  the  court,  "would,  in  efi^ect,  be  com- 
pelling the  client  to  carry  on  the  litigation  at  his  own  ex- 
pense, simph^  for  the  contingent  benefit  of  the  attorney."'^^ 

§  196.  Client  may  settle  before  judgment. — Therefore, 
until  a  judgment  is  entered,  the  client  may  settle  or  compro- 
mise the  suit  in  any  manner  that  he  may  think  to  be  for  his 
interest,  without  consulting  his  attorney;  and  the  attorney 

68  Cooley  V.  Patterson,  52  Maine  Y.   S.  433,   19  Civ.   Proc.   R.  32,  32 

472.  N.  Y.  St.  445. 

GO  Gammon      v.      Chandler,      30  "i  Dunlap  v.  Burnham,  38  Maine 

Maine  152.  112. 

70  Commercial    Telegram    Co.    v.  "i-  Piatt  v.  Jerome,  19  How.    (U. 

Smith,  57  Hun  (N.  Y.)   176,  10  N.  S.)   384,   15   L.   ed.  623. 


§   196 


LIENS. 


202 


has  no  right  to  interfere  or  power  to  prevent  such  settlement 
or  compromise/^  If,  after  such  settlement,  the  attorney 
proceeds  to  enforce  judgment,  this  will  be  set  aside  as 
irregular.'^ 

Under  statutes  which  give  an  attorney  a  lien  upon  the 
judgment  and  execution  for  his  fees  and  disbursements  in  ob- 
taining the  same,  he  has  no  lien  before  judgment,  for  the  lien 
is  one  that  is  expressly  created  upon  the  judgment  and  exe- 
cution. Before  judgment  the  client  may  settle  the  action 
and  discharge  the  debtor  without  the  consent  of  the  attor- 
ney;"^ or  the  client  may  at  any  time  before  the  entry  of  judg- 


es Chapman  v.  Haw,  1  Taunt. 
(U.  S.)  341;  Nelson  v.  Wilson.  6 
Bing.       568;       Clark      v.       Smith, 

6  M.  &  G.  1051;  Francis  v.  Webb, 

7  C.  B.  731;  Brunsdon  v.  Allard, 
2  E.  &  E.  17;  Emma  Silver  Min- 
ing Co.  (limited)  v.  Emma  Silver 
Mining  Co.,  12  Fed.  815;  Peterson 
V.  Watson,  1  Blatchf.  &  H.  (U.  S.) 
487,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  11037;  Brooks  v. 
Snell,  1  Sprague  (U.  S.)  48,  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  1961 ;  Purcell  v.  Lincoln,  1 
Sprague  (U.  S.)  230,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
11471;  Getchell  v.  Clark,  5  Mass. 
309;  Simmons  v.  Almy,  103  Mass. 
33;  Grant  v.  Hazeltine,  2  N.  H. 
541;  Young  v.  Dearborn,  27  N.  H. 
324;  Lamont  v.  Washington  &  G. 
R.  Co.,  2  Mack.  (D.  C.)  502,  47 
Am.  Rep.  268;  Foot  v.  Tewksburj^ 
2  Vt.  97;  Hutchinson  v.  Pettes, 
18  Vt.  614;  Tillman  v.  Reynolds, 
48  Ala.  365;  Parker  v.  Blighton.  32 
Mich.  266;  Voigt  Brew.  Co.  v. 
Donovan,  103  Mich.  190,  61  N.  W. 
343;  Nielsen  v.  Albert  Lea,  91 
Minn.  388,  98  N.  W.  195;  Swanston 
V.  Morning  Star  Mining  Co.,  13 
Fed.  215,  4  McCrary  (U.  S.)  241; 
Wood  V.  Anders,  5  Bush  (Ky.) 
601;   Conner  v.  Boyd,  11  Ala.  385. 


New  York:  Power  v.  Kent,  1  Cow. 
172;  McDowell  v.  Second  Ave.  R. 
Co.,  4  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  670;  Shank  v. 
Shoemaker,  18  N.  Y.  489;  Wade  v. 
Orton,  12  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N.  Y.) 
444;  Coughlin  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  & 
Hud.  Riv.  R.  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  443, 
27  Am.  Rep.  75;  Pulver  v.  Harris, 
52  N.  Y.  1Z;  Wright  v.  Wright, 
70  N.  Y.  96;  Roberts  v.  Doty,  31 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  128;  Reynolds  v.  Port 
Jervis  Boot  &  Shoe  Factory,  32 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  64;  Eberhardt  v. 
Schuster,  10  Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y.) 
374,  391,  note;  otherwise  since 
1879.  Smith  v.  Vicksburg  S.  &  T. 
R.  Co.,  112  La.  985,  36  So.  826. 

''i  McDowell  v.  Second  Ave.  R. 
Co.,  4  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  670;  Pinder 
V.  Alorris,  3  Caines  (N.  Y.)  165. 
See,  however,  Rasquin  v.  Knick- 
erbocker Stage  Co.,  12  Abb.  Prac. 
(N.  Y)  324,  21  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
293. 

"5  Simmons  v.  Almy,  103  Mass. 
c>2>;  Getchell  v.  Clark,  5  Mass.  309; 
Coughlin  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  Hud. 
Riv.  R.  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  443,  27  Am. 
Rep.  75;  Hawkins  v.  Loyless,  39 
Ga.    5. 


203  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §   198 

ment  assign  his  interest  in  the  cause  of  action  and  thus  de- 
feat the  lien  of  the  attorney. "° 

§  197.  Action  for  damages  settled  by  parties. — An  action 
for  unliquidated  damages  may  always  be  settled  by  the 
parties,  against  the  assent  of  the  attorney,  in  the  absence  of 
a  statute  protecting  him  from  the  beginning  of  the  litiga- 
tion."^" Thus,  where  a  person  having  a  claim  against  a  rail- 
road company,  for  damages  resulting  from  negligence, 
agreed  with  an  attorney  that  he  should  have  half  the  amount 
that  might  be  recovered  for  his  services  in  prosecuting  the 
suit,  and  while  the  suit  was  pending  settled  with  the  defend- 
ant and  gave  a  release,  it  was  held  that  the  release  was  a  bar 
to  the  further  prosecution  of  the  action,  though  the  defend- 
ant had  notice  of  the  attorney's  interest  in  the  claim. "^^  If 
the  attorney  has  omitted  to  protect  himself  by  giving  notice 
of  his  lien,  and  the  parties  compromise  before  judgment,  and 
with  notice  of  such  settlement  he  proceeds  with  the  suit  for 
his  costs,  he  must  show  that  the  adverse  party  made  the  set- 
tlement collusively,  with  the  design  of  defeating  the  attor- 
ney's demand  for  his  costs  or  fees;  and  failing  to  show  this, 
his  proceedings  will  be  set  aside.''^^ 

§  198.  Settlement  by  parties  will  not  affect  attorney's 
lien, — Where  by  statute  the  lien  is  upon  the  cause  of  action 
and  attaches  from  the  commencement  of  the  suit,  as  is  now 
the  case  in  Georgia,"^^^  Idaho,^^*'  Missouri, "^°  Montana,'^''  New 

"^^  Potter     V.     Mayo,     3     Greenl.  "^  McDowell   v.   Second  Ave.   R. 

(Maine)  34,  14  Am.  Dec.  211.  Co.,  4  Bosw.   (N.  Y.)  670. 

""  Kusterer    v.    Beaver   Dam,    56  ~'>^  A  judgment  of  non-suit  ends 

Wis.   471,    14   N.   W.   617,   43   Am.  attornej^'s  lien,  and  settlement  by 

Rep.    725;    Hanna    v.    Island    Coal  a   client   before  he   has   brought  a 

Co.,  5  Ind.  App.  163,  31   N.   E.  846,  new  suit  leaves  him  without  rem- 

51   Am.   St.   246;   Courtney   v.    Mc-  edy.     Brown   v.    Georgia   C.    &   N. 

Gavock,  23  Wis.  619.  R.  Co.,  101  Ga.  80,  28  S.  E.  634.  See 

78CoughIin  V.  N.  Y.   C.  &  Hud.  ante,  §   173. 

Riv.  R.  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  443,  27  Am.  '»'^See  ante,  §  173a. 

Rep.   75.  '9<^See  ante,   §  181a. 

'9dSee  ante,  §  182. 


§198  LIENS.  204 

York,^^  Oklahoma/'^'^^  and  Tennessee,^^  Utah,^^*  no  settle- 
ment or  compromise  can  be  made  between  the  parties  which 
will  affect  the  attorney's  lien,  unless  made  with  his  consent 
or  by  leave  of  court.  The  attorney  may  proceed  with  the 
action  to  final  judgment.  And,  according  to  the  practice  in 
New  York,  he  may  do  this  without  obtaining  leave  of  court. ^^ 

But  if  the  action  be  for  unliquidated  damages,  such,  for 
instance,  as  an  action  for  personal  injuries,  the  lien  can  hardly 
attach  until  it  has  been  established  by  verdict,  when  it  be- 
comes for  the  first  time  certain  and  vested.  Thus,  in  an 
action  for  damages  arising  from  assault  and  battery,  the 
plaintiff  will  be  allowed  to  discontinue  the  action  against  the 
objection  of  his  attorney  who  insists  that  the  suit  shall  go 
on,  so  that  he  may  get  his  taxable  costs  in  case  a  recovery 
is  had.^^ 

And  so  where  a  lien  is  given  upon  a  cause  of  action  from 
the  time  of  giving  notice  of  it  to  the  adverse  party,  there  can 
be  no  lien  before  judgment  upon  a  cause  of  action  for  tort 
which,  in  case  of  the  death  of  the  parties  or  of  either  of  them, 
would  not  survive.^* 

Where  the  attorney  has  a  lien  upon  the  cause  of  action,  a 
settlement  made  in  good  faith  by  the  parties  will  not  be  set 
aside  at  the  instance  of  the  plaintiff's  attorney,  where  it  ap- 
pears that  the  sum  agreed  to  be  paid  to  his  client  exceeds  the 
amount  necessary  to  satisfy  his  lien,  and  especially  where 
the  defendant  has  offered  to  pay  this  amount  directly  to  the 
attorney.^^ 

so  See  ante,  §  186.  S3  Cahill   v.    Cahill.   9  N.   Y.   Civ. 

soaSee  ante,  §  189b.  Proc.    R.   241;    Wade   v.   Orton.    12 

81  See  ante,  §  190.  Abb.   Pr.    (N.   S.)    (N.   Y.)   444. 

81^  See  ante,  §  190b.  §4  Abbott    v.    Abbott,    18    Nebr. 

82Forstman      v.      Schulting,      35  503,   26   N.   W.   361. 

Hun    (N.   Y.)    504;    Lewis   v.    Day,  85  in  re  Tuttle,  21   Weekly  Dig. 

10     Weekly     Dig.     49;     Coster     v.  528. 
Greenpoint  Ferry  Co.,  5  N.  Y.  Civ. 
Proc.   R.   146. 


205  attorney's   special  or   charging  lien.  §    200 

§  199.  Attorney's  withdrawal  from  case. — When  an  at- 
torney withdraws  from  a  case  of  his  own  motion  before  judg- 
ment, the  court  will  impress  no  lien  in  his  favor  on  any 
ultimate  recovery,  as  a  condition  to  the  substitution  of  other 
attorneys,  unless  a  special  reason  is  shown  for  this.*^ 

§  200.  Only  attorney  is  entitled  to  a  lien. — Only  the  at- 
torney who  is  in  charge  of  the  suit  at  the  time  the  judgment 
is  entered  is  entitled  to  this  lien;^^  though  of  course  a  former 
attorney  may  be  given  a  lien  by  special  agreement  between 
him  and  his  client.®^  Counsel  employed  to  assist  an  attorney 
in  the  trial  of  a  cause  have  no  lien  for  their  services  upon  the 
judgment  recovered.®^ 

Where  the  original  attorney  holds  an  irrevocable  power  of 
attorney  coupled  with  an  interest  in  the  claim,  and  a  new 
attorney  is  substituted  by  motion  of  the  party,  the  former 
attorney  has  rights  which  the  court  will  protect.  Thus  the 
United  States  Court  of  Claims  held  in  such  a  case  that,  where 
an  attorney's  fees  are  fixed  by  statute,  a  substitution  will  not 
be  ordered  until  the  original  attorney's  fees  are  ascertained 
and  paid.  Where  the  attorney's  fee  is  contingent,  the  court 
will  assure  him  of  a  lien  upon  the  ultimate  judgment,  and 
secure  his  immediate  reimbursement  of  the  expenses  that 
have  been  incurred.^^ 

86Hektograph    Co.    v.    Fourl,    11  (N.   Y.)   587,   11   Hun   (N.  Y.)   21; 

Fed.  844.  Gibson   v.    Chicago,    M.    &    St.    P. 

S7  Wells  V.  Hatch,  43  N.  H.  246.  R.    Co.,    122    Iowa   565,   98    N.    W. 

But    under    the    Iowa    statutes    an  474. 

attorney   giving   notice   has    a   lien  so  Carver  v.  United  States,  7  Ct. 

for     the     reasonable    value    of    his  CI.    (U.    S.)    499.      In    this    case    it 

services    even    though    he    is    dis-  was   ordered   that   the   original   at- 

charged,  and  a  new  suit  is  brought  torney  have  and  retain  a  lien  upon 

by   another    attorney.       Gibson    v.  the    cause    of   action,    and    papers 

Chicago,   M.  &  St.   P.  R.   Co.,   122  and  effects  of  the  client,  and  upon 

Iowa  565,  98  N.  W.  474.  the   judgment,    for    his    contingent 

88  In  re  Wilson,  12  Fed.  235;  fees  and  costs.  To  like  effect,  see 
Ronald  v.  Mut.  Reserve  Fund  Life  Supervisors  of  Ulster  County  v. 
Association,   30   Fed.   228.  Brodhead,    44    How.    Pr.    (N.    Y.) 

89  Brown   v.    New   York,   9   Hun  411. 


§    20I  LIENS.  206 

§201.  Lien  by  contract. — By  contract  this  lien  may  be 
availed  of  by  an  agent  not  an  attorney  at  law,  if  he  renders 
services  of  the  same  character  as  those  rendered  by  an  attor- 
ney at  law.  Thus,  where  one  who  was  not  an  attorney  was 
employed  to  prosecute  a  claim  against  the  government,  under 
a  stipulation  that  he  should  receive  for  his  services  one-half 
of  the  amount  that  might  be  recovered,  and  he  employed  at- 
torneys and  controlled  the  suit,  and  after  many  years  re- 
covered a  judgment  for  a  large  sum,  it  was  held  that  the 
plaintiff  was  not  entitled  to  vacate  the  appearance  of  the 
agent's  attorney,  and  to  substitute  his  own  attorney,  with- 
out paying  to  the  agent,  or  his  representative,  one-half  of 
the  amount  of  the  judgment,  in  accordance  with  the  agree- 
ment.^^ 

A  party  to  a  suit  prosecuted  for  himself  and  others  having 
a  like  interest  is  entitled  to  a  lien  for  his  reasonable  costs, 
counsel  fees,  charges  and  expenses  incurred  in  the  proper 
prosecution  of  the  suit,  and  such  lien  may  be  enforced  against 
the  trust  funds  brought  under  the  control  of  the  court  by  the 
suit  so  instituted.^^ 

§  201a.  Attorney's  lien  on  fund  recovered. — An  attorney 
has  a  lien  upon  a  fund  recovered  by  his  aid  paramount 
to  the  claims  of  persons  interested  in  the  fund  of  their 
creditors. ^^     The  lien  in  such  case  exists  without  the  aid  of 

!5i  In  Dodge  v.  Schell,  20  Blatchf.  not   conferred."     See  also,  Canney 

(U.  S.)   517,  12  Fed.  515,  Wallace,  v.    Canney,    131    Mich.    363,    91    N. 

J.,  said:  "If   [the  agent]   had  been  W.  620. 

an    attorney,    the    agreement    and  ^-  Trustees  v.  Greenough,  105  U. 

services     would     have     created     a  S.  527,  26  L.   ed.   1157;   Central   R. 

lien.      There    is    no    magic    in    the  &    Banking    Co.   v.    Pettus,    113   U. 

name  attorney,  which  conjures  up  S.    116,   28    L.    ed.   915,   5    Sup.    Ct. 

a    lien.     It    is    the    nature     of     the  387. 

services    and    the    control,    actual  ^3  Puett    v.    Beard,    86    Ind.    172, 

or  potential,  which  the  mechanical  44  Am.  Rep.  280;  Koons  v.  Beach, 

or    professional    laborer    has    over  147   Ind.   137,  45   N.   E.   601,  46  N. 

the  object  intrusted  to  him  which  E.  587;  Justice  v.  Justice,  115  Ind. 

determine  whether  a  lien   is   or  is  201,  16  N.  E.  615.     See  also,  Strat- 


207  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §  20 lb 

the  statute.'^'*  An  attorney  who  has  rendered  services  in  a 
partition  suit  has  a  lien  for  those  services  upon  his  client's 
share  of  the  proceeds,  paramount  to  the  claims  of  third  per- 
sons to  whom  the  client,  pending  the  suit,  assigns  and  mort- 
gages his  interest  in  the  property  as  security  for  money 
owing  them  by  him.^''  An  attorney  who  by  his  services  has 
procured  a  will  to  be  set  aside  and  established  his  client's 
right  to  share  in  the  estate  of  the  testator,  acquires  an  equit- 
able lien  for  his  fees  upon  the  fund  so  secured  to  his  client, 
and  is  entitled  to  priority  of  payment  over  a  judgment 
creditor  of  the  latter  whose  lien  attaches  after  the  contract 
for  such  professional  services  was  entered  into.^^ 

§  201b.     Defendant's  attorney  can  have  no  lien  on  fund. — 

The  lien  being  upon  the  judgment  obtained  by  the  attorney, 
it  follows  that  the  defendant's  attorney  can  have  no  lien,  un- 
less a  judgment  for  costs  or  in  set-of¥  is  obtained,®^  There 
are,  however,  some  decisions  not  consistent  with  this  general 
proposition.  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  the  attorney  of 
bondholders  who  has  unsuccessfully  resisted  a  suit  by  other 
bondholders  to  foreclose  the  mortgage  security  may  be  al- 
lowed a  lien  upon  the  dividends  which  would  go  to  these 
bonds,  and  that  purchasers  of  the  bonds  pendente  lite  took 
subject  to  such  lien.®^ 

ton  V.  Hussey,  62  Maine  286;  An-  petition    of    these    counsel    for    an 

drews  v.   Morse,   12   Conn.   444,   31  allowance  out  of  the  general  fund 

Am.   Dec.  752.  in  court  was  before  me,  I  had  no 

94  Hanna  v.  Island  Coal  Co.,  5  hesitation  in  dismissing  it.  The 
Ind.  App.  163,  31  N.  E.  846,  51  labors  of  these  counsel  were  ad- 
Am.   St.   246.  verse   to  the  purposes  of  the   suit, 

95  Boyle  V.  Boyle,  106  N.  Y.  654,  and  wholly  obstructive.  They 
12   N.    E.   709.  were    not    directed    to    the    benefit 

96  Justice  V.  Justice,  115  Ind.  201,  of  the  fund,  and  did  not  inure  to 
16  N.  E.  615.  its     benefit.      There    was,    in     my 

9"  See  post,  §  230.  opinion,   no  imaginable  ground  on 

98  Mahone  v.  Southern  Tel.  Co.,  which    a    claim    against    the    fund, 

33    Fed.   702.     Hughes,   J.,   deliver-  on  their  part,  could  be  rested,  and 

ing    judgment    said:      "When    the  their  petition  was  dismissed.     The 


§    202 


LIENS. 


208 


§  202.     No  lien  where  court  is  not  court  of  record. — No 

lien  exists  upon  a  judgment  rendered  in  a  court  not  of  record 
for  services  performed  in  such  court  in  obtaining  the  judg- 
ment. In  such  courts  there  are  no  attorneys,  in  the  sense  in 
which  the  term  is  used  in  courts  of  record ;  and  it  is  said  to 
be  only  in  respect  of  the  office  of  attorney  or  soHcitor  that 
the  lien  exists.  Besides,  courts  not  of  record  possess  only 
limited  jurisdiction,  and  have  no  such  equitable  control  over 
their  judgments  as  will  enable  them  to  adjudicate  upon  and 
enforce  liens  thereon.^^  Therefore  no  lien  exists  for  services 
rendered  by  an  attorney  in  a  justice's  court,  nor  in  a  probate 
court  ;^  nor  was  there  such  a  lien  for  services  rendered  in  the 
Surrogate's  Court  of  New  York,  before  that  court  was  made 
by  statute  a  court  of  record;-  and  whether  there  is  since  that 
statute  seems  to  be  a  disputed  question. 


question  now  is  a  different  one. 
These  petitioners  rendered  various 
services  as  counsel,  under  the  di- 
rection and  at  the  command  of 
their  immediate  clients.  They  did 
their  masters'  bidding,  at  the  re- 
quest and  for  the  supposed  inter- 
ests of  their  clients.  How  valua- 
ble or  effectual  their  work  was  to 
the  general  fund,  or  even  to  their 
special  clients,  is  not  to  the  point 
in  the  present  inquiry.  They  did 
work  and  labor  for  their  own  cli- 
ents at  the  special  instance  and 
request  of  those  clients,  and  are 
entitled  to  a  quantum  meruit  com- 
pensation from  some  source.  Pri- 
marily, it  should  probably  come 
from  their  clients  personally;  but 
these  are  residents  of  a  distant 
state,  and  may  not  be  solvent  or 
accessible.  Petitioners  prefer  to 
look  to  the  fund,  near  at  hand,  in 
this  court,  which  has  accrued  from 
the  bonds  of  their  clients  which 
they  proved  in  the  cause,  and  upon 


which  a  dividend  was  decreed." 
A  final  judgment  for  alimony  is 
subject  to  a  lien  of  an  attorney 
who  has  procured  the  judgment. 
Hubbard  v.  Ellithorpe,  135  Iowa 
259,  112  N.  W.  796.  124  Am.  St. 
271. 

99  Flint  v.  Van  Dusen,  26  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  606;  Fox  v.  Jackson,  8 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  355;  Read  v.  Jos- 
elyn,  Sheld.  (N.  Y.)  60;  Eisner 
v.  Avery,  2  Dem.  Sur.  (N.  Y.)  466. 
See  In  re  Halsey,  13  Abb.  N.  Cas. 
(N.  Y.)  353.  See.  however,  ante, 
§   201. 

1  McCaa  v.  Grant,  43  Ala.  262. 

2  Flint  V.  Van  Dusen,  26  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  606.  Such  a  lien  was  said 
to  exist  in  Eisner  v.  Avery,  2  Dem. 
Sur.  (N.  Y.)  466.  But  in  a  later 
case  it  was  held  that  §  66  of  the 
Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  as  amend- 
ed in  1879,  does  not  apply  to  sur- 
rogates' courts,  because  in  these 
tribunals  actions  are  unknown. 
The   lien     established     under  that 


209 


ATTORNEY  S   SPECIAL   OR    CHARGING   LIEN. 


§    203 


But  the  attorney's  lien  extends  to  an  award  of  arbitrators.^* 

§  203.  Settlement  in  fraud  of  attorneys. — A  settlement 
made  by  the  parties  before  judgment,  in  fraud  of  the  at- 
torney's rights,  and  with  the  intention  to  cheat  him  out  of  his 
costs,  would  be  set  aside  so  as  to  allow  the  suit  to  proceed 
for    the    purpose    of    collecting    his    costs. ^     Slight    circum- 


clause  of  the  code  is  for  services 
of  the  attorney  in  an  action,  and 
is  confined  to  actions  for  the  re- 
covery of  money,  or  actions 
wherein  a  demand  for  money  is 
asserted  by  way  of  counterclaim. 
The  surrogates'  courts  have  no 
jurisdiction  to  try  and  determine 
such  a  cause.  Smith  v.  Central 
Trust  Co..  4  Dem.  Sur.  (N.  Y.)  75. 

-^  Hutchinson  v.  Howard,  IS  Vt. 
544.     See  ante,  §  142. 

3  Swain  v.  Senate,  2  Bos.  &  Pul. 
99;  Cole  v.  Bennett,  6  Price  15; 
Morse  v.  Cooke,  13  Price  473; 
Brunsdon  v.  Allard,  2  E.  &  E.  19. 
New  York:  Talcott  v.  Bronson, 
4  Paige  (N.  Y.)  501;  Tullis  v. 
Bushnell.  12  Daly  (N.  Y.)  217,  65 
How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  465;  Rasquin 
V.  Knickerbocker  Stage  Co.,  12 
Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  324,  21  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  293;  Sweet  v.  Bartlett,  4 
Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  661;  Dimick  v. 
Cooley,  3  N.  Y.  Civ.  Proc.  141; 
Zogbaum  v.  Parker,  66  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  341;  Dietz  v.  McCallum,  44 
How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  493;  Keenan  v. 
Dorflinger,  19  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
153;  Owen  v.  Mason,  18  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  156;  The  Victory,  1 
Blatchf.  &  H.  443,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
16937,  per  Betts,  J.  Georgia:  Mc^ 
Donald  v.  Napier,  14  Ga.  89;  Jones 
V.  Morgan,  39  Ga.  310,  99  Am.  Dec. 
458.  Kentucky:  Hubble  v.  Dun- 
lap,  101  Ky.  419,  41  S.  W.  432,  de- 
cided under  statute  which  did  not 
forbid       compromise.       Vermont : 

14 


Hutchinson  v.  Pettes,  18  Vt.  614. 
Michigan:  Parker  v.  Blighton,  32 
Mich.  266.  Alabama  :  Ex  parte  Leh- 
man, 59  Ala.  631 ;  Jackson  v.  Clop- 
ton,  66  Ala.  29;  Mosely  v.  Norman, 
74  Ala.  422.  In  Coughlin  v.  New 
York  Central  &  Hudson  Riv.  R. 
Co.,  71  N.  Y.  443,  27  Am.  Rep. 
75,  Earl,  J.,  said:  "There  are 
many  cases  where  this  has  been 
allowed  to  be  done.  It  is  impossi- 
ble to  ascertain  precisely  when 
this  practise  commenced,  nor  how 
it  originated,  nor  upon  what  prin- 
ciple it  was  based.  It  was  not 
upon  the  principle  of  a  lien,  be- 
cause an  attorney  has  no  lien  upon 
the  cause  of  action,  before  judg- 
ment, for  his  costs;  nor  was  it 
upon  the  principle  that  his  serv- 
ices had  produced  the  money  paid 
his  client  upon  the  settlement,  be- 
cause that  could  not  be  known, 
and  in  fact  no  money  may  have 
been  paid  upon  the  settlement.  So 
far  as  I  can  perceive,  it  was  based 
upon  no  principle.  It  was  a  mere 
arbitrary  e.xercise  of  power  by  the 
courts;  not  arbitrary  in  the  sense 
that  it  was  unjust  or  improper,  but 
in  the  sense  that  it  was  not  based 
upon  any  right  or  principle  recog- 
nized in  other  cases.  The  parties 
being  in  court,  and  a  suit  com- 
menced and  pending,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  protecting  attorneys  who 
were  their  officers  an^  subject  to 
their  control,  the  courts  invented 
this     practice     and     assumed     this 


203 


LIENS. 


2IO 


stances  are  often  regarded  as  competent  proof  of  collusion, — 
as  that  the  party  has  a  good  cause  of  action  for  a  larger  sum 
than  that  received  in  settlement,  and  is  irresponsible  and  un- 
able to  satisfy  his  attorney's  costs;  or  that  there  is  an  appear- 
ance of  concealment  in  the  settlement;  and  in  some  cases  it 
seems  to  be  held  that  a  settlement  or  compromise  of  a  good 
cause  of  action  without  the  consent  of  the  attorney  is  in- 
effectual to  deprive  the  attorney  of  his  lien,  though  there  is 
no  other  evidence  of  any  intention  to  deprive  the  attorney  of 
his  lien.^  But  generally,  suspicious  circumstances  alone  are 
not  enough  to  authorize  the  court  to  interfere  for  the  attor- 
ney's protection.  There  must  be  something  to  show  that  the 
judgment  debtor  fraudulently  colluded  with  the  judgment 
creditor  to  defeat  the  attorney's  lien.^  Fraud  must  not  only 
be  alleged,  but  proved.^ 

The  mere  fact  that  the  parties  to  a  suit  make  a  settlement 
after  verdict,  but  before  entry  of  judgment  and  pending  a 
stay  of  proceedings,  is  not  conclusive  that  the  parties  acted 


extraordinary  power  to  defeat  at- 
tempts to  cheat  the  attorneys  out 
of  their  costs.  The  attorneys' 
fees  were  fixed  and  definite  sums, 
easily  determined  by  taxation,  and 
this  power  was  exercised  to  secure 
them  their  fees."  Under  the  pres- 
ent code  of  New  York,  the  attor- 
ney has  complete  protection  from 
the  beginning  of  the  action.  See 
ante,  §  185.  A  clause  prohibiting  a 
settlement  between  parties  with- 
out the  consent  of  attorneys  is 
void  as  opposed  to  public  policy. 
Matter  of  Snyder,  190  N.  Y.  66,  82 
N.  E.  742,  14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  llOln, 
123  Am.  St.  533,  and  cases  cited.  In 
Georgia  an  attorney  has  a  lien  up- 
on a  cause  of  action  prosecuted  by 
him  but  he  must  show  a  good  cause 
of  action  in  his  client.  Code  1911, 
§   3364;   Atlanta   R.   Co.  v.   Owens, 


119  Ga.  833,  47  S.  E.  213.  Where 
defendant  agrees  to  allow  judg- 
ment to  be  entered  against  him  on 
assurance  that  he  will  not  be 
forced  to  pay  it,  the  attorney  can 
not  enforce  the  judgment  to  re- 
cover his  lien.  Hall  v.  Locker- 
man,  127  Ga.  537,  56  S.  E.  759. 

4Skaggs  V.  Hill,  12  Ky.  L.  382, 
14  S.  W.  363.  See,  however,  Rowe 
V.  Fogle,  88  Ky.  105,  10  Ky.  L. 
689,  10  S.  W.  426,  2  L.  R.  A.  708. 

5  Francis  v.  Webb,  7  C.  B.  731; 
Clark  v.  Smith,  6  M.  &  G.  1051; 
Nelson  v.  Wilson,  6  Bing.  568. 

6  Hanna  v.  Island  Coal  Co.,  5 
Ind.  App.  163,  31  N.  E.  846,  51  Am. 
St.  246.  "Characterizing  a  trans- 
action as  fraudulent  does  not  make 
it  so  in  law  unless  it  is  so  in  fact." 
Per    Fox,   J. 


211  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §  204 

collusively  to  defraud  the  attorney  of  his  rights.  Something 
more  must  be  shown.''^  Baron  Parke  on  this  spoint  justly 
said:^  "It  is  quite  competent  to  parties  to  settle  actions  be- 
hind the  backs  of  the  attorneys,  for  it  is  the  client's  action 
and  not  the  attorney's.  It  must  be  shewn  affirmatively  that 
the  settlement  was  effected  with  the  view  of  cheating  the  at- 
torney of  his  costs."  The  burden  of  proving  collusion  or  bad 
faith  in  the  settlement  rests  with  the  attorney. 

Where  a  judgment  is  not  vacated  by  an  appeal,  but  is 
merely  suspended,  the  lien  attaching  to  it  is  also  suspended, 
but  upon  affirmance  of  the  judgment  attaches  again  with  full 
force.  If  the  client  compromises  the  judgment  pending  an 
appeal,  the  attorney  may  still  enforce  his  lien.^ 

§  204.  Collusion  between  debtor  and  creditor.  Even 
after  judgment,  if  the  debtor  acts  in  collusion  with  his  credit- 
or and  pays  him,  with  the  intention  of  cheating  the  attorney 
out  of  his  lien,  the  debtor  is  not  protected  in  making  such 
payment,  though  he  has  received  no  actual  notice  of  the 
lien.^°  If  notice  of  the  attorney's  lien  has  been  given  to  the 
adverse  party  and  the  latter  disregards  the  notice  and  pays 
the  judgment,  or  compromises  it  with  the  client,  such  adverse 
party  is  liable  to  the  attorney  for  the  amount  of  his  lien.^^ 

A  settlement  of  a  judgment  in  an  action  for  damages  for  a 

7  Wright  V.  Burroughes,  3  C.  B.      Y.)  324,  21  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  293; 


344;  Francis  v.  Webb,  7  C.  B.  731 
Nelson  v.  Wilson,  6  Bing.  568 
Jones    V.     Bonner,    2    Exch.    230 


Jones  V.  Duff  Grain   Co.,  69  Nebr. 
91,  95  N.  W.  1. 

^1  New   Jersey:     Barnes   v.  Tay- 


Wade   V.   Orton,    12  Abb.   Pr.    (N.  lor,   30   N.   J.   Eq.   467;   Heister  v. 

S.)   (N.  Y.)  444.  Mount,  17  N.  J.  L.  438;  Braden  v. 

8  Jordan  v.  Hunt,  3  Dowl.  P.  C.  Ward,  42  N.  J.  L.  518.  In  this 
666.  state    the    attorney's    right    of   lien 

9  Covington  v.  Bass,  88  Tenn.  exists  only  where  he  has  received 
496,   12  S.  W.  1033.  the  money  upon  the  judgment,  or 

10  Heartt  v.  Chipman,  2  Aik.  has  arrested  it  in  transitu,  or 
(Vt.)  162;  Heister  v.  Mount,  17  where  the  defendant  has  paid  the 
N.  J.  L.  438;  Howard  v.  Osceola.  money  after  receiving  the  notice 
22  Wis.  453;  Rasquin  v.  Knicker-  of  the  attorney's  claim.  Braden 
bocker  Stage  Co.,  12  Abb.  Pr.   (N.  v.  Ward,  42  N.  J.  L.  518. 


§    204a  LIENS.  212 

personal  injury,  effected  by  the  defendant's  attorney  with 
the  plaintiff,  a  married  woman,  without  notice  to  her  counsel, 
may  be  set  aside  as  fraudulent  and  not  binding,  even  without 
placing  it  upon  the  ground  that  the  plaintiff's  attorney  has  a 
lien  for  his  fees,  and  that  the  settlement  was  made  in  fraud 
of  his  rights. ^^ 

But  even  as  regards  a  settlement  before  judgment  without 
the  attorney's  consent,  the  courts  so  far  take  notice  of  and 
regard  the  equitable  claim  of  the  attorney  to  be  paid  for  his 
services  in  the  case,  that,  wherever  the  party  is  obliged  to 
ask  the  aid  of  the  court  to  enforce  or  carry  into  effect  his 
settlement,  the  court  will  refuse  its  assistance  if  any  want 
of  good  faith  to  the  attorney  be  discovered  in  the  transac- 
tion.^^ The  fact  that  there  was  no  consideration,  or  no 
adequate  consideration,  for  the  settlement  and  discharge  of 
the  suit  is  evidence  of  bad  faith. ^^ 

§  204a.  Waiver  of  attorney's  lien. — The  lien  does  not  exist 
after  the  client  has  accepted  satisfaction  of  his  judgment,  and 
it  does  not  attach  to  property  received  in  satisfaction  of  it. 
After  an  attorney  had  procured  a  judgment  against  a  rail- 
road company,  all  its  property  and  franchises  were  sold  to 
satisfy  various  liens.  The  client  and  others  became  pur- 
chasers, the  company  was  reorganized,  and  stock  was  issued 
to  the  purchasers,  by  mutual  agreement  among  them,  in  pay- 
ment of  their  claims  against  the  old  company.  Liens  prior 
to  the  judgment  procured  by  the  attorney  absorbed  all  the 
purchase  price.     It  was  held  that  the  attorney  had  no  lien, 

12  Voell  V.  Kelly,  64  Wis.  504,  payable  in  settlement,  and  if  the 
25  N.  W.  536.  defendant    pays    over     the     money 

13  Young  V.  Dearborn,  27  N.  H.  regardless  of  the  lien  he  becomes 
324.  liable.     Fischer-Hansen  v.   Brook- 

i-iYoimg  V.  Dearborn,  27  N.  H.  lyn  Heights  R.  Co.,  173  N.  Y.  492, 

324.      Under    New    York    statutes  66    N.    E.    395.    reversing   63    App. 

an    attorney's    lien    on    a    cause    of  Div.  356,  71   N.  Y.  S.  513. 
action  attaches  at  once   to  a  fund 


213  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §  205 

by  virtue  of  the  judgment,  on  the  stock  which  was  issued  to 
his  client. ^^ 

§  205.  Court  of  admiralty. — A  court  of  admiralty  will  not 
allow  an  out-door  settlement  of  a  suit  by  a  seaman  for 
wages,  made  without  the  concurrence  of  his  proctor,  to  bar 
his  claim  for  costs.  Notwithstanding  the  settlement,  the 
court  will  retain  the  suit  and  allow^  the  proctor  to  proceed 
for  costs. ^^  The  court  w'ill  consider  a  settlement  so  made, 
unless  explained,  to  have  been  made  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
priving the  proctor  of  his  costs.  Collusion  to  defeat  the  lien 
of  an  attorney  is  at  law  a  ground  for  avoiding  a  settlement 
so  far  as  the  attorney  is  concerned.  But  a  court  of  admiralty 
proceeds  upon  a  broader  principle  in  protecting  the  proctor. 
Costs  are  treated  as  his  distinct  and  exclusive  right,  although 
nominally  granted  to  the  party.  They  are,  moreover,  granted 
or  denied,  according  to  the  merits  and  equities  of  the  party 
in  relation  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  litigation.  Accord- 
ingly, where  a  suit  for  wages  had  almost  reached  a  hearing, 
and  the  proctor  had  incurred  large  expenses,  when  the  libel- 
ant made  a  secret  settlement  and  gave  a  release  in  full,  and 
it  appeared  that  he  had  a  good  cause  of  action  for  more  than 
the  amount  paid  in  settlement,  the  court  protected  the  proc- 
tor, and  decreed  the  payment  of  costs  to  him,  notwithstanding 
the  settlement. ^'^ 

In  suits  for  personal  torts,  settlements  made  by  seamen  in 
the   absence  of  the   proctor  are  allowed  when   deliberately 

15  Morton  v.  Hallam,  89  Ky.  165,  Blatchf.  &  H.  (U.  S.)  401,  Fed.  Cas. 
11  Ky.  L.  447,  12  S.  W.  187;  Whit-  No.  12348;  Collins  v.  Hathaway, 
tie  V.   Newman,  34  Ga.  Zll .  Ok.  (U.  S.  Adm.)  176  Fed.  Cas.  No. 

16  Brig  Planet,  1  Sprague  (U.  3014;  Ship  Cabot,  Newb.  (U.  S. 
S.)  11,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  11204;  Col-  Adm.)  348,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8759; 
lins  V.  Nickerson,  1  Sprague  (U.  Trask  v.  The  Dido,  1  Haz.  Pa. 
S.)  126,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  3016;  An-  Reg.  9;  Gaines  v.  Travis,  Abb.  (U. 
gell  V.  Bennett,  1  Sprague  (U.  S.)  S.  Adm.)  297. 

85,   Fed.   Cas.  387;   The  Victory,    1  i7  The  Victory,  1   Blatchf.  &  H. 

Blatchf.  &  H.  (U.  S.)  443,  Fed.  Cas.       (U.  S.)  443,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  16937. 
No.     16937;     The     Sarah     Jane,     1 


§    2o6  LIENS.  214 

made  for  a  consideration  not  shown  to  be  inadequate,  and 
the  proctor  is  tendered  his  costs.  The  latter  will  not  be  al- 
lowed to  proceed  with  the  suit  merely  because  he  objects  to 
the  settlement. ^^  And  even  though  the  proctor  is  not  pro- 
tected in  the  settlement,  if  this  be  made  in  good  faith,  and 
the  situation  of  the  respondent  was  such  that  there  was  more 
danger  of  undue  influence  upon  him  than  upon  the  libelant, 
the  proctor  will  not  be  allowed  to  proceed  with  the  suit  to 
recover  his  costs. ^^  In  a  suit  for  a  tort  the  respondent  is  not 
bound  to  regard  the  costs  of  the  libelant's  proctor  in  the 
light  of  a  lien  on  him  or  on  any  funds  under  his  control,  be- 
cause no  costs  could  exist  until  damages  had  been  decreed 
against  the  respondent,  and  because  a  recovery  in  such  a  suit 
does  not  conclusively  carry  costs  as  an  incident  in  admiralty.^*^ 

§  206.  Assignment  of  judgment. — Unless  the  cause  of 
action  be  assignable  in  its  nature,  the  client  can  not  give  his 
attorney  any  lien  upon  it  which  will  prevent  a  settlement  by 
the  parties,  even  by  agreement.^^     Although  in  such  case 

18  Brooks  V.  Snell,  1  Sprague  the  client,  recited  that  the  sum 
(U.   S.)   48,   Fed.   Cas.   No.   1961.  agreed  upon  "should  in  some  form 

19  Purcell  V.  Lincoln,  1  Sprague  be  charged  upon  or  paid  out  of 
(U.  S.)  230,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  11471;  any  sums  to  be  recovered  upon 
Peterson  v.  Watson,  1  Blatchf.  &  the  Alabama  claims."  It  was  held 
H.  (U.  S.)  487,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  that  there  was  no  effective  assign- 
11037.  ment  to  the  attorney  of  any  right 

20  Peterson  v.  Watson,  1  in  those  claims,  and  that,  even  if 
Blatchf.  &  H.  (U.  S.)  487,  Fed.  there  were,  the  United  States  stat- 
Cas.  No.  11037.  i^te,     Comp.    Stats.     1901,    §    3477, 

21  Swanston  v.  Morning  Star  would  render  the  assignment 
Mining  Co.,  13  Fed.  215,  4  Mc-  void.  New  York:  Coughlin  v. 
Crary  (U.  S.)  241,  14  Rep.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  Hud.  Riv.  R. 
321;  Hanna  v.  Island  Coal  Co.,  5  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  443,  27  Am. 
Ind.  App.  163,  31  N.  E.  846;  New-  Rep.  75,  reversing  8  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
ell  V.  West,  149  Mass.  520,  21  N.  136;  Eberhardt  v.  Schuster,  10  Abb. 
E.  954.  An  agreement  between  an  N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  374,  note;  McBrat- 
attorney  at  law  and  his  client  for  ney  v.  Rome,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  17  Hun 
the  payment  of  a  certain  sum  for  (N.  Y.)  385,  affd.  87  N.  Y.  467; 
the  former's  professional  services  Sullivan  v.  O'Keefe,  53  How.  Pr. 
in  prosecuting  Alabama  claims  of  (N.   Y.)    426;    Brooks   v.   Hanford, 


215  ATTORNEY  S   SPECIAL   OR    CHARGING   LIEN.  §    20/ 

there  be  a  definite  agreement  for  a  lien  in  which  the  amount 
of  the  fees  is  fixed,  and  the  defendant  is  notified  of  this  at  the 
commencement  of  the  action,  the  attorney  can  have  no  lien 
before  judgment  is  rendered.  A  claim  against  a  town  for 
personal  injuries  caused  by  a  defective  sidewalk  is  not  an 
assignable  cause  of  action,  and,  therefore,  an  agreement  by 
the  plaintill  to  give  his  attorney  for  his  fees  half  of  the 
amount  that  he  might  recover  in  the  action  creates  no  lien 
upon  the  cause  of  action,  and  does  not  prevent  the  defendant 
from  making  a  settlement  with  the  plaintiff  and  paying  him 
a  sum  of  money  for  a  release  and  discontinuance  of  the  action 
against  the  attorney's  protest.  The  attorney  had  no  vested 
interest  in  the  claim,  and  no  lien  even  for  his  taxable  costs.-^ 
Where,  in  an  action  to  recover  land  which  the  plaintiff 
claimed  was  held  under  fraudulent  sales  and  transfers,  the 
plaintiff  entered  into  an  agreement  with  his  attorney  w'here- 
by  he  was  to  receive  for  his  services  a  part  of  the  property 
that  might  be  recovered  in  the  action,  and,  pending  the  liti- 
gation, the  plaintiff  settled  with  the  defendant,  it  was  held 
that  the  attorney,  who  had  taken  no  steps  to  perfect  a  lien 
in  accordance  with  the  statute,  could  not  intervene  to  con- 
tinue the  suit  by  virtue  of  the  contract.^^ 

§  207.     Actions  not  assignable. — An  action  for  slander  or 
libel,  or  for  assault  and  battery,  is  not  assignable ;  and  the  at- 

15   Abb.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)   342;  Quincey  torney  in  a  divorce  case  where  no 

V.     Francis,     5     Abb.     N.     C.     (N.  lien  is  allowed  on  the  amount  re- 

Y.)    286;    Pulver   v.    Harris,    52    N.  covered    as    alimony.        Jordan    v. 

Y.  73,  affirming  62  Barb.   (N.   Y.)  Westerman,    62    Mich.    170,    28    N. 

500; Wright    v.    Wright,    70    N.    Y.  W.  826,  4  Am.   St.  836;    Lynde   v. 

96,  affirming  9  J.  &  S.  432.     Other-  Lynde,  64  N.  J.  Eq.  736,  52  Atl.  694, 

wise  by  statute  in  New  York  since  58  L.  R.  A.  471,  97  Am.  Rep.  692. 

1879.       See      §      185.       Wisconsin:  22  Kusterer    v.    Beaver    Dam,    56 

Voell  V.  Kelly,  64  Wis.  504,  25  N.  Wis.    471,    14    N.    W.    617,   43    Am. 

W.  536,  per  Cole,   C.  J.;   Kusterer  Rep.  725. 

V.    Beaver    Dam,    56    Wis.    471,    14  23  Lavender  v.   Atkins,  20  Nebr. 

N.  W.  617,  43  Am.  Rep.  725.  There  206,  29  N.  W.  467. 
may  be  a   lien   in   favor  of  an   at- 


§    208  LIENS.  2l6 

torney  can  have  no  lien  on  the  cause  of  action  before  judg- 
ment. Though  the  chent  promised  the  attorney  before  the 
suit  was  begun  that  he  should  receive  for  his  services  the 
damages  that  might  be  recovered,  the  client  may  discontinue 
the  suit  at  any  time  before  judgment  without  the  attorney's 
consent.-^  Even  under  the  new  Code  of  New  York,  the  at- 
torney's lien  does  not  attach  so  as  to  prevent  a  discontinu- 
ance of  the  action  without  costs  when  the  plaintiff  has  for- 
given the  defendant,  and  the  parties  want  the  further  prose- 
cution of  the  action  stopped.^''  Whenever  the  cause  of  action 
is  for  tort,  and  would  not  survive  the  death  of  either  of  the 
parties,  the  attorney  is  not  entitled  to  a  lien  upon  it.-*^ 

In  like  manner  a  cause  of  action  for  personal  injuries,  in- 
curred through  the  negligence  of  a  person  or  corporation,  is 
not  assignable  in  its  nature,  and  does  not  survive  a  settle- 
ment by  the  parties  before  judgment  without  consent  of  the 
attorney.^" 

§  208.  Action  founded  on  negotiable  instrument. — AVhere, 
however,  the  action  is  founded  upon  a  negotiable  instrument, 
or  a  contract  in  writing,  which  is  in  the  attorney's  possession, 
his  lien  attaches  to  the  contract  before  judgment,  and  his 
client  can  make  no  settlement  or  assig-nment  of  the  action 
without  discharging  his  attorney's  fees.-^  The  lien  in  such 
case  attaches  from  the  time  the  contract  is  delivered  to  the 

-•*  Quincey  v.  Francis,  5  Abb.  N.  -'"  Kusterer    v.    Beaver    Dam,    56 

C.   (N.  Y.)   286;   Miller  v.   Newell,  Wis.    471.    14    N.    W.    617,    43   Am. 

20  S.   Car.   123,  47   Am.   Rep.   833;  Rep.  725. 

Cahill  V.  Cahill,  9  N.  Y.  Civ.  Proc.  ^s  Coughlin  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  & 
R.  241;  Hanna  v.  Island  Coal  Co.,  Hud.  Riv.  R.  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  443,  27 
51  Ind.  App.  163,  31  N.  E.  846,  51  Am.  Rep.  75.  per  Earl,  J.;  Court- 
Am.  St.  246.  New  York:  Pulver  ney  v.  McGavock,  23  Wis.  619; 
V.  Harris,  62  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  500,  Kusterer  v.  Beaver  Dam,  56  Wis. 
affirmed   52   N.   Y.   73.  471.  14  N.  W.  617,  43  Am.  Rep.  725; 

25  Cahill  v.  Cahill,  9  N.  Y.  Civ.  Howard  v.  Osceola,  22  Wis.  453; 
Proc.    R.  241.  Dennett  v.  Cutts,  11  N.  H.  163. 

26  Abbot    V.    Abbott,     18    Nebr. 
503.  26  N.  W.  361. 


21/  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §  208 

attorney  and  he  commences  the  action.  In  such  case  the  lien 
attaches  not  only  for  his  attorney's  services  rendered  in  that 
suit,  but  also  for  his  general  account  for  professional  services 
rendered  the  client.  The  settlement  or  assignment  is  subject 
to  the  attorney's  general  lien.-''  In  such  case,  also,  the  rule 
that  a  bona  fide  settlement,  payment  or  assignment  of  the 
cause  of  action  made  before  judgment,  without  notice  of  the 
attorney's  lien,  prevails  against  the  lien,  has  no  application; 
neither  has  the  rule  that  the  attorney's  lien  upon  a  judgment 
yields  to  the  right  of  set-off  of  the  opposite  party.^'^  Under 
such  circumstances  an  attorney  may  posecute  an  appeal  even 
against  his  client's  wishes  or  intervene  and  obtain  a  review 
in  his  own  name."'"'' 

The  attorney  may  be  in  effect  an  assignee  of  the  judgment 
by  virtue  of  the  law  that  gives  him  a  lien  upon  it,  so  that 
his  lien  will  be  effectual,  though  he  does  not  hold  the  con- 
tracts upon  which  the  judgment  is  based.  Thus,  in  a  suit 
against  a  corporation  to  enforce  payment  of  debts,  if  the  at- 
torney succeeds  in  bringing  a  fund  under  the  control  of  the 
court  for  the  common  benefit  of  a  class  of  creditors,  he  is 
entitled  to  reasonable  costs  and  counsel  fees  out  of  the  fund, 
both  as  regards  the  claim  of  the  complainants  who  employed 
him,  and  as  regards  other  creditors  who  come  in  and  secure 
the  benefit  of  the  proceedings.  If  after  decree  and  pending 
the  proof  of  claims,  the  corporation  buys  up  all  the  claims, 
the  attorney's  lien  upon  the  fund  is  not  defeated,"^  provided 
the  law  of  the  state  where  the  suit  was  pending  entitles  the 
attorney  to  a  lien  upon  the  decree,  in  such  manner  that  he  is 
regarded  as  an  assignee  of  the  decree  to  the  extent  of  his  fees. 

29  Schwartz  v.  Schwartz.  21  Hun  98  X.  W.  414;  Greek  v.  McDaiiiel, 
(N.   Y.)   33.  68  Nebr.  569,  94  N.  W.  518. 

30  Schwartz  v.  Schwartz,  21  Hun  3i  Trustees  v.  Greenough,  105  U. 
(N.  Y.)  33.  S.    527,    26    L.    ed.    1157;    Central 

30a  Counsman  v.  Modern  Wood-  Railroad  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Pettus, 
men,  69  Nebr.  710,  96  N.  W.  672,       113  U.  S.  116,  28  L.  ed.  915,  5  Sup. 

Ct.  387. 


^  209 


LIENS. 


218 


The  right  of  the  attorney  in  such  case  is  superior  to  any 
which  the  defendant  corporation  could  acquire  subsequent  to 
the  decree,  by  the  purchase  of  the  claims  of  the  creditors. ^- 

§  209.  Notice  of  attorney's  lien. — Where  the  judgment  is 
for  damages  as  well  as  for  costs,  the  attorney  should  give  no- 
tice of  his  lien  to  the  judgment  debtor;  otherwise  he  will  not 
be  protected  against  a  settlement  of  the  judgment  with  his 
client.^^  But  the  notice  affords  such  protection,  so  that,  if 
the  debtor  afterwards  pays  the  judgment,  he  does  so  in  his 
own  wrong,  for  the  attorney  may  proceed  with  the  execution 
against  the  debtor,  and  enforce  payment  of  it  to  the  extent 
of  his  fees  and  disbursements."^     The  circumstance  that  a 


32  Central  Railroad  &  Banking- 
Co.  V.  Pettus,  113  U.  S.  116,  28  L. 
ed.  915,  5  Sup.  Ct.  387. 

33  Welsh  V.  Hole,  1  Doug.  238, 
per  Lord  Mansfield;  Read  v.  Dup- 
per,  6  T.  R..  361;  Mitchell  v.  Old- 
field,  4  T.  R.  123.  New  York:  Pul- 
ver  V.  Harris,  52  N.  Y.  11;  Mar- 
shall V.  Meech,  51  N.  Y.  140,  10 
Am.  Rep.  572;  Crotty  v.  MacKen- 
zie.  52  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  54,  42  N.  Y. 
How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  156;  Ackerman  v. 
Ackerman,  14  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
229;  Bishop  v.  Garcia,  14  Abb.  Pr. 
(N.  S.)  (N.  Y.)  69;  Lesher  v. 
Roessner,  3  Hun  (N.  Y.)  217; 
Martin  v.  Hawks,  15  Johns.  (N. 
/.)  405;  St.  John  v.  Diefen- 
dorf,  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  261; 
Carpenter  v.  Sixth  Av.  R.  R.  Co. 
1  Am.  L.  Reg.  (N.  S.)  410;  NicoU 
V.  Nicoll,  16  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  446; 
Pinder  v.  Morris,  3  Caines  (N.  Y.) 
165,  Colem.  &  C.  Cas.  489;  Power 
V.  Kent,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  172;  Ten 
Broeck  v.  De  Witt,  10  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  617;  Pearl  v.  Robitchek,  2 
Daly  (N.  Y.)  138.  Georgia:  Gray 
V.    Lawson,    36    Ga.    629;    Hawkins 


V.    Loyless,    39    Ga.    5.      Vermont : 
Heartt    v.    Chipman,    2   Aik.    (Vt.) 
162;   Hooper  v.  Welch,  43  Vt.  169, 
5       Am.     Rep.     267.       Wisconsin : 
Courtney    v.    McGavock,    23    Wis. 
619;  Voell  v.  Kelly,  64  Wis.  504,  25 
N.   W.   536,  per   Cole,   C.   J.   Other 
States :     Andrews     v.     Morse,     12 
Conn.     444,     31     Am.     Dec.     752 
Barnes  v.  Taylor,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  467 
Young  V.  Dearborn,  27  N.  H.  324 
Boston    &    Colorado   Smelting   Co. 
V.  Bless,  8  Colo.  87,  5  Pac.  650. 

34  Commercial  Telegram  Co.  v. 
Smith,  57  Hun  (N.  Y.)  176,  10 
N.  Y.  S.  433,  32  N.  Y.  St.  445,  19 
Civ.  Proc.  R.  32;  Marshall  v. 
Meech,  51  N.  Y.  140,  10  Am.  Rep. 
572;  Goodrich  v.  McDonald,  112  N. 
Y.  157,  19  N.  E.  649;  Randall  v.  Van 
Wagenen,  115  N.  Y.  527,  22  N.  E. 
361,  12  Am.  St.  828;  Wright  v. 
Wright,  70  N.  Y.  98;  In  re  Wolf, 
51  Hun  (N.  Y.)  407,  4  N.  Y.  S.  239, 
21  N.  Y.  St.  224.  Where  a  wife, 
in  an  action  for  separation,  pro- 
cures a  decree  for  alimony,  costs 
and  attorney's  fees,  and  the  de- 
fendant,   though    verbally    advised 


219  ATTORNEYS   SPECIAL   OR    CHARGING   LIEN.  §    2IO 

dispute  may  exist  concerning  the  amount  of  his  compensa- 
tion or  his  right  to  remuneration  will  not  defeat  the  pro- 
ceeding; for  the  court  is  empowered  through  the  intervention 
of  a  reference  to  determine  the  validity  of  his  claim,  as  well 
as  of  the  objections  which  may  be  made  against  it  by  either 
of  the  parties  to  the  judgment  or  others.^^ 

§  210.  Statutory  provisions  as  to  notice  of  lien. — In  sev- 
eral states  there  are  statutory  provisions  in  regard  to  giving 
notice  of  the  lien.  Thus  in  Georgia  the  lien  continues  if  the 
attorney  files  a  claim  of  lien  upon  the  property  recovered 
within  thirty  days  after  the  recovery.^''''  In  Indiana  the  at- 
torney has  a  lien  on  the  judgment  if  he  enters  in  writing 
upon  the  docket  or  records,  at  the  time  such  judgment  is 
rendered,  his  intention  to  claim'  a  lien.  In  Iowa  and  North 
and  South  Dakota  the  lien  attaches  during  the  pendency  of 
the  suit,  if  the  attorney  gives  notice  of  his  claim  to  the  ad- 
verse party.  It  attaches  from  the  time  of  such  notice.  After 
judgment  the  notice  may  be  given  by  entry  in  the  judgment 
docket.  In  Kansas,  also,  the  lien  exists  from  the  time  of 
giving  notice  of  the  lien  to  the  adverse  party.^"^""  In  Minne- 
sota and  Oregon  the  lien  exists  from  the  time  of  giving  no- 

of  a  lien  of  plaintiff's  attorneys  on  979,   19  Civ.   Proc.  R.  28;   Lachen- 

the    judgment,     secretly     procures  meyer    v.    Lachenmeyer,    65    How. 

plaintiff   to   execute   a   satisfaction  Pr.     (N.    Y.)    422.      New    Jersey: 

of  the  decree,  the  satisfaction  will  Braden  v.  Ward,  42  N.  J.  L.  518. 

be  set  aside  for  the  protection  of  35  Commercial   Telegram    Co.   v. 

plaintiff's  attorneys,  even  after  the  Smith,  57  Hun   (N.  Y.)   176,  10  N. 

death    of    plaintiff.      The    conduct  Y.  S.  433,  32  N.  Y.  St.  445,  19  Civ. 

of  the   defendant  in  obtaining  the  Proc.  Zl. 

satisfaction  piece  had  the  effect  of  '^^^  It    is    not    necessary    to    file 

substituting    the    attorneys    of    the  notice     except     as     against     third 

plaintiff,  the  plaintiffs  herein,  thus  persons.      Coleman    v.    Austin,    99 

to  enable  them  to  carry  on  the  case  Ga.  629,  27  S.  E.  763. 

by  the  appropriate   remedies   until  asb^  notice  served  upon  the  at- 

their  lien  is  paid,  or  the  modes  of  torney  of  the  adverse  party  is  suf- 

procedure  for  collection  exhausted.  ficient   notice.      Noftzger   v.    Mof- 

Branth  v.  Branth,  57  Hun  (N.  Y.)  fett,  63  Kans.  354,  65  Pac.  670. 
592,  10  N.  Y.  S.  638,  32  N.  Y.  St. 


§211  LIENS.  220 

tice  of  the  lien  to  the  adverse  party.  After  judgment  the  Hen 
exists  in  Minnesota  from  the  time  of  giving  notice  to  the 
judgment  debtor;  and  in  Oregon  from  the  time  of  fihng  no- 
tice with  the  clerk  where  the  judgment  is  entered.  In  ]\Ion- 
tana  the  lien  attaches  from  the  commencement  of  the  suit; 
but  after  judgment,  notice  must  be  filed  within  three  days 
in  the  office  of  the  clerk  in  which  the  judgment  is  obtained. 
In  Nebraska  and  Wyoming,  if  any  lien  exists,  it  is  from  the 
time  of  filing  notice  of  it  with  the  adverse  party. 

In  New  York,  under  the  present  code,  the  lien  exists  from 
the  commencement  of  the  suit,  and  no  notice  of  the  lien  need 
be  given. ^*'  But  notice  of  the  lien  is  necessary  where  no  lien 
is  expressly  given  by  statute.^'^  In  Tennessee,  also,  the  lien 
dates  from  the  commencement  of  the  suit,  the  pending  of 
which  is  of  itself  notice  of  the  lien. 

Where  by  statute  the  lien  exists  from  the  time  of  giving 
notice  of  it,  the  parties,  acting  in  good  faith,  may  make  a 
valid  settlement  at  any  rime  before  the  notice  is  given,  in 
the  manner  prescribed.''' 

§211.  Notice  to  adverse  party. — The  notice  should  be 
given  to  the  adverse  ]iarty  personally,  and  not  to  his  attor- 
ney. It  would  be  inequitable  to  require  a  party  to  pay  a  judg- 
ment, or  any  part  of  it,  a  second  time,  when  it  appears  that 
he  has  never  received  notice  of  any  lien  upon  it,  though  such 
notice  may  have  been  given  to  his  attorney."^'* 

But  notice  to  the  attorney  of  record,  or  to  the  attorney  in 

36  Coster    V.     Greenpoint     Ferry  See.    however,    Jenkins    v.    Adams, 

Co.,  5   Civ.    Proc.   R.    (N.   Y.)    146;  22  Hun  (N.  Y.)  600. 

Dimick  v.  Cooley,  3  Civ.  Proc.  R.  37  Lablache  v.  Kirkpatrick,  8  Civ. 

(N.   Y.)    141;    Kehoe  v.   Miller,   10  Proc.  R.   (N.  Y.)   256. 

Abb.  N.   C.    (N.  Y.)   393;  Tullis  v.  38  Casar  v.  Sargeant.  7  Iowa  317; 

Bushnell,   12  Daly   (N.  Y.)   217,  65  Hawkins    v.     Loyless,    39     Ga.    5; 

How.     Pr.     (N.    Y.)     465;     Albert  Green  v.  Southern  Express  Co.  39 

Palmer  Co.  v.  Van-Orden,  64  How.  Ga.  20. 

Pr.  (N.  Y.)  79,  4  Civ.  Proc.  R.  44.  39  Wright    v.    Wright,    70   N.    Y. 

96,  7  Daly  (N.  Y.)  62. 


221  attorney's   special   OR    CHARGING   LIEN.  §    212 

fact,  may  often  be  sufficient. ^^  Where,  however  one  mem- 
ber of  a  law  firm  in  a  particular  matter  is  individnally  the  at- 
torney of  the  party,  and  the  other  members  have  nothing  to 
do  with  the  case,  a  notice  of  an  attorney's  lien  served  upon 
either  of  the  other  members  of  the  firm  is  not  notice  to  the 
attorney  actually  engag'ed  in  the  case,  so  as  to  bind  him  or 
his  client. ^^ 

The  placing  of  a  paper  upon  the  files  of  the  court  in  which 
the  judgment  was  rendered  is  not  notice  to  the  judgment 
debtor,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  making  it  so.  If,  without 
knowledge  of  such  paper  or  other  notice  of  the  attorney's 
lien  upon  the  judgment  the  debtor  makes  a  bona  fide  settle- 
ment of  the  judgment  with  the  creditor,  by  payment  or  other- 
wise, the  attorney  can  not  look  to  the  debtor  for  his  unpaid 
fees.« 

§  212.  Actual  notice  not  necessary. — But  actual  notice  of 
the  attorney's  claim  to  a  lien  is  not  in  all  cases  necessary 
for  the  protection  of  his  rights.  If  the  judgment  debtor  acts 
in  the  face  of  circumstances  which  are  sufficient  to  put  him 
upon  inquiry,  he  acts  contrary  to  good  faith,  and  at  his  peril; 
and  a  discharge  of  the  judgment  under  such  circumstances 
is,  as  to  the  attorney,  void  in  the  same  manner  as  it  would 
be  after  an  actual  notice  of  his  claim  to  a  lien.^"  But  the 
mere  fact  that  the  attorney  appears  in  a  cause  is  not  sufficient 
notice  of  his  lien.^^ 

40  Kansas  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Thach-  H.  324;  Sexton  v.  Pike,  13  Ark. 
er,  17  Kans.  92.  193.      Vermont:        Weed      Sewing 

41  St.  Louis  &  San  Francisco  R.  Mach.  Co.  v.  Boutelle,  56  Vt.  570, 
Co.  V.  Bennett,  35  Kans.  395,  11  48  Am.  Rep.  821;  Lake  v.  Ingham, 
Pac.   155.  3  Vt.  158;  Hooper  v.  Welch,  43  Vt. 

■1^  Boston  &  Colo.  Smelting  Co.  169,  5  Am.  Rep.  267,  per  Wilson,  J. 

V.    Pless,   8    Colo.   87,    5    Pac.    650;  New  York:  Wilkins  v.   Batterman, 

Wright     V.     Wright.   70   N.   Y.  96,  4    Barb.     (N.    Y.)     47;     Martin    v. 

7  Daly  (N.  Y.)  62.  Hawks,  IS  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  405;  Ten 

4;:Abel  v.  Potts.  3  Esp.  242;  Cur-  Broeck  v.  De  Witt.  10  Wend.   (N. 

rier  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.   Co.  37  N.  Y.)  617. 

H.  223;  Young  v.  Dearborn.  27  N.  -»4  Gray  v.   Lawson,  36  Ga.  629. 


213 


LIENS. 


222 


AVhere  a  judgment  debtor  settled  a  judgment  by  offsetting 
claims  against  his  creditor  and  agreeing  to  pay  the  costs  of 
the  plaintiff's  attorney,  it  was  held  that  the  terms  of  the 
agreement  imparted  to  the  debtor  notice  of  the  attorney's 
lien  and  of  the  amount  of  it.*^ 

§  213.  Lien  on  damages  recovered. — An  attorney  has  no 
lien  upon  the  damages  recovered  in  a  suit  before  the  money 
comes  into  his  hands,  although  his  demands  against  his 
client  equal  or  exceed  the  amount  of  judgment.  He  has  a 
lien  for  his  costs  out  of  a  judgment  for  damages  and  costs; 
but  he  may  lose  this  if  he  does  not  give  notice  to  the  judg- 
ment debtor  before  the  latter  discharges  the  judgment  by 
payment  to  the  plaintiff.^^ 

§  214.  Judgment  for  costs  only. — When  the  judgment  is 
for  costs  only,  this  is  of  itself  a  legal  notice  of  the  lien,  which 
can  be  discharged  only  by  payment  to  the  attorney.^^  The 
judgment  debtor  pays  such  a  judgment  to  the  creditor  at  his 


45  Hall  V.  Ayer,  9  Abb.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  220,  19  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  91. 

46  St.  John  V.  Diefendorf,  12 
Wend.   (N.  Y.)   261. 

47  New  York:  Marshal  v.  Meech, 
51  N.  Y.  140,  10  Am.  Rep.  572;  Mc- 
Gregor V.  Comstock,  28  N.  Y.  237; 
Wilkins  v.  Batterman,  4  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  47;  Haight  v.  Holcomb,  7  Abb. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  213,  16  How.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  173;  Lesher  v.  Roessner,  3 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  217;  Naylor  v.  Lane, 
5  Civ.  Proc.  R.  149,  66  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  400;  Martin  v.  Hawks,  15 
Johns.  (X.  Y.)  405;  Kipp  v.  Rapp, 
7  Civ.  Proc.  R.  (N.  Y.)  385;  Ennis 
V.  Currie,  2  Month.  L.  Bui.  66. 
Maine:  Hobson  v.  Watson,  34 
Maine  20,  56  Am.  Dec.  632;  New- 
bert  V.  Cunningham,  50  Maine  231, 
79    Am.     Dec.    612;    McKenzie    v. 


Wardwell,  61  Maine  136;  Strat- 
ton  V.  Hussey,  62  Maine  286. 
There  are  a  few  decisions  that 
are  inconsistent  with  the  view 
that  a  judgment  for  costs  only  be- 
longs absolutely  to  the  attorney. 
Thus  in  People  v.  Hardenbergh,  8 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  335,  it  was  held 
that  such  a  judgment  might  be 
settled  between  the  parties,  if  the 
debtor  acts  in  good  faith  and  with- 
out notice  from  the  judgment 
creditor's  attorney  of  his  claim  of 
a  lien.  And  in  the  recent  case  of 
Horton  v.  Champlin,  12  R.  I.  550, 
34  Am.  Rep.  722,  it  was  held  that 
an  attorney  who  had  obtained  a 
judgment  for  his  client  for  costs 
only  had  no  authority  to  bring  a 
suit  on  the  judgment  without  his 
client's   consent  and   direction. 


223 


ATTORNEY  S  SPECIAL  OR   CHARGING  LIEN. 


215 


peril.  His  pa3^ment  is  equivalent  to  paying  the  assignor  a 
debt  which  has  been  assigned  after  notice  of  the  assignment. 
Where  a  judgment  was  recovered  for  six  cents  damage 
and  costs,  and  the  plaintiff's  attorney  gave  notice  of  his  lien, 
and  the  sherifr  to  whom  the  execution  was  committed  ar- 
rested the  defendant,  and  afterwards  voluntarily  permitted 
his  escape,  the  attorney  was  allowed  to  sue  the  sheriff  in  the 
name  of  his  client;  and  the  sheriff  was  not  allowed  to  avail 
himself  of  a  release  afterwards  obtained  from  the  client,  for 
this  was  a  fraud  upon  the  attorney.^^ 

§  215.  Rule  in  court  of  the  King's  Bench. — The  rule  in 
the  court  of  the  King's  Bench  was  that  no  set-off  should  be 
allowed  to  the  prejudice  of  the  attorney's  lien  for  his  costs. '^^ 
The  courts  of  Common  Pleas,  however,  did  not  follow  the 
King's  Bench  in  this  practice,  but  allowed  a  set-off  in  all  such 
cases,  upon  the  ground  that  the  lien  of  the  attorney  was 
subject  to,  and  must  give  way  to,  the  equitable  rights  of  the 
parties. '^^     The  two  courts  thus  stood  in  conflict  until  the 


4S  Martin  v.  Hawks,  15  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  405. 

49  Mitchell  V.  Oldfield,  4  T.  R. 
123  (1791);  Randle  v.  Fuller,  6 
T.  R.  456;  Smith  v.  Brocklesby,  1 
Anstr.  61;  Middleton  v.  Hill,  1  M. 
&  S.  240;  Stephens  v.  Weston,  3  B. 
&  C.  535;  Holroyd  v.  Breare,  4  B. 

6  Aid.  43,  700;  Simpson  v.  Lamb, 

7  E.  &  B.  84. 

soSchooIe  V.  Noble,  1  H.  Bl.  23; 
Vaughn  v.  Davies,  2  H.  Bl.  440; 
George  v.  Elston,  1  Scott,  518; 
Emden  v.  Darley,  4  B.  &  P.  22. 
In  Hall  V.  Ody,  2  B.  &  P.  28,  be- 
fore the  Common  Pleas  of  Eng- 
land, in  which  the  lien  was  de- 
clared to  be  subject  to  set-off.  Lord 
Eldon,  then  recently  appointed 
chief    justice     of    that     court,     ex- 


pressed his  surprise  that  by  the 
settled  practice  of  that  court  the 
attorney  by  whose  diligence  the 
fund  had  been  recovered  was  not 
entitled  to  take  his  costs  out  of  it. 
in  preference  to  the  right  of  the 
opposite  party  to  the  set-off;  and 
emphatically  declared  that  it  was 
in  direct  contradiction  to  the 
practice  of  every  other  court,  as 
well  as  to  the  principles  of  jus- 
tice; and  he  acquiesced  in  the  de- 
cision in  that  case  only  because 
the  attorney  who  claimed  the  lien 
had  acted  with  the  knowledge  of 
the  settled  practices  of  that  court, 
and  therefore  had  no  right  to  claim 
the  advantages  of  a  more  just 
principle. 


§    2l6  LIENS.  224 

adoption  of  the  new  rules  in  ISSS,'^^  when  the  rule  of  the 
King's  Bench  was  made  applicable  to  all  the  courts.  Now, 
however,  under  the  Judicature  Acts  of  1873,  it  seems  that  the 
equitable  rule  prevails. ^- 

§  216.  Rule  in  equity. — In  equity  it  seems  to  have  been 
long  established  that  a  solicitor's  lien  is  not  to  interfere  with 
the  equities  between  the  parties.  In  a  case  before  Lord 
Langdale,  M.  R.,  in  1838,'^'"  it  was  held  that  a  solicitor's  lien 
upon  a  balance  due  to  his  client  could  not  extend  beyond  the 
amount  of  the  true  balance  as  ultimately  ascertained,  and 
that  the  court  would  not  allow  the  lien  to  interfere  with  the 
equities  between  the  parties.  As  before  remarked,  the  rule 
in  equity  seems  now  to  have  become  the  rule  of  all  the  courts 
since  the  Judicature  Act.^^ 

But  even  in  equity  a  judgment  for  costs  alone  is  not  sub- 
ject to  set-ofF  by  another  judgment  for  costs  in  a  dififerent 
matter  so  as  to  interfere  with  the  attorney's  lien  for  his 
costs. ""^  Thus,  if  a  plaintiff  in  an  action  obtains  a  judgment 
for  costs  against  the  defendant,  and  in  a  different  matter  he 
becomes  liable  to  pay  costs  to  the  defendant,  neither  the 
plaintiff*  nor  the  defendant  can  have  the  costs  set  off  to  the 
detriment  of  the  attorney  having  a  lien  for  his  costs.  But  if 
the  judgments  for  costs  have  been  rendered  in  the  same 
matter,  Ihey  may  be  set  off'.  The  principle  is  declared  to  be 
that,  where  a  solicitor  is  employed  in  a  suit  or  action,  he 
must  be  considered  as  having  adopted  the  proceeding  from 
the  beginning  to  the  end,  and  acted  for  better  or  worse.     His 

•''1  General  Rules  of  Hilary  Term,  B.   499;    Brunsdon   v.   Allard,   2   E. 

1853,  Rule  63.  &  E.   19. 

-•-  See  ante,  §  24.  55  Robarts   v.    Buee,   L.   R.  8  Ch. 

■">3  Bawtree    v.    Watson,    2    Keen  Div.     198;     Cattell     v.     Simons,     6 

713.    See,    also,    Cattell    v.    Simons,  Beav.    304;    Collett   v.    Preston,    IS 

6    Beav.    304;    Verity    v.    Wylde,   4  Beav.  458.     Explained,  however,  in 

Drew.  427;  Robarts  v.  Buee,  L.  R.  Robarts  v.  Buee,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  Div. 

8  Ch.  Div.  198.  198. 

^■i  Mercer  v.   Graves.   L.  R.  7  Q. 


225 


ATTORNEY'S   SPECIAL   OR    CHARGING   LIEN. 


§    217 


client  may  obtain  costs  in  some  matters  in  the  suit  or  action 
and  not  in  others,  and  the  solicitor  takes  his  chance  and  may 
ultimately  enforce  his  lien  for  any  balance  which  may  appear 
to  be  in  favor  of  his  client.^^ 

§  217.  Rule  in  the  United  States. — In  this  country  the 
rule  of  the  court  of  Common  Pleas  in  England  has  been 
followed  in  the  greater  number  of  states.  The  lien  of  an 
attorney  upon  a  judgment  is  upon  the  interest  of  his  client 
in  the  judgment,  and  is  subject  to  an  existing  right  of  set- 
off in  the  other  party  to  the  suit.'^^     In  other  words,  an  attor- 


ns Robarts  V.  Buee,  L.  R.  8  Cli. 
Div.   198,  per   Hall,   V.   C 

•^"  National  Bank  v.  Eyre,  3  Mc- 
Crary  (U.  S.)  175,  8  Fed.  732, ;  Shirts 
V.  Irons,  54  Ind.  13;  Renick  v.  Lud- 
ington,  16  W.  Va.  378.  Connecti- 
cut: Gager  v.  Watson,  11  Conn. 
168;  Rumrill  v.  Huntington,  5  Day 
(Conn.)    163;    Andrews    v.    Morse, 

12  Conn.  444,  31  Am.  Dec.  752; 
Benjamin  v.  Benjamin,  17  Conn. 
110.  Georgia:  Smith  v.  Evans,  110 
Ga.  536,  35  S.  E.  633;  Langston  v. 
Roby,  68  Ga.  406.  Kansas :  Turner 
V.  Crawford,  14  Kans.  499,  over- 
ruling Leavenson  v.  Lafontaine,  3 
Kans.  523.  New  York:  Mohawk 
Bank  v.  Burrows,  6  Johns.  Ch. 
(N.  Y.)  317;  Porter  v.  Lane,  8 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  357;  Nicoll  v. 
Nicoll,  16  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  446; 
People  V.   New  York  Com.  Pleas, 

13  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  649,  28  Am.  Dec. 
495;  Cragin  v.  Travis,  1  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  157;  Noxon  v.  Gregory,  5 
How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  339;  Brooks  v. 
Hanford,  15  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  342; 
Hayden  v.  McDermott,  9  Abb.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  14;  Martin  v.  Kanouse,  17 
How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  146,  9  Abb.  Pr. 
370;    Davidson   v.    Alfaro,    16    Hun 

15 


(N.  Y.)  353,  54  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
481;  Sanders  v.  Gilette,  8  Daly  (N. 
Y.)  183.  The  practice  in  New  York 
has  been  to  allow  the  set-off  since 
Porter  v.  Lane,  8  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
357,  was  decided  in  1811.  In  some 
earlier  cases,  as  in  Devoy  v.  Boyer, 
3  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  247,  and  Cole  v. 
Grant,  2  Caines  (N.  Y.)  105, 
Colem.  &  C.  Cas.  368,  the  lien  of 
the  attorney  for  his  costs  was  not 
allowed  to  be  affected  by  the  set- 
off. In  equity  the  doctrine  of  these 
cases  was  followed  at  a  later  day 
in  Dunkin  v.  VanDenbergh,  1 
Paige  (N.  Y.)  622,  and  Gridley  v. 
Garrison,  4  Paige  (N.  Y.)  647.  A 
set-off  as  against  the  attorney's 
lien  for  costs  was  refused  in 
Smith  V.  Lowden,  1  Sandf.  (N.  Y.) 
696;  Gihon  v.  Fryatt,  2  Sandf.  (N. 
Y.)  638,  3  Code  Rep.  204;  Purchase 
V.  Bellows,  16  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  105 
22  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  642.  Since  the 
passage  of  the  act  of  1879,  §  66,  no 
set-off  is  allowed  as  against  the  at- 
torney's lien.  Naylor  v.  Lane,  66 
How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  400,  18  J.  &  S. 
(N.  Y.)  97,  5  Civ.  Proc.  R.  (N.  Y.) 
149;  Ennis  v.  Curry,  22  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  584,  reversing  61  How.  Pr.  (N. 


§    2l8 


LIENS. 


226 


ney  can  have  a  lien  for  an  amount  no  greater  than  what  is 
actually  found  to  be  owing  by  the  opposite  party  to  his  client. 
It  is  subject  to  the  equitable  claims  of  the  parties  in  the 
cause,  as  well  as  to  the  rights  of  third  parties,  which  can  not 
be  varied  or  affected  by  it. 

§  218.  Judgment  as  set-off. — When  a  defendant  has  a  right 
by  statute  to  set  ofT  a  judgment  in  his  favor  against  a  judg- 
ment against  him,  the  court,  in  order  to  protect  the  attor- 
ney's costs,  will  not  interfere. ^^  An  attorney's  lien  upon  a 
payment  is  not  equivalent  to  an  equitable  assignment  to 
him  of  the  judgment  debt,^^  or  to  an  equitable  interest  in  the 


Y.)  1 ;  Hovey  v.  Rubber  Tip  Pen- 
cil Co.,  14  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N.  Y.) 
66.  See  §  185.  Iowa:  Hurst  v. 
Sheets,  21  Iowa  501 ;  Tiffany  v. 
Stewart,  60  Iowa  207,  14  N.  W. 
241;  Watson  v.  Smith.  63  Iowa  228, 
18  N.  W.  916.  Alabama:  Mosely 
V.  Norman,  74  Ala.  422;  Ex  parte 
Lehman,  59  Ala.  631.  The  statute 
gives  a  legal  right  to  set  off  one 
judgment  against  another.  Civil 
Code,  1907,  §  5861.  South  Dakota: 
Pirie  v.  Harkness,  3  S.  Dak.  178, 
52  N.  W.  581.  See  §  189b.  Texas: 
Wright  v.  Treadwell,  14  Tex.  255; 
Fitzhugh  v.  McKinney,  43  Fed. 
461.  Maryland:  Levy  v.  Steinbach, 

43  Md.  212;  Marshall  v.  Cooper,  43 
Md.  46.  Minnesota:  Morton  v. 
Urquhart,  79  Minn.  390,  82  N.  W. 
653.     Nebraska:   Field  v.  Maxwell, 

44  Nebr.  900,  63  N.  W.  62.  Ver- 
mont: McDonald  v.  Smith,  57  Vt. 
502;  Walker  v.  Sargeant,  14  Vt. 
247;  Hooper  v.  Welch,  43  Vt.  169,  5 
Am.  Rep.  267,  per  Wilson,  J.; 
Fairbanks  v.  Devereaux,  58  Vt. 
359,  3  Atl.  500.  Wisconsin:  Bos- 
worth  v.  Tallman,  66  Wis.  533,  29 
N.   W.   542;    Yorton   v.   Milwaukee 


R.  Co.,  62  Wis.  367,  21  N.  W.  516, 
23  N.  W.  401;  Gano  v.  Chicago  & 
N.  W.  R.  Co.,  60  Wis.  12,  17  N.  W. 
15. 

58  Mercer  v.  Graves,  L.  R.  7  Q 
B.  499;  Brunsdon  v.  Allard,  2  E. 
&  E.  19;  Ex  parte  Lehman,  59 
Ala.  631;  Mosely  v.  Norman,  74 
Ala.  422,  Fairbanks  v.  Devereaux, 
58  Vt.  359.  3  Atl.  500;  McDonald  v. 
Smith,  57  Vt.  502.  See  Walker  v. 
Sargeant,  14  Vt.  247.  Royce,  J., 
said:  "We  recognize  nothing  in 
this  particular  species  of  lien  which 
ought,  in  a  case  like  this,  to  be 
interposed  against  a  salutary  pro- 
vision of  statute  law.  We  think  it 
clear  that  the  lien  here  asserted 
should  be  held  subordinate  to  the 
defendant's  right  of  set-off."  In 
Fairbanks  v.  Devereaux,  58  Vt.  359, 
3  Atl.  500,  Ross,  J.,  referring  to 
that  decision,  said:  "The  principles 
then  announced  have  remained  the 
unquestioned  law  of  the  subject 
from  the  time  of  its  rendition  in 
1842  to  the  present  time." 

59  Brunsdon  v.  Allard,  2  E.  &  E. 
19,  per  Campbell,  C.  J.,  Erie  and 
Crompton,  JJ. 


227 


ATTORNEY  S   SPECIAL   OR    CHARGING   LIEN. 


220 


proceeds  of  the  judgment.  The  protection  the  courts  afford 
to  the  attorney  stops  very  far  short  of  putting  him  in  the 
position  of  cestui  que  trust  to  his  client,  so  as  to  compel  the 
client  to  act  as  his  trustee  in  collecting  the  judgment.^*^  The 
attorney  can  not  maintain  a  bill  in  equity  in  such  a  case 
against  a  judgment  debtor  to  restrain  him  from  exercising 
his  own  legal  rights  under  a  statute  allowing  a  set-off.^^ 

§  219.    When  set-off  good  against  the  attorney's  lien. — • 

But  when  the  set-ofT  is  one  which  would  have  been  a  good 
defense  to  the  action  where  the  judgment  was  recovered,  the 
judgment  debtor  has  a  right  of  set-off  against  the  attorney's 
lien.62 

It  is  clear  that  a  set-ofT  acquired  after  the  judgment  should 
not  be  allowed  to  prevail  against  the  attorney's  lien.^^ 

§  220.    Rule  in  some  of  the  states. — In  other  states,  how- 
ever, the  rule  of  the  King's  Bench  is  followed,®^  and  it  is  held 


60  Mercer  v.  Graves,  L.  R.  7  Q. 
B.  499,  per  Blackburn,  J. 

61  Mercer  v.  Graves,  L.  R.  7  Q. 
B.  499,  per  Lush,  J. 

62  Robertson  v.  Shutt,  9  Bush 
(Ky.)  659;  Calvert  v.  Coxe,  1  Gill 
(Md.)  95;  Carter  v.  Bennett,  6  Fla. 
214.  In  Nicoll  v.  Nicoll,  16 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  446,  Justice  Cowen 
said  that  no  authority  could  be 
produced  where  the  attorney's 
lien  Mi^as  ever  recognized  on  a  trial 
at  law  as  barring  a  set-off,  the 
right  to  which  would  otherwise  be 
perfect. 

63  Bradt  v.  Koon,  4  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
416;  Warfield  v.  Campbell,  38  Ala. 
527,  82  Am.  Dec.  724;  Rumrill  v. 
Huntington,  5  Day  (Conn.)  163; 
Ward  v.  Watson,  27  Nebr.  768,  44 
N.  W.  27. 

6-1  New  Hampshire:  Shapley  v. 
Bellows,    4   N.    H.   347;    Currier   v. 


Boston  &  Maine  R.  R.  37  N.  H. 
223.  Maine:  Stratton  v.  Hussey, 
62  Maine  286;  Hooper  v.  Brund- 
age,  22  Maine  460;  Howe  v.  Klein, 
89  Maine  376,  36  Atl.  620.  New 
York:  Since  the  act  of  1879,  §  66. 
See  §  185;  Turno  v.  Parks,  2  How. 
Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N.  Y.)  35;  Naylor 
V.  Lane,  5  Civ.  Proc.  R.  149,  66 
How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  400,  50  N.  Y. 
Super.  Ct.  91;  Davidson  v.  Alfaro, 
80  N.  Y.  660;  In  re  Bailey,  4  N. 
Y.  Civ.  Proc.  R.  140,  66  How. 
Prac.  (N.  Y.)  64;  Contra,  Sanders 
v.  Gillett,  8  Daly  (N.  Y.)  183; 
Garner  v.  Gladwin,  12  Weekly  Dig. 
9,  criticised  in  Turno  v.  Parks,  2 
How.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N.  Y.)  35.  An 
attorney  has  a  lien  on  motion 
costs  in  favor  of  his  client  which 
attaches  the  instant  the  costs  are 
due.  Costs  arising  upon  an  appeal 
from    an    order    are    motion    costs. 


§    220  LIENS.  228 

that  an  attorney's  lien  upon  a  judgment  for  his  costs  is  not 
subject  to  a  right  of  set-off  in  the  adverse  party;  and  when 
by  statute  he  is  given  a  right  of  lien  for  his  fees,  the  same 
rule  applies.  His  lien  for  costs  is  paramount  to  the  right  of 
the  debtor  to  set  off  a  judgment  he  holds  against  the  judg- 
ment creditor.  So  strong  is  the  equity  of  the  attorney  to 
claim  and  maintain  his  lien  that  even  a  statute  which  requires 
the  officer  to  set  off  executions  held  by  the  parties  against 
each  other  is  construed  as  containing  an  implied  condition 
that  this  should  not  be  done  in  derogation  of  the  attorney's 
right  to  claim  the  judgment  as  his  own,  by  way  of  a  lien  upon 
it,  to  the  extent  of  his  costs. 

The  right  to  set  oft'  one  judgment  against  another,  in  the 
absence  of  a  statutory  provision,  is  one  of  equitable  discre- 
tion, and  will  not  be  allowed  where  the  just  rights  of  another 
party,  such  as  an  assignee,  would  be  disturbed;  and  the  court 
will  not  allow  such  a  set-off  to  the  deteriment  of  the  claim  of 
an  attorney  for  his  fees  in  obtaining  a  judgment  where  it 
appears  to  be  right  that  his  claim  should  be  respected.^^ 

In  Maine^^  and  Michigan'''^  it  is  provided  by  statute  that 
executions  shall  not  be  set  off  against  each  other  as  to  so 
much  of  the  executions  as  is  due  to  the  attorney  in  the  suit 
for  his  fees  and  disbursements  therein. 

Such  costs  are  the  property  of  the  Johnson    v.    Ballard,   44    Ind.     270. 

attorney,    and    are    not    subject    to  Other    States:    Dunklee    v.    Locke, 

any  offset   in   favor   of   the   plain-  13    Mass.    525;    Boyer    v.    Clark,    3 

tiff.      Place   V.    Hayward,    3    How.  Nebr.    161 ;    Robertson   v.    Shutt,   9 

Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N.  Y.)  59,  8  N.  Y.  Civ.  Bush    (Ky.)    659;    Carter  v.   Davis, 

Proc.  R.  352.     And  see  Tunstall  v.  8   Fla.   183. 

Winton,  31   Hun   (N.  Y.)   219,   af-  65  Diehl  v.  Friester,  37  Ohio  St. 

firmed    9    N.    Y.    660;    Marshall    v.  473. 

Meech,  51  N.  Y.  140,  10  Am.  Rep.  ec  Rev.  Stat.  1903,  ch.  86,  §  28. 

572;   In   re   Knapp,  85   N.   Y.   284;  C7  Comp.    Laws    1897,    §    10348; 

Turno  v.  Parks,  2  How.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  and  see  Wells  v.  Elsam,  40  Mich. 

(N.    Y.)    35.      Indiana:      Puett    v.  218;    Kinney  v.   Robison,  52   Mich. 

Beard,   86   Ind.    172,   44   Am.   Rep.  389,  18  N.  W.  120. 
280;   Adams   v.    Lee,   82   Ind.    587; 


229  attorney's   special  or   charging  lien.  §    222 

§  221.  Delay  in  objecting  to  set-off. — When  a  set-off  has 
been  allowed  by  order  of  court,  the  attorney  can  not  after  de- 
lay interfere  at  a  subsequent  term  of  court.  Thus,  where 
judgments  in  two  actions  betw^een  the  same  parties  were  by 
order  of  court  set  off  against  each  other,  the  court  refused,  at 
a  subsequent  term  and  after  the  lapse  of  two  years,  to  rescind 
the  order  upon  the  motion  of  the  attorney  of  one  of  the 
parties,  upon  the  ground  that  his  lien  was  affected  by  it,  for 
it  was  then  too  late;  though  the  court  could  not  have  made 
the  order  had  the  objection  been  interposed  at  the  time.*'^ 

§  222.  Assignment  of  judgment. — But  an  assignment  of  a 
judgment  by  the  judgment  creditor  to  his  attorney,  in  pay- 
ment or  security  for  his  fees  in  the  suit,  is  effectual  to  prevent 
a  set-off  against  such  judgment  of  another  judgment  pre- 
viously recovered  by  the  judgment  debtor  against  the  judg- 
ment creditor.^^  If  an  attorney  undertakes  the  defense  of  a 
suit  for  an  insolvent  client  in  consideration  that  the  costs 
that  might  be  recovered  should  belong  to  him,  and  he  re- 
covers a  judgment  for  costs  and  assigns  this  to  the  attorney, 
a  judgment  against  the  defendant  can  not  be  set  off  against 
such  judgment  for  costs.  The  attorney's  claim  in  such  case 
is  not  one  of  lien,  but  of  ownership.'''^  If  the  assignment  be 
made  before  the  right  of  set-off  attaches,  the  assignment  of 
course  prevails. ''^^     If  the  assignment  be  made  after  a  right  of 

68  Holt  V.  Quimby,  6  N.  H.  79.  Dec.  527;  Fairbanks  v.  Devereaux, 

69  Benjamin      v.      Benjamin,      17      58  Vt.  359,  3  Atl.  500. 

Conn.  110;  Rumrill  v.  Huntington,  "o  Ely  v.  Cook,  9  Abb.  Pr.  (N. 
5  Day  (Conn.)  163;  Rice  v.  Garn-  Y.)  336,  2  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  406,  modi- 
hart,  35  Wis.  282.  Otherwise  in  fied  28  N.  Y.  365;  Perry  v.  Chester, 
Iowa  and  Vermont,  where  it  is  53  N.  Y.  240;  Naylor  v.  Lane,  5 
held  that  the  judgment  in  such  Civ.  Proc.  R.  149,  66  How.  Pr.  (N. 
case  passes  subject  to  the  equities  Y.)  400,  1'8  J.  &  S.  (N.  Y.)  97;  New- 
against  it  in  the  hands  of  the  as-  berg  v.  Schwab,  5  Civ.  Proc.  R.  19, 
signor.       Tiffany     v.     Stewart,     60  17  J.  &  S.  232. 

Iowa  207,  14  N.  W.  241;   Ballinger  7i  Firnienich    v.    Bovee,    1     Hun 

V.    Tarbell.    16    Iowa   491,   85    Am.  (N.   Y.)   532,  4  Thomp.   &   C.    (N. 

Y.)  98. 


§    223  LIENS.  230 

set-off  given  by  statute  has  accrued,  then  the  statutory  right 
of  set-off  is  paramount  to  the  attorney's  right  under  the  as- 
signmentJ^ 

The  assignee,  however,  should  give  notice  to  the  judg- 
ment debtor  of  the  assignment,  for  otherwise  the  latter  may 
make  a  settlement  with  the  judgment  creditor  which  will 
discharge  the  judgment  and  destroy  the  lien  under  the  as- 
signmentJ^ 

An  attorney's  lien  is  merged  in  an  assignment  to  him  as 
security  for  his  costs,  and  his  only  title  or  claim  to  the  judg- 
ment after  that  arises  from  his  title  as  owner.'^^ 

§  223.  Equitable  assignment  of  the  judgment. — An  agree- 
ment between  an  attorney  and  his  client  that  the  attorney 
shall  have  a  lien  for  his  services  to  a  certain  amount  upon  a 
judgment  to  be  recovered,  constitutes  a  valid  equitable  as- 
signment of  the  judgment  pro  tanto  which  attaches  to  the 
judgment  as  soon  as  entered.'^  Such  an  agreement  is  within 
the  principle  that  an  agreement  between  a  debtor  and  credi- 
tor that  the  creditor  shall  have  a  claim  upon  a  specific  fund 
for  payment  of  his  debt  is  a  binding  equitable  assignment  of 
the  fund  pro  tanto.  This  is  a  settled  rule  in  equity.  Some- 
times it  has  been  objected  that  if  such  an  assignment  em- 
braces only  a  part  of  the  fund,  it  is  not  obligatory  on  the 

"2  Fairbanks     v.     Devereaux,     58  365,    2    Abb.     Dec.     14;     Williams 

Vt.  359,  3  Atl.  500.  v.      Ingersoll,      89     (N.      Y.      508; 

'3  Boston    &   Colorado    Smelting  Weeks   v.    Wayne    Circuit   Judges, 

Co.  V.  Pless,  8  Colo.  87,  5  Pac.  650;  73  Mich.  256,  41   N.   W.  269;  Pot- 

Stoddard   v.    Benton,  6   Colo.   508;  ter  v.    Hunt,   68   Mich.   242,   36   N. 

Bishop  V.  Garcia,  14  Abb.  Pr.   (N.  W.  58;   Wells  v.   Elsam,  40  Mich. 

S.)   (N.  Y.)  69.  218.      An    assignment    by    a    judg- 

'4  Bishop  V.  Garcia,  14  Abb.  Pr.  ment    creditor    and    an    entry    of 

(N.  S.)   (N.  Y.)  69;  Dodd  v.  Brott,  satisfaction    by    the    assignee    will 

1  Gil.  (Minn.)  205,  66  Am.  Dec.  541.  not    defeat    an    attorney's    lien    on 

7^5  Terney  v.  Wilson,  45  N.  J.  L.  the  judgment.     Peterson  v.  Struly, 

282;     Middlesex     v.     State     Bank,  25   Ind.  App.   19,  56  N.   E.  733,  57 

38     N.     J.     Eq.     36,     19     Cent.     L.  N.  E.  599. 
J.    393;     Ely    v.     Cook,    28    N.    Y. 


231  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §  225 

debtor  without  his  assent,  because  his  single  obligation  can 
not  be  split  up  into  several  without  his  consent.  This  objec- 
tion prevails  only  at  law,  but  does  not  affect  the  remedy  in 
equity.'^ '^ 

The  equity  of  the  attorney  under  such  an  agreement  is 
superior  to  the  claim  of  the  judgment  debtor  to  set  off 
against  the  judgment  a  judgment  against  the  plaintiff,  which 
the  debtor  had  purchased  after  the  entry  of  the  judgment 
against  himself,  and  before  he  had  notice  of  the  assignment. 
Failure  to  give  notice  of  the  assignment  does  not  subject  the 
assignee  to  merely  equitable  claims  of  the  debtor,  which  do 
not  attach  to  the  debt  itself  and  which  accrue  to  him  after 
the  assignment.  A  claim  of  set-off  against  a  judgment  aris- 
ing from  a  subsequent  purchase  of  a  judgment  against  the 
judgment  creditor  is  not  a  set-off  which  attaches  to  the  debt. 
A  prior  assignment,  whether  legal  or  equitable,  of  the  judg- 
ment, prevents  the  right  of  set-off  from  attaching.  The  as- 
signee's equity,  being  prior  in  time,  is  superior.'^" 

§  224.  Lien  by  agreement. — Where  a  client  agrees  that 
his  attorney  shall  have  a  paramount  lien  upon  the  claim  in 
suit  for  his  fees,  charges  and  disbursements,  and  to  secure 
this  agreement  executes  a  power  of  attorney  to  a  third  per- 
son giving  him  the  control  of  the  suit,  such  power  of  attor- 
ney with  the  agreement  operates  to  vest  in  the  attorney  an 
interest  in  the  claim,  of  which  he  can  not  be  divested  by  the 
client  of  his  own  motion  without  satisfying  his  part  of  the 
agreement.  It  is  the  duty  and  practice  of  courts  to  protect 
attorneys  in  rights  so  acquired  against  the  hostile  acts  of 
those  from  whom  they  are  acquired. '^^ 

§  225.  Lien  created  by  parol. — A  lien  upon  a  chose  in  ac- 
tion may  be  created  by  parol.    Thus,  an  oral  agreement  by  a 

"«  See  §§  43-62.  416;   Wright  v.   Wright,   70   N.   Y. 

77  Terney  v.  Wilson,  45  N.  J.  L.      96,  affirming  9  J.  &  S.  (N.  Y.)  432. 

282;  Bradt  v.  Koon,  4  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  78  Stewart  v.  Hilton,  7  Fed.  562, 

19  Blatchf.   (U.  S.)   290. 


§    226  LIENS.  232 

client  with  his  attorney  that  the  latter  should  have  a  lien  for 
all  sums  that  the  client  might  become  entitled  to  from  any  of 
the  suits  or  proceedings  conducted  by  the  attorney,  which 
lien  should  be  superior  to  any  right  the  client  might  have, 
was  held  to  operate  as  an  equitable  lien  upon  an  award  to  the 
client  as  damages  for  a  malicious  prosecution."^ 

§  226.  Attorney's  lien  assignable. — The  lien  of  an  attor- 
ney for  his  fees  is,  like  any  chose  in  action,  assignable.  It  is 
incident  to  the  judgment  to  which  it  is  attached,  and  is  neces- 
sarily as  much  assignable  as  is  the  judgment  to  which  it  is 
incident.^^ 

An  attorney's  lien  is  superior  to  the  rights  of  a  third  per- 
son who  is  assignee  of  the  judgment,*^  for  the  assignee  has 
no  greater  equities  than  the  assignor  had;  and  though  the 
assignee  had  no  notice  of  the  lien,  this  may  be  enforced  as 
against  him. 

§  227.    Attorney's  lien  superior  to  lien  of  attachment. — An 

attorney's  lien  on  a  judgment  is  superior  to  the  lien  of  a 
subsequent  attaching  or  execution  creditor.*-  It  is  imma- 
terial whether  the  client  be  the  plaintiff  or  defendant  in  the 
suit.  In  equity,  especially,  the  position  of  the  party  is  of  no 
consequence,  because  a  nominal  defendant  may  be  adjudged 
entitled  to  the  whole  or  a  part  of  the  funds  in  controversy.   In 

"9  Williams    v.    Ingersoll,    89    N.  82  Ex  parte  Moule,  5  Madd.  462; 

Y.   508;    Middlesex   Freeholders    v.  Damroii     v.     Robertson,     12     Lea 

State    Bank,    38    N.    J.    Eq.    36,    19  (Tenn.)   372;    Miller  v.    Newell,   20 

Cent.  L.  J.  393.  S.     Car.    123,    47    Am.    Rep.    833; 

80  Day  V.  Bowman,  109  Ind.  383,  Hutchinson  v.  Howard,  IS  Vt.  544; 
10  N.  E.  126;  Sibley  v.  Pine  Coun-  Weed  Sewing  Mach.  Co.  v.  Bou- 
ty,  31  Minn.  201,  17  N.  W.  337.  telle,  56  Vt.  570,  48  Am.  Rep.  821; 

81  Cunningham  v.  McGrady,  2  Henry  v.  Traynor,  42  Minn.  234, 
Baxt.  (Tenn.)  141;  Longworth  v.  44  N.  W.  11;  Justice  v.  Justice, 
Handy,  2  Dis.  (Ohio)  75,  13  Ohio  115  Ind.  201,  16  N.  E.  615;  Hargett 
Dec.  47;  Sexton  v.  Pike,  13  Ark.  v.  McCadden,  107  Ga.  773,  33  S.  E. 
193;   Tyler  v.   Slemp,   124  Ky.  209,  666. 

28  Ky.  L.  959,  90  S.  W.  1041. 


233  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §  228 

equity,  also,  an  attorney  may  have  a  lien  before  judgment  by 
virtue  of  a  special  agreement  that  he  shall  be  compensated 
out  of  the  fund  recovered;  and  such  lien  prevails  against  an 
attaching  creditor  of  the  client. ^^  It  matters  not  that  such 
agreement  is  by  parol  and  not  in  writing;  and  it  is  not  need- 
ful, in  order  to  make  such  lien  valid,  that  notice  of  it  should 
be  given  to  the  debtors. ^^ 

§  228.  Not  defeated  by  bankruptcy. — An  attorney's  lien 
is  not  defeated  by  the  insolvency  or  bankruptcy  of  the  client, 
or  by  his  general  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors, 
pending  the  action,  if  judgment  is  finally  entered  in  his 
favor.^^  The  assignee  in  insolvency  or  bankruptcy  stands  in 
the  debtor's  place,  and  takes  the  estate  burdened  by  the 
equitable  incumbrance  of  the  lien.^^  Thus,  where  a  rail- 
road company,  pending  an  action  against  it,  became  insolvent 
and  a  receiver  was  appointed,  and  a  judgment  for  costs  was 
afterwards  entered  in  its  favor,  it  was  held  that  the  receiver 
had  no  title  to  such  costs;  and  the  other  party  to  the  action, 
having  paid  the  judgment  to  the  receiver  with  notice  of  the 
lien,  was  not  protected  from  an  execution  issued  to  the  at- 
torney on  such  judgment.*" 

But  as  against  the  judgment  debtor,  if  he  obtains  a  dis- 

8-5  Williams  v.  Jngersoll,  23  Hun  ment  of  the  debt,  and  the  creditor 

(N.  Y.)  284,  affd.  89  N.  Y.  508.  admitted    for    the    residue,    if    any; 

84  Williams  v.  Ingersoll,  23  Hun  or  the  creditor  may  retain  the 
(N.  Y.)  284,  aflFd.  89  N.  Y.  508.  property,  if  the  assignee   does  not 

85  Cooke  V.  Thresher,  51  Conn.  require  it  to  be  sold  as  provided, 
105.  and    enforce    his    lien.      Rogers    v. 

86  There  are  two  ways  of  pro-  Heath,  62  Vt.  101,  18  Atl.  1043,  per 
ceeding   when    one    has   a    lien    on  Rowell,  J. 

property  for  securing  the  payment  8"  In  re  Bailey,  66  How.  Pr.  (N. 

of    a    debt    against    an    insolvent  Y.)   64,  4  N.  Y.  Civ.  Proc.   R.   140, 

debtor.      If    the    assignee    or    the  affd.    31    Hun    (N.    Y.)    608,    5    Civ. 

creditor    requires    it,    the    property  Proc.  253;  Russell  v.  Somerville,  10 

is    sold    under    an    order    of    the  Abb.   N.   C.    (N.  Y.)   395;   Clark  v. 

court   of   insolvency,    the    net   pro-  Binninger,    1    Abb.    N.    C.    (N.    Y.) 

ceeds     applied     toward     the     pay-  421. 


§    228  LIENS.  234 

charge  in  bankruptcy  or  insolvency  after  the  rendition  of  the 
judgment,  the  attorney's  lien  upon  the  judgment  is  dis- 
charged with  the  judgment,  like  any  other  debt  of  the  bank- 
rupt.*^ 

If  a  receiver  of  the  client's  property  is  appointed,  and  a 
judgment  upon  which  an  attorney  has  a  lien  passes  into  his 
hands,  the  attorney  can  obtain  full  protection  in  all  proceed- 
ings taken  by  the  receiver  upon  such  judgment,  and  may,  if 
need  be,  apply  to  the  court  for  relief  out  of  the  assets  or 
funds  collected  by  the  receiver. ^^ 

The  receiver  acquires  no  other  or  better  title  than  the  as- 
signor had,  but  takes  the  property  subject  to  the  liens  af- 
fecting it. 

If  an  attorney  takes  from  his  client  collateral  security  for 
professional  services,  and  upon  demand  of  a  receiver  of  his 
client's  property  delivers  the  security  to  the  receiver  with  a 
written  notice  of  his  lien  thereon  and  takes  a  receipt  therefor, 
he  does  not  thereby  waive  his  lien.^^ 

The  receiver  of  a  corporation  appointed  pending  an  action 
against  it,  who  collects  costs  arising  from  a  successful  de- 
fense, may  be  required  to  pay  them  over  to  the  attorney  who 
conducted  the  defense.^^ 

In  equity  an  attorney  has  a  lien  for  his  fees  and  disburse- 
ments upon  a  fund  in  court  recovered  by  his  services.^^  This 
lien  can  not  be  defeated  by  the  insolvency  of  the  client,  or  by 
his  assignment  of  the  fund.  His  assignee  in  bankruptcy  or 
his  assignee  by  purchase  takes  the  fund  subject  to  the  at- 
torney's lien  with  which  it  was  affected  as  against  the  client, 

88  Blumenthal    v.    Anderson,    91  firming  4  N.  Y.  Civ.  Proc.  R.  140, 

N.  Y.  171.  66  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  64. 

80  Moore  v.  Taylor,  40  Hun   (N.  92  Turwin     v.     Gibson,     3     Atk. 

Y.)  56.  720;      Ex     parte     Price,      2     Ves. 

90  Corey    v.    Harte.     21     Weekly  407;    Skinner    v.    Sweet,    3    Madd. 
Dig.  247.  244;  Lann  v.  Church,  4  Madd.  391; 

91  In  re  Bailey,  31   Hun   (N.  Y.)  Ex    parte     Moule,    5     Madd.    462; 
608.  5  X.  Y.  Civ.  Proc.  R.  253,  af-  Jones   v.   Frost,   L.   R.   7   Ch.   App. 

m.     See  ante,  §  201a. 


235 


ATTORNEY  S  SPECIAL  OR   CHARGING  LIEN. 


§    229 


But  a  court  of  equity,  before  awarding  any  part  of  the  fund 
in  satisfaction  of  the  attorney's  lien,  will  inquire  if  the  fee  is 
reasonable. ^^ 

§  229.  Attorney's  lien  on  lands. — An  attorney  has  no  lien 
on  his  client's  lands  for  services  rendered  in  defending  them 
against  an  effort  to  charge  them  with  the  payment  of  the 
debt  of  another;^*  nor  for  services  in  prosecuting  a  suit  in 
equity  to  establish  the  title  of  his  client  to  the  lands.®^     To 


93  McCain  v.  Portis,  42  Ark.  402. 

••>4Shaw  V.  Neale,  6  H.  L.  Cas. 
581;  Lee  v.  Winston,  68  Ala.  402; 
McWilliams  v.  Jenkins,  12  Ala.  480. 

95  McCullough  V.  Flournoy,  69 
Ala.  189;  Hinson  v.  Gamble,  65 
Ala.  605;  Hanger  v.  Fowler,  20 
Ark.  667;  Hershy  v.  Du  Val,  47 
Ark.  86,  14  S.  W.  469;  Smalley  v. 
Clark,  22  Vt.  598;  Cozzens  v.  Whit- 
ney, 3  R.  I.  79;  Humphrey  v. 
Browning,  46  111.  476,  95  Am.  Dec. 
446;  Stewart  v.  Flowers,  44  Miss. 
513,  7  Am.  Rep.  707;  Martin  v. 
Harrington,  57  Miss.  208;  Fowler 
V.  Lewis'  Admr.,  36  W.  Va.  112. 
14  S.  E.  447;  McCoy  v.  McCoy. 
Z(i  W.  Va.  772,  15  S.  E.  973;  Holmes 
V.  Waymire.  11  Kans.  104,  84  Pac. 
558.  See  also.  Kelley  v.  Horsely. 
147  Ala.  508.  41  So.  902.  Under  a 
statute  of  Louisiana  giving  attor- 
neys a  lien  for  fees  "on  all  judg- 
ments obtained  by  them,"  it  was 
held  in  Luneau  v.  Edwards,  39 
La.  Ann.  876.  6  So.  24,  that  it  did 
not  create  a  lien  on  land  re- 
covered, and  in  Weil  v.  Levi, 
40  La.  Ann.  135,  3  So.  559, 
that  it  did  not  on  land  success- 
fully defended.  In  some  early 
cases  in  England  a  lien  seems  to 
have  been  given  upon  the  land  in 
favor  of  the    silicitor;   as   where   a 


solicitor  had  been  employed  by 
the  committee  of  a  lunatic,  he  was 
regarded  as  subrogated  to  the 
lien  of  the  committee  upon  the 
lunatic's  estate,  both  real  and  per- 
sonal. Barnesley  v.  Powell,  1 
Amb.  102;  Ex  parte  Price,  2  Ves. 
407,  referred  to  by  Chancellor 
Kent  in  In  re  Southwick,  1  Johns. 
Ch.  (N.  Y.)  22.  In  the  cases  first 
cited,  there  is  a  dictum  by  Lord 
Hardwicke  to  the  effect  that  a 
solicitor  has  a  lien  on  the  estate 
recovered  in  the  hands  of  his 
client.  But  the  House  of  Lords, 
in  Shaw  v.  Neale,  6  H.  L.  Cas.  581, 
repudiated  the  doctrine  that  an 
attorney  or  solicitor  has  an  im- 
plied lien  on  the  estate  recovered. 
Interrupting  the  argument.  Lord 
Wensleydale  said  "I  never  heard 
such  a  proposition  at  law."  Lord 
St.  Leonards :  "Nor  I  in  equity." 
In  consequence  of  the  decision  in 
Shaw  V.  Neale,  6  H.  L.  Cas.  581,  it 
was  enacted  by  23  &  24  Vic.  (1860) 
ch.  127,  §  28,  that  in  every  case  in 
which  an  attorney  or  solicitor 
shall  be  employed  to  prosecute  or 
defend  any  suit,  the  court  or  judge 
before  whom  the  suit  has  been 
heard  may  declare  such  attorney 
or  solicitor  entitled  to  a  charge 
upon    the    property    recovered    or 


§  230 


LIENS. 


236 


extend  the  attorney's  lien  to  lands  recovered  in  a  suit  would 
be,  in  effect,  to  create  an  equitable  mortgage  in  his  favor,  and 
would  be  subject  not  only  to  the  objections  urged  against 
such  a  lien  in  England,  but  to  the  further  objection  in  this 
country,  that  it  would  be  contrary  to  the  policy  of  our  regis- 
try system.^^ 

An  attorney's  lien  for  his  fee  upon  the  judgment  recovered 
does  not  attach  to  land  which  is  sold  in  satisfaction  of  the 
judgment  and  purchased  by  the  client.^' 

§  230.  Rule  in  some  states. — In  some  states,  however,  it 
is  held  that  an  attorney  is  entitled  to  an  equitable  lien  on  the 
property  or  thing  in  litigation,  whether  real  or  personal,  for 
his  just  and  reasonable  fees,  and  the  client  can  not,  while  the 
suit  is  pending,  so  dispose  of  the  subject-matter  in  dispute  as 
to  deprive  him  of  his  lien.®^ 


preserved  through  his  instrumen- 
tality for  the  costs,  charges,  and 
expenses  of  or  in  reference  to  such 
suit.  This  statute  has  been  the 
subject  of  construction  or  appli- 
cation in  several  cases.  See  16 
Ir.  L.  T.  331.  Of  course  the  lien 
under  this  statute  is  confined  to 
the  client's  interest  in  the  land. 
Thus,  if  a  tenant  in  tail  employs 
a  solicitor  to  defend  a  suit,  the  lat- 
ter gets  a  charge  on  the  estate  of 
his  client,  but  not  on  that  in  the 
remainder.  If  the  client  bars  the 
estate  tail,  and  gets  the  fee,  the 
solicitor  gets  a  charge  on  the  fee; 
but  otherwise  only  the  interest  of 
the  client.  Berrie  v.  Howitt,  L. 
R.  9  Eq.  1. 

96  Hanger  v.  Fowler,  20  Ark. 
667;  Humphrey  v.  Browning,  46 
HI.  476.  95  Am.   Dec.  446. 

9"  Cowen  V.  Boone,  48  Iowa 
350;  Keehn  v.  Keehn,  115  Iowa 
467,  88  N.  W.  957.     And  see  Wish- 


ard  V.  Biddle,  64  Iowa  526,  21  N. 
W.  15.  Apparently  the  same 
rule  prevails  in  Mississippi:  Stew- 
art v.  Flowers,  44  Miss.  513,  7  Am. 
Rep.  707.  Otherwise  in  Arkansas: 
Porter  v.  Hanson,  36  Ark.  591. 

98  Tennessee:  First  recognized  in 
Hunt  v.  McClanahan,  1  Heisk. 
(Tenn.)  503;  Perkins  v.  Perkins,  9 
Heisk.  (Tenn.)  95;  Brown  v. 
Bigley,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  618.  But  when 
the  land  in  controversy  is  con- 
veyed to  the  complainant  partly  in 
exchange  for  land  conveyed  to  the 
defendant,  the  attorney  of  the  lat- 
ter has  no  lien  for  his  fees  on  the 
land  so  conveyed  to  his  client. 
Sharp  V.  Fields,  5  Lea  (Tenn.)  326, 
Kentucky :  Skaggs  v.  Hill,  212  Ky. 
L.  382,  14  S.  W.  363.  In  Colorado  : 
Fillmore  v.  Wells,  10  Colo.  228,  15 
Pac.  343.  3  Am.  St.  567,  the  lien 
was  declared  to  extend  to  realty 
recovered,  but  the  decision  was 
based  expressly  on  a  statute;  and 


^2>7 


ATTORNEYS   SPECIAL   OR    CHARGING   LIEN. 


§    230 


In  Arkansas  an  attorney's  lien  has  been  extended  by  stat- 
ute so  as  to  charge  lands  recovered  by  the  attorney.  The 
lien  is  declared  to  be  an  interest  in  the  property,  whether 
real  or  personal,  recovered  by  judgment,  to  the  amount  of 
such  judgment. ^^ 

In  Georgia  the  code  gives  a  lien  on  all  property,  both  real 
and  personal,  recovered  by  judgment,  superior  to  all  liens 
except  those  for  taxes. ^  One  who  purchases  the  land  after 
the  attorney  has  filed  a  bill  to  enforce  his  lien  purchases  with 
notice  of  the  lien  and  takes  the  property  subject  to  such  lien.- 

In  Kentucky  a  statute  provides  that  an  attorney  prosecut- 
ing to  recover  an  action  for  property,  real  or  personal,  shall 
have  a  lien  on  it  for  his  fee.^ 


the  opinion  in  the  case  admits  that 
it  could  not  be  sustained  by  the 
common  law,  saying:  "There  are 
a  few  decisions  which  seem  to  sus- 
tain  the  attorney's  right  to  look, 
through  his  lien,  to  the  land  for 
his  taxable  fees;  but  the  weight  of 
authority  undoubtedly  sanctions 
the  proposition  that  no  such  privi- 
lege is  awarded  by  the  common 
law." 

99  Kirby's  Digest  1904,  §  4458; 
Porter  v.  Hanson,  36  Ark. 
591;  Compton  v.  State,  38  Ark.  601. 
Such  a  lien  had  been  previously 
denied  in  Hanger  v.  Fowler,  20 
Ark.  667.  In  the  late  case  of 
Hershy  v.  Du  Val,  47  Ark.  86,  14 
S.  W.  469,  it  was  held  that  "a 
solicitor  has  no  Hen  upon  his 
client's  land  for  his  fee  for  services 
rendered  in  removing  a  cloud  from 
his  title  to  it;"  that  the  lien  pro- 
vided by  said  act  "is  limited  to 
cases  where  there  has  been  an 
actual  recovery,  and  cannot  be  ex- 
tended to  professional  services 
which    merely   protect   an    existing 


title  or  right  of  property."  The 
court  declared  that,  without  a 
statute  to  authorize  it,  attorneys 
cannot  sustain  a  claim  against 
real  estate  for  services  in  either 
prosecuting  or  defending  a  suit  in- 
volving it.     See  ante,  §  170. 

iCode  1911,  §  3364;  Wil- 
son v.  Wright,  72  Ga.  848.  Pro- 
curing a  restraining  against  a  sale 
of  land  by  the  sheriff  does  not  give 
him  a  right  to  lien.  Hodnett  v. 
Bormer,  107  Ga.  452,  33  S.  E.  416. 
See  ante,  §  173. 

2  Wilson  V.  Wright,  12  Ga.  848. 
As  to  right  to  join  different  claims 
against  different  pieces  of  land  in 
enforcing  lien  on  land  see  Suwan- 
nee, etc.,  Co.  V.  Baxter,  109  Ga. 
597,  35  S.  E.  142. 

3  Carroll's  Stats.  1909,  §  107; 
Skaggs  V.  Hill,  12  Ky.  L.  382,  14  S. 
W.  363.  But  under  this  statute, 
"where  nothing  is  recovered  for 
his  client  there  is  nothing  to  which 
an  attorney's  lien  can  attach." 
Wilson  v.  House,  10  Bush  (Ky.) 
406.     Where  an  attorney  recovers 


§    230 


LIENS. 


238 


There  can  be  no  lien,  however,  unless  the  suit  be  for 
specific  land,  or  it  impounds  the  property  in  litigation  by 
some  process  which  places  it  within  the  custody  of  the  court. ^ 

His  lien  upon  land  which  is  the  subject  of  a  decree  is  also 
entitled  to  priority  of  satisfaction  over  the  lien  of  a  judgment 
creditor  of  the  client  acquired  subsequently  to  the  decree.^ 
The  creditor's  right  is  against  the  property  of  the  debtor,  and 
not  against  the  interest  of  a  third  person  in  such  property, 
though  this  interest  be  a  mere  lien  or  equity. 

Independent  of  the  registration  laws,  the  creditor's  equity 
is  equal  and  not  superior  to  the  equity  of  third  persons,  and 
therefore  whichever  is  prior  in  time  has  the  better  right." 

But  the  defendant's  solicitor  is  not  entitled  to  a  lien  on  his 
client's  land  for  services  rendered  in  defending  a  suit  in 
which  it  was  sought  to  establish  a  resulting  trust  in  such 
lands,  although  the  defense  was  successful.  The  lien  exists 
only  in  case  of  the  actual  recovery  of  land  by  a  suit  instituted 
for  that  purpose.  It  can  not  be  extended  to  services  which 
merely  protect  an  existing  title  or  right  to  property.''' 


land  in  a  suit  for  his  client,  he  has 
a  lien  on  it.  Mclntosk  v.  Bach, 
110  Ky.  701,  62  S.  W.  515. 

■*  Sharpe  v.  Allen,  11  Lea  (Tenn.) 
518;  Brown  v.  Bigley,  3  Tenn.  Ch. 
618. 

^  Pleasants  v.  Kortrecht,  5 
Heisk.  (Tenn.)  694,  though  the 
principle  perhaps  not  properly  ap- 
plied to  the  facts.  "The  inclina- 
tion of  the  courts  of  this  country, 
and  of  none  more  so  than  those  of 
this  state,  has  been  to  enlarge  the 
doctrine  of  equitable  liens  and 
charges  with  a  view  to  the  attain- 
ment of  the  ends  of  justice,  with- 
out much  respect  for  the  technical 
restrictions  of  the  common  law. 
It  was  a  logical  result  of  this  ten- 
dency that  our  Supreme  Court 
should    follow    the    lead    of    Lord 


Hardwicke,  made  before  the  Revo- 
lution, rather  than  the  modern 
doctrine  of  the  House  of  Lords. 
And  it  was  both  natural  and  wise 
that  the  lien  of  the  lawyer  on  the 
fruits  of  his  professional  labor 
should  be  treated  as  equitable, 
rather  than  legal.  The  proper  ad- 
ministration of  justice  is  essential 
to  the  well-being  of  the  republic, 
and  cannot  be  secured  without  an 
enlightened  and  prosperous  bar." 
Brown  v.  Bigley,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  618. 

c  Brown  v.  Bigley,  3  Tenn.  Ch. 
618. 

"  Garner  v.  Garner,  1  Lea 
(Tenn.)  29;  Stanford  v.  Andrews, 
12  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  664;  Sharp  v. 
Fields,  5  Lea  (Tenn.)  326;  Guild  v. 
Borner,  7  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  266;  Win- 
chester     V.       Heiskell,       16       Lea 


239 


ATTORNEY  S   SPECIAL   OR    CHARGING   LIEN. 


§    230 


An  attorney  has  no  lien  upon  the  assets  of  an  estate  real- 
ized from  a  sale  of  its  lands  for  defending  a  suit  brought  to 
establish  a  demand  against  it. 

Nor  has  he  a  lien  upon  a  fund  arising  from  sale  of  land  of  a 
person  or  estate,  already  owned  by  such  person  or  estate,  for 


(Tenn.)  556,  affg.  119  U.  S.  450, 
30  L.  ed.  462,  7  Sup.  Ct.  281;  but 
the  merits  of  the  case  were  not 
considered  by  the  Supreme  Court; 
Fowler  v.  Lewis'  Admr.,  36  W. 
Va.  112,  14  S.  E.  447.  The  lan- 
guage used  in  the  first  decision 
in  which  a  lien  on  land  was  recog- 
nized (Hunt  V.  McClanahan,  1 
Heisk.  (Tenn.)  503,  seemed  to  imply- 
that  the  lien  existed  in  favor  of 
counsel,  whether  retained  by  the 
plaintiff  or  the  defendant,  and  to 
give  a  Hen  on  the  land  in  contro- 
versy to  the  lawyer  of  the  suc- 
cessful party.  "In  consequence  of 
this  construction  the  practice  of 
the  courts  was,  for  a  time,  very 
liberal,  and  the  lien  was  declared 
in  favor  of  the  counsel  of  the  de- 
fendant as  well  as  of  the  plaintiff. 
Upon  further  consideration  it  was 
seen  that  this  extension  of  the 
doctrine  could  not  be  sustained 
upon  the  principles  of  the  original 
decision,  nor  upon  general  prin- 
ciples. It  operated  as  a  restraint 
upon  the  free  disposition  of  prop- 
erty, and  created  a  new  and  secret 
trust,  not  only  unknown  to  the 
common  law,  but  not  warranted 
by  its  principles,  and  in  conflict 
with  the  policy  of  our  registration 
laws.  It  was  therefore  held  by 
this  court  that  the  lien  exists 
only  in  the  case  of  the  actual  re- 
covery of  land,  by  a  suit  instituted 


for  the  purpose,  just  as  at  common 
law  the  lien  was  on  the  money 
judgment  recovered.  The  lien,  it 
was  said,  is  declared  to  exist  from 
the  commencement  of  the  suit, — 
manifestly  contemplating  a  suit  for 
the  specific  property;  and  the  doc- 
trine, although  an  extension  of  the 
principle  of  the  common  law,  may 
be  sustained  upon  the  ground  that 
the  lis  pendens  is  notice  to  all  the 
world  of  the  plaintiff's  right,  and 
no  great  harm  can  result  from 
carrying  out  of  this  right,  a  lien  in 
favor  of  the  attorney  running 
pari  passu  with  the  lien  of  the  lis 
pendens.  But  the  lis  pendens  is  no 
notice  to  any  one  of  the  defend- 
ant's rights,  which  stand  precisely 
as  if  no  suit  were  pending;  and 
consequently  a  lien  on  that  right, 
without  contract,  would  be  with- 
out any  rule  or  analogy  to  sup- 
port it,  besides  being  in  conflict 
with  the  policy  of  our  registration 
laws."  Cooper,  J.,  in  Pierce  v. 
Lawrence,  16  Lea  (Tenn.)  572,  1  S. 
W.  204.  See,  however,  Strohecker 
V.  Irvine,  1(y  Ga.  639,  2  Am.  St. 
62,  holding  that  the  lien  of  an  at- 
torney for  services  in  successfully 
resisting  a  levy  on  a  homestead 
and  obtaining  it  to  be  set  apart  as 
an  exemption  is  in  the  nature  of 
labor  done  on  the  homestead  and 
of  purchase-money  thereof,  and  the 
homestead      is      subject      thereto. 


§231  LIENS.  240 

services  purely  defensive,  in  resisting  suits  brought  to  estab- 
lish demands  against  it.^ 

An  attorney's  lien  on  land  for  services  in  defending  a  suit 
affecting  the  land  may  be  rendered  binding  upon  the  parties, 
and  those  claiming  under  them,  pending  the  litigation,  if  de- 
clared by  the  court  in  which  the  services  were  rendered;  but 
such  lien  does  not  affect  third  persons  having  prior  liens  upon 
the  land.^ 

§  231.  Waiver  of  attorney's  lien. — This  lien  may  be 
waived  by  an  arrangement  or  transaction  between  the  attor- 
ney and  his  client  which  shows  the  attorney's  intention  to 
rely  upon  some  other  security  or  mode  of  payment. ^*^  The 
taking  of  a  promissory  note  by  the  attorney  does  not  neces- 
sarily imply  a  waiver  of  his  lien,  for  this  may  have  been 
given  merely  for  the  purpose  of  fixing  the  amount  of  the 
debt.  But  the  taking  of  a  distinct  and  independent  security 
will  generally  amount  to  a  waiver  of  the  lien,  for  the  attorney 
in  such  case  has  carved  out  his  own  security,  and  is  pre- 
sumed to  have  intended  to  waive  his  lien.  It  is  true,  how- 
ever, that  the  waiver  arising  from  the  acceptance  of  collateral 
security  is  presumptive  only,  and  may  be  rebutted  by  evi- 
dence of  an  intention  not  to  rely  exclusively  upon  it,  but  to 
retain  the  equitable  lien.^^ 

An  attorney  waives  his  lien  upon  a  judgment  by  keeping 
silent  about  it  when  his  silence  would  operate  as  a  fraud  upon 
another.  On  a  motion  to  open  a  default,  the  court  required 
the  defendant  to  stipulate  not  to  dispose  of  a  judgment  in 
his  favor  against  a  third  person,  and  to  make  the  judgment 
in  plaintifT's  favor  a  lien  thereon.     The  attorney  who  repre- 

8  Fowler  v.  Lewis'  Admr.,  36  W.  Y.  425,  58  N.  E.  522,  modifying  13 
Va.  112,  14  S.  E.  447.  App.  Div.  371,  43  N.  Y.  S.  206.  See 

9  Pierce  v.  Lawrence,  16  Lea  also,  Barnahee  v.  Holmes,  115 
(Tenn.)  572,  1  S.  W.  204.  Iowa  581,  88  N.  W.  1098. 

10  Renick  v.  Ludington,  16  W.  11  Renick  v.  Ludington,  16  W. 
Va.    378;    West    v.    Bacon,    164    N.      Va.  378. 


241  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §  231 

sented  defendant  had  a  lien  on  such  judgment  for  his  services 
in  procuring  it,  but  made  no  mention  thereof,  and,  as  a  notary 
pubhc,  took  defendant's  acknowledgment  of  the  stipulation. 
It  was  held  that  he  was  estopped  to  assert  his  lien  against  the 
claim  of  plaintiff  under  the  stipulation.^^  The  attorney  waives 
his  lien  by  his  acquiescence  in  a  satisfaction  of  the  judgment 
by  the  payment  of  money  or  the  transfer  of  property  to  his 
client,  and  he  can  not  afterwards  enforce  his  lien  upon  such 
money  or  property,  but  must  look  to  his  client  alone  for  his 
compensation.^^ 

An  attorney's  lien  upon  a  judgment  is  waived  by  his  pro- 
curing in  transfer  to  his  client  of  land  attached  in  the  suit  in 
satisfaction  of  the  judgment.  His  lien  upon  the  judgment 
does  not  follow  the  land  when  the  title  is  perfected  in  the 
client.  Subsequent  purchasers  of  the  land  from  the  client 
have  a  right  to  suppose  the  lien  has  been  w^aived  or  satisfied. ^^ 
An  attorney's  lien  upon  a  judgment  is  not  discharged  by  his 
delay  in  collecting  it,  though  this  delay  be  for  several  years. ^^ 
It  is  not  lost  though  his  claim  against  his  client  is  barred  by 
the  statute  of  limitations.^^  It  is  not  divested  by  his  allow- 
ing his  claim  to  become  dormant,  so  that  it  has  to  be  revived 
by  other  attorneys. ^'^ 

Neither  is  it  lost  by  the  attorney's  receiving  or  collecting 
a  part  of  the  judgment,  and  paying  over  the  part  so  collected 
to  his  client  without  deducting  his  fees.  He  can  enforce  his 
lien  upon  the  balance  of  the  judgment. ^^ 

It  would  seem  that  an  attorney's  lien  would  not  prevail 

12  Clare    v.    Lockard,    122    N.    Y.  ^^  Cowen  v.  Boone,  48  Iowa  350. 
263,  24  N.   E.   453,   reversing  2   N.  15  Stone  v.  Hyde,  22  Maine  318. 
Y.  S.  646.  16  Higgins  v.  Scott,  2   B.  &  Ad. 

13  Goodrich    v.    McDonald,     112  413. 

N.  Y.  157,  19  N.  E.  649,  reversing  17  Jenkins    v.    Stephens,    60    Ga. 

41  Hun  (N.  Y.)  235;  In  re  Knapp,  216. 

85   N.  Y.  284;   Marshall  v.    Meech,  is  Hooper  v.  Brundage,  22  Maine 

51  N.  Y.  140,  10  Am.  Rep.  572;  St.  460. 

John  V.  Diefendorf,   12  Wend.   (N. 

Y.)  261. 

16 


§    232  LIENS.  242 

against  a  state  in  whose  favor  he  has  obtained  a  judgment, 
in  the  absence  of  a  special  statute  giving  such  a  lien.^^ 

§  232.  Attorney's  process  to  secure  rights. — In  general 
it  may  be  said  that  the  attorney  has  the  same  remedial  pro- 
cess as  his  client  to  obtain  satisfaction  to  the  extent  of  his 
lien,  inasmuch  as  he  is  regarded  to  that  extent  as  an  equit- 
able assignee  of  the  judgment.  Therefore,  where  a  judg- 
ment has  ben  rendered  for  the  defendant  in  a  replevin  suit, 
the  attorney  has  a  right  to  enforce  the  replevin  bond  taken 
from  the  plaintiff  for  the  return  of  the  goods.  And  if  the 
sheriff  has  taken  an  insufficient  bond,  the  attorney  has  a  right 
to  the  damages  which  may  be  recovered  from  the  sheriff  for 
his  neglect  in  taking  such  bond.  The  judgment  in  such  suit 
belongs  to  the  attorney  to  the  extent  of  his  lien.^*^ 

An  attorney  who  has  prosecuted  a  bastardy  process  to 
final  judgment  and  execution  has  a  lien  upon  the  bond  given 
by  the  respondent  in  that  process.^^ 

When  an  attachment  has  been  made,  the  lien  of  the  at- 
tachment inures  to  the  benefit  of  the  attorney  for  his  fees  and 
costs,  and  this  can  not  be  defeated  by  any  settlement  made 
by  the  client  with  the  debtor,  without  his  consent.^^ 

Where  a  judgment  is  a  lien  upon  real  estate,  and  this  is 
about  to  be  sold  under  execution,  an  attorney's  lien  upon  the 
judgment  will  not  be  protected  by  a  stay  of  a  sale  under  the 
execution,  but  the  sheriff  may  be  stayed  from  paying  the 
proceeds  of  sale  to  the  plaintiff  or  his  assignee  under  the  exe- 
cution until  the  amount  of  the  attorney's  compensation  can 
be  ascertained.^^ 

19  Compton  V.  State,  38  Ark.  601.  Wood  v.  State,  125  Ind.  219,  25  N. 

At   any   rate,   no   decree   of  a   lien  E.  190.     See  ante,  §  154a. 

could    be    taken    against    a    state,  20  Newbert    v.    Cunningham,    50 

though,  in  case  the  funds  are  with-  Maine  231,  79  Am.  Dec.  612. 

in  the  control  of  the  court,  it  may,  21  Bickford    v.    Ellis,    50    Maine 

in    the    exercise    of    its    equitable  121. 

powers,  have  the  fees  paid  out  of  22  Gist  v.   Hanly,  33  Ark.  233. 

the    fund.      State    v.    Edgefield    &  23  Loaners'     Bank    v.    Nostrand, 

Ky.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  92;  21  J.  &  S.  (N.  Y.)  525. 


243 


ATTORNEY  S  SPECIAL  OR   CHARGING  LIEN. 


§    233 


But  the  attorney  can  hardly  be  considered  as  the  assignee 
of  the  judgment  in  such  a  sense  as  to  entitle  him  to  go  into 
another  court  to  enforce  his  lien  by  an  action  in  his  own 
name.^^ 

The  attorney  may  enforce  his  lien  by  an  action  on  the 
judgment  in  the  name  of  the  creditor.^^ 

The  lien  of  an  attorney  upon  a  judgment  is  enforced  ac- 
cording to  the  law  of  the  state  where  the  judgment  was  re- 
covered and  the  lien  attached,  and  not  according  to  the  law 
of  another  state  where  it  is  sought  to  collect  the  judgment.'^ 

§  233.  Settlement  by  parties. — When  the  parties  have  col- 
lusively  settled  a  suit  before  judgment,  with  the  design  of 
preventing  the  attorney  from  obtaining  his  costs  or  fees,  the 
court  may  allow  the  attorney  to  go  on  with  the  suit  and  ob- 
tain a  judgment  for  the  amount  of  his  costs  or  fees,  notwith- 
standing the  settlement.^'^     If  the  settlement  has  been  filed 


-■i  Adams  v.  Fox,  40  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  442;  27  How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)  409. 

25  Stone  V.   Hyde,  22  Maine  318. 

26  Citizens'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Culver, 
54  N.  H.  327,  20  Am.  Rep.  134. 

2"  Rasquin  v.  Knickerbocker 
Stage  Co.,  12  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  324, 
21  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  293;  People 
V.  Hardenbergh,  8  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
335;  Talcott  v.  Bronson,  4  Paige 
(N.  Y.)  501;  Chase  v.  Chase,  65 
How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  306;  Flint  v. 
Hubbard,  16  Colo.  App.  464,  66 
Pac.  446.  In  some  cases  it  is 
said  that,  before  an  attorney  can 
proceed  with  an  action  after  settle- 
ment and  discontinuance  by  the 
client,  the  attorney  should  obtain 
leave  of  court  to  enforce  his  lien 
by  supplementary  proceedings. 
Dimick  v.  Cooley,  3  N.  Y.  Civ. 
Proc.  R.  141.  In  this  case  the 
court  say:  "It  would  be  an  unwise 


and  dangerous  practice,  extremely 
hazardous  to  the  rights  of  both 
parties,  to  allow  an  attorney  to 
continue  the  action,  after  settle- 
ment by  the  parties,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  collecting  his  costs,  with- 
out first  obtaining  the  consent  of 
the  court,  that  he  may  proceed  for 
that  purpose.  When  such  per- 
mission is  given,  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  court  to  direct  as  to  the  time 
and  manner,  and  watch  the  pro- 
ceedings and  doing  of  the  attor- 
ney, so  as  fully  to  protect  the 
rights  of  both  parties,  and  not  un- 
necessarily annoy  and  embarrass 
either."  Per  Barker,  J.  In  Moore 
V.  Taylor,  2  How.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N. 
Y.)  343,  it  is  said  that  leave  of 
court  to  institute  such  proceedings 
is  especially  requisite  where  the 
affidavit  says  nothing  about  any 
lien. 


§    233  LIENS.  244 

in  the  court,  the  attorney  should  first  obtain  an  order  setting 
it  aside.  His  course  then  is  to  bring  the  case  to  trial  and  final 
judgment  in  the  name  of  his  client.  He  is  not  entitled  to  an 
order  to  enter  judgment  for  the  amount  of  his  costs  without 
bringing  the  cause  to  trial;  and  a  judgment  so  obtained  is 
irregular.^^  In  such  cases  the  attorney  must  establish  the 
collusion.^*' 

A  plaintiff  who  has  obtained  a  judgment  may  consent  that 
the  judgment  in  his  favor  be  set  aside  by  the  court,  but  it 
must  be  subject  to  the  right  of  his  attorney  to  his  fees,  and 
afterwards  the  attorney  may  proceed  to  establish  his  right 
to  his  fees,  in  doing  which  he  must  establish  the  plaintiff's 
right  to  recover  on  the  state  of  facts  existing  at  the  time  the 
case  was  first  disposed  of,  independently  of  the  question  of 
fees.^*^ 

Where  a  judgment  is  compromised,  pending  appeal,  with- 
out notice  to  the  attorneys  of  the  successful  plaintiff,  they 
may  enforce  their  lien  against  defendant  in  equity.^^ 

In  New  York,  according  to  the  later  and  present  practice, 
the  attorney  is  entitled  to  proceed  with  the  action  without 
first  obtaining  leave  of  the  court  to  do  so.^^  He  may  prose- 
cute the  suit  to  trial  and  final  judgment  in  the  name  of  his 
client,  with  a  view  to  the  protection  of  his  own  rights. 

28  Pickard  v.  Ycncer,  21  Hun  (N.  for  his  compensation  if  the  appeal 
Y.)  403,  10  Week.  Dig.  271;  Smith  was  successful.  Walker  v.  Equita- 
V.  Baum,  67  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  267;  ble  Mortg.  Co.,  114  Ga.  862,  40  S. 
Wilber  v.   Baker,  24  Hun   (N.  Y.)  E.    1010. 

24.  32  Pickard    v.    Yencer,    21     Hun 

29  Lang  V.  Buffalo  Seamen's  (N.  Y.)  403.  10  Week.  Dig.  271; 
Union,  22  Alb.   L.  J.   (N.  Y.)   114.  Wilber  v.   Baker,  24  Hun   (N.  Y.) 

30  Twiggs  V.  Chambers,  56  Ga.  24;  Forstman  v.  Schulting,  35  Hun 
279;  Coleman  v.  Ryan,  58  Ga.  132;  (N.  Y.)  504;  Merchant  v.  Sessions, 
Rodgers  v.  Furse,  83  Ga.  115,  9  S.  5  N.  Y.  Civ.  Proc.  R.  24.  The 
E.  669.  case    of    Goddard   v.    Trenbath,   24 

31  Covington  v.  Bass,  88  Tenn.  Hun  (N.  Y.)  182,  holding  that 
496,  12  S.  W.  1033.  A  client  can  leave  of  court  must  be  obtained  to 
not  withdraw  a  writ  of  error  when  prosecute  the  suit  in  such  cases, 
his    attorney    would    have    a    lien  is   overruled. 


245  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §  234 

In  this  state,  however,  if  the  attorney  is  the  equitable 
owner  of  the  entire  judgment  recovered,  as  is  the  case  where 
the  judgment  is  for  costs  only,  he  should  prosecute  in  his 
own  name  an  undertaking  given  to  secure  its  payment,  inas- 
much as  the  code  directs  that  every  action  shall  be  prose- 
cuted in  the  name  of  the  real  party  in  interest,  whether  he 
be  a  legal  or  equitable  assignee  of  the  cause  of  action.^^  If 
he  brings  such  action,  even  with  leave  of  the  court,  in  the 
name  of  his  client,  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  his  lien,  a 
previous  assignment  by  his  client  of  the  cause  of  action  and 
release  of  the  judgment  will  bar  the  action.  The  order  al- 
lowing the  attorney  to  proceed  does  not  determine  that  the 
attorney  is  entitled  to  recover  the  sum  he  claims,  nor  does  it 
determine  any  of  the  issues  between  the  parties.^'* 

§  234.  The  English  practice. — The  English  practice  in 
such  cases  seems  to  have  been  for  the  attorney  whose  lien 
has  been  destroyed  by  the  conduct  of  the  parties  to  move 
the  court  to  vacate  the  satisfaction  of  judgment,  and  to  ap- 
ply for  a  rule  calling  upon  the  opposite  party  to  pay  him  his 
costs.^^  Although  the  parties  to  the  suit  have  collusively 
settled  the  judgment,  the  attorney  has  no  such  authority 
over  the  execution  in  his  hands  as  to  enforce  it  against  the 
judgment  debtor  of  his  own  mere  motion  and  without  his 
client's  consent.  He  must  apply  to  the  equitable  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  court.^*^ 

A  similar  mode  of  practice  prevails,  or  has  prevailed,  in 
some  of  our  state  courts.  1 

The  plaintiff's  attorney  may  also  be  protected  upon  his 

33  Kipp  V.  Rapp,  2  How.  Pr.  (N.  Graves  v.  Eades,  5  Taunt.  429; 
S.)  (N.  Y.)  169,  7  Civ.  Proc.  R.  Reid  v.  Dupper,  6  T.  R.  361;  Charl- 
316.  wood     V.     Berridge,     1     Esp.     345; 

34  Kipp  V.  Rapp,  2  How.  Pr.  (N.  Jones   v.    Bonner,   2   Exch.  230. 
S.)    (N.   Y.)    169,    7   Civ.    Proc.    R.  36  Barker  v.   St.    Quintin,   12   M. 
316.  &    W.    441;    Brunsdon    v.    Allard, 

35  Welsh  V.   Hole,   1   Doug.   238;  2   E.    &   E.    19. 


§    235  LIENS.  246 

application  to  the  court  for  a  rule  restraining  the  judgment 
debtor  from  paying  the  money  to  the  plaintiff  until  the  at- 
torney's lien  is  satisfied. 

Where  a  decree  has  been  entered  for  the  payment  of 
money  to  a  complainant,  and  his  solicitor  has  given  the  de- 
fendant notice  that  he  claims  a  lien  on  the  moneys  decreed 
to  be  paid,  and  this  notice  is  disregarded  by  the  defendant, 
the  latter  may,  on  an  order  of  the  court  to  show  cause,  be 
required  to  pay  to  the  solicitor  such  amount  as  he  should 
establish  a  lien  for  upon  a  reference  made  by  the  court.^''^ 

§  235.  Application  to  protect  lien. — An  application  to  the 
court  by  an  attorney  to  protect  his  lien  upon  a  judgment  is 
addressed  to  the  discretion  of  the  court.^^  The  right  of  the 
attorney  to  claim  the  lien  should  be  clear  to  justify  the 
court's  interference.  But  it  has  the  power  to  interfere, 
whether  the  lien  be  for  the  taxable  costs  or  for  compensa- 
tion, when  a  lien  for  this  is  given  by  statute.  When  the 
amount  of  compensation  is  in  dispute,  the  court  may  direct 
that  a  sufficient  sum  to  cover  the  claims  be  brought  into 
court  to  await  an  action  at  law,  or  other  procedure  between 
the  attorney  and  client  to  settle  the  amount. ^^ 

In  Indiana  a  complaint  by  an  attorney  to  set  aside  an 
entry  of  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  on  the  ground  that  it 
was  fraudulently  made  should  allege  the  amount  of  fees  due 
him,  either  by  stating  the  contract  with  his  client  respecting 
his  fees,  or  by  averring  the  value  of  his  services. ^"^  The 
complaint  should  allege  that  the  lien  was  taken,  and  notice 
of  it  filed  at  the  time  of  the  rendition  of  the  judgment,  for 

37  Barnes  v.  Taylor,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  Y.)  442,  27  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  409; 
467.  Fox  V.  Fox,  24  How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.) 

38  Adams  v.  Fox,  40  Barb.  (N.  409.  See  Matter  of  Speranza,  186 
Y.)  442,  27  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  409;  N.  Y.  280. 

Howitt  V.   Merrill,    113   N.   Y.   630,  40  Dunning  v.   Galloway,  47  Ind. 

20  N.  E.  868,  2  Silvernail  Ct.  App.  182;    Adams   v.    Lee,   82    Ind.   587; 

158.  Day  v.   Bowman,   109  Ind.  383,  10 

39  Adams   v.   Fox,   40   Barb.    (N.  N.  E.  126. 


247  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §  237 

such    entry    and    notice    are    required    to    make     the     lien 
effectual. ^^ 

In  some  cases  the  courts,  after  declaring  the  lien,  have 
directed  a  reference  to  a  master  to  determine  the  proper 
amount  of  the  attorney's  charges;'*-  but  perhaps  the  better 
practice  is  to  declare  the  lien,  and  leave  the  attorney  to 
enforce  his  claim  by  an  appropriate  proceeding  against  his 
client. ^^ 

§  236.  Money  paid  into  court. — Upon  an  application  by  a 
solicitor  for  money  which  has  been  paid  into  court  under  a 
decree,  his  claim  can  not  be  passed  upon  without  notice  to 
his  client  and  proof  to  maintain  his  claim,  though  the  client 
has  assigned  to  him  the  cause  of  action  upon  which  the  de- 
cree was  founded  as  security  for  his  services.^"* 

§  237.  Delay  in  asserting  lien. — But  if  the  attorney  waits 
for  an  unreasonable  time  after  his  client  has  settled  with 
the  opposite  party,  and  discharged  the  judgment,  the  satis- 
faction will  not  be  set  aside  in  order  to  allow  the  attorney 
to  obtain  his  costs. ^^     Great  and  unreasonable  delays  and 

41  Day  V.  Bowman,  109  Ind.  383,  services  rendered  by  him,  nor  need 
10  N.  E.  126.  he,    upon    trial,    go    into    proof   of 

42  Hunt  V.  McClanahan,  1  Heisk.  the  same;  but  the  services  will  be 
(Tenn.)  503;  Yourie  v.  Nelson,  1  treated  as  a  whole.  Walker  v. 
Tenn.  Ch.  614;  Bowling  v.  Scales,  Floyd,  30  Ga.  237.  But  after  the 
1  Tenn.  Ch.  618;  Barnes  v.  Taylor,  client  has  possessed  himself  of  the 
30  N.  J.   Eq.  467.  entire  fund  recovered,  the  attorney 

43  Perkins  v.  Perkins,  9  Heisk.  can  not  proceed  by  rule  to  collect 
(Tenn.)  95.  his  fees.     The  court  has  no  juris- 

44  Black  v.  Black,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  diction  to  control  its  officers  and 
74.  When  an  attorney  claims  a  the  parties  connected  with  a  ju- 
lien  upon  money  in  the  hands  of  dicial  proceeding  after  the  litiga- 
an  officer  of  the  court,  and  the  tion  has  ended.  Whittle  v.  New- 
claim  is  controverted  by  the  client,  man,  34  Ga.  ZIT . 

a    rule    is    the    proper    remedy    in  45  Winans    v.    Mason,    33    Barb. 

Georgia  to  settle  the  question.    To  (N.  Y.)  522,  21   How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.) 

such    rule    the    attorney    need    not  153. 
attach   a  bill   of  particulars   of  the 


§    238  LIENS.  248 

laches  on  his  part  in  asserting  his  rights  are  fatal  to  his  claim, 
as  they  would  be  to  the  claim  of  any  ordinary  suitor.  Al- 
though proceedings  by  an  attorney  to  enforce  his  claim  do 
not  constitute  an  action  within  the  literal  operation  of  the 
statute  of  limitations,  yet  in  enforcing  a  remedy  of  this  char- 
acter, depending  upon  the  equitable  powers  of  the  court, 
and,  to  a  certain  extent,  upon  its  discretion,  it  will  in  general 
be  governed  by  the  analogy  of  the  statute.'*'^ 

After  the  litigation  is  ended  and  the  client  has  possessed 
himself  of  the  entire  fund  recovered  by  the  litigation,  the 
court  has  no  powder  to  give  relief  to  the  attorney."*' 

§  238.  Attorney  need  not  be  a  party  to  the  record. — An 
attorney  is  not  bound  to  make  himself  a  party  to  the  record 
in  order  to  enforce  his  lien  for  fees  against  a  judgment  ob- 
tained for  his  client.  If  he  has  given  notice  to  the  judgment 
debtor  of  his  lien,  he  may  enforce  it  notwithstanding  a  com- 
promise and  settlement  between  the  judgment  debtor  and 
his  client;  the  court  may,  however,  allow  the  attorney  to 
intervene,  after  judgment,  and  be  made  a  party  to  the  suit, 
when  that  course  seems  necessary  for  the  protection  of  his 
rights.^s 

In  Nebraska,  it  is  said  that  under  some  circumstances  the 
attorney  may  properly  be  admitted  as  a  party  plaintifif  in  the 
action  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  and  enforcing  his  lien. 
In  such  proceeding  it  would  be  the  proper  practice  for  the 
attorney,  on  being  admitted  as  a  party,  to  file  a  petition  in 
his  own  name  against  both  plaintiff  and  defendant,  setting 
for  the  particulars  of  his  claim,  so  that  if  it  be  disputed 
answers  could  be  filed,  and  issues  made  up  as  in  other  cases. "^^ 

46  Richardson  v.   Brooklyn   C.   &  on   a    counterclaim    for    his    client 
N.  R.  Co.,  7  Hun  (N.  Y.)  69.  has      a      lien      on      the      recovery 

47  Whittle    V.    Newman,    34    Ga.  and    may   enforce   his   Hen    on   the 
377.  judgment    in    counterclaim.      Mer- 

48  Patrick  v.  Leach,  17  Fed.  476,  chants'    Nat.    Bank    v.    Armstrong, 
3  McCrary  (U.  S.)  SSS.     An  attor-  107  Ga.  479,  33  S.   E.  473. 

ney  for  a  defendant  who  recovers  49  Reynolds      v.      Reynolds,      10 


249  attorney's  special  or  charging  lien.  §  240 

§  239.  Action  to  dissolve  a  partnership. — In  an  action  to 
dissolve  partnership  the  court  will  not  appoint  a  receiver  in 
order  to  secure  the  lien  of  the  plaintiff's  attorney;  for  a  re- 
ceiver is  appointed  in  such  an  action  only  when  it  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  do  so  for  the  protection  of  the  property. 
If  the  attorney  has  given  notice  of  his  claim  before  the  set- 
tlement, he  may  be  allowed  to  go  on  with  the  suit  and  enter 
up  judgment  for  his  costs. ^^ 

§  240.  Proceeding  to  wind  up  insolvent  insurance  com- 
pany.— In  proceedings  to  wind  up  an  insolvent  life  insurance 
company  an  attorney  was  retained  by  certain  policy  holders, 
and  appeared  in  their  behalf.  A  dividend  to  each  of  his 
clients  was  declared,  whereupon  he  claimed  a  lien  and  moved 
that  the  receiver  pay  the  dividends  to  him.  It  did  not  appear 
that  these  policy  holders  were  formal  parties  to  the  proceed- 
ings, or  that  the  attorney  entered  his  appearance  of  record, 
nor  that  his  services  procured  the  dividends.  The  attorney's 
motion  was  denied,  except  upon  his  filing  authority  from  his 
clients  to  receive  such  dividends.  It  was  doubted  whether 
he  had  any  lien  under  the  code;  and,  whether  he  had  or  not, 
the  court  could  not  make  an  order  practically  enforcing  a 
lien  without  notice  to  the  clients. ^^ 

Nebr.  574,  7  N.  W.  322,  cited  with  contract  between  a  client  and  his 

approval   in    Oliver   v.    Sheeley,    11  attorney,   where  there  is  no   claim 

Nebr.  521,  9  N.  W.  689;   Elliott  v.  for    a    lien,    would    not    be    notice 

Atkins,  26  Nebr.  403,  42  N.  W.  403.  to    the    adverse    party    that    he    in- 

"An   attorney,    therefore,    who    de-  tended  to  assert  the  claim  against 

sires    to    enforce    a    claim    for    his  him,  as  it  might  be  presumed  that 

services    must    file    a    lien    to    that  such  attorney  intended  to  rely  on 

effect;    otherwise    he    can    not    en-  the    responsibility  of   his    own    cli- 

force   a  claim  against   the   adverse  ent."     Per   Maxwell,  J. 

party.     This  claim  for  a  lien  may  -"<^  Anon.  2  Daly  (N.  Y.)  533. 

be    filed    with    the    papers    in    the  ^^  Attorney-General      v.      North 

case,    and    the    adverse    party   will  American   Life   Ins.    Co.,  93   N.   Y. 

be    chargeable    with    notice    of    its  387. 
existence.       The     existence     of     a 


.    CHAPTER  VI. 


BANKER'S  LIENS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

241.  Bank  has  a  lien.  252. 

242.  Banker's  lien  part  of  the  law 

merchant.  253. 

243.  Only     banks     have     bankers' 

liens. 

244.  Banker's     lien    on    securities      254. 

of    his    debtor. 

245.  Banker's     lien    only    secures      255. 

debts  that  are  due.  256. 

246.  Rule  in  equity. 

247.  Customer's    several    accounts      257. 

regarded  as  one  account. 

248.  Lien    attaches     only     to     se-      258. 

curities  of  the  customer. 

249.  No  lien  on  trust  securities. 

250.  No    lien    on    fiduciaries'    ac-      259. 

counts.  260. 

251.  No    lien    on    pledged    securi- 

ties   for  general   debts.  261. 


Surplus  of  pledged  securi- 
ties. 

Nature  and  extent  of  lien  as 
dependent  upon  terms  of 
contract. 

No  lien  on  box  containing 
securities. 

Circumstances   effecting  lien. 

No  lien  on  securities  casual- 
ly  left   at    the   bank. 

Lien  on  paper  received  for 
collection. 

Lien  on  paper  received  for 
collection — ^Application  of 
doctrine. 

Doctrine   in   New  York. 

Lien  on  paper  of  a  corre- 
sponding bank. 

No  lien  where  no  advances 
are  made. 


§  241.  Bank  has  a  lien. — A  bank  has  a  Hen  on  all  moneys, 
funds  and  securities  of  a  depositor  for  the  general  balance  of 
his  account.^    Thus,  if  a  bank  discounts  a  note  for  a  depositor, 


1  Jourdaine    v.    Lefevre,    1    Esp 
66;  Davis  v.  Bowsher,  5  T.  R.  481 
Scott    V.    Franklin,    15    East    428 
Bolton   V.   Puller,    1    B.   &   P.    539 
Giles  V.   Perkins,  9   East   12;   Bol- 
land  V.   Bygrave,  R.  &  M.  271;   In 
re  Williams,  3  Jr.  Eq.  346;  Brandao 
v.  Barnett,  12  CI.  &  F.  787;  Marsh 
V.  Oneida  Central   Bank,  34   Barb. 
(N.    Y.)    298;    Beckwith    v.    Union 


Bank,  4  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  604; 
Commercial  Bank  of  Albany 
V.  Hughes,  17  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
94;  In  re  Van  Allen,  37  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  225;  Ford's  Admr.  v.  Thorn- 
ton, 3  Leigh  (Va.)  695;  State  Bank 
V.  Armstrong,  4  Dev.  (N.  Car.) 
519;  Whittington  v.  Farmers'  Bank, 
5  Har.  &  J.  (Md.)  489;  McDowell 
v.  Bank  of  Wilmington  &  Brandy- 


250 


251 


BANKER  S    LIENS. 


§    242 


and  this  is  not  paid  at  maturity,  all  funds  of  the  depositor 
held  by  the  bank  at  the  time  of  the  maturity  of  the  note,  or 
afterwards  acquired  in  the  course  of  business  with  him, 
whether  on  general  deposit  or  in  the  form  of  commercial 
paper  placed  by  him  in  bank  for  collection,  may  be  applied 
to  the  discharge  of  his  indebtedness  to  the  bank  on  such 
note,-  And  the  rule  is  the  same  as  regards  any  other  indebt- 
edness, such  as  an  overdraft  or  an  advance  of  any  kind. 

§  242.  Banker's  lien  part  of  the  law  merchant. — The  lien 
of  bankers  is  part  of  the  law  merchant,  and  the  courts  are 
bound  to  take  judicial  notice  of  it,  just  as  they  are  bound 
to  recognize  the  negotiability  of  bills  of  exchange.     Thus 


wine,  1  Harr.  (Del.)  369;  Gibbons 
V.  Hecox,  105  Mich.  509,  63  N.  W. 
519,  55  Am.  St.  463.  It  is  de- 
clared in  the  codes  of  Califor- 
nia, Idaho,  Montana,  Oklahoma, 
North  Dakota  and  South  Da- 
kota that  a  banker  has  a  gen- 
eral lien,  dependent  on  possession, 
upon  all  property  in  his  hands  be- 
longing to  a  customer,  for  the  bal- 
ance due  to  him  from  such  cus- 
tomer in  the  course  of  the  busi- 
ness. California:  Civ.  Code  1906, 
§  3054;  Idaho:  Rev.  Code  1908, 
§  3449;  Montana:  Code  (Civ.) 
Ann.  1895,  §  3937;  North  Dakota: 
Rev.  Code  1905,  §  6288;  Oklahoma: 
Comp.  Laws  1909,  §  4144;  South 
Dakota:  Rev.  Civ.  Code  1903, 
§  2155.  In  Pennsylvania  the 
doctrine  of  bankers'  liens  does 
not  prevail.  It  is  regarded 
as  opposed  to  well-established 
legal  principles,  and  as  a  cus- 
tom it  can  not  therefore  ob- 
tain. In  re  Liggett  Spring  and 
Axle  Co.'s  Appeal,  111'  Pa.  St.  291,  2 
Atl.  684.  In  California  under 
§   3054  of  the  Civil   Code,  a   bank 


has  a  lien  on  an  overdraft  on  a 
paid-up  policy  given  to  the  bank 
instead  of  an  assigned  policy.  Du 
Brutz  V.  Bank  of  Visalia,  4  Cal. 
App.  201,  87  Pac.  467.  See,  also, 
National  Bank  of  Phoenixville  v. 
Bonsor,  38  Pa.  Sup.  Ct.  275.  Under 
§  3449  of  the  Rev.  Stats,  of  Idaho, 
1908,  giving  a  bank  a  lien  on  all 
property  belonging  to  its  custo- 
mers, it  is  held  that  the  bank  has 
no  lien  on  stocks  of  merchandise. 
In  re  Gesas,  146  Fed.  734,  11  C. 
C.  A.  291,  the  lien  that  a  banker 
has  on  his  customer's  deposit  can 
not  be  enforced  in  equity,  but  it 
may  be  declared.  Wynn  v.  Talla- 
poosa County  Bank,  168  Ala.  469, 
53   So.   228. 

2  Muench  v.  Valley  Nat.  Bank, 
11  Mo.  App.  144.  The  right  that  a 
bank  has  to  take  its  depositor's 
money  to  satisfy  a  debt  he  owes 
the  bank  is  in  effect,  the  right  of 
set-off.  Gibsonburg  Banking  Co 
V.  Wakeman  Bank  Co.,  20  Ohio  C 
C.  591,  10  Ohio  C.  D.  754.  See  also, 
Cockrill  \.  Joyce,  62  Ark.  216,  35 
S.  W.  221. 


§    243  LIENS.  252 

Lord  Lyndhurst,  in  a  case  before  the  House  of  Lords,  said:^ 
"There  is  no  question  that,  by  the  law  merchant,  a  banker 
has  a  Hen  for  his  general  balance  upon  securities  deposited 
with  him.  I  consider  this  as  part  of  the  established  law  of 
the  country,  and  that  the  courts  will  take  notice  of  it;  it 
is  not  necessary  that  it  should  be  pleaded,  nor  is  it  neces- 
sary that  it  should  be  given  in  evidence  in  the  particular 
instance."  Lord  Campbell  in  the  same  case  said:  "The 
usage  of  trade  by  which  bankers  are  entitled  to  a  general 
lien,  is  not  found  by  the  special  verdict,  and  unless  we  are 
to  take  judicial  notice  of  it,  the  plaintiff  is  at  once  entitled 
to  judgment.  But,  my  lords,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the 
general  lien  of  bankers  is  part  of  the  law  merchant  and  is 
to  be  judicially  noticed — like  the  negotiability  of  bills  of  ex- 
change, or  the  days  of  grace  allowed  for  their  payment. 
When  a  general  usage  has  been  judicially  ascertained  and 
established,  it  becomes  a  part  of  the  law  merchant,  which 
courts  of  justice  are  bound  to  know  and  recognize.  Such 
has  been  the  invariable  understanding  and  practice  in  West- 
minster Hall  for  a  great  many  years ;  there  is  no  decision  or 
dictum  to  the  contrary,  and  justice  could  not  be  administered 
if  evidence  were  to  be  given  toties  quoties  to  support  such 
usages,  issue  might  be  joined  upon  them  in  each  particular 
case." 

§  243.  Only  banks  have  banker's  liens. — Courts  will  not, 
however,  judicially  take  notice  of  the  lien  of  bankers  who  are 
not  strictly  such.  In  the  case  of  persons  engaged  in  discount- 
ing, buying,  advancing  on,  or  selling  bills  or  notes,  a  lien 
for  a  general  balance  will  not  be  presumed  to  exist  in  the 
absence  of  an  express  agreement.  If  a  usage  exists  to  give 
such  a  lien,  it  should  be  proved.^ 

3Brandao    v.    Barnett,    12    CI.    &  Grant  v.  Taylor,  3  J.  &  S.  (N.  Y.) 

Fin.  787,  3  C.   B.  519,  6  M.  &   Gr.  338. 

630,  approved  in  Misa  v.  Currie,  L.  ^Grant  v.  Taylor,  3  J.   &  S.    (N. 

R.    1    App.    Cas.    554;    Muench    v.  Y.)  338. 
Valley  Nat.  Bank,  11  Mo.  App.  144; 


253  BANKERS    LIENS.  ^    244 

§  244.  Banker's  lien  on  securities  of  his  debtor. — A  banker 
has  a  Hen  on  all  securities  of  his  debtor  in  his  hands  for  the 
general  balance  of  his  account,  unless  such  a  lien  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  actual  or  presumed  intention  of  the  parties.' 
The  lien  attaches  to  notes  and  bills  and  other  business  paper 
which  the  customer  has  intrusted  to  the  bank  for  collection, 
as  well  as  to  his  general  account.*^  Whether  there  is  such 
a  lien  in  a  particular  case  depends  upon  the  circumstances 
attending  it.  If  there  is  nothing  in  the  transaction  which 
repels  the  presumption  that  the  banker  gave  credit  on  the 
strength  of  the  debtor's  securities  in  his  hands,  he  has  a  lien 
upon  them  for  the  general  balance  due  him  from  the  debtor. 
And  so  if  the  securities  be  deposited  after  the  credit  was 
given,  the  banker  has  a  lien  for  his  general  balance  of  ac- 
count, unless  there  be  an  express  contract  or  circumstances 
that  show  an  implied  contract  inconsistent  with  such  lien. 

A  banker  has  a  lien  for  a  general  balance  of  account  upon 
securities  left  with  him  by  a  customer  without  any  special 
agreement;'^  and  if  a  portion  of  the  securities  so  left  be  after- 
wards pledged  to  secure  a  particular  debt,  the  banker  has 
a  lien  upon  the  securities  not  so  pledged  for  his  balance  of 
account.^ 

^Davis  V.   Bowsher,  5  T.   R.  488,  Bank,    63    App.    Div.    (N.    Y.)    177, 

per    Lord   Kenyon ;    Kelly  v.    Phe-  71  N.  Y.  S.  416. 

Ian,  5  Dill.   (U.  S.)  228;  Fed.   Cas.  eRarnett  v.   Brandao,  6  M.  &  G. 

No.    7673;    Brandao    v.    Barnett,    6  630;   Ex  parte    Pease,   1   Rose  232; 

Man.    &    Gr.   630,   3    C.    B.    519,    12  Ex  parte  Wakefield   Bank.  1  Rose 

CI.    &   F.    787;   approved    in    Lon-  243;    Scott    v.    Franklin,    15    East 

don   Chartered    Bank  of  Australia  428. 

V.  White,  L.  R.  4  App.  Cas.  413,  ^Davis  v.  Bowsher,  5  T.  R.  481. 
and  in  Misa  v.  Currie,  L.  R.  1  8  Dumont  v.  Fry,  13  Fed.  423, 
App.  Cas.  554;  In  re  European  reversed  130  U.  S.  354,  32  L.  ed. 
Bank,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  App.  41 ;  Wyman  934,  9  Supt.  Ct.  486.  Where  collat- 
V.  Colorado  Nat.  Bank,  5  Colo.  30,  eral  is  delivered  to  a  bank  to  se- 
40  Am.  Rep.  133;  In  re  Williams,  cure  certain  named  rates  "or  any 
3  Jr.  Eq.  346,  20  L.  T.  N.  S.  282;  other  liability"  of  the  maker,  the 
Lehman  v.  Tallassee  Mfg.  Co.,  64  bank  is  authorized  to  sell  the  col- 
Ala.  567;  Delahunty  v.  Central  Nat.  lateral  for  the  payment  of  any  in- 


§  245 


LIENS. 


254 


§  245.    Banker's  lien  only  secures  debts  that  are  due. — A 

banker's  lien  secures  only  such  debts  as  are  due  and  paya- 
ble to  the  banker  at  the  time  he  claims  to  retain  his  cus- 
tomer's funds  or  securities.^  If  a  bank  discounts  a  note  for  a 
customer,  and  places  the  proceeds  to  his  account,  it  has 
no  right  to  retain  the  amount  of  his  general  deposit  to  apply 
upon  an  indebtedness  of  the  customer  not  yet  matured.  To 
do  this  would  be  in  complete  hostility  to  the  purpose  con- 
templated in  the  contract  of  discount.  "The  purpose  exist- 
ing and  understood  by  the  parties  in  that  act  is,  that  the 
customer  of  the  bank  may  draw  out  at  his  pleasure  the 
avails  of  the  discount.  After  the  paper  discounted  falls  due 
and  payable  and  remains  unpaid,  unless  other  rights  have 
intervened,  the  bank  may  hold  a  balance  of  deposits  and 
apply  it  toward  the  payment  of  the  paper.     But  these  de- 


debtedness  owed  by  the  pledgor 
to  the  bank.  Cross  v.  Brown,  (R. 
I.)  33  Atl.  370. 

3  Jordan  v.  National  Shoe  & 
Leather  Bank,  74  N.  Y.  467, 
30  Am.  Rep.  319;  Beckwith 
V.  Union  Bank,  4  Sandf.  (N. 
Y.)  604.  In  the  latter  case 
a  depositor  was  an  indorser 
on  a  bill  held  by  the  bank.  He 
made  a  general  assignment  for  the 
benefit  of  his  creditors  before  the 
bill  matured,  and  at  that  time 
there  was  a  balance  to  his  ac- 
count at  the  bank  nearly  equal  to 
the  amount  of  the  indorsed  bill. 
The  bill  was  protested  at  maturity 
and  charged  to  his  account  by  the 
bank,  before  notice  of  the  assign- 
ment was  given  to  the  bank.  It 
was  held,  however,  that  the  as- 
signee was  entitled  to  recover  the 
entire  sum  in  deposit,  the  situa- 
tion of  the  bank  not  being  affected 
by  want  of  notice  of  the  assign- 
ment.   In  a  case  in  Illinois,  Fourth 


Nat.  Bank  v.  City  Nat.  Bank,  68 
111.  398,  where  a  customer  obtained 
a  discount  of  his  note  at  a  bank, 
and  the  money  was  placed  to  his 
credit,  and  he  became  insolvent  be- 
fore the  maturity  of  the  note,  hav- 
ing at  the  time  a  deposit  to  his 
credit  against  a  part  of  which  he 
had  drawn  a  check,  it  was  held  that 
the  bank  had  no  lien  as  against 
the  check  holder  who  presented 
this  check  for  payment  before  the 
maturity  of  the  note.  The  value 
of  this  decision  as  an  authority 
elsewhere  is  impaired  by  the  rule 
adopted  in  this  state  that  a  check 
is  an  appropriation  of  so  much  of 
the  depositor's  account,  giving  him 
a  right  of  action  for  it  against  the 
bank.  See  Bollard  v.  Bygrave, 
Ry.  &  M.  271.  In  case  a  note  is 
discounted  by  the  bank  for  its  de- 
positor it  will  have  no  lien  on  his 
funds  until  the  note  matures. 
Smith  V.  Eighth  Ward  Bank,  31 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  6,  52  N.  Y.  290. 


255  banker's  liens.  §  247 

posits  in  a  bank  create  between  it  and  the  depositor  the 
relation  of  debtor  and  creditor.  Now  a  debtor  in  one  sum 
has  no  Hen  upon  it  in  his  hands,  for  the  payment  of  a  debt 
owed  by  him,  which  has  not  yet  matured ;  nor  has  a  bank, 
more  than  any  other  debtor.  Both  hold,  as  debtors,  the 
moneys  of  their  creditors,  and  may  set  up  no  claim  to  them 
not  given  by  the  law  of  set-off,  counterclaim,  recoupment, 
or  kindred  rules. "^^ 

§  246.  Rule  in  equity. — In  equity  it  has  been  held  that  the 
lien  of  a  bank  may  attach  before  the  indebtedness  has  ma- 
tured. Thus,  where  a  depositor,  having  obtained  a  discount 
at  a  bank,  died  before  the  note  matured,  upon  evidence  of 
danger  that  his  estate  and  also  the  indorser's  would  prove 
to  be  insolvent,  it  was  held  that  the  bank  should  be  allowed 
to  retain  enough  of  the  funds  of  the  depositor  in  the  hands 
of  the  bank  to  meet  the  note  when  it  should  be  due.^^ 

Of  course  securities  may  by  express  agreement  be  pledged 
to  cover  debts  not  matured  or  contingent  liabilities;^-  but 
such  a  lien  is  a  different  thing  from  a  banker's  implied  gen- 
eral lien. 

But  ordinarily  equity  follows  the  statute  and  the  law  in 
regard  to  a  set-off,  unless  there  are  peculiar  circumstances 
presented.  The  insolvency  of  a  debtor  sometimes  moves 
equity  to  grant  a  set-off  which  would  not  be  allowed  at  law; 
and  that  consideration  doubtless  much  moved  the  court  in 
the  Virginia  case  above  cited. ^^ 

§  247.  Customer's  several  accounts  regarded  as  one  ac- 
count.— If  a  customer  keeps  several  deposit  accounts  with 

loPer    Folger,    J.,    in    Jordan    v.  i^Merchants'  Bank  of  London  v. 

Nat.  Shoe   &  Leather  Bank,  74  N.  Maud,  19  W.  R.  657. 

Y.  467,  30  Am.  Rep.  319.  i3  Jordan  v.  Nat.  Shoe  &  Leather 

11  Ford's    Admr.    v.    Thornton,    3  Bank,   74   N.    Y.   467,   30   Am.    Rep. 

Leigh  (Va.)  695.     See  Fourth  Nat.  319,  per  Folger,  J. 
Bank    v.    City    Nat.    Bank,   68    111. 
398. 


§    247  LIENS.  256 

a  bank,  they  are  to  be  regarded  as  one  account  as  regards 
the  bank's  right  of  Hen.  Thus,  if  a  customer,  as  a  matter 
of  convenience,  keeps  with  a  bank  three  accounts,  namely,  a 
loan  account,  a  discount  account  and  a  general  account,  and 
becomes  a  debtor  to  the  bank  on  one  account,  the  bank  has  a 
lien  for  the  debt  upon  the  customer's  balance  upon  another 
account.^^  "In  truth,"  said  Lord  Justice  James,  "as  between 
banker  and  customer,  whatever  number  of  accounts  are  kept 
in  the  books,  the  whole  is  really  but  one  account,  and  it  is 
not  open  to  the  customer,  in  the  absence  of  some  special 
contract,  to  say  that  the  securities  which  he  deposits  are 
only  applicable  to  one  account."  Of  course  this  rule  applies 
only  where  all  the  accounts  belonged  to  the  depositor  in  the 
same  capacity. 

A  bank  discounted  for  a  customer,  bills  of  exchange  drawn 
against  goods  consigned  to  India  upon  the  security  of  the 
bills  of  lading.  As  a  further  security  against  a  fall  in  the 
price  of  the  goods,  the  bank  retained  a  sum  from  the  full 
discount  value  of  the  bills,  and  carried  this  to  a  suspense 
account  until  it  should  receive  advice  of  the  payment  of  the 
bills,  and  gave  to  the  customer  accountable  receipts  for  such 
margins  or  sums  retained.  This  was  the  usual  course  of 
dealing  between  the  parties;  and  it  was  also  the  habit  of  the 
bank,  when  it  had  been  advised  that  the  bills  had  been  paid 
in  full,  to  carry  over  the  retained  margin  to  the  credit  of 
the  customer  in  his  general  banking  account.  The  customer 
pledged  three  of  such  receipts  with  a  party  who  gave  notice 
to  the  bank  of  such  assignment.  On  the  same  day  the  cus- 
tomer suspended  payment,  being  largely  indebted  to  the 
bank  upon  an  overdrawn  account  and  on  suspended  accounts. 
It  was  held  that  the  bank  was  entitled  to  a  lien  on  the  receipts 
for  such  margins  or  suspended  account  for  such  sums  as  were 
actually  due  and  payable  to  it  at  the  times  when  the  receipts 
became  payable,   in   respect  of  liabilities   contracted   before 

i4ln  re   European   Bank,  L.  R.  8    Ch.  App.  41. 


257 


BANKER  S    LIENS. 


248 


notice  was  received  by  the  bank  of  the  pledge  or  assignment 
of  the  receipts. ^^ 

§  248.     Lien  attaches  only  to  securities  of  the  customer. — 

As  a  general  rule  the  lien  attaches  only  to  securities  belong- 
ing to  the  customer  in  his  own  right,  unless  the  securities  be 
transferable  by  delivery,  or  have  been  intrusted  to  the  cus- 
tomer by  the  owner  in  such  a  way  that  he  appears  to  be 
the  owner,  andvhas  the  power  of  transferring  them  as  if 
they  were  his  own;  in  which  case  the  banker  receiving  the 
securities  in  good  faith  may  acquire  a  title  which  the  cus- 
tomer did  not  have.^*'  If  the  property  is  subject  to  a  trust,  of 
which  the  banker  must  necessarily  have  notice,  or  of  which 
he  actually  has  notice,  the  trust  must  prevail  against  the 
banker's  lien.^" 

If  a  depositor  keeps  two  accounts,  one  of  which  is  a  trust 
account,  the  bank  can  acquire  no  lien  on  the  latter  account 
for  a  deficiency  in  the  individual  account.  If  the  banker 
has  knowledge  of  this,  he  is  liable  for  permitting  the  cus- 
tomer to  transfer  money  from  his  trust  account  to  his  private 
account. ^^  A  banker  has  no  lien  on  the  deposit  of  a  partner 
on  his  separate  account  for  a  balance  due  to  the  bank  from 
the  firm.^^ 


i"'Jeffryes  v.  Agra  &  Master- 
man's  Bank,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  674,  35 
L.  J.  (N.  S.)  Ch.  686,  14  W.  R. 
889. 

isBarnett  v.  Brandao,  6  M.  &  G. 
630,  per  Lord  Denman,  C.  J.;  Col- 
lins V.  Martin,  1  Bos.  &  P.  648. 
If  the  payee  of  a  check  given  for 
a  particular  purpose  deposits  it  in 
his  own  name  in  a  bank  and  the 
bank  makes  advances  to  him  on 
the  faith  of  the  deposit,  not  hav- 
ing notice  of  the  trust,  its  rights 
are  superior  to  those  of  the  drawer 
of  the  check.  Erisman  v.  Delaware 


County  Nat.  Bank,  1  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
144,  Z7  W.  N.  C.  518.  See  also, 
Cockrill  v.  Joyce,  62  Ark.  216,  35  S. 
W.  221;  Hill  v.  Miles.  83  Ark.  486, 
104  S.  W.  198. 

iT^Manningford  v.  Toleman,  1 
Coll.  670;  Locke  v.  Prescott,  Z2 
Beav.  261. 

18  Bodenham  v.  Hoskins,  2  De  G., 
M.  &  G.  903. 

i^Watts  v.  Christie,  11  Beaver 
546;  Ex  parte  City  Bank  Case,  3 
De  G.,  F.  &  J.  629;  Raymond  v. 
Palmer,  41  La.  Ann.  425,  6  So.  692, 
17  Am.  St.  398. 


17 


§    249  LIENS.  258 

§  249.  No  lien  on  trust  securities. — One  can  not  create  an 
effectual  lien  by  an  agreement  to  transfer  to  a  bank  securities 
which  he  holds  in  trust,  though  they  stand  in  his  own  name 
and  are  within  his  control.  The  agreement  to  transfer  does 
not  amount  to  the  same  thing  as  an  actual  transfer,  so  far 
as  the  rights  of  the  beneficial  owner  are  concerned;  for  the 
bank  will  not  have  a  lien  by  the  agreement  as  against  such 
owner.  Thus,  one  holding  shares  in  a  banking  company  in 
his  own  name,  though  part  of  them  were  purchased  with  trust 
funds,  and  were  in  fact  held  in  trust,  agreed  to  transfer  a  cer- 
tain number  of  shares  to  the  banking  company  as  security  for 
advances;  but  no  transfer  was  actually  made,  and  he  be- 
came bankrupt  without  having  shares  sufficient  to  satisfy  the 
trust  and  his  agreement  to  assign.  It  was  held  that  the 
banking  company  had  no  lien  on  the  shares  held  in  trust. -'^ 
Referring  to  the  trustee's  agreement  to  transfer,  Lord  Cot- 
tenham.  Lord  Chancellor,  said :  "All  that  he  has  done  has 
been  an  attempt  to  commit  a  breach  of  trust,  and  a  fraud 
undoubtedly  on  the  bank,  by  saying,  T  will  pledge  these 
shares  so  standing  in  my  name  for  the  purpose  of  securing 
the  debt  which  I  owe  to  you.'  Then  here  are  two  equities, 
that  is  to  say,  here  is  a  trustee  of  the  property,  which  he 
held  for  the  benefit  of  the  cestuis  que  trust,  endeavoring  to 
create  an  equity  upon  that  property  to  secure  his  own  debt. 
Which  of  these  two  equities  is  to  prevail?  Undoubtedly  the 
former." 

§  250.  No  lien  on  fiduciaries'  accounts. — A  bank  receiv- 
ing deposits  to  the  account  of  a  customer,  as  executor,  ad- 
ministrator, trustee  or  agent  is  chargeable  with  notice  of  the 
trust,  and  can  not  have  a  lien  upon  the  deposits  to  secure 
his  private  debts  to  the  bank.-^     If  the  bank  officers  have 

-OMurray  v.  Pinkett,  12  CI.  &  F.  opening  of  an  account  as  executor 

764.  operated  as   a   notice   to  the   bank 

-1  Bailey  v.  Finch,   L.  R.  7  Q.   B.  of  the  trust,  it   being  a  statement 

34.      Blackburn,    J.,    said    that    the  to  the  bank  :  "This  account  which  I 


259  banker's  liens.  .  §  250 

actual  knowledge  that  the  money  deposited  by  a  customer  is 
held  by  him  in  a  fiduciary  capacity,  the  bank  for  stronger 
reasons  is  affected  with  equities  of  the  beneficial  owners 
of  the  fund.  Thus,  where  a  customer  opened  an  account 
with  a  bank  in  his  own  name,  as  general  agent,  and  it  was 
known  to  the  bank  that  he  was  the  agent  of  an  msurance 
company;  that  the  conducting  of  this  agency  was  his  chief 
business;  that  the  account  was  opened  to  facilitate  that  busi- 
ness, and  was  used  as  a  means  of  accumulating  the  premiums 
on  policies  collected  by  him  for  the  company,  and  of  making 
payments  to  it  by  checks,  the  bank  is  chargeable  with  notice 
of  the  equitable  rights  of  the  company,  though  he  deposited 
his  own  money  to  the  same  account  and  drew  checks  against 
it  for  his  private  use.  Therefore,  when  such  depositor  bor- 
rowed money  from  the  bank  for  his  own  use  upon  the 
security  of  his  wife's  name  and  property,  and  the  loan  not 
being  paid  it  was  charged  to  the  depositor's  account  as  gen- 
eral agent,  it  was  held  that  the  bank  had  no  lien  as  against 
the  insurance  company  on  such  deposits.--  Mr.  Justice 
Matthews,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  said:  "Evi- 
dently the  bank  has  no  better  right  than  the  depositor,  un- 
less it  can  obtain  it  through  its  banker's  lien.  Ordinarily,  that 
attaches  in  favor  of  the  bank  upon  the  securities  and  moneys 

am  opening  is  not  my  own  unlimit-  a  profitable    one   to   the   bank  was 

ed  property,  but  it  is  money  which  alleged  by  the  customer  as  a  rea- 

belongs  to  the   estate  which  I  am  son  why  he  should  have  the  accom- 

administering  as  executor;  conse-  modation;  but   it  was  not  pledged 

quently,     there     may     be     persons  for  the  payment  of  the  loan,  either 

who    have    equitable    claims    upon  in    express  terms,   or  by  any  acts 

it."     The  bank  would  be  bound  by  or  conduct  from  which  such  an  in- 

any  equity  which   did  exist  in  an-  tention  could  be  inferred.     But,  as 

other.      And    see    Jones    on    Col-  against  the  insurance  company,  it 

lateral   Securities,   (3d   ed.)    §   474;  could  have  made  no  difference  if 

Wagner  v.  Citizens'  Bank  &  Trust  the    depositor    had    attempted    to 

Co.,   122  Tenn.   164,   122  S.   W.  245.  pledge  his  account;   for   the   bank 

22National     Bank    v.     Insurance  had    notice    that    this    did    not    be- 

Co.,    104   U.    S.    54,    26    L.    ed.   693.  long  to  him. 
The   existence   of   this   account   as 


§    251  .  LIENS.  260 

of  the  customer  deposited  in  the  usual  course  of  lousiness; 
for  advances  which  are  supposed  to  be  made  upon  their 
credit.  It  attaches  to  such  securities  and  funds,  not  only 
against  the  depositor,  but  against  the  unknown  equities  of 
all  others  in  interest,  unless  modified  or  waived  by  some 
agreement,  express  or  implied,  or  by  conduct  inconsistent 
with  its  assertion.  But  it  can  not  be  permitted  to  prevail 
against  the  equity  of  the  beneficial  owner,  of  which  the 
bank  has  notice,  either  actual  or  constructive.  In  the  pres- 
ent case,  in  addition  to  the  circumstance  that  the  account 
was  opened  and  kept  by  [the  depositor]  in  his  name  as  gen- 
eral agent,  and  all  the  presumptions  properly  arising  upon 
it,  we  have  found  that  other  facts  proven  on  the  hearing 
justify  and  require  the  conclusion  that  the  bank  had  full 
knowledge  of  the  sources  of  the  deposits  made  by  [the 
depositor]  in  this  account,  and  of  his  duty  to  remit  and 
account  for  them  as  agent  for  the  insurance  company.  It  is, 
consequently,  chargeable  with  notice  of  the  equities  of  the 
[insurance  company]." 

§  251.     No  lien  on  pledged  securities  for  general  debts. — 

A  banker  or  broker  holding  securities  pledged  for  the  pay- 
ment of  a  particular  debt,  or  deposited  for  a  special  pur- 
pose, has  no  lien  upon  them  for  a  general  balance  of  account 
or  for  the  payment  of  other  claims.-^  The  general  lien  is 
limited  and  defined  by  the  express  contract.  Thus,  if  a 
partnership  and  an  individual  member  of  the  firm  have  ac- 
counts with  the  same  bank,  and  the  partner  deposits  certain 

23Vanderzee  v.  Willis,  3  Bro.  Nat.  Bank,  131  Mass.  14;  Jarvis 
Ch.  21;  In  re  Medewe's  Trust,  26  v.  Rogers,  IS  Mass.  389.  New 
Beav.  588;  In  re  Gross,  24  L.  T.  York:  Lane  v.  Bailey,  47  Barb. 
(N.  S.)  198;  Armstrong  V.  Chemical  (N.  Y.)  395;  Wyckoff  v.  Anthony, 
Nat.  Bank,  41  Fed.  234,  6  L.  R.  A.  90  N.  Y.  442,  affirming  9  Daly  (N. 
226n ;  Reynes  v.  Dumont,  130  U.  Y.)  417;  Davenport  v.  Bank  of 
S.  354,  32  L.  ed.  934,  9  Sup.  Ct.  486.  Buffalo,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.)  12.  Ken- 
Massachusetts :  Brown  v.  New  tucky :  Woolley  v.  Louisville 
Bedford  Inst,  for  Savings,  137  Banking  Co.,  81  Ky.  527,  5  Ky.  L. 
Mass.  262;  Hathaway  v.  Fall  River  562. 


26i  banker's  liens.  §  251 

railway  shares  as  collateral  security  for  a  certain  promissory 
note  of  his  own  discounted  by  the  bank,  or  for  any  sums 
he  may  thereafter  owe  to  the  bank,  the  fact  that  the  shares 
were  the  property  of  the  firm,  and  that  the  discounts  ob- 
tained by  the  use  of  them  were  employed  for  the  purposes 
of  the  firm,  does  not  entitle  the  bank  to  hold  the  shares  as 
a  security  for  a  balance  due  him  from  the  firm.-^ 

A  customer  of  a  bank  deposited  with  it  as  security  for  his 
current  indebtedness  on  discounts  the  note  of  a  third  person 
secured  by  mortgage,  and  afterwards  withdrew  the  same 
for  the  purpose  of  foreclosure  and  collection,  under  an  agree- 
ment to  return  the  proceeds  or  to  furnish  other  securities. 
He  purchased  the  mortgaged  property  at  the  foreclosure  sale, 
and  at  the  request  of  the  bank  deposited  with  it  the  deed  of 
the  property.  His  indebtedness  to  the  bank  was  afterwards 
fully  paid,  and  for  a  time  he  had  no  dealings  with  it.  After- 
wards he  incurred  other  debts  to  it,  and  was  largely  indebted 
to  it  when  he  became  a  bankrupt.  It  was  held  that  the  bank 
had  no  equitable  lien  on  the  property  mentioned  in  the  deed.-^ 

Thus,  also,  where  a  deposit  was  made  in  a  bank  for  the 
express  purpose  of  paying  coupons  which  had  been  made 
payable  at  the  bank,  it  was  held  that  the  bank,  having  ac- 
cepted the  deposit,  knowing  the  purpose  for  which  it  was 

-4Ex  parte  City  Bank  Case,  3  count,  said  that  it  was  untenable: 
De  G.,  F.  &  J.  629.  Lord  Campbell,  "First,  that  it  disregards  the  fact 
L.  C. :  "It  cannot  be  said  that  a  that  one  of  the  parties  to  the  con- 
contract  was  entered  into  by  tract,  [the  bank],  did  not  even 
which  the  shares  were  not  to  be  know  of  the  partnership  title,  and 
a  security  for  the  separate  debt  dealt  with  the  transaction  as  a 
of  [the  partner],  and  were  to  be  transaction  on  the  separate  ac- 
a  security  for  the  joint  debt  of  the  count;  and,  secondly,  that  it  dis- 
partnership."  Turner,  L.  J.,  re-  regards  also  the  distinction  be- 
ferring  to  the  argument  that  the  tween  the  rights  and  liabilities  of 
shares  having  become  the  prop-  the  parties  to  the  contract,  and  the 
erty  of  the  partnership,  the  pledge  extent  of  the  contract  itself." 
must  be  taken  to  have  been  on  the  -•"•Railroad  Co.  v.  McKinley,  99 
joint  and  not  on  the   separate  ac-  U.  S.  147,  25  L.   ed.  272. 


§    252  LIENS.  262 

made,  could  not  retain  the  money  and  apply  it  to  a  prior 
indebtedness  of  the  depositor  on  another  account.-^ 

§  252.  Surplus  of  pledged  securities. — Where,  however, 
the  bankers  have  the  right  to  sell  the  security  pledged  for 
a  specified  debt,  after  they  have  epcercised  this  right,  and 
have  in  their  hands  a  surplus  of  money  remaining  after  satis- 
fying the  specific  charge,  they  may  set  off  this  money  against 
further  sums  due  to  them.-" 

But  before  a  sale,  and  while  the  security  is  held  with  a 
mere  power  of  sale,  which  the  debtor  or  his  assignee  may 
defeat,  and  which  the  bankers  had  not  even  signified  their 
election  to  exercise,  the  bankers  are  not  in  a  position  to  set 
off  the  debts  due  them  against  the  surplus  proceeds  of  the 
securities  which  might  arise  in  case  they  should  sell  them 
under  the  power. ^^ 

Where  a  customer  deposited  a  life  insurance  policy  with 
his  bankers,  accompanied  by  a  memorandum  of  charge  to 
secure  overdrafts,  not  exceeding  a  specified  amount,  it  was 
held  that  the  bankers'  general  lien  was  displaced,  and  the 
charge  was  limited  to  the  amount  specified.  The  court  re- 
garded it  as  inconsistent  with  the  terms  of  the  agreement 
that  the  bankers  should  claim  a  general  lien  under  an  implied 
contract,  when  by  the  express  contract  the  charge  was  limit- 
ed to  a  stipulated  sum.-^ 

-6Bank   of   the   United   States   v.  the    property    included    in    the    de- 

Macalester,  9  Pa.  St.  475.  posited   deeds,   and   in   Strathmore 

27Jones    V.    Peppercorne,    Johns.  v.    Vane   the   security  was    limited 

Ch.     430;     Judy     v.     Farmers'     &  to  cover  a  part  only  of  the  debt. 

Traders'  Bank,  81  Mo.  404.  See,  also,  In  re  Medewe,  26  Beav. 

^SBrown   v.   New   Bedford   Inst.  588,    5   Jur.    (N.    S.)    421,    28    L.   J. 

for  Savings,  137  Mass.  262.  Ch.  891,  where   it  was  held  that  a 

29  Strathmore     v.     Vane,     L.     R.  security   given    by    a    customer    to 

33  Ch.  Div.  586.    To  like  effect  see  his  bankers  for  the  balance  "which 

Wylde   v.  Radford,  33  L.  J.    (Ch.)  shall  or  may  be  found  due  on  the 

51,  12  W.  R.  38,  9  Jur.  (N.  S.)  1169,  balance    of"   the    account,   covered 

which  cannot  be  distinguished,  ex-  the  existing  account  only,  and  not 

cept    that    in    the    latter    case    the  a  floating  balance, 
security  was  limited  to  a  part   of 


263  banker's  liens.  §  255 

§  253.  Nature  and  extent  of  lien  as  dependent  upon  terms 
of  contract. — If  a  lien  is  given  to  bankers  by  express  contract, 
the  nature  and  extent  of  the  lien  depend  upon  the  terms 
of  the  contract.  Thus,  where  an  agreement  was  made  by 
a  contractor  about  to  furnish  certain  manufactured  articles  to 
the  government  that  advances,  to  be  made  by  a  bank  to  en- 
able him  to  fulfil  his  contract,  should  be  a  lien  on  the  drafts  to 
be  drawn  by  him  on  the  government  for  the  proceeds  of  the 
articles  manufactured,  it  was'  held  that  the  bank  had  no 
lien  on  a  judgment  obtained  against  the  government  for 
damages  for  violation  of  the  contract,  all  the  drafts  drawn 
upon  the  government  for  the  articles  manufactured  and  de- 
livered having  been  paid  in  full  to  the  bank.^*^ 

§  254.  No  lien  on  box  containing  securities. — ^Bankers 
have  no  lien  on  a  box  containing  securities  deposited  with 
them  by  a  customer  for  safe  keeping,  he  keeping  the  key 
and  having  access  to  the  box,  and  the  bankers  not  having 
access  to  the  contents  of  it.^^  The  same  rule  would  apply 
to  securities  left  with  a  banker  for  safe  keeping  in  a  sealed- 
up  parcel,^-  and  to  a  box  of  plate  deposited  in  the  bank 
vaults  for  safe  custody.^^ 

§  255.  Circumstances  effecting  lien. — There  can  be  no  lien 
where  the  securities  have  come  into  the  banker's  hands  un- 

30  Bank  of  Washington  v.   Nock,  E.  273.     See,  also,  First  Nat.  Bank 

9  Wall.   (U.  S.)  2,7i,  19  L.   ed.  717.  v.  Scott,  123  N.  Car.  538,  31  S.  E. 

Where    a    rate    is    put    up    as    col-  819;    Fullerton    v.    Chatham    Nat. 

lateral  at  a  bank  that  "the  above  Bank,  17  Misc.   (N.  Y.)  529,  40  N. 

collateral     is     also     put   up     and  Y.  S.  874;  Bacon's  Admr.  v.  Bacon's 

pledged     *     *     *      for    any    other  Trustees,  94  Va.  686,  27  S.  E.  576; 

note    or    indebtedness    which    the  Malone     v.     Wright,     (Tex.     Civ. 

holder  now  has  or  may  hereafter  App.),  34  S.  W.  455. 

have  against  me,"  it  is  held  to  be  siLeese  v.   Martin,   L.  R.   17  Eq. 

retained    as    collateral    for    notes  224. 

given    for    stock    in    the    creditor  32Per    Hall,    V.    C,    in    Leese    v. 

bank.     Stanley  v.  Chicago  Trust  &  Martin,  L.  R.  17  Eq.  224. 

Savings    Bank,   165    111.   295,   46   N.  ssEx  parte  Eyre,  1  Ph.  227. 


§    255  LIENS.  264 

der  circumstances  inconsistent  with  the  existence  of  a  gen- 
eral lien.  A  Portuguese  merchant  residing  in  Lisbon  em- 
ployed his  correspondent,  a  merchant  in  London,  to  invest 
money  for  him  in  exchequer  bills.  The  latter  purchased 
the  bills  and  deposited  them  in  a  box  that  he  kept  at  his 
bankers',  the  key  of  which  he  himself  retained.  Whenever 
it  became  necessary  to  receive  the  interest  on  the  bills  and 
to  exchange  them  for  new  ones,  the  London  merchant  was 
in  the  habit  of  taking  them  out  of  the  box  and  giving  them  to 
the  bankers  for  that  purpose ;  and  when  such  purpose  was 
accomplished,  as  soon  as  conveniently  might  be,  the  bankers 
handed  them  or  the  new  bills  back  to  their  customer,  who 
locked  them  up  in  the  box.  The  amount  of  interest  re- 
ceived by  the  bankers  w^as  passed  to  the  credit  of  the  cus- 
tomer. The  bills  themselves  were  never  entered  to  his 
account,  nor  had  the  bankers  any  notice  or  knowledge  that 
they  were  not  the  customer's  own  property.  Finally  the 
customer  delivered  the  exchequer  bills  to  the  bankers  for 
the  purpose  of  receiving  the  interest  and  exchanging  them 
for  new  bills;  but  after  the  exchange,  on  account  of  the  cus- 
tomer's illness,  the  new  bills  remained  in  the  possession  of 
the  bankers  for  some  two  months,  and  until  the  customer's 
failure,  he  having  in  the  meantime  considerably  overdrawn 
his  account.  In  a  suit  by  the  true  owner  of  the  bills  against 
the  bankers,  it  was  held  in  the  House  of  Lords  that  they 
had  no  lien  for  the  general  balance  of  their  account  upon 
the  securities,  although  these  were  transferable  by  delivery.^^ 
Lord  Lyndhurst,  Lord  Chancellor,  said:  "It  is  impossible, 
considering  how  this  business  was  carried  on,  that  we  can 
come  to  any  other  conclusion  than  this,  that  it  was  an  under- 
standing between  the  parties  that  the  new  bills  were  to  be 
returned  after  the  interest  was  received,  or  after  the  old  bills 

•5-iBrandao    v.    Barnett,    3    C.    B.       also    Grant    v.    Taylor,    3    J.    &    S. 
519,   12  CI.   &  F.  787,  overruling   1       (N.   Y.)    338. 
M.  &  G.  908,  2  Scott,  N.  R.  96.    See 


265  banker's  liens.  §  257 

had  been  exchanged.  If  so — if  that  was  the  understanding 
— or  if  that  was  the  fair  inference  from  the  transaction,  it  is 
quite  clear  that  there  could  be  no  lien,  that  it  does  not  come 
within  the  general  rule.  *  *  *  Although  from  the  accidental 
circumstance  of  the  illness  of  [the  customer],  the  particular 
bills  happened  to  remain  for  a  longer  period  in  the  hands  of 
the  bankers  than  was  usual,  that  accidental  circumstance 
alone  will  not  vary  the  case,  or  give  the  bankers  a  lien,  if 
under  other  circumstances  that  lien  would  not  attach."  Lord 
Campbell  concurring,  on  another  point  said:  "No  reliance, 
I  think,  can  be  placed  on  the  circumstances  of  the  interest 
received  on  the  old  exchequer  bills  going  to  the  credit  of  the 
account  of  the  customer;  for  while  he  gives  the  bankers  the 
interest  to  keep  for  him  with  one  hand,  he  locks  up  the  new 
exchequer  bills  in  his  tin  box  with  the  other." 

§  256.     No  lien  on  securities  casually  left  at  the  bank. — 

A  banker  has  no  lien  on  securities  casually  left  with  him  after 
he  has  refused  to  advance  money  on  them.  In  a  leading  case 
on  this  point,  a  person  went  to  a  banker  to  raise  a  certain 
sum  of  money  on  the  security  of  a  lease.  The  banker  con- 
sidered the  proposition  and  rejected  it.  But  the  lease,  in 
the  language  of  the  report,  was  "casually  left"  in  the  pos- 
session of  the  bankers,  and  the  bankruptcy  of  the  owner  of 
the  lease  having  afterwards  happened,  the  bankers  claimed 
they  were  entitled  to  hold  this  lease  by  virtue  of  a  banker's 
lien  upon  it.  The  court  held  that  there  was  no  lien  upon 
the  lease. ^"' 

§  257.  Lien  on  paper  received  for  collection. — A  bank  has 
a  lien  on  paper  received  for  collection  from  a  corresponding 
bank,  although  it  is  not  the  property  of  that  bank,  if  there  be 
nothing  on  the  face  of  the  paper  and  no  notice  in  any  way  to 
the  collecting  bank  that  the  paper  does  not  belong  to  the 

35Lucas  V.  Dorrien,  7  Taunt.  278,       Brandao,  6  Man.  &  Gr.  630;  Petrie 
1   Moore  29.     See,  also,  Barnett  v.      v.  Myers,  54  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  513. 


§    257  LIENS.  266 

bank  that  transmits  it.  In  a  leading  case  before  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  it  appeared  that  two  banks  were 
in  the  habit  of  transmitting  to  each  other  paper  for  collec- 
tion. They  had  for  several  years  an  account  current  be- 
tween them  in  which  they  mutually  credited  each  other  with 
the  proceeds  of  all  paper  remitted  for  collection  which  ap- 
peared to  be  the  property  of  the  respective  banks.  One 
bank  transmitted  to  the  other  certain  paper ;  indorsed  by 
the  bank  which  sent  it,  and  apparently  belonging  to  it,  for 
collection.  The  bank  which  received  the  paper  collected 
it,  and  held  the  proceeds,  when  the  bank  which  had  trans- 
mitted it  proved  to  be  insolvent,  and  indebted  to  the  other 
bank.  The  paper  in  fact  belonged  to  a  third  bank,  which 
brought  suit  against  the  collecting  bank  for  the  proceeds 
of  the  paper.  The  Supreme  Court  held  that  the  bank  which 
had  collected  the  paper,  in  the  absence  of  knowledge  or  no- 
tice of  facts  to  put  it  upon  inquiry  that  the  paper  did  not 
belong  to  its  correspondent,  had  the  same  right  of  lien  for  a 
general  balance  of  account  upon  the  paper  and  its  proceeds 
that  it  would  have  had  if  the  paper  had  actually  belonged  to 
its  correspondent.^^  The  court  said  that  the  plaintifif  bank 
contributed  to  give  to  the  bank  which  proved  insolvent  credit 
with  the  defendant  bank,  by  placing  in  its  hands  paper  which 
was  apparently  the  property  of  the  insolvent  bank,  thus  en- 
abling this  bank  to  deal  with  the  paper  as  if  it  were  the  real 
owner  of  it.  The  defendant  bank,  on  the  other  hand,  was  not 
in  any  way  responsible  for  the  confidence  which  the  plaintiff 
bank  reposed  in  its  agent.  The  superior  equity  is  on  the 
side  of  the  defendant  bank,  which  is  entitled  to  a  lien  for  a 
general  balance  of  account  with  its  corresponding  bank. 

36Bank    of     Metropolis    v.    New  Kearney.    17    Ohio    572;    Miller    v. 

England  Bank,  1  How.  (U.  S.)  234,  Farmers'  and  Mechanics'  Bank,  30 

11  L.  ed.  115,  affirmed  6  How.   (U.  Md.    392.      See.    also,    Hoffman    v. 

S.)  212,   12  L.  ed.  409,  followed  in  Miller,  9  Bosw.   (N.  Y.)  334;  Van 

Russell  V.  Hadduck,  3  Gilm.  (111.)  Namee   v.    Bank  of   Troy,   5   How. 

233,    44   Am.    Dec.   693;    Gordon   v.  Pr.    (N.    Y.)    161. 


267  banker's  liens.  §  259 

§  258.  Lien  on  paper  received  for  collection — Application 
of  doctrine. — A  similar  case  was  decided  in  like  man- 
ner by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Colorado."'  It  appeared 
that  a  customer  of  a  banker  drew  his  draft  on  London, 
payable  to  the  banker,  to  whom  he  delivered  it  to  col- 
lect and  placed  to  the  customer's  account.  The  banker 
indorsed  and  transmitted  the  draft  to  a  national  bank  for 
collection.  At  this  time  the  banker  was  indebted  to  the 
national  bank  for  over-drafts.  The  draft  was  paid,  but  be- 
fore the  proceeds  came  into  the  actual  possession  of  the 
national  bank,  it  received  notice  that  the  drawer  of  the  draft 
had  delivered  it  to  his  banker  for  collection,  and  that  he 
claimed  the  proceeds.  In  a  suit  by  the  drawer  against  the 
national  bank,  it  was  held  that  he  could  not  recover;  but  that 
this  bank  had  a  lien  upon  the  proceeds  for  a  balance  of  ac- 
count against  the  banker  from  whom  the  bank  received  the 
draft.  The  bank  received  the  draft  without  notice  of  the 
equities  between  the  original  parties,  and  thus  became  a 
bona  fide  holder  of  the  draft  for  value. ^^ 

The  possession  of  the  paper  by  the  bank  transmitting  it 
is  regarded  as  prima  facie  evidence  that  it  owned  the  paper; 
and  the  bank  receiving  it,  having  no  notice  to  the  contrary, 
is  entitled  so  to  treat  it. 

§  259.  Doctrine  in  New  York. — This  doctrine  does  not 
apply  in  New  York,  because  under  the  rule  established  in 
Coddington  v.  Bay,^^  the  taking  of  paper  as  security  for, 
or  in  payment  of,  an  antecedent  debt,  is  not  a  valuable  con- 
sideration therefor,  and  therefore  a  collecting  bank  not  mak- 
ing any  present  advance   upon  their  paper,   or  giving  any 

37Wyman  V.  Colorado  Nat.  Bank,  3320  Johns.   (N.  Y.)  637,  11  Am. 

5  Colo.  30,  40  Am.  Rep.  133.  Dec.   342;    Van   Zandt  v.    Hanover 

38In    support    of    this     rule     see  Nat.  Bank,  149  Fed.  27.  79  C.  C.  A. 

Clark  V.  Merchants'  Bank,  2  N.  Y.  23. 
380;  Sweeny  v.  Easter,  1  Wall.  (U. 
S.)  166,  17  L.  ed.  681. 


§    26o  LIENS.  268 

new  credit,  or  assuming  any  new  responsibility  on  the  faith 
of  such  paper,  has  no  Hen  upon  it  for  a  balance  of  account 
arising  from  previous  dealings  between  the  banks. ^"^ 

Where  two  banks  acts  as  collecting  agent  for  each  other, 
keeping  a  running  account  and  settling  balances  at  stated 
intervals,  and  the  collections  not  being  kept  separate  from 
other  funds  of  the  bank,  the  relation  between  the  banks  is 
simply  that  of  debtor  and  creditor.  The  creditor  bank  ac- 
quires no  lien  upon  any  specific  fund,  and  upon  the  failure  of 
the  debtor  bank,  is  not  entitled  to  any  preference  over  other 
creditors."*^ 

§  260.  Lien  on  paper  of  a  corresponding  bank. — If  a  bank 
receives  paper  "for  collection"  from  a  corresponding  bank, 
or  with  other  notice  that  the  paper  does  not  belong  to  the 
latter,  but  that  it  is  sent  for  collection  for  the  account  of 
a  third  person,  such  banker  can  not  retain  the  paper  or  its 
proceeds  to  answer  a  balance  owing  by  the  corresponding 
banker.  If  the  corresponding  banker  indorsed  the  paper  "for 
collection,"  the  negotiability  is  thereby  limited  to  that  pur- 
pose, and,  notwithstanding  the  rule  that  one  who  has  placed 
his  name  on  negotiable  paper  shall  not  afterwards  be  al- 
lowed to  impeach  the  instrument,  the  banker  who  has  in- 
dorsed paper  for  collection  is  competent  to  prove  that  he 
w^as  not  the  owner  of  it,  and  did  not  mean  to  give  title  to 
it  or  to  its  proceeds  when  collected. ^- 

The  fact  that  a  banker  received  the  paper,  with  knowledge 
that  it  was  indorsed  for  collection  only,  may  appear  other- 

40McBride  v.   Farmers'   Bank,  26  4i People  v.   City  Bank  of  Roch- 

N.    Y.   450.     And    see    Lindauer   v.  ester,  93  N.  Y.  582. 

Fourth    Nat.    Bank,    55    Barb.    (N.  -t^Sweeny  v.  Easter,   1   Wall.   (U. 

Y.)  75;   Dod  v.  Fourth  Nat.  Bank,  S.)    166,   17   L.  ed.  681;   Cecil   Bank 

59   Barb.    (N.   Y.)    265.     As   to   the  v.  Farmers'  Bank,  22  Md.  148.  And 

rule     in     Coddington     v.     Bay,     20  see  Bank  of  the  Metropolis  v.  New 

Johns.    (N.    Y.)    637,    11    Am.   Dec.  Eng.  Bank,  6  How.  (U.  S.)  212,  12 

342,  see  Jones  Collateral  Securities  L.  ed.  409. 
(3d  ed.),  §§  117-123. 


269  banker's  liens.  §  261 

wise  than  by  an  indorsement  in  terms  for  collection  only. 
Such  knowledge  may  be  shown  by  any  competent  evidence. 
If  the  paper  be  indorsed  in  blank,  and  sent  to  a  banker  with 
a  letter  of  instructions,  in  which  it  is  stated  that  the  paper 
is  sent  for  collection,  the  banker  is  not  an  assignee  of  the 
paper,  but  merely  an  agent  for  its  collection,  and  can  not 
hold  the  paper  or  its  proceeds  for  a  general  balance  of  ac- 
count due  from  the  correspondent  who  sent  it,  and  who  was 
also  an  agent  for  collection. ^^ 

A  banker's  lien  is  sustained  in  such  case  upon  the  presump- 
tion that  credit  was  given  upon  the  faith  of  the  securities, 
either  in  possession  or  in  expectancy.  If  the  banker  has 
knowledge  of  circumstances  which  should  put  a  prudent  man 
upon  inquiry  as  to  the  title  of  the  securities,  he  is  affected 
with  notice  of  such  facts  as  the  inquiry  would  lead  to.^* 

§  261.  No  lien  where  no  advances  are  made. — The  col- 
lecting bank  can  not,  however,  maintain  a  lien,  if  it  has  made 
no  advances  and  given  no  credit  to  the  corresponding  bank 
on  account  of  the  paper  received  and  collected.  Where  a 
bank  employed  to  collect  paper  transmits  it  to  another  bank^ 
either  by  express  authority  or  under  authority  implied  from 
the  usual  course  of  trade,  or  from  the  nature  of  the  trans- 
action, the  principal  may  treat  the  latter  bank  as  his  agent, 
and,  when  it  has  received  the  money,  may  recover  it  in  an 
action  for  money  had  and  received. ^"^     Where   there   is   no 

43Lawrence  v.  Stonington  Bank,  effect  it  may  have  between  them- 
6  Conn.  521.  The  authorities  re-  selves,  cannot  affect  the  claims  of 
lied  upon  in  this  case  are  Barker  a  third  person,  who  has  confided 
V.  Prentiss,  6  Mass.  430;  Herrick  v.  the  collection  of  a  bill  to  one  of 
Carman,  10  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  224.  them,  without  assent,  either  ex- 
Chief  Justice  Hosmer,  giving  press  or  implied,  to  the  mode  of 
the  opinion,  said :  "The  cus-  transacting  their  business." 
torn  of  transmitting  bills  for  -i-iRussell  v.  Hadduck,  3  Gilman 
collection  from  one  bank  to  (111.)  233,  44  Am.  Dec.  693. 
another,  and  crediting  in  ac-  -JSWilson  v.  Smith,  3  How.  (U. 
count  the  avails  received,  whatever  S.)    763,    11    L.   ed.   820. 


§    26l  LIENS.  270 

mntual  arrangement  between  corresponding  banks,  or  pre- 
vious course  of  dealing  between  them,  whereby  it  is  express- 
ly or  impliedly  understood  that  remittances  of  paper  are  to 
be  placed  to  the  credit  of  the  remitting  bank,  or  where  there 
is  no  credit  given  upon  the  faith  of  the  particular  paper  re- 
mitted, or  of  the  usual  course  of  dealing,  the  collecting  bank 
has  no  lien  upon  the  money  collected  in  that  manner;  and 
the  owner  of  the  bill  or  note  remitted  for  collection,  through 
his  banker,  may  recover  the  amount,  although  the  collecting 
bank  has  placed  the  amount  to  the  credit  of  the  correspond- 
ing bank  in  payment  of  a  subsisting  indebtedness.^^ 

46Millikin  v.  Shapleigh,  36  Mo.  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  265;  Lindauer  v. 
596,  88  Am.  Dec.  171.  And  see,  Fourth  Nat.  Bank,  55  Barb.  (N. 
also,  Dod  V.  Fourth  Xat.  Bank,  59      Y.)   75. 


CHAPTER  VII 


CARRIERS'  LIENS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

262.  Lien    of   common    carrier    on      285. 

goods  carried. 

263.  Origin  of  the  lien.  286. 

264.  Rule  in  some  states. 

265.  Carrier's  lien,  a  specific  lien.      287. 

266.  Condition     giving     carrier    a 

lien.  288. 

267.  Stoppage   in   transitu   not   af- 

fected. 289. 

268.  Owner     bound     by     carrier's 

lien.  290. 

269.  Carrier's   lien   on  passenger's      291. 

baggage. 

270.  Lien  of  carrier  by  water.  292. 

271.  Lien    for   freight. 

272.  No     lien     under     a     charter      293. 

party. 

273.  Master    signing   bills    of   lad-      294. 

ing. 

274.  Terms    of   bill    of   lading.  295. 

275.  No    lien    before     commence- 

ment  of   voyage.  296. 

276.  One    not    a    common    carrier 

has  no  lien  without  reserv-      297. 
ing  it. 

277.  Lien  of  substitute  carrier.  298. 

278.  Agent  of  bailee  has  no  lien. 

279.  Goods  of  the  United   States.      299. 

280.  Insurance   of  goods. 

280a.  Lien    only    for    usual    freight      300. 

rate. 
28L     Carrier's    lien    for    charges,  301. 

282.  No    lien    for    demurrage    im- 

plied. 

283.  Expenses  of  keeping  proper- 

ty rejected.  302. 

284.  Carrier   and   warehouseman. 

271 


Local  custom  for  carriers  by 
water. 

No  lien  for  transportation 
from  a  wharf. 

Shipowner's  lien  for  ex- 
penses. 

Shipowner's  lien  for  contri- 
butions. 

Carrier  has  lien  for  freight 
charges  paid  by  it. 

Lien  for  import   duties   paid. 

First  carrier  a  forwarding 
agent. 

Authority  of  carriers  to  for- 
ward goods. 

Connecting  carrier  has  no 
Hen. 

Guaranty  not  binding  on 
connecting    carrier. 

Xo  lien  where  freight  is  pre- 
paid. 

Way-bill  accompanying 
goods. 

First  carrier  receiving  pay- 
ment. 

Carrier  employed  by  another 
carrier  has  lien. 

Lien  only  for  customary 
freight  rate. 

Second  carrier  bound  by  first 
carrier's    agreement. 

Lien  does  not  cover  ad- 
vances for  matters  not 
connected  with  the  car- 
riage. 

Damage  to  goods  before 
reaching   last    carrier. 


§    262 


LIENS. 


272 


Sec.  Sec. 

303.  Lien  on   stolen  goods.  321. 

304.  American  decisions. 

305.  Carrier's       lien      on       goods      322. 

wrongfully  diverted.  323. 

306.  Apparent    authority    of    ship- 

per. 324. 

307.  The  carrier's  lien  can  not  be 

set  up  by  a  wrongdoer.  325. 

308.  Carrier   may   waive    lien. 

309.  Carrier's     lien    continues     on      326. 

goods  placed  in  warehouse.      327. 

310.  Carrier's    Hen    lost   by    deliv-      328. 

ery.  329. 

311.  Delivery     to     the     consignee 

upon  condition.  330. 

312.  Nature  of  delivery  necessary 

to  terminate  lien.  331. 

313.  Payment    of   freight   and   de- 

livery of  goods.  332. 

314.  Terms  of  charter  party  may 

be      such      that     chartered 
freight  will  not  be  due  un-      332a 
til    cargo    has    been    deliv- 
ered. 333. 

315.  Cargo  in  hands  of  consignee.       334. 

316.  Promise    to    pay    carrier    not 

presumed  from  taking  pos-      335. 
session. 

317.  Lien  continues  when  posses-      336. 

sion    is    secured    by    fraud. 

318.  No  lien  where  goods  are  de-       337. 

livered   through   mistake. 

319.  The   carrier  has  a  lien   upon      338. 

all  the  goods  carried. 

320.  Delivery  of  part  of  the  goods       339. 

not   a  waiver. 


Separate  liens  on  separate 
goods. 

Lien  waived  by  contract. 

Extension  of  time  of  pay- 
ment. 

Promissory  note  does  not 
afifect    carrier's    lien. 

When  carrier  has  no  lien  for 
freight    charges. 

Waiver  of  carrier's   lien. 

W^aiver   of  lien   not   inferred. 

Waiver  by  attachment. 

Action  to  collect  freight 
charges. 

Waiver  by  issuance  of  an  ex- 
ecution. 

Lien  defeated  by  injury  to 
goods. 

Carrier's  lien  not  affected  by 
consignee's  failure  to  re- 
ceive goods. 

Condition  precedent  to  car- 
rier's   lien. 

Carrier's  lien  lost. 

Claiming  general  Hen  does 
not   waive    special    lien. 

Carrier's  lien  founded  on 
possession. 

Sale  of  goods  by  carrier  au- 
thorized by  statutes. 

Sale  by  carrier  must  be 
made  in  good   faith. 

Sale  by  carrier  of  perishable 
goods. 

Statute  of  the  United  States. 


§  262.  Lien  of  common  carrier  on  goods  carried. — A 
common  carrier  has  a  particular  or  specific  lien  upon  the 
goods  carried  for  his  hire  in  carrying  them.^     He  is  invested 

1  Skinner     v.     Upshaw,     2     Ld.  5  Wall.   (U.  S.)  545,  18  L.  ed  662; 

Raym.    752;    Gisbourn   v.    Hurst,    1  Ames  v.  Palmer,  42  Maine  197,  66 

Salk.  249;   Middleton  v.   Fowler,    1  Am.    Dec.    271;    Wilson    v.    Grand 

Salk.    282;    The    Bird    of    Paradise,  Trunk    R.    Co.,    56    Maine    60,    96 


273  carriers'  liens.  §  263 

with  this  peculiar  privilege,  it  is  said,  on  account  of  his  obli- 
gation to  receive  and  carry  any  goods  offered,  and  his  lia- 
bility for  their  safety  in  the  course  of  transportation.^  He 
is  necessarily  in  possession  of  the  goods,  and,  at  the  end  of 
the  journey,  he  is  allowed  to  retain  possession  until  he  re- 
ceives a  reasonable  remuneration  for  his  services.  The  car- 
rier's right  to  retain  the  goods  until  he  is  paid  for  his  services 
is  his  lien.  This  right  is  merely  a  right  of  possession.  The 
property  is  necessarily  supposed  to  be  in  some  other  person. 
One  can  not  have  a  lien  upon  his  own  property.  The  lien 
confers  no  right  of  property.  It  does  not  enable  the  car- 
rier to  sell  the  goods,  except  as  he  is  authorized  to  do  so  by 
some  modern  statute,  even  though  the  keeping  of  them  be 
attended  with  expense  and  inconvenience.^  The  lien  merely 
confers  a  right  of  possession  until  the  charges  for  carriage 
are  paid.  This  right  avails  against  the  true  owner  of  the 
goods,  though  some  one  else  be  liable  for  the  freight,  unless 
they  have  been  shipped  in  fraud  of  the  owner.^ 

§  263.  Origin  of  the  lien. — As  regards  the  origin  of  this 
lien  and  the  reasons  for  its  existence,  it  does  not  seem  neces- 
sary to  go  beyond  the  common-law  principle  that  a  bailee  of 
goods  who  alters  or  improves  their  condition  is  entitled  to  a 

Am.  Dec.  35;   Sullivan  v.   Park,  33  Hilton,  11   Ohio  303;   Sutton  v.  St. 

Maine    38;    Hunt    v.    Haskett,    24  Louis  &  S.  F.  R,  Co.,  159  Mo.  App. 

Maine  339,  41  Am.  Dec.  387;   Pin-  685,  140  S.  W.  76.    A  tender  to  the 

ney  v.  Wells,  10  Conn.  104;  Galena  carrier  for  the  correct  amount  due 

&   Chicago   Union    R.   Co.   v.    Rae,  as    freight   will   discharge   the   car- 

18  III.  488,  68  Am.  Dec.  574;  Clark-  rier's  lien.     Brown  v.  Philadelphia 

son  V.   Edes,  4  Cow.   (N.  Y.)   470;  B.    &   W.    R.    Co..   36   App.    D.    C. 

Langworthy  v.  N.  Y.  &  Harlem  R.  221. 

Co.,   2   E.   D.   Smith    (N.   Y.)    195;  2  Per    Holt,    C.    J.,    in   Yorke    v. 

Barker   v.    Havens,    17   Johns.    (N.  Grenaugh,    2    Ld.    Raym.    866,    per 

Y.)    234,   8  Am.   Dec.  393;   Rucker  Lord    Ellenborough,    in    Rushforth 

V.  Donovan,   13  Kans.  251,  19  Am.  v.    Hatfield,  6   East   519. 
Rep.  84;  Brown  v.  Clayton,  12  Ga.  3  See  post,  §§  335-374. 

564;   Boggs  v.   Martin,   13  B.   Mon.  -t  Robinson    v.     Baker,    5    Cush. 

(Ky.)    239;    Goodman    v.    Stewart,  (Mass.)   137,  51  Am.  Dec.  54. 
Wright    (Ohio)    216;    Bowman    v. 

18 


§    264  LIENS.  274 

Hen  on  them  for  his  compensation.  The  reason  assigned  for 
the  existence  of  the  lien,  that  carriers  are  bound  to  carry  for 
any  persons  who  may  require  them  to  do  so,  does  not  apply 
to  carriers  by  water,  who,  nevertheless,  have  a  lien  for  carry- 
ing goods.  This  lien  for  the  freight  of  goods  carried  by  sea 
does  not  depend  upon  any  peculiar  maritime  law  or  custom. 
It  is  a  common-law  lien  as  much  as  is  the  lien  given  to  car- 
riers by  land;  and  the  common-law  principle  whicl>  lies  at 
the  foundation  of  most  common-law  liens  is  suf^cient  to 
justify  the  lien  of  carriers  by  land,  and  carriers  by  water  as 
well. 

§  264.  Rule  in  some  states. — In  several  states  the  car- 
rier's lien  is  declared  by  statute.  The  statutes  of  these  states 
differ  much  in  the  terms  in  which  the  lien  is  declared.  Some 
of  them  materially  change  the  common-law  rules,  and  there- 
fore it  seems  important  to  give  a  synopsis  of  these  statutes. 

In  Alaska  any  person  who  is  a  common  carrier  or  who 
shall,  at  the  request  of  the  owner  or  lawful  possessor  of  any 
personal  property,  carry,  convey,  or  transport  the  same 
from  one  place  to  another,  shall  have  a  lien  upon  such 
property  for  his  just  and  reasonable  charges  for  the  labor, 
care  and  attention  he  has  bestowed  and  the  food  he  has 
furnished,  and  he  may  retain  possession  of  such  property 
until  such  charges  be  paid.'*'' 

In  California,^  North  Dakota  and  South  Dakota,*^  every 
person  who,  while  lawfully  in  possession  of  an  article  of 
personal  property,  renders  any  service  to  the  owner  thereof, 
by  labor  or  skill,  employed  for  the  protection,  improvement, 
safe-keeping,  or  carriage  thereof,  has  a  special  lien  thereon, 
dependent  on  possession,  for  the  compensation,  if  any,  which 
is  due  to  him  from  the  owner  for  such  service. 

■*a  Carter's    Ann.    Codes    1900,    p.  §   2144   as   amended   by   Stats,   and 

414,   §   277.  Amends.  Codes  1909,  p.  1000. 

5  Civ.     Code     1906,     §     3051,     as  « North  Dakota  Rev.  Code  1905, 

amended    by    Stats,    and    Amends.  §§   5661,  6286;   South  Dakota   Rev. 

Codes     1907,     p.    85.       See     also,  Code   (Civ.)    1903,   §   2153. 


2/5  carriers'  liens.  §  264 

In  Colorado'^  and  Wyoming^  every  common  carrier  of 
goods  or  passengers  who  shall,  at  the  request  of  the  owner 
of  any  personal  goods,  carry,  convey  or  transport  the  same 
from  one  place  to  another,  and  any  warehouseman  or  other 
person  who  shall  safely  keep  or  store  any  personal  property, 
at  the  request  of  the  owner  or  persons  lawfully  in  possession 
thereof,  shall  in  like  manner  have  a  lien  upon  all  such  per- 
sonal property,  for  his  reasonable  charges  for  the  transpor- 
tation, storage,  or  keeping  thereof,  and  for  all  reasonable 
and  proper  advances  made  thereon  by  him  in  accordance 
with  the  usage  and  custom  of  common  carriers  and  ware- 
housemen. 

In  Georgia^  a  carrier  has  a  lien  for  freight  upon  the  goods 
carried,  and  may  retain  them  until  the  freight  is  paid,  un- 
less this  right  is  waived  by  special  contract  or  actual  deliv- 
ery. But  such  lien  does  not  arise  until  the  carrier  has  com- 
plied with  his  contract  as  to  transportation.  He  can,  how- 
ever, recover  pro  rata  for  the  actual  distance  the  goods  are 
carried,  when  the  consignee  voluntarily  receives  the  goods 
at  an  intermediate  point. 

In  Iowa  ^^  personal  property  transported  by,  or  stored  or 
left  with,  any  warehouseman,  forwarding  and  commission 
merchant,  express  company,  carrier  or  bailee  for  hire  is  sub- 
ject to  a  lien  for  the  lawful  charges  on  the  same,  and  for  the 
transportation,  advances,  and  storage  thereof. 

In  Louisiana^^  carriers'  charges  and  the  accessory  ex- 
penses are  a  privilege  on  the  thing  carried,  including  neces- 
sary charges  and  expenses  paid  by  carriers,  such  as  taxes, 
storage,  and  privileged  claims  required  to  be  paid  before 
moving  the  thing. 

7  Mills'  Ann.  Stats.  1912,  §  4.569.      also,  Laws  1907,  ch.  160,  §  27;  Laws 
sComp.  Stats.  1910,  §  3756.  1911,  ch.  155,  §  26. 

9  Code  1911,  §  2741.  11  Merrick's    Rev.    Code    1900,    § 

10  Code  Ann.   1897,   §  3130.     See      3217,  art.  9. 


§    265  LIENS.  276 

In  New  Mexico^^  common  carriers  have  a  lien  on  the 
things  carried  for  the  freight  due,  if  payment  of  freight  was 
to  have  been  made  on  delivery  of  the  things  carried.  All 
persons  carrying  goods  for  hire  or  pay  are  deemed  common 
carriers. 

In  Minnesota^^  and  Oregon^"*  any  person  who  is  a  com- 
mon carrier,  and  any  person  who,  at  the  request  of  the 
owner  or  lawful  possessor  of  any  personal  property,  carries, 
conveys,  or  transports  the  same  from  one  place  to  another, 
and  any  person  who  safely  keeps  or  stores  any  personal 
property,  at  the  request  of  the  owner,  or  lawful  possessor 
thereof,  shall  have  a  lien  and  power  of  sale  for  the  satisfac- 
tion of  his  reasonable  charges,  but  a  voluntary  surrender  of 
possession  shall  extinguish  the  lien  herein  given. 

In  Montana, ^^*  a  carrier  has  a  lien  for  freightage,  which  is 
regulated  by  the  laws  on  liens. 

In  Utah  any  railroad  company  or  other  common  carrier 
except  an  express  company,  after  the  failure  of  the  owner  or 
consignee  for  sixty  days  to  receive  freight  or  baggage  and 
pay  the  charges  may  place  the  same  in  storage,  and  the  per- 
son or  company  receiving  the  same  shall  have  a  lien  for  the 
charges  of  the  carrier  and  for  storage. ^° 

The  liens  of  carriers  are  also  in  other  states  either  ex- 
pressly or  incidentally  recognized  in  the  statutory  provis- 
ions authorizing  the  sale  of  goods  by  carriers,  and  the  sat- 
isfaction of  their  charges  out  of  the  proceeds. 

§  265.  Carrier's  lien,  a  specific  lien. — The  carrier's  lien 
is  a  particular  or  specific  lien,  attaching  only  to  the  specific 
goods  in  his  possession,  and  in  general  secures  only  the  un- 
paid price  for  the  carriage  of  those  specific  goods. ^^     It  is 

i2Comp.     Laws     1897,     §§  2244,          i4a  Civ.    Code    1895,    §    2848. 

2245,   3873.  isComp.    Laws    1907,    §    1416. 

13  Laws  1907,  ch.   114.  16  Butler  v.  Woolcott,  2  B.  &  P. 

i4BeIHnger  &  Cotton's  Ann.  (N.  R.)  64;  Hartshorne  v.  John- 
Codes  and  Stats.  1902,  §§  5674,  son.  7  N.  J.  L.  108;  Leon- 
5675.  ard's       Exrs.       v.       Winslow,       2 


2^]^  carriers'  liens.  §  265 

only  by  express  agreement,  or  by  an  agreement  implied 
from  the  general  usage  of  trade,  or  from  previous  dealings 
between  the  same  parties,  that  his  lien  can  be  extended  to 
cover  his  general  balance  of  account. ^^  The  claim  of  a  lien 
for  a  general  balance  is  not  encouraged  by  the  courts. ^^ 
Such  usage  must  be  proved  by  clear  and  satisfactory  in- 
stances, sufficiently  numerous  and  general  to  warrant  a  con- 
clusion affecting  the  custom  of  the  country.  A  few  instances 
of  such  a  usage  will  not  serve  to  establish  the  requisite 
proof  of  it.^^  Thus,  proof  of  instances  of  such  a  usage  by 
carrier  in  a  particular  part  of  the  country  for  ten  or  twelve 
years,  and  in  one  instance  so  far  back  as  thirty  years,  though 
not  opposed  by  other  evidence,  was  regarded  by  the  King's 
Bench  as  insufficient  to  establish  a  general  usage.  Lord 
Ellenborough,  referring  to  the  evidence  in  this  case,  said:-*^ 
"In  many  cases  it  would  happen  that  parties  would  be  glad 
to  pay  small  sums  due  for  the  carriage  of  former  goods, 
rather  than  incur  the  risk  of  a  great  loss  by  the  detention  of 
goods  of  value.  Much  of  the  evidence  is  of  that  description. 
Other  instances  again  were  in  the  case  of  solvent  persons, 
who  were  at  all  events  liable  to  answer  for  their  general 
balance.     And  little  or  no  stress  could  be  laid  on  some  of 

Grant       Cas.       (Pa.)       139.       The  i»  Rushforth  v.  Hadfield,  6  East 

carrier's      lien      in      the      absence  519,    2    Smith   634;    Whitehead    v. 

of  contract  is  only  for  the  charges  Vaughan,  6  East  523n;  Holderness 

on  the  goods  shipped  and  not  for  \.   Collison,   7   B.   &  C.  212;   Kirk- 

the    shipment    of    previous    goods.  man  v.   Shawcross,  6  T.  R.    14. 

Atlas  S.  S.  Co.  V.  Colombian  Land  -O  Rushforth  v.  Hadfield,  7  East 

Co.,  102  Fed.  358,  42  C.  C.  A.  398.  224,   3   Smith  221.     The   words   of 

I'i'Rushforth  v.    Hadfield,  6   East  Lord  Ellenborough  seem  to  imply 

519,     7     East     224,     2     Smith    634;  his     opinion     that     notice     of     the 

Wright  V.  Snell,  5  B.  &  A.  D.  350:  usage  to  the  party  dealing  with  a 

Pennsylvania    R.    Co.   v.    Am.    Oil  carrier  might  create  a  general  lien; 

Works  Co.,  126  Pa.  St.  485,  17  Atl  but  in  the  same  case  Gosse,  L.  J., 

671,   12  Am.  St.  885.  said:     "I   take  it  to  be   sound  law 

18  Holderness    v.    Collison,    7    B.  that  no  such  lien  can  exist  except 

&   C.   212;    Aspinwall   v.    Hickford,  by  the  contract  of  the  parties,  ex- 

3   B.   &   P.   44n.  press   or   implied." 


§    266  LIENS.  278 

the  more  recent  instances  not  brought  home  to  the  knowK 
edge  of  the  bankrupt  at  the  time.  Most  of  the  evidence 
therefore  is  open  to  observation.  If  indeed  there  had  been 
evidence  of  prior  dealings  between  these  parties  upon  the 
footing  of  such  an  extended  lien,  that  would  have  furnished 
good  evidence  for  the  jury  to  have  found  that  they  continued 
to  deal  upon  the  same  terms.  But  the  question  for  the  jury 
here  was,  whether  the  evidence  of  a  usage  for  the  carrier  to 
retain  for  their  balance  was  so  general  as  that  the  bankrupt 
must  be  taken  to  have  known  and  acted  upon  it?  And 
they  have  in  effect  found  either  that  the  bankrupt  knew  of 
no  such  usage  as  that  which  was  given  in  evidence,  or  know- 
ing, did  not  adopt  it." 

No  usage  can  enable  the  carrier  to  retain  the  goods  as 
against  a  consignee  to  whom  they  belong,  for  debts  due  him 
from  the  shipper.^^ 

§  266.  Condition  giving  carrier  a  lien. — A  condition  or 
provision  in  a  contract  giving  the  carrier  a  general  lien  must 
be  clearly  brought  home  to  the  knowledge  of  the  customer. 
It  seems  proper  that  the  carrier's  right  to  create  a  lien  for 
his  general  balance  should  be  restricted  in  the  same  way 
that  his  right  to  limit  his  common-law  liability  is  restricted; 
that  is  to  say,  it  should  be  incumbent  upon  the  carrier,  in 
case  he  attempts  to  make  any  change  from  the  usual  mode 
of  dealing,  to  bring  home  to  his  customers  such  notice  or 
knowledge  of  the  charge  as  warrants  the  implication  of  a 
contract  to  that  effect.  An  agreement  by  a  trader  with  a 
railway  company  providing  for  a  general  lien  does  not  apply, 
after  the  trader's  failure,  to  goods  sent  to  the  company  by  a 
receiver  and  manager  appointed  to  carry  on  the  trader's 
business  in  liquidation;  and  if  such  receiver,  in  order  to  ob- 
tain  a  delivery  of  such  goods,  pays  under  protest  a  prior 

21  Wright  V.  Snell,  5  B.  &  Aid.  (N.  Car.)  99;  Butler  v.  Woolcott, 
350;  Leuckhart  v.  Cooper,  3  Bing.      2   B.   &  P.   (N.  R.)     64. 


279  carriers'  liens.  §  267 

indebtedness  of  the  trader  to  the  company,  the  company  is 
liable  in  a  proper  action  for  the  repayment  of  the  amount  so 
paid.^^ 

If  the  carrier  demands  a  further  sum  besides  the  freight, 
or  any  charge  connected  with  the  carriage  of  the  goods,  and 
refuses  to  deliver  them  unless  such  further  sum  is  first  paid, 
the  consignee,  who  is  ready  to  pay  the  freight,  is  not  bound 
to  tender  this  to  the  carrier  before  bringing  trover.  The 
carrier's  refusal  to  give  up  the  goods,  except  upon  receiving 
a  payment  he  had  no  right  to  demand,  is  evidence  of  a  con- 
version.^^ 

A  common  carrier  cannot  seize  goods  while  in  transit  for  a 
debt  due  himself  wholly  unconnected  with  the  shipment.  He 
cannot  by  his  own  act  prevent  himself  from  performing  his 
contract,  and  then  plead  his  own  act  as  an  excuse  for  not 
performing  it.^* 

§  267.  Stoppage  in  transitu  not  affected. — A  consignor's 
right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  is  not  affected  by  an  agreement 
for  a  general  lien,  such  as  a  contract,  express  or  implied, 
between  the  consignee  of  goods  and  the  carrier,  that  the 
latter  shall  have  a  lien  for  a  general  balance  of  account. -■" 

--  Ex    parte    Great    Western    R.  sylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Am.  Oil-Works 

Co.,   L.   R.  22  Ch.   Div.  470.  126  Pa.  St.  485,  17  Atl.  671,  12  Am. 

23  Adams  v.  Clark,  9  Cush.  St.  885:  "When  the  consignor  ex- 
(Mass.)  215,  57  Am.  Dec.  41.  The  ercised  his  right  of  stoppage,  the 
further  sum  demanded  by  the  car-  goods  were  deliverable  to  him,  and 
rier  in  this  case  was  for  the  pas-  the  carrier's  right  of  detention  de- 
sage  of  a  third  party,  the  con-  pended  on  the  relations  thus  cre- 
signor's  son,  who  accompanied  the  ated.  It  the  consignor  was  not 
goods.  debtor    for   previous    carriage,    and 

-•*  Pharr  v.   Collins,  35   La.   Ann.  had     not     contracted     that     these 

939,  48  Am.   Rep.  251.  goods  might  be  retained  from  him 

25  Wright  V.  Snell,  5   B.   &  Aid.  for   such    debt,    then    the    carrier's 

350;  Potts  V.  N.  Y.  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.,  lien    did    not    extend     beyond     the 

131    Mass.   455,   41    Am.    Rep.   247;  charges    applicable    to    the    goods 

Farrel  v.   Richmond   &  D.   R.   Co.,  stopped,  and  on  payment  or  tender 

102  N.  Car.  390,  9  S.   E.  302,  3   L.  of  these  he  was  entitled  to  a  de- 

R.   A.  647,    11   Am.   St.   760;    Penn-  livery  of  the  goods.     If  the  right 


268 


LIENS. 


280 


A  usage  for  carriers  to  retain  goods,  as  a  lien  for  a  general 
balance  of  account  between  them  and  the  consignees,  does 
not  affect  the  right  of  the  consignor  to  stop  the  goods  in 

transitu.-^ 

§  268.  Owner  bound  by  carrier's  lien. — But  the  owner 
of  goods  who  stops  them  in  transitu  is  bound  by  the  carrier's 
specific  lien,  and  cannot  take  the  goods  from  him  without 
first  paying  or  tendering  the  freight  thereon. -'^ 

§  269.  Carrier's  lien  on  passenger's  baggage. — This  lien 
attaches  in  favor  of  a  carrier  of  passengers  to  the  luggage 
of  a  passenger,  either  to  secure  the  payment  of  his  fare,  or 
charges  for  extra  luggage. ^^  Upon  a  railroad  the  lien  at- 
taches not  only  to  luggage  which  the  passenger  delivers 
to  the  company's  servants  to  be  marked  and  carried  as  such, 
but  also  to  whatever  the  passenger  takes  with  him  as  lug- 


of  the  carrier  to  extend  its  lien 
by  contract  with  the  owner  to  the 
general  balance  due  from  such 
owner  be  conceded,  as  it  may  be, 
still  the  lien  is  confined  to  the 
goods  of  such  owner.  The  goods 
which  by  the  exercise  of  the  right 
of  stoppage  become  those  of  the 
consignor  can  not  be  made  subject 
to  a  lien  for  the  debt  of  the  con- 
signee."     Per    Williams,    J. 

26  Oppenheim  v.  Russell,  3  B.  & 
P.  42;  Jackson  v.  Nichol,  5  Bing. 
(N.  C.)  508,  7  Scott  577;  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.  V.  Am.  Oil  Works, 
126  Pa.  St.  485,  17  Atl.  671,  12 
Am.  St.  885;  Hays  v.  Mouille,  14 
Pa.  St.  48. 

2"  Raymond  v.  Tyson,  17  How. 
(V.  S.)  53,  15  L.  ed.  47;  The  Eddy, 
5  Wall.  (U.  S.)  481,  18  L.  ed.  4.%; 
The  Volunteer,  1  Sumn.  (U.  S.) 
551,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  16991;  Chandler 


V.  Belden,  18  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  157; 
Potts  V.  N.  Y.  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.,  131 
Mass.  455,  41  Am.  Rep.  247;  Cow- 
ing V.  Snow,  11  Mass.  415;  Penn- 
sylvania Steel  Co.  V.  Georgia  Rail- 
road &  Banking  Co.,  94  Ga.  636, 
21   S.   E.  577. 

2SWolf  V.  Summers,  2  Camp.  631. 
"There  is  no  reason  why  there 
should  not  be  the  same  lien  for  the 
recovery  of  passage  money  as  for 
the  recovery  of  freight."  Per 
Lawrence,  J.  Woods  v.  Devin,  13 
ni.  746,  56  Am.  Dec.  483,  per  Treat, 
C.  J. ;  Nordemeyer  v.  Loescher,  1 
Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  499;  Southwestern  R. 
Co.  V.  Bently,  51  Ga.  311;  Hutch- 
ings  V.  Western  &  Atlantic  R.  Co., 
25  Ga.  61,  71  Am.  Dec.  156.  In  Cal- 
ifornia: so  declared  by  the  Code, 
§  2191  of  Civ.  Code  of  1906.  Also 
in  Georgia:  Code  1911,  §  3360. 


28 1  .  carriers'  liens.  §  270 

gage  into  the  passenger  coach;  for  this  is  considered  so  far 
in  the  possession  of  the  agents  of  the  company  as  to  author- 
ize it  to  exercise  the  right  of  detainer  for  the  passenger's 
fare,  or  for  freight  upon  the  article  itself.-^ 

If  a  person  goes  to  a  coach  office  and  has  a  place  booked  for 
him  in  a  particular  coach,  and  leaves  his  portmanteau,  the 
carrier  has  a  lien  upon  this  for  some  part,  but  not  the  full 
amount,  of  the  regular  fare,^^  in  case  the  passenger  does  not 
occupy  his  place.  But  if  a  person  merely  leaves  his  port- 
manteau at  the  coach  office,  w^hile  he  goes  to  inquire  if  there 
is  an  earlier  coach,  and  no  place  is  actually  booked  for  him, 
the  coach  proprietor  has  no  lien  at  all.^^ 

§  270.  Lien  of  carrier  by  water. — Carriers  by  water  have 
a  lien  as  well  as  carriers  by  land.  A  ship  owner  has  a  lien  for 
freight  upon  the  goods  carried,  whether  the  vessels  be  chart- 
ered, or  be  general  ships  carrying  goods  for  all  persons  for 
hire.  The  master  is  not  bound  to  deliver  possession  of  any 
part  of  his  cargo  until  the  freight  and  other  charges  due  in 
respect  of  such  part  are  paid.^-  This  lien  may  be  regarded 
as  a  maritime  lien,  because  it  is  recognizable  in  the  admiralty, 
and,  under  the  usages  of  commerce,  arises  independently  of 
the  agreement  of  the  parties.  The  ship  owner  may  retain 
the  goods  until  the  freight  is  paid,  or  he  may  enforce  it  by  a 

-OHutchings    v.    Western    &    At-  Mass.     12;     Cowing    v.     Snow,     11 

lantic    R.    Co.,    25    Ga.    61',    71    Am.  Mass.    415;    Hunt    v.    Haskell,    24 

Dec.  156.  Maine  339,  41  Am.  Dec.  387;  Froth- 

30Higgins  v.   Bretherton,  5  C.  &  ingham   v.    Jenkins,     1     Cal.   42,   52 

P.  2.  Am.  Dec.  286;  Green  v.  Campbell, 

siHiggins  v.   Bretherton,  5  C.  &  52  Cal.  586.     In   Hlinois   it  is  pro- 

P.  2.  vided   by   statute   that   there    shall 

32Kirchner   v.    Venus,    12    Moore  also  be  a  lien  upon  "goods,  wares, 

P.    C.   361 ;    Phillips    v.     Rodie,    15  and  merchandise  shipped,  taken  in. 

East  547;  Bird  of  Paradise,  5  Wall.  and  put  aboard  any  water  craft  for 

(U.  S.)  545,  18  L.  ed.  662;  The  Vol-  sums    due    for    freight,    advanced 

unteer,    1    Sum.    (U.    S.)    551,    Fed.  charges    and    demurrage."      Kurd's 

Cas.  No.  16991 ;  Lane  v.  Penniman,  Rev.  Stats.  1912,  p.  100,  §  2. 
4  Mass.  91;   Lewis  v.   Hancock,   11 


§    2/1  LIENS.  •  282 

proceeding  in  rem  in  the  admiralty  court. ^"  But  although 
the  lien  is  maritime  and  cognizable  in  the  admiralty,  it  stands 
upon  the  same  ground  with  the  common-law  lien  of  the  car- 
rier on  land,  is  subject  to  the  same  principles  except  as  re- 
gards enforcement,  and  may  therefore  be  considered  in  con- 
nection with  the  liens  of  carriers  by  land.^^ 

§271.  Lien  for  freight. — There  is  ordinarily  a  lien 
for  freight  under  a  charter-party.  This  lien  arises  in- 
dependently of  the  express  terms  of  the  charter-party,  unless 
these  are  inconsistent  with  it;  and  it  exists  even  where  the 
charter  freight  is  a  fixed  sum,  having  no  direct  relation  to 
the  quantity  of  goods  carried.  Whatever  be  the  contract,  if 
the  ship  owner  undertakes  to  carry  the  goods  and  not  mere- 
ly to  lease  his  ship,  it  seems  that  there  is  a  lien  for  freight. ^^ 
The  substance  of  the  charter-party  is  considered,  and  not 
the  form  of  it.  If  the  ship  be  clearly  leased  to  the  charterer, 
there  can  be  no  lien,  because  the  hirer  is  in  exclusive  pos- 
session for  the  term.^^  But  the  nature  of  the  service  is  to 
be  considered,  as  well  as  the  terms  of  the  charter-party, 
in  determining  whether  the  ship  owner  has  parted  with  pos- 
session. Where  there  is  no  express  demise  of  the  ship  and 
the  nature  of  the  service  does  not  show  that  the  charterer 
w^as  to  have  possession,  he  does  not  become  the  owner  for  the 
voyage ;  but  the  possession  continues  in  the  ship  owner,  and 
he  may  have  a  lien  on  the  cargo  for  his  freight. ^^ 

ssBird  of  Paradise,  5  Wall.    (U.  35Carver's  Carriage  of  Goods  by 

S.)  545,  18  L.  ed.  662,  per  Clifford,  Sea,  §  655;  Tate  v.  Meek,  8  Taunt. 

J.;  The  Volunteer,  1  Sumn.  (U.  S.)  280. 

551,   Fed.   Cas.    No.   16991;    Certain  36Hutton  v.   Bragg,  7  Taunt.    14, 

Logs   of   Mahogany,   2   Sumn.    (U.  2  Marsh.  339.     And  see  Vallejo  v. 

S.)   589,   Fed.   Cas.   No.   2559.  Wheeler,     1     Cowp.     143;     Trinity 

34Bird  of  Paradise,  5  Wall.   (U.  House  v.  Clarke,  4  M.  &  S.  288. 

S.)  545,  18  L.  ed.  662,  per  Clifford,  37Saville    v.     Campion,    2     B.    & 

J.;    Bags  of   Linseed,   1    Black   (U.  Aid.  503. 
S.)     108,    per    Taney,    C.    J.      See 
post,  §   1720. 


283  carriers'  liens.  §  273 

§  272.  No  lien  under  a  charter-party. — Under  a  charter- 
party  for  the  voyage  the  ship  owner  generally  has  no  lien  on 
goods  shipped  by  the  charterer,  because  he  is  considered 
the  owner  for  the  voyage,  and  the  ship  owner  has  no  pos- 
session of  the  ship  or  goods  sufficient  to  maintain  a  lien.^^ 
But  where  the  charter-party  expressly  reserves  to  the  ship- 
owner a  lien  on  the  lading  of  the  ship,  the  charterer  in  effect 
covenants  that,  whatever  may  be  the  lagal  operation  of  the 
charter-part}^  as  between  themselves,  the  charterer's  pos- 
session of  the  ship  shall  be  the  owner's  possession,  so  far  as 
the  right  of  the  latter  to  a  lien  on  the  cargo  is  concerned, 
and  he  may  assert  his  lien  as  against  the  cargo,  though  this 
belongs  to  the  charterer. ^^  If  the  latter  sells  the  cargo  dur- 
ing the  voyage,  the  purchaser,  with  notice  of  the  charter 
party,  takes  it  subject  to  the  lien  in  favor  of  the  ship  owner 
to  which  it  was  subject  before  the  sale.  The  lien  remains 
good  even  against  an  indorsee  of  the  bill  of  lading  with  no- 
tice.^<* 

§  273.  Master  signing  bills  of  lading. — If  the  master,  be- 
ing the  agent  of  the  ship  owner,  signs  bills  of  lading  for  the 
goods  of  third  persons,  or  bills  of  lading  which  are  transferred 
to  others,  subject  only  to  the  freight  specified  therein,  and  not 
expressly  reserving  a  lien  to  the  ship  owner  for  the  charter 
freight,  the  ship  owner  is  regarded  as  having  waived  his 
lien  under  the  charter  party,  and  he  is  estopped  from  en- 
forcing such  lien  beyond  the  freight  specified  in  the  bills  of 
lading,  though  this  may  be  less  than  the  charter  freight. 
Third  persons  are  authorized  to  deal  with  the  holder  of  such 
bills  of  lading  on  the  basis  of  the  freight  therein  specified.'*^ 

ssHutton  V.   Bragg,  7  Taunt.   14,  rendered  by  Tindal,  C.  J.,   in  this 

2  Marsh.  339;  Belcher  v.  Capper.  4  case,    are    not    qualified    as    in    the 

M.  &  G.  502.  text  above,  and  are  not  in  accord 

39Small  V.  Moates,  9  Bing.  579.  with  later  decisions. 

40Small  V.    Moates,  9   Bing.   574.  •iiposter  v.   Colby.   28   L.    J.    Ex. 

Some    passages    in    the    judgment  81;    Gardner   v.   Trechmann,    15   Q. 


§    274  LIENS,  284 

The  goods  of  third  persons  shipped  in  a  general  ship  are 
not  affected  by  a  claim  in  a  charter-party,  of  which  he  has 
no  notice  or  knowledge,  giving  the  ship  owner  a  lien  on 
all  the  cargo  and  freight  for  arrears  of  hire  due  to  him  under 
the  charter-party,^-  A  shipper  is  not  bound  to  assume  that 
there  is  a  charter-party,  and  he  is  not  bound  by  its  contents 
until  he  is  put  upon  inquiry,^^  But  if  the  charterer  of  a  ship, 
under  a  charter-party  giving  the  owner  a  lien  on  any  part 
of  the  cargo  for  all  the  freight,  fraudulently  issues  a  bill  of 
lading  for  the  goods  of  a  third  party,  using  the  master's 
name  without  his  knowledge  or  authority,  who  had  no  knowl- 
edge of  the  charter-party,  the  goods  are  subject  to  the  lien 
given  by  the  charter-party.^^ 

And  so  if  the  master  of  a  ship  coUusively  issues  bills  of 
lading  to  shippers  with  the  purpose  of  depriving  the  ship 
owner  of  his  lien,  the  latter  may  nevertheless  detain  the 
goods  for  the  freight  due  under  the  charter-party.^''  And 
so,  if  the  master  acts  without  authority  in  issuing  bills  of 
lading  which  make  the  freight  payable  to  third  persons,  the 
ship  owner  may  still  have  a  lien  on  the  goods  for  the  balance 
of  the  charter  freight. ^*^  It  is  not  in  the  power  of  the  master 
to  charge  the  charter-party  so  as  to  release  the  charterer  from 
his  contract  with  the  owner,  and  deprive  the  latter  of  his 
lien  on  the  cargo  for  his  freight.  All  the  power  delegated  to 
the  master  while  the  charter-party  continues  to  operate,  is 
to  perform  the  undertakings  of  the  owner  in  the  fulfilment 
of  the  contract.''" 

§  274.  Terms  of  bill  of  lading. — The  bill  of  lading  may  by 
its  terms  incorporate  the  charter  party,  or  a  provision  of  it 

B.   Div.   154;    Mitchell   v.    Scaife,   4  44The  Karo,  29  Fed.  652. 

Camp.  298;  Chappel  v.  Comfort,  31  -i^Faith  v.   East   India   Co.,  4   B. 

L.  J.   C.  P.  58;  The  Karo,  29  Fed.  &  Aid.  630. 

652.  ■lOReynolds  v.  Jex,  34  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

-tsThe  Stornoway,  46  L.  T.  Hi.  251'. 

43Per   Lord  Romilly,   in   Peek  v.  ^TQracie  v.  Palmer,  8  Wheat.  (U. 

Larsen,  12  Eq.  378.  S.)  605,  5  L.  ed.  696. 


285  carriers'  liens.  §  274 

giving  a  lien  for  freight,  so  that  the  owner's  lien  for  charter 
freight  will  be  preserved.'*^  A  provision,  however,  that 
freight  shall  be  paid  as  per  charter-party  may  mean  onh'-  that 
freight  is  payable  at  the  rate  mentioned  in  the  charter- 
party,  so  that  the  lien  would  be  limited  to  such  rate,^^  and 
further  liens  given  by  the  charter-party  would  not  be  pre- 
served.^*^ Under  such  a  general  reference  to  the  charter- 
party,  a  lien  given  by  that  for  dead  freight,  or  demurrage, 
does  not  attach  as  against  holders  of  the  bills  of  I'ading 
who  have  no  other  knowledge  of  the  provisions  of  the  char- 
ter-party.^^ 

A  charter-party  expressly  provided  that  the  owner  should 
have  a  lien  on  the  cargo  for  freight,  dead  freight,  and  de- 
murrage, and  also  provided  that  the  captain  should  sign  bills 
of  lading  at  any  rate  of  freight:  "but,  should  the  total  freight, 
as  per  bills  of  lading,  be  under  the  amount  estimated  to  be 
earned  by  this  charter,  the  captain  to  demand  payment  of 
any  difference  in  advance."  Goods  were  shipped  and  a  bill  of 
lading  issued  whereby  freight  was  made  payable  at  a  less 
rate  than  that  provided  for  by  the  charter  party;  the  bill  of 
lading  also  containing  a  clause  providing  that  extra  expenses 
should  be  borne  by  the  receivers,  and  "other  conditions  as  per 
charter  party."  Upon  the  arrival  of  the  ship  at  the  port 
of  discharge,  the  owner  claimed  and  compelled  payment  at 
the  rate  mentioned  in  the  charter-party.  In  a  suit  by  the 
consignees  to  recover  the  excess  paid  above  the  freight 
specified  in  the  bill  of  lading,  it  was  held^^  that  the  bill  of 
lading  did  not  incorporate  the  stipulation  of  the  charter- 
party  as  to  the   payment   of  freight ;  that   no  right  of  lien 

48Porteus    V.    Watney,    3    Q.    B.  ^oSmith  v.  Sieveking.  5  E.  &   B. 

Div.  223;  Wegener  v.  Smith,  24  L.  589. 

J.  C.  P.  25;  Gray  v.  Carr,  L.  R.  6  ^1  McLean    v.    Fleming.    L.    R.    2 

Q.   B.   522.  H.    L.    (Scotch)    128;    Chappel    v. 

-i^Fry    V.    Chartered    Mercantile  Comfort,  31   L.  J.   C.   P.  58. 

Bank,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  689.  52Gardner   v.   Trechmann,    15    Q. 

B.   Div.    154. 


§2/5  LIENS.  286 

existed  for  the  difference  between  the  freight  under  the 
charter-party  and  that  payable  under  the  bill  of  lading;  and 
that  the  plaintiffs  were  entitled  to  delivery  of  the  goods  upon 
payment  of  the  freight  specified  in  the  bill  of  lading.  Brett, 
M.  R.,  said:  *'In  the  first  place,  I  am  of  opinion  that  the 
charter-party  gave  no  right  of  lien  for  that  difference ;  the 
excess  of  the  amount  estimated  to  ])e  earned  by  the  charter- 
party  over  the  freight  payable  under  the  bills  of  lading  was 
to  be  paid  immediately  before  the  ship  sailed;  it  was  to  be 
demanded  by  the  captain;  the  ship  owner  had  no  right  of  lien 
for  that  excess  even  against  the  charterer;  the  stipulation 
was  a  mere  reservation  of  a  right  which  the  ship  owner  could 
not  enforce  by  lien.  Secondly,  if  the  right  of  lien  ever  existed, 
it  was  ousted  by  the  terms  of  the  bill  of  lading.  There  are 
many  cases  as  to  what  is  brought  into  the  bill  of  lading  by 
this  general  reference  to  the  charter-party.  It  brings  in  only 
those  clauses  of  the  charter-party  which  are  applicable  to  the 
contract  contained  in  the  bill  of  lading;  and  those  clauses 
of  the  charter-party  can  not  be  brought  in  which  w^ould  alter 
the  express  stipulations  in  the  bill  of  lading." 

§  275.  No  lien  before  commencement  of  voyage. — A  ship 
owner  has  no  lien  for  freight,  before  the  commencement  of 
the  voyage,  on  goods  taken  on  board  the  ship.  If  the  owner 
of  the  goods  sells  them  before  the  voyage  begins,  and  gives 
an  order  for  their  delivery  to  the  purchaser,  the  shipowner 
can  not  detain  them  for  the  freight  under  an  agreement  for 
a  charter-party  made  with  the  vendor,  the  charter-party  never 
having  been  executed  in  accordance  with  the  agreement. 
The  purchaser  is  entitled  to  the  goods,  and  the  shipowner 
must  look  to  the  vendor  for  damages  for  violation  of  the 
contract. ^^ 

A  carrier  or  other  person  who  has  undertaken  to  perform 
a  definite  service  in  the  carriage  of  goods  can  not  claim  a 

53Burgess   v.    Gun,    3    Har.    &   J.    (Md.)  225. 


287  carriers'  liens.  §  276 

lien  if  he  has  failed  to  perform  his  contract.  Thus,  if  he  has 
undertaken  to  haul  all  the  logs  upon  a  certain  lot  within 
a  certain  time,  and  only  partly  performs  the  contract,  he  can 
not  hold  the  logs  he  has  hauled  on  the  ground  of  a  lien  for 
the  service  he  has  done.^*  It  would  seem,  however,  that 
there  is  no  good  reason  for  any  legal  distinction  in  this 
respect  between  a  private  carrier  and  a  common  carrier. 

§  276.  One  not  a  common  carrier  has  no  lien  without  re- 
serving it. — One  who  is  not  a  public  or  common  carrier,  but 
specially  undertakes  to  carry  particular  goods  for  hire,  is 
said  to  have  no  lien  for  his  services,  unless  he  specially  re- 
serves it  by  agreement.  But  if  he  holds  himself  out  to  the 
public  as  a  carrier  for  hire,  he  is  as  much  a  common  carrier 
on  his  first  trip  as  on  any  subsequent  one,  and  is  entitled  to  a 
lien  for  his  services. ^^ 

Upon  general  principles,  however,  there  seems  to  be  no 
reason  why  a  private  carrier  should  not  have  a  lien  for  per- 
forming services  similar  to  those  rendered  by  a  public  car- 
rier. His  services  go  to  increase  the  value  of  the  thing  car- 
ried, in  the  same  manner  that  a  mechanic  adds  to  the  value  of 
a  chattel  by  his  labor  upon  it.  The  old  notion  of  the  origin 
of  the  lien,  that  it  is  a  privilege  given  to  a  carrier  on  account 
of  his  obligation  to  receive  and  carry  any  goods  offered,  nec- 
essarily confined  the  lien  to  public  carriers.  We  have  already 
suggested  doubts  whether  this  should  be  accounted  the 
true  foundation  for  this  lien;  and  it  is  admitted  that  all  car- 
riers by  water  have  the  lien,  whether  they  be  public  or  private 
carriers.  The  usage,  moreover,  seems  now  to  be  common 
that  private  carriers  by  land  may  demand  and  receive  the 
same  lien  that  is  given  to  common  carriers.     The  statutes  of 

54Hodgdon  v.  Waldron,  9  N.  H.  (Ind.)    465;    Caye  v.   Pool's   Assig- 

66.  nee.    108   Ky.   124,  21    Ky.    L.    1600, 

55Fuller   V.    Bradley,   25    Pa.    St.  55  S.  W.  887,  49  L.  R.  A.  251,  94 

120;    Picquet   v.    M'Kay,   2   Blackf.  Am.  St.  348. 


§  277 


LIENS. 


288 


several  states  recognizing  or  declaring  carriers'  liens  make  no 
distinction  between  public  carriers  and  private  carriers. 

It  seems  that  where  logs  have  been  transported  by  being 
towed  through  a  canal  or  river,  or  rafted  together  and  floated, 
the  person  performing  the  service  has  a  lien  upon  the  logs 
for  his  compensation,  upon  the  same  principle  which  gives  a 
lien  for  the  freight  of  goods  forwarded  by  ordinary  convey- 
ances.^*' A  lumberman  who  carries  lumber  for  hire  upon 
a  river,  though  not  a  common  carrier,  has  a  lien  in  the  same 
way  that  a  carrier  by  water,  who  is  not  a  common  carrier, 
has  a  lien. 

§  277.  Lien  of  substitute  carrier. — One  substituted  in  the 
carrier's  right  occupies  his  place,  but  can  occupy  no  better 
position.  An  offtcer  levied  upon  goods  which  the  consignor 
had  stopped  in  transitu,  and  paid  the  carrier's  charges.  The 
consignor  thereupon  took  the  goods  from  the  officer  upon  a 
writ  of  replevin,  and  the  officer  neither  demanded  the  freight 
charges  paid  by  him,  nor  in  any  way  placed  his  right  to  retain 
possession  upon  the  ground  of  the  carrier's  lien.  It  was  held 
that  he  could  not  afterwards  set  up  a  claim  of  lien  for  such 
charges  in  defense  to  the  suit.^" 


^^Wing  V.  Griffin,  1  E.  D.  Smith 
(N.  Y.)  162;  In  re  Coumbe,  24 
Grant  (Ont.)  Ch.  519.  See  Hodg- 
don  V.  Waldron,  9  N.  H.  66. 

57Keep  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Moore,  11 
Lea  (Tenn.)  285.  The  case  of 
Rucker  v.  Donovan,  13  Kans.  251, 
19  Am.  Rep.  84,  is  criticised.  In 
that  case,  the  officer  attached  the 
goods  under  the  same  circum- 
stances as  stated  in  the  text,  and 
paid  the  carrier's  charges.  It  was 
rightly  declared  by  the  court  that 
the  officer  was  justified  in  paying 
them,   and    was    substituted    to   all 


the  rights  of  the  carrier.  It  was 
further  held  that,  before  the  of- 
ficer's possession  could  be  dis- 
turbed, he  must  be  reimbursed  for 
the  money  so  advanced  by  him. 
But  it  does  not  appear  by  the  facts 
stated,  whether  the  officer  demand- 
ed repayment  of  such  advances,  or 
disclosed  the  fact  that  he  had  paid 
them.  Under  these  circumstances, 
the  court,  in  the  Tennessee  case, 
say  that  there  may  have  been  facts 
which  justified  the  decision,  but 
that  the  facts  stated  do  not  justi- 
fy it. 


289  carriers'  liens.  §  279 

§  278.  Agent  of  bailee  has  no  lien. — A  carrier  acting  solely 
for  the  bailee  or  lessee  of  goods  has  no  lien  upon  them  as 
against  the  owner.  Thus,  a  carrier  employed  to  move  house- 
hold goods,  including  a  leased  sewing-machine,  can  not  assert 
any  lien  for  his  services  upon  such  sewing-machine  as  against 
the  owners. ^^ 

A  carrier  received  goods  from  commission  merchants  for 
transportation  to  Europe,  knowing,  or  having  reason  to 
know,  that  the  merchants  were  acting  merely  as  agents  for 
the  owner,  and,  upon  the  failure  of  the  commission  house, 
the  owner  demanded  the  goods  of  the  carrier,  who  claimed 
a  lien  upon  them,  and  refused  to  deliver  them.  In  an  action 
of  replevin  to  recover  the  goods,  it  appeared  that  the  com- 
mission merchants  had  no  authority  to  bind  the  owner  by  the 
contract  of  freight  made  by  them,  and  that,  inasmuch  as  the 
carrier  was  put  upon  inquiry  as  to  the  agency  and  authority 
of  the  commission  merchants,  the  owner  was  not  bound  by 
the  contract  they  had  made  with  the  carrier,  and  that  the 
owner  could  maintain  the  action  without  paying  or  tender- 
ing the  carrier's  charges. "'^'•^ 

§  279.  Goods  of  the  United  States. — There  can  be  no  lien 
upon  goods  belonging  to  the  United  States,  or  any  other 
sovereignty,  for  services  rendered  by  a  carrier  in  transport- 
ing such  goods. ^^ 

i'^Gilson  V.  Gwinn,  107  Mass.  126,  subsequent  lien  for  materials.  The 

9  Am.  Rep.  V3.    The  same  rule  was  Great    West    No.    Two    v.    Obern- 

applied  to  the  lien  of  a  pilot  on  a  dorf,  57  111.  168. 

vessel  for  his  pilotage,  where  per-  ^*JHayes  v.  Campbell,  63  Gal.  143. 

sons  not  authorized  by  the  owner  60£)ufolt     v.     Gorman,     1     Minn, 

took  command   of   the   vessel   and  (Gil.    234)    301,    66    Am.    Dec.    543. 

carried    her    out    of    the    regular  And   see   The   Siren,    7   Wall.    (U. 

course  of  the  voyage.     The  Anne,  S.)   152,   19  L.  ed.  129;  The  Davis, 

1  Mason  (U.  S.)  508,  Fed.  Gas.  No.  10  Wall.  (U.  S.)   15,  19  L.  ed.  875; 

412.     The  same  rule   is  applied  to  United   States  v.   Wilder,  3   Sumn. 

the     lien     of     a     keeper     of     ani-  (U.   S.)   308,   Fed.   Gas.   No.   16694; 

mals.      In    like    manner    the    mort-  Briggs  v.  Light  Boat  Upper  Gedar 

gage  of  a  vessel   is   superior  to  a  Point,  11  Allen  (Mass.)   157.     Gon- 

19 


§    28o  LIENS.  290 

§  280.  Insurance  of  goods. — An  insurance  against  fire  ef- 
fected by  carriers  "on  goods  their  own,  and  in  trust  as  car- 
riers," in  a  warehouse,  covers  the  whole  value  of  goods  in 
their  hands  as  carriers,  and  also  any  interest  they  have  in 
them  for  their  lien  as  carriers.''^ 

In  Louisiana^-  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  there  shall 
be  a  privilege  for  money  paid  by  the  carrier  for  prior  neces- 
sary charges  and  expenses,  such  as  taxes,  storage,  and  privi- 
leged claims  required  to  be  paid  before  moving  goods;  and 
in  case  the  thing  carried  be  lost  or  destroyed  without  the  fault 
of  the  carrier,  this  privilege  for  money  paid  by  the  carrier 
shall  attach  to  the  insurance  effected  on  the  thing  for  the 
benefit  of  the  owner;  provided  written  notice  of  the  amount 
so  paid  by  the  carrier,  and  for  whose  account,  with  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  property  lost  or  destroyed,  be  given  to  the  insurer 
or  his  agent  within  thirty  days  after  the  loss;  or,  if  it  be 
impracticable  to  give  the  notice  in  that  time,  it  shall  be 
sufficient  to  give  the  notice  at  any  time  before  the  money 
is  paid  over. 

§  280a.  Lien  only  for  usual  freight  rate. — In  the  absence 
of  an  express  contract,  the  lien  is  for  the  usual  and  proper 
rate  of  freight.  If  there  was  a  misunderstanding  as  to  the 
amount  of  the  charge,  the  carrier  may  hold  the  goods  for 
the  usual  freight,  though  a  smaller  rate  was  named  to  the 
shipper.  Thus  a  shipper  at  the  freight  office  of  a  railroad 
asked  the  freight  cashier  the  rate  to  a  place  named.  The 
cashier,  not  knowing  the  rate,  repeated  the  question  to  the 
way-bill  clerk,  who,  on  account  of  noise,  misunderstood  the 
cashier,  and  gave  an  erroneous  rate.  His  only  means  of 
knowing  the  rate  was  by  reference  to  the  tariff-sheet  which 
hung  in  the  office  for  the  convenient  use   and  information 

tra,     Union      Pacific      R.      Co.      v.  62Merricks  Rev.  Civ.  Code  1900, 

United  States,  2  Wyo.  170.  §  3217,  art.  9. 

61  London    &    N.    W.    R.    Co.    v. 
Glyn,  1  El.  &  El.  652. 


291  carriers'  liens.  §  281 

of  all  shippers,  the  rates  in  which  could  not  be  changed  by 
any  employe.  The  cashier's  duties  did  not  require  him  to 
know  the  rate.  On  the  erroneous  answer  of  the  way-bill 
clerk,  the  cashier  figured  up  the  amount  of  plaintiff's  ship- 
ment, who  afterward  delivered  his  goods,  paid  the  amount 
to  the  railroad  company,  and  requested  shipment  to  the  place 
named.  Shortly  thereafter  the  error  was  discovered,  but 
the  shipper  could  not  be  found,  and  the  goods  were  forwarded 
with  instructions  to  the  agent  at  the  place  of  delivery  to 
hold  them  for  the  additional  charges  based  on  the  correct 
rate,  and  which  were  fair  and  reasonable,  and  would  have 
been  paid  by  plaintiff  if  he  had  been  correctly  informed  be- 
fore shipment.  The  shipper  refused  to  pay  additional 
charges,  demanded  the  goods,  and  sued  for  conversion.  It 
was  held,  that  there  was  no  contract  of  shipment,  and  the 
railroad  company  was  entitled  to  hold  the  goods  until  it 
received  its  reasonable  charges  for  transportation.^^ 

§  281.  Carrier's  lien  for  charges. — A  carrier  has  no  lien 
for  charges  not  connected  with  the  transportation  of  the 
goods,  and  not  within  the  contemplation  of  the  parties.®* 
Thus,  ordinarily,  a  carrier  has  no  lien  for  the  storage  of 
goods  which  he  has  carried,  unless  there  be  a  special  contract 
allowing  him  to  charge  for  storage. ^^    Nor  has  he  a  lien  upon 

63Rowland  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  Atl.   1060,  3  L.   R.   A.    (N.   S.)   327, 

&    H.    R.    Co.,    61    Conn.    103,    23  110  Am.  St.  550.    See  post,  §  297. 
Atl.  755,  29  Am.   St.   175;   Thomas  64Lambert    v.    Robinson,    1    Esp. 

V.  Frankfort  &  C.  R.  Co.,  116  Ky.  119;     Adams     v.     Clark,     9     Cush. 

879,    25    Ky.    Law    1051,    1(>   S.    W.  (Mass.)  215,  57  Am.  Dec.  41;  Great 

1093;    Savannah    F.    &   W.    R.    Co.  Northern  R.  Co.  v.  Swaffield  L.  R. 

V.    Bundick,   94   Ga.   775,   21    S.    E.  9  Ex.  132,  per  Pollock,  B.  The  car- 

995;   Chicago,  R.  I.  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  rier  can  have  no  lien  on  the  bag- 

V.   Hubbell,  54   Kans.  232,  38   Pac.  gage   of  a  passenger   for  the    fare 

266;    Chesapeake    &    O.    R.    Co.    v.  of   the   owner's   infant   child   trav- 

Dobbins,  23    Ky.   Law    1588,   65    S.  eling  with  her.     Cantwell  v.  Ter- 

W.  334;    Nicolette    Lumber   Co.   v.  minal    R.    Ass'n    of    St.    Louis,    160 

People's    Coal   Co.,   26    Pa.    Super.  Mo.  App.  393,  140  S.  W.  966. 
Ct.    575,    reversed,    213    Pa.    379,    62  c^Lambert    v.    Robinson,    1    Esp. 


§    282  LIENS.  292 

goods  for  damages  arising  from  the  consignee's  neglect  to 
take  them  away  within  a  reasonable  time  after  notice  to 
him  of  their  arrival.  Thus,  a  railroad  company  can  not 
retain  goods  to  satisfy  a  charge  for  the  detention  of  cars  by 
the  failure  of  the  consignee  to  remove  the  goods  after  notice; 
for  the  claim  is  in  the  nature  of  demurrage,  and  no  lien 
exists  for  this.  Such  detention  is  a  breach  of  contract  sim- 
ply, for  which,  as  in  case  of  a  contract  in  reference  to  pilot- 
age or  port  charges,  the  party  must  seek  his  redress  in  the 
ordinary  manner.  He  can  not  enforce  it  by  detaining  the 
goods.®® 

§  282.  No  lien  for  demurrage  implied. — A  lien  for  demur- 
rage in  favor  of  carriers  by  land  is  not  implied  by  law,  and 
can  not  be  asserted  except  by  virtue  of  an  express  agree- 
ment, or  of  a  custom  so  recognized  as  to  have  the  force  of  a 
contract.  The  rules  and  regulations  of  a  railroad  company, 
providing  for  a  lien  for  demurrage,  though  published,  are 
not  binding  upon  the  consignor  or  consignee  of  goods  with- 
out their  consent,  or  the  consent  of  one  of  them,  when  the 
contract  for  shipping  the  goods  was  made.  Even  the  knowl- 
edge of  such  rules  by  the  shipper  or  consignee,  without  as- 
sent thereto,  does  not  bind  him.  The  law  does  not  presume 
assent  to  the  rules  of  a  railroad  company,  for  damages  caused 
by  delay  of  the  consignee  in  receiving  goods  shipped,  from 
the  publication  of  such  rules. ®'^ 

119;     Somes     v.     British     Empire  said:  "The  right  to  demurrage,   if 

Shipping  Co.,  30  L.  J.  Q.  B.  229.  it   exists  as  a   legal   right,   is  con- 

ecCrommelin  v.  N.  Y.  &  Harlem  fined  to  the  maritime  law,  and 
R.  Co.,  *43  N.  Y.  (4  Keyes)  90,  1  only  exists  as  to  carriers  by  sea- 
Abb.  Dec.  472.  going  vessels.     But   it   is  believed 

6TBurlington  &  M.  R.   R.  Co.  v.  to  exist  alone  by  force  of  contract. 

Chicago  Lumber  Co.,  15   Neb.  390,  All    such    contracts    of    affreight- 

19  N.  W.  451;  Crommelin  v.  N.  Y.  ment  contain  an  agreement  for  de- 

&    Harlem    R.    Co.,    *43    N.    Y.    (4  murrage   in  case   of  delay  beyond 

Keyes)   90,   1   Abb.   Dec.  472;   Chi-  the  period  allowed  by  the  agree- 

cago    &    Northwestern    R.    Co.    v.  ment,   or   the   custom   of   the   port 

Jenkins,    103    111.   588.     Walker,    J.,  allowed    the   consignee    to   receive 


293  carriers'  liens.  §  283 

§  283.  Expenses  of  keeping  property  rejected. — Al- 
though a  carrier  may  have  no  lien  for  charges  incurred 
in  keeping  goods  which  the  consignee  neglects  or  refuses 
to  receive,  yet  he  may  recover  of  the  owner  the  expenses  so 
incurred.  Thus,  the  owner  of  a  horse  sent  it  by  railroad 
consigned  to  himself,  and,  on  the  arrival  of  the  horse  at  its 
destination,  there  being  no  one  present  to  receive  it,  the 
station-master  sent  it  to  a  livery-stable.  The  owner's  servant 
soon  arrived,  and  was  referred  to  the  livery-stable  keeper, 
who  refused  to  deliver  the  horse  except  on  payment  of 
charges.  The  next  day  the  owner  demanded  the  horse, 
and  the  station-master  finally  offered  to  pay  the  charges 
and  let  the  owner  take  away  the  horse;  but  he  de- 
clined to  take  it  and  went  away.  The  horse  remained  at  the 
livery-stable  for  some  months,  until  the  charges  for  his  keep- 
ing amounted  to  £17,  when  the  railroad  company  paid  the 
charges  and  sent  the  horse  to  the  owner,  who  accepted  it. 
It  was  held  that  the  owner  was  liable  for  these  charges. *^^ 
Baron  Pollock  said :  "As  far  as  I  am  aware,  there  is  no 
decided  case  in  English  law  in  which  an  ordinary  carrier  of 
goods  by  land  has  been  held  entitled  to  recover  this  sort  of 
charge  against  the  consignee  or  consignor  of  goods.  But  in 
my   opinion   he   is   so   entitled.     It    had   long  been   debated 

and    remove    the    goods.      But    the  fee     for    car     service    or     storage 

mode  of  doing  business  by  the  two  charges.     Chicago,   P.   &  St.   L.   R. 

kinds    of     carriers     is     essentially  Co.    v.    Dorsey    Fuel    Co.,    112    111. 

different.         Railroad       companies  App.   382;   Schumacher  v.    Chicago 

have  warehouses  in  which  to  store  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  207  111.  199,  69  N. 

freights.     Owners  of  vessels  have  E.  825.     But  see   108  111.  App.  520. 

none.    Railroads  discharge  cargoes  A   lien    for   demurrage    charges    is 

carried  by  them.     Carriers  by  ship  recognized  in  Mississippi.     Wolf  v. 

do  not,  but  it  is  done  by  the  con-  Crawford,  54  Miss.   514;   New   Or- 

signee.      The    masters    of    vessels  leans  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  George,  82 

provide  in  the  contract  for  demur-  Miss.  710,  35  So.  193. 

rage,  while  railroads  do  not."  See  68Great      Northern     R.     Co.     v. 

also.  New  Orleans  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.  Swaffield,    L.   R.  9   Ex.   132;   Schu- 

v.   A.   H.    George   &   Co.,  82    Miss.  macher  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 

710,   35   So.    193.     A   railroad   com-  207  111.  199,  69  N.  E.  825. 
pany  has   a   right   to  a   reasonable 


§    284  LIENS.  294 

whether  a  ship  owner  has  such  a  right,  and  gradually,  partly 
by  custom  and  partly  by  some  opinions  of  authority  in  this 
country,  the  right  has  come  to  be  established."^'*  Chief 
Baron  Kelly  and  Baron  Pigott  and  Amphlett  delivered  sepa- 
rate opinions  to  the  same  effect.  The  question  whether  a 
lien  existed  for  the  charges  of  keeping  the  horse  did  not 
arise,  but  Pollock,  B.,  incidentally  expressed  the  opinion  that 
such  a  lien  did  not  exist,  while  Amphlett,  B.,  said  that,  as  at 
present  advised,  he  should  not  wish  to  be  considered  as  hold- 
ing that,  in  a  case  of  this  sort,  the  person  who,  in  pursuance 
of  a  legal  obligation,  took  care  of  a  horse  and  expended 
money  upon  him,  would  not  be  entitled  to  a  lien  on  the  horse 
for  the  money  so  expended. 

§  284.  Carrier  and  warehouseman. — A  railroad  com- 
pany may,  however,  assume  the  double  character  of  car- 
rier and  warehouseman,  and  is  entitled  to  reasonable  com- 
pensation as  warehouseman,  and  a  lien  as  such,  in  the  same 
manner  as  any  other  warehouseman.'''^  A  consignee  who 
has  notice  of  a  rule  or  custom  of  the  railroad  company  to 
charge  for  storage,  where  goods  have  been  called  for  within 
a  certain  time  after  their  arrival  at  their  destination,  is  re- 
garded as  having  impliedly  promised  to  pay  charges  for  stor- 
age in  accordance  with  such  custom  or  rule ;  and  the  company 
may  retain  the  goods  till  its  reasonable  warehouse  charges, 
as  well  as  its  freight  charges,  are  paid."^^  If  the  consignee 
refuses  to  receive  the  goods,  the  contract  for  carriage  hav- 

69Citing    Notara    v.    Henderson,  138  Mass.  340;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co. 

L.    R.   7  Q.    B.   225,   where   all    the  v.  Alexander,  20  111.  23. 
authorities      are      reviewed      with  "iCulbreth  v.  Philadelphia  W.  & 

care.     Cargo  ex  Argos,  L.  R.  5  P.  B.    R.    Co.,    3    Houst.    (Del.)    392; 

C.   134.  McHenry  v.  Philadelphia  W.  &  B. 

TOMiller  V.  Mansfield,   112  Mass.  R.  Co.,  4  Harr.  (Del.)  448;  Darling- 

260;  Norway  Plains  Co.  v.  Boston  ton    v.    Missouri    Pac.    R.    Co.,    99 

&   M.   R.   1    Gray   (Mass.)    263,   61  Mo.  App.  1,  72  S.  W.  122.     But  see 

Am.    Dec.   423;    Barker   v.    Brown,  Wallace  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co., 

216  Pa.  311,  65  Atl.  665. 


295  carriers'  liens.  §  286 

ing  been  performed,  the  carrier  may  store  the  goods  for  the 
use  of  the  owner,'''-  and  retain  a  lien  upon  them. 

§  285.  Local  custom  for  carriers  by  water. — A  well-estab- 
lished local  custom  for  carriers  by  water  to  deliver  goods 
to  a  storage  agent,  when  the  consignee  is  not  present  to  re- 
ceive them,  and  to  make  an  additional  charge  for  storage, 
becomes  a  part  of  the  implied  contract  under  which  the 
goods  are  shipped,  and  the  goods  may  be  detained  for  the 
payment  of  such  storage  as  well  as  the  freight.  The  car- 
rier has  the  right,  in  the  absence  of  an  agreement,  to  make 
a  charge  for  storage  where  this  is  necessary  for  the  protection 
of  the  goods;  and  this  charge  may  be  included  in  the  general 
charge  for  freight,  or  it  may  be  a  separate  charge.'''^  The  fact 
that  the  agent  of  the  carrier  who  stores  the  goods  is  allowed 
to  retain  the  entire  amount  of  the  charge  for  storage,  for 
his  own  compensation,  does  not  afTect  the  case. 

§  286.  No  lien  for  transportation  from  a  wharf. — A  com- 
mon carrier  by  water  has  no  lien  for  transporting  goods 
from  a  wharf,  at  their  place  of  destination,  to  the  consignee's 
place  of  business  in  the  same  city,  in  the  absence  of  any 
authority  from  either  the  consignor  or  consignee.  The  fact 
that  the  goods  are  marked  with  the  consignee's  place  of 
business  does  not  impart  such  authority.'^^ 

'i'2Rankin  v.  Memphis  &  C.  Pack-  reasonable    time,    the    carrier    may 

et   Co.,   9   Heisk.    (Term.)    564,   24  place  them  in  a  warehouse  or  leave 

Am.  Rep.  399;  Kremer  v.  Southern  them  in  the  cars  and  collect  stor- 

Express   Co.,  6  Cold.   (Tenn.)   356;  age    as    well    as    freight.      Its    lien 

Arthur    v.    The    Cassius,    2    Story  extends    to    both.      Schumacher    v. 

(U.    S.)    81,    Fed.    Cas.    No.    564;  Chicago  &  N.  W.   R.  Co.,   108  111. 

Fisk  V.  Newton,   1   Denio   (N.   Y.)  App.  520,  afifd.  207  111.  199,  69  N.  E. 

45,    43    Am.    Dec.    649;    Briggs    v.  825;   Dixon   v.   Central   of  Georgia 

Boston  &  Lowell   R.  Co.,  6  Allen  R.   Co.,   110  Ga.   173,  35  S.  E.  369. 

(Mass.)  246,  83  Am.  Dec.  626;  The  -SHurd    v.    Hartford    &    N.    Y. 

Eddy,  5  Wall.    (U.   S.)   481,   18   L.  Steamboat  Co.,  40  Conn.  48. 

ed.  486.     The  carrier  has  a  lien  for  "-iRichardson  v.  Rich,   104  Mass. 

freight    and    where    the    consignee  156,  6  Am.  Rep.  210. 
fails    to    unload    cars    for    an    un- 


§    287  LIENS.  296 

§  287.  Ship  owner's  lien  for  expenses. — A  ship  owner  has 
a  Hen  at  common  law  for  extraordinary  expenses  incurred 
for  the  preservation  of  the  cargo  from  damage  arising  from 
causes  for  which  the  ship  owner  is  not  responsible.^''  Such 
are  the  expenses  of  unloading  and  drying  the  cargo  to  save  it 
from  the  wreck  of  the  ship.  The  inquiry  in  such  cases  is 
whether  the  expenditure  was  incurred  in  saving  the  property 
at  risk,  as  distinguished  from  an  expenditure  in  performing 
the  contract  to  carry  the  cargo  to  its  destination  and  to  earn 
freight.  It  is  not  only  the  right  of  the  shipowner  to  incur 
expenses,  where  reasonably  practicable  under  all  the  cir- 
cumstances, to  save  the  goods  intrusted  on  board  the  ship, 
but  it  is  his  duty  to  do  so,  and  he  is  liable  for  not  doing 
so,  where  his  agent,  the  master,  has  neglected  this  duty.'^ 
The  master,  if  necessary,  may  raise  money  by  a  respondentia 
bond  upon  the  goods,  in  order  to  do  what  is  necessary  for 
their  safety.''^'^ 

The  authority  of  the  master  to  incur  extraordinary  ex- 
penses for  the  preservation  of  the  goods  does  not  arise  where 
the  ow^ner  of  the  goods  or  his  representative  is  at  hand,  or 
it  is  practicable  to  communicate  with  him."^ 

§  288.  Ship  owner's  lien  for  contributions. — The  ship 
owner  has  also  liens  for  general  average  contributions  from 
the  cargo  where  the  expenditure  has  been  for  the  purpose 
of  saving  the  whole  venture,  the  ship  as  well  as  the  cargo. "^ 
In  that  case  the  owners  of  each  part  saved  must  contribute 
ratably,  and  the  master  may  retain  each  part  of  the  property 
saved  until  the  amount  of  the  contribution  in  respect  of  it 
is  paid  or  secured.     The  ship  owner  is  the  only  person  who 

'5Hingston    v.    Wendt,    1    Q.    B.  ""Cargo    ex    Sultan.    Swab.    504, 

Div.   367;    Cargo   ex   Argos.    L.    R.  510;  The  Glenmanna,  Lush.  115. 

5  P.  C.  134;  Nicolette  Lumber  Co.  "^Cargo    ex    Sultan,    Swab.    504; 

V.  People's  Coal  Co.,  26  Pa.  Super  Cargo  ex  Argos,  L.  R.  5  P.  C.  134. 

Ct.  575.  "J'Crooks  v.  Allan,  5  Q.   B.   Div. 

'SNotara  v.   Henderson.   L.   R.   7  38;    Hingston    v.    Wendt,    1    Q.    B. 

Q.  B.  225.  Div.  367,  per   Blackburn,  J. 


297  carriers'  liens.  §  289 

can  exercise  this  lien;  and  he  is  liable  in  damages  to  a  part 
owner  of  the  cargo  for  not  exercising  it  and  securing  pay- 
ment of  the  contributions.^^ 

§  289.     Carrier  has  lien  for  freight  charges  paid  by  it. — By 

well-settled  commercial  usage,  a  carrier  may  pay  the  freight 
charges  of  previous  carriers  and  have  a  lien  for  such  pay- 
ment. Each  independent  carrier  who  pays  such  back  freight 
may  be  said  to  become  the  agent  of  his  predecessors  to  for- 
ward the  goods  and  collect  the  freight.  He  may  also  be 
regarded  as  in  a  manner  substituted  or  subrogated  to  their 
rights.  But  more  properly  the  carrier  is  to  be  regarded  as 
the  agent  of  the  owner  or  consignee  to  receive  and  forward 
the  goods.  But,  whatever  may  be  the  theoretical  founda- 
tion of  the  right,  usage,  growing  out  of  the  necessities  of  the 
case,  has  made  the  right  a  part  of  the  common  commercial 
law.^^  If,  upon  the  delivery  of  the  goods  to  the  consignee, 
they  are  found  to  be  damaged,  and  it  appears  that  the  last 
carrier  was  not  associated  with  the  preceding  carriers,  and 
that  the  damage  did  not  occur  while  the  goods  were  in  the 
hands  of  such  last  carrier,  his  lien  for  his  own  freight  charges 
and  for  those  of  the  prior  carriers  paid  by  him  can  not  be 
defeated  by  a  claim  for  damages.  A  carrier  receiving  goods 
from  a  prior  carrier  is  not  obliged  to  open  the  packages  for 

soCrooks   V.   Allan,   5   Q.    B.    Div.  nized   it,  and  hence   it   has   become 

38.      See    Hallett    v.    Bousfield,    18  a    part    of    the    law    itself.      This 

Ves.  187.  commercial    convenience   and    uni- 

siRissel  V.  Price,  16  111.  408.  versal  necessity  is  the  true  reason 
"The  reason  of  this  is  founded  in  why  this  principle  has  been  en- 
commercial  convenience  and  neces-  grafted  upon  and  become  a  part 
sity,  from  which  has  originated  a  of  the  law  itself,  although,  for  the 
universal  custom,  pervading  the  sake  of  harmony,  and  to  avoid  ap- 
whole  country, — indeed,  it  might  parent  contradictions  in  legal 
be  said,  the  whole  commercial  maxims,  artificial  reasons  have 
world, — which  has  been  so  long  es-  been  invented,  and  legal  iniplica- 
tablished  and  so  universally  known  tions  raised,  in  order  to  support 
that  the  courts  themselves  have  it."  Per  Caton,  J. 
long    taken    notice    of    and    recog- 


§    290  LIENS.  298 

examination  as  to  the  condition  of  the  goods;  but  if  they  are 
apparently  in  good  order  he  has  a  right  to  pay  the  back 
freight,  and  have  a  lien  on  the  goods  for  the  charges  paid  as 
well  as  his  own  charges.^-  If  the  consignee  notifies  the  car- 
rier before  he  receives  the  goods,  and  pays  the  back  charges 
to  a  prior  carrier,  that  the  goods  have  been  damaged,  and 
that  he  is  not  to  receive  them,  he  does  so  at  his  own  risk. 
He  has  no  right  to  meddle  with  the  goods  against  the  express 
direction  of  the  owner,  or  other  person  in  legal  control  of 
them. 

§  290.  Lien  for  import  duties  paid. — If  a  carrier  pays  the 
import  duties  on  goods,  he  has  a  lien  upon  them  for  his 
reimbursement.  The  United  States  has  a  specific  lien  on 
all  imported  goods  for  the  duties  on  them,^"  and,  though  this 
lien  may  be  preserved  for  the  benefit  of  the  carrier  who  has 
paid  the  duties,  a  new  lien  arises  in  his  favor  under  his  implied 
authority  to  advance  all  reasonable  back  charges  which  con- 
stitute a  lien  on  the  goods,  and  for  which  they  could  be 
detained.^^ 

§  291.  First  carrier  a  forwarding  agent. — When  a  con- 
signor delivers  goods  to  a  carrier  to  be  carried  over  succes- 
sive routes,  beyond  the  route  of  the  first  carrier,  he  makes 
the  first  carrier  his  forwarding  agent;  and  the  second  carrier 

s^Knight  V.  Providence  &  Wor-  thorized  the  consignment.     To  en- 

cester  R.  Co.,  13  R.  I.  572,  43  Am.  title  him  to  claim  his  lien  for  his 

Rep.  46;   Monteith  v.   Kirkpatrick,  own  charges  and  his  advances,  the 

3  Blatch.  (U.  S.)  279,  Fed  Cas.  No.  law  imposed  upon  him  nothing  be- 

9721;    Bissel   v.    Price,    16   111.   408;  yond  what  a  prudent  man  would, 

White  V.  Vann,  6  Humph.  (Tenn.)  under     like     circumstances,     have 

70,   44   Am.    Dec.   294;    Bowman    v.  done    in    the    management     of    his 

Hilton,  11   Ohio  303.     In  this  case  own  business. 

Birchard,  J.,  said  in  substance  that  ssDennie     v.      Harris,     9      Pick, 

the    carrier    receiving    the    goods  (Mass.)   364,   nom.   Harris   v.  Den- 

from  a  previous  carrier,  in  appar-  nie,  3  Pet.  (U.  S.)  292,  7  L.  ed.  683. 

ent  good  order,  has  a  right  to  pre-  S4Guesnard  v.  Louisville  &  Nash- 

sume  that  the  owner  had  duly  au-  ville  R.  Co.,  76  Ala.  453. 


299  CARRIERS     LIENS.  §    29 1 

has  a  lien,  not  only  for  the  freight  over  his  own  route,  but 
also  for  the  freight  paid  by  him  to  the  first  carrier.^^  Even  if 
the  first  carrier  makes  a  mistake  in  directing  the  goods,  or  in 
taking  bills  of  lading,  by  reason  of  which  the  goods  are  sent 
to  a  wrong  destination,  the  last  carrier  has  a  lien  upon  the 
goods,  not  only  for  the  freight  earned  by  him,  but  also  for 
the  sums  paid  by  him  for  the  freight  from  the  commencement 
of  the  transportation.  The  first  carrier  who  receives  the 
goods,  and  directs  them  over  the  route  of  the  succeeding 
carrier,  is  the  owner's  agent,  and  the  successive  carriers  after- 
wards carrying  the  goods  act  under  the  authority  of  the 
owner,  and  can  not  be  considered  as  wrong-doers,  though 
they  carry  the  goods  to  a  place  to  which  the  owner  did  not 
intend  they  should  be  sent.^*^ 

The  question  whether  the  lien  continues  to  the  successive 
carriers,  and  may  be  exercised  by  the  last  carrier,  is  in  every 
case  to  be  answered  in  accordance  with  the  fact  whether  the 
first  carrier  to  whom  the  goods  were  delivered  is  made, 
either  expressly  or  impliedly,  the  agent  of  the  owner  to  for- 
ward the  goods. ^^  If  there  is  no  such  agency,  and  the  first 
carrier  at  the  end  of  his  own  route  forwards  the  goods,  con- 
trary to  the  instructions  of  the  owner,  by  an  unauthorized 
route,  then  the  subsequent  carriers  do  not  become  the  agents 
of  the  owner,  but  simply  the  agents  of  the  first  carrier,  and, 

ssBriggs  V.  Boston  &  Lowell  R.  116  Ky.  879,  25  Ky.  L.  1051,  76  S. 

Co.,  6  Allen    (Mass.)    246,   83  Am.  W.  1093. 

Dec.  626;   Potts  v.   N.  Y.   &  N.   E.  seBriggs  v.  Boston  &  Lowell  R. 

R.  Co.,  131  Mass.  455,  41  Am.  Rep.  Co.,   6  Allen    (Mass.)    246,   83   Am. 

247;    Crossan   v.    New   York    &    N.  Dec.  626;   Denver  &  R.   G.   R.   Co. 

E.  R.  Co.,  149  Mass.  196,  21  N.  E.  v.  Hill,  13  Colo.  35,  21  Pac.  914,  4 

367;  Bird  v.  Georgia  R.  R.,  72  Ga.  L.   R.   A.   Z76;   Price   v.    Denver   & 

655;     Vaughan     v.     Providence     &  R.  G.  R.  Co.,  12  Colo.  402.  21   Pac. 

Worcester    R.    Co.,    13    R.    L    578;  188;  Fowler  v.  Parsons,  143  Mass. 

Shewalter  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  401,  9  N.  E.  799. 

84  Mo.  App.  589.  See  also,  Pearce  s^Robinson  v.  Baker,  5  Cush. 
V.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  89  Mo.  App.  437;  (Mass.)  137,  51  Am.  Dec.  54;  Arm- 
Thomas  V.  Frankfort  &  C.  R.  Co.,  strong  v.   Chicago,  St.   P.  &  A.   C. 

R.  Co.,  62  Mo.  639. 


§    292  LIENS.  300 

although  they  may  act  in  perfect  good  faith,  they  have  no  lien 
upon  the  goods  for  their  freight,  or  the  freight  of  other  car- 
riers advanced  by  them.  If  the  owner  had  constituted  the 
first  carrier  his  forwarding  agent,  the  owner's  consent  to  the 
diversion  of  the  goods  from  the  intended  route  would  have 
been  imphed,  and  the  subsequent  carriers  would  have  become 
entitled  to  a  lien  for  the  freight.^* 

§  292.  Authority  of  carriers  to  forward  goods. — A  rail- 
road receiving  goods  consigned  to  a  place  beyond  its  own 
line  is  clothed  with  the  apparent  authority  to  forward  the 
goods  by  any  usual  route ;  and  although  the  route  selected  is 
not  that  by  which  the  owner  of  the  goods  intended  they 
should  be  carried,  the  charges  for  freight  by  such  route  will 
constitute  a  valid  lien  upon  the  property.^^  This  rule  was 
follov/ed  in  a  case  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States.®*^ 
It  appeared  that  a  carload  of  lumber  was  shipped  in  Ohio 
for  Denver,  Colorado.  It  was  delivered  to  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  Railroad  Company,  with  instructions  to  forward 
it  from  Chicago  over  a  particular  railroad  with  which  the 
owners  had  contract  arrangements  for  special  rates.  The 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Company  disregarded  these  instructions, 
and  in  the  usual  course  of  business  forwarded  the  car  by  a 
different  route.  On  the  arrival  of  the  car  at  Denver  the 
owners   declined   to   pay   the   freight   charges,    and  brought 

■'^sBriggs  V.  Boston  &  Lowell  R.  was     held     that     the     forwarding 

Co.,   6   Allen    (Mass.)    246,   83    Am.  company    is    only   a    special    agent 

Dec.  626.  with  limited  powers;  that  whoever 

S!>\Vhitney      v.       Beckford.      105  deals  with  such  agent  is  bound  to 

Mass.  267,  271 ;  Bird  v.  Georgia  R.  take    notice   of    the    extent    of   his 

R.,  72  Ga.   655.  authority;  and  that  if  such  carrier, 

'-•^Patten  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.,  discharging  his  instructions,  deliv- 

29  Fed.  590;  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  ers    the   goods    to    the   wrong  car- 

V.   Hill,  13  Colo.  35,  21   Pac.  914,  4  rier,  the   latter,  though  he  carries 

L.    R.  A.  376.     The   case   of   Fitch  them   to   the   place   of   destination, 

V.    Newberry,    1    Doug.    (Mich.)    1,  does   so  at  his   own   risk,   and  has 

40   Am.    Dec.   33,   is   criticised   and  no  claim   for  freight  or  lien  upon 

dissented    from.      In    that    case    it  the   goods.     See  post,   §   298. 


30I  carriers'  liens.  §  293 

a  writ  of  replevin.  They  claimed  that  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  Company,  in  disregarding  their  instructions,  had  ex- 
ceeded its  authority,  and  that  the  carriage  by  the  unauthor- 
ized route  created  no  charge  for  freight  and  no  right  of  lien. 
The  court,  however,  adopted  the  rule  above  stated,  and  held 
that  the  last  carrier  was  entitled  to  a  lien  for  its  own  charges 
and  for  prior  charges  paid  to  other  carriers.  "Any  other 
rule,"  said  Mr.  Justice  Brewer,  ''would  work  a  serious  hind- 
rance to  the  immense  transportation  business  of  to-day,  while 
this  rule  protects  both  carrier  and  owner.  If  the  first  carrier 
disobeys  his  instructions,  by  which  loss  results  to  the  owner, 
such  carrier  is  liable  to  an  action  of  damages,  and,  as  is 
proper,  the  wrong-doer  suffers  the  loss.  At  the  same  time, 
the  second  and  innocent  carrier,  having  done  the  work  of 
transportation,  receives,  as  it  ought,  the  just  freight  therefor. 
The  first  carrier  is  the  agent  of  the  owner.  If  he  has  done 
wrong,  why  should  not  the  principal  be  remitted  to  his  action 
against  his  wrongdoing  agent,  and  why  should  the  burden  of 
litigation  be  case  upon  the  innocent  second  carrier.^  Plaintiffs 
say  that,  in  this  case,  they  would  have  to  go  to  Ohio  to  main- 
tain their  action;  but,  if  they  select  an  agent  in  Ohio,  and  that 
agent  does  wrong,  why  should  they  not  go  to  Ohio  to  punish 
him  for  his  wrong?  And  why  should  the  defendant,  innocent 
of  any  wrong,  be  forced  to  g'o  thither  to  litigate  with  their 
agent  ?  And  why  should  the  owner,  who  has  his  goods  car- 
ried to  the  place  of  destination,  be  permitted  to  take  them 
from  the  carrier  without  any  payment  for  such  transporta- 
tion? Is  the  route  by  which  the  freight  is  transported  a  mat- 
ter so  vital  to  him  that,  carried  over  the  wrong  route,  he  is 
entitled  equitably  to  the  possession  of  his  goods  free  from 
any  burden  of  freight  ?" 

§  293.  Connecting  carrier  has  no  lien. — A  connecting  car- 
rier who  receives  goods,  knowing  at  the  time  that  they  were 
directed  to  be  sent  by  another  route,  has  no  lien  upon  them. 
In  such  case  his  receiving  them  is  wrongful,  and  his  trans- 


^    294  LIENS.  302 

porlation  of  them  afterwards  would  be  voluntary.  He  would 
have  no  lien  upon  them  for  freight  charges,  and  consequently 
he  could  not  detain  them  from  the  consignee.  His  refusal  to 
deliver  them  in  such  case  would  be  a  conversion  for  which 
trover  would  lie.  The  question  whether  the  carrier  had 
knowledge  of  a  direction  that  the  goods  should  be  trans- 
ported by  a  different  route  is  a  question  for  the  jury,  and  it 
would  be  proper  for  them  to  take  into  consideration  the 
marks  on  the  packages  of  goods,  though  these  alone  might 
not  be  conclusive. ^^  The  fact  that  when  the  connecting  car- 
rier received  the  goods  from  the  first  carrier,  they  were  load- 
ed in  a  car  appropriately  marked  for  the  particular  railroad 
over  which  the  first  carrier  was  instructed  to  forward  them, 
does  not  of  itself  amount  to  an  implied  notice  to  the  second 
carrier  of  such  instruction. ^- 

§  294.     Guaranty  not  binding  on  connecting  carrier. — A 

guaranty  that  the  through  freight  shall  not  exceed  a  certain 
sum  is  not  binding  upon  other  independent  connecting  car- 
riers on  the  route  having  no  knowledge  or  notice  of  the  guar- 
anty.^^  Each  carrier  after  the  first  may  charge,  and  pay  back 
charges,  at  the  usual  rates;  and  the  last  carrier,  or  the  ware- 
houseman who  receives  the  goods  and  pays  the  back  charges, 
has  a  lien  for  the  total  amount  of  such  charges,  without  re- 
gard to  the  guaranty.  It  is  regarded  as  unreasonable  that 
the  subsequent  carrier,  who  receives  and  forwards  the  goods 
in  the  usual  way,  should  be  bound  by  a  secret  contract  be- 
tween the  owner  and  a  prior  carrier,  which  may  prevent  his 
receiving  his  ordinary  rates.     Whether  the  bill  of  lading  in 

91  Bird  V.   Georgia  R.  R.,  72  Ga.  15  S.  W.  1030;  Wolf  v.  Hough,  22 

655;  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Hill,  Kans.  659;  Vaughan  v.  Providence 

13  Colo.  35,  21  Pac.  914.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  13  R.  I.  578;  Loewen- 

92Patten  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.,  berg  v.  Arkansas   &  L.   R.   Co.,  56 

29  Fed.  590.  Ark.  439,  19  S.  W.  1051;  Beasley  v. 

93Schneider    v.    Evans,    25    Wis.  Baltimore    &    P.    R.    Co.,    27    App. 

241,  3  Am.  Rep.  56;  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  D.   C.  595. 
&   S.    R.    Co.   v.   Lear,  54  Ark.  399, 


303  CARRIERS     LIENS.  §    29/ 

this  case  showed  the  special  rate  guaranteed  was  immaterial, 
because  on  the  trial  the  parties  stipulated  that  the  succeed- 
ing carriers  had  no  knowledge  of  the  guaranty. 

§  295.  No  lien  where  freight  is  prepaid. — The  prepayment 
of  freight  negatives  the  carrier's  right  to  the  lien  ordinarily 
implied  by  law,  if  he  has  knowledge  of  such  prepayment. 
Thus,  if -a  railroad  company  makes  a  contract  for  carrying 
goods  to  their  place  of  destination  at  a  point  beyond  its  own 
line,  and  receives  the  price  of  transportation  to  such  place  in 
advance,  another  railroad  company,  which  receives  the  goods 
from  the  first  company  with  knowledge  that  a  thorough  con- 
tract had  been  made,  can  not  assert  a  lien  upon  the  goods 
upon  the  ground  that  the  sum  allowed  by  the  first  company 
was  insufficient  to  pay  the  connecting  company  its  full  share 
of  freight  charges.  A  carrier  who  receives  goods  from  an- 
other carrier  with  knowledge  that  a  through  contract  for  car- 
rying them  has  been  made,  and  the  freight  prepaid,  is  bound 
by  that  contract,  and  can  assert  no  lien  upon  the  goods. '^^ 

§  296.  Way-bill  accompanying  goods. — If  a  bill  of  lading 
or  way-bill  accompanying  the  goods  shows  that  the  freight 
has  been  paid  wholly  or  in  part  for  the  through  route,  the 
succeeding  carriers  would  be  affected  with  knowledge  of 
such  prepayment;  for  if  they  consult  the  bill  of  lading  they 
will  have  actual  knowledge,  and  if  they  do  not  consult  it  they 
may  be  regarded  as  guilty  of  negligence,  and  constructively 
affected  with  knowledge  of  what  the  bill  of  lading  actually 
shows. ®^ 

§  297.  First  carrier  receiving  payment. — Where  the  first 
carrier  has  received  payment  on  a  through  contract  not 
known  to  the  succeeding  independent  carrier,  the  latter,  com- 

94Marsh  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.,      241,  3  Am.  Rep.  56,  per  Paine,  J.; 
3  McCrary  (U.  S.)  236,  9  Fed.  873.      Travis  v.  Thompson.  11  Barb.   (N. 
s^^Schneider    v.    Evans,    25    Wis.      Y.)  236,  per   Hogeboom,  J. 


§    298  LIENS.  304 

ing  into  possession  of  the  goods  under  a  lawful  authority, 
may  have  a  right  to  charge  for  his  own  services  at  the  ord- 
inary rate  of  transportation,  and  assert  a  lien  therefor.'''^ 

If  the  first  carrier  has  received  payment  for  freight  over  his 
own  and  a  connecting  line,  but  has  allowed  a  less  sum  for  the 
carriage  over  the  connecting  line  than  by  the  tariff  of  the  lat- 
ter it  is  entitled  to  receive,  the  connecting  carrier  acquires  a 
lien  for  the  additional  freight,  although  when  the  fatter  ac- 
cepted the  goods  for  carriage  it  might  have  had  notice  from 
the  way-bill  that  there  had  been  an  attempt  to  prepay  the 
freight."^ 

§  298.     Carrier  employed  by  another  carrier  has  lien. — If 

a  carrier  employs  another  carrier  in  his  place  to  forward  the 
goods,  the  latter  has  a  lien,  unless  payment  has  been  made  to 
the  carrier  who  received  the  goods  in  advance,  in  which  case 
the  substituted  carrier  has  no  lien,  but  must  look  to  the  per- 
son who  employed  him.  In  such  case  there  is  no  privity  of 
contract  between  the  shipper  and  the  carrier  who  performs 
the  service. ^^  The  carrier  to  whom  the  goods  were  deliv- 
ered had  the  right  to  exact  payment  for  his  services  in  ad- 
vance; and,  having  done  so,  he  is.  not  the  owner's  agent  to 
employ  any  other  carrier  to  perform  the  service  for  him  and 
to  collect  payment  of  the  freight  again.  Consequently,  the 
substituted  carrier,  though  acting  in  good  faith  and  without 
knowledge  of  prepayment  of  the  freight,  can  not  collect  it 

^"Travis   v.  Thompson,  37   Barb.  be    sound,    for,    by   general    usage, 

(N.     Y.)     236.       Judge     Hogeboom  the     last     carrier     pays     all    prior 

suggests  the  distinction,  that  such  freight  charges,  and  business  could 

carrier  may  have  no  lien  for  pre-  not   well    be    conducted    unless    he 

vious    charges    paid    by    him    upon  is   protected    in   making   such   pay- 

the  goods,  for  the   reason  that  he  ment. 

is     not     obliged     to     receive     the  ^^Crossan  v.  New  York  &  N.  E. 

goods    charged    with    this    burden,  R.  Co.,  149  Mass.  196,  21  N.  E.  367, 

and,  at  any  rate,  was  bound  to  in-  3  L.  R.  A.  766,  14  Am.  St.  408. 
quire       whether       such       previous  'J«Nordemeyer     v.     Loescher,     1 

charges    had    been    prepaid.      But  Hilton   (N.  Y.)   499. 
this   distinction  does  not   seem   to 


305  carriers'  liens.  §  298 

again,  or  retain  the  goods  for  its  payment  to  himself.  He 
can  act  only  in  subordination  to  the  original  contract  with 
the  owner.  Where  there  is  no  arrangement  between  con- 
necting carriers,  a  subsequent  carrier  is  not  bound  by  a  re- 
ceipt given  by  the  first  carrier  for  the  through  carriage  of  the 
goods;  so  that,  although  the  first  carrier  has  given  a  receipt 
stating  that  the  freight  charges  have  been  paid  through  to 
the  place  of  destination,  the  last  carrier,  having  received  and 
transported  the  goods  without  notice  of  such  prepayment, 
has  a  lien  upon  the  goods  for  his  own  unpaid  charges. "'^  It 
is  said  that,  while  the  receipt  is  binding  upon  the  carrier  who 
gave  it,  yet,  before  the  subsequent  carrier  could  be  held  to 
its  terms,  it  must  appear  either  that  he  had  given  authority 
to  the  first  carrier  to  make  such  a  contract,  or  that  he  had 
undertaken  the  transportation  with  notice  that  such  a  con- 
tract had  been  made. 

Although  the  prior  carrier  has  agreed  with  the  owner  that 
his  charges  should  be  applied  to  the  account  of  a  prior  in- 
debtedness of  his  to  the  owner,  a  subsequent  carrier  who  has 
in  good  faith,  and  in  accordance  with  the  usual  custom  of 
business,  paid  the  freight  charges  of  the  prior  carrier  without 
knowledge  of  such  contract,  is  entitled  to  retain  the  goods 
until  such  charges  are  repaid  to  him.^ 

oowolf  V.  Hough,  22  Kans.  659.  A  ultimate    carrier,    without    knowl- 

decision   to   the   contrary   is    Fitch  edge  of  such  prepayment,   has   re- 

V.    Newberry,    1    Doug.    (Mich.)    1,  ceived    the     goods    from    another 

40    Am.    Dec.    33,    which    has    been  carrier,     and    paid     him     the     full 

discredited   in  all  the   later  decis-  amount  of  the  customary  charges 

ions.      In    that    case    it    was    held  for  the  previous  transportation  of 

that,  if  the  consignor  has  paid   in  the   goods,   he    can   assert   no    lien 

advance   to   the    original   carrier   a  against    the    consignee    either    for 

portion  of  the  freight  charges,  the  the    charges    he    has    paid     to     the 

ultimate  carrier  can  assert  a  lien  prior  carrier,  or  for  his  own  serv- 

for    only    the     remainder    of     the  ices    in    carrying   the    goods.      See 

proper  charges  after  deducting  the  ante,   §  292. 

payment  on  account.  If  the  freight  iWhite      v.      Vann,     6      Humph, 

has   been   wholly  prepaid,   but   the  (Tenn.)   70,  44  Am.  Dec.  294. 


20 


§    299  LIENS,  306 

§  299.  Lien  only  for  customary  freight  rate.— If  the  last 
carrier  has  paid  to  a  previous  carrier  an  amount  in  excess  of 
the  usual  and  proper  charges  for  transporting  the  goods,  he 
can  assert  a  lien  for  only  the  customary  and  reasonable  rates 
of  transportation. - 

§  300.     Second  carrier  bound  by  first  carrier's  agreement. — 

If  the  last  carrier  has  not  paid  the  prior  charges,  his  lien  is 
limited  to  the  amount  agreed  upon  with  the  first  carrier.^ 
Thus,  where  a  railroad  company  makes  a  through  contract 
for  the  carriage  of  goods,  and  delivers  them  to  an  independ- 
ent connecting  company  to  be  delivered  at  the  place  of  des- 
tination, the  latter,  on  carrying  them  to  such  point,  must 
deliver  them  to  the  consignee  upon  his  tendering  the  sum 
agreed  upon,  if  this  sum  equals  the  regular  charges  of  the  lat- 
ter company,  whether  it  includes  any  charges  for  the  former 
company  or  not ;  and  if  such  company  refuses,  upon  a  tender 
of  such  sum,  to  deliver  the  goods,  the  consignee  may  replevy 
them.  The  first  company  assumed  the  burden  of  satisfying 
the  charges  of  the  roads  over  which  the  goods  were  to  be 
carried;  and  the  last  carrier,  not  having  paid  the  ^prior 
charges,  can  assert  a  lien  only  for  the  amount  agreed  upon, 
and  must  settle  as  it  can  with  the  company  that  made  the 
contract. 

§  301.  Lien  does  not  cover  advances  for  matters  not  con- 
nected with  the  carriage. — The  lien  does  not  cover  advances 
made  for  matters  not  connected  with  the  carriage  of  the 
goods.  The  lien  extends  only  to  the  carrier's  own  charges  for 
carrying  his  goods,  and  such  charges  of  prior  carriers  as  he 

^Travis    v.    Thompson,    Zl    Barb.  ^Evansville  &  Crawfordsville  R. 

(N.    Y.)    236;    Mallory   v.    Burrett,  Co.  v.  Marsh,  57  Ind.  505;  Thomas 

1  E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.)  234;  Pearce  v.  Frankfort  &  C.  Co.,  116  Ky.  879, 

V.    Wabash    R.    Co.,   89    Mo.    App.  25  Ky.  Law  1051,  76  S.  W.  1093. 
437,  reversed   192  U.   S.   179,   48   L. 
ed.  397,  24  Sup.  Ct.  231. 


307  CARRIERS'    LIENS.  §    3O2 

may  have  paid.  It  does  not  extend  to  or  cover  advances  made 
on  claims  against  the  owners  or  consignees  wholly  foreign  to, 
and  disconnected  with,  any  cost  or  charge  for  transportation. 
It  is  the  duty  of  the  carrier  to  examine  the  charges  that  are 
made  by  a  prior  forwarding  agent  or  carrier,  and  the  fact 
that  he  has  paid  charges  upon  the  goods  does  not  enable  him 
to  retain  them  for  a  greater  sum  than  the  usual  and  proper 
charges  previously  incurred  in  their  transportation.  If  the 
carrier  has  paid  charges  which  include  a  prior  debt  due  the 
forwarding  agent  or  carrier  from  the  shipper,  he  can  not  hold 
the  goods  against  the  owner  or  consignee  for  the  amount 
paid  on  account  of  such  prior  debt.* 

§  302.     Damage  to  goods  before  reaching  last  carrier. — 

The  fact  that  the  goods  have  suffered  damage  before  they 
reach  the  last  carrier,  who  has  received  them  from  a  prior 
carrier,  does  not  deprive  the  last  carrier  of  his  lien  for  freight 
and  for  charges  paid.^  The  last  carrier,  in  receiving  the 
goods  in  good  faith  and  in  apparent  good  order,  and  paying 
the  costs  and  charges  upon  them,  is  regarded  as  acting  as  the 
agent  of  the  owner,  and  not  as  the  agent  of  the  prior  car- 
rier; and  the  last  carrier  is  not  liable  for  any  damage  to  the 
goods  which  took  place  while  they  were  in  the  hands  of  a 
prior  carrier.'^ 

A  similar  rule  applies  where  the  first  carrier  expressly 
limits  its  liability  to  its  own  line,  but  undertakes  to  forward 
goods,  and  prepays  the  charges  for  such  further  carriage: 
the  lien  of  the  first  carrier  is  not  in  such  case  impaired  by 
damages  incurred  by  the  fault  of  the  second  carrier.  Thus, 
where  an  express  company  received  a  package  of  money  to 

^Steamboat  Virginia  v.  Kraft,  25  Co.  v.    Browne,  27  Tex.   Civ.  App. 

Mo.  76.  437,  66  S.   W.  341. 

5Bowman  v.  Hilton,  11  Ohio  303;  «Hunt  v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  Co.,  1 

Thomas  v.  Frankfort  &  C.  R.  Co.,  Hilton  (N.  Y.)  228;  Bissel  v.  Price, 

116   Ky.   879,   25   Ky.   Law   1051,   76  16  111.  408. 
S.  W.   1093;    Gulf,  W.  T.  &   P.   R. 


§    303  LIENS.  308 

be  carried  to  the  terminus  of  its  line,  and  to  forward  it  by  a 
stage  company,  and  through  the  delay  of  the  stage  company 
it  did  not  reach  its  destination  until  the  consignee  had  left, 
and  the  consignor  ordered  its  return,  it  was  held  that  the 
express  company  had  a  lien  on  the  package  after  its  return 
for  its  own  charges,  and  also  for  the  advances  it  had  made  to 
the  stage  company/ 

§  303.  Lien  on  stolen  goods. — Whether  a  carrier  has  a 
lien  upon  goods  which  have  been  stolen,  so  that  he  can  de- 
tain them  for  his  charges  against  the  true  owner,  is  a  ques- 
tion upon  which  the  authorities  are  not  in  harmony.  The 
English  courts  hold  that  he  has  a  lien  even  upon  such  goods. 
In  an  early  case.  Chief  Justice  Holt  declared  that  a  common 
carrier  might  detain  goods  for  his  charges,  although  they 
were  delivered  to  him  by  one  who  had  stolen  them.^  He 
cited  the  Exeter  Carrier's  case,  "where  A  stole  goods,  and 
delivered  them  to  the  Exeter  carrier,  to  be  carried  to  Exe- 
ter: the  right  owner  finding  the  goods  in  possession  of  the 
carrier,  demanded  them  of  him,  upon  which  the  carrier  re- 
fused to  deliver,  without  being  paid  for  the  carriage.  The 
owner  brought  trover,  and  it  was  held  that  he  might  justify 
detaining  against  the  right  owner  for  the  carriage ;  for  when 
A  brought  them  to  him,  he  was  obliged  to  receive  them  and 
carry  them;  and  therefore,  since  the  law  compelled  him  to 
carry  them,  it  will  give  him  remedy  for  the  premium  due  for 
the  carriage." 

§  304.  American  decisions. — The  American  decisions 
upon  this  point  generally  discard  the  English  doctrine,  and 
hold  that  the  carrier  has  no  lien  for  the  carriage  of  goods 

"United    States    Express    Co.    v.  v.  Woolcutt,  2  B.  &  P.  (N.  R.)  64. 

Haines,     67     111.     137.       See     The  This  view  was  incidentally  recog- 

Thomas   McManus,  24  Fed.  509.  nized     in     King     v.     Richards,     6 

sYorke  V.  Genaugh,  2  Ld.  Raym.  Whart.  (Pa.)  418,  Z7  Am.  Dec.  420. 
866,   Powell,   J.,   dissenting;    Butler 


209  carriers'  liens.  §  304 

which  he  has  received  from  a  wrong-doer,  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  owner,  express  or  implied;  for  they  say  that  the 
duty  of  the  carrier  to  receive  and  carry  goods  arises  only 
when  they  are  offered  by  the  owner,  or  by  his  authority.'* 
The  chattel  does  not  generally  in  such  case  become  more 
valuable  to  the  owner  by  reason  of  such  carriage;  on  the 
contrary,  he  is  quite  as  liable  to  be  injured  as  benefited  by 
its  transportation  after  it  is  wrongfully  taken  out  of  his 
possession.  And,  moreover,  it  is  a  settled  general  principle 
that  no  man  can  be  divested  of  his  property  without  his  con- 
sent, so  that  even  an  honest  purchaser  under  a  defective  title 
can  not  hold  it  against  the  true  owner. ^'^ 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Massachusetts,  asserting  this  funda- 
mental principle  against  the  carrier,  ask:^^  "Why  should 
the  carrier  be  exempt  from  the  operation  of  this  universal 
principle?  Why  should  not  the  principle  of  caveat  emptor 
apply  to  him  ?  The  reason,  and  the  only  reason,  given  is,  that 
he  is  obliged  to  receive  goods  to  carry,  and  should  therefore 
have  a  right  to  detain  the  goods  for  his  pay.  But  he  is  not 
bound  to  receive  goods  from  a  wrong-doer.  He  is  bound 
only  to  receive  goods  from  one  who  may  rightfully  deliver 
them  to  him,  and  he  can  look  to  the  title,  as  well  as  persons 
in  other  pursuits  and  situations  in  life.  Nor  is  a  carrier  bound 
to  receive  goods,  unless  the  freight  or  pay  for  the  carriage 

oRobinson  v.  Baker,  5  Cush.  58  N.  Y.  672;  Collman  v.  Collins, 
(Mass.)  137,  51  Am.  Dec.  54;  2  Hall  (N.  Y.)  569;  Buskirk  v. 
Stevens  v.  Boston  &  W.  R.  Purinton,  2  Hall  (N.  Y.)  561; 
Corp.,  8  Gray  (Mass.)  262;  Clark  Everett  v.  Saltus,  15  Wend.  (N. 
V.  Lowell  &  L.  R.  Co.,  9  Gray  Y.)  474;  Travis  v.  Thompson,  Zl 
(Mass.)  231;  Gilson  v.  Gwinn,  107  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  236;  King  v.  Rich- 
Mass.  126,  9  Am.  Rep.  13;  Ames  ards,  6  Whart.  (Pa.)  418,  37  Am. 
v.    Palmer,    42    Maine    197,    66   Am.  Dec.  420. 

Dec.    271;    Fitch    v.    Newberry,    1  loSaltus  v.  Everett,  20  Wend.  (N. 

Doug.   (Mich.)   1,  40  Am.   Dec.  ZZ;  Y.)  267,  32  Am.   Dec.  541. 

the       first       direct      adjudication;  uRobinson    v.     Baker,    5     Cush. 

Vaughan   v.    Providence    &   W.    R.  (Mass.)  137,  51  Am.  Dec.  54. 
Co.,  13  R.  I.  578;  Martin  v.  Smith, 


§    305  .  LIENS.  310 

is  first  paid  to  him;  and  he  may  in  all  cases  secure  the  pay- 
ment of  the  carriage  in  advance." 

§  305.     Carrier's  lien  on  goods  wrongfully  diverted. — The 

same  rule  applies  where  the  goods  have  merely  been  wrong- 
fully diverted  from  the  route  authorized  by  the  owner,  and 
have  come  into  the  hands  of  the  carrier  without  the  consent 
of  the  owner,  expressed  or  implied.  Though  the  carrier  is 
ignorant  of  this  fact,  and  supposes  that  the  goods  have  been 
rightfully  delivered  to  him,  he  can  not  in  such  case  detain 
them  for  the  payment  of  his  services,  or' the  payment  of  the 
charges  of  the  previous  carrier.  Having  in  fact  obtained 
possession  of  the  goods  wrongfully,  though  innocently,  he 
is  bound  to  deliver  them  to  the  owner  or  consignee  on  de- 
mand, and,  on  refusal,  such  owner  or  consignee  may  take 
them  by  writ  of  replevin,  or  recover  their  value  in  an  action 
of  trover.^-  A  carrier  who  receives  goods  from  a  wharfinger, 
with  whom  the  owner  has  deposited  them  without  authority 

i2Fitch  V.  Newberry,  1  Doug.  owner's  agent  to  forward  the 
(Mich.)  1,  40  Am.  Dec.  33;  Robin-  goods,  and  had  no  right  to  ex- 
son  V.  Baker,  5  Cush.  (Mass.)  137,  ercise  any  control  over  them,  ex- 
51  Am.  Dec.  54;  Stevens  v.  Boston  cept  to  deliver  them  to  the  agent 
&  W.  R.  Co.,  8  Gray  (Mass.)  262.  of  the  railroad  company.  Yet,  in 
In  Robinson  v.  Baker,  5  Cush.  violation  of  their  duty,  the  canal 
(Mass.)  137,  51  Am.  Dec.  54,  the  company  shipped  the  flour  to  New 
owner  of  a  parcel  of  flour  delivered  York,  and  thence  by  vessel  to 
it  to  a  canal-boat  company  to  be  Boston.  It  was  held  that  the  own- 
transported  to  Albany.  This  com-  ers  of  the  vessel  had  no  lien  upon 
pany  gave  bills  of  lading  wherein  the  flour  for  the  freight.  These 
they  agreed  to  deliver  it  at  Albany  cases  are  distinguished  from 
to  a  person  named,  who  was  the  such  cases  as  Briggs  v.  Bos- 
agent  of  the  Western  Railroad  ton  &  L.  R.  Co.,  6  Allen  (Mass.) 
Company.  The  owner  sent  one  of  246,  83  Am.  Dec.  626,  where  the 
these  bills  to  this  agent,  and  the  owner  makes  the  first  carrier  his 
other  to  the  consignee  at  Boston,  agent  to  forward  the  goods,  and 
thus  reserving  to  himself  the  right,  the  owner  thus  becomes  responsi- 
and  assuming  the  responsibility  of  ble  for  mistakes  of  this  agent  in 
giving  to  the  agent  the  directions  forwarding  them.  Savannah  F.  & 
for  forwarding  the  goods.  The  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Talbot,  123  Ga.  2>7S,, 
canal  company  did  not  become  the  51  S.  E.  401. 


311  carriers'  liens.  §  307 

to  forward  them,  has  no  lien  on  them  for  freight  aganist  the 
owner. ^^ 

For  a  stronger  reason,  a  carrier  who  receives  goods  from 
an  agent,  with  notice  that  the  agent  in  contracting  with  the 
carrier  has  exceeded  his  authority,  can  not  hold  them  for 
his  charges  as  against  the  principal,  who  may  reclaim  them 
without  paying  such  charges. ^^ 

§  306.  Apparent  authority  of  shipper. — But  a  carrier  re- 
ceiving goods  from  one  who,  by  the  owner's  act,  has  been 
clothed  with  an  apparent  authority,  has  a  lien  on  them  as 
against  such  owner.^^  Thus,  if  the  carrier  receives  goods 
from  one  to  whom  the  owner  has  delivered  them,  intending 
at  the  time  to  part  with  his  property  in  them,  though  he  may 
have  been  induced  to  sell  and  deliver  them  by  fraud  or  false 
pretences,  which  would  authorize  him  to  disaf^rm  the  con- 
tract and  reclaim  them  from  the  person  to  whom  ne  had 
delivered  them,  the  carrier  stands  in  the  position  of  a  bona 
fide  purchaser,  and  has  a  valid  lien  upon  them  for  his  charges 
and  advances.^® 

§  307.     The  carrier's  lien  can  not  be  set  up  by  a  wrongdoer. 

— This  lien  of  a  common  carrier  is  a  personal  privilege  which 
he  alone  can  set  up.  It  does  not  deprive  the  owner  of  the 
goods  of  his  right  to  immediate  possession  as  against  a 
wrongdoer.  The  owner  has  constructive  possession,  and 
may  sue  any  one  in  trover  or  trespass  who  forcibly  or  wrong- 
fully takes  them  from  the  carrier.  Such  trespasser  or  wrong- 
doer can  not  set  up  the  carrier's  right  of  possession  to  de- 
stroy the  right  of  the  general  owner  to  maintain  such  ac- 

laClark  v.   Lowell   &   L.    R.   Co.,  i^Vaughan  v.    Providence    &  W. 

9  Gray  (Mass.)  231.  R.   Co.,  13   R.   I.  578. 

i4Hayes  v.  Campbell,  63  Cal.  143.  leCaldwell    v.    Bartlett,    3    Duer 

In   this    case   the   carrier   was    put  (N.     Y.)     341 ;     Hoffman     v.     Lake 

upon  inquiry  as  to  the  terms  upon  Shore   &   M.    S.    R.    Co.,   125   Mich, 

which    the    agent    could    contract  201,  84  N.  W.  55. 
for    the    carriage    of    the    goods. 


§    3°^  LIENS.  312 

tion.^''^  If  such  wrongdoer  pays  the  freight  and  charges  of  the 
carrier,  he  does  not  thereby  acquire  the  carrier's  lien  and  a 
right  to  hold  the  goods. ^^ 

§  308.  Carrier  may  waive  lien. — Of  course  the  carrier  may 
waive  his  lien,  and  he  does  so  b}^  delivering  the  goods  with- 
out first  requiring  payment  of  the  freight.^"  By  relinquish- 
ing possession  he  is  deemed  to  yield  up  the  security  he  has 
by  means  of  it,  and  to  trust  wholly  to  the  personal  responsi- 
bility of  the  owner  or  consignee.  Possession  is  the  first  re- 
quisite of  a  common-law  lien,  and  if  this  l:»e  parted  with  the 
lien  is  gone.  He  may  hold  possession  by  an  agent,  but, 
if  such  agent  acts  on  his  instructions  in  such  a  way  as  to 
give  the  possession  to  the  owner  or  consignee,  the  lien  is  lost. 

In  like  manner  a  maritime  lien  for  freight  and  demurrage 
is  waived  by  an  unconditional  delivery  of  the  cargo,-"  un- 
less there  is  an  understanding  that  the  lien  is  to  remain,  or 
there  is  an  established  local  usage  of  the  port  where  the 
cargo  is  delivered  that  the  lien  shall  remain.-^ 

§  309.  Carrier's  lien  continues  on  goods  placed  in  ware- 
house.— The  placing  of  the  goods  in  a  warehouse  is  not 
a  delivery  that  destroys  the  carrier's  lien,  if  the  carrier  still 
retains  exclusive  control  of  the  goods.     If  the  warehouse  be 

I'Ames  V.  Palmer,  42  Maine  197,  1  N.  W.  619;  Terril  v.  Rogers,  3 
66  Am.  Dec.  271,  supported  by  Hayw.  (Term.)  203;  Gring  v.  Car- 
similar  cases  between  principal  go  of  Lumber,  38  Fed.  528;  Egan 
and  agent:  Daubigny  v.  Duval,  5  v.  A  Cargo  of  Spruce  Lath,  43 
T.  R.  604;  McCombie  v.  Davies,  Fed.  480,  affirming  41  Fed.  830; 
7  East  5;  Holly  v.  Huggeford,  8  Columbus  Southern  R.  Co.  v. 
Pick.  (Mass.)  1Z,  19  Am.  Dec.  303;  Woolfolk,  94  Ga.  507,  20  S.  E. 
Jones  V.  Sinclair,  2  N.  H.  319,  9  Am.  119. 
Dec.  75.  -^Egan    v.    A    Cargo    of    Spruce 

iSGuilford    V.    Smith,    30    Vt.    49.  Lath,    41    Fed.    830,    affd.    43    Fed. 

isBigelow    V.    Heaton,    4    Denio  480.      Bags     of    Linseed,    1     Black 

(N.  Y.)  496;  Wingard  v.  Banning,  (U.  S.)    108. 

39  Cal.   543;   Reineman  v.   Coving-  -'Wilcox    v.    500   Tons    of    Coal, 

ton   C.   &  B.  R.  Co.,  51   Iowa  338.  14  Fed.  49. 


313 


CAKRIEkS      LIENS. 


§    310 


his  own,  he  of  course  retains  such  control.  So,  if  by  law 
a  shipowner  is  required  to  land  and  store  the  goods  in  a  parti- 
cular place,  or  in  a  public  warehouse,  his  lien  is  not  thereby 
affected.-^" 

But  if  the  carrier  stores  them  in  the  warehouse  of  an  in- 
dependent person  who  has  a  lien  for  warehousing  charges, 
it  seems  that  the  carrier's  lien  will  be  lost.-^ 

§310.  Carrier's  lien  lost  by  delivery, — A  carrier  who  has 
once  parted  with  the  possession  of  the  goods  with  the  inten- 
tion of  making  delivery  can  not  revive  his  lien  by  a  resump- 
tion of  possession,  nor  has  he  any  right  by  reason  of  his  claim 
to  stop  the  goods  in  transitu,-^  unless  he  has  lost  possession 
by  fraud. ^* 

If  one  who  has  a  lien  on  goods  ships  them  to  the  owner 
on  his  account  and  at  his  risk  and  expense,  his  lien  is  gone, 
for  this  is  equivalent  to  a  delivery  to  the  owner.  The  lien 
can  not  be  recovered  by  stopping  the  goods  in  transitu,  and 
and  procuring  a  redelivery  by  means  of  a  bill  of  lading  from 
the  carrier  issued  after  the  commencement  of  the  voyage.-^ 


2]  "Wilson  V.  Kymer,  1  M.  &  S. 
157,  Lord  Ellenborough,  C.  J.,  in- 
terrupting the  argument,  asked: 
"Is  not  this  point  incontrovertible, 
that,  when  goods  on  board  a  ship 
are  subject  to  lien,  if  they  are 
taken  out  of  the  ship  in  invitum 
and  by  compulsion  of  law,  the  lien 
shall  be  preserved  in  the  place  of 
safe  custody  where  the  goods  are 
deposited  by  law?"  The  carrier's 
lien  is  terminated  by  delivery  to 
consignee  as  agent  for  consignor. 
Lembeck  v.  Jarvis  Terminal  Cold 
storage  Co.,  69  N.  J.  Eq.  781,  63 
Atl.  257. 

22Mors-le-Blanch  v.  Wilson,  L. 
R.  8  C.  P.  227.  Brett,  J. :  "I  very 
much  doubt  whether,  if  the  master 
were   so   to   deposit   the   goods   on 


shore  as  to  give  another  person  a 
lien  upon  them,  he  would  not  as  a 
matter  of  course  lose  his  own  lien, 
even  though  such  other  person 
should  undertake  to  the  master 
not  to  deliver  the  goods  to  the 
consignee  without  being  paid  the 
master's  claim  for  freight." 

23Sweet  v.  Pym,  1  East  4,  per 
Buller,  J.;  Artaza  v.  Smallpiece. 
1  Esp.  23;  Coombs  v.  Bristol  & 
Exeter  R.  Co.,  27  L.  J.  Ex.  401; 
Hartley  v.  Hitchcock,  1  Stark.  408. 

24Wallace  v.'  Woodgate,  Ry.  & 
M.  193. 

2^Sweet  V.  Pym,  1  East  4;  Lem- 
beck V.  Jarvis  Terminal  Cold  Stor- 
age Co.,  68  N.  J.  Eq.  492,  59  Atl. 
360,  affd.  69  N.  J.  Eq.  781,  63  Atl. 
257.     Even  when  delivery  is  made 


§  311 


LIENS. 


314 


A  ship-owner's  lien  for  freight  depends  upon  his  posses- 
sion of  the  goods,  and  is  lost  by  delivering  them  to  the  con- 
signee voluntarily,  and  without  notice  that  he  looks  to  him 
for  the  payment  of  his  charges  ;-*^  or  when  any  agreement  is 
entered  into  by  the  parties  in  regard  to  the  payment  of 
freight,  which  involves  a  prior  surrender  of  the  possession. 
This  lien,  without  possession,  can  not,  like  some  maritime 
liens,  be  enforced  by  a  proceeding  in  rem.-'^ 

§311.  Delivery  to  the  consignee  upon  condition. — What 
acts  on  the  part  of  a  shipowner  amount  to  a  waiver  of  his 
lien  for  freight,  it  is  often  dif^cult  to  determine.  It  is  not 
divested  by  a  delivery  to  the  consignee  or  his  agent  if  con- 
ditions are  annexed  to  the  delivery,  or  if  there  be  an  under- 
standing, express  or  implied,  that  the  lien  shall  continue. ^^ 
The  shipowner,  or  the  master  as  his  agent,  may  agree  with 
the  consignee  or  owner  that  the  goods  shall  be  deposited  in 
the  warehouse  of  the  consignee  or  owner,  and  that  such  de- 
posit shall  not  be  regarded  as  a  waiver  of  the  lien,  and  the 
courts,  both  at  law  and  in  admiralty,  will  uphold  the  agree- 
ment and  support  the  lien.-^ 


by  the  carrier  to  the  consignee 
who  agrees  to  hold  until  the 
freight  was  all  paid,  if  the  con- 
signee disposes  of  the  goods  to 
another  person  who  has  no  notice 
or  knowledge  that  the  freight  is 
unpaid,  the  carrier  will  lose  his 
lien  as  against  such  purchaser. 
Lembeck  v.  Jarvis  Terminal  Cold 
Storage  Co.,  68  N.  J.  Eq.  492,  59 
Atl.  360,  afifd.  69  N.  J.  Eq.  781,  63 
Atl.  257. 

26Cranston  v.  Cargo  of  250  Tons 
Coal,  2  Fed.  614;  Darlington  v. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  99  Mo.  App. 
1,  72  S.   W.   122. 

27Cutler  V.  Rae,  7  How.  (U.  S.) 
729,  12  L.  ed.  890;  Dupont  v.  Vance, 


19  How.  (U.  S.)  162,  15  L.  ed.  584; 
Bags  of  Linseed,  1  Black  (U.  S.) 
108. 

28Bags  of  Linseed,  1  Black  (U. 
S.)  108.  No  delivery  such  as  will 
deprive  a  carrier  of  its  lien  is 
made  by  the  carrier  placing  loaded 
cars  on  which  the  freight  is  un- 
paid, on  the  spur  tracks  of  a  con- 
signee. New  York  Cent.  &  H.  A. 
R.  Co.  V.  Davis,  86  Hun.  (N.  Y.) 
86,  34  N.  Y.  S.  206;  Southern  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Lockwood  Mfg.  Co.,  142 
Ala.  322,  37  So.  667,  68  L.  R.  A. 
277,  110  Am.  St.  32. 

2!)The  Eddy,  5  Wall.  (U.  S.)  481, 
18   L.    ed.   486,   per    Clififord,   J. 


315  carriers'  liens.  §  312 

The  mere  manual  delivery  of  an  article  by  a  carrier  to 
the  consignee  does  not  of  itself  operate  necessarily  to 
discharge  the  carrier's  lien  for  the  freight;  the  delivery  must 
be  made  with  the  intent  of  parting  with  his  interest  in  it,  or 
under  circumstances  from  which  the  law  will  infer  such  an 
intent.  The  act  of  the  party  is  characterized  by  the  intent 
with  which  it  is  performed,  either  expressly  or  by  necessary 
implications.  Therefore,  a  delivery  made  under  the  expecta- 
tion that  the  freight  will  be  paid  at  the  time  is  not  such 
a  delivery  as  parts  with  the  lien,  and  the  carrier  may  after- 
ward libel  the  articles  in  rem,  in  admiralty,  for  the  freight."*^ 

§  312.     Nature  of  delivery  necessary  to  terminate  lien. — 

What  delivery  is  effectual  to  terminate  a  carrier's  lien  is  often 
an  important  and  difficult  question.  Delivery  of  the  goods 
and  payment  of  the  freight  are,  in  the  absence  of  any  special 
contract,  acts  to  be  done  at  the  same  time.  A  delivery  may 
be  complete  for  one  purpose,  and  not  for  another.  Thus, 
a  delivery  may  be  complete  so  far  as  to  terminate  the  liability 
of  a  carrier,  and  yet  be  upon  an  implied  condition  as  to  pay- 
ment. If  a  railroad  company  carries  coal  to  its  place  of  des- 
tination, and  the  owner's  servants  deposited  it  in  bins  on  the 
company's  land  adjoining  the  owner's  land,  the  lien  is  not 
lost.31 


20151    Tons    of    Coal,   4    Blatchf.  they   would   have    no    right    to    re- 

(U.    S.)    368,    Fed.   Cas.    No.    10520.  take  the  flour,  if  he  should  refuse 

See    Egan   v.   A    Cargo    of   Spruce  to   pay?      But  suppose,   instead  of 

Lath,  41  Fed.  830,  which  is  distin-  one    load,   there   should  be   a  hun- 

guished.  dred    barrels,    and    the    first    load 

"iLane   v.    Old    Colony   &    F.    R.  should   be   allowed   to   go   without 

Co.,    14    Gray    (Mass.)    143.      Hoar,  payment,  the  rest  being  taken  from 

J.,    said  :      "Suppose    the    railroad  the  cars  and  put  upon  the  platform 

company  should  allow  a  customer,  in  the  freight  house,  the  company 

for  whom  they  had  brought  a  lot  knowing  that   enough   was   left   to 

of  flour,  to  unload  it  from  the  cars  make  them  secure,  and  the  demand 

onto  his  wagon,  and,  as  he  started  should  be  made  as  the  owner  was 

with   the  load,  should  demand  the  about     removing     the     last     load, 

freight,  could   it  be  supposed  that  could  this  destroy  the  right  to  re- 


§    313  LIENS.  316 

§313.     Payment  of  freight  and  delivery  of  goods. — The 

payment  of  the  freight  and  the  delivery  of  the  goods  are  or- 
dinarily to  be  concurrent  acts.  Even  if  the  bill  of  lading 
of  a  cargo  provides  for  the  payment  of  the  freight  on  the 
right  delivery  of  the  cargo,  the  delivery  of  the  cargo  is  not  a 
condition  precedent  to  the  right  to  demand  the  freight. ^- 
The  delivery  of  the  cargo  and  the  payment  of  the  freight  are 
still  to  be  concurrent  acts,  and  the  master  is  not  bound  to 
deliver  the  cargo  unless  the  consignee  stands  ready  to  pay 
the  freight  at  the  same  time.  On  the  other  hand,  the  master 
is  not  entitled  to  demand  the  freight  unless  he  is  ready  to 
deliver  the  cargo.  There  must  be  concurrent  readiness  on 
both  sides — on  the  one  to  deliver,  and  on  the  other  to  pay. 
The  ship  owner  or  master  may  require  a  pro  rata  payment 
of  the  freight  of  goods  as  they  are  landed  from  day  to  day 
on  the  wharf,  if  the  goods  are  at  the  same  time  delivered  to 
the  consignee. ^'^  But  the  master  can  not  properly  demand 
payment  of  the  freight  upon  the  whole  shipment,  when  he 
has  landed  and  is  ready  to  deliver  only  a  part  of  it.^^  The 
consignee  is  entitled  to  an  opportunity  to  examine  the  goods 
and  see  if  the  obligations  of  the  bill  of  lading  have  been  ful- 
filled by  the  ship  owner.  When  the  landing  of  a  cargo  occu- 
pies several  days,   and  the  consignee  does  not  receive  the 

tain  for  the  lien?"     But  where  the  R.    Co.,    125    Mich.    201,    7    Detroit 

carrier  delivers  the  goods  shipped  Leg.   News  503,  84  N.  W.   55. 

to   the   consignee   for  the  purpose  ^-Tate  v.  Meek,  8  Taunt.  280,  per 

of    allowing    him    to    unload    the  Gibbs,    C.    J.;    Paynter    v.    James, 

same  to   save   demurrage   and    not  L.  R.  2  C.   P.  348;   Black  v.    Rose, 

for  any  other  purpose  and  the  con-  2  Moore  P.  C.  (N.  S.)  277;  Rankin 

signee    then    ships    them    over    an-  v.    Memphis    &    C.    Packet    Co.,    9 

other    line    and    has    not    paid    the  Heisk.    (Tenn.)    564,    24   Am.    Rep. 

lien   of  the   first  carrier   and   does  339. 

not    pay   the    last    carrier   and    the  33Black  v.  Rose,  2  Moore   P.   C. 

last  carrier  had  no  knowledge  that  (N.   S.)  277. 

the  first  carrier  was  not  paid,  his  34Brittan    v.    Barnaby,    21    How. 

lien    is    a   first   and  prior    lien   su-  (U.  S.)  527,  16  L.  ed.  177;  Berry  v. 

perior    to    the    first    carrier's    lien.  Grace,  62  Fed.  607. 

Hoffman   v.   Lake   Shore    &  M.   S. 


317  carriers'  liens.  §  314 

goods  and  make  pro  rata  payments  of  freight,  if  such  pay- 
ments are  demanded  the  master  may  dehver  the  goods  on  the 
wharf;  and  if  they  are  not  taken  by  the  consignee  after  no- 
tice, the  master  may  store  the  goods  for  safe  keeping  at  the 
consignee's  expense  and  risk,  in  the  name  of  the  ship  owner, 
to  preserve  his  lien  for  the  freight. ^^ 

A  frequent  and  even  general  practice  at  a  particular  port 
for  the  owners  to  allow  goods  to  be  transported  to  the  ware- 
houses of  the  consignee,  and  there  inspected  before  freight  is 
paid,  is  not  such  a  custom  as  will  displace  the  ordinary  mari- 
time right  of  the  ship  owner  to  demand  payment  of  the 
freight  upon  the  delivery  of  the  goods  upon  the  wharf.^® 

§  314.  Terms  of  charter-party  may  be  such  that  charter 
freight  will  not  be  due  until  cargo  has  been  delivered. — The 

terms  of  the  charter  party  may  be  such,  however,  that  the 
chartered  freight  will  not  be  due  until  the  cargo  has  been 
completely  delivered.  Thus,  a  ship  was  chartered  to  go  to 
Algoa  Bay  for  a  cargo,  with  which  to  proceed  to  London, 
where  it  was  to  be  delivered  on  payment  of  freight  at  certain 
specified  rates.  The  freight  was  to  be  paid  "on  unloading 
and  right  delivery  of  the  cargo."  The  master  was  to  sign 
bills  of  lading  under  which  the  freights  w^ere  to  be  collected 
by  the  charterer.  It  was  held  that  the  charter-party  freight 
was  not  due  till  the  objects  of  the  voyage  had  been  carried 
out."^  "On  principle,"  said  Lord  Justice  Wood,  "we  conceive 
that  the  freight  can  not  be  due  from  the  charterers  on  a 
charter-party  such  as  the  present,  until  they  have  had  the 
full  use  of  the  ship  for  the  purposes  for  which  they  chartered 
it.  It  is,  in  fact,  analogous  to  the  demise  of  property  until  a 
g'iven  purpose  is  answered,  the  purpose  in  this  case  being-, 
first,  the  outward  voyage;  second,  the  taking  in  of  a  complete 

s^Brittan    v.    Barnaby.    21    How.  36The  Eddy,  5  Wall.  (U.  S.)  481, 

(U.    S.)    527,    16    L.    ed.    177,    per  18  L.  ed.  486. 

Wayne,    J.;    The     Eddy,    5    Wall.  37Biown  v.  Tanner,   L.  R.  3   Ch. 

(U.  S.)  481,  18  L.  ed.  486.  597. 


§    315  LIENS.  318 

cargo  at  such  profit  freight  as  the  charterers  might  be  able  to 
obtain  above  the  freights  they  have  agreed'  to  pay  to  the 
owner;  and,  third,  the  delivering  of  the  cargo  to  the  con- 
signees by  the  charterers.  *  *  *  Now,  it  is  not  alleged 
that  there  was  any  undue  delay  on  the  part  of  the  charterers 
in  the  unloading  and  delivering.  Until,  therefore,  that  was 
absolutely  completed,  it  appears  to  us  the  freight  was  not 
due  to  the  owner."  The  shipowner's  right  of  lien  was  not 
involved  in  this  case.  A  lien  w^as  expressly  given  by  the 
charter-party,  and  the  decision  was  not  inconsistent  with  such 
a  lien.  The  question  in  the  case  arose  between  a  mortgagee 
of  the  ship,  who  had  taken  possession  while  the  cargo  was 
being  discharged,  and  an  assignee  of  the  freight  from  the  ship- 
owner. But  the  decision  had  an  important  application,  and 
would  cut  away  the  lien  for  freight  in  like  cases  where  no 
lien  is  expressly  reserved. ^^ 

§  315.  Cargo  in  hands  of  consignee. — If  a  cargo  is  placed 
in  the  hands  of  a  consignee,  with  the  understanding  that  the 
lien  is  to  continue,  a  court  of  admiralty  will  regard  the  trans- 
action as  a  deposit  of  the  goods,  for  the  time,  in  the  ware- 
house, and  not  as  an  absolute  delivery,  and  on  that  ground 
will  consider  the  shipowner  as  being  still  constructively  in 
possession  so  far  as  to  preserve  his  lien.^^  It  is  the  duty 
of  the  consignee,  and  not  of  the  shipowner,  to  provide  a 
suitable  and  safe  place  for  the  storage  of  the  goods;  and 
several  days  are  often  consumed  in  unloading  and  storing 
the  cargo.  If  the  cargo  could  not  be  unladen  and  placed  in 
the  warehouse  of  the  consignee  without  waiving  the  lien, 
it  would  seriously  interfere  with  the  convenience  both  of  the 
shipowner  and  the  merchant.  In  such  a  case  it  is  frequently 
understood  between  the  parties  that  such  a  transfer  of  the 
goods  to  the  consignee's  warehouse  shall  not  be  regarded  as 

ssCarver   on    Carriage    of   Goods  •••'Bags   of  Linseed,   1    Black   (U. 

by  Sea,   §  658.  .S.)  108. 


319  carriers'  liens.  §  317 

a  waiver  of  the  shipowner's  lien,  but  that  he  deserves  the 
right  to  proceed  in  rem  to  enforce  it,  if  the  freight  be  not 
paid.  But  such  a  transfer  of  the  goods  into  the  possession 
of  the  consignee  will  defeat  the  lien,  unless  an  understand- 
ing that  it  shall  not  have  this  effect  can  be  shown  to  have 
existed  between  the  parties,  or  unless  it  be  plainly  inferable 
from  the  established  local  usage  of  the  port.^" 

§  316.  Promise  to  pay  carrier  not  presumed  from  taking 
possession. — A  promise  to  pay  the  amount  of  a  carrier's  lien 
upon  goods  is  not  necessarily  presumed  from  the  taking 
possession  of  such  goods  with  knowledge  that  such  a  lien 
is  claimed.  Thus,  where  a  railroad  company,  having  deliv- 
ered a  portion  of  a  cargo  of  coal  on  the  order  of  the  con- 
signee to  a  purchaser  of  the  whole  cargo,  on  the  arrival  of 
the  remainder  of  the  coal  notified  the  purchaser  that  it 
claimed  a  lien  on  such  remainder  for  the  freight  of  the  en- 
tire cargo,  and  directed  him  not  to  unload  it,  but  the  pur- 
chaser did  unload  and  take  possession  of  the  coal  without 
paying  the  freight,  it  was  held  the  purchaser  could  not  be 
conclusively  presumed  as  a  matter  of  law  to  have  promised 
to  pay  the  freight.*^ 

§  317.  Lien  continues  when  possession  is  secured  by 
fraud. — The  carrier's  lien  is  not  lost  in  case  the  goods  are 
obtained  from  him  by  fraud.  He  has  not  in  such  case  volun- 
tarily parted  with  the  possession.  His  right  of  possession 
remains,  and  he  may  assert  his  right  by  replevying  the  goods, 
though  they  be  in  the  hands  of  the  consignee.^-     Thus,  if 

^"Bags  of  Linseed,   1    Black    (U.  Rep.    360,    is    distinguished.      The 

S.)    108;    Shea    v.    Minneapolis    St.  question   whether   the   law    implies 

P.  &  S.  S.  M.  R.  Co.,  63  Minn.  228,  a  contract  to  pay  the  freight  was 

65  N.  W.  458.  not   adjudicated.      But   see    Central 

4iNew  York  &   N.   E.   R.  Co.   v.  R.  Co.  v.  MacCartney,  68  N.  J.  L. 

Sanders,    134   Mass.   S3.     The    case  165,  52  Atl.  575. 
of  New  Haven  &  Northampton  Co.  ^-Wallace    v.    Woodgate,    Ry.    & 

V.  Campbell,  128  Mass.  104,  35  Am.  M.  193. 


§    3l8  LIENS.  320 

the  goods  are  delivered  to  the  consignee  in  consequence  of 
his  false  and  fraudulent  promise  to  pay  the  freight  as  soon 
as  the  delivery  is  complete,  such  delivery  does  not  amount 
to  a  waiver  of  the  lien,  and  the  carrier  may,  notw^ithstanding, 
maintain  replevin  for  the  goods. '^^ 

But  there  must  be  some  evidence  of  fraud  or  trick  in  ob- 
taining possession,  or  the  loss  of  possession  will  defeat  the 
lien.  In  replevin  by  a  railroad  company,  to  enforce  a  lien 
for  freight  upon  a  horse,  it  appeared  that  the  car  contain- 
ing the  horse  arrived  at  the  depot  about  eleven  o'clock  in 
the  morning;  that  the  consignee,  being  notified  by  telephone, 
asked  if  the  horse  could  remain  in  the  car  till  the  following 
morning,  and  gave  directions  about  the  care  of  the  horse ; 
that  the  horse  was  allowed  to  remain  in  the  car;  and  that 
in  the  morning  the  consignee  sent  and  got  the  horse  without 
paying  the  freight.  It  was  held  that  a  verdict  finding  that 
the  company  voluntarily  abandoned  its  lien  upon  parting  with 
possession  of  the  horse  would  not  be  reversed  on  appeal, 
and  that  the  action  of  replevin  could  not  be  maintained. ^^ 

§318.  No  lien  where  goods  are  delivered  through  mis- 
take.— A  carrier  can  have  no  relief  in  equity  on  the  ground  of 
a  mistake  in  fact  in  delivering  the  goods  to  the  consignee 
under  the  belief  that  he  is  solvent,  when  in  fact  his  estate 
proves  to  be  insolvent.  It  is  no  fraud  on  the  part  of  the  con- 
signee that  immediately  after  the  delivery  of  the  goods  he 
dies,  and  his  estate  proves  to  be  insolvent.'*^ 

^sBigelow  V.  Heaton,  6  Hill  (N.  44Geneva,   Ithica  &   S.   R.   Co.  v. 

Y.)  43,  4  Denio  (N.  Y.)  496.     The  Sage,  35  Hun  (N.  Y.)  95.     Hardin, 

carrier's  lien  is  not  lost  by  delivery  P.  J.,  said:     "We  see  no  evidence 

to  the  assignee  of  the  shipper  for  of  trick,  fraud,  or  overreaching  on 

such     assignee     takes     the     goods  the   part   of  the   defendant   to   ob- 

charged     with     the     carrier's     lien.  tain  possession." 

Caye   v.    Pool's   x\ssignee,    108   Ky.  -isSears  v.  Wills,  4  Allen  (Mass.) 

124,  55  S.  W.  887,  49  L.  R.  A.  251.  212. 


321 


CARRIERS     LIENS. 


320 


§  319.     The  carrier  has  a  lien  upon  all  the  goods  carried. — 

The  consignee  can  not  insist  upon  a  delivery  of  any  part 
until  the  whole  freight  is  paid.^*^  The  carrier  may  deliver 
by  instalments,  if  the  goods  are  in  distinct  parcels,  and  the 
freight  charges  are  divisible;  and  he  may  require  the  freight 
on  each  instalment  to  be  paid  upon  the  delivery  of  it.*" 

§  320.  Delivery  of  part  of  the  goods  not  a  waiver. — A 
delivery  of  a  part  of  the  goods  is  not  a  waiver  of  the  Hen  upon 
the  remainder  for  the  whole  freight. ^^  The  lien  is  gone  upon 
the  part  delivered,  but  remains  good  upon  the  part  retained 
for  the  payment  of  the  entire  freight,  that  upon  the  goods 
delivered  as  well  as  that  upon  the  goods  still  retained.  Even 
if  the  goods  were  delivered  to  the  carrier  in  separate  par- 
cels at  different  times,  but  all  the  parcels  are  carried  under 
one  contract,  the  lien  will  attach  in  respect  to  the  charges 
incurred  in  the  carriage  of  the  whole  upon  any  one  or  more 
of  the  parcels;  or,  in  other  words,  if  some  of  the  parcels  be 
delivered,  the  lien  for  the  carriage  of  these  will  attach  to 
those  not  delivered. ^^  Moreover,  in  such  case,  the  carrier 
may  treat  all  the  parcels  as  one  lot  of  goods,  for  the  purpose 
of  the  lien,  but  not  if  the  goods  were  shipped  under  several 
contracts.^" 


•leperez  v.  Alsop,  3  F.  &  F. 
188. 

47Black  V.  Rose,  2  Moore  P.  C. 
(N.  S.)  277,  11  L.  T.  N.  S.  31. 

^sSodergren  v.  Flight,  6  East 
622;  Ex  parte  Cooper,  11  Ch.  Div 
68;  Potts  V.  N.  Y.  &  N.  E.  R.  Co. 
131  Mass.  455,  41  Am.  Rep.  247^ 
New  Haven  &  Northampton  Co.  v 
Campbell,  128  Mass.  104,  35  Am 
Rep.  360;  Lane  v.  Old  Colony  & 
F.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Gray  (Mass.)  143; 
Boggs  V.  Martin,  13  B.  Men.  (Ky.) 
239;  Frothingham  v.  Jenkins,  1 
Cal.  42,  52  Am.  Dec.  286;  Phila- 
delphia &  Reading  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dows,   15   Phila.    (Pa.)    101;   Stein- 

21 


man  v.  Wilkins,  7  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.) 
466,  42  Am.  Dec.  254;  Fuller  v. 
Bradley,  25  Pa.  St.  120;  New  York 
Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  86 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  86,  34  N.  Y.  S.  206, 
68  N.  Y.  St.  54,  affd.  158  N.  Y. 
674,  52   N.   E.   1125. 

■isChase  v.  Westmore,  5  M.  &  S. 
180;Schumacher  v.  Chicago  &  N. 
W.  R.  Co.,  207  III.  199,  108  III. 
App.  520,  69  N.  E.  825;  Jeffries  v. 
Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  93  Wis.  250,  67 
N.  W.  424,  33  L.  R.  A.  351,  57  Am. 
St.  919. 

soBernal  v.  Pim,  1  Gale  17; 
Sodergren  v.  Flight,  6  East  622. 


§321  LIENS.  322 

The  part  of  the  goods  remaining  will  be  discharged  from 
the  lien  for  the  freight  upon  the  part  delivered,  it  such  was 
the  intention  of  the  parties. ^^ 

§  321.  Separate  liens  on  separate  goods. — If  separate  con- 
tracts be  made  for  the  carriage  of  separate  parcels  of  goods, 
a  separate  lien  will  attach  to  each  parcel,  and  the  lien  is  lost 
by  the  delivery  of  such  parcel.  If,  in  such  case,  several  bills 
of  lading  have  been  given,  and  these  have  been  assigned  to 
different  persons,  the  carrier  can  not  have  a  lien  for  the 
freight  due  under  one  bill  of  lading  upon  the  goods  comprised 
in  another  which  is  not  held  by  the  same  person. ^^ 

Separate  liens  upon  separate  lots  of  goods  carried  may, 
by  the  action  of  the  parties,  be  changed  into  a  general  lien 
upon  all  the  goods.  Thus,  if  several  cargoes  of  coal  carried 
by  a  railroad  company  are  so  far  distinct  subjects  of  contract 
that  the  company  may  deliver  and  demand  freight  for  one 
before  delivering  another,  and  the  consignee  may  demand  the 
delivery  of  one  without  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  the  whole, 
there  is  a  separate  lien  upon  each  cargo  for  the  freight  of 
that  cargo,  and  a  lien  for  the  freight  of  several  cargoes  de- 
livered could  not  be  asserted  against  the  cargo  not  delivered. 
But  if  the  several  cargoes  be  mingled  together  in  bins  upon 
the  company's  land  by  direction  of  the  consignee,  so  that 
they  can  not  be  distinguished,  then  all  the  coal  will  be  re- 
garded as  delivered  together,  and  the  separate  lien  upon 
each  cargo  will  be  merged  in  a  general  lien  upon  the  wdiole 
quantity.  If,  then,  portions  of  the  coal  be  taken  from  the 
bins  by  the  owner,  and  delivered  to  purchasers  from  time 
to  time,  the  railroad  company  may  at  any  time  forbid  the 

•■^^New    Haven    &    Northampton  rier  may   legally  hold   any  one  of 

Co.    V.    Campbell,    128    Mass.    104.  the    cars    for    freight    due    on    all 

35  Am.  Rep.  360.  of    the    cars.      Pennsylvania    Steel 

52Sodergren  v.  Flight,  6  East  622.  Co.  v.  Georgia  R.   &  Banking  Co., 

If   several    car    loads    are    shipped  94  Ga.  636,  21  S.  E.  577. 
under   a   single    contract,    the   car- 


323  carriers'  liens.  §  322 

taking  away  of  any  more  of  the  coal  without  payment  of 
the  unpaid  freight,  and  may  assert  a  lien  upon  the  coal 
remaining  for  the  freight  of  all  the  cargoes. ^^ 

§  322.  Lien  waived  by  contract. — The  lien  is  waived  by  a 
contract  whereby  the  carrier  gives  credit  for  the  freight 
extending  beyond  the  time  when  the  goods  are  to  be  deliv- 
ered.^^ A  charter  party  which  provides  that  a  part  of  the 
freight  shall  be  paid  by  the  charterer's  acceptance,  payable 
three  months  after  delivery  to  him  of  a  certificate  of  the 
right  of  delivery  of  the  cargo,  displaces  the  lien  for  such 
part  of  the  freight,  although  the  charterer  had  become  bank- 
rupt before  the  arrival  of  the  vessel  at  the  port  of  discharge. 
The  subsequent  bankruptcy  of  the  charterer  can  neither 
operate  to  erase  the  clause  of  the  charter  party  giving  credit 
for  an  instalment  of  the  freight,  nor  to  shorten  the  term 
of  the  credit. ^^  There  can  be  no  lien  on  a  cargo  for  freight 
where  the  charter  party  provides  for  the  payment  of  it  two 
months  after  the  delivery  of  it,  or  in  thirty  days  after  the 
return  of  the  vessel  to  the  home  port.^^ 

The  taking  of  bills  of  exchange  or  promissory  notes  for 
the  freight,  payable  at  a  future  time  after  the  time  at  which 
the  goods  should  be  delivered,  is  a  waiver  of  the  lien.^'''  It 
seems,  however,  that,  if  the  paper  be  dishonored  before  the 
goods  have  been  delivered,  the  lien  will  revive.^* 

53Lane   v.   Old   Colony   &   F.   R.  Wells,  10  Conn.  104.   And  see  Tam- 

R.  Co.,  14  Gray  (Mass.)   143.  vaco   v.    Simpson,    19   C.   B.    N.   S. 

54Crawshay  v.  Homfray,  4  B.  &  453;     Alsager     v.     St.     Katherine's 

Aid.  50;  Alsager  v.  St.  Katherine's  Dock  Co.,  14  M.  &  W.  794;  Thomp- 

Dock  Co.,  14  M.  &  W.  794;  Foster  son  v.  Small,   1   C.  B.  328. 

V.   Colby,  3   H.   &  N.  705,  28  L.    J.  ocpickman    v.     Woods,    6     Pick. 

Ex.  81;  Chase  v.  Westmore,  5   M.  (Mass.)   248. 

&  S.  180;  Raitt  v.  Mitchell,  4  Camp.  ^'''Hewison    v.    Guthrie,    2    Bing. 

146;  Chandler  v.  Belden,  18  Johns.  (N.    C.)    755;    Horncastle    v.    Far- 

(N.  Y.)   157,  9  Am.   Dec.   193;   Pin-  ran,   3   B.    &  Aid.   497;    Bunney   v. 

ney  v.  Wells,  10  Conn.  104.  Poyntz,   4    B.    &   Ad.    568. 

55 Bird  of  Paradise,  5  Wall.   (U.  5SGunn  v.  Bolckow,  L.  R.  10  Ch. 

S.)    545,    18   L.   ed.   662;   Pinney  v.  491. 


§    323  LIENS.  324 

§  323.  Extension  of  time  of  payment. — If  the  provision 
be  that  the  freight  shall  be  paid  by  bills  on  a  specified  time 
after  delivery,  then  the  shipowner  has  a  lien  on  the  cargo 
until  payment  by  bills  in  the  manner  provided,  the  delivery 
of  the  cargo  and  the  payment  of  the  freight  being  con- 
comitant acts.^^  If  the  delivery  of  the  cargo  be  a  w^ork  of 
several  days,  the  bills  should  bear  date  from  the  last  deliv- 
ery, and  to  avoid  a  waiver  of  the  lien  the  master  may  in  the 
first  instance  land  the  cargo  in  his  own  name. 

A  charter-party  provided  that  freight  at  a  certain  rate  per 
ton  should  be  paid  part  in  cash  at  a  certain  time  before  the 
voyage  could  be  ended,  and  part  in  bills  having  specified 
times  to  run  from  the  day  on  which  the  ship  should  arrive  in 
the  Thames  on  her  return  upon  her  homeward  voyage.  The 
charterers  became  bankrupt,  and  neither  they  nor  their  as- 
signees tendered  the  bills  for  freight.  In  an  action  by  the 
assignees  for  the  goods,  it  was  held  that  the  shipowner 
was  entitled  to  retain  them  until  payment.  Abbott,  C.  J., 
delivering  the  judgment,  said:^^  "Upon  this  instrument, 
therefore,  and  between  the  parties  to  this  suit,  we  think  the 
defendant  had  the  possession  of  the  ship  and  goods  for  the 
voyage,  and  a  lien  on  the  goods  for  the  stipulated  hire  of 
the  ship,  there  being  nothing  to  show  that  the  delivery  of  the 
goods  was  to  precede  the  payment  of  that  hire  in  cash  and 
bills,  as  provided  for  by  the  deed." 

§  324.  Promissory  note  does  not  affect  carrier's  lien. — 
A  promissory  note  or  bill  of  exchange  given  for  freight 
and  falling  due  before  the  delivery  of  the  goods  does  not  dis- 
charge the  lien,  but  the  carrier  may  stand  upon  his  lien  as 
fully  as  if  the  note  or  bill  had  never  been  given. ^^     By  the 


50 Tate  V.  Meek,  8  Taunt.  280 
Yates  V.  Railston,  8  Taunt.  293 
Bohtling    V.    Inglis,    3    East    381 


soSaville  v.  Campion,  2  B.  & 
Ad.  503.  See,  also,  Faith  v.  East 
Indian  Co.,  4  B.  &  Aid.  630. 


Tamvaco   v.    Simpson,   L.   R.   1    C.  eiRird  of  Paradise,  5  Wall.   (U. 

P.  363.  S.)  545,  18  L.  ed.  662. 


325  carriers'  liens.  §  325 

general  commercial  laws,  a  bill  or  note  given  for  a  precedent 
debt  does  not  extinguish  the  debt  or  operate  as  payment, 
unless  such  was  the  express  agreement  of  the  parties.  The 
creditor  may  return  the  bill  or  note  when  it  is  dishonored,  and 
proceed  upon  the  original  debt,  the  bill  or  note  being  re- 
garded as  accepted  upon  the  condition  of  its  payment.  The 
rule  is  different  in  Massachusetts,  the  presumption  of  law 
there  being  that  a  promissory  note  extinguishes  the  debt 
for  which  it  was  given.  Yet  in  Massachusetts  this  presump- 
tion may  be  repelled  by  evidence  that  such  was  not  the  in- 
tention of  the  parties.  Upon  this  ground  it  was  held  that 
under  the  Massachusetts  rule  it  is  not  to  be  presumed  that 
a  shipowner,  having  a  lien  upon  a  cargo  for  the  payment  of 
the  freight,  intended  to  waive  his  lien  by  taking  the  notes 
of  the  charterer  drawn  so  as  to  be  payable  at  the  time  of 
the  expected  arrival  of  the  ship  in  port.^^ 

§  325.     When  carrier  has  no  lien  for  freight  charges. — 

There  can  be  no  lien  for  freight  when  the  contract  for  its 
payment  is  inconsistent  with  a  lien.  If  the  time,  place  and 
manner  of  payment  of  the  freight  are  regulated  by  the  char- 
ter-party in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  inconsistent  with  the 
existence  of  a  lien,  then  the  only  way  of  compelling  pay- 
ment is  by  an  action  upon  the  charter  party.  Thus,  where 
a  ship  was  chartered  at  New  York  for  several  voyages,  part- 
ly at  the  option  of  the  charterer,  with  the  agreement  that  the 
time  of  the  employment  should  be  the  full  term  of  fifteen 
months,  with  a  privilege  to  the  charterer  to  extend  it  to 
twenty-four  months,  the  charterer  paying  at  the  rate  of 
two  thousand  dollars  per  month,  payable  semi-annually  at 
New  York,  it  was  held  that  the  circumstances  indicated  that 
the  owner  meant  to  waive  his  lien  upon  the  cargo  for  freight, 

62The   Kimball,   3   Wall.    (U.    S.)  owner,  and  were  to  be  held  over  or 

37,   18  L.  ed.   50.     There   was   evi-  renewed  in  case  they  fell  due  be- 

dence    that    the   notes    were    given  fore  the  arrival  of  the  ship, 
for  the  accommodation  of  the  ship- 


326 


LIENS. 


326 


and  to  trust  wholly  to  the  personal  responsibility  of  the 
charterer.  A  libel  filed  at  San  Francisco  to  hold  the  cargo 
responsible   for  the   freight  was   accordingly   dismissed. ^^ 

§  326.  Waiver  of  carrier's  lien. — There  is  a  waiver  of  the 
lien  as  against  an  indorsee  for  value  of  a  bill  of  lading,  when 
this  holds  out  that  the  goods  are  to  be  delivered  free  of 
freight.  Where  a  bill  of  lading  of  goods  shipped  at  Liver- 
pool for  Sidney  provided  for  the  payment  of  the  freight  in 
Liverpool  by  the  shipper  one  month  after  the  sailing  of  the 
vessel,  and  the  bill  of  lading  passed  into  the  hands  of  in- 
dorsees for  value,  it  was  held  that  the  representations  of 
the  bill  of  lading  were  such  that  no  lien  could  be  claimed 
against  the  consignee  at  the  port  of  discharge,  though  the 


csRaymond  v.  Tyson.  17  How. 
(U.  S.)  53,  IS  L.  ed.  47.  In  this 
case,  not  only  the  time  but  the 
place  of  payment  was  regarded 
as  of  importance  in  determining 
whether  the  lien  was  waived. 
"Place  for  the  payment  of  money 
is  a  substantial  part  of  any  con- 
tract to  pay  it  there.  It  can  be 
insisted  upon  by  him  who  is  to 
receive  it,  and  cannot  be  right- 
fully refused  or  omitted  by  him 
who  has  to  pay  it.  A  broken 
promise  of  that  kind  gives  to 
the  creditor  a  right  of  action 
against  the  debtor  for  its  recovery. 
Why  upon  principle  should  a 
promise  to  pay  freight  at  a  parti- 
cular time,  and  at  a  place  other 
than  that  where  the  owner  of  the 
ship  has  undertaken  to  deliver  the 
cargo,  be  required  to  be  paid  else- 
where? It  is  the  payer's  privi- 
lege to  pay  it  there.  And,  should 
it  not  be  paid,  why  should  the 
owner  have  more  than  a  right  of 
action  for  its  recovery,  or  larger 
remedies   by   suit,   than   are    given 


in  any  other  contract?  We  confess 
we  do  not  see  why.  Place  for  the 
payment  of  freight,  other  than  that 
for  which  the  cargo  is  shipped  and 
discharged,  amounts  to  a  stipula- 
tion that  freight  will  not  be  de- 
manded at  the  last,  as  a  condition 
for  the  cargo's  delivery.  All  of 
the  authorities  concur  in  this,  that 
place  for  the  payment  of  freight 
is  a  waiver  of  a  lien  upon  the 
cargo  unless  there  are  already  cir- 
cumstances or  stipulations  to  show 
that  it  could  not  have  been  meant. 
It  is  so,  because  it  is  at  variance 
with  the  enforcement  of  such  a 
lien  according  to  the  usage  of 
trade;  and  it  is  so,  because,  when 
parties  to  a  charter-party  depart 
from  that  usage  by  agreeing  to 
pay  and  receive  freight  at  another 
place  than  that  where  the  common 
law  gives  to  an  owner  of  a  ship 
a  lien  to  enforce  payment,  it  must 
be  regarded  that  the  owner  had 
some  sufficient  reason  for  not  in- 
sisting upon  his  right  according^ 
to  the  common  law." 


327 


CARRIERS     LIENS. 


§    326 


master  had  been  advised  by  the  shipowner  that  the  freight 
had  not  been  paid,  and  directed  not  to  deliver  the  goods 
unless  the  freight  should  be  paid.^^ 

The  shipowner  can  not  claim  a  lien  for  freight  when  this 
is  inconsistent  with  a  bill  of  lading  given  with  his  authority, 
if  the  bill  of  lading  represents  the  freight  to  have  been  paid, 
when  in  fact  it  had  not  been  paid,  an  indorsee  for  value  of 
the  bill  of  lading  is  entitled  to  claim  that  the  representation 
is  true;  and  no  lien  for  freight  can  be  claimed  as  against 
him.®^  And  so,  if  the  bill  of  lading  holds  out  that  the  goods 
are  to  be  delivered  free  of  freight  to  the  consignee,  there  can 
be  no  lien  for  freight.  Such  is  the  effect  of  a  representation 
in  the  bill  of  lading  that  the  freight  is  payable  by  the  shipper 
in  advance,  on  sailing  or  at  a  fixed  time  afterward;  and 
though  the  shipper  fails  to  pay  as  agreed,  no  lien  for  freight 
can  arise  as  against  the  consignee.*''^     But  a  mere  provision 


('4Kirchner  v.  Venus,  12  Moore 
P.  C.  361,  following  How  v.  Kirch- 
ner,  11  Moore  P.  C.  21,  and  dis- 
senting from  Gilkison  v.  Middle- 
ton,  2  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  134,  and  Neish 
V.  Graham,  8  EI.  &  Bl.  505.  In 
Kirchner  v.  Venus,  12  Moore 
P.  C.  361,  Lord  Kingsdown,  deliv- 
ering the  judgment,  said:  "No 
doubt  parties  who  have  superseded 
by  a  special  contract  the  rights 
and  obligations  which  the  law  at- 
taches to  freight  in  its  legal  sense 
may,  if  they  think  fit,  create  a  lien 
on  the  goods  for  the  performance 
of  the  agreement  into  which  they 
have  entered,  and  they  may  do  this 
either  by  express  conditions  con- 
tained in  the  contract  itself,  or 
by  agreeing  that  in  case  of  failure 
of  performance  of  that  agreement, 
the  right  of  lien  for  what  is  due 
shall  subsist  as  if  there  had  been 
an  agreement  for  freight.  But  in 
such    case    the    right    of    lien    de- 


pends entirely  on  the  agreement, 
and  if  the  parties  have  not,  in  fact, 
made  such  a  contract,  it  is  very 
difficult  to  understand  upon  what 
grounds  it  can  be  implied,  or  why, 
upon  failure  of  performance  of  the 
agreement  which  they  have  made, 
the  law  is  to  substitute  for  it  an- 
other and  very  different  contract 
which   they   have   not   made." 

CaHoward  v.  Tucker,  1  Barn.  & 
Ad.  712;  Tamvaco  v.  Simpson,  L. 
R.   1   C.   P.  363. 

66H0W  V.  Kirchner,  11  Moore 
P.  C.  21;  Kirchner  v.  Venus,  12 
Moore  P.  C.  361.  In  the  latter 
case  there  is  a  dictum  of  Lord 
Kingsdown  that  freight  payable  in 
advance  is  not  freight.  It  is  not 
money  for  carrying  goods,  but  for 
taking  them  on  board.  But  this 
view  is  not  affirmed  in  later  cases. 
Carver's  Carriers  of  Goods  by  Sea, 
666.  This  dictum  is  commented 
upon   and    explained    in  Allison  v. 


\.Z^7 


LIENS. 


328 


that  the  freight  shall  be  paid  in  advance  does  not  seem  to  be 
inconsistent  with  a  lien,  especially  if  the  consignee  is  himself 
liable  for  it.  An  agreement  for  prepayment  of  freight  does 
not  alter  its  legal  character  of  freight.^''' 

§  327.  Waiver  of  lien  not  inferred. — No  waiver  of  the 
lien  will  be  inferred,  however,  unless  it  is  evident  from  the 
terms  of  the  contract  that  it  is  contemplated  that  delivery 
is  to  precede  the  payment  for  freight. ^^  Accordingly  a  stipu- 
lation in  a  charter  party  that  the  freight  shall  be  paid  within 
ten  days  after  the  return  of  the  vessel  to  the  port  of  departure 
does  not  displace  the  lien  on  the  return  cargo,  inasmuch  as 
the  delivery  of  the  cargo  might  be  rightfully  postponed  be- 
yond the  ten  days  after  the  returning  of  the  ship.*^^  And  so 
a  stipulation  that  the  freight  shall  be  paid  in  five  days  or  in 
ten  days  after  the  discharge  of  the  cargo  is  held  not  to  dis- 
place the  lien,  inasmuch  as  the  word  discharge,  in  this  con- 
nection, is  construed  to  mean  merely  the  unloading  of  the 
cargo  from  the  ship,  and  not  the  delivery  of  it  to  the  owner 
or  consignee. "^^ 


Bristol  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  L.  R.  1 
App.  Cas.  209.  On  the  princi- 
pal point  decided,  the  cases 
of  Gilkison  v.  Middleton,  2  C. 
B.  (N.  S.)  134,  and  Neish  v. 
Graham,  8  El.  &  Bl.  505,  are  dis- 
cussed and  dissented  from  in  the 
Privy  Council  cases. 

67 Allison  V.  Bristol  Marine  Ins. 
Co.,  L.  R.  1  App.  Cas.  209. 

espaith  v.  East  India  Co.,  4  B. 
&  Aid.  630;  Bird  of  Paradise,  5 
Wall.  (U.  S.)  545,  18  L.  ed.  662; 
Certain  Logs  of  Mahogany,  2 
Sumn.  (U.  S.)  589,  Fed..  Cas.  No. 
2559;  Howard  v.  Macondray,  7 
Gray  (Mass.)  516.  In  this  case, 
Dewey,  J.,  delivering  the  judg- 
ment of  the  court,  said:  "While 
it     is     conceded     that     the     mari- 


time lien  for  freight  may  be 
considered  as  waived,  when 
there  are  stipulations  in  the  con- 
tract as  to  time  and  place  of  pay- 
ment inconsistent  with  the  exist- 
ence of  such  lien,  in  the  cases  re- 
ported there  seems  manifestated  a 
strong  disposition  to  limit  this  ex- 
clusion of  such  lien  to  cases  plain- 
ly importing  such  exclusion."  Rug- 
gles  V.  Bucknor,  1  Paine  (U.  S.) 
358,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  12115,  per 
Thompson,  J.,  is  to  the  same  effect. 

C9The  Volunteer,  1  Sum.  (U.  S.) 
551,  Fed.  Cas.  No.   16991. 

70The  Kimball,  3  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
37,  18  L.  ed.  50;  Certain  Logs  of 
Mahogany,  2  Sumn.  (U.  S.)  589, 
Fed.   Cas.   No.  2559. 


329  carriers'  liens.  §  331 

§  328.  Waiver  by  attachment. — An  attachment  by  the 
carrier  of  the  property  on  which  a  Hen  is  claimed  for  freight 
is  a  waiver  or  forfeiture  of  the  lien.'^^ 

§  329.  Action  to  collect  freight  charges. — A  carrier  may 
bring  an  action  for  his  freight  charges,  and  attach  other  goods 
to  secure  the  demand,  without  discharging  his  lien,  especial- 
ly if  the  owner  has  wrongfully  taken  the  goods  from  him 
by  means  of  a  writ  of  replevin. ''^^ 

§  330.  Waiver  by  issuance  of  an  execution. — A  lien  is  de- 
stroyed by  the  carriers  taking  on  execution  the  same  goods 
upon  which  the  lien  is  attached,  for  he  thereby  gives  up 
possession  to  the  sheriff.^^ 

§331.  Lien  defeated  by  injury  to  goods. — The  carrier's 
lien  may  be  defeated  by  an  injury  to  the  goods  carried,  hap- 
pening by  the  carrier's  fault,  to  an  amount  larger  than  his 
charge  for  freight.'^'*  His  right  to  freight,  and  to  detain  the 
goods  for  its  payment,  results  from  his  performance  of  the 
contract  to  carry  the  goods.  If  he  fails  to  carry  the  goods 
and  have  them  ready  for  delivery,  he  can  not  claim  his 
freight.  If,  through  his  fault  the  goods  sustain  damage  to 
an  amount  exceeding  the  amount  of  his  charges  for  freight, 
he  is  not  entitled  to  demand  anything  for  the  carriage  of  the 
goods;  and  if  the  damages  be  less  than  the  freight  charges, 
the  amount  he  is  entitled  to  demand  is  reduced  to  that  ex- 
tent. His  lien  is,  of  course,  only  coextensive  with  his  right 
to  claim  and  recover  freight.  If  by  reason  of  such  injury 
to  the  goods  he  is  not  entitled  to  demand  any  freight,  he  has 

"iWingard    v.    Banning,    39    Cal.  '^Dyer   v.    Grand   Trunk   R.   Co., 

543.  42  Vt.  441,  1  Am.  Rep.  350;  Hum- 

''■2Barnard  v.  Wheeler,  24  Maine  phreys    v.    Reed,    6    Whart.    (Pa.) 

412.  435;  Boggs  v.  Martin,   13  B.   Mon. 

73Jacobs  V.  Latour,  5   Bing.   130;  (Ky.)  239.     See  ante,  §  302. 
Re   Coumbe,  24  Grant   Ch.    (Ont.) 
519. 


§    332  LIENS.  330 

no  right  to  retain  the  goods  for  the  payment  of  the  freight, 
and  if  he  does  so  they  may  be  taken  from  him  by  replevin. 
There  is  no  good  reason  why  the  carrier's  liabihty  for  dam- 
ages to  the  goods  accruing  through  his  fault  should  not  be 
asserted  and  determined  by  way  of  defense  to  his  claim 
for  freight,  as  well  as  by  a  cross  action.  It  would  be  con- 
trary to  the  analogies  of  cases  involving  similar  relations 
of  subject-matter  and  parties,  to  say  nothing  of  the  hard- 
ships to  the  consignee,  to  require  him  to  pay  the  freight  upon 
the  goods,  and  then  to  trust  to  the  responsibility  of  the  car- 
rier at  the  end  of  a  lawsuit  for  the  recovery  of  the  damages 
to  the  goods  sustained  through  the  fault  of  the  carrier."^^ 

§  332.  Carrier's  lien  not  affected  by  consignee's  failure  to 
receive  goods. — The  refusal  of  the  consignee  to  accept  the 
goods  after  they  arrive  at  their  destination  does  not  in  any 
way  afTect  the  carrier's  lien,  whether  this  is  implied  by  law 
or  arises  under  an  express  stipulation  of  contract."^  But 
upon  the  refusal  of  the  consignee  to  accept  the  goods  and 
pay  the  freight,  the  carrier  is  not  entitled  to  take  the  goods 
forthwith  back  to  the  place  whence  they  were  shipped.  He  is 
bound  to  keep  them  for  a  reasonable  time  at  the  place  where 
they  were  to  be  delivered,  so  as  to  give  the  consignee  an  op- 
portunity of  obtaining  the  goods  upon  paying  the  carrier's 
demand.^"  If  the  goods  are  left  in  the  carrier's  hands  with- 
out fault  on  his  part,  he  is  bound  to  take  reasonable  measures 
for  their  preservation,  and  may  recover,  and  have  a  lien,  for 
the  expenses  so  incurred. ''^^ 

"3  Dyer  v.   Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  general    lien,    with    power    of    sale 

42    Vt.    44r,    1    Am.    Rep.    350,    per  in  satisfaction  of  it. 

Barrett,   J.;   Browning  v.   Belford,  '^''''Great      Western      R.      Co.      v. 

83  App.  Div.  144,  82  N.  Y.  S.  489.  Crouch,  3   H.   &  N.   183;   Southern 

"GWestfield     v.     Great     Western  R.  Co.  v.  Born  Steel  Rang  Co.,  126 

R.  Co.,  52  L.  J.  Q.  B.  276.     In  this  Ga.  527,  55  S.  E.  173. 

case    the    contract   provided    for    a  "SGreat      Northern     R.     Co.     v. 

Swaffield.    L.   R.  9   Ex.    132. 


331  carriers'  liens.  §  334 

332a.  Condition  precedent  to  carrier's  lien. — The  per- 
formance of  the  carrier's  contract  is  a  condition  precedent  to 
his  right  to  demand  freight,  and  consequently  to  his  obtain- 
ing a  lien  for  the  freight. ^^  A  carrier  loses  a  lien  by  failing 
cient,  unless  delivery  be  dispensed  with  or  prevented  by  the 
owner.^*^ 

§  333.  Carrier's  lien  lost. — The  carrier's  lien  is  lost  v^hen 
the  performance  of  his  contract  becomes  impossible.  Thus, 
if  a  ship  be  lost  on  the  voyage,  and  the  shipowner  has  no 
means  of  carrying  the  cargo  on  to  its  destination,  he  has 
no  lien  upon  it  for  freight. ^^  But  if  the  shipowner  sub- 
stantially performs  the  contract,  as  by  trans-shipping  the 
goods  to  another  ship,  he  may  still  exercise  his  lien,  or  en- 
able the  owner  of  the  other  ship  to  do  so.^-  And  so  if  a  ship- 
owner deliver  the  cargo  at  a  port  which  is  within  the  terms 
of  the  charter  party,  though  the  charterer  had  ordered  the 
vessel  to  discharge  at  a  port  to  which  it  had  become  im- 
possible for  her  to  go,  on  account  of  the  breaking  out  of 
a  war,  the  shipowner  does  not  lose  his  lien  for  his  chartered 
freight. ^^ 

§  334.     Claiming  general  lien  does  not  waive  special  lien. 

— Claiming  a  general  lien,  or  a  lien  for  other  charges,  is 
not  generally  a  waiver  of  a  specific  lien  for  freight.  If  the 
carrier  claims  to  detain  the  goods,  not  only  on  the  ground 
that  he  has  a  lien  for  freight,  but  also  a  lien  for  other  charges, 

"^Osgood  V.  Groning,  2  Camp.  16  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  348;  Burrill  v. 
466;  Duthie  v.  Hilton,  L.  R.  4  C.  Cleeman,  17  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  72. 
P.  138;  Palmer  v.  Lorillard,  16  si  Nelson  v.  Association  for  Pro- 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  348;  Taylor  v.  tection  of  Wrecked  Property,  43 
Smith,  87  App.  Div.  78,  84  N.  Y.  L.  J.  C.  P.  218;  Ex  parte  Nyholm, 
S.  13;  Liefert  v.  Galveston  L.  &  43  L.  J.  Bank.  21. 
H.  R.  Co.,  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  57  S.  S2 Matthews  v.  Gibbs,  30  L.  J.  Q. 
W.  899.  B.  55,  per  Cockburn,  C.  J. 

sojohnson  v.  Davis,  60  Mich.  56,  saDuncan  v.   Koster,   L.    R.  4   P. 

26  N.  W.  830;  Palmer  v.  Lorillard,  C.   171. 


§  335  LIENS.  332 

and  the  consignee  disputes  the  latter  claim,  he  should  ten- 
der payment  of  the  freight,  for  he  is  not  relieved  from  paying 
this,  though  the  carrier  improperly  joins  with  it  a  further 
claim  of  lien.^^  The  carrier's  conduct  may,  however,  be  such 
as  to  do  away  with  the  necessity  of  a  tender. ^^  Where  a  car- 
rier detained  three  pigs  out  of  a  lot  carried,  to  satisfy  a 
balance  due  on  former  shipments,  and  the  owner  was  ready 
to  pay  the  freight  on  the  present  shipment,  but  the  carrier 
refused  to  deliver  the  pigs  until  payment  of  the  old  account 
should  be  made,  it  was  held  that  he  waived  a  tender  of  the 
freight  for  the  last  shipment. ^^ 

§  335.  Carrier's  lien  founded  on  possession. — The  car- 
rier's lien,  like  all  other  common-law  liens  founded  upon  pos- 
session, gives  him  no  right  to  sell  the  property,  but  only  a 
right  to  retain  it  until  his  charges  are  paid.^'  He  can  enforce 
his  lien  indirectly  by  obtaining  judgment  for  his  charges 
and  levying  the  execution  upon  the  goods.  But  a  sale  with- 
out process  is  a  conversion;  the  measure  of  damages  for 
which  is  the  market  value  of  the  goods,  deducting  the  amount 
of  the  lien.^^ 


84Scarfe   v.   Morgan,  4  M.   &  W.  the   plaintiff  was   ready   to  pay:   it 

270.  was    equivalent    to    saying    to    the 

ssjones   v.   Tarlton,  9   M.    &  W.  plaintiff,   'Do    what  you   will,   ten- 

675.  der  what  you  will,  it  is  of  no  use; 

88Jones   V.   Tarlton,   9   M.    &  W.  I    will    not    receive    it    unless    you 

675.     Alderson,  B. :  "I  think  if  the  pay  the  old  account  also.' " 

defendant    absolutely    refused    to  ^"Lickbarrow   v.    Mason,  6    East 

deliver   the    pigs   when   they  were  21;    Jones    v.    Pearle,    1    Stra.    556; 

demanded,    until    payment    by    the  Mulliner  v.  Florence,  3  Q.  B.  Div. 

plaintiff,   not   only   of   the    freight  484;    Hunt    v.    Haskell,    24    Maine 

for  that  particular  cargo,  but  also  339,  41   Am.   Dec.  387;  Fox  v.   Mc- 

of    the    freight    due    on    a    former  Gregor,  11  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  41;  Saltus 

account,  and  which,  as  now  appears  v.    Everett,  20  Wend.   (N.  Y.)   267, 

by  the  finding  of  the  jury,  the  de-  32  Am.   Dec.  541. 

fendant    was    not    entitled    to    de-  s^Briggs    v.     Boston    &    Lowell 

mand,  that  must  be  considered  as  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Allen  (Mass.)  246,  83 

a  waiver  of  any  tender  of  the  pre-  Am.  Dec.  626;   Staples  v.   Bradley, 

cise    sum    really    due,    and    which  23  Conn.  167,  60  Am.  Dec.  630. 


333  carriers'  liens.  §  336 

The  right  of  possession  under  the  lien  continues  although 
the  debt  itself  be  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations.  The 
possession,  however,  even  for  that  length  of  time,  confers 
no  title  to  the  property  upon  the  bailee.  The  ov^^ner  may  at 
any  time  demand  the  property,  and  is  entitled  to  it  upon 
tendering  the  amount  due  upon  the  property  under  the  lien. 

A  shipowner  can  not,  of  his  own  motion,  sell  the  goods  in 
order  to  pay  the  freight,  except  by  virtue  of  a  statute.  His 
usual  and  proper  remedy  is  by  libel  in  rem  before  an  admir- 
alty court,  by  whose  decree  his  rights  may  be  protected.*^ 

§  336.     Sale  of  goods  by  carrier  authorized  by  statutes. — 

In  almost  every  state  and  territory  there  are  statutes  which 
enable  carriers  to  sell  goods  upon  which  they  have  liens 
for  freight,  and  by  means  of  these  statutes  the  passive  com- 
mon-law lien  is  converted  into  an  active  lien.  These  stat- 
utes are  of  two  classes.  One  class  in  terms  provides  a  rem- 
edy by  sale  for  the  enforcement  of  the  carrier's  lien.  And 
this  remedy  is  usually  the  same  as  that  provided  for  the  en- 
forcement of  other  liens.  For  these  provisions,  see  the  chap- 
ter on  Remedies.  The  other  class  in  terms  provides  for  the 
sale  of  unclaimed  goods,  and  for  the  payment  of  the  car- 
rier's charges  and  expenses  out  of  the  proceeds.  The  result 
is  substantially  the  same  in  both  cases;  the  carrier  is  enabled 
to  dispose  of  the  goods  and  to  get  the  amount  due  him.  Al- 
though the  provisions  of  the  latter  class  of  statutes  are  wide- 
ly different  in  the  several  states,  and  it  is  impossible  to  make 
an  adequate  general  statement  of  them,  inasmuch  as  they  re- 
late only  incidentally  to  liens,  it  does  not  seem  desirable  to 
give  them  in  detail,  and  so  they  are  only  referred  to.^^ 

89Sullivan  v.  Park,  33  Maine  438;  law  for  the  enforcement  of  a  car- 
Hunt  V.  Haskell,  24  Maine  339,  41  rier's  lien,  by  allowing,  a  sale  to 
Am.  Dec.  387.  pay   charges,  does  not,   in  the  ab- 

ooAlabama :        Civ.      Code      1907,  sence    of    express    provision,    take 

§   6139.      This    statute,    though    af-  away  any  equitable  remedy  which 

fording    an    adequate     remedy    at  may      have      previously      existed. 


337 


LIENS. 


334 


§  337.     Sale  by  carrier  must  be  made  in  good  faith. — In 

making  a  sale  under  the  statute  of  unclaimed  goods,  to  pay 


Crass  V.  Memphis  &  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
96  Ala.  447,  11  So.  480.  See  Gen. 
Acts  1911,  p.  387,  for  recent  law 
authorizing  sale  of  unclaimed 
freight. 

Alaska :  Carter's  Ann.  Code. 
1900,  pp.  414,  418,  419. 

Arizona  :    Rev.  Stat.  1901,  §  873. 

Arkansas:  Kirby's  Dig.  of  Stats., 
1904,    §   8002. 

California:  Civ.  Code  1906, 
§§  2144,  2204,  3051;  Pol.  Code  1906, 
§§  3152,  3153;  Stats,  and  Amends. 
Codes  1907,  pp.  85,  86;  Stats,  and 
Amends.  Codes  1909,  p.  1000. 

Colorado:  Ann.  Stats.  1912, 
§§  4569,  7620  et  seq. 

Connecticut:  Gen.  Stats.  1902, 
§§  4675-4679;  Pub.  Acts.  1911,  p. 
1450,  §§  26,  27. 

Delaware  :  Laws,  Rev.  Code  as 
amended  1893,  ch.  164,  p.  816. 

District  of  Columbia:  Code  1901, 
§§  642-644. 

Georgia:  Code  1911,  §§  2741, 
2743,  2757,  3366;  Central  of  Georgia 
R.  Co.  V.  Chicago  Portrait  Co.,  122 
Ga.  11,  49  S.  E.  721,  106  Am.  St. 
87. 

Idaho:  Rev.  Code  1908,  §§  1546- 
1549,  3446. 

Illinois:  Rev.  Stats.  1913,  p.  100, 
§  2;  p.  2460,  §§  1-4. 

Indiana:  Burns'  Rev.  Stats.  1914, 
§  3893. 

Iowa:  Code  1897,  §§  3130,  3131; 
Code  Supp.  1907,  §  3131,  p.  784. 

Kansas :     Gen.  Stats.  1909,  §  4810. 

Kentucky:  Carroll's  Stats.  1909, 
§  785. 

Louisiana:  Merrick's  Rev.  Civ. 
Code  1900,  arts.  3217,  3265. 


Maine:  Rev.  Stats.  1903,  ch.  54, 
§§  16-20. 

Alaryland :  Pub.  Gen.  Laws  1904, 
pp.  651,  652,  §§  267-270;  Laws  1910, 
ch.  406. 

Massachusetts  :  Rev.  Laws  1902, 
ch.  95,   §§    1-7. 

Michigan:  Comp.  Laws  1897, 
§§  5727-5738,  6238,  6239;  Pub.  Acts 
1901,  p.  369;  Howell's  Stat.  Ann. 
1912,  §  6591. 

Minnesota:  Gen.  Stats.  1913, 
§  7037. 

Mississippi:  Code  1906,  ch.  54, 
§§  2293-2295. 

Missouri:  Rev.  Stats.  1909, 
§§   8274-8277. 

Montana:  Civ.  Code  1895, 
§  2848. 

Nebraska:  Ann.  Stats.  1911, 
§§  12176,  12177. 

Nevada:  Rev.  Laws  1912,  §§  337- 
542;  Stats.  1909,  p.  216. 

New  Hampshire :  Pub.  Stats. 
1901,  ch.  160,  §§  26-28. 

New  Jersey:  Comp.  Stats.  1910, 
pp.  369,  370,  §§  6,  7;  pp.  3137,  3138, 
§§  57-60. 

New  Mexico:  Comp.  Laws  1897, 
§§  2239-2245,  3873. 

New  York:  Birdseye's  C.  &  G. 
Consol.  Laws  1909,  p.  1866,  §  280; 
p.  4747,  §  46. 

North  Carolina:  Revisal  1905, 
§  2637. 

North  Dakota:  Rev.  Code  1905, 
ch.  57,  §  5661;  chapts.  74,  86  and 
87. 

Ohio  :     Gen.  Code,  §§  8365-8375. 

Oklahoma :  Comp.  Laws  1909, 
§§  454,  472,  4142. 

Oregon :     Ann.  Codes  and  Stats. 


335 


CARRIERS     LIENS. 


338 


the  freight  and  charges,  a  carrier  is  held  not  only  to  good 
faith  in  making  the  sale,  but  to  reasonable  diligence  in 
ascertaining  and  giving  notice  of  the  contents  of  the  pack- 
ages sold.  But,  while  he  is  required  to  examine  all  external 
marks  and  indications  of  the  contents,  he  is  not  required  or 
authorized  to  open  the  packages  for  the  purpose  of  ascer- 
taining their  contents.  If,  knowing,  or  having  reason  to 
know,  the  contents  of  the  packages,  he  withholds  his  knowl- 
edge or  belief,  and  sells  valuable  goods  to  a  favorite  having 
superior  knowledge,  at  a  nominal  price,  this  is  a  fraud  which 
vitiates  the  sale,  and  renders  him  and  the  purchaser  liable 
in  damages  to  the  owner. ^^ 

§  338.  Sale  by  carrier  of  perishable  goods. — If,  however, 
the  goods  are  of  a  perishable  nature,  in  the  absence  of  the 
consignee,  it  is  a  matter  of  necessity  for  the  carrier  to  sell 
them.    But  in  such  case  he  sells,  not  bv  virtue  of  his  lien,  but 


(Bellinger  &  Cotton)  1902,  §§  3892- 
3903,  5674,  5675. 

Pennsylvania :  Purdon's  Digest 
(13th  ed.)  1903,  p.  2265,  §§  1-3.  See, 
also,  Laws  1909,  p.  19. 

Rhode  Island:  Gen.  Laws  1909, 
p.  619,  §  5. 

South  Carolina:  Acts  1913,  p. 
140  et  seq.,  repealing  Code  of  Laws 
(Civ.)  1912,  §§  2610-2613. 

South  Dakota:  Rev.  Code  (Civ.) 
1903,  §  1548. 

Tennessee :  Ann.  Code  1896,  p. 
841,  §§  3598,  3599. 

Texas:  Rev.  Civ.  Stats.  1911, 
arts.  725-727;  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 
V.  North  Texas  Grain  Co.,  Zl  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  93,  74  S.  W.  567. 

Utah  :  Comp.  Laws  1907,  §§  1416- 
1417.     See  also.  Laws  1911,  p.  271. 

Vermont:  Pub.  Stats.  1906,  ch. 
239,  §§  5663-5668.  See,  also.  Laws 
1912,    p.   231. 


Virginia:  Code  1904,  p.  669,  ch. 
54a,  §§  28,  29. 

Washington:  Ann.  Codes  and 
Stats.  (Remington  &  Ballinger's) 
1910.  §§  1191-1196. 

Wisconsin:  Stats.  1898,  §§  1637- 
1640. 

Wyoming:  Comp.  Stats.  1910, 
§§  3756-3762. 

Author's  note:  §§  340-374.  In 
the  first  edition  of  this  work  a 
full  abstract  of  the  statutes  of  the 
several  states  providing  for  the 
enforcement  of  Carriers'  Liens 
was  given,  one  section  being  de- 
voted to  each  state.  In  the  second 
and  third  editions  it  has  not  seemed 
best  to  give  as  much  space  to  a 
detailed  statement  of  the  statutory 
remedies,  but  instead  to  make  ref- 
erence in  §  337  to  the  statutes. 

9iNathan  v.  Shivers,  71  Ala.  117, 
46  Am.  Rep.  303. 


§  339  LIENS.  336 

by  virtue  of  his  trust  relation  to  the  owner,  and  in  his  interest. 
Out  of  the  proceeds  he  may  retain  his  freight  and  charges. 
To  justify  the  sale,  it  must  be  shown  that  the  goods  were 
perishable,  and  that  the  sale  is  one  of  absolute  necessity  in 
the  interest  of  the  owner.^^ 

§339.  Statute  of  the  United  States. — A  statute  of  the 
United  States^^  provides  that  whenever  the  collector  shall 
be  notified  of  a  lien  for  freight  on  any  goods  imported,  he 
shall  hold  the  same  until  it  is  shown  that  the  freight  has 
been  paid  or  secured.  Under  this  statute  the  consignee 
should  first  tender  the  amount  of  freight  he  admits  to  be 
due,  and  if  declined,  he  should  tender  a  sufficient  bond  con- 
ditioned to  pay  all  freight  that  may  be  found  to  be  due,  or 
that  may  be  adjudged  due  by  any  court  of  competent  juris- 
diction. Should  this  be  declined,  proof  of  these  tenders 
should  be  hade  to  the  collector,  who,  if  he  finds  the  bond 
adequate  to  secure  the  carrier,  should  release  the  goods  on 
the  deposit  with  him,  for  the  use  of  the  carrier,  of  the  bond 
originally  tendered.®^ 

92Arthur  v.  Schooner   Cassius,  2  93U.  S.  Comp.  Stats.  1901,  §  2981. 

Story    (U.    S.)    81,    Fed.    Cas.    No.  94Wyman    v.    Lancaster,  32   Fed. 

564;     Rankin    v.     Memphis     &     C.      720. 
Packet   Co.,  9  Heisk.   (Tenn.)    564, 
24  Am.  Rep.  339. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


LIENS  OF  CORPORATIONS  ON  THEIR  MEMBERS'  SHARES. 


Sec.  ■  Sec. 

375.  Corporation   at   common   law      392. 

had   no   lien   on    its    mem- 
bers' shares.  393. 

376.  Lien  of  corporation   by   stat-      394. 

ute. 

377.  By-laws   to   regulate   transfer      395. 

of  shares. 

378.  Notice    where     by-law     rests      396. 

upon   inferential  authority.      397. 

379.  Statute  constructive  notice  of      398. 

lien. 

380.  Usage      of     corporations      in      399. 

claiming  liens.  400. 

381.  Lien   can  only  be   authorized      401. 

by  statute. 

382.  Lien    conferred    on    existing      402. 

corporation. 

383.  Option    by    statute    does    not      403. 

create  a  lien. 

384.  Bank  can  have  no  lien  on  its      404. 

own  stock. 

385.  Lien    may    cover    liability    of      405. 

equitable   shareholder. 

386.  Equitable    shares    subject    to      406. 

lien. 

387.  Enforcement  of  lien  on  hold-      407. 

er  of  legal  title  of  shares. 

388.  Equitable     assignee     has     no      408. 

lien. 

389.  Priority  of  lien  over  equitable      409. 

pledge. 

390.  Availability    of    lien    in    state       410. 

other  than  that  where  cor- 
poration   is   organized.  411. 

391.  Corporations'    lien    on    divi- 

dends. 412. 


Lien  not  confined  to  stock 
owned. 

The  word  "indebted." 

Lien  not  restricted  to  par- 
ticular debt. 

Liens  not  confined  to  debts 
due  for  shares. 

By-laws  restricted  by  statute. 

Lien  on  calls  for  shares. 

Debt  of  partnership  or  of  a 
surety. 

Debt  of  joint  trustee. 

Lien  in  case  of  bankruptcy. 

Surety  subrogated  to  right  of 
lien  holder. 

Lien  of  corporation  securing 
several    debts. 

Lien  may  be  waived  by  cor- 
poration. 

Lien  after  notice  of  transfer 
of  stock. 

Notice  to  its  officer  is  notice 
to  a  corporation. 

Corporation  may  be  estopped 
to  claim  lien. 

Waived  by  taking  a  transfer 
of  the    shares. 

No  waiver  by  taking  other 
security. 

Lien  acquired  after  attach- 
ment of  stock. 

Stock  pledged  after  the  bank 
has  waived  its  lien. 

Transfer  of  part  of  the 
shares  not  a  waiver. 

Usage  may  operate  against 
lien. 


337 


22 


375 


LIENS. 


338 


Sec. 
413. 

414. 

415. 


No  waiver  by  reason  of  the 
corporation  allowing  stock 
to  remain  outstanding. 

Issuing  of  certificate  will  not 
amount  to  a  waiver. 

Lien  not  enforcible  on  un- 
authorized  debt. 


Sec. 

416.  Payment    of    debt   discharges 

lien. 

417.  Lien  not  lost  because  debt  is 

barred  by  statute  of  limit- 
ations. 


§  375.  Corporation  at  common  law  has  no  lien  on  its 
member's  shares. — A  corporation  has  no  lien  at  common 
law  upon  the  shares  of  its  members  for  any  indebtedness 
to  the  company.^  The  reason  sometimes  given  for  this  is 
that  secret  liens  are  repugnant  to  the  general  policy  of  the 
common  law.  But  there  is  in  fact  no  sufficient  ground  in 
law  upon  which  to  rest  a  claim  to  such  a  lien.  Such  posses- 
sion as  a  corporation  has  of  its  members'  shares  does  not 
give  it  a  possessory  lien  for  their  debts.-  The  corporation 
really  has  no  possession  of  stock  that  it  has  issued  to  its 


LXeale  v.  Janney,  2  Cr.  C.  C.  188, 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  10069;  Driscoll  v. 
West  Bradley  &  Gary  Mfg.  Co., 
59  N.  Y.  96,  per  Folger,  J.;  Mc- 
Murrich  v.  Bond  Head  Harbor  Co., 
9  U.  C.  Q.  B.  333.  Kentucky:  Dana 
V.  Brown,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  304; 
Frankfort  &  S.  Turnpike  Co.  v. 
Churchill,  6  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  427, 
17  Am.  Dec.  159;  Fitzhugh  v.  Bank 
of  Shepherdsville,  3  T.  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  126,  16  Am.  Dec.  90.  Louis- 
iana: New  Orleans  Nat.  Banking 
Asso.  V.  Wiltz,  10  Fed.  330,  4 
Woods  (U.  S.)  43;  Bryon  v.  Car- 
ter, 22  La.  Ann.  98;  Byrne  v.  Union 
Bank,  9  Rob.  (La.)  433.  Massa- 
chusetts: Massachusetts  Iron  Co. 
V.  Hooper,  7  Cush.  (Mass.)  183; 
Sargent  v.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.,  8 
Pick.  (Mass.)  90,  19  Am.  Dec.  306; 
Nesmith  v.  Washington  Bank,  6 
Pick.      (Mass.)      324;      Hussey     v. 


Manufacturers'  &  Mechanics'  Bank, 
10  Pick.  (Mass.)  421,  per  Shaw, 
C.  J.  Pennsylvania:  Steamship  Dock 
Co.  V.  Heron,  52  Pa.  St.  280;  Mer- 
chants' Bank  v.  Shouse,  102  Pa.  St. 
488,  16  Rep.  442.  Other  States:  Ha- 
gar  V.  L^nion  Nat.  Bank,  63  Maine 
509;  Vansands  v.  Middlesex  Coun- 
ty Bank,  26  Conn.  144;  Farmers'  & 
Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Wasson,  48 
Iowa  336,  30  Am.  Rep.  398;  Mobile 
Mut.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Cullom,  49  Ala. 
558;  Bank  of  Holly  Springs  v. 
Pinson,  58  Miss.  421,  38  Am. 
Rep.  330,  per  George  J.;  Heart  v. 
State  Bank,  17  N.  Car.  Ill;  Peo- 
ple V.  Crockett,  9  Gal.  112;  Wil- 
liams V.  Lowe,  4  Nebr.  382,  affd. 
94  U.  S.  650.  24  L.  ed.  216,  per 
Gantt.   J. 

-Fitzhugh  V.  Bank  of  Shepherds- 
ville, 3  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  126,  16 
Am.  Dec.  90. 


339 


LIENS    ON    CORPORATE    STOCK. 


§    376 


members  except  in  case  they  transfer  it  to  the  corporation. 
The  corporation  is  not  a  debtor  to  its  members  for  the 
stock  it  has  issued  to  them,  so  that  no  right  can  arise  against 
them  by  way  of  set-ofT. 

A  further  reason  against  such  a  lien  is  that  it  would 
operate  as  a  restraint  upon  the  transfer  of  stock,  in  the  nature 
of  a  restraint  of  trade,  and  such  a  restraint  is  not  allowed 
except  by  force  of  an  express  provision  of  statute.^ 

The  lien  of  a  corporation  upon  its  members'  shares  pre- 
vents a  transfer  by  the  shareholder,  but  it  gives  the  cor- 
poration no  right  of  sale.^ 

§  376.  Lien  of  corporation  by  statute. — Inasmuch  as  the 
common  law  implies  no  lien  in  favor  of  a  corporation  upon 
its  shares  for  the  debts  of  its  shareholders,  and  inasmuch 
as  it  is  not  only  reasonable  but  desirable  that  there  should 
be  such  a  lien,'  it  has  become  usual  in  statutes  or  charters 
creating  moneyed  or  commercial  companies  to  provide  ex- 
pressly for  such  lien. 

In  some  states  there  are  general  laws  declaring  this  lien, 
and  in  some  instances  prescribing  the  mode  of  enforcing  the 
lien.'^     These  statutes  provide  that  the  transferees  of  stock 


^Farmers'  &  Mechanics'  Bank  v. 
Wasson,  48  Iowa  336,  30  Am.  Rep. 
398. 

^Tete  V.  Farmers'  &  Mechanics' 
Bank,  4  Brew.  St.   (Pa.)  308. 

5In  Alabama  corporations  have 
a  lien  upon  the  stock  standing  in 
the  name  of  a  debtor,  and  may- 
enforce  it  after  thirty  days'  notice 
to  the  debtor,  by  selling  the  same 
at  public  auction,  ten  days'  notice 
of  sale  being  first  published.  Civ. 
Code  1907,  §  3476.  A  mortgage, 
pledge,  or  other  lien  upon  stock  is 
void  as  to  bona  fide  creditors  and 
purchasers  unless  a  transfer  is  reg- 
istered within  fifteen  days.  Civ. 
Code   1907,  §  3471. 


Arkansas:  A  corporation  shall 
at  all  times  have  a  lien  upon  all  the 
stock  or  property  of  its  members 
invested  therein  for  all  debts  due 
from  them  to  such  corporation. 
Kirby's  Dig.  of  Stats.   1904,   §  853. 

Colorado:  Banks  organized  un- 
der the  statutes  of  the  state  have 
a  lien  upon  the  stock  and  dividends 
of  shareholders  for  their  debts. 
Ann.  Stats.  (Mills)  1912,  p.  155, 
§  364.  As  to  transfers  of  stock,  see 
same    section. 

Connecticut:  Every  corporation 
has  at  all  times  a  lien  upon  all  the 
stock  owned  by  any  person  there- 
in   for    all    debts    due    to    it    from 


3/6 


LIENS. 


340 


shall  take  it  subject  to  all  the  liabilities  of  the  stockholders 
who  make  the  transfers ;  or  forbid  transfers  so  long  as  the 
holder  of  the  shares  is  indebted  to  the  company;  or  declare 
that  the  corporation  shall  have  a  paramount  lien  upon  all 
shares  to  secure  the  debts  of  the  shareholders  to  the  cor- 
poration.® 


him.  Gen.  Stats.  1902,  §  ^2,7Z; 
Pub.  Acts  1903,  ch.  194,  §  21. 

Florida:  No  shares  of  a  private 
corporation  shall  be  transferred 
until  all  previous  assessments  there- 
on shall  have  been  fully  paid  in. 
Gen.  Stats.  1906,  §  2656. 

Georgia:  The  by-law^s  of  a  cor- 
poration may  create  a  lien  upon 
the  shares  of  other  property  of 
the  stockholders  in  favor  of  the 
company;  such  lien  is  binding  upon 
the  corporators  themselves,  and 
upon  all  creditors  given  credit  with 
notice,  or  purchasers  at  public  or 
private  sale  purchasing  with  notice. 
Code  1911,  §  3375. 

Michigan:  Shares  of  building 
and  loan  associations  are  subject 
to  a  lien  for  the  payment  of  un- 
paid dues  and  such  other  charges 
as  are  lawfully  incurred,  and  the 
by-laws  may  prescribe  the  manner 
of  enforcing  this  lien.  Howell's 
Stats.  1912,  §  7663. 

Minnesota:  Stock  shall  not  be 
transferred  upon  the  books  of  the 
corporation  while  any  indebtedness 
of  the  record  holder  thereof  to 
the  corporation  remains  unpaid. 
Gen.  Stats.  1913,  §  6176. 

Nevada:  Banks  have  prior  liens 
upon  stock  of  shareholder  to  the 
extent  of  assessment  and  may  sell 
stock  of  delinquent  shareholder, 
after  giving  due  notice.  Rev.  Laws 
•1912,  art  651.  p.  200. 

Utah:     A  private  corporation  has 


a  lien  on  the  amount  paid  in  by 
a  stockholder  upon  his  subscrip- 
tion, and  the  dividends  thereon  for 
any  balance  due  for  the  stock. 
Comp.  Laws  1907,  §  333. 

Vermont:  A  private  corporation 
may  sell  at  public  auction  the 
shares  of  a  delinquent  stockholder 
according  to  its  by-laws.  Pub. 
Stats.  1906,  §  4268. 

West  Virginia:  No  share  shall 
be  transferred  without  the  consent 
of  the  board  of  directors,  until  all 
previous  calls  thereon  have  been 
paid.     Code  1906,  §2336. 

^Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Seton,  1  Pet. 
(U.  S.)  229,  7  L.  ed.  152;  Brent  v. 
Bank  of  Washington,  10  Pet.  (U. 
S.)  596,  9  L.  ed.  547;  National  Bank 
V.  Watsontown  Bank,  105  U.  S. 
217,  26  L.  ed.  1039;  Union  Bank  v. 
Laird,  2  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  390,  4  L. 
ed.  269.  Pennsylvania:  Mount 
Holly  Paper  Co.'s  Appeal,  99  Pa. 
St.  513.  New  York:  Strebbins  v. 
Phenix  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  3  Paige  (N. 
Y.)  350;  Arnold  v.  Suffolk  Bank,  27 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  424;  Leggett  v.  Bank 
of  Sing  Sing,  24  N.  Y.  283.  Ohio: 
Conant  v.  Seneca  Co.  Bank,  1  Ohio 
St.  298.  Kentucky:  Bank  of 
America  v.  McNeil,  10  Bush  (Ky.) 
54;  Kenton  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bowman, 
15  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  578; 
Kenton  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bowman,  84 
Ky.  430,  8  Ky.  L.  467,  1  S.  W. 
717;    Corbin    Banking    Co.    v.    Mit- 


341 


LIENS  ON  CORPORATE  STOCK. 


§  377 


§  377.  By-laws  to  regulate  transfer  of  shares. — By  virtue 
of  the  general  authority  to  regulate  the  transfer  of  shares 
conferred  upon  corporations  by  statute  or  special  charter, 
many  authorities  hold  that  corporations  may  enact  by-laws 
creating  liens  upon  the  shares  of  their  members;  and  that 
it  matters  not  that  this  statutory  authority  to  regulate  the 
transfer  of  shares  is  conferred  in  the  most  general  terms. '^ 


chell,  141  Ky.  172,  132  S.  W.  426. 
Maryland:  Hodges  v.  Planters' 
Bank,  7  G.  &  J.  (Md.)  306;  Reese 
V.  Bank  of  Commerce,  14  Md.  271, 
74  Am.  Dec.  536. 

"Child  V.  Hudson's  Bay  Co.,  2 
P.  Wms.  207.  The  decision  of  this 
case  as  reported,  1  Str.  645,  was 
upon  the  ground  that  the  corpora- 
tion had  a  sort  of  set-off.  Brent 
V.  Bank  of  Washington,  10  Pet. 
(U.  S.)  596,  9  L.  ed.  547;  Pender- 
gast  V.  Bank  of  Stockton,  2  Saw- 
yer (U.  S.)  108,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
10918;  In  re  Bachman,  12  N.  Bank. 
Reg.  223.  In  Child  v.  Hud- 
son's Bay  Co.,  2  P.  Wms.  207, 
power  was  given  to  the  Hud- 
son Bay  Company  by  their 
charter  to  make  by-laws  for 
the  better  government  of  the  com- 
pany and  for  the  management  of 
their  trade,  and  they  made  a 
by-law  that,  if  any  of  their  mem- 
bers should  be  indebted  to  the 
company,  his  company  stock  should 
be  liable  in  the  first  place  for  the 
payment  of  such  debts  as  he  might 
owe  to  the  company,  and  that  the 
company  might  seize  and  detain 
the  stock  as  security  for  such  in- 
debtedness. In  a  contest  between 
the  assignees  in  bankruptcy  of  the 
shareholder  and  the  company,  the 
by-law  was  adjudged  good  upon 
the  ground  that  the  legal   interest 


in  all  the  stock  was  in  the  com- 
pany. 

Alabama:  Cunningham  v.  Ala- 
bama L.  Co.,  4  Ala.  652.  The 
charter  gave  the  directors  power 
"to  make  rules  concerning  the 
transfer  of  stock." 

California:  Jennings  v.  Bank  of 
California,  79  Cal.  323,  21  Pac. 
852,  5  L.  R.  A.  233,  12  Am.  St. 
145.  "Our  opinion  proceeds  upon 
the  proposition  that  the  acceptance 
of  the  certificate  of  stock  contain- 
ing the  condition  in  question,  and 
the  subsequent  borrowing  of 
money,  without  anything  to  ex- 
clude the  idea  that  the  condition 
was  to  govern,  creates  an  implied 
contract  from  which  an  equitable 
Hen  arises.  This  was  the  ground 
of  decision  in  the  Connecticut  case, 
which  expressly  states  that  it  did 
not  proceed  on  the  ground  of 
usage."    Per  Hayne,  J. 

Connecticut:  Vansands  v.  Mid- 
dlesex County  Bank,  26  Conn.  144. 

Delaware:  McDowell  v.  Bank  of 
Wilmington,  1  Harr.  (Del.)  27,  2 
Del.  Ch.  1.  In  the  latter  report, 
however,  it  appears  that  the  by- 
law was  authorized  expressly  by 
the    act    of    incorporation. 

Georgia:  Tuttle  v.  Walton,  1 
Ga.  43.  A  provision  that  stock  is 
only  transferable  on  the  books  of 
the  corporation  does  not  give  a  lien 


377 


LIENS. 


342 


Without    any   by-laws,    corporations    may    issue    certificates 
containing  a  condition  to  the  effect  that  transfers  upon  the 


on  the  stock.  Buena  Vista  L.  & 
S.  Bank  V.  Grier,  114  Ga.  398,  40 
S.  E.  284.  See,  also,  Owens  v.  At- 
lantic Trust  &  Banking  Co.,  119 
Ga.  924,  47  S.  E.  215. 

Iowa:  Dempster  Mfg-.  Co.  v. 
Downs,  126  Iowa  80,  101  N.  W. 
735,  106  Am.  St.  340;  Des  Moines 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Warren  County 
Bank,  97  Iowa  204,  66  N.  W.  154. 

Louisiana:  Bryon  v.  Carter,  22 
La.  Ann.  98.  See  New  Orleans 
Nat.  Banking  Asso.  v.  Wiltz,  4 
Woods  (U.  S.)  43,  10  Fed.  330; 
Bath  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Sagadahoc  Nat. 
Bank,  89  Maine  500,  36  Atl.  996. 

Michigan:  See  Russel  Wheel 
&  Foundry  Co.  v.  Hammond,  130 
Mich.  7,  89  N.  W.  590.  And  it  is 
held  that  such  lien  is  not  waived 
by  a  by-law  providing  that  the 
holder  of  stock  shall  give  the  bank 
an  option  to  buy  should  the  holder 
desire  to  sell.  Citizen's  State  Bank 
of  Monroeville,  Ind.,  v.  Kalamazoo 
County  Bank,  111  Mich.  313,  69 
N.  W.  663. 

Mississippi:  Bank  of  Holly 
Springs  v.  Pinson,  58  Miss.  421, 
38  Am.  Rep.  330. 

Missouri:  Mechanics'  Bank  v. 
Merchants'  Bank,  45  Mo.  513,  100 
Am.  Dec.  388;  St.  Louis  Perpetual 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Goodfellow,  9  Mo.  149; 
Spurlock  v.  Pacific  R.  R.,  61  Mo. 
319. 

New  Hampshire:  Costello  v. 
Portsmouth  Brewing  Co.,  69  N.  H. 
405,  43  Atl.  640,  where  a  provi- 
sion allowing  the  appropriation  of 
the  stock  at  par  to  pay  the  debt 
was   upheld. 

New  York:  Leggett  v.  Bank 
of   Sing   Sing,   24   N.    Y.   283;    Mc- 


Cready  v.  Rumsey,  6  Duer  (N.  Y.) 
574;  Stebbins  v.  Phoenix  Ins.   Co., 

3  Paige  (N.  Y.)  350;  Rosenback 
v.  Salt  Springs  Nat.  Bank,  53  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  495;  Arnold  v.  Suffolk 
Bank,  27  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  424. 

In  Ohio  it  is  held  that  a  sav- 
ings and  loan  company  may  re- 
serve a  lien  against  its  stock- 
holders by  stipulating  the  same  in 
the  stock  certificate  and  that  the 
lien  is  good  as  against  a  purchaser 
of  the  stock  who  buys  even  be- 
fore the  vendor  becomes  indebted 
to  the  corporation,  but  the  stock 
is  presented  for  transfer  after  such 
indebtedness.  Stafford  v.  Produce 
Exchange  Banking  Co.,  61  Ohio  St. 
160,  55  N.  E.  162,  76  Am.  St.  271. 

Pennsylvania:  Reading  F.  Ins. 
&  Trust  Co.  v.  Reading  Iron 
Works,  137  Pa.  St.  282,  21  Atl.  169, 
27  Wkly.  Notes  Cas.  91;  Tete 
v.    Farmers'    &    Mechanics'    Bank, 

4  Brewst.  (Pa.)  308;  Morgan  v. 
Bank  of  North  America,  8  Serg.  & 
R.  (Pa.)  73,  11  Am.  Dec.  575; 
Geyer  v.  Western  Ins.  Co.,  3  Pitts. 
(Pa.)  41.  In  this  case  the  charter 
declared  the  stock  assignable  "sub- 
ject to  such  restrictions  and  limi- 
tations as  the  stockholders,  at  a 
general  and  regular  meeting,  may 
adopt." 

Rhode  Island:  Lockwood  v.  Me- 
chanics' Nat.  Bank,  9  R.  I.  308,  11 
Am.  Rep.  253.  This  is  one  of  the 
latest  and  ablest  decisions  sustain- 
ing this  view.  After  an  elaborate 
examination  of  the  authorities. 
Potter,  J.,  said:  "We  consider, 
therefore,  that  it  is  well  settled 
by  reason  and  authority,  that  the 
power  to  make  by-laws  to  regulate 


343 


LIENS  ON  CORPORATE  STOCK. 


§  2>in 


books  shall  be  subject  to  the  indebtedness  of  the  stock- 
holders to  the  corporations ;  and  such  condition  creates  an 
implied  contract  from  which  an  equitable  lien  arises.^ 

The  stockholders  are  regarded  as  having  an  implied  power 
to  enact  by-laws  giving  the  corporation  a  lien  upon  its  mem- 
bers' shares,  either  by  providing  in  express  terms  that  the 
company  shall  have  a  paramount  lien  for  any  indebtedness 
of  its  members,  or  by  prohibiting  a  transfer  of  shares  upon 
its  books  while  the  holder  is  indebted  to  it.. 

But  it  is  conceded  in  some  of  these  decisions  that  a  by- 
law made  upon  such  authority  does  not  bind  others  than 
the  members  of  the  corporation  whose  privilege  and  duty 
it  is  to  know  its  rules  and  regulations,  so  far  as  these  affect 
their  interests;^  or  purchasers  and  creditors  having  notice  of 
such  lien.^° 

Under  a  statute  which  provides  that  shares  shall  be  trans- 
ferable in  such  manner  as  may  be  agreed  upon  in  the  articles 


the  management  of  the  business 
of  the  association  is  sufficient  to 
justify  a  by-law  creating  a  lien  on 
the  stock.  That  the  power  to 
regulate  the  transferring  or  man- 
ner of  transferring  stock  is  suffi- 
cient to  authorize  a  by-law  creat- 
ing such  a  lien.  That  the  power 
to  regulate  the  transferring  or 
manner  of  transferring  of  stock  is 
sufficient  to  authorize  a  by-law  that 
the  stock  shall  be  transferable 
only  at  the  bank,  or  on  the  books; 
and,  in  that  case,  until  such  trans- 
fer, the  purchaser  would  take  only 
an  equitable,  not  a  legal,  title,  and 
subject  to  any  claim  of  the  bank, 
by  charter  or  by-law,  or  valid 
usage,  or  agreement.  That  a  ma- 
jority, at  a  regular  or  legally  called 
meeting,  when  a  quorum  is  present, 
is  sufficient  to  enact  by-laws.  That 
a  by-law  informally  adopted  may 
be  subsequently  ratified,  and,  with- 


out any  record  of  adoption,  may 
be  proved  by  the  usage  and  acts 
of  the  bank,  and  parties  dealing 
with  it." 

sVansands  v.  Middlesex  County 
Bank,  26  Conn.  144;  Jennings  v. 
Bank  of  California,  79  Cal.  323,  21 
Pac.  852,  5  L.  R.  A.  233,  12  Am. 
St.  145. 

9  MacDowell  v.  Bank  of  Wil- 
mington,  1   Harr.   (Del.)  27. 

loSteamship  Dock  Co.  v.  Heron's 
Admx.,  52  Pa.  St.  280,  per  Thomp- 
son, J.;  Lockwood  v.  Mechanics' 
Nat.  Bank,  9  R.  I.  308,  11  Am. 
Rep.  253;  Morgan  v.  Bank  of  North 
America.  8  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  IZ, 
11  Am.  Dec.  575;  Tuttle  v.  Walton, 
1  Ga.  43.  The  question  whether 
a  bona  fide  purchaser  without  no- 
tice of  such  by-law  would  be  pro- 
tected against  the  lien  was  left 
undecided. 


§  378  LIENS.  344 

of  association,  the  directors  have  no  power  to  adopt  a  by-law 
prohibiting  a  transfer  of  shares  by  one  indebted  to  the  cor- 
poration, although  the  corporation  in  its  articles  of  associa- 
tion delegated  to  the  board  of  directors  the  power  to  make 
by-laws  for  the  management  of  its  business. ^^ 

§  378.  Notice  where  by-laws  rest  upon  inferential  author- 
ity.— If  such  a  lien  is  not  created  or  authorized  in  special 
terms,  but  only  by  inference,  notice  of  the  lien  by  recital 
in  the  certificate  may  be  essential  to  make  the  lien  effectual. 
Thus,  where  the  charter  of  a  corporation  provided  in  general 
terms  that  the  mode  and  manner  of  transferring  stock  might 
be  regulated  by  by-laws,  and  a  by-law  was  enacted  that  no 
transfer  of  stock  should  be  made  while  the  stockholder  was 
indebted  to  the  company,  and  that  the  certificate  should 
contain  notice  of  the  lien,  it  was  held  that  a  purchaser  of 
stock  without  actual  notice  of  the  lien  was  not  bound  by 
the  by-law,  and  took  the  stock  free  of  the  lien.^^  The  pur- 
chaser in  such  case  was  not  affected  with  constructive  no- 
tice through  the  charter  that  there  would  be  any  by-law 
preventing  a  stockholder  indebted  to  the  corporation  from 

iiBank  of  Attica  v.  Manufactur-  ment  of  its  own  affairs.     They  are 

ers'    &    Traders'    Bank,    20    N.    Y.  self-imposed    rules,    resulting    from 

501.       The     question,     whether     a  an  agreement  or  contract  between 

statutory   power   to   determine   the  the    corporation    and    its    members 

manner  in  which  a  transfer  on  the  to   conduct   the  corporate   business 

books    may    be    made    includes    a  in    a    particular    way.      They    are 

power  to  forbid  it  in  case  the  share-  not    intended    to    interfere    in    the 

holder  is  indebted  to  the  corpora-  least  with  the  rights  and  privileges 

tion,    was    not    determined    in    this  of  others  who  do  not  subject  them- 

case.  selves    to   their  influence.      It   may 

i2Bank  of  Holly  Springs  v.  Pin-  be  said  with  truth,  therefore,  that 

son,  58  Miss.  421,  38  Am.  Rep.  330.  no    person    not    a    member    of    the 

"By-laws    of   private   corporations  corporation  can  be  affected  in  any 

are    not    in    the    nature    of    legisla-  of   his    rights    by    a    corporate    by- 

tive    enactments,    so    far    as    third  law    of   which    he    has    no    notice." 

persons  are   concerned.     They  are  Per    George,    J.      And    see    Lee    v. 

mere    regulations    of    the    corpora-  Citizens'  Nat.  Bank,   13  Ohio  Dec. 

tion   for   the   control   and   manage-  913,  2  Cin.  R.  298. 


345  LIENS    ON    CORPORATE    STOCK.  §    380 

disposing  of  his  stock,  but  only  with  notice  that  there  might 
be  some  regulation  of  the  mode  and  manner  of  the  trans- 
fer; and  the  purchaser  had  a  right  to  presume  that  the  regu- 
lation referred  to  was  one  announced  in  the  certificate  that 
it  was  transferable  at  the  company's  office,  in  person  or  by 
attorney,  and  was  not  bound  to  inquire  further. 

§  379.  Statute  constructive  notice  of  lien. — But  a  statute 
conferring  or  authorizing  such  a  lien  is  constructive  notice 
of  the  lien  to  all  persons  affected  by  it.  When  a  lien  in 
favor  of  a  corporation  is  created  by  statute,  either  general 
or  special,  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  corporation  to  make 
any  claim  to  such  lien,  or  to  give  any  notice  of  it  in  its 
certificates  of  stock,  in  order  to  maintain  the  lien  either  as 
against  the  shareholder  or  his  pledgee  or  purchaser. ^^ 

§  380.     Usage  of  corporations  in  claiming  liens. — In  a  few 

cases  it  has  been  said  that  a  usage  of  a  corporation  to  claim 
a  lien  upon  its  members'  stock  for  any  indebtedness  to  it, 
or  an  informal  regulation  to  that  effect,  made  known  to  a 
purchaser  of  stock  at  the  time  of  his  taking  a  transfer,  may 
have  the  effect  of  giving  the  corporation  such  a  lien.^"*   Thus, 

i3First    Nat.    Bank    v.    Hartford  America,  8  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  12,,  11 

Life  &  Annuity  Ins.  Co.,  45  Conn.  Am.  Dec.  575.    In  this  case  it  ap- 

22;  Rogers  v.  Huntingdon  Bank,  12  pears  that  there  was  no  by-law  or 

Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  11;  Grant  v.  Me-  written  regulation  of  the  board  giv- 

chanics'  Bank,  15  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  ing  a  lien  upon  the  stock,  but  the 

140;  Sewall  v.  Lancaster  Bank,   17  court  held  that  a  lien  arose  from 

Serg.   &  R.    (Pa.)   285;   Stebbins  v.  the  borrowing  of  money  from  the 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.)  bank  with  knowledge  of  its  usage 

350;  McCready  v.  Rumsey,  6  Duer  in  that  regard,  and  said:    "A  course 

(N.   Y.)    574;    Downer's    Admr.    v.  of  dealing,  a  usage,  an  understand- 

Zanesville    Bank,    Wright     (Ohio)  ing,    a     contract,    express    or    im- 

477;   Farmers'   Bank  v.   Iglehart,  6  plied,    is    the    lien    of    the    parties 

Gill     (Md.)     50;     Bohmer    v.     City  and  a  law  to  them,  provided  they 

Bank,  11  Va.  445;  Door  v.  Life  Ins.  are    not   repugnant   to   the    charter 

Clearing   Co.,   71    Minn.   38,   73   N.  or  the  laws   of  the   land.     *     *     * 

W.  635,  70  Am.   St.  309.  The  bank  had  an  undoubted  right 

i4Morgan     v.     Bank     of     North  to    say    to    any    stockholder:    'We 


§    ^So  LIENS.  346 

in  a  case  in  Connecticut  where  neither  the  charter  nor  the 
by-laws  of  a  bank  contained  any  provision  in  regard  to  such 
a  lien,  but  the  bank  had  from  its  organization,  a  period  of 
fifteen  years,  used  a  form  of  certificate  which  provided  that 
it  was  transferable  at  the  bank,  subject  to  the  indebtedness 
a  certificate,  having  obtained  discounts  at  the  bank,  after- 
wards made  an  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors, 
and  his  assignee  claimed  the  right  to  have  the  stock  trans- 
ferred to  himself;  and,  in  a  suit  against  the  bank  upon  its 
refusal  to  allow  such  transfer,  it  was  held  that  the  provi- 
sion in  the  certificate  was  binding  upon  the  shareholder  by 
reason  of  his  acceptance  of  the  certificate  in  that  form,  such 
acceptance  being  equivalent  to  an  agreement  that  the  stock 
should  be  subject  to  the  lien.^^  His  assignee  also  was  re- 
garded as  estopped  to  deny  that  the  stock  was  held  subject 
to  the  lien  created  by  such  assent. 

It  is  even  declared  that  a  by-law,  though  unauthorized 
by  statute  or  charter,  is  as  binding  on  all  the  members  of 
the  corporation,  and  others  acquainted  with  their  mode  of 
doing  business,  as  is  the  charter  itself,  or  any  public  law 
of  the  state.^^ 

But  of  course  such  a  by-law,  though  established  by  usage 
and  binding  upon  the  members  of  the  corporation,  can  have 
no  force  or  effect  as  against  others,  unless  knowledge  of  the 
by-law  be  brought  home  to  them.  It  is  not  binding  upon  a 
purchaser  or  pledgee  wdthout  notice,^"  nor  upon  a  judgment 
creditor  of  the  stockholder.^^ 

discount    your    note;    but,    remem-  or  implied,  it  is  a  bar,  in  law  and 

ber,  until  it  is  paid,  we  shall  hold  equity,  to  this  action." 

your   stock   in   security;    you    shall  i^Vansands  v.  Middlesex  County 

not    be    permitted    to    transfer    it  Bank,  26  Conn.   144. 

until  you  pay  us.'     *  *  *     Call  this  leQeyer   v.    Western    Ins.    Co.,   3 

answer     of     the     bank     what     you  Pitts.    (Pa.)   41,  per  Williams,  J. 

please,  lien,  set-oflf,  legal  or  equita-  i^People  v.  Crockett,  9  Cal.  112. 

ble,      pledge,      retainer,      stoppage,  iSBryon   v.    Carter,   22   La.   Ann. 

course    of   dealing,    general    under-  98. 

standing,    usage,    contract    express 


347 


LIENS    ON    CORPORATE    STOCK. 


§    381 


§  381.  Lien  can  only  be  authorized  by  statute. — That  such 
a  lien  can  only  be  created  or  authorized  by  statute  is  the 
conclusion  in  which  the  latest  and  best  authorities  on  this 
point  generally  concur,  although  there  is  still  some  conflict 
of  opinion.  A  corporation  can  not,  under  the  authority  given 
to  it  to  regulate  transfers  of  stock,  create  or  declare  by  by- 
law a  secret  lien  in  its  favor  upon  its  stockholders'  shares 
to  secure  their  debts  to  the  corporation.^^  Such  a  by-law 
can  be  made  only  in  pursuance  of  a  general  statute,  or  of 
some  provision  in  its  special  charter.^^  A  by-law  made  sim- 
ply in  pursuance  of  an  incidental  authority  must  be  a  rea- 
sonable one,  and  a  by-law  which  interferes  with  the  common 
rights  of  property,  and  the  dealings  of  third  persons  with 
reference  to  it,  is  not  considered  a  reasonable  one.^^  A  by- 
law creating  a  lien  upon  its  members'  stock  is  certainly  a  very 
serious  hindrance  to  dealings  in  such  stocks,  for  there  would 
be  no  safety  in  a  transfer  of  the  certificate  only,  without  an 
actual  transfer  upon  the  books;  and,  unless  the  right  of  the 
corporation  is  declared  upon  the  face  of  its  certificates  of 
stock,  the  lien  would  also  be  a  secret  one,  and  as  such  ob- 
jectionable.^- 


i^Anglo-California  Bank  v. 
Grangers'  Bank,  16  Rep.  70,  6  Am. 
&  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  543;  Moore  v. 
Bank  of  Commerce,  52  Mo.  377; 
Bryon  v.  Carter,  22  La.  Ann.  98; 
Crook  V.  Girard  Iron  &  Metal  Co., 
87  Md.  138,  39  Atl.  94,  67  Am.  St. 
325.  But  see,  Wetherell  v.  Thirty- 
First  St.  B.  &  L.  Asso.,  153  111. 
361,  39  N.  E.  143,  affd.  43  III.  App. 
509,  where  it  is  held  that  a  by- 
law creating  a  lien  in  the  absence 
of  a  statute  is  valid. 

20New  Orleans  Nat.  Banking 
Association  v.  Wiltz,  4  Woods  (U. 
S.)  43,  10  Fed.  330;  Driscoll  v. 
West  Bradley  &  Cary  Mfg.  Co., 
59  N.  Y.  96;   Carroll  v.  Mullanpay 


Sav.  Bank,  8  Mo.  App.  249;  Chou- 
teau Spring  Co.  v.  Harris,  20 
Mo.  382;  Merchants'  Bank  v. 
Shouse,  16  Rep.  442;  In  re  Long 
Island  R.  R.  Co.,  19  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
Zl,  32  Am.  Dec.  429;  Byrne  v. 
Union  Bank,  9  Rob.  (La.)  433; 
Steamship  Dock  Co.  v.  Heron's 
Admx.,   52  Pa.  St.  280. 

2iDriscoll  V.  West  Bradley  & 
Cary  Mfg.  Co.,  59  N.  Y.  96; 
Moore    v.    Bank    of   Commerce,    52 

Mo.  zn. 

22Chouteau  Spring  Co.  v.  Harris, 
20  Mo.  382.  "This  power,  however, 
of  regulating  transfers  of  stock 
confers  no  corporate  authority  to 
control    its    transferability    by   pre- 


§    ^82  LIENS.  348 

Moreover,  the  natural  and  obvious  purpose  of  a  power 
given  to  a  corporation  to  regulate  the  transfer  of  its  stock 
is  simply  to  enable  the  corporation  to  determine  who  are  its 
members,  who  is  entitled  to  take  part  in  its  meetings  and 
vote,  and  who  are  entitled  to  receive  its  dividends. 

§  382.  Lien  conferred  on  existing  corporation. — Such  a 
lien  may  be  conferred  by  statute  upon  a  corporation  already 
organized  in  respect  of  shares  already  issued  for  debts  al- 
ready incurred.  In  such  case  the  lien  is  created  by  the  stat- 
ute immediately  upon  its  going  into  effect,  so  that  an  in- 
debtedness to  the  corporation  from  a  shareholder  existing 
at  the  time  will  be  secured  in  preference  to  a  pledgee  to  whom 
the  shareholder  has  delivered  the  certificate  with  a  power 
of  attorney  for  its  transfer,  provided  the  corporation  has 
received  no  notice  of  such  pledge  of  the  certificate.^^ 

§  383.  Option  by  statute  does  not  create  a  lien. — An  op- 
tion given  by  statute  to  a  corporation  to  prohibit  a  transfer 
by  a  member  indebted  to  the  corporation  does  not  of  itself 
create  a  lien.  There  is  no  lien  in  such  case  until  the  com- 
pany or  its  directors  have  exercised  the  option  conferred 
by  the  statute  and  declared  a  lien.^* 

It  would  seem  that  a  corporation  having  authority  to 
enact  such  a  by-law  could  not  enact  one  which  would  have 
a  retrospective  effect. ^^ 

scribing  to  whom  the  owner  maj'^  dividends,   and   it  is   construed   ac- 

sell,    and    to    whom    not,    or    upon  cordingly,    the    corporation    being 

what  terms.     The  truth  is,  the  pro-  left  to  exercise   the  power  or  not, 

vision    is    considered    as    being    in-  at  its  own  pleasure,  as  being  alone 

tended   exclusively   for   the   benefit  interested     in     the     matter."       Per 

of  the  company,  in  order  that  they  Leonard,  J. 

may,  by  proper  regulations,  provide  ^spirst    Nat.    Bank    v.    Hartford 

themselves     with     the     means     of  Life  &  Annuity  Ins.  Co.,  45  Conn. 

knowing   who    they    are    bound    to  22. 

treat  as  members  liable  to  assess-  24Perrine  v.   Fireman's   Ins.   Co., 

ment  and   entitled  to  vote  at  cor-  22  Ala.  575. 

porate     meetings     and     to     receive  25People  v.  Crockett,  9  Cal.  112. 


349 


LIENS    ON    CORPORATE    STOCK. 


§    385 


§  384.  Bank  can  have  no  lien  on  its  own  stock. — Under 
the  National  Banking  Act  of  1864,  a  bank  can  not  have  a  lien 
on  its  own  stock  held  by  a  debtor,  although  its  articles  of 
association  and  its  by-laws  are  framed  with  a  direct  view 
to  giving  it  such  a  lien;  for,  aside  from  the  fact  that  the  act 
of  the  preceding  year  contained  an  express  provision  for 
such  a  lien,  which  was  omitted  in  the  substituted  act  of  1864, 
it  was  considered  that  such  a  lien  would  be  inconsistent  with 
the  general  policy  of  the  act  which  prohibits  loans  upon 
the  security  of  shares  of  its  own  capital  stock.-*^ 

§  385.     Lien  may  cover  liability  of  equitable  shareholder. — 

Under  some  circumstances  this  lien  may  cover  the  liability  of 
one  who  is  merely  an  equitable  shareholder.  The  by-laws  of 
an  incorporated  savings  bank,  enacted  under  statutory  au- 


26Bank  v.  Lanier,  11  Wall.  (U. 
S.)  369,  20  L.  ed.  172;  Bullard  v. 
Bank,  18  Wall.  (U.  S.)  589,  21 
L.  ed.  923;  National  Bank  of 
Xenia  v.  Stewart,  107  U.  S. 
676,  27  L.  ed.  592,  2  Sup.  Ct.  778; 
New  Orleans  Nat.  Banking  Asso- 
ciation V.  Wiltz,  4  Woods  (  U.  S.) 
43,  10  Fed.  330;  Evansville  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Metropolitan  Nat.  Bank, 
2  Biss.  (U.  S.)  527,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
4573,  10  Am.  Law.  Reg.  (N.  S.) 
774;  Louisville  Bank  v.  Newark 
Bank,  11  Nat.  Bank.  R.  49;  Dela- 
ware L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  V.  Oxford 
Iron  Co.,  38  N.  J.  Eq.  340.  The 
earlier  cases  in  this  state,  Young 
V.  Vough,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  325,  and 
Mattison  v.  Young,  24  N.  J.  Eq. 
535,  overruled.  Second  Nat.  Bank 
of  Louisville  v.  Nat.  State  Bank, 
10  Bush  (Ky.)  367,  14  Am.  L.  Reg. 
(N.  S.)  281;  Rosenback  v.  Salt 
Springs  Nat.  Bank,  53  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  495;  Conklin  v.  Second  Nat. 
Bank,  45  N.  Y.  655;  Bridges  v. 
National  Bank,  185  N.  Y.  146,  aflfg. 


106  App.  Div.  616,  94  N.  Y.  S.  1140; 
Hagar  v.  Union  Nat.  Bank,  63 
Maine  509;  Thompson's  Nat.  Bank 
Cases,  523,  per  Virgin,  J.,  Lee  v. 
Citizens'  Nat.  Bank,  13  Ohio  Dec. 
913,  2  Cin.  S.  C.  Rep.  298;  Smith  v. 
First  Nat.  Bank,  115  Ga.  608,  41  S. 
E.  983;  Buffalo  German  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Third  Nat.  Bank,  171  N.  Y.  670,  64 
N.  E.  1119;  affg.  Third  Nat.  Bank 
v.  Buffalo  German  Ins.  Co.,  193 
U.  S.  581,  48  L.  ed.  801,  24  Sup.  Ct. 
524.  See  also.  Smith  v.  First  Nat. 
Bank,  115  Ga.  608,  41  S.  E.  983; 
Buffalo  German  Ins.  Co.  v.  Third 
Nat.  Bank,  162  N.  Y.  163,  56  N. 
E.  521,  48  L.  R.  A.  107.  Contra, 
see  Bansands  v.  Middlesex  County 
Bank,  26  Conn.  144;  In  re  Bige- 
low,  2  Ben.  (U.  S.)  469,  1  Nat. 
Bank.  R.  667;  Knight  v.  Old  Nat. 
Bank,  3  Cliff.  (U.  S.)  429;  In  re 
Dunkerson,  4  Biss.  (U.  S.)  227, 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  4156;  Evansville  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Metropolitan  Nat.  Bank, 
2  Biss.  (U.  S.)  527,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
4573. 


§    3^6  LIENS.  350 

thority,  declared  a  lien  in  favor  of  the  bank  on  the  stock  of 
any  shareholder  who  might  be  indebted  to  it  in  any  manner. 
On  the  dissolution  of  a  partnership  owning  stock  in  the 
bank,  the  continuing  members  of  the  firm  bought  all  the 
interest  of  the  retiring  members  and  assumed  all  the  part- 
nership debts.  The  new  firm  became  the  equitable  owners 
of  the  stock.  It  was  held  that  the  lien  of  the  bank  might 
be  enforced  upon  such  stock  for  the  liabilities  of  the  new  firm 
incurred  in  subsequent  transaction  with  the  bank.-"^ 

§  386.  Equitable  shares  subject  to  lien. — Shares  which 
equitably  belong  to  a  debtor  of  the  corporation,  as  well  as 
those  standing  in  his  own  name,  are  subject  to  the  lien  in  its 
favor.  But  if  the  officers  of  a  corporation  knowingly  permit 
shares  to  be  transferred  to  a  mere  nominal  holder,  it  seems 
that  a  bona  fide  purchaser  from  him,  even  without  a  trans- 
fer on  the  books  of  the  company,  will  be  entitled  to  relief 
against  the  lien  of  the  company  for  a  debt  due  from  the  real 
owner. ^^  If  a  certificate  of  stock  be  assigned  with  a  power  of 
attorney  to  complete  the  transfer  upon  the  books,  while 
the  corporation  might  have  a  lien  against  the  stockholder  in 
whose  name  the  shares  were  standing,  or  against  the  equita- 
ble owner,  if  the  rights  of  others  dealing  with  the  equitable 
owner  in  good  faith  are  not  interfered  with,  yet  the  cor- 
poration can  not  assert  its  lien  against  an  equitable  owner 
after  he  has  transferred  the  certificate  to  a  purchaser  in  good 
faith. 

27Planters'    &    Merchants'    Mut.  -^Stebbins  v.  Phoenix  F.  Ins.  Co., 

Ins.    Co.    V.    Selma    Savings    Bank.  3    Paige    (N.   Y.)   350;   Planters'    & 

63  Ala.  585.     "We  can  perceive  no  Merchants'  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Seima 

good  reason,  and  we  are  not  aware  Sav.   Bank,  63  Ala.   585.     The   lan- 

of   any    authority,    requiring    it,    to  guage    of    some    decisions    would 

limit  the   lien   to   debts    owing   the  imply  that  the  lien  could  only  be 

bank    by    the    holder    of    the    legal  asserted    against    the    stockholder 

title   only,   excluding   such   as   may  of    record.     Helm   v.   Swiggett,    12 

be  due  from  the  owner  of  the  com-  Ind.    194. 
plete  equitable  title."     Per  Brickell, 
C.J. 


351  LIENS    ON    CORPORATE    STOCK.  §    389 

§  387.  Enforcement  of  lien  on  holder  of  legal  title  of 
shares. — Though  the  shareholder  be  only  the  holder  of  the 
legal  title,  the  equitable  ownership  being  in  another,  the  lien 
may  be  enforced  for  the  debt  of  the  shareholder  of  record. ^^ 

§  388.  Equitable  assignee  has  no  lien. — As  a  general 
rule,  the  equitable  assignee  of  a  certificate  of  stock  can 
have  no  other  or  greater  rights  than  his  assignor  had;  and, 
therefore,  if  the  corporation  had  a  lien  as  against  the  as- 
signor, the  assignee  can  not  obtain  a  transfer  of  the  legal 
title  upon  the  books  without  paying  the  amount  for  which 
the  stock  is  affected  with  a  lien.^*^ 

The  corporation  can  assert  its  lien  against  the  stockholder 
of  record,  although  he  had  already  pledged  the  certificate  be- 
fore incurring  the  debt  for  which  the  corporation  claims 
the  lien,  provided  the  corporation  had  no  knowledge  of  the 
pledge  at  the  time  the  stockholder  became  indebted  to  it.^^ 

§  389.  Priority  of  lien  over  equitable  pledge. — Even  if  the 
corporation  has  notice  of  an  equitable  pledge  of  the  shares, 
it  may  have  priority  by  reason  of  provisions  of  the  articles  of 

2!>New  London  &  Brazilian  Bank  74  Am.   Dec.  536;   Bishop  v.   Globe 

V.   Brocklebank,   L.   R.  21    Ch.   Div.  Co.,   135    Mass.    132.     See    Bronson 

302;   Burford  v.   Crandell,  2  Cr.   C.  Electric    Co.    v.    Rhenbottom,    122 

C.  86;   Young  v.   Vough,  23   N.   J.  Mich.  608,  81  N.  W.  563. 

Eq.  325;  affd.  24  N.  J.  Eq.  535.  siin   re   Peebles,  2   Hughes   394, 

soUnion  Bank  v.  Laird,  2  Wheat.  Fed   Cas.   No.   10902,   Piatt  v.   Bir- 

(U.    S.)    390,    4    L.    ed.    269;    Brent  mingham   Axle   Co.,  41    Conn.  255. 

V.    Bank    of    Washington,    10    Pet.  "In  contemplation  of  law,  the  stat- 

(U.  S.)  596,  9  L.  ed.  547;  McCready  ute  was  known  to  petitioner  when 

V.    Rumsey,   6   Duer    (N.    Y.)    574;  he  accepted  the  certificate;  it  was, 

Bank  of  Utica  v.  Smalley,  2  Cow.  to  him,  as  if  he  had  been  embodied 

(N.    Y.)     770,    74    Am.     Dec.    526;  therein;  it  was  in  the  nature  of  a 

Bohmer    v.    City    Bank    of    Rich-  qualification    or    restriction    of    his 

mond,  n  Va.  445;  Taylor  v.  Wes-  equitable  interest;  it  was  notice  to 

ton,   n   Cal.   534,  20  Pac.  62;   Jen-  him  that  if,  after  a  reasonable  time 

nings  V.  Bank  of  California,  79  Cal.  had  elapsed,  he  refrain  from  giving 

323,  21  Pac.  852,  5  L.  R.  A.  233,  12  any   notice    of    his    interest    in    the 

Am.    St.     145;     Farmers'     Bank    v.  stock  to  the  corporation,  a  statute 

Iglehart,    6    Gill    (Md.)    50;    Reese  lien  might  come  into  existence   at 

V.  Bank  of  Commerce,  14  Md.  271,  any  moment."     Per  Pardee,  J. 


§    390  LIENS.  352 

association,  the  terms  of  which  are  known  to  the  pledgee. 
The  articles  of  association  of  a  company  provided  that  it 
should  have  a  first  and  paramount  lien  on  every  share  for 
all  debts  due  from  the  shareholder  to  the  company.  A  share- 
holder deposited  his  shares  with  his  banker  as  security  for 
a  balance  due  him  on  current  account,  and  notice  of  the 
deposit  was  given  to  the  company.^^  The  certificate  stated 
that  the  shares  were  held"  subject  to  the  articles  of  associa- 
tion. It  was  held  that  the  company  had  priority  over  the 
bankers  in  respect  of  a  debt  due  from  the  shareholder  to  the 
company,  although  the  debt  became  due  after  notice  of  the 
deposit  of  the  shares  with  the  banker.  The  decision  was 
placed  upon  the  ground  that,  by  the  articles  of  association, 
a  contract  had  been  entered  into  between  the  company  and 
the  shareholder  whereby  the  company  was  tp  have  a  first 
lien  on  his  shares  for  any  debt  due  him;  and  that  by  this 
contract  a  priority  was  conferred  upon  the  company  as 
against  all  persons  claiming  only  an  equitable  interest  in  the 
shares,  and  having  notice  of  the  articles  of  association;  the 
deposit  of  the  shares  without  a  transfer  creating  only  an 
equitable  interest. ^^ 

§  390.  Availability  of  lien  in  state  other  than  that  where 
corporation  is  organized.  The  lien  of  a  corporation,  when 
conferred  by  general  law  or  charter,  may  be  availed  of  in  a 
state  other  than  that  in  which  the  corporation  was  organ- 
ized, when  a  suit  is  brought  against  the  corporation  in  such 
other  state  by  a  person  claiming  to  be  an  equitable  assignee 
of  shares  of  its  stock,  to  recover  damages  for  refusing  to 
make  a  transfer  upon  the  books.    The  rights  and  obligations 

32Bradford       Banking       Co.       v.  company   could   not   claim   priority 

Briggs,    31    Ch.    Div.    19,    affirmed  after  notice  of  the  advance  by  the 

in    Miles    v.    New    Zealand    Alford  banker. 

Estate   Co.,  32  Ch.   Div.  266.     The  3.3Societe    Generale    de    Paris    v. 

former  case  overruled  29  Ch.  Div.  Tramways  Union  Co.,  14  Q.  B.  D. 

149,    where    it    was    held    that    the  424. 


353 


LIENS    ON    CORPORATE    STOCK.  §    392 


of  the  stockholders  of  a  corporation  as  between  them  and  the 
corporation  are  to  be  determined  by  the  laws  of  the  state 
under  which  the  corporation  was  organized.^^ 

§391.  Corporations'  lien  on  dividends. — Corporations 
have  an  equitable  lien  upon  the  dividends  of  their  sharehold- 
ers to  secure  their  debts.  The  rule  against  an  implied  lien 
in  favor  of  corporations  upon  the  shares  of  their  members 
does  not  apply  in  respect  to  dividends  declared  upon  such 
shares.  Dividends  are  considered  as  so  much  money  in  pos- 
session of  the  bank  belonging  to  the  stockholder;  and  it  is 
not  inconsistent  with  any  provision  of  the  National  Banking 
Act,  or  in  conflict  with  any  principle  of  public  policy,  that 
the  bank  should  have  an  equitable  lien  upon  such  dividends.^^ 
The  dividends,  when  payable,  are  a  debt  owing  by  the  cor- 
poration to  the  shareholder,  and  in  a  suit  by  the  shareholder 
for  such  debt  the  corporation  could  set  oft  any  debt  owing 
to  the  corporation  by  the  shareholder.^^ 

§  392.  Lien  not  confined  to  stock  owned. — The  lien  is  not 
confined  to  stock  owned  by  the  stockholder  at  the  time  the 
debt  was  incurred, •'''^  unless  the  language  of  the  statute  or 
charter  giving  the  lien  suggests  such  a  restriction.  If  the 
charter  provides  that  the  corporation  shall  "at  all  times  have 
a  lien  upon  the  stock  or  property  of  its  members  invested 

-iBishop  V.  Globe  Co.,  135  Mass.  (Pa.)   140;  Farmers'  Bank  v.  Igle- 

132.  hart,    6   Gill    (Md.)    50;    McDowell 

35Hague  V.  Dandeson,  2  Ex.  741;  v.  Wilmington  Bank,  1  Har.  (Del.) 

Hagar    v.     Union     Nat.    Bank,    63  27. 

Maine  509;  Thompson's  Nat.  Bank  seSt.    Louis    Perpetual    Ins.    Co., 

Cas.   523;   Sargent  v.   Franklin  Ins.  v.    Goodfellow,   9    Mo.    149;    Hagar 

Co.,   8    Pick.    (Mass.)    90,    19   Am.  v.  Union  Nat.  Bank,  63  Maine  509; 

Dec.   306;    Stebbins  v.   Phoenix   F.  Merchants'    Bank    v.    Shouse,    102 

Ins.  Co.,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.)  350;  Bates  Pa.   St.   488. 

V.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co.,  3  Johns.  Cas.  238;  37Schmidt    v.    Hennepin    County 

St.    Louis    Perpetual    Ins.    Co.    v.  Barrel  Co.,  35  Minn.  511,  29  N.  W. 

Goodfellow,   9    Mo.    149;    Grant   v,  200,    15    Am.    &    Eng.    Corp.    Cas. 

Mechanics'    Bank,    15    Serg.    &    R.  576. 

23 


393 


LIENS. 


354 


therein,  for  all  debts  due  from  them  to  such  corporation," 
the  lien  attaches  to  stock  of  members  whenever  afterwards 
acquired  during  the  indebtedness.  There  is  a  lien  whenever 
the  indebtedness  and  the  ownership  of  the  stock  concur. 

§  393.  The  word  "indebted." — The  word  "indebted,"  in 
statutory  provisions  for  liens  in  favor  of  corporations,  applies 
as  well  to  debts  to  become  due  as  to  those  actually  due  and 
payable. ^^  Thus  the  lien  applies  in  favor  of  a  bank  that  has 
discounted  a  note  or  bill  on  which  a  shareholder  is  liable, 
though  the  note  or  bill  has, not  matured. ^'-^  So  the  liability 
of  a  shareholder  for  an  unpaid  balance  of  his  subscription  for 
the  shares  is  a  debt  within  the  meaning  of  such  provision 
for  a  lien,  even  before  such  balance  of  the  subscription  has 
been  called. 

A  provision  that  shares  of  a  bank  shall  not  be  transferable 
unless  the  shareholder  shall  discharge  all  debts  due  by  him  to 
the  company  was  held  to  embrace  all  debts  of  the  share- 
holder, wdiether  payable  presently  or  in  the  future.    The  ob- 


ssGrant  v.  Mechanics'  Bank,  15 
Ins.  Co.,  3  Pitts.  (Pa.)mf  mfw  mf 
Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  140;  Geyer  v. 
Western  Ins.  Co.,  3  Pitts.  (Pa.)  41; 
St.  Louis  Perpetual  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Goodfellow,  9  Mo.  149.  In  Grant 
V.  Mechanics'  Bank,  15  Serg. 
&  R.  (Pa.)  140,  Tilghman,  C.  J., 
said :  "Where  words  are  not 
technical,  their  meaning  is,  in 
general,  best  ascertained  by  com- 
mon parlances.  Laws  are  made 
for  the  people,  and  should  be  ex- 
pressed in  language  which  they 
understand.  Now  the  word  'in- 
debted' has  not  acquired  a  tech- 
nical signification,  and,  in  com- 
mon understanding,  means  a 
sum  of  money  which  one 
has  contracted  to  pay  another, 
whether    the    day    of    payment    be 


come  or  not.  Even  in  law  lan- 
guage we  speak  of  debitum  in 
praesenti,  solvendum  in  future — a 
present  debt,  to  be  paid  in  a  fu- 
ture time.  So,  in  act  of  assembly 
language,  a  debt  signifies  money 
payable  at  a  future  time."  See, 
also,  Stanley  v.  Chicago  Trust  & 
Savings  Bank,  61  111.  App.  257, 
affd.  165  111.  295,  46  N.  E.  273, 
where  it  is  held  that  the  word 
"debt"  embraces  a  rate  given  for 
stock  in  the  bank. 

30 Brent  v.  Bank  of  Washington, 
10  Pet.  (U.  S.)  596,  9  L.  ed.  547; 
In  re  Bachman,  12  Nat.  Bank  Reg. 
223;  Rogers  v.  Huntingdon  Bank, 
12  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  11;  Sewall  v. 
Lancaster  Bank,  17  Serg.  &  R. 
(Pa.)  283,  285;  Leggett  v.  Bank 
of  Sing  Sing,  24  N.  Y.  283. 


355  LIENS    ON    CORPORATE    STOCK.  §    394 

ject  of  the  provision  was  to  protect  and  secure  the  bank,  and 
to  accomplish  this  the  lien  must  cover  debts  not  matured. '^'^ 

There  is  an  English  case,  not  to  be  relied  upon,  however, 
where,  under  articles  of  association  which  provided  that  the 
company  should  have  a  lien  upon  all  shares  of  any  member 
for  any  money  due  the  company.  Master  of  the  Rolls  Jessel 
held  that  the  lien  was  limited  to  moneys  due  and  payable 
from  a  shareholder  to  the  company,  and  was  not  applicable 
where  the  indebtedness  was  a  mere  acceptance  of  a  bill  of 
exchange.'*^ 

But  if  the  words  used  to  describe  the  debts  for  which 
there  may  be  a  lien  imply  more  than  a  mere  indebtedness, 
as  where  the  words  used  are  "debts  actually  due  and  payable 
to  the  corporation,"  the  debts  contemplated  are  such  as  are 
due  at  the  time  the  lien  attaches,  and  not  those  payable  in 
future,  such  as  notes  and  bills  afterwards  to  mature. ^^ 

§  394.  Lien  not  restricted  to  particular  debt. — Where 
the  statute  authorizing  a  lien  is  general  in  its  terms  and  ap- 
plies to  all  debts  due  the  corporation,  the  lien  will  not  be  re- 
stricted to  a  particular  debt  or  a  particular  class  of  debts. 
Thus,  under  the  Companies  Act  of  England,  the  provision 
that  "the  company  may  decline  to  register  any  transfer  of 
shares  made  by  a  member  who  is  indebted  to  them,"  is  not 
limited  to  cases  where  the  member  is  indebted  for  calls,  or 
otherwise  indebted  in  respect  of  the  particular  shares  pro- 
posed to  be  transferred,  but  enables  the  company  to  decline 
to  register  the  transfer,  if  the  member  is  indebted  on  any 
account  whatever.''^ 

But  a  provision  of  statute  or  charter,  giving  a  corporation 
a  lien  to  secure  any  indebtedness  to  it  from  a  shareholder, 
does  not  authorize  the  corporation  to  make  an  accommoda- 

•lOLeggett  V.  Bank  of  Sing  Sing,  -t-Reese  v.  Bank  of  Commerce,  14 

24  N.  Y.  283.  Md.  271,  74  Am.  Dec.  536. 

•iiln  re  Stockton  Malleable  Iron  ^sEx  parte  Stringer,  9  Q.   B.  D. 

Co.,  2  Ch.  Div.  101.  436. 


§  395  LIENS.  356 

tion  loan  to  a  shareholder,  where  it  is  not  within  the  power 
of  the  corporation  to  make  such  a  loan.  The  lien  is  in  aid  of 
the  legitimate  powers  of  the  corporation,  and  can  not  be  held 
to  imply  a  sanction  to  a  division  of  the  corporate  assets  to 
accommodation  loans  to  a  stockholder.** 

§  395.     Liens    not    confined    to    debts   due    for    shares. — 

Where  the  language  of  the  statute  declaring  the  lien  is  broad 
enough  to  embrace  every  form  of  indebtedness  to  the  com- 
pany which  a  member  may  incur,  the  courts  will  not  confine 
the  lien  to  debts  due  for  the  shares,  or  for  calls  upon  them, 
but  will  extend  it  to  debts  due  generally  from  the  share- 
holder. The  object  in  creating  the  lien  is  the  security  of 
the  corporation,  and  there  is  no  good  reason  for  limiting 
general  words  embracing  an  indebtedness  of  any  kind  to  an 
indebtedness  of  a  special  kind,  namely,  that  for  shares,  or 
calls  upon  them.*^ 

§  396.  By-laws  restricted  by  statute. — If  the  by-law  of 
a  corporation  creating  a  lien  upon  its  stock  is  broader  in 
terms  than  the  statute  authorizing  it,  the  by-law  will  be  re- 
stricted in  its  operation  to  the  terms  of  the  statute.**^  Thus, 
where  a  statute  gives  a  lien  upon  the  shares  of  a  stockholder 
for  the  balance  due  the  corporation  upon  his  subscription 
to  the  stock,  the  company  has  no  lien  upon  the  stock  for  any 
other  debts  due  the  company,  though  such  a  lien  be  declared 
by  a  by-law  to  that  effect.*'''  Even  if  such  a  by-law  has  any 
effect,  it  can  only  apply  to  the  interest  of  the  debtor  stock- 
holder after  the  lien  of  the  stock  debt  is  satisfied.*^ 

4^Webster  v.  Howe  Machine  Co.,  70   Mo.   262;   and   see   Presbyterian 

54  Conn.  394,  8  Atl.  482.  Congregation    v.    Carlisle    Bank,    5 

•isRogers    v.    Huntingdon    Bank,  Pa.  St.  345. 
12    Serg.    &    R.    (Pa.)    11;    Mobile  47Petersburg  Savings  &  Ins.  Co. 

Mut.   Ins.    Co.   V.    Cullom,   49   Ala.  v.  Lumsden,  75  Va.  327. 
558;  Cunningham  v.  Alabama  Life  48Petersburg  Savings  &  Ins.  Co. 

Ins.  &  Trust  Co.,  4  Ala.  652.  v.  Lumsden,  75  Va.  327. 

46Kahn    v.    Bank    of    St.    Joseph, 


357 


LIENS    ON    CORPORATE    STOCK. 


§    398 


§  397.  Lien  on  calls  for  shares. — A  lien  for  calls  upon 
shares  applies  only  to  the  shares  upon  which  the  calls  are 
made,  and  not  to  other  paid  up  shares  of  the  shareholder. 
Under  a  statute  which  provided  that  no  shareholder  should 
be  entitled  to  transfer  any  share,  after  a  call  had  been  made 
in  respect  thereof,  until  he  should  have  paid  the  call,  and 
should  have  paid  all  calls  for  the  time  being  due  on  every 
share  held  by  them,  the  court  of  Queen's  Bench  held  that  the 
company  had  no  power  to  hold  paid  up  shares  as  a  security 
for  the  amount  of  a  call  on  other  shares. ^^  A  like  decision 
was  made  in  Virginia  under  a  statute  providing  that  stock 
should  not  be  transferred  without  the  consent  of  the  com- 
pany until  all  moneys  payable  to  the  company  on  such  stock 
should  have  been  paid.^^ 

§  398.  Debt  of  partnership  or  of  a  surety. — A  by-law  pro- 
hibiting a  transfer  of  shares  by  a  member  indebted  to  the 
corporation  applies  where  the  only  indebtedness  is  by  a  part- 
nership in  which  the  shareholder  is  a  copartner. ^^ 

It  applies  as  well  where  the  liability  of  the  shareholder  is 
that  of  a  surety  or  indorser,  as  where  his  liability  is  that  of  a 
principal  debtor. ^- 


49Hubbersty  v.  Manchester,  Shef- 
field &  Lincolnshire  R.  Co.,  L.  R. 
2  Q.  B.  59.  Otherwise,  however,  in 
Stebbins  v.  Phoenix  F.  Ins.  Co.,  3 
Paige  (N.  Y.)  350. 

soShenandoah  Valley  R.  Co.  v. 
Griffith.  76  Va.  913;  Code  1873,  ch. 
57,  §  26.  See  Code  1904,  §  llOSe 
(57). 

siGeyer  v.  Western  Ins.  Co.,  3 
Pitts.  (Pa.)  41,  per  Williams,  J.; 
Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Earp,  4  Rawle 
(Pa.)  384;  Arnold  v.  Suffolk  Bank, 
27  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  424;  In  re  Bige- 
low,  2  Ben.   (U.  S.)  469,  Fed.  Cas. 


Xo.    1395;    German    Security    Bank 
V.  Jefferson,   10  Bush.   (Ky.)  326. 

^-St.  Louis  Perpetual  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Goodfellow,  9  Mo.  149;  Leggett  v. 
Bank  of  Sing  Sing,  24  N.  Y.  283, 
Allen,  J.,  dissenting;  West  Branch 
Bank  v.  Armstrong,  40  Pa.  St.  278; 
Schmidt  v.  Hennepin  County  Bar- 
rel Co.,  35  Minn.  511,  29  N.  W. 
200;  McLean  v.  Lafayette  Bank,  3 
McLean  (U.  S.)  587,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
8888;  McDowell  v.  Bank  of  Wil- 
mington &  Brandywine,  1  Har. 
(Del.)  27;  Bacon's  Admr.  v.  Ba- 
con's Trustees,  94  Va.  686,  27  S.  E. 
576. 


§  399  LIENS.  358 

§  399.  Debt  of  joint  trustee. — Where  the  articles  of  asso- 
ciation of  a  banking  company  provided  that  it  should  have 
a  paramount  lien  on  the  shares  of  any  shareholders  for  all 
moneys  owing  the  company  from  him  alone  or  jointly  with 
any  other  person,  and  trustees  invested  in  shares  of  the  com- 
pany which  were  transferred  into  their  joint  names,  and 
one  of  the  trustees  was  a  partner  in  a  firm  which  was  in- 
debted to  the  company,  it  was  held  that  the  l^ank  had  a  lien 
on  the  shares  for  this  debt  which  must  prevail  over  the  title 
of  the  cestui  que  trust ;  for  the  lien  was  within  the  express 
terms  imposed  by  the  articles  of  association  as  a  condition 
upon  which  one  might  become  a  member  of  the  company. ^^ 

§  400.  Lien  in  case  of  bankruptcy. — Upon  the  bankruptcy 
of  a  stockholder  whose  shares  are  subject  to  a  lien  to  the 
corporation,  the  corporation  is  entitled  to  appropriate  the 
proceeds  of  such  shares  to  the  payment  of  the  debt,  and  to 
prove  against  the  bankrupt's  estate  for  any  balance  of  the 
debt  not  paid.  This  is  the  general  rule;  though  under  the 
insolvent  laws  of  some  of  the  states  it  is  held  that,  after  the 
corporation  has  applied  the  proceeds  of  the  shares  under  its 
lien,  it  is  postponed  until  the  general  creditors  have  been 
made  equal  out  of  the  general  estate  by  receiving  an  equal 
percentage,  and  then  the  residue  is  distributed  pro  rata 
among  all  the  creditors."* 

§  401.     Surety   subrogated   to   right   of    lien    holder. — A 

surety  upon  a  debt  of  a  stockholder,  secured  by  a  lien  upon 
his  stock,  upon  paying  the  debt  is  subrogated  to  the  credit- 
or's lien.^^    The  debt  to  the  corporation  is  the  object  of  the 

^3New  London  &  Brazilian  Bank  ^^Klopp  v.  Lebanon  Bank,  46  Pa. 

V.  Brocklebank,  21   Ch.  Div.  302.  St.  88;   Petersburg  Savings  &   Ins. 

s^German   Security  Bank  v.  Jef-  Co.  v.  Lumsden,  75  Va.  327;  Young 

ferson,  10  Bush   (Ky.)  326;  North-  v.  Vough,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  325;  Kuhns 

ern   Bank  v.   Keizer,  2  Duv.    (Ky.)  v.    Westmoreland    Bank,    2    Watts 

169.  (Pa.)   136. 


359  LIENS  ON  CORPORATE  STOCK.  §  402 

lien,  and  for  which  it  is  security,  and  equity  lays  hold  of  this 
security  for  the  benefit  of  the  surety.  The  equitable  right 
of  the  surety  in  such  case  attaches  at  the  time  the  lien  of  the 
corporation  commences,  although  the  corporation  may  not 
know  of  the  existence  of  his  suretyship.  The  surety's  right 
of  subrogation  does  not  depend  upon  his  giving  any  notice  to 
the  corporation,  but  upon  the  fact  of  his  suretyship  and  his 
payment  of  the  debt.  Notice  is  important  only  for  the  pur- 
pose of  preventing  the  corporation  from  allowing  a  transfer 
of  the  stock  upon  payment  of  the  debt  in  ignorance  of  the 
surety's  claim. ^^ 

If  a  corporation  having  a  lien  upon  stock  to  secure  a  debt 
upon  which  there  is  a  surety  allows  the  stockholder  to  trans- 
fer his  shares  to  secure  another  debt,  or  permits  the  stock 
to  be  sold  and  the  proceeds  applied  to  the  payment  of  an- 
other debt,  the  surety  is  discharged.^" 

Where  a  corporation,  though  having  the  power  to  declare 
a  lien,  has  neglected  to  do  so,  and  consequently  has  no  lien,  it 
loses  no  right  against  the  surety  by  allowing  the  debtor  to 
make  a  transfer.  There  is  nothing  in  such  case  to  which 
the  surety  can  be  subrogated. ^^ 

§  402.     Lien  of  corporation  securing   several  debts.---In 

case  a  corporation  has  a  lien  to  secure  several  debts,  upon 
one  of  which  there  is  a  surety,  the  question  arises  whether 
the  surety  upon  that  debt,  upon  paying  it,  is  subrogated  to 
the  lien,  so  as  to  be  entitled  in  equity  to  have  the  shares  ap- 
plied to  the  discharge  of  that  debt  in  priority  to  the  other 
debts  afterward  incurred.  In  a  case  in  Rhode  Island,  where 
the  charter  of  a  bank  provided  that  the  stockholders  should 
at  all  times  be  liable  for  the  payment  of  debts  due  the  bank, 
it  was  declared  that  this  provision  was  not  adopted  with  the 

56  Klopp    V.    Lebanon    Bank,    46  'jSPerrine  v.   Fireman's   Ins.    Co., 

Pa.    St.   88.  22  Ala.  575. 

•'">''■  Kuhns  V.  Westmoreland  Bank, 
2  Watts   (Pa.)   136. 


§    403  LIENS.  ^  360 

view  of  securing  an  indorser,  and  it  was  held  that  the  cor- 
poration could  not  be  compelled  to  apply  the  shares  to  the 
payment  of  such  indorsed  debt  in  preference  to  any  other 
debt  due  to  it,  although  such  other  debt  might  be  of  later 
date.^^  This  decision  would  seem  to  be  correct  in  case  the 
corporation  had  no  notice  at  the  time  the  subsequent  debt 
was  incurred  that  there  was  a  surety  upon  the  prior  debt. 
But,  in  case  the  corporation  should  allow  the  stockholder 
to  incur  a  further  debt  after  a  surety  had  paid  a  prior  debt 
and  had  claimed  the  right  of  subrogation,  it  would  seem  that 
the  corporation  should  not  be  allowed  to  avail  itself  of  its 
lien  to  the  detriment  of  the  surety;  and  it  would  also  seem 
that,  if  the  corporation  knew  of  the  relation  of  suretyship  at 
the  time  the  obligation  was  incurred,  it  could  not  after- 
ward allow  the  stockholder  to  incur  a  further  indebtedness 
to  the  detriment  of  the  surety.  The  surety  has  an  interest 
in  the  lien  from  the  time  the  obligation  is  incurred,  and  it 
may  reasonably  be  presumed  that  he  incurred  the  obliga- 
tion on  the  strength  of  the  lien.®° 

§  403.  Lien  may  be  waived  by  corporation.  This  lien, 
though  declared  by  statute,  may  be  waived  by  the  corpora- 
tion entitled  to  it,  and  the  waiver  may  be  made  by  an  officer 

s*>Cross  V.  Phoenix  Bank,  1  R.  I.  pledge  would  be  of  no  value  to  the 

39,  41.     "It  was  intended  to  secure  bank,  whilst  as  to  all  debts  exceed- 

the  payment  of  such  debts  of  each  ing   the   amount   of  stock,   and   for 

stockholder     as     became     insecure,  which  its  additional  security  would 

whether  by  the  failure  of  principal  be   needed,    the    pledge    would    be 

or  surety,  or  by  the  failure  of  both;  wholly    inapplicable.      This     never 

and     such     intent     is     inconsistent  could  have  been  the  understanding, 

with   an   application   of  the   pledge  either    of    the    legislature,    or    the 

regulated    bj^    a    priority    of    date.  stockholders,     on     becoming    such; 

Such   a  rule  would  make   the   pro-  nor  could  the  surety  of  an  indebt- 

vision  operate  only  for  the  benefit  ed   stockholder  indulge  the  expec- 

of     the      surety,      where      security  tation,    with    any    degree    of    confi- 

would  not  be  needed  until  the  in-  dence,  that  such  could  be  the  con- 

debtedness    exceeded    the    amount  struction  of  such  a  provision." 

of  the  stock;  and  if  in  all  such  cases  60See      Rogers     v.      Huntingdon 

the      surety     was      sufficient,      the  Bank,   12  Serg.  &  R.   (Pa.)   11. 


361  LIENS    ON    CORPORATE    STOCK.  §    404 

having  the  general  management  of  its  daily  business:  thus 
the  cashier  of  a  bank  may  waive  the  lien  in  behalf  of  the 
bank;^^  and  he  does  this  by  entering  a  transfer  upon  the 
books  of  the  bank.  Mr.  Justice  Matthews,  delivering  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  said:**-  "A  complete  transfer  of  the  ti- 
tle to  the  stock  upon  the  books  of  the  bank,  it  is  not  doubted, 
would  have  the  effect  to  vest  it  in  the  transferee  free  from 
any  claim  or  lien  of  the  bank.  The  consent  of  the  bank  made 
necessary  to  such  transfer,  is  the  waiver  of  its  rights,  as  its 
refusal  would  be  the  assertion  of  it.  The  transfer,  when  thus 
consummated,  destroys  the  relation  of  membership  be- 
tween the  corporation  and  the  old  stockholder,  with  all  its  in- 
cidents, and  creates  an  original  relation  with  the  new  mem- 
ber, free  from  all  antecedent  obligations.  This  legal  relation 
and  proprietary  interest,  on  which  it  is  based,  are  quite  in- 
dependent of  the  certificate  of  ownership,  which  is  mere 
evidence  of  title.  The  complete  fact  of  title  may  very  well 
exist  without  it.  All  that  is  necessary,  when  the  transfer 
is  required  by  law  to  be  made  upon  the  books  of  the  corpo- 
ration, is  that  the  fact  should  be  appropriately  recorded  in 
some  suitable  register  or  stock  list,  or  otherwise  formally 
entered  upon  its  books.  For  this  purpose  the  account  in  a 
stock  ledger  showing  the  names  of  the  stockholders,  the 
number  and  amount  of  the  shares  belonging  to  each,  and  the 
sources  of  their  title,  whether  by  original  subscription  and 
payment  or  by  derivation  from  others,  is  quite  suitable,  and 
fully  meets  the  requirements  of  the  law." 

§  404.  Lien  after  notice  of  transfer  of  stock. — Whether, 
after  notice  to  a  corporation  of  an  equitable  transfer  of  the 
shares,  it  can  acquire  a  lien  upon  them  as  against  the  equi- 
table assignee,  is  a  question  which  has  already  been  con- 

fiiNational  Bank  v.  Watsontown  C2Xational   Bank  v.  Watsontown 

Bank,  105  U.  S.  217,  26  L.  ed.  1039;      Bank,  105  U.  S.  217,  26  L.  ed.  1039. 
Case  V.  Bank,  100  U.  S.  446,  25  L. 
ed.  695. 


§    405  LIENS.  362 

sidered.^"  But  it  is  certain  that  a  corporation  can  not 
claim  a  lien  after  it  has  permitted  its  debtor  to  transfer 
the  shares  upon  its  books,  so  as  to  give  the  assignee 
not  merely  the  equitable  but  the  legal  title,  unless  the 
corporation  in  express  terms,  known  and  assented  to  by  the 
assignee,  reserves  a  lien  at  the  time  of  the  transter.^^  But 
the  assent  of  a  corporation  to  a  general  assignment  of  a 
debtor  for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors,  subject  to  preferences 
authorized  by  law,  does  not  amount  to  a  waiver  of  a  lien 
by  the  corporation  on  the  debtor's  shares,  for  the  lien  is  a 
preference  authorized  by  law,  and,  moreover,  the  assignee 
in  a  voluntary  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  creditors  stands 
in  no  better  situation  than  the  assignor.^^ 

§  405.     Notice  to  its  officer  is  notice  to  a  corporation. — 

Notice  to  an  ofificer  of  a  corporation  who  has  a  general 
charge  and  management  of  its  business  is  notice  to  the  cor- 
poration. Thus,  notice  to  the  cashier  of  a  bank  of  an  out- 
standing equity  is  notice  to  the  bank.^®  His  knowledge  that 
a  stockholder's  shares  had  been  pledged  by  delivery  of  the 
certificate  to  secure  his  note  to  a  third  person  should  put 
him  upon  inquiry,  even  after  the  maturity  of  that  note,  to  as- 
certain whether  the  note  had  been  renewed;  for  a  renewed 
note  should  be  secured  by  the  original  pledge,  and  if  the  bank 
under  such  circumstances  should  make  a  loan  to  the  stock- 
holder, even  after  the  maturity  of  the  original  note  for  which 

c^Bradford       Banking       Co.       v.  64HiII  v.  Pine  River  Bank,  45  N. 

Briggs,   29   Ch.    D.    149,    10  Am.    &  H.  300;  Hodges  v.  Planters'  Bank, 

Eng.   Corp.   Cas.    120,   overruled   in  7  Gill  &  J.   (Md.)  306. 

31    Ch.    Div.    19;    and    see    Nesmith  esDobbins  v.  Walton,  37  Ga.  614, 

V.      Washington      Bank,     6      Pick.  95  Am.  Dec.  Zl . 

(Mass.)    324;    Bank   of  America   v.  66Bank  of  America  v.  McNeil,  10 

McNeil,    10   Bush.    (Ky.)    54;    Con-  Bush    (Ky.)    54;    Connecticut   Mut. 

ant  v.  Reed  (Seneca  County  Bank),  Life  Ins.   Co.  v.  Scott,  81   Ky.  540, 

1    Ohio   St.  298;    Newberry   v.    De-  5  Ky.  L.  639. 
troit    &    Lake    Superior    Iron    Mfg. 
Co.,  17  Mich.   141. 


363  LIENS  ON  CORPORATE  STOCK.  §  407 

the  shares  were  pledged,  the  lien  of  the  bank  would  be  sub- 
ject to  the  pledge  to  secure  the  renewed  note.^" 

But  notice  to  an  employee  of  a  corporation  who  has  no 
power  to  transact  its  general  business  with  third  persons, 
and  who  is  well  known  to  have  no  such  power,  does  not  affect 
the  corporation ;  and  a  waiver  of  a  lien  by  such  an  employe 
does  not  bind  the  corporation.*^^  A  corporation  is  not  estopped 
to  assert  a  lien  by  the  fact  that,  on  a  stockholder's  presenting 
a  certificate  for  transfer,  the  person  in  charge  of  the  transfer- 
book  promised  to  make  a  transfer  and  issue  a  new  certifi- 
cate as  soon  as  an  officer  whose  signature  was  necessary 
should  return,  when  it  does  not  appear  that  such  person 
had  any  general  authority,  or  any  knowledge  of  the  stock- 
holder's indebtedness.^^ 

§  406.     Corporation  may  be  estopped  to  claim  lien. — A 

corporation  is  estopped  to  claim  a  lien  as  against  one  who 
has  been  induced  to  make  a  loan  upon  a  pledge  of  its  stock 
to  a  shareholder  by  representations  of  the  officers  of  the 
company  that  the  stock  was  unincumbered,  and  that  he 
could   safely  make  a  loan  upon  it.'^^ 

§  407.  Waived  by  taking  a  transfer  of  the  shares. — A 
corporation  haing  a  lien  by  its  charter  upon  the  shares  of 
a  stockholder  for  his  indebtedness  to  the  corporation  waives 
this  lien  by  taking  a  transfer  of  the  stock  as  collateral  secur- 

67Bank  of  America  v.  McNeil,  10  eoRishop  v.  Globe  Co.,  135  Mass. 

Bush   (Ky.)   54.     The  pledgee  was  132,  5  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  161. 

under  no  obligation  to  the  bank  to  '''OMoore  v.    Bank  of   Commerce, 

notify    it    of    the    renewal    of    the  52    Mo.    377;    Oakland    City    Sav. 

note.  Bank  v.  State  Bank,  113  Mich.  284, 

csKenton  Insurance  Co.  v.  Bow-  71  N.  W.  453,  dl  Am.  St.  463;  Des 

man,  84  Ky.  430,  1  S.  W.  717,  8  Ky.  Moines  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Des  Moines 

L.  467,  15  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.   Cas.  Nat.  Bank,  97  Iowa  668,  66  N.  W. 

578.  914.     See   also.   Just  v.   State   Sav. 

Bank,  132  Mich.  600. 


§    408  LIENS.  364 

ity  for  such  indebtedness.  The  taking  of  the  transfer  shows 
that  the  corporation  did  not  rely  upon  the  lien.'^^ 

§  408.  No  waiver  by  taking  other  security. — A  cor- 
poration does  not  waive  its  Hen  by  taking  other  security  for 
the  debt,  as,  for  instance,  by  taking  sureties  upon  it  or  a 
mortgage  upon  other  property;  for  a  creditor  may  lawfully 
take  and  hold  several  securities  for  the  same  debt,  and  he 
can  not  be  compelled  to  surrender  either  until  the  debt  is 
paid.'^- 

§  409.  Lien  acquired  after  attachment  of  stock. — A  lien 
acquired  by  a  corporation  for  an  indebtedness  incurred  after 
a  stockholder's  shares  have  been  attached  or  levied  upon 
by  a  creditor,  and  service  of  such  attachment  or  levy  has 
been  made  upon  the  company,  is  subject  to  the  lien  of  such 
attachment  or  levy.'^^  If  the  liability  of  the  shareholder  was 
incurred  before,  though  the  debt  does  not  become  payable  till 
after,  the  attachment  or  levy  by  the  creditor,  the  lien  of  the 
corporation  is  superior  to  that  of  the  creditor.'^*  Moreover, 
if  the  debt  secured  by  the  lien  be  renewed,  the  lien  attaches 
to  the  renewed  debt,  though  the  debtor's  shares  be  attached 
before  or  after  the  renewal. '^^ 

§  410.     Stock  pledged  after  the  bank  has  waived  its  lien. — 

Where  a  bank  waived  its  charter-right  of  lien  upon  a  stock- 
holder's shares  for  a  period  of  six  months,  and  within  that 
time    the    stockholder    pledged    bis    shares    for    a    debt,    the 

TiMcLean   v.   Lafayette   Bank,   3  467,   1   S.   W.  717,   15  Am.  &  Eng. 

McLean  (U.  S.)  587,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  Corp.  Cas.  578. 

8888.  "3Geyer   v.    Western    Ins.    Co.,   3 

72Union  Bank  v.  Laird,  2  Wheat.  Pitts.  (Pa.)  41. 

(U.    S.)    390,   4    L.    ed.   869;    In    re  '^Sewall    v.    Lancaster    Bank,    17 

Morrison,    10   N.    Bank.    Reg.    105;  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  285;  West  Branch 

Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Earp,  4  Rawle  Bank  v.  Armstrong,  40  Pa.  St.  278. 

(Pa.)    384;    Kenton    Insurance    Co.  'sSewall   v.    Lancaster    Bank,    17 

V.   Bowman,  84  Ky.  430,  8  Ky.  L.  Serg.   &  R.   (Pa.)  285. 


365  LIENS  ON  CORPORATE  STOCK.  §  412 

right  of  the  bank  does  not  attach  again  immediately  upon 
the  expiration  of  that  period,  unless  the  debt  for  which  the 
pledge  was  made  has  been  paid,  but  is  subordinate  to  the 
right  of  the  pledgee  until  the  debt  is  paid  or  the  pledge  re- 
leased.^^ 

§411.     Transfer  of  part  of  the  shares  not  a  waiver. — The 

lien  is  not  waived  by  permitting  a  transfer  of  a  part  of  the 
shares.  Though  the  debt  be  for  a  less  sum  than  the  value  of 
the  debtor's  stock  which  the  corporation  holds  a  lien  upon,  it 
may  hold  all  his  shares  till  the  debt  is  paid.  It  is  not  bound  to 
appropriate  part  of  the  shares  as  security  for  the  debt  and 
transfer  the  rest.''  Of  course  the  corporation  may  permit 
the  debtor  to  transfer  part  of  his  stock,  and  by  such  action  it 
will  not  waive  its  lien  upon  the  shares  still  remaining  in  his 
name.'^*' 

§  412.  Usage  may  operate  against  lien. — A  usage  may 
operate  against  a  lien  which  the  by-laws  of  a  corporation 
enact  in  its  behalf.  Thus,  where  by  the  by-law  the  consent 
of  the  directors  of  a  corporation  was  required  to  a  transfer 
of  stock  by  a  stockholder  indebted  to  it,  but  in  practice  such 

76Bank  of  America  v.  McNeil,  10  cision  of  any  value  it  might  other- 
Bush   (Ky.)   54.  wise    have.      This    for   a    curiosity: 

'i'TSewall    V.    Lancaster    Bank,    17  "Since    the    days    of    Lord    Bacon, 

Serg.    &    R.    (Pa.)     285;     and     see  who   promulgated  the   idea,   banks, 

Union    Bank    v.    Laird,    2    Wheat.  then    in    their    infancy,    have    been 

(U.  S.)  390,  4  L.  ed.  269.  odious   to   the  common  mind,  and 

'3'8  First    Nat.    Bank   v.    Hartford  by    pursuing    with    steadiness    the 

Life  &  Annuity  Ins.   Co.,  45  Conn.  law  of  their  existence  and  individ- 

22.     In  Presbyterian  Congregation  uality,  they  exposed  themselves  to 

V.  Carlisle  Bank,  5  Pa.  St.  345,  the  the     keen     and     deep     sarcasm     of 

fact  that  the  bank  consented  to   a  Burke.      The     present     case     is     a 

transfer  of  part  of  the  shares  was  pregnant    instance    of    the    facility 

apparently     one     ground     of     the  with  which  they  bring  themselves 

court's  refusal  to  permit  the  bank  within  the  condemnation  of  what- 

to  assert  a  lien  to  the  remainder;  ever     is     magnanimous,     just     and 

but  the  blind  prejudice  of  the  court  manly  in  our  nature." 
against  all  banks  deprives   the   de- 


§    413  LIENS.  366 

cases  were  never  brought  before  the  board,  it  was  held  that 
a  transfer  made  without  such  consent,  but  according-  to  the 
usage  of  the  company,  was  effectual,  and  passed  the  title 
to  the  stock  unincumbered  by  a  lien.'^ 

§  413.  No  waiver  by  reason  of  the  corporation  allowing 
stock  to  remain  outstanding. — The  fact  that  the  corporation 
allows  its  debtor's  certificate  of  stock  to  remain  outstand- 
ing does  not  amount  to  a  waiver  of  its  lien.  AVhen  the  lien 
is  created  by  proper  statutory  authority,  the  corporation  may 
assert  the  lien,  although  the  shareholder  has  pledged  his 
certificate  to  secure  a  prior  loan.  If  the  pledgee  chooses  to 
hold  this  certificate,  and  not  obtain  a  transfer  to  himself  upon 
the  books  of  the  company,  he  does  so  at  his  own  risk.  The 
corporation  is  not  bound  to  call  for  a  surrender  of  the  cer- 
tificate when  it  makes  a  loan  to  a  shareholder.  It  does  not 
waive  its  lien  by  leaving  the  certificate  outstanding.^*^ 

§  414.     Issuing  of  certificate  will  not  amount  to  a  waiver. 

— The  issuing  of  a  certificate  of  shares  upon  which  a  corpora- 
tion has  a  possible  right  of  lien  does  not  amount  to  a  waiver 
or  abandonment  of  that  right, ^^  though  the  certificate  makes 
no  reference  to  the  lien,  but  declares  that  the  shares  are  trans- 
ferable only  at  the  corporation's  ofifice,  personally  or  by  at- 
torney on  surrender  of  the  certificate.^^ 

V  415,  Lien  not  enforcible  on  unauthorized  debt. — If  the 
transaction  in  which  a  corporation  seeks  to  enforce  a  lien  was 
unauthorized  by  its  charter,  and  was  a  perversion  of  its  cor- 

■''^Chambersburg      Ins.       Co.      v.  v.  Lumsden,  75  Va.  Z21 ;  Hussey  v. 

Smith,  11  Pa.  St.  120.  Manufacturers'  &  Mechanics'  Bank, 

soBohmer  v.    City   Bank,   11  Va.  10  Pick.    (Mass.)   415. 
445,  and   see   Piatt  v.    Birmingham  82Reese  v.  Bank  of  Commerce,  14 

Axle  Co.,  41  Conn.  255.  Md.  271,  74  Am.  Dec.  536. 

siPetersburg  Savings  &  Ins.  Co. 


367  LIENS  ON  CORPORATE  STOCK.  §  41? 

porate  powers,  it  confers  no  right  upon  the  corporation  to 
enforce  the  lien.^^ 

§  416.     Payment  of  debt  discharges  lien. — Of  course,  if  the 

debt  is  discharged,  the  Hen  is  gone.^'* 

§  417.  Lien  not  lost  because  debt  is  barred  by  statute  of 
limitations. — The  lien  is  not  lost  though  the  right  of  action 
for  the  debt  be  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations,  for  the 
statute  does  not  cancel  the  debt,  but  merely  takes  away  the 
right  of  action  for  it;  just  as,  in  the  case  of  a  mortgage  or 
pledge  securing  such  a  debt,  the  mortgage  or  pledge  re- 
mains valid,  and  may  be  enforced,  although  the  right  of  ac- 
tion upon  the  debt  is  barred. ^^ 

ssWhite's    Bank    v.    Toledo    Ins.  Bank  of  Washington,    10  Pet.    (U. 

Co.,  12  Ohio  St.  601.  S.)    596,    9    L.    ed.    547;    Jones    on 

8-iFarmers'    Bank   v.    Iglehart,    6  Mortgages  (6th  ed.)   §  1203;  Jones 

Gill  (Md.)   50.  on    Chattel    Mortgages     (5th    ed.) 

85  Geyer  v.   Western   Ins.   Co.,  3  §   112;  Jones  on  Collateral  Securi- 

Pitts.    (Pa.)   41;    Farmers'    Bank  v.  ties  (3d  ed.),  §  581. 
Iglehart,  6  Gill  (Md.)  50;  Brent  v. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES  AND  MERCHANTS. 


Sec. 

418.  Factor     or    consignee     under 

common  law  has  lien  on 
goods   in  his  possession. 

419.  One    who    has    no    authority 

to  make  sales  is  not  a  fac- 
tor. 

420.  Lien   of   merchandise   broker. 

421.  Lien  of  stock-broker. 

422.  Broker     employed     on     com- 

mission has  a  lien. 

423.  An  insurance  broker  is  a  fac- 

tor. 

424.  Extent  of  insurance  broker's 

lien. 

425.  Agent's   specific  lien. 

426.  Factor's  lien  for  general  bal- 

ance. 

427.  A    general    lien    is    not    im- 

plied when  there  is  a  spe- 
cial agreement  which  is 
inconsistent  with  such  a 
lien. 

428.  Factor  has  no  lien  on  goods 

received  under  express  di- 
rections. 

429.  Factor's  agent  has  no  lien  as 

against  principal. 

430.  Efifect  of  factor's  assignment 

for  creditors. 

431.  Goods  received  after  death  of 

principal. 

432.  No  lien  on  goods  when  con- 

signor has  informed  factor 
that  goods  do  not  belong 
to  him. 

433.  -Agent's   lien. 


Sec. 
434. 

435. 

436. 

436a. 

436b. 

436c. 

437. 

438. 

439. 

440. 

440a. 

440b. 

441. 

442. 

443. 

444. 

445. 

446. 
447. 
448. 

449. 


450. 

451. 
452. 

453. 

453a. 


Lien  of  consignee  depends  on 
manner  of  consignment. 

Lien  of  consignee  on  insur- 
ance  money. 

State  statutes. 

Delaware. 

Florida. 

Georgia. 

Louisiana. 

Maine. 

Maryland. 

Massachusetts. 

Missouri. 

New  York. 

Ohio. 

Pennsylvania. 

Rhode  Island. 

Wisconsin. 

Debt  is  foundation  of  agent's 
lien. 

Lien  covers  interest  on  debt. 

Debt  must  be  due. 

Factor  cannot  claim  lien  for 
debt  due  his  principal. 

Factor  has  no  lien  for  old 
debt  due  from  his  princi- 
pal. 

The  lien  covers  acceptances 
as  well  as  advances  in 
money. 

Lien  for  duties  paid. 

Lien  exists  even  where  debt 
is  barred. 

Lien  for  advancement  on 
crop. 

Arkansas. 


368 


3^9 


LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    418 


Sec. 

453b. 

454. 

455. 

455a. 

456. 

456a. 

456b. 

457. 

457a. 

458. 

458a. 

458b. 

459. 

4S9a. 

459b. 

4S9c. 

459d. 

459e. 

459f. 

459g. 

459h. 

459i. 

459j. 

459k. 

460. 

461. 

462. 

463. 

464. 


465. 


Sec. 

Florida.  466. 

Georgia. 

Idaho.  467. 

Kentucky.  468. 

Louisiana. 

Minnesota.  469. 

Mississippi.  470. 

North  Carolina. 

North  Dakota. 

South  Carolina.  470a. 

South  Dakota. 

Tennessee. 

Virginia.  471. 

Liens  for  water  furnished  for 

irrigation.  472. 

Colorado.  473. 

Idaho. 

Kansas.  474. 

Louisiana. 

New  Mexico.  475. 

Oklahoma.  476. 

Oregon. 

South  Dakota.  477. 

Texas.  478. 

Washington, 

Effect  of  a  delivery  of  goods.      479. 

Delivery  to  common   carrier. 

No  lien  while  consignor  con-      480. 
trols    goods. 

Delivery  of  bill  of  lading  es-      481. 
sential. 

No  lien  for  advancements  ex- 
cept when  goods  are  deliv-      482. 
ered. 

Advances    made    on    faith    of 
bill  of  lading. 


Lien  lost  by  losing  posses- 
sion. 

Possession  necessary  to  lien. 

Loss  of  temporary  posses- 
sion no  waiver. 

Revival  of  the  lien. 

Disclosure  of  his  principal 
does  not  defeat  the  factor's 
lien. 

Factor  waives  his  lien  by 
failing  to  follow  princi- 
pal's instructions. 

Lien  ends  with  payment  of 
the  debt. 

Enforcement  of  factor's  lien. 

Factor  employed  to  purchase 
goods. 

Factor's  special  property  in 
goods. 

Factor's  right  to  sell  goods. 

Factor  may  sell  at  a  fair 
price. 

Rule  in  certain  states. 

Factor's  lien  attaches  to  pro- 
ceeds of  sale. 

Factor's  right  to  retain  pro- 
ceeds of  sale. 

Bill  of  sale  from  principal  to 
agent. 

Factor  may  sue  for  the  debt 
notwithstanding  he  has 
lien. 

Carrier  may  enforce  con- 
signee's  lien. 


§  418.  Factor  or  consignee  under  common  law  has  lien  on 
goods  in  his  possession. — It  is  a  general  common  law  rule 
that  a  factor  or  consignee  has,  in  the  absence  of  any  express 
agreement,  a  lien  upon  the  goods  in  his  hands,  and  upon  the 
proceeds  of  the  same,  as  his  security  for  all  advances  made, 
or  acceptances  given  to  his  principal  in  the  business  of  his 
agency,  or  connected  with  the  goods  consigned  to  him.  The 
24 


4i8 


LIENS. 


370 


law  implies  or  infers  the  lien  from  the  relation  between  the 
parties.^  The  factor's  lien  is  a  general  lien  covering  the 
balance  of  account  due  him  from  his  principal.  He  has  a 
general  lien,  because  he  is  an  agent  for  a  continuous  service. 


1  Kruger  v.  Wilcox,  1  Ambler  252 
(1755).  ["Before  this  case]  it  was 
certainly  doubtful  whether  a  fac- 
tor had  a  lien  and  could  retain 
for  the  balance  of  his  general  ac- 
count," remarked  Lord  Mansfield 
in  Green  v.  Farmer,  4  Burr.  2214 
(1768).  The  case  of  Kruger  v. 
Wilcox  was  decided  by  Lord  Hard- 
wicke,  Chancellor.  He  examined 
four  merchants  upon  the  custom 
and  usage  of  merchants  in  regard 
to  such  a  lien.  "All  the  four  mer- 
chants, both  in  their  examination 
in  the  cause  and  now  in  court, 
agree  that,  if  there  is  a  course  of 
dealings  and  general  account  be- 
tween the  merchant  and  factor,  and 
a  balance  is  due  to  the  factor,  he 
may  retain  the  ship  and  goods,  or 
produce,  for  such  balance  of  the 
general  account,  as  well  as  for  the 
charges,  customs,  etc.,  paid  on  ac- 
count of  the  particular  cargo." 
Lord  Hardwicke  gave  his  opin- 
ion that  a  factor  has  a  lien  for  his 
general  balance,  which  was  after- 
wards confirmed  by  Lord  Mans- 
field in  Godin  v.  London  Assur- 
ance Co.,  1  Burr.  489,  and  Fox- 
croft  V.  Devonshire,  2  Burr.  931; 
by  Lord  Kenyon  and  Mr.  Justice 
Ashurst,  in  Walker  v.  Birch,  6  T. 
R.  258,  and  by  Mr.  Justice  Buller 
in  Lickbarrow  v.  Mason,  6  East  21. 
Alabama:  Barnett  v.  Warren,  82 
Ala.  557,  2  So.  457.  California, 
Idaho,  Montana,  North  Dakota, 
Oklahoma,  South  Dakota:  A  factor 
or  commission  merchant  has  a  gen- 
eral lien,  dependent  on  possession, 


for  all  that  is  due  him  as  such,  upon 
all  articles  of  commercial  value 
that  are  intrusted  to  him  by  the 
same  principal.  California:  Civil 
Code  1906,  §  3053;  Idaho:  Rev. 
Code  1908,  §  3448;  North  Dakota: 
Rev.  Code  1905,  §  6287;  Montana: 
Code  (Civ.)  Ann.  1895,  §  3936; 
South  Dakota:  Rev.  Code  1903,  § 
2154;  Oklahoma:  Comp.  Laws 
1909,  §  4143.  Louisiana:  Onachita 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Weiss,  49  La.  Ann. 
573,  21  So.  857.  Minnesota:  Haeb- 
ler  v.  Luttgen,  61  Minn.  315,  63  N. 
W.  720.  Missouri:  Archer  v.  Mc- 
Mechan,  21  Mo.  43.  New  York: 
Nagle  V.  McFeeters,  97  N.  Y.  196; 
Williams  v.  Tilt,  36  N.  Y.  319.  See 
Holbrook  V.  Weight,  24  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  169,  35  Am.  Dec.  607;  Bank  of 
Rochester  v.  Jones,  4  N.  Y.  497,  55 
Am.  Dec.  290;  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kasson,  37  N.  Y.  218;  Myer  v.  Ja- 
cobs, 1  Daly  (N.  Y.)  32;  Commer- 
cial Nat.  Bank  v.  Heilbronner,  108 
N.  Y.439,  15  N.  E.  701.  Ohio:  Jor- 
dan v.  James,  5  Ohio  88;  Griefif  v. 
Cowguill,  2  Disn.  (Ohio)  58,  13 
Ohio  Dec.  37;  Matthews  v.  Mened- 
ger,  2  McLean  (U.  S.)  145,  Fed.  Cas. 
No.  9289.  Oklahoma:  Comp.  Laws 
1909,  §  4143.  Pennsylvania:  Stein- 
man  v.  Wilkins,  7  Watts.  &  S. 
(Pa.)  466,  42  Am.  Dec.  254;  Haeb- 
ler  V.  Leuttgen,  61  Minn.  315,  63 
N.  W.  720;  Dufify  v.  England,  176 
Ind.  575,  96  N.  E.  704;  Plattner  Im- 
plement Co.  V.  International  Har- 
vester Co.  of  America,  133  Fed. 
376,  66  C.  C.  A.  438. 


371  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    419 

An  agent  employed  to  perform  services  upon  a  particular 
thing  has  a  lien  for  such  services  upon  the  thing  upon  which 
he  has  bestowed  his  labor.  It  is  a  lien  for  that  particular 
service,  and  not  for  any  other  service  or  for  any  other  debt. 

Lord  Kenyon  in  an  early  case  said :  "There  is  no  doubt, 
and,  indeed,  the  point  has  been  so  long  settled  that  it  ought 
not  now  to  be  brought  into  dispute,  but  that,  in  general,  a 
factor  has  a  lien  for  his  general  balance  on  the  property  of 
his  principal  coming  into  his  hands. "^ 

At  first  the  factor's  right  by  custom  to  a  general  Hen  ap- 
pears to  have  been  made  the  subject  of  proof  in  the  cause. ^ 
Afterwards  the  right  was  regarded  as  fully  established;'*  and 
in  modern  practice  no  proof  is  ever  required  that  such  a 
general  lien  exists,  as  a  matter  of  fact.  Judicial  notice  is 
taken  of  the  factor's  right  to  a  general  lien.^ 

§  419.  One  who  has  no  authority  to  make  sales  is  not  a 
factor.  A  warehouseman  to  whom  goods  are  intrusted  for 
the  purpose  of  sale,  but  with  authority  merely  to  receive  of- 
fers and  to  negotiate  sales  to  be  reported  to  the  owner  and 
concluded  by  him,  is  not  a  factor  or  other  agent  intrusted 
with  the  possession  of  merchandise  for  sale  within  the 
meaning  of  a  factor's  act.® 

One  who  carries  on  the  business  of  slaughtering  hogs,  and 
curing,  storing,  and  selling  the  product,  as  well  for  himself  as 
for  others,  and  who  makes  advances  to  others  on  receiving 
their  hogs  and  holds  the  product  until  he  sells  it,  is  a  factor, 

^Walker   v.    Birch,   6   T.    R.    258,  ^Barnett  v.   Brandao,  6  M.  &   G. 

262.     No  lien  when  goods  never  in  630,  per  Lord  Denman,  C.  J. 

factor's      possession.        Elwell      v.  ^Thacher    v.     Moors,    134    Mass. 

Coon  (N.  J.   Eq.)  46  Atl.  580.  156.       See,     also,    Stollenwerck    v. 

3 As  in  Kruger  v.  Wilcox,  1  Amb-  Thacher,    115    Mass.  224.     A  ware- 

ler  252,  1  Burr.  494.  houseman    with    authority    to    sell 

4  Green  v.  Farmer,  4  Burr.  2214;  has   a  lien.     Whigam   v.    Fountain, 

Drinkwater    v.    Goodwin,    1    Cowp.  132  Ga.  277,  63  S.  E.  1115. 
251. 


§    420  LIENS.  372 

and  has  a  lien  on  the  property  so  received  and  held,  for  his 
services  and  advances.^ 

§  420.  Lien  of  merchandise  broker. — A  merchandise  brok- 
er, like  any  other  agent,  may  have  a  specific  lien,  when  he 
has  such  possession  of  the  property  that  he  can  exercise  the 
right.  If  the  property  does  not  come  into  his  hands,  or  into 
the  hands  of  some  one  who  holds  it  in  his  interest,  he  can 
exercise  no  right  of  lien.  Generally  he  is  not  intrusted  with 
the  possession  of  the  property  which  he  is  employed  to  sell; 
but  his  business  is  merely  that  of  a  negotiator  between  the 
contracting  parties,  and  ordinarily  he  has  no  property  in  his 
hands  on  which  the  right  of  lien  can  attach.  He  must  gen- 
erally contract  in  the  name  of  his  principal,  while  a  factor  may 
buy  and  sell  in  his  own  name.  A  broker  ordinarily  has  no 
possession  of  the  goods  he  is  employed  to  sell,  nor  has  he 
any  right  to  obtain  possession.  When  in  any  case  he  has 
possession,  his  lien  is  a  specific  lien  upon  the  goods  for  his 
services  in  negotiating  a  sale  of  the  same,  and  not  a  general 
lien  for  a  balance  of  account  due  from  his  principal.** 

Moreover,  when  a  broker  claims  a  right  of  lien  for  broker- 
age as  against  property  coming  into  his  hands,  he  can  not 
enforce  it  unless  he  was  employed  by  the  owner.  If  he 
knew  or  had  reason  to  believe  that  the  person  by  whom  he 
was  employed  was  himself  merely  an  agent,  he  was  bound 
to  inquire  as  to  his  authority,  and  to  know  that  he  could  not 
retain  the  property  for  a  debt  due  from  the  agent  to  himself.® 

§  421.  Lien  of  stock-broker. — A  stock-broker  holding 
stocks  and  bonds  of  a  customer  upon  which  he  has  made  ad- 

"Shaw  V.  Ferguson,  78  Ind.  547;  him  and  expenses  incurred,  and  his 

Hanna  v.  Phelps,  7  Ind.  21,  63  Am.  lien  is  prior  to  a  lien  given  by  the 

Dec.  410.    See  East  v.  Ferguson,  59  owner  to  another.     Dewing  v.  Hut- 

Ind.    169.     An    agent    managing   a  ton,  40  W.  Va.  521,  21  S.  E.  780. 

general     trading    business,    having  sBarry  v.  Boninger,  46  Md.  59. 

the    right   to   buy,   sell   and  barter,  oBarry  v.  Boninger,  46  Md.  59. 
has   a   lien    for   advances   made   by 


373  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    422 

vances  is  a  pledgee  of  the  securities  rather  than  the  holder  of 
a  lien  upon  them,^*^  though  his  interest  is  sometimes  spoken 
of  as  a  lien.^^  If  stocks  are  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  broker 
for  sale,  and  he  makes  advances  upon  them,  he  may  be  re- 
garded as  a  factor  for  that  purpose,  and  he  would  have  a  lien 
upon  them  or  upon  their  proceeds  for  his  advances  and  com- 
missions. There  is  an  important  distinction  between  the 
rights  of  a  broker  having  a  lien,  and  those  of  a  factor  who 
has  a  lien.  In  the  case  of  a  factor  there  is  an  exception  to 
the  rule  that  no  sale  can  be  made  under  a  lien  except  in  pur- 
suance of  statutory  authority,  or  by  a  decree  of  a  court  of 
equity.  A  factor  may  sell  to  reimburse  himself  for  advances 
made  and  liabilities  incurred  on  account  of  the  consignment. 
It  is  important  for  a  stock-broker  that  he  should  be  regarded 
as  a  factor  if  his  special  interest  in  his  customer's  stocks  is  to 
be  regarded  as  a  lien;  and  inasmuch  as  he  ordinarily  holds 
the  customer's  securities,  which  are  generally  regarded  as 
merchandise,  he  may  properly  be  considered  as  a  factor 
governed  by  the  general  law  regulating  factors.^-  He  has 
such  a  special  interest  in  stocks  upon  which  he  has  made 
advancements,  that  he  may  properly  refuse  to  sell  the  stocks 
if  the  customer's  order  to  sell  is  expressly  given  for  the 
purpose  of  reinvesting  in  other  stocks  which  the  broker 
would  be  obliged  to  hold  as  security  for  his  advances. ^^  The 
broker  in  such  case  is  entitled  to  the  management  and  con- 
trol of  the  stocks. 

§  422.     Broker  employed   on  commission  has  a  lien. — A 

broker  or  agent  employed  upon  a  commission  to  obtain  a  loan 
has  a  lien  on  the  fund,  and  may  retain  out  of  it  the  amount  of 

10  Jones  on  Collateral  Securities  i^Biddle's  Law  of  Stockbrokers, 
(3d  ed.),   §§   151-154,  722.  pp.  118-120. 

11  Jones  V.  Gallagher,  3  Utah  54,  i3Jones  v.  Gallagher,  3  Utah  54, 
1  Pac.  15,  reversed  129  U.  S.  193,  1  Pac.  15,  reversed  129  U.  S.  193, 
32  L.  ed.  658,  9  Sup.  Ct.  335.  32  L.  ed.  658,  9  Sup.  Ct.  335. 


§  423  LIENS.  374 

his  commission. ^^  He  is  not,  however,  a  factor,  and  therefore 
is  not  entitled  to  a  lien  for  his  general  balance  of  account.  His 
lien  is  specific;  though  having  in  his  hands  money  of  his 
principal,  he  may,  in  an  action  for  the  money  by  his  prin- 
cipal, he  may,  in  an  action  for  the  money  by  his  principal, 
have  a  right  of  set-off  in  respect  of  his  principal's  existing  in- 
debtedness to  him. 

A  real  estate  agent  or  broker  has  a  lien  for  his  fees  and 
advancements  upon  deeds  which  come  into  his  possession  by 
reason  of  his  employment.  His  lien,  however,  is  not  a  gen- 
eral lien.^^ 

§  423.  An  insurance  broker  is  a  factor. — An  insurance 
broker,  however,  who  is  intrusted  with  his  principal's  poli- 
cies, is  a  factor  rather  than  a  broker,  and,  like  a  factor,  he 
has  a  lien  on  such  policies,  and  the  money  collected  by  him 
for  losses  under  the  policies,  for  his  general  balance.^®  It  is 
customary  to  intrust  an  insurance  broker  with  the  policies 
which  he  has  effected,  particularly  marine  policies,  so  that 
he  may  be  able  to  adjust  any  losses  which  may  occur.  It  is 
the  broker's  right  to  retain  the  policies  so  long  as  the  prin- 
cipal is  indebted  to  him.  He  has  a  lien  on  the  policies  for 
premiums  paid  and  for  his  commissions.^^  If  the  broker 
acts  for  his  principal  continuously,  or  has  an  open  insurance 
account  with  him,  he  has  a  lien  upon  the  policies  for  the  gen- 
eral balance  of  his  insurance  account. ^^     Even  if  the  broker 

i4Vinton  v.  Baldwin.  95  Ind.  433;  leLevy  v.  Barnard,  8  Taunt.  149; 

Hanna  v.  Phelps,  7  Ind.  21,  63  Am.  Snook   v.    Davidson,   2    Camp.   218; 

Dec.    410.      Peterson    v.     Hall,    61  Mann  v.  Forrester,  4  Camp.  60. 

Minn.  268,  63  N.  W.  733.  i^Levy  v.  Barnard,  8  Taunt.  149; 

isRichards    v.    Gaskill,    39    Kans.  Mann   v.    Forrester,    4    Camp.    60; 

428,   18  Pac.  494.     His  lien  is  only  Sharp  v.  Whipple,  1  Bosw.  (N.  Y.) 

on    specific    securities.      Carpenter  557. 

V.  Momsen,  92  Wis.  449,  65  N.  W.  is  Mann    v.    Forrester,    4    Camp. 

1027,    66    N.    W.    692.        See    also,  60;  Sharp  v.  Whipple,  1  Bosw.  (N. 

Gresham      v.      Galveston      County  Y.)    557;    Man   v.   Shiffner,   2   East 

(Tex.),  36  S.  W.  796;   Peterson  v.  523;    Moody   v.    Webster,    3    Pick. 

Hall,  61  Minn.  268,  63  N.  W.  7ZZ.  (Mass.)   424. 


375 


LIENS  OF  FACTORS,   BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC. 


424 


has  knowledge  that  the  person  who  employs  him  is  merely 
an  agent  for  the  insured,  he  is  entitled  to  his  special  lien; 
and  if  it  is  not  known  to  him  that  his  employer  is  merely  an 
agent,  he  has  a  lien  for  his  general  balance  against  Tiis  em- 
ployer in  the  same  way  as  if  he  had  acted  directly  for  the 
insured. ^^ 

An  insurance  broker  may  assert  his  general  lien  even 
against  an  assignee  of  the  policy.  Thus,  where  the  owner  of 
goods  sells  them  after  directing  his  broker  to  effect  insur- 
ance upon  them,  and  the  broker  retains  the  policy  and  col- 
lects money  for  a  loss,  he  can  hold  the  money  for  his  general 
balance  as  against  the  purchaser.-^ 

§  424.  Extent  of  insurance  broker's  lien. — If  one  acts  both 
as  an  insurance  broker  and  as  a  factor  for  the  sale  of  goods, 
his  lien  extends  to  a  general  balance  of  both  accounts;  he 
may  retain  a  sum  received  for  a  loss  on  a  policy,  not  only  for 
a  balance  due  him  upon  his  insurance  account,  but  also  for  a 
balance  due  him  for  advances  and  commissions  upon  goods. "^ 
But  if  the  principal  has  remitted  the  premiums,  payable 
in  respect  of  the  insurance,  so  that  he  has  no  longer  any  lien 
as  a  broker  upon  the  policy,  he  is  not  entitled  to  hold  it  for 
the  general  balance  due  from  his  principal  to  him  as  a  fac- 
tor.22 


lOMann  v.  Forrester,  4  Camp.  60; 
Sharp  V.  Whipple,  1  Bosw.  (N.  Y.) 
557;  Westwood  v.  Bell,  4  Camp. 
349.  "I  hold  that,  if  a  policy  of 
insurance  is  effected  by  a  broker, 
in  ignorance  that  it  does  not  be- 
long to  the  persons  by  whom  he 
is  employed,  he  has  a  lien  upon  it 
for  the  amount  of  the  balance 
which  they  owe  him.  *  *  *  The  only 
question  is,  whether  he  knew  or 
had  reason  to  believe  that  the  per- 
son by  whom  he  was  employed  was 
only  an  agent;  and  the  party  who 
seeks    to    deprive    him    of    his    lien 


must  make  out  the  afifirmative.  The 
employer  is  to  be  taken  to  be  the 
principal  till  the  contrary  is 
proved."  Per  Gibbs,  C.  J.  In 
Snook  V.  Davidson,  2  Camp.  218, 
and  in  Lanyon  v.  Blanchard,  2 
Camp.  597,  the  broker  must  be 
taken  to  have  had  notice  that  the 
person  who  employed  him  was  not 
the  principal. 

^oMan  V.  Shififner,  2  East  523. 

2iOIive  V.  Smith,  5  Taunt.  56. 

22Dixon  V.  Stansfield,  10  C.  B. 
398. 


§    425  LIENS.  376 

§  425.  Agent's  specific  lien. — An  agent,  who  is  not  a  brok- 
er or  general  agent,  who  effects  insurance  for  his  principal, 
and  pays  or  becomes  bound  for  the  premium,  has  a  specific  "^ 
lien  on  the  policy  so  long  as  he  retains  it.  If  he  surrenders 
the  policy  to  his  principal,  his  lien  is  gone.  Although  the 
insurers  are  entitled  to  deduct  the  premium,  if  unpaid,  from 
the  amount  payable  upon  a  loss,  yet,  if  the  agent  has  paid 
the  premium  to  the  insurers,  he  has  no  equity  to  stand  in 
their  place,  and  to  claim  payment  out  of  the  sum  due  for 
the  loss.^^ 

But  such  an  agent  who  procures  a  policy  in  pursuance  of 
a  specific  order,  and  under  directions  to  forward  the  policy  to 
his  principal,  has  no  lien  on  the  policy.  "By  undertaking 
to  execute  the  order,"  said  Chief  Justice  Shaw,^^  "he  bound 
himself  to  comply  with  the  terms  and  forward  the  policy; 
and  this  precludes  the  supposition  that  he  was  to  have  any 
lien  upon  it  or  interest  in  it." 

A  ship's  husband,  for  the  general  management  of  the 
vessel  insured,  has  no  lien  on  a  policy  for  the  balance  of  his 
account,  where  he  has  procured  the  insurance  under  specific 
directions  to  forward  the  policy  to  the  owner.^^ 

If  the  broker  knew  at  the  time  of  effecting  a  policy  that 
the  person  who  employed  him  was  acting  for  another,  he  has 
no  lien  upon  the  policy  for  the  general  balance  due  him  from 
such  agent,  but  only  a  special  lien  for  the  premium  and  com- 
missions due  on  that  policy.^^ 

§  426.  Factor's  lien  for  general  balance. — A  factor's  lien 
for  his  general  balance  attaches  only  to  goods  received  by 
him  in  his  general  capacity  as  factor;  it  does  not  attach  to 
goods  received  by  him  under  a  special  agreement  for  a  par- 
ticular purpose.     "The  lien  which  a  factor  has  on  the  goods 

23Cranston    v.    Philadelphia    Ins.  25Reed  v.  Pacific  Ins.  Co.,  1  Met. 

Co.,  5  Binn.   (Pa.)   538.  (Mass.)  166. 

24Reed  v.  Pacific  Ins.  Co.,  1  Met.  26Man  v.  Shiffner,  2  East  523. 
(Mass.)  166. 


377  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    427 

of  his  principal  arises  upon  an  agreement  which  the  law  im- 
plies; but  where  there  is  an  express  stipulation  to  the  con- 
trary, it  puts  an  end  to  the  general  rule  of  law."^^  Thus, 
where  the  owner  of  certain  cotton  deposited  it  with  a  brok- 
er for  sale,  under  a  special  agreement  that  the  latter  should 
pay  the  proceeds  to  the  owner,  it  was  held  that  the  broker 
had  no  lien  on  this  cotton  for  the  balance  of  his  general  ac- 
count arising  upon  other  articles;  for  the  express  stipulation 
of  the  parties  excluded  the  idea  of  such  a  lien.  The  goods  not 
having  been  sold,  the  owner,  or  his  assignee  in  bankruptcy, 
was  entitled  to  have  them  returned.-^ 

The  special  agreement  may,  however,  be  consistent  with 
the  implied  lien.  Wool  merchants  in  Ohio,  in  consideration 
of  further  advances  by  their  factors  in  New  York,  agreed  to 
ship  them  wool  enough  to  balance  their  account  for  such  ad- 
vances and  a  large  indebtedness  already  existing,  and  any 
indebtedness  that  might  subsequently  accrue.  It  was  held 
that  the  lien  of  the  factors  upon  the  wool  received  was  not 
limited  to  their  advances  on  each  shipment,  but  was  avail- 
able for  the  satisfaction  of  the  general  balance  due  them.-'^ 

If  a  factor  receives  goods  in  the  general  course  of  busi- 
ness without  notice  of  the  fact  that  they  were  consigned  to 
him  for  a  special  purpose,  he  has  a  lien  upon  them  for  his 
general  balance. ^° 

§  427.  A  general  lien  is  not  implied  when  there  is  a  spe- 
cial agreement  which  is  inconsistent  with  such  a  lien.^^ — 

27Walker  v.   Birch,  6  T.   R.  258,  3iBrandao   v.    Barnett,    3     C.     B. 

per  Lord  Kenyon.  519.     A  factor's  contract  is  not  in- 

-SWalker  v.   Birch,  6  T.   R.  258.  consistent    with     his     common-law 

See     Hall     v.     Jackson,     20     Pick.  lien,  where  it  provides  that  money 

(Mass.)    194;   Garrison  v.  Vermont  advanced  by  him  to  purchase  wool 

Mills,  152  N.  Car.  643,  68  S.  E.  142.  is  to  be  repaid  as  the  same  is  ex- 

29Chapman  v.  Kent,  3  Duer   (N.  pended.     Welker  v.   Appleman,   44 

Y.)  224.  Ind.  App.  699,  90  N.  E.  35. 

soArcher   v.    McMechan,    21    Mo. 
43. 


§    428  LIENS.  378 

If  a  transaction  between  two  houses  having  many  dealings 
between  them  is  shown  to  be  an  isolated  dealing  on  a  par- 
ticular footing,  and  to  have  been  intended  to  be  brought  to 
a  point  and  settled  by  itself,  it  does  not  enter  into  the  gen- 
eral account  between  the  parties  and  become  subject  to  a  lien 
for  a  general  balance.  A  firm  of  merchants  in  Hamburg  di- 
rected their  correspondents  in  London,  a  firm  of  merchants, 
to  purchase  Mexican  bonds  upon  certain  terms,  and  to  hold 
them  in  safe  custody  at  the  disposal  of  the  Hamburg  firm. 
The  bonds  were  accordingly  purchased  July  2,  and  the  next 
day  the  London  firm  drew  upon  the  Hamburg  firm  for  the 
amount,  which,  they  said,  balanced  the  transaction.  The 
bills  were  accepted  and  paid.  On  the  19th  of  November  the 
Hamburg  firm  requested  that  the  bonds  be  sent  to  them  by 
post ;  but  on  the  same  day  the  London  firm  wrote  that  they 
had  stopped  payment,  but  that  the  bonds  had  not  been  jeop- 
ardized. The  Hamburg  firm  afterwards  stopped  payment. 
In  a  suit  by  the  representatives  of  this  firm  for  the  delivery  of 
the  bonds,  it  was  held  that  the  bonds  were  not  subject  to  the 
general  balance  of  account  between  the  two  firms.^^ 

Under  an  agreement  that  certain  advances  shall  be  paid 
out  of  the  proceeds  of  a  certain  consignment,  the  factor  is 
bound  to  apply  the  proceeds  of  such  consignment  to  the 
payment  of  the  specific  advances,  and  can  not  apply  them  to  a 
debt  due  him  not  contracted  under  the  agreement,  and  for 
which  he  had  no  lien.^^ 

§  428.  Factor  has  no  lien  on  goods  received  under  ex- 
press directions. — A  factor  has  no  general  lien  on  goods 
which  he  has  received  under  express  directions  to  apply  the 
proceeds  of  in  a  particular  way.  He  must  first  carry  out 
the  instructions  of  the  consignor  as  to  the  application,  and 

32Bock  V.  Gorrissen,  30  L.  J.  Ch.  saQwen     v.     Iglanor,      4      Cold. 

39.  (Tenn.)   15. 


379  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    429 

then,  if  there  is  a  surplus,  his  general  Hen  may  attach  to 
this.^'^ 

He  has  no  Hen  on  goods  which  are  dehvered  to  him  as 
agent  for  the  use  of  his  principal.  Such  a  delivery  is  consid- 
ered as  a  delivery  to  the  principal,  and  the  possession  is  con- 
sidered to  be  in  the  principal. ^'^ 

No  lien  arises  in  favor  of  an  agent  with  whom  goods  or  a 
policy  of  insurance  is  deposited  for  safe  keeping.'^*'  And  so  if 
he  is  intrusted  with  property  for  a  particular  purpose,  he 
can  not  retain  it  under  a  claim  of  a  general  lien.^"  An  agent 
employed  merely  to  purchase  certain  goods  is  entitled  to  a 
lien  for  his  advances  in  making  the  purchase,  but  he  is  not 
entitled  to  a  lien  for  a  general  balance  due  him  from  his  prin- 
cipal.^^ 

§  429.     Factor's  agent  has  no  lien  as  against  principal. — 

A  third  person,  to  whom  a  factor  has  intrusted  his  princi- 
pal's goods  for  sale,  has  no  lien  on  them  as  against  the  princi- 
pal.^'^ The  relation  of  a  factor  to  his  principal  is  one  of 
trust,  and  he  can  not  delegate  his  authority  to  another,  or 
substitute  another  in  his  place,  without  the  sanction  of  his 
principal,  express  or  implied.  A  transfer  of  the  goods  by 
the  factor  to  another,  whom  he  authorizes  to  act  in  his 
place,  is  a  conversion  of  the  goods  by  the  factor.  The  prin- 
cipal may  thereupon  sue  the  factor  in  trover  for  the  conver- 
sion, or,  waiving  the  tort,  he  may  sue  him  in  assumpsit  for 
the  value  of  the  goods. '^^ 

34Frith  V.  Forbes,  32  L.  J.  Ch.  10.  ton  Co.,  160  Fed.  635.  87  C.   C.  A. 

The  factor  must  follow  his  princi-  606. 

pal's  instructions,  but  where  no  in-  Si'Gurney  v.  Sharp,  4  Taunt.  242. 

structions  are  given  the  factor  has  36Muir   v.    Fleming,    1    D.    &    R. 

a  lien  for  expenses,   liabilities   and  N.  P.  C.  29. 

commission    and    the    principal    or  s^Burn  v.  Brown,  2  Stark.  272. 

one  acting  for  him  cannot  recover  ssDe  Wolf  v.  Rowland,  2  Paine 

the  possession  without  payment  or  (U.  S.)  356,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  3852. 

tender  of  the   amount  of  the  lien.  sophelps  v.  Sinclair,  2  N.  H.  554. 

Heffner  v.  Gwynne-Treadwell  Cot-  40Campbell    v.    Reeves,    3    Head 

(Tenn.)  226. 


§    43°  LIENS.  380 

The  lien  of  a  factor  is  a  personal  privilege,  and  can  not  be 
set  up  by  any  other  person  in  defense  to  an  action  by  the 
principal.  He  may  avail  himself  of  it  or  not,  as  he  pleases. ^^ 

§  430.     Effect  of  factor's  assignment  for  creditors. — If  a 

factor  or  consignee  makes  a  general  assignment  for  the  ben- 
efit of  his  creditors,  the  assignee  has  no  right  to  sell  the 
goods,  for  the  factor  or  consignee  can  not  delegate  his  au- 
thority to  another  without  the  consent  of  the  principal.  All 
that  passes  by  the  assignment  is  the  lien  on  the  goods.  The 
assignee  has  lawful  possession  of  the  goods  under  the  as- 
signment, but  this  gives  him  no  right  of  way  to  assume 
to  himself  the  entire  property,  or  right  of  disposing  of  the 
goods.  A  sale  of  the  goods  by  him  is  a  tortious  conversion 
of  them.  His  legal  right  extends  no  further  than  to  hold  the 
goods  by  virtue  of  the  lien,  or  to  foreclose  the  lien  in  the 
manner  provided  by  statute.^" 

§  431.  Goods  received  after  death  of  principal. — Although 
the  death  of  the  principal  is  a  revocation  of  the  agent's  au- 
thority, yet  the  possession  of  goods  acquired  by  a  factor  after 
the  death  of  his  principal,  where  he  has  made  advances  upon 
the  goods,  may  entitle  him  to  a  lien.^^ 

But  if  the  factor  does  not  obtain  actual  or  constructive 
possession  of  the  goods  till  after  the  death  of  the  principal, 
he  has  no  lien  for  an  existing  debt,  or  general  balance  of  ac- 

4iHolly    V.    Huggeford,    8    Pick.  factor's   Hen   for  advances   thereon 

(Mass.)  IZ,  19  Am.  Dec.  303.  is  discharged.     Cameron  v.  Crouse, 

42Terry  v.   Bamberger,  44  Conn.  11  App.  Div.  391,  42  N.  Y.  S.  58.    A 

558,    14   Blatchf.    (U.    S.)    234,   Fed.  factor  having  a  lien  on   notes  has 

Cas.   No.   13837,  affd.  103  U.  S.  40,  no     implied     authority     to     assign 

26  L.  ed.  317;  Willard  v.  White,  56  them    to   pay   his    debts.      People's 

Hun  581,  32  N.  Y.  St.  151,  10  N.  Y.  Bank  v.  Frick  Co.,  13  Okla.  179,  12, 

S.  170.    The  assignee  for  the  bene-  Pac.  949. 

fit  of  a  factor's  creditors  may  legal-  43Hammonds  v.   Barclay,  2  East 

ly   retain   the   possession   of  goods  227;   Lempriere  v.  Pasley,  2  T.   R. 

consigned    his    assignor    until    the  485. 


381  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    432 

count. ^^  Thus  a  manufacturer  wrote  to  commission  mer- 
chants to  whom  he  was  indebted,  and  inclosed  an  invoice  of 
goods  which  he  was  about  to  ship  to  them,  but  died  before 
the  letter  was  mailed  or  the  goods  had  left  his  possession. 
His  son  the  next  day  forwarded  the  letter  and  the  goods, 
and  the  merchant  sold  the  goods,  and  gave  credit  for  the 
proceeds  in  reduction  of  their  balance  of  account  against  the 
manufacturer.  In  a  suit  against  them  by  the  administrator 
of  the  deceased,  it  was  held  that  they  must  pay  over  the 
proceeds  of  these  goods  to  the  administrator.'*^ 

§  432.  No  lien  on  goods  when  consignor  has  informed 
factor  that  goods  do  not  belong  to  him. — A  factor  has  no  gen- 
eral lien  on  goods  which  the  consignor  has  informed  him  be- 
long to  another  person  to  whose  credit  he  is  directed  to  place 
the  proceeds. ^^  Dealers  in  livestock  shipped  to  brokers  in 
Chicago  certain  carloads  of  stock,  which  had  been  purchased 
with  the  money  of  a  banker  at  the  place  of  shipment,  and 
the  dealers  so  informed  the  broker,  and  directed  him  to 
place  the  proceeds  of  sale  to  the  credit  of  the  banker  in  a 
certain  bank  in  Chicago,  in  accordance  with  their  custom  in 
previous  transactions.  The  stock  really  belonged  to  the 
banker,  though  the  dealers  had  shipped  it  in  their  own 
names  without  consulting  him,  in  order  to  get  better  rates 
of  freight.  The  brokers  applied  the  proceeds  of  the  sale,  less 
their  commissions,  to  an  old  account  against  the  dealers  for 
advances  made  to  them  for  which  they  claimed  a  factor's 

44  Cook's   Admr.    v.    Brannin,   87  sion  and  custody  of  the  consignor, 

Ky.  101,  9  Ky.  L.  955,  7  S.  W.  877.  is    not    sufficient    to    create    a    lien. 

•isFarnum   v.    Boutelle,     13     Met.  In  the  present  case,  it  appears  that 

(Mass.)  159.    "But  before  such  lien  the  goods  remained  on  the  prem- 

attaches,  the  goods  must  have  been  ises  of  the  intestate  at  the  time  of 

delivered  or  sent  to  the  consignee,  his  decease,  and  were  subsequently 

or  at  least,  put  upon  their  transit  forwarded  by  his  son."     Per  Shaw, 

to  him;  and  an  intention  so  to  con-  C.  J. 

sign    them,    and    an    intimation    of  4c\Veymouth  v.  Boyer,  1  Ves.  Jr. 

such     intention     by     letter,     whilst  425;  Darlington  v.  Chamberlain,  120 

they  remain   in   the   actual  posses-  111.  585,  12  N.  E.  78. 


§  433  LIENS.  382 

lien.  It  was  held  that  their  claim  was  inadmissible  as  against 
the  owner  of  the  stock. ''''^ 

A  consignee  who  receives  shipments  of  goods  upon  which 
others  have  made  advances,  and  taken  transfers  of  bills  of 
lading  as  security,  acquires  no  lien  upon  them  to  the  pre- 
judice of  those  who  have  made  the  advances. ^^ 

A  factor  and  consignee  who  has  received  property  with 
knowledge  that  a  draft  has  been  drawn  against  him  for 
the  proceeds  by  the  consignor  in  favor  of  a  third  person 
can  not  apply  the  proceeds  on  any  other  account.  Even 
if  he  might  himself  enforce  a  lien  for  a  general  balance  of 
account,  he  can  not  retain  the  proceeds  and  pay  the  same 
over  to  a  firm  to  which  the  consignor  was  indebted,  though 
the  consignee  is  a  member  of  that  firm.'*'^ 

§  433.  Agent's  lien. — If  the  agent  has  notice  of  the 
bankruptcy  of  his  principal,  or  of  his  assignment  for 
the  benefit  of  his  creditors,  before  he  gets  possession  of  the 
property,  he  can  not  hold  it  under  a  claim  of  a  general  lien.^^ 
But  if  he  has  received  a  bill  of  lading  or  other  insignia  of 
property  in  the  goods  before  notice  of  his  principal's  bank- 
ruptcy, he  is  not  divested  of  his  right  of  lien,  though  he 
has  such  notice  before  the  goods  actually  arrive,  for  the 
bill  of  lading  confers  title  and  constructive  possession.  The 
bankruptcy  of  the  principal  after  the  factor  has  received  the 
goods  does  not  divest  him  of  his  lien.°^ 

'I'Darlington  v.  Chamberlain,  120  21;  Fourth  Nat.  Bank  v.  American 

III.  585,  12  N.  E.  78.  Mills  Co.,  137  U.  S.  234,  34  L.  ed. 

4SFirst  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ege,  109  N.  655,    11    Sup.   Ct.   52.     If   the    prin- 

Y.  120,  16  N.  E.  317,  4  Am.  St.  431.  cipal    before    his    insolvency    has 

•^''Fisher   v.   First   Nat.    Bank,   37  transferred  the  goods   to   the  fac- 

111.  App.  333.    See  also,  Hollins  v.  tor     in     discharge     pro     tanto     of 

Hubbard,   165   N.  Y.  534,  59  N.  E.  the    lien    debt,    the    latter    is    not 

317.  bound  to  set  off  the  amount  of  ac- 

ooCopland  v.  Stein,  8  T.   R.  199;  commodation  drafts  drawn  by  the 

Robson  V.   Kemp,  4   Esp.  233,  per  principal    for    the    factor's    benefit, 

Lord  Ellenborough,  C.  J.  which  were  not  due  when  the  goods 

5^ Hudson  V.  Granger,  5  B.  &  Aid.  were  so  transferred,  and  have  not 


383  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    434 

After  a  factor  has  obtained  possession  of  the  goods,  his 
lien  is  not  divested  by  an  attachment  of  them  by  a  creditor 
of  his  principal. ^- 

§  434.  Lien  of  consignee  depends  on  manner  of  consign- 
ment.— Whether  a  consignee  has  a  lien  upon  goods  which 
have  been  wrongfully  consigned  to  him  depends  very  much 
upon  the  manner  in  which  the  consignment  is  made.^^  A 
carrier  has  no  lien  on  such  goods  for  freight  as  against  the 
rightful  owner,^"^  and  the  consignee  could  acquire  no  lien 
as  against  such  owner  by  paying  the  freight.  As  regards  the 
duties  upon  goods  imported  by  one  who  has  come  wrong- 
fully into  possession  of  the  goods,  the  United  States  would 
have  a  lien,  and  the  duties  must  be  paid  if  the  goods  are 
entered,  and  withdrawn  from  the  custody  of  the  United 
States;  but  this  lien  would  not  ordinarily  be  transferred  to 
the  consignee  under  the  wrongful  consignment,  who  has 
paid  the  duties  and  received  the  goods,  for  no  lien  can  be 
implied  in  favor  of  one  who  acts  adversely  to  the  rights  of 
the  owner.^^ 

But  the  owner  may  be  estopped  by  his  conduct  from  deny- 
ing that  such  consignee  paid  the  duties  for  his  use  and  at  his 
request.  Thus,  if  the  owner,  intending  to  replevy  the  goods, 
stands  by  and  knowingly  allows  the  consignee,  who  honestly 
believes  the  goods  were  properly  consigned  to  him,  to  pay 
the  customs  duties,  the  owner  can  not  maintain  his  action 
of  replevy  without  tendering  the  amount   so  paid.     Under 

been  paid  by  the  principal.    Fourth  debt  due   him   from  the  consignor. 

Nat.   Bank  v.  American   Mills   Co.,  Burns'     Ann.     Stats.      1914,     §  862 

137  U.  S.  234,  34  L.  ed.  655,  11  Sup.  Louisiana:    See  post,   §   437. 

Ct.  52.  ''SFowler  v.    Parsons,    143    Mass. 

02Maxen     v.     Landrum,     21     La.  401,  9  N.  E.  799,  per  Field,  J. 

Ann.   366.      In    Indiana:    Goods   at-  "''i  See  ante,  §304. 

tached  in  the  hands  of  a  consignee  "'SFowler   v.    Parsons,    143    Mass. 

shall  be   subject  to  a   lien   for  any  401,  9  N.  E.  799. 


§  435  LIENS.  384 

such  circumstances  the  consignee  obtains  an  equitable  lien 
upon  the  goods  by  reason  of  such  payment. ^^ 

It  is  held,  however,  that,  although  the  consignor  has  ob- 
tained the  goods  by  means  of  fraudulent  representations, 
a  factor  who  has  in  good  faith  received  the  goods  for  sale, 
and  made  advances  upon  them  to  the  consignor,  acquires 
a  valid  lien,  and  the  original  vendor  can  not  obtain  them 
from  him  without  paying  the  advances.^''' 

But  a  factor  who  has  obtained  possession  of  the  property 
on  which  he  claims  a  lien  by  means  of  misrepresentations, 
or  in  any  manner  which  makes  his  possession  unauthorized 
or  tortious,  is  not  entitled  to  a  lien.^^ 

§  435.  Lien  of  consignee  on  insurance  money. — A  con- 
signee who  has  insured  the  goods  on  which  he  has  made 
advances  has  a  lien  upon  the  insurance  money  collected 
by  him  for  a  loss  by  fire  without  his  fault,  though  the  insur- 
ance was  effected  for  the  benefit  of  the  consignor.  He  had 
a  lien  upon  the  goods,  and  when  these  were  destroyed  the 
amount  recovered  by  him  upon  their  loss  was  substituted 
in  their  place,  and  w^as  held  subject  to  the  same  lien.^^ 

§  436.  State  statutes. — In  several  states  there  are  statutes 
which  protect  factors  in  their  dealings  with  consignors.  These 
statutes  are  generally  made  a  part  of  the  Factors'  Acts  of 
these  states.  The  general  purpose  of  the  Factors'  Acts  is  to 
enable  third  persons  to  deal  with  agents  intrusted  with  goods, 
or  with  the  documents  of  title  to  goods,  for  sale,  as  though 
they  were  the  absolute  owners  of  the  goods. '^'^     The  same 

^6Fowler  v.    Parsons,    143    Mass.  faith  or  he  will  have  no  lien.     Peo- 

401,  9  N.  E.  799.  pie's    Bank  v.   Frick   Co.,    13    Okla. 

57Williams  v.  Birch,  6  Bosw.  (N.  179,   12,   Pac.   949. 

Y.)  299,  affd.  36  N.  Y.  319.  oojohnson      v.       Campbell,      120 

iiSMadden  v.  Kempster,  1   Camp.  Mass.  449. 

12;    Taylor  v.    Robinson,   8   Taunt.  eojones    on    Collateral    Securities 

648.      A    factor    must    act    in    good  (3d  ed.),  §  333. 


385  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.      §    436a 

.acts  also  generally  afford  a  similar  protection  to  factors  who 
make  advances  to  consignors  upon  goods  consigned. 

§  436a.  Delaware. ^^ — In  all  cases  in  which  commission 
merchants,  factors,  and  all  common  carriers,  or  other  per- 
sons, shall  have  a  lien  under  existing  laws  upon  any  goods, 
wares,  merchandise  or  other  personal  property,  for  or  on 
account  of  the  costs  or  expenses  of  carriage,  storage,  or  labor 
bestowed  on  such  goods,  wares,  merchandise,  or  other  per- 
sonal property,  if  the  owner  or  consignee  of  the  same  shall 
fail  or  neglect,  or  refuse  to  pay  the  amount  of  charges  upon 
any  such  property,  goods,  w^ares,  or  merchandise,  within  sixty 
days  after  demand  thereof,  made  personally  upon  such  owner 
or  consignee,  or  at  his  last  known  place  of  residence,  then  in 
such  case  it  shall  and  may  be  lawful  for  any  such  commis- 
sion merchant,  factor,  common  carrier,  or  other  person  hav- 
ing such  lien  as  aforesaid,  after  the  expiration  of  said  period 
of  sixty  days,  to  expose  such  goods,  wares,  merchandise,  or 
other  personal  property  to  sale  at  public  auction,  and  to 
sell  the  same,  or  so  much  thereof  as  shall  be  sufficient  to 
discharge  said  lien,  together  with  costs  of  sale  and  advertis- 
ing: provided,  that  notice  of  such  sale,  together  with  the 
name  of  the  person  or  persons  to  whom  such  goods  shall 
have  been  consigned,  shall  have  been  first  published,  for 
three  successive  weeks,  in  a  newspaper  published  in  the  coun- 
ty, and  by  six  written  or  printed  hand-bills,  put  up  in  the 
most  public  and  most  conspicuous  places  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
depot  where  said  goods  may  be. 

Upon  the  application  of  any  of  the  persons  or  corpora- 
tions having  a  lien  upon  goods,  wares,  merchandise,  or 
other  property,  as  mentioned  above,  verified  by  affidavit,  to 
any  judge  of  the  superior  court  of  this  state,  or  to  the  chan- 
cellor, setting  forth  that  the  place  of  residence  of  the  owner 
or  consignee  of  any  such  goods,  wares,  merchandise,  or  other 

eiRev.  Code  1893,  pp.  816,  817. 
25 


§  436b  LIENS.  386 

property  is  unknown,  or  that  such  goods,  wares,  merchandise, 
or  other  property  are  of  such  a  perishable  nature,  or  so  dam- 
aged, or  showing  any  other  cause  that  shall  render  it  im- 
practicable to  give  the  notice  as  required  in  the  first  section 
of  this  act,  then,  in  such  case,  it  shall  and  may  be  lawful 
for  the  judge,  or  chancellor,  hearing  such  application,  to 
make  an  order,  to  be  by  him  signed,  authcw.-izing  the  sale  of 
such  goods,  wares,  merchandise,  or  other  property  upon  such 
terms  as  to  notice  as  the  nature  of  the  case  may  admit  of 
and  to  such  judge  shall  seem  meet ;  provided,  that  in  case  of 
perishable  property,  the  affidavit  and  proceedings  required 
by  this   section  may  be   had  before   a  justice   of  the   peace. 

§  436b.  Florida.'^- — Any  person  or  persons  who  shall  pro- 
cure a  loan  or  advance  of  money  or  goods  and  chattels, 
wares  or  merchandise  or  other  things  of  value,  to  aid  him,  her 
or  them  in  the  business  of  planting,  farming,  timber  getting 
or  any  other  kind  of  businesses  in  this  state,  from  any  factor, 
merchant,  firm  or  person  in  this  state,  or  in  the  United 
States  or  in  any  foreign  country,  shall,  by  this  act,  be  held 
to  have  given  to  the  lender,  lenders,  or  person  making  such 
advance,  a  statutory  lien  of  prior  dignity  to  all  other  incum- 
brances saving  and  excepting  liens  for  labor  and  liens  in 
favor  of  landlords,  upon  all  the  timber  getting,  all  the  crops, 
and  products  grown  or  anything  else  made  or  grown  by 
said  person  or  persons,  through  the  assistance  of  said  loan  or 
advances:  provided,  that  the  lien  above  given  shall  not  be 
created  unless  the  person  or  persons  obtaining  or  procuring 
such  loan  or  advance  shall  give  to  the  person  or  persons 
making  such  loan  or  advance  an  instrument  of  writing  con- 
senting to  said  lien  ;  and  the  same  shall  be  recorded  in  the 
office  of  the  clerk  of  the  circuit  court  of  the  county  wherein 
such  business  of  planting,  farming  or  timber  getting  is  con- 
ducted. 

et'Gen.  Stats.  1906,  §  2208. 


387  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    437 

§  436c.  Georgia/'" — A  factor's  lien  extends  to  all  balances 
on  general  account,  and  attaches  to  the  proceeds  of  the  sale 
of  goods  consigned,  as  well  as  to  the  goods  themselves.  Pe- 
culiar confidence  being  reposed  in  the  factor,  he  may,  in 
the  absence  of  instructions,  exercise  his  discretion  according 
to  the  general  usages  of  the  trade;  in  return  greater  and 
more  skillful  diligence  is  required  of  him,  and  the  most  active 
good  faith. 

§437.  Louisiana.''^ — Every  consignee  or  commission 
agent  who  has  made  advances  on  goods  consigned  to  him, 
or  placed  in  his  hands  to  be  sold  for  account  of  the  consignor, 
has  a  privilege  for  the  amount  of  these  advances,  with  inter- 
est and  charges,  on  the  value  of  the  goods,  if  they  are  at  his 
disposal  in  his  store  or  in  a  public  warehouse,  or  if,  before 
their  arrival,  he  can  show,  by  a  bill  of  lading  or  letter  of 
advice,  that  they  have  been  dispatched  to  him.  This  privi- 
lege extends  to  the  unpaid  price  of  goods  which  the  consignee 
or  the  agent  shall  have  thus  received  and  sold.  Such  privi- 
lege is  preferred  to  that  of  any  attaching  creditor  on  the 
goods  consigned  to  him,  for  any  balance  due  to  him,  whether 
specially  advanced  on  said  goods  or  not:  provided  they,  or 
an  invoice  or  bill  of  lading,  have  been  received  by  him  prev- 
ious to  the  attachment.  This  privilege  shall  not  have  a 
preference  over  a  privilege  pre-existing  in  behalf  of  a  resident 
creditor  of  this  state. ^^  In  the  event  of  the  failure  of  the  con- 
signee or  commission  agent,  the  consignor  has  not  only  a 
right  to  reclaim  the  goods  sent  by  him,  and  which  remain 
unsold  in  the  hands  of  the  consignee  or  agent,  if  he  can  prove 
their  identity,  but  he  has  also  a  privilege  on  the  price  of 
such  as  have  been  sold,  if  the  price  has  not  been  paid  by  the 

esCode  1911,  §  3502.  Bank  v.  Weis,  49  La.  Ann.  573,  21 

64  Rev.  Civ.  Code  1900,  arts.  3247,      So.  857. 
3248.  Ott  V.  His  Creditors,  127  La.  tJ-'Buddecke    v.     Spence,    23    La. 

827,     54     So.     44;      Ouachita     Nat.      Ann.   367;    Maxen   v.    Landrum,   21 

La.  Ann.  366. 


§    43^  LIENS.  388 

purchaser,  or  passed  into  account  current  between  him  and 
the  bankrupt. 

Under  this  statute  giving  a  consignee  a  lien  by  way  of 
pledge  upon  goods  consigned  to  him  for  his  advances  upon 
them,  if  he  has  control  of  the  goods,  or  if  before  their  ar- 
rival he  can  show  by  a  bill  of  lading,  or  letter  of  advice,  that 
they  have  been  dispatched  to  him,  the  consignee,  after  re- 
ceiving such  letter  of  advice,  or  a  bill  of  lading,  has  a  lien 
which  can  not  be  defeated  by  the  consignor's  drawing  a 
draft  against  the  goods,  obtaining  a  discount  of  it,  and  using 
the  proceeds  for  the  purchase  of  the  goods  so  consigned. ^° 

§  438.  Maine.^" — Every  person  in  whose  name  merchan- 
dise is  forwarded,  every  factor  or  agent  intrusted  with  the 
possession  of  any  bill  of  lading,  custom-house  permit,  or  ware- 
house-keeper's receipt  for  the  delivery  of  such  merchandise, 
and  every  such  factor  or  agent  not  having  the  documentary 
evidence  of  title,  who  is  intrusted  with  the  possession  of 
merchandise  for  the  purpose  of  sale,  or  as  security  for  ad- 
vances to  be  made  thereon,  shall  be  deemed  the  true  owner 
thereof,  so  far  as  to  give  validity  to  any  lien  or  contract  made 
by  such  shipper  or  agent  with  any  other  person  for  the  sale 
or  disposal  of  the  whole  or  any  part  of  such  merchandise, 
money  advanced,  or  negotiable  instrument,  or  other  obliga- 
tion in  writing,  given  by  such  person  upon  the  faith  thereof. 

No  person  taking  such  merchandise  in  deposit  from  such 
agent  as  security  for  an  antecedent  demand  shall  thereby 
acquire  or  enforce  any  right  or  interest  therein  other  than 
such  agent  could  then  enforce.  But  the  true  owner  of  such 
merchandise,  upon  repayment  of  the  money  so  advanced, 
restoration  of  the  security  so  given,  or  satisfaction  of  all 
legal  liens,  may  demand  and  receive  his  property,  or  recover 
the  balance  remaining  as  the  produce  of  the  legal  sale  there- 
of, after  deducting  all  proper  claims  and  expenses  thereon. 

66Helm   V.    Meyer,   30   La.   Ann.  67Rev.  Stat.  1903,  ch.  33,  §§  1-3. 

943. 


389  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    44O 

§  439.  Maryland. ^^ — Any  person  intrusted  with  and  in 
possession  of  any  bill  of  lading,  storekeeper's  or  inspector's 
certificate,  order  for  the  delivery  of  goods,  or  other  docu- 
ment showing  possession,  shall  be  deemed  the  true  owner 
of  the  goods,  wares,  or  merchandise  described  therein,  so  far 
as  to  give  validity  to  any  contract  thereafter  to  be  made 
by  such  person  with  any  other  person  or  body  corporate 
for  the  sale  or  disposal  of  the  said  goods,  wares,  or  mer- 
chandise, or  for  the  pledge  or  deposit  thereof  as  a  security 
for  any  money  or  negotiable  instrument  advanced  or  given  on 
the  faith  of  such  documents,  or  any  of  them;  provided,  that 
such  person  or  body  corporate  shall  not  have  notice,  by  such 
document  or  otherwise,  that  the  person  so  intrusted  is  not 
the  actual  and  bona  fide  owner  of  such  goods,  wares,  and 
merchandise. 

If  any  person  or  body  corporate  shall  take  any  goods, 
wares,  or  merchandise,  or  any  document  mentioned  in  the 
foregoing  clause,  in  deposit  or  pledge  from  any  person  so 
intrusted  with  the  same,  or  to  whom  the  same  may  be  con- 
signed, or  who  may  be  intrusted  with  and  in  possession  of 
any  such  bill  of  lading,  storekeeper's  or  inspector's  certificate, 
order  for  the  delivery  of  goods,  or  other  such  document 
showing  possession,  without  notice,  as  a  security  for  any 
debt  or  demand  existing  before  the  time  of  such  deposit  or 
pledge,  then  such  person  shall  acquire  such  right,  title,  or  in- 
terest as  was  possessed  and  might  have  been  enforced  by 
the  person  from  whom  he  received  the  same,  and  no  more. 

§  440.  Massachusetts.^^ — A  shipper  who  is  in  lawful  pos- 
session of  merchandise  at  the  time  of  shipment  and  in  whose 
name  it  is  shipped  for  sale  shall  be  deemed  the  true  owner 

68Pub.   Gen.  Laws  1904,  art.  2,  §  his  lien  on  the  goods.     Rowland  v. 

3.     Where  a  factor  has  placed  the  Dolby,    100    Md.   272,    59   Atl.    666. 

goods    in    a   warehouse    and    given  See      Farmers'      Packing      Co.      v. 

the   receipt   to   his   principal  he   so  Brown,  87  Md.   1,  39  Atl.  625. 

far  gives  up  possession  as  to  end  coRgv.  Laws  1902,  ch.  68,  §§  2,  3. 


§  44oa  LIENS.  390 

thereof  so  far  as  to  entitle  the  consignee  to  a  lien  thereon 
for  money  advanced,  or  securities  given  to  the  shipper  for 
or  on  account  of  such  consignment,  unless  the  consignee,  at 
or  before  the  time  when  he  made  the  advances  or  gave  the 
securities,  had  notice,  by  the  bill  of  lading  or  otherwise, 
that  the  shipper  was  not  the  actual  and  bona  fide  owner. 

When  a  person  intrusted  with  merchandise,  and  having 
authority  to  sell  or  consign  the  same,  ships  or  otherwise 
transmits  or  delivers  it  to  any  other  person,  such  other 
person  shall  have  a  lien  thereon  for  any  money  or  merchan- 
dise advanced,  or  negotiable  security  given  by  him.  on  the 
faith  of  such  consignment,  to  or  for  the  use  of  the  person  in 
whose  name  such  consignment  or  delivery  was  made ;  and 
for  any  money,  negotiable  security,  or  merchandise  received 
for  the  use  of  the  consignee  by  the  person  in  whose  name 
such  consignment  or  delivery  was  made,  if  such  consignee 
had,  at  the  time  of  such  advance  or  receipt,  probable  cause 
to  believe  that  the  person  in  whose  name  the  merchandise 
was  shipped,  transmitted,  or  delivered  was  the  actual  owner 
thereof,  or  had  a  legal  interest  therein  to  the  amount  of 
said  lien. 

§  440a.  Missouri.^^ — When  any  commission  merchant  or 
w^arehouseman  shall  receive,  on  consignment,  produce,  mer- 
chandise or  other  property,  and  shall  make  advances  thereon, 
either  to  the  owner  or  for  freight  and  charges,  it  shall  be 
lawful  for  the  person  who  may  make  such  advances,  if  the 
same  be  not  paid  to  him  within  sixty  days  from  the  date  of 
such  advances,  to  cause  the  produce,  merchandise  or  prop- 
erty on  which  the  advances  were  made  to  be  advertised  and 
sold  in  the  same  manner  as  unclaimed  property. 

§  440b.  New  York.'^^ — Every  factor  or  other  agent,  in- 
trusted with  the  possession  of  any  bill  of  lading,   custom- 

-oRev.   Stats.   1909,    §  8278.  Kingsbury,   113  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.) 

TiBirdseye's     C.     &    G.     Consol.      555,  100  N.  Y.  S.  323. 
Laws  1909,  p.  4214,  §  43;   Beken  v. 


391  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.      §    440b 

house  permit,  or  warehouseman's  receipt  for  the  de- 
livery of  any  merchandise,  and  every  such  factor  or 
agent  not  having  the  documentary  evidence  of  title, 
who  shall  be  intrusted  with  the  possession  of  any  mer- 
chandise for  the  purpose  of  sale,  or  as  a  security  for  any 
advances  to  be  made  or  obtained  thereon,  shall  be  deemed 
to  be  the  true  owner  thereof,  so  far  as  to  give  validity  to 
any  contract  made  by  such  agent  with  any  other  person, 
for  the  sale  or  disposition  of  the  whole  or  any  part  of  such 
merchandise,  for  any  money  advanced,  or  negotiable  in- 
strument or  other  obligation  in  writing  given  by  such  other 
person  upon  the  faith  thereof. 

Every  person  wdio  shall  hereafter  accept  or  take  any  such 
merchandise  in  deposit  from  any  such  agent,  as  security 
for  any  antecedent  debt  or  demand,  shall  not  acquire  there- 
by, or  enforce  any  right  or  interest  in  or  to  such  mer- 
chandise or  document,  other  than  was  possessed  or  might 
have  been  enforced  by  such  agent  at  the  time  of  such  deposit. 

Nothing  contained  in  the  preceeding  subdivisions  of  this 
section  shall  be  construed  to  prevent  the  true  owmer  of  any 
merchandise  so  deposited,  from  demanding  or  receiving  the 
same,  upon  prepayment  of  the  money  advanced,  or  on  re- 
storation of  the  security  given,  on  the  deposit  of  such  mer- 
chandise and  upon  satisfying  such  lien  as  may  exist  thereon 
in  favor  of  the  agent  who  may  have  deposited  the  same;  nor 
from  recovering  any  balance  wdiich  may  remain  in  the  hands 
of  the  person  with  whom  such  merchandise  shall  have  been 
deposited,  as  the  produce  of  the  sale  hereof,  after  satisfy- 
ing the  amount  justly  due  to  such  person  by  reason  of  such 
deposit. 

Nothing  contained  in  this  section  shall  authorized  a  com- 
mon carrier,  warehouseman,  or  other  person  to  whom  mer- 
chandise or  other  property  may  be  committed  for  transporta- 
tion or  storage  only,  to  sell  or  hypothecate  the  same. 


§441  LIENS.  392 

§441.  Ohio.'- — Every  person  in  whose  name  any  mer- 
chandise shall  be  shipped  shall  be  deemed  the  true  owner 
thereof,  so  far  as  to  entitle  the  consignee  of  such  merchandise 
to  a  lien  thereon:  1.  For  any  money  advanced  or  negotia- 
ble security  given  by  such  consignee,  to  or  for  the  use  of  the 
person  in  whose  name  such  shipment  shall  have  been  made ; 
and,  2.  For  any  money  or  negotiable  security  received  by 
the  person  in  whose  name  such  shipment  shall  have  been 
made  to  or  for  the  use  of  such  consignee.  The  lien  so  pro- 
vided for  shall  not  exist  where  such  consignee  shall  have 
notice,  by  the  bill  of  lading  or  otherwise,  at  or  before  the 
advancing  of  any  money  or  security  by  him,  or  at  or  before 
the  receiving  of  such  money  or  security  by  the  person  in 
whose  name  the  shipment  shall  have  been  made,  that  such 
person  is  not  the  actual  and  bona  fide  owner  thereof. 

§  442.  Pennsylvania."^ — Whenever  any  person  intrusted 
with  merchandise,  and  having  authority  to  sell  or  consign 
the  same,  shall  ship  or  otherwise  transmit  the  same  to  any 
other  person,  such  other  person  shall  have  a  lien  thereon : 
1.  For  any  money  advanced  or  negotiable  security  given 
by  him  on  the  faith  of  such  consignment  to  or  for  the  use  of 
the  person  in  whose  name  such  merchandise  was  shipped 
or  transmitted ;  2.  For  any  money  or  negotiable  security 
received  for  the  use  of  such  consignee  by  the  person  in  whose 
name  such  merchandise  was  shipped  or  transmitted.  But 
such  lien  shall  not  exist  for  any  of  the  purposes  aforesaid, 
if  such  consignee  shall  have  notice,  by  the  bill  of  lading  or 
otherwise,  before  the  time  of  such  advance  or  receipt,  that 
the  person  in  whose  name  such  merchandise  was  shipped 
or  transmitted  is  not  the  actual  owner  thereof. 

§  443.  Rhode  Island."^ — The  consignee  of  merchandise 
shipped  shall  have  a  lien  thereon  for  any  money  or  negotia- 

72Gen.  Code  1910,  §§  8358,  8359.  -4Gen.  Laws  1909,  p.  612,  §  1. 

"sPurdon's     Digest      (13th      ed.) 
1903,  p.  1608,  §§  1-4. 


393  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    445 

ble  security  b}'  him  advanced  upon  the  faith  of  such  ship- 
ment to,  or  for  the  use  of,  the  person  in  whose  name  the 
shipment  shall  have  been  made,  in  the  same  manner,  and 
to  the  same  extent,  as  if  such  person  were  the  true  owner 
thereof:  provided,  at  the  time  of  the  advance,  the  consignee 
shall  have  no  notice  or  knowledge  that  the  shipper  was  not 
the  true  owner  of  such  merchandise. 

§  444.  Wisconsin.'''^ — Every  consignee  of  property  shall 
have  a  lien  thereon  for  any  money  advanced  or  negotiable 
security  given  by  him  to  or  for  the  use  of  the  person  in 
whose  name  the  shipment  of  such  property  is  made,  and  for 
any  money  or  negotiable  security  received  by  such  person  for 
his  use,  unless  he  shall,  before  advancing  any  such  money, 
or  giving  such  security,  or  before  it  is  received  for  his  use, 
have  notice  that  such  person  is  not  the  actual  owner  thereof. 

Every  factor,  broker  or  other  agent  intrusted  by  the  owner 
with  the  possession  of  any  bill  of  lading,  custom-house  per- 
mit, warehouse  receipt  or  other  evidence  of  the  title  to  per- 
sonal property,  or  with  the  possession  of  personal  property 
for  the  purpose  of  sale,  or  as  security  for  any  advances  made 
or  liability  by  him  incurred  in  reference  to  such  property,  shall 
have  a  lien  upon  such  personal  property  for  all  such  advances, 
liability  incurred,  or  commissions  or  other  moneys  due  him 
for  services  as  such  factor,  broker  or  agent,  and  may  retain 
the  possession  of  such  property  until  such  advances,  commis- 
sions, or  moneys  are  paid,  or  such  liability  is  discharged. "^^ 

§  445.  Debt  is  foundation  of  agent's  lien. — A  debt  due 
from   the   principal   to   the   agent   is   the    foundation   of   the 

75Stats.  1898,  §§  3345-3347.  York   statute,   from  which   that  of 

76This  statute  applies  to  receipts  Wisconsin    was    taken;    for   in    the 

given   by   private   warehouses,   and  latter    state    there    are    no    bonded 

not  merely  to  bonded  warehouses.  warehouses.      Price    v.    Wisconsin 

In  this  respect  the  statute  is  con-  Marine    &    Fire    Ins.    Co.,   43    Wis. 

strued   differently    from    the    New  267. 


§  446  LIENS.  394 

agent's  lien.  The  debt  must  be  certain  and  liquidated.  A 
liability  of  an  agent  as  surety  for  his  principal  does  not 
entitle  him  to  a  lien,  in  the  absence  of  an  express  contract,'^^ 
unless  this  liability  is  connected  with  the  agency. 

The  debt  must  be  one  contracted  in  the  agent's  business. 
It  is  usually  limited  to  advances,  expenses,  and  commissions 
incurred  in  this  business.  The  debt  which  is  covered  by  the 
lien  is  not  limited  to  the  advances  and  charges  pertaining 
to  a  particular  consignment ;  but  the  lien  covers  the  grand 
balance  of  account  between  the  parties  in  their  relation  of 
principal  and  factor. 

If  a  consignee  pays  freight  on  goods  which  prove  not  to 
be  of  the  quality  ordered,  he  has  a  lien  for  the  freight  as 
against  the  seller.'''^ 

§  446,  Lien  covers  interest  on  debt. — The  lien  covers  in- 
terest upon  the  debt  as  well  as  the  debt  itself,  though  this 
be  payable  immediately,  but  the  factor  is  permitted  or  re- 
quested to  defer  the  sale  of  the  goods  in  his  possession. '^^ 

§  447.  Debt  must  be  due. — The  debt  must  be  due  from 
the  owner  of  the  goods  which  the  factor  retains  by  virtue 
of  his  lien,^*^  unless  the  debt  be  in  the  form  of  negotiable 
paper  of  a  third  person,  transferred  to  the  factor  by  the 
owner  of  the  goods,  or  the  factor  is  employed  by  an  agent 
for  an  undisclosed  principal.  If  a  broker  effects  insurance  in 
ignorance  that  the  person  who  employs  him  is  not  the  owner 
of  the  property  insured,  but  is  acting  for  another,  he  has 
a  lien  for  the  balance  of  account  due  him  from  the  person 
who  employs  him.  He  is  supposed  to  have  made  advances 
on  the  credit  of  the  policy  which  is  allowed  to  remain  in  his 

'"Drinkwater      v.      Goodwin,      1  58;  Heins  v.  Peine,  6  Rob.  (N.  Y.) 

Cowp.  251;   Hammonds  v.  Barclay,  420. 

2  East  227.  soBarry  v.   Longmore.    12  Ad.   & 

TSCoit  V.  Schwartz,  29  Kans.  344.  El.  639. 

'i'SEx  parte   Kensington.   1    Deac. 


395  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    448 

hands. ''*^  If  the  broker  receives  notice  that  a  third  person 
is  interested  in  the  policy,  his  lien  upon  it  is  limited  to  the 
amount  of  his  general  balance  at  that  time.^- 

A  merchant,  after  advising  his  factor  of  an  intended  con- 
signment of  oats,  and  drawing  upon  him  in  anticipation, 
indorsed  the  bill  of  lading  to  a  third  person.  The  latter 
sent  the  bill  of  lading  to  the  factor  first  mentioned,  who 
took  possession  of  the  cargo  and  paid  the  freight.  It  was 
held  that  the  factor  had  no  lien  on  the  cargo  for  his  ad- 
vances, because  he  held  the  goods,  not  as  agent  of  the  per- 
son to  wdiom  he  made  the  advances,  but  as  the  agent  of  the 
person  from  whom  he  received  the  bill  of  lading.^^ 

And  so  if  an  insurance  broker  effects  a  policy  in  the  name 
of  an  agent  employed  by  the  master  of  a  vessel,  the  agency 
being  known  to  the  broker,  he  can  not,  upon  collecting  the 
amount  of  a  loss  under  the  policy,  retain  it  for  a  debt  due 
to  him  from  the  agent. ^"*  The  employer  is  to  be  taken  as  the 
principal  until  the  contrary  is  proved,  and  knowledge  of  the 
agency  is  brought  home  to  the  insurance  broker.^"* 

§  448.  Factor  can  not  claim  lien  for  debt  due  his  princi- 
pal.— A  factor  can  not  claim  a  lien  for  debts  not  due  to  him- 
self, but  to  his  principal.  Thus,  a  factor  sold  goods  of  his 
principal  in  his  own  name  to  a  purchaser  who  did  not  pay 
for  them  at  the  time,  but  sent  other  goods  to  the  factor  to  be 
sold  for  him,  never  having  employed  him  as  a  factor  before. 
This  purchaser  then  became  bankrupt,  and  his  assignees 
claimed  the  goods  sent  by  him  to  the  factor,  and  which  re- 
mained unsold,  tendering  the  charges  upon  them.  The  fac- 
tor refused  to  deliver  the  goods,  claiming  a  lien  upon  them 

siVVestwood  v.  Bell,  4  Camp.  349;  s^Bruce  v.  Wait,  3  M.  &  W.  15. 

Mann  v.  Forrester,  4  Camp.  60,  per  S'lp'oster  v.   Hoyt,  2  Johns.   Cas. 

Ellenborough,  C.  J.  (N.  Y.)  327.     See  ante,  §  432. 

82Mann    v.    Forrester,    4    Camp.  s-^Westwood  v.  Bell,  4  Camp.  349; 

60.     See  Levy  v.  Barnard,  8  Taunt.  1     Holt     122,     per     Gibbs,      C.    J.; 

149.  Maanss   v.  Henderson,   1   East  335. 


§  449  LIENS.  396 

for  the  price  of  the  goods  sold  by  him  to  the  bankrupt. 
There  was  then  a  balance  due  the  factor  from  his  first  princi- 
pal.^^ It  was  held  that  the  assignees  of  the  bankrupt  were 
entitled  to  recover. 

§  449.  Factor  has  no  lien  for  old  debt  due  from  his 
principal. — A  factor  has  no  lien  for  a  debt  due  from  his 
principal  before  he  became  his  factor,  unless  it  was  con- 
tracted in  anticipation  of  the  relation  of  principal  and  factor. 
"I  do  not  find,"  said  Chambre,  Justice, ^^  "any  authority  for 
saying  that  a  factor  has  any  general  lien  in  respect  of  debts 
which  arise  prior  to  the  time  at  which  his  character  of  factor 
commences;  and  if  a  right  to  such  a  lien  is  not  established  by 
express  authorit}^,  it  does  not  appear  to  me  to  tall  within 
the  general  principle  upon  which  the  liens  of  factors  have 
been  allowed.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  liens  of  factors  have 
been  allowed  for  the  convenience  of  trade,  and  with  a  view 
to  encourage  factors  to  advance  money  upon  goods  in  their 
possession,  or  which  must  come  to  their  hands  as  factors; 
but  debts  which  are  incurred  prior  to  the  existence  of  the  re- 
lation of  principal  and  factor  are  not  contracted  upon  this 
principle."  To  give  a  lien  for  such  debts  would,  he  says,  op- 
erate the  contrary  way,  since  it  would  tend  to  prevent  insol- 
vent persons  from  employing  their  creditors  as  factors,  lest 
the  goods  intrusted  to  them  should  be  retained  in  satisfac- 
tion of  former  debts. 

A  factor's  lien  for  a  general  balance  rests  on  the  custom 
of  trade,  and  nothing  can  fall  within  the  custom  of  trade 
but  what  concerns  trade.     Therefore  collateral  obligations, 

S6  Houghton  V.  Matthews,  3  Bos.  srHoughton  v.  Matthews,  3  Bos. 

&  Pul.  485.     Lord  Alvanley,  C.  J.,  &   Pul.  485;    Mann  v.   Forrester,  4 

dissented,  being  of  opinion  that  the  Camp.  60,  per  Ellenborough,  C.  J.; 

moment  the  goods  were  sent,  the  Olive  v.  Smith,  5  Taunt.  56;   Wal- 

relation     of    principal     and     factor  ker  v.  Birch,  6  T.  R.  258;   Stevens 

arose,  and  when  that  relation  com-  v.    Robins,    12    Mass.    180;    Sturgis 

menced,  the  right  to  a  general  lien  v.  Slacum,  18  Pick.  (Mass.)  36,  per 

attached.  Wilde,  J. 


397  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    45O 

such  as  money  due  for  rent,  are  not  within  the  custom  which 
authorizes  a  factor  to  retain  for  a  general  balance. ^^ 

The  factor's  lien  does  not  cover  the  price  of  goods  sold 
by  the  factor  to  his  principal.  It  does  not  cover  any  debt 
not  connected  with  the  general  purposes  of  the  relation  of 
principal  and  agent. ^'^ 

§  450.  The  lien  covers  acceptances  as  well  as  advances  in 
money. — An  agent  or  consignee  to  whom  goods  are  con- 
signed for  sale  under  an  agreement  that  he  will  accept  bills 
drawn  upon  him  for  the  amount,  has  a  lien  on  the  goods  for 
the  amount  of  his  acceptances,  and  is  entitled  to  retain  the 
goods  until  the  acceptances  are  paid.  It  is  a  necessary  in- 
ference in  such  case  that  the  drafts  are  to  be  drawn  on  the 
credit  of  the  goods,  and  that  the  consignee  is  to  have  a  lien 
on  the  goods  to  secure  him  against  his  acceptances.  It  the 
consignee  had  upon  the  request  of  the  consignor  advanced 
money  upon  the  goods,  he  would  clearly  have  had  a  lien 
upon  the  goods  to  secure  his  advances;  and  his  acceptances 
amount  in  fact  to  advances. ^^  The  debt  need  not  be  paya- 
ble immediately.  The  factor  may  retain  goods  to  meet  his 
liability  upon  an  acceptance  payable  at  a  future  time.^^ 

ssHoughton  v.  Matthews,  3  Bos.  for     his     accommodation,     to     the 

&  Pul.  485,  per  Heath,  J.;  Ex  parte  amount    of    the    goods    thus    con- 

Deeze,    1   Atk.  228.  signed.      What    is    the    legal    infer- 

soThacher    v.    Hannahs,    4    Rob.  ence    from    such   a    state   of    facts? 

(N.  Y.)  407.     Factors  have  no  liens  What  other  inference  can  there  be, 

on  goods   bought   for  their  princi-  except  that  the  drafts  were  drawn 

pals,  for  damages  sustained  by  the  on  the  credit  of  the  goods,  and  the 

principal's  refusal  to  receive  other  goods  were  to  be  held  as  an  indem- 

goods    bought    by   them.      Beakley  nity    against    the     drafts?      There 

V.   Rainier,   (Tex.)   78  S.  W.  702.  could    have    been    no    other    under- 

90Nagle  V.   McFeeters,  97   N.  Y.  standing,    and    no    other    legal    ef- 

196.     "Here  was  the  principal  con-  feet  can  be  given   to  the   arrange- 

signing  goods  to  his  agents  to  sell,  ment."       Per    Earl,     J.       See     also 

under  an  agreement  that  he  should  Eaton  v.  Truesdail,  52  111.  307. 

be    permitted   to   draw   upon   them  ^i Hammonds  v.   Barclay,  2  East 

drafts   which    they  were    to   accept  227. 


§    451  LIENS.  398 

§451.  Lien  for  duties  paid. — There  is  a  lien  in  favor  of 
the  government  upon  goods  in  its  possession  for  the  duties 
due  thereon;  but  the  lien  is  restricted  to  the  duties  upon 
the  particular  goods. ^-  The  consignee  can  not  take  the  goods 
until  he  has  paid  the  duties.  Neither  can  the  creditor  of  the 
owner  by  any  attachment  or  other  process  take  the  goods 
out  of  the  possession  of  the  officer  of  customs  by  attachment 
or  other  process  until  tlie  lien  for  duties  be  actually  dis- 
charged.'^^ 

The  owner's  property  in  the  goods  is  not  divested  by  the 
possession  of  the  United  States  for  the  purpose  of  main- 
taining the  lien  for  duties.  That  possession  is  not  adverse 
to  the  title  of  the  owner,  and,  indeed,  may  be  properly  deemed 
not  so  much  an  exclusive  as  a  concurrent  and  mixed  pos- 
session for  the  joint  benefit  of  the  owner  and  of  the  United 
States.  It  leaves  the  owner's  right  to  the  immediate  pos- 
session perfect  the  moment  the  lien  for  the  duties  is  dis- 
charged. And  if  he  tenders  the  duties,  or  the  proper  security 
therefor,  and  the  collector  refuses  the  delivery  of  the  goods, 
it  is  a  tortious  conversion  of  the  property,  for  which  an  ac- 
tion of  trespass  or  trover  will  lie.^"* 

§  452.  Lien  exists  even  where  debt  is  barred. — Though 
the  debt  has  been  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations,  a  lien 
for  such  debt  attaches  to  goods  of  the  principal  which  after- 
wards come  into  the  agent's  hands,  for  the  debt  is  not  dis- 
charged by  the  statute,  but  only  the  remedy  by  action; 
he  has  a  subsisting  demand,   and   therefore  if  goods   come 

92Dennie     v.      Harris,     9     Pick.  »3Harris    v.    Dennie,    3    Pet.    (U. 

(Mass.)   364;   Meeker  v.   Wilson,   1  S.)  292,  7  L.  ed.  683. 

Gall.    (U.    S.)    419,    Fed.    Cas.    Xo.  o^Conard    v.    Pacific    Ins.    Co.,    6 

9392;   Dias   v.    Bouchaud,   10   Paige  Pet.  (U.  S.)  262,  8  L.  ed.  392;  Con- 

(N.  Y.)  445,  reversed  1   X.  Y.  201,  ard  v.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.,  1  Pet.  (U. 

4    How.     Prac.    291;     Guesnard    v.  S.)    386,    7    L.    ed.    189;    Conard    v. 

Louisville   &   XashviUe   R.   Co.,   76  Xicoll,  4  Pet.  (U.  S.)  291,  7  L.  ed. 

Ala.  453.  862. 


399  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.      §    453b 

into  his  possession  he  has  the  remedy  in  his  own  hands,  and 
has  no  occasion  for  an  action. '^^ 

§  453.  Lien  for  advcincement  on  crop. — By  common  law, 
one  who  advances  money  or  suppHes  to  a  farmer  or  planter 
to  enable  him  to  make  a  crop  acquires  no  lien  upon  the  crop 
for  such  advances.'-*"  Such  a  lien  may,  however,  be  created 
by  express  agreement,"-*'  and  in  some  states  it  is  given  by 
statute.     Such  a  lien  is  commonly  called  an  agricultural  lien. 

§  453a.  Arkansas.-'- — if  any  landlord,  to  enable  his  tenant 
or  employe  to  make  and  gather  the  crop,  shall  advance  such 
tenant  or  employe  any  necessary  supplies,  either  of  money, 
provisions,  clothing,  stock,  or  other  necessary  articles,  such 
landlord  shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  crop  raised  upon  the 
premises  for  the  value  of  such  advances,  which  lien  shall 
have  preference  over  any  mortgage  or  other  conveyance  of 
such  crop  made  by  such  tenant  or  employe.  Such  lien  may 
be  enforced  by  an  action  of  attachment  before  any  court 
or  justice  of  the  peace  having  jurisdiction  and  the  lien  for 
advances  and  for  rent  may  be  joined  and  enforced  in  the 
same  action. 

§  453b.  Florida.'*'* — Any  person  or  persons  who  shall 
procure  a  loan  or  advance  of  money  or  goods  and  chattels, 
wares  or  merchandise,  or  other  things' of  value,  to  aid  him, 
her  or  them  in  the  business  of  planting,  farming,  timber  get- 
ting or  any  other  kind  of  businesses  in  this  state,  from  any 
factor,  merchant,  firm  or  person  in  this  state,  or  in  the 
United  States  or  in  any  foreign  country,  shall,  by  this  act, 

95Spears  v.  Hartly,  3  Esp.  81,  per  App.    Div.    N.    Y.   564,   95    N.   Y.    S. 

Lord  Eldon;  Higgins  v.  Scott,  2  B.  494,   affd.    184   N.    Y.   612,   11   N.    E. 

&  Ad.  413.  1196. 

9fi  Franklin  v.  Meyer,  36  Ark.  96.  I'SKirby's    Dig.    of   Stats.    1904,    § 

97Bell    V.    Radcliflf,    32    Ark.    645;  5033. 
Schermerhorn     v.     Gardenier,     107  99Gen.  Stats.  1906,  §  2208. 


§  454  LIENS.  400 

be  held  to  have  given  to  the  lender,  lenders,  or  person  mak- 
ing such  advance,  a  statutory  lien  of  prior  dignity  to  all 
other  incumbrances,  saving  and  excepting  liens  for  labor 
and  liens  in  favor  of  landlords,  upon  all  the  timber  getting, 
all  the  crops,  and  products  grown  or  anything  else  made  or 
grown  by  said  person  or  persons,  through  the  assistance  of 
said  loan  or  advances:  provided,  that  the  lien  above  given 
shall  not  be  created  unless  the  person  or  persons  obtaining 
or  procuring  such  loan  or  advance  shall  give  to  the  person 
or  persons  making  such  loan  or  advance  an  instrument  of 
writing  consenting  to  said  lien;  and  the  same  shall  be  re- 
corded in  the  office  of  the  clerk  of  the  circuit  court  of  the 
county  wherein  such  business  of  planting,  farming  or  timber 
getting  is  conducted. 

§  454.  Georgia.^ — Landlords  furnishing  supplies,  money, 
horses,  mules,  asses,  oxen,  farming  utensils  of  necessity,  to 
make  crops,  shall  have  the  right  to  secure  themselves  from 
the  crops  of  the  year  in  which  such  things  are  done  or  fur- 
nished, upon  such  terms  as  may  be  agreed  upon  by  the  par- 
ties, with  this  condition,  that  the  liens  so  provided  for  shall 
arise  by  operation  of  law  from  the  relation  of  landlord  and 
tenant,  as  well  as  by  special  contract  in  writing,^  whenever 
the  landlord  shall  furnish  the  articles  above  enumerated, 
or  any  one  of  them,  to  the  tenant,  for  the  purpose  therein 
named. 

The  lien  of  the  landlord  has  priority;^  but  if  the  crop  be 
delivered  into  the  possession  of  a  factor  or  of  his  agent,  he 
has  a  lien  upon  it  at  common  law.  In  such  case  his  lien  is 
superior  to  that  of  a  landlord  for  the  rent  of  the  land  upon 

iCode   1911,  §  3348.     See   statute  be    alleged    in    the    plaintiff's    affi- 

for  further  conditions.  davit    to    foreclose    the    lien.      The 

2lnasmuch    as    it    is    one    of    the  affidavit    must    state    all    the    facts 

conditions  of  a  valid  crop  lien  that  necessary  to  constitute  a  valid  lien, 

it   should   be   created   by   a   special  Powell  v.  Weaver,  56  Ga.  288. 

contract  in  writing,  that  fact  should  3Code  1911,  §  3348. 


40I  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.      §    4553- 

which  the  cotton  is  raised,  if  the  landlord's  lien  has  not 
been  foreclosed  and  the  factor  has  no  notice  of  it.'* 

The  lien  given  to  merchants  and  factors  upon  growing 
crops  does  not  cover  money  advanced  with  which  the  planter 
is  to  purchase  provisions  and  supplies;  and  a  note  given  for 
money,  which  upon  its  face  recites  that  the  money  is  to  be 
used  to  purchase  provisions,  does  not  create  a  debt  which 
is  secured  by  the  lien.^ 

The  al^davit  to  foreclose  such  lien  must  state  that  the  de- 
ponent is  either  a  factor  or  a  merchant,  and  that,  as  such,  he 
has  furnished  either  provisions  or  commercial  manures,  or 
both,  to  the  defendant ;  and  it  must  also  state  the  terms  upon 
which  such  supplies  were  furnished.^'  It  must  also  aver  a 
demand  of  payment  of  the  debt  and  a  refusal  to  pay,  and 
that  the  lien  is  prosecuted  within  one  year  after  the  debt  be- 
came due.^ 

§  455.  Idaho. — A  person  furnishing  or  advancing  neces- 
saries is  given  a  lien  to  secure  his  account,  but  he  must  file 
a  notice  of  such  lien  and  describe  generally  the  crop  and 
land  on  which  he  holds  such  lien.^ 

§  455a.  Kentucky.^ — A  landlord  shall  have  a  superior 
lien,  against  which  the  tenant  shall  not  be  entitled  to  any 
exemption,  upon  the  whole  crop  of  the  tenant  raised  upon 
the  leased  or  rented  premises  to  reimburse  him  for  money 
or  property  furnished  to  the  tenant  to  enable  him  to  raise 
the  crop,  or  to  subsist  whilst  carrying  out  his  contract  of 
tenancy.  But  the  lien  of  the  landlord  shall  not  continue  for 
more  than  one  hundred  and  twenty  days  after  the  expiration 
of  the  term,  and,  if  the  property  upon  which  there  is  a  lien 
be  removed  openly  from  the  leased  premises,  and  without 

■iClark  V.   Dobbins,    52    Ga.    656.  ^Callaway  v.  Walls,   54   Ga.    167; 

See   also,    Garrick  v.   Jones,   2    Ga.  Anderson  v.  Beard,  54  Ga.  137. 

App.  382,  58  S.  E.  543.  8  Rev.   Code   1908,   §   5141;   Beck- 

f'Saulsbury  v.  Eason,  47  Ga.  617.  stead  v.   Griffith,   11   Idaho  738,  83 

See  Speer  v.  Hart,  45  Ga.  113.  See  Pac.  764;   Hardwick  v.   Griffith,   11 

also,  Dart  v.  Mayhew,  60  Ga.   104.  Idaho   751,  83   Pac.   768. 

6Toole  V.  Jowers,  49  Ga.  299.  ^Carroll's  Stats.   1909,  §  2323. 

26 


§  456 


LIENS. 


402 


fraudulent  intent  and  not  returned,  the  landlord  shall  have 
a  superior  lien  upon  the  property  so  removed  for  fifteen  days 
from  the  date  of  its  removal,  and  may  enforce  his  lien 
against  the  property  wherever  found. 

§  456.  Louisiana.^"' — A  privilege  is  given  for  debts  in- 
curred for  necessary  supplies  furnished  to  any  farm  or  plan- 
tation on  the  product  of  the  crops  of  the  year  and  the  pro- 
ceeds thereof.  This  privilege  must  be  confined  to  the  crop 
cultivated,  standing,  or  being  gathered  and  taken  off  at  the 
time  the  supplies  were  furnished.  It  can  not  be  extended 
to  the  crop  subsequently  planted,  and  sold  with  the  planta- 
tion to  a  third  party. \^ 

A  privilege  in  favor  of  one  w^ho  furnishes  supplies  to  a 
plantation  springs  only  from  the  law  that  confers  it.  It  can 
not  be  the  subject  of  contract.  An  acknowledgment  that  a 
creditor  has  a  privilege  on  a  crop  can  not,  therefore,  be 
recognized  as  conferring  a  lien  on  it,  unless  it  be  shown  that 
he,  not  the  creditor,  has  furnished  the  supplies  to  make  it.^- 


lOMerrick's  Rev.  Civ.  Code  1900, 
art.  3217.  See  Wolff's  Const.  &  Rev. 
Laws  1904,  p.  1339.  Wood  v.  Cal- 
loway, 21  La.  Ann.  471.  The  con- 
stitution provides  that  '"no  mort- 
gage or  privilege  shall  affect  third 
persons,  unless  recorded  in  the  par- 
ish where  the  property  to  be  affect- 
ed is  situated."  Consequently  a 
privilege  in  favor  of  a  merchant 
for  supplies  furnished  a  planter 
must  be  recorded  in  the  book  of 
mortgages  and  prvileges  in  order 
to  have  effect  against  third  per- 
sons. White  v.  Bird,  23  La.  Ann. 
270.  The  recording  of  a  privilege 
too  late  is  equivalent  to  not  re- 
cording it  at  all,  so  far  as  seizing 
creditors  are  concerned.  Lapene 
v.  Meegel,  26  La.  Ann.  80. 

iiMcCutchon  v.  Wilkinson.  12 
La.  Ann.  483;  Given  v.  Alexander, 


25  La.  Ann.  71.  Where  one  holds 
a  mortgage  at  the  time  the  mort- 
gagor purchases  supplies  to  culti- 
vate a  crop  and  seizes  the  crop  to 
satisfy  the  mortgage  and  sells  the 
same,  the  purchaser  gets  title,  but 
he  takes  it  subject  to  the  rights  of 
the  furnisher  of  such  supplies. 
Weill  V.  Kent,  52  La.  Ann.  2139, 
28  So.  295.  See  also  Brasfield  v. 
Powell,  117  N.  Car.  140,  23  S.  E. 
106.  The  privilege  extends  only 
to  advancements  necessary  for  the 
operation  of  the  plantation.  Henry 
Lochte  V.  Lefebvre,  128  La.  108,  54 
So.  578.  It  does  not  cover  a  nec- 
essary portion  for  seed  for  planting 
the  next  year.  Dunlap  v.  Berthelot, 
122  La.  531,  47  So.  882.  See  also, 
Nat.  Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Sulli- 
van, 117  La.  163,  41  So.  480. 

i2Payne   v.    Spiller,   23    La.    Ann. 


403  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.      §    456a 

It  is  also  provided^^  that  the  appointments  or  salaries  for 
the  overseer  for  the  current  year  are  a  privilege  on  the  crops 
of  the  year  and  the  proceeds  thereof;  debts  due  for  neces- 
sary supplies  furnished  to  any  farm  or  plantation,  not  includ- 
ing articles  furnished  and  which  were  sold  to  laborers;  and 
debts  due  for  money  actually  advanced  and  used  for  the  pur- 
chase of  necessary  supplies;  and  the  payment  of  necessary 
expenses  for  any  farm  or  plantation,  are  privileges  on  the 
crops  of  the  year  and  the  proceeds  thereof. 

The  privileges  granted  to  the  overseer,  the  laborers,  the 
furnishers  of  supplies,  and  the  party  advancing  money  neces- 
sary to  carry  on  any  farm  or  plantation,  shall  be  concurrent, 
and  shall  not  be  divested  by  any  prior  mortgage,  whether 
conventional,  legal,  or  judicial,  or  by  any  seizure  and  sale  of 
the  land  while  the  crop  is  on  it.^^* 

All  the  privileges  on  the  growing  crop  in  favor  of  the 
class  of  persons  mentioned  shall  be  concurrent,  except  that 
in  favor  of  the  laborer,  which  shall  be  ranked  as  the  first 
privilege  on  the  crop. 

§  456a.  Minnesota.^^ — There  is  a  lien  for  a  loan  or  pur- 
chase of  seed  grain  when  the  person  receiving  the  same 
executes  a  note  containing  a  statement  of  the  amount  and 
kind  of  seed  and  the  terms  of  the  agreement  relative  thereto. 
To  preserve  the  lien,  such  note  or  contract  must,  within 
thirty  days   after  the  execution  of  the  same,  be  filed  with 

248;      Southern       Grocer      Co.      v.  Co.   v.   McNair  &  Pearsall,    139  N. 

Adams,  112  Ga.  60,  36  So.  226.  The  Car.  326,   51    S.    E.   949.     A  verbal 

privilege    is    exhausted    when    the  contract  giving  a  lien  on  crops  is 

amount  of  the  lien  intended  is  re-  binding  on  the  parties,  but  a  writ- 

ceived.    Minge   v.     Barbre,    51     La.  ing  is  necessary  under  the  statutes 

Ann.   1285,  26  So.   180.  to    establish    a    claim    and    lien    as 

i3Merrick's  Rev.  Civ.  Code  1900,  against    third    persons.       Odom    v. 

art.    3217.      A    lien    of    one    who  Clark,  146  N.  Car.  544,  60  S.  E.  513. 

has     made     advances     to     aid     in  ^^a  Merrick's      Rev.      Civ.     Code 

raising        a        crop        is        assign-  1900,   art.   3217   (9). 

able.      Virginia-Carolina    Chemical  i4Gen.    Stats.    1913,    §§   6994-6996. 


§  456b  LIENS.  404 

the  clerk  of  the  town  or  municipality  in  which  the  land  upon 
which  the  crop  is  to  be  grown,  is  situated.  This  lien  continues 
for  one  year  upon  the  crop  growing  or  grown  as  against 
the  owner  and  all  creditors  and  purchasers.  The  holder  of 
the  lien  may,  after  condition  broken,  take  possession  of  the 
crop  or  so  much  of  it  as  may  be  necessary  for  his  security. 

§  456b.  Mississippi.^^ — Every  lessor  of  land  shall  have  a 
lien  on  the  agricultural  products  of  the  leased  premises,  how- 
ever and  by  whomsoever  produced,  to  secure  the  payment 
of  the  rent  and  of  money  advanced  to  the  tenant,  and  the  fair 
market  value  of  all  advances  made  by  him  to  his  tenant,  and 
the  fair  market  value  of  all  advances  made  by  him  to  his 
tenant  for  supplies  for  the  tenant  and  others  for  whom  he 
may  contract,  and  for  his  business  carried  on  upon  the  leased 
premises;  and  this  lien  shall  be  paramount  to  all  other  liens, 
claims,  or  demands  upon  such  products.  And  the  claim  of 
the  lessor  for  supplies  furnished  may  be  enforced  in  the  same 
manner  and  under  the  same  circumstances  as  his  claim  for 
rent  may  be ;  and  all  the  provisions  of  law  as  to  attachment 
for  rent  and  proceedings  under  it  shall  be  applicable  to  a 
claim  for  supplies  furnished,  and  such  attachment  may  be 
levied  on  any  goods  and  chattels  liable  for  rent,  as  well  as  on 
the  agricultural  products. 

A  landlord  shall  have  a  lien,  for  one  year,  for  the  reason- 
able value  of  all  live  stock,  farming  tools,  implements,  and 
vehicles  furnished  by  him  to  his  tenant,  upon  the  property 
so  furnished,  and  upon  all  the  agricultural  products  raised 
upon  the  leased  premises;  and  the  property  so  furnished 
shall  be  considered  as  supplies,  and  the  lien  therefor  may  be 
enforced  accordingly.  Such  lien  shall  be  a  superior  and  first 
lien,  and  need  not  be  evidenced  by  writing,  or,  if  in  writing, 
it  need  not  be  recorded. 

15  Code  1906,  §§  2832,  2833. 


405 


LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    457 


§  457.  North  Carolina.^^^' — If  any  person  shall  make  any 
advance  either  in  money  or  supplies  to  any  person  who  is 
engaged  in  or  about  to  engage  in  the  cultivation  of  the  soil, 
the  person  so  making  such  advance  shall  be  entitled  to  a 
lien  on  the  crops  which  may  be  made  during  the  year  upon 
the  land  in  the  cultivation  of  which  the  advances  so  made 
have  been  expended,  in  preference  to  all  other  lines  existing 
or  otherwise,  except  the  laborer's  or  landlord's  liens,  to  the 
extent  of  such  advances:^"     provided  an  agreement  in  writ- 


lORevisal  1905,  §  2052. 

I'i'The  advances  must  be  made  in 
money  or  supplies  to  a  person 
about  to  engage  in  the  cultivation 
of  the  crops,  and  after  the  agree- 
ment for  such  advances  has  been 
made,  or  simultaneously  with  the 
making  and  delivery  of  the  agree- 
ment. The  advances  must  be  ex- 
pended in  the  cultivation  of  the 
crop  of  that  year,  and  the  lien  must 
be  on  the  crop  of  that  year,  made 
by  reason  of  the  advances.  Clark 
V.  Farrar,  74  N.  Car.  686;  Reese  v. 
Cole,  93  N.  Car.  87.  One  who 
makes  advances  of  agricultural 
supplies  to  a  tenant  or  cropper 
does  so  with  notice  of  the  rights 
of  the  landlord,  and  takes  the  risk 
of  the  tenant  or  cropper  abandon- 
ing or  otherwise  violating  his  con- 
tract. If  the  cropper  abandons  his 
contract,  this  being  special  and  en- 
tire, he  can  not  recover  of  the  land- 
lord for  a  partial  performance,  and 
his  interest  becomes  vested  in  the 
landlord,  divested  of  any  lien  which 
may  have  attached  to  it  for  ad- 
vances while  the  cropper  was  in 
possession.  Thigpen  v.  Leigh,  93 
N.  Car.  47.  The  lien  in  aid  of  ad- 
vances is  in  preference  to  all  other 
liens  except  that  of  the  landlord 
for  rents.     Wooten  v.   Hill,  98  N. 


Car.  48,  3  S.  E.  846;  Branch  v.  Gal- 
loway, 105  N.  Car.  193,  10  S.  E. 
911;  Spruill  v.  Arrington,  109  N. 
Car.  192,  13  S.  E.  779.  A  mortgagee 
of  a  cotton  crop  has  no  lien  for 
further  advances  made  to  enable 
the  mortgagor  to  secure  the  crop, 
which  will  take  precedence  of  a 
second  mortgage  duly  recorded. 
The  fact  that  the  advances  were 
essential  to  the  gathering  of  the 
crop,  which  might  otherwise  have 
been  lost,  does  not  aid  the  claim. 
The  doctrine  contended  for  is  a 
principle  of  maritime  law,  which 
applies  in  favor  of  those  who,  by 
personal  efforts  and  at  great  peril, 
save  vessels  and  cargoes  from  loss 
at  sea;  but  it  is  not  a  principle  of 
the  common  law,  nor  can  it  be  rec- 
ognized when  in  conflict  with  stat- 
utory regulations  in  reference  to 
liens.  Weathersbee  v.  Farrar,  97 
N.  Car.  106,  1  S.  E.  616.  Pending 
a  real  action,  in  which  defendants 
were  finally  adjudged  to  be  the 
owners  of  the  land  in  question,  the 
court  appointed  a  receiver  of  the 
rents  and  profits,  up  to  which  time 
plaintiffs  were  in  possession  under 
claim  of  title.  During  such  posses- 
sion plaintiffs  executed  an  agricul- 
tural lien  for  advances.  It  was 
held  that  the  lienees  were  entitled 


457a 


LIENS. 


406 


ing  shall  be  entered  into  before  any  such  advance  is  made 
to  this  effect,  in  which  shall  be  specified  the  amount  to  be 
advanced,  or  in  v^hich  a  limit  shall  be  fixed  beyond  which 
the  advance,  if  made  from  time  to  time  during  the  year, 
shall  not  go;  which  agreement  shall  be  registered,  in  the 
office  of  the  register  of  the  county  in  which  the  person  to 
whom  the  advance  is  made  resides,  within  thirty  days  after 
its  date.^^ 

The  lien  for  work  on  crops  or  farms  or  materials  shall  be 
preferred  to  every  other  lien  or  incumbrance  which  attached 
upon  the  property  subsequent  to  the  time  at  which  the  work 
was  commenced  or  the  materials  were  furnished.^^ 

§  457a.  North  Dakota.-^ — Any  person  who  shall  furnish 
to  another  seed  to  be  sown  or  planted  on  the  lands  owned 


to  recover  for  advances  made  to 
plaintiffs  up  to  the  time  the  re- 
ceiver entered,  but  the  advances 
made  after  such  entry  would  de- 
pend upon  the  circumstances  un- 
der which  they  were  made.  An 
agricultural  lien  which  describes 
the  land  on  which  the  crop  is  to 
be  grown  as  "a  tract  of  land  in 
Granville  County  known  as  the  'C. 
H.  Dement,  dec'd,'  or  any  other 
lands  he  may  cultivate  during  the 
year  1888,"  is  sufficient;  the  words 
"or  any  other  lands  he  [the  de- 
fendant] may  cultivate,"  being 
mere  surplussage.  Perry  v.  Bragg, 
109  N.  Car.  303,  14  S.  E.  97.  The 
lien  is  operative  only  on  the  land 
particularly  described.  Gwathmey 
V.  Etheridge,  99  N.  Car.  571,  6  S. 
E.  411;  Cooper  v.  Kimball,  123  N. 
Car.  120,  31  S.  E.  346. 

18  The  lien  is  valid  as  between 
the  parties,  although  not  regis- 
tered within  the  time  limited.  Gay 
V.  Nash,  78  N.   Car.   100;   Reese  v. 


Cole,  93  N.  Car.  87.  But  if  the 
lien  is  not  registered,  it  is  invalid 
as  against  subsequent  purchasers 
and  mortgagees.  Lawrence  v. 
Weeks,  107  N.  Car.  119,  12  S.  E. 
120;  Nichols  v.  Speller,  120  N.  Car. 
75,   28   S.   E.  632. 

19A  mortgagor  in  possession  can 
not  create  such  a  lien  against  the 
mortgagee.  Brewer  v.  Chappell, 
101  N.  Car.  251,  7  S.  E.  670.  A  lien 
for  advances  made  to  a  landlord 
is  subject  to  a  contract  previously 
made  by  the  landlord  with  a  crop- 
per who  is  to  receive  a  share  of 
the  crops.  Rouse  v.  Wooten,  104  N. 
Car.  229,  10  S.  E.  190;  Meekins  v. 
Walker,  119  N.  Car.  46,  25  S.  E. 
706.      ' 

20Rev.  Code  1905,  §§  6271,  6272. 
In  North  Dakota  one  who  fur- 
nished seed  has  a  lien  on  the  crop 
for  all  his  account,  whether  all  the 
seed  is  sown  or  not.  Schlosser  v. 
Moores,  16  N.  Dak.  185,  112  N.  W. 
78. 


407  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    458 

or  contracted  to  be  purchased,  used,  occupied  or  rented  by 
him,  shall  upon  filing  the  statement  provided  for  by 
statute,  have  a  lien  upon  all  the  crop  produced  from  the  seed 
so  furnished  to  secure  the  payment  of  the  purchase-price 
thereof.  Any  person  entitled  to  a  lien  hereunder  shall  within 
thirty  days  after  the  seed  is  furnished  file  in  the  office  of  the 
register  of  deeds  of  the  county  in  v^hich  the  seed  is  to  be 
sown  or  planted  a  statement  in  writing,  verified  by  oath, 
showing  the  kind  and  quantity  of  seed,  its  value,  the  name 
of  the  person  to  whom  furnished  and  a  description  of  the 
land  upon  which  the  same  is  to  be  or  has  been  planted  or 
sown.  Unless  the  person  entitled  to  the  lien  shall  file  such 
statement  within  the  time  aforesaid  he  shall  be  deemed  to 
have   waived   his   right   thereto. 

§458.  South  Carolina.^^ — Any  person  who  shall  make  ad- 
vances-^ in  provisions,  supplies,  and  other  articles  for  agricul- 
tural purposes,  shall  have  a  lien  in  preference  to  all  other 
liens,  existing  or  otherwise,  upon  such  provisions,  supplies, 
and  other  articles,  until  the  same  shall  be  consumed  in  the 
use.-"* 

2iCode    of    Laws    1912,    §    4170;  soil,"    and    entitled   to    incumber   it 

Leightsey  v.  Rentz,  85  S.  Car.  401,  with  liens.     But  a  contract  by  the 

67  S.  E.  456;  Lockhart  v.  Smith,  50  owner  of  land,  whereby  he  gives  to 

S.  Car.  112,  27  S.  E.  567;  Dicks  v.  another  the  possession  of  land  for 

Nimmons,  88  S.  Car.  428,  71  S.  E.  a  year  for  the  purpose  of  planting 

47.  cotton,  and  the  owner  is  to  receive 

--A  mule  can  not  be  considered  all  of  the  crop  above  a  certain 
an  "advance"  to  be  expended  quantity,  is  substantially  a  lease  for 
upon  the  land.  McCullough  v.  Kib-  a  year,  and  gives  the  lessee  such  an 
ler,  5  S.  Car.  468;  Hankinson  v.  interest  in  the  crops  as  enables  him 
Hankinson,  61  S.  Car.  193,  39  S.  E.  to  incumber  them  with  liens  for  ad- 
385.  See  Richey  v.  Du  Pre,  20  S.  Car.  vances,  subject  to  the  landlord's 
6;  Kennedy  v.  Reames,  15  S.  Car.  lien  by  statute  for  rent  to  the  ex- 
548.  A  mere  employe,  who  culti-  tent  of  one  third  of  the  crop.  Wha- 
vates  the  crop  of  another  for  hire,  ley  v.  Jacobson,  21  S.  Car.  51;  Ken- 
either  in  money  or  a  part  of  the  nedy  v.  Reames,  15  S.  Car.  548. 
crop,  is  not,  in  the  sense  of  the  ag-  230n  proof  of  an  attempt  of  the 
ricultural  acts,  "a  cultivator  of  the  person  to  whom  the  advances  have 


§    45^^  LIENS.  408 

§  458a.  South  Dakota.-^ — Any  person,  co-partnership,  as- 
sociation or  corporation  who  shall  furnish  to  any  person 
wheat,  oats,  barley,  rye,  corn,  flax  or  potatoes,  to  be  sown 
or  planted  upon  any  lands  owned,  used,  occupied  or  rented 
by  such  person,  shall  have  a  lien  only  upon  the  crop  pro- 
duced from  the  kind  of  seed  furnished  by  such  person  upon 
the  lands  aforesaid,  upon  filing  the  notice  hereinafter  speci- 
fied to  secure  payment  for  the  seed  so  furnished.  Such  liens 
shall  have  preference  in  the  order  of  the  filing  thereof,  and 
shall  have  priority,  over  all  other  liens  and  incumbrances 
upon  said  crops,  except  threshers'  liens,  if  filed  within  thirty 
days  after  the  seed  grain  is  furnished.  Any  person,  co- 
partnership, association  or  corporation  entitled  to  a  lien  un- 
der this  article  shall  make  an  account  in  writing,  stating  the 
quantity  of  seed  furnished  in  bushels,  by  kind,  and  the  value 
thereof,  the  name  of  the  person  to  whom  furnished,  and  a 
description  of  the  land  upon  which  the  same  has  been,  or  is 
to  be  planted  or  sown,  and  after  making  oath  to  the  correct- 
ness of  the  account  shall  file  the  same  in  the  office  of  the 
register  of  deeds  of  the  county  where  the  person  to  whom 
such  seed  is  furnished  resides,  except  when  such  person  re- 
sides in  an  unorganized  county,  and  in  such  case,  said  state- 
ment shall  be  filed  in  the  county  to  which  said  unorganized 
county  is  attached  for  judicial  purposes. 

been  made  to  dispose  of  the  crop  55   S.   Car.  309,  33  S'.   E.  357.     The 

or  to  defeat  the  lien,  a  warrant  may  lien     for     advancements     may     be 

be  issued  for  a  seizure  and  sale  of  against     the     crops     of     a     lessee, 

the   crop   by  the   sheriff.      Code   of  Brock  v.  J.  J.   Haley  &  Co.,  88  S. 

Laws   1912,  §  4166.     An  agreement  Car.  373,  70  S.  E.  1011. 
for  an  agricultural  lien  not  signed  24Rev.   Code     (Civ.     Proc.)    1903, 

by  the  one  who  is  to  make  the  ad-  §§     731-736;     Schouweiler    v.     Mc- 

vances,  but  by  the  borrower  only,  Caull,  18  S.  Dak.  70,  99  N.  W.  95. 

is    void.      Sease    v.    Dobson,    34    S.  P'or    a    sufficient    description    in    a 

Car.  345,   13   S.    E.   530.     See  also,  notice    of    lien    under    the    South 

Blair  v.   Morgan,  59  S.   Car.  52,  37  Dakota     statute,     see     First     Nat. 

S.  E.  45.    An  agricultural  lien  need  Bank  v.  Peavy  Elevator  Co.,  10  S. 

not  be  attested.     Brown  v.  Young,  Dak.    167,    72    N.    W.   402. 


409  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,   ETC.      §    458b 

§  458b.  Tennessee.-^ — Any  debt  by  note,  account,  or 
otherwise,  contracted  for  supplies,  implements  of  industry 
or  work  stock,  furnished  by  owners  of  the  land  to  lessees, 
or  by  lessees  to  subtenants,  and  used  in  the  cultivation  of 
the  crop,  shall  be  and  constitute  a  lien  upon  the  crop  grow- 
ing or  made  during  the  year  upon  the  premises,  in  as  full 
and  perfect  a  manner  as  provided  by  statute  with  regard  to 
rents;  provided,  the  said  lien  is  expressly  contracted  for  on 
the  face  of  the  note  or  writing,  between  the  owner  of  the 
land  or  lessees,  or  between  the  lessees  and  subtenants.  The 
agreement  or  contract  so  entered  into  shall  not  have  priority 
of  the  lien  of  the  owner  of  the  land  for  the  rent;  but  no 
recovery  for  the  value  of  the  crop  can  be  had  as  against 
the  purchaser  of  the  crop  without  notice. 

The  landlord,  in  additions  to  liens  already  given  him  by 
law,  shall  have  a  further  lien  on  the  growing  crop,  for  nec- 
essary supplies  of  food  and  clothing  furnished  by  the  land- 
lord or  his  agent,  to  the  tenant,  for  himself  or  those  depend- 
ent on  him,  to  enable  the  tenant  to  make  the  crop;  provided, 
an  account  of  such  necessary  supplies  is  kept  as  the  articles 
are  furnished,  and  is  sworn  to  before  some  justice  of  the 
peace,  before  the  enforcement  of  the  lien.  This  lien  shall 
be  secondary  to  that  of  the  landlord  for  his  rent,  and  may 
be  enforced  in  the  same  manner.  The  affidavits  above  pro- 
vided for  shall  be  made,  as  to  the  truth  and  justice  of  the 
account,  before  the  magistrate  or  clerk  of  the  court  shall 
issue  the  writ  of  attachment. 

Landowners  and  persons  controlling  land,  by  lease  or 
otherwise,  shall  have  a  lien  on  the  crops  raised  on  such  lands 
by  share  croppers  for  supplies,  implements,  and  work  stock 
furnished  such  croppers,  for  himself  or  those  dependent  on 
him,  to  enable  the  cropper  to  make  a  crop.  Such  furnisher 
shall  have  the  same  rights,  and  enforce  them  in  the  same 
way  and  at  the  same  time,  as  provided  for  landlords. 

25  Ann.  Codes  1896,  §§  5304,  5305. 


§  459  LIENS.  410 

§  459.  Virginia.-'^ — If  any  person,  other  than  a  landlord, 
make  advances,  either  in  money  or  supplies,  or  other  thing 
of  value,  to  any  one  v^ho  is  engaged  in,  or  who  is  about  to 
engage  in,  the  cultivation  of  the  soil,  the  person  so  making 
such  advances  shall  be  entitled  to  a  lien  on  the  crops  which 
may  be  made  or  seeded  during  the  year  upon  the  lands  in 
or  about  the  cultivation  of  which  the  advances  so  made  have 
been,  or  were  intended  to  be,  expended  to  the  extent  of  such 
advances :  provided,  however,  that  an  agreement  in  writing, 
signed  by  both  parties,  shall  be  entered  into,  or  in  which  shall 
be  specified  the  amount  advanced  or  in  which  a  limit  shall 
be  fixed  beyond  which  any  advances  made  from  time  to  time 
during  the  year  shall  not  go;  and  the  said  agreement  to  be 
delivered  to  the  clerk  of  the  county  in  which  the  land  lies, 
and  by  him  docketed  in  a  book  to  be  kept  by  him  for  that 
special  purpose;  such  agreement  shall  be  docketed  by  said 
clerk  in  the  same  manner  that  judgments  are  now  required 
by  law  to  be  docketed,  and  from  the  time  they  are  so  dock- 
eted shall  have  the  same  force  and  effect  as  if  they  were 
recorded  in  the  deed-book,  and  for  such  service  said  clerk 
shall  receive  a  fee  of  twenty-five  cents,  which  lien  shall  be 
valid  as  to  purchasers  without  notice  from  and  creditors  of 
the  party  or  parties  obtaining  such  advance  or  advances 
only  from  the  time  when  the  said  agreement  shall  have  been 
delivered  to  the  said  clerk  to  be  docketed  as  hereinbefore 
provided. 

Any  person  about  to  dispose  of  the  crops,  or  in  any  way 
to  defeat  the  lien,  may  be  restrained  by  a  decree  in  equity. 

§  459a.  Liens  for  water  furnished  for  irrigation. — In  a 
number  of  states  liens  by  statute  are  given  to  water  com- 
panies and  persons  for  the  agreed  or  ascertained  value  of 
water  furnished  to  land  owners  or  those  in  possession  there- 
of. These  liens  are  sometimes  created  against  crops  grown 
on  the  land  or  the  lands  themselves,  or  both. 

26Acts    1910,    ch.    345,    amending    Code  1904,  §  2494. 


411  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,   ETC.      §    459b 

§  459b.  Colorado.-' — It  is  provided  by  statute  that  any 
person,  company  or  association  furnishing  water  for  any 
tract  of  land  shall  have  a  first  and  prior  lien  on  said  water 
right  and  land  upon  which  the  water  is  used,  for  all  deferred 
payments  for  said  water  right;  said  lien  to  be  in  all  respects 
prior  to  any  and  all  other  liens  created  or  attempted  to  be 
created  by  the  owner  and  possessor  of  said  land;  said  lien  to 
remain  in  full  force  until  the  last  deferred  payment  for  the 
water  right  is  paid  and  satisfied  according  to  the  terms  of  the 
contract  under  which  the  water  right  was  acquired;  the  con- 
tract for  the  water  right  upon  which  the  lien  is  founded  to 
be  recorded  in  the  office  of  the  county  clerk  of  the  county 
where  the  land  is  situated. 

Upon  default  of  any  payment  secured  by  the  lien,  the 
person,  persons,  company  of  persons,  association  or  incorpo- 
rated company  owning  said  lien  may  foreclose  it  according 
to  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  contract  granting  and 
selling  the  water  right  to  the  consumer;  all  sales  to  be  first 
advertised  in  a  newspaper  of  general  circulation  in  the  county 
where  the  land  is  situated,  for  six  consecutive  weeks  and 
then  to  be  sold  to  the  highest  bidder  at  the  front  door  of 
the  courthouse,  or  such  place  as  may  be  agreed  upon  in  the 
terms  of  the  contract,  and  the  sheriff  of  the  county  is  re- 
quired to  give  all  notices  of  sale  and  to  sell  all  property  and 
make  and  execute  a  good  and  sufficient  deed  to  the  pur- 
chaser and  at  such  sale  no  person,  company  of  persons,  asso- 
ciation or  incorporated  company  owning  or  holding  any  lien 
shall  bid  in  or  purchase  any  land  or  water  right  at  a  less  price 
than  the  amount  due  on  said  deferred  payments  and  the 
costs  incurred  in  making  the  sale  of  said  land  and  water 
right.  The  sheriff  shall  execute  a  certificate  of  sale  as  in 
case  of  the  sale  of  other  property,  subject  in  all  respects  to 
redemption  as  in  case  of  a  sale  on  exception  and  if  not  re- 
deemed the  sheriff  shall  execute  a  deed. 

27Mills'  Ann.  Stats.  1912,  §  5781. 


§  459C  LIENS.  412 

§  459c.  Idaho. -^ — Any  person,  association  or  corporation 
contracting  to  deliver  water  to  any  party  or  parties,  the 
vahie  of  which  shah  be  fixed  by  contract  or  as  provided  by 
law  is  given  a  first  hen  upon  the  land  for  the  irrigation  of 
which  said  water  is  furnished  and  delivered.  If  the  title 
to  said  land  is  in  the  United  States  or  in  the  state  of  Idaho, 
then  the  said  amount  shall  be  a  first  lien  upon  any  crop  or 
crops  which  may  be  raised  upon  said  tract  of  land  which 
said  lien  shall  be  recorded  and  collected  as  provided  by  law 
for  other  liens  in  Idaho. 

Any  mortgage  or  other  liens  upon  said  tracts  of  land  that 
may  hereafter  be  given,  shall  in  all  cases  be  subject  to  the 
lien  for  the  price  of  water  as  herein  provided. 

§  459d.  Kansas.-'' — It  is  provided  by  statute  that  any 
person,  association  or  corporation,  which  shall  under  con- 
tract with  the  owner  of  a  tract  or  piece  of  land,  his  agent, 
trustee,  or  under  contract  with  the  husband  or  wife  of  such 
owner,  furnish  water  for  irrigating  any  portion  of  said  tract 
of  land,  shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  whole  crop  grown  upon 
said  tract  or  parcel  of  land  during  the  year  the  water  is  so 
furnished,  for  the  full  amount  of  the  contract  price. 

§  459e.  Louisiana.^^ — The  statute  provided  that  any  per- 
son, association  of  persons  or  corporation  who  shall  furnish 
water  to  another  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  or  assisting  him 
in  the  growing  or  maturing  of  a  crop,  shall  have  a  privilege 
co-equal  with  the  supplies  upon  said  crop  to  secure  the  pay- 
ment of  the  agreed  compensation  therefor. 

§  459f.  New  Mexico.^^ — The  statute  authorizes  incorpo- 
rated cities,  towns  and  villages  to  assess  the  lots  and  parcels 
of  ground  within  their  limits  to  pay  the  expenses  of  pro- 

2SRev.  Code  1908,  §  3288.  •"'OLa.   Const.  &  Rev.   Laws   1904, 

29Gen.  Stats.  1909,  §  4403.  p.  1341. 

31  Laws  1909,  p.  206,  §  3. 


413*  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.      §    459h 

curing  water  to  be  used  in  the  growing  of  grass  and  other 
products  and  provides  that  upon  the  failure  of  the  owner  or 
agent  of  any  such  lot  or  parcel  of  land  so  assessed  to  pay 
the  sum  so  assessed  against  the  same  a  lien  will  attach  to 
such  lot  or  ground  in  favor  of  such  city,  town  or  village  and 
shall  be  enforced  against  the  same  to  be  provided  by  ordi- 
nance of  such  city,  town  or  village. 

§  459g.  Oklahoma.^- — Persons,  corporations  or  associa- 
tions of  persons  have  the  right  to  make  contracts  to  furnish 
water  and  for  the  sale  of  permanent  water  rights  to  persons 
who  own  or  have  a  possessory  right  to  land  for  the  pur- 
pose of  irrigating  such  land  for  mining,  milling  or  stock 
raising  and  such  contracts  shall  be  secured  by  liens  on  the 
land  or  otherwise.  The  statute  provides  what  shall  be  the 
obligations  of  the  contracting  parties  in  cases  of  shortage 
of  water  and  the  relative  rights  of  all  land  owners  within 
the  territory  where  such  water  is  held  for  irrigating  pur- 
poses and  provides  that  such  contracts  may  be  recorded  and 
that  water  rights  secured  shall  be  considered  as  easements 
and  shall  run  with  the  land  and  that  the  mere  conveyance  of 
the  land  shall  also  convey  such  rights. 

§  459h.  Oregon.^^ — Any  person,  firm  or  corporation  who 
shall  supply  water  to  any  person  for  irrigation  of  crops  shall 
have  a  lien  upon  all  crops  raised  by  the  use  of  such  water 
for  the  reasonable  value  of  the  water  supplied,  which  lien 
shall  be  a  continuing  one  and  shall  bind  said  crops  after, 
as  well  as  before  the  same  have  been  gathered  and  without 
record  shall  be  preferred  to  all  other  liens  or  incumbrances 
upon   said   crop   whatever. 

Such  liens  may  be  enforced  by  a  suit  in  equity,  and  upon 

32Comp.  Laws  1909,  §  3917.  Bellinger    &    Cotton's    Ann.    Code 

33Gen.  Laws  1913,  p.  139,  §  6544;      1902,  §  5012. 


§  459i  LIENS.  '414 

judgment  or  decree  of  foreclosure  the  court  or  judge  shall 
allow  as  a  part  of  the  cost  a  reasonable  sum  as  attorney's 
fees. 

§  459i.  South  Dakota.^^ — The  statute  authorizes  town- 
ships to  construct  wells  and  make  contracts  for  furnishing 
water  to  land  owners  and  gives  the  township  a  lien  upon  said 
lands  mentioned  in  such  water  contracts  from  the  time  the 
contract  is  filed  with  the  register  of  deeds  and  the  township 
may  foreclose  its  said  lien  by  advertising  as  now  or  as  may 
hereafter  be  provided  by  law  for  the  foreclosure  of  real  estate 
mortgages. 

§  459j.  Texas.^^ — Every  person,  corporation  or  associa- 
tion of  persons  which  has  constructed  or  may  hereafter  con- 
struct any  ditch,  canal,  dam,  lake  or  reservoir  for  the  pur- 
pose of  irrigation  and  who  shall  lease  or  rent  water  from 
said  ditch,  canal,  dam,  lake  or  reservoir  to  any  person  or  as- 
sociation of  persons  or  corporation  owning  any  lands  sub- 
ject to  irrigation  from  any  such  ditch,  canal,  dam,  lake  or 
reservoir,  such  person,  corporation  or  association  of  persons 
owning  such  ditch,  canal,  dam,  lake  or  reservoir  shall  have 
a  preference  lien,  superior  to  every  other  lien,  upon  the  crop 
or  crops  raised  upon  the  land  thus  irrigated  under  such  lease 
or  contract. 

§  459k.  Washington.^^ — Any  person,  company  or  asso- 
ciation of  persons  or  incorporated  company  furnishing  water 
for  any  tract  of  land  shall  have  a  prior  lien  on  said  water 
right  and  land  upon  which  said  water  is  used  for  all  de- 
ferred payments  for  said  water  right  and  for  any  mainte- 
nance fee  due;  said  lien  to  be  in  all  respects  prior  to  any 
other  lien   or   liens   created  by   the   owner   or   possessor   of 

34Rev.  Code  1903,  p.  489,  §  2700.  scRemington  &  Ballenger's  Ann. 

35Rev.  Civ.  Stats.  1911,  art.  5009.      Codes  &  Stats.  1910,  §  6721. 


415  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    460 

said  land;  said  lien  to  remain  in  full  force  and  effect  until 
the  last  deferred  payment  for  the  water  right  is  fully  paid 
and  satisfied  according  to  the  terms  of  the  contract  under 
which  said  water  right  was  acquired  and  until  all  delinquent 
maintenance  fees  are  fully  paid. 

§  460.  Effect  of  a  delivery  of  goods. — On  general  prin- 
ciples a  delivery  of  goods  by  the  owner  to  a  third  person, 
with  the  intention  of  passing  a  special  property  to  a  factor 
as  security  for  advances,  should  be  sufficient  to  confer  a  lien 
from  the  time  of  such  delivery,  though  the  factor  might  not 
obtain  the  actual  possession  of  the  goods  till  long  after- 
ward.^^ The  delivery  of  possession  to  an  agent  or  servant 
of  the  factor  is  a  delivery  to  the  factor  himself,  and  his  lien 
attaches  from  the  time  of  such  delivery. ^^  It  is  immaterial 
whether  the  depositary  be  a  common  carrier,  a  shipmaster, 
or  warehouseman,  or  any  other  bailee,  provided  only  such 
bailee  receives  the  goods  on  account  of  the  factor  who  is  to 
have  a  special  property  in  them.  It  is  material,  however, 
whether  the  bailee's  receipt  of  the  goods  for  the  factor  be 
evidenced  by  some  document,  for  the  document  is  evidence 
of  a  change  of  property.  In  this  respect  a  bill  of  lading  or 
shipping  receipt  issued  by  a  carrier  is  important;  for  in  the 
absence  of  this  or  other  sufficient  evidence  of  an  intention 
on  the  part  of  the  consignor  to  vest  the  specific  property  in 
the  consignee,  the  consignor  may  change  the  destination 
of  the  goods  at  any  time  before  they  come  into  the  actual 
possession  of  the  consignee. ^^ 

37Gibson  v.  Stevens,  8  How.  (U.  v.    Davidson,    5    Binn.     (Pa.)    392; 

S.)    384,    12   L.    ed.    1123;    Grove   v.  Ganseford     v.     Dutillet,     13     Mart. 

Brien,  8   How.    (U.   S.)    429,    12   L.  (La.)    284;    Sumner  v.    Hamlet,    12 

ed.    1142;    Nesmith   v.    Dyeing    Co.,  Pick.   (Mass.)  76;  Nesmith  v.  Dye- 

1   Curt.  (U.  S.)   130,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  ing  Co.,  1   Curtis   (U.  S.)   130,  Fed. 

10124.  Cas.  No.  10124. 

38McCombie  v.  Davis,  7  East  5,  soMitchel   v.    Ede,    11   Ad.    &   El. 

per    Lord    Ellenborough;    Clemson  888;    Lewis  v.    Galena   &   C.   U.   R. 


§    461  LIENS.  416 

But  unless  the  consignment  be  made  in  pursuance  of  an 
express  agreement,  or  one  implied  from  the  dealings  be- 
tween the  parties,  no  lien  attaches  until  the  factor  has  ac- 
cepted it  upon  the  terms  of  the  letter  of  consignment.'*^ 

§  461.  Delivery  to  common  carrier. — The  delivery  of 
goods  to  a  common  carier  consigned  to  a  factor  under  a 
contract  made  before  that  time,  is  such  a  delivery  to  the 
factor  as  will  cause  his  lien  to  attach  for  advances  made.*^ 
Thus,  if  a  planter  deliver  cotton  to  a  carrier  for  a  consignee 
in  pursuance  of  an  agreement  that  he  should  have  the  sell- 
ing of  the  crop,  and  should  reimburse  himself  from  the  pro- 
ceeds of  the  sales  for  advances  made  by  him  to  the  planter 
to  enable  him  to  make  the  crop,  such  delivery  is  a  delivery 
to  the  factor,  whose  lien  immediately  attaches  to  the  cotton. 

It  is  essential  to  the  acquisition  of  a  lien  by  a  factor  that 
he  should  have  and  retain  possession  of  the  property  upon 
which  he  claims  a  lien.  "A  man  can  not  have  a  lien  on 
goods  unless  he  have  in  some  sort  the  possession  of  the 
goods. ""*-  But  the  possession  may  be  constructive  as  well 
as  actual.  It  is  only  necessary  that  the  goods  should  be  so 
appropriated  to  the  factor  that  they  are  essentially  under 
his   control."*^ 

§  462.     No  lien  while  consignor  controls  goods. — But  a 

factor's  lien  can  not  attach  while  the  goods  remain  under 

Co.,  40  111.  281;  Strahorn  v.  Union  Hardeman    v.    De    Baughn,   49    Ga. 

Stock  Yards  &  Transit  Co.,  43  111.  596. 

424,  92  Am.  Dec.  142.  42Hutton  v.   Bragg,  7  Taunt.   14, 

^owinter  v.  Coit,  7  N.  Y.  288,  57  per  Gibbs,  C.  J.     See  also   Hallett 

Am.  Dec.  522.  v.   Bousfield,  18  Ves.  187;  Garrison 

4iNesmith  v.  Dyeing  Co.,  1  Cur-  v.  Vermont  Mills,  152  N.  Car.  643, 

tis    (U.    S.)    130,     Fed.     Cas.     No.  68  S.  E.  142. 

10124;  Holbrook  v.  Wight,  24  43Nesmith  v.  Dyeing  Co.,  1  Cur- 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  169,  35  Am.  Dec.  tis  (U.  S.)  130,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  10124; 
607;  Grosvenor  v.  Phillips,  2  Hill  Garrison  v.  Vermont  Mills,  152  N. 
(N.  Y.)  147;  Elliott  v.  Cox,  48  Ga.  Car.  643,  68  S.  E.  142;  James  Free- 
39;  Wade  v.  Hamilton,  30  Ga.  450;  man    Brown    Co.    v.    Harris,    88    S. 

Car.  558,  70  S.  E.  802. 


417  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,   ETC.         §    463 

the  consignor's  control.  A  delivery  of  goods  to  a  carrier 
is  undoubtedly  a  delivery  to  the  factor  to  whom  they  are 
consigned,  if  the  delivery  is  made  with  the  intention  of  pass- 
ing a  special  property  in  the  goods,  and  the  consignor  wholly 
parts  with  control  of  the  goods.  But  the  rule  is  otherwise 
wdien  goods  are  sent  by  a  consignor  on  his  own  account 
without  any  previous  arrangement,  and  they  remain  while 
in  transit  under  the  consignor's  control.  Thus,  a  manufac- 
turer put  goods  into  the  hands  of  a  carrier  at  Providence, 
to  be  carried  to  Boston  and  left  at  a  tavern  where  the  car- 
rier's wagon  usually  stopped.  The  manufacturer  then  went 
to  Boston  and  presented  an  invoice  of  the  goods  to  his  factor, 
stating  that  they  were  on  the  way,  and  obtained  an  advance 
on  them.  While  the  goods  were  on  their  way  they  were 
attached  at  the  suit  of  a  creditor  of  the  manufacturer.  It 
was  held  that  the  factor  had  no  lien.^'^  Chief  Justice  Shaw, 
delivering  the  opinion,  said:  "Authorities  were  cited  by  the 
defendants  to  show,  that  when  goods  are  consigned,  a  de- 
livery to  a  common  carrier,  is  in  law  a  delivery  to  the  con- 
signee. This  is  no  doubt  so,  where  the  goods  are  sent  in 
pursuance  of  a  previous  order  by  the  consignee.  But  in 
this  case,  so  far  from  a  previous  order  from  the  consignees, 
they  w^ere  sent  by  the  consignors  for  their  own  account, 
subject  to  their  own  order,  and  there  would  be  no  change 
of  legal  possession,  till  some  further  act  done  or  destination 
given  to  the  goods  by  them,  and  before  any  such  act  done, 
the  goods  were  attached.  The  new  advance  created  no  such 
lien,  because  no  actual  or  constructive  possession  was  ob- 
tained before  the  attachment." 

§  463.  Delivery  of  bill  of  lading  essential. — A  delivery 
of  the  bill   of  lading,   or  some  authorized  appropriation  of 

'i^Baker  v.  Fuller,  21  Pick.  before  a  factor  can  have  a  lien  for 
(Mass.)  318.  See  Farnum  v.  Bou-  his  advances.  Ommen  v.  Talcott, 
telle,  13  Met.  (Mass.)  159,  per  188  Fed.  401,  112  C.  C.  A.  239,  re- 
Shaw,  C.  J.     A  delivery  is  essential  versing   175   Fed.   261. 

27 


§    463  LIENS.  418 

the  goods,  is  essential.  While  a  delivery  of  a  bill  of  lading 
amounts  to  a  transfer  of  the  property,  the  making  of  a  bill 
of  lading  in  the  name  of  an  agent,  by  direction  of  the  prin- 
cipal, does  not  affect  a  transfer  to  such  agent  without  de- 
livery to  him.  A  firm  of  merchants  in  Philadelphia,  being 
indebted  to  their  agent  in  Boston,  without  previous  arrange- 
ment delivered  on  board  a  ship  bound  for  Boston  certain 
flour,  taking  bills  of  lading  in  three  parts,  by  wdiich  the  ship- 
owner agreed  to  deliver  the  flour  to  the  agent.  The  ship- 
owner retained  one  of  the  bills  of  lading,  and  the  merchants 
retained  the  others.  The  latter,  finding  themselves  in  a 
failing  condition,  and  not  having  paid  for  the  flour,  delivered 
the  bills  of  lading  to  their  vendor,  and  returned  to  him  the 
bill  of  the  flour.  The  ship-owner  refused  to  deliver  posses- 
sion to  the  vendor,  who  obtained  possession  by  replevin. 
The  ship-owner  delivered  his  part  of  the  bill  of  lading  to  the 
agent  in  Boston.  It  was  held  that  the  latter  obtained  no 
title  to  flour.  There  was  no  authorized  delivery  of  a  bill 
of  lading  to  the  consignee,  and  there  was  no  possession  or 
right  of  possession  conferred  upon  him.  The  consignors, 
not  having  delivered  the  bills  of  lading,  could  countermand 
the  shipment. ^^ 

A  factor  acc|uires  no  lien  until  the  property  comes  into  his 
actual  or  constructive  possession.  A  merchant  who  has 
made  advances  on  goods  which  he  experts  to  buy  acquires 
no  right  thereto,  before  delivery  to  him,  as  against  a  mort- 
gagee of  the  owner;  though  the  goods  are  all  the  time  in 
possession  of  a  third  party. ■*'^'  Until  actual  delivery  or  con- 
signment of  the  goods  the  lien  is  only  an  incipient  one;  and 
if  the  debtor  dies  before  such  delivery  or  consignment  the 
incipient  lien  can'  not  prevail  against  the  right  of  the  other 
creditors  to  have  all  the  debtor's  property,  including  the 
promised  consignment,  divided  equally  among  all  the  cred- 

45Walter  v.  Ross,  2  Wash.  C.  C.  4GFrost  v.  Deutsch   (Tex.),  13  S. 

283,   Fed.   Cas.   No.   17122.  W.  981. 


419  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    465 

itors  interested,  although  the  debtor's  administrator,  after 
his  intestate's  death,  dehvered  the  goods  according  to  the 
original  agreement.'*''' 

§  464.  No  lien  for  advancements  except  when  goods  are 
delivered. — Of  course,  if  a  factor  makes  advances  upon  a 
mere  executory  agreement  of  his  principal  to  make  a  con- 
signment, he  acquires  no  lien  until  there  is  some  sort  of  a 
delivery  to  him,  either  actual  or  constructive.  A  factor's 
lien  at  common  law  is  a  right  to  retain  a  thing  of  which  the 
factor  has  the  actual  or  constructive  possession.  It  can  not 
apply  to  property  which  the  owner  has  merely  agreed  to 
send  to  his  factor  to  secure  and  reimburse  him  for  advances 
made  upon  it.^^  In  equity,  perhaps,  a  specific  performance  of 
the  contract  might  be  enforced,  in  case  this  should  be  indis- 
pensable to  justice. ^^  But  at  law  the  factor  would  have  only 
a  right  of  action  for  the  non-performance  of  the  agreement. 

§  465.     Advances  made  on  faith  of  bill  of  lading. — If  the 

consignee  has  made  advances  upon  the  faith  of  a  bill  of 
lading,  or  shipping-receipt,  a  delivery  to  the  carrier  is  a 
sufficient  delivery  to  the  consignee  to  enable  him  to  main- 
tain a  lien  upon  the  goods  for  his  advances.  A  factor  can 
claim  a  lien  on  goods  in  his  possession  either  actual  or  con- 
structive.^*^ 

A  bill  of  lading  is  now  regarded  as  a  document  of  title, 

4T  Cook's   Admr.    v.    Brannin,    87  49  Sullivan  v.  Tuck,  1  Md.  Ch.  59. 

Ky.  101,  9  Ky.  L.  955,  7  S.  W.  877;  ^ODavis    v.    Bradley,   28   Vt.    118, 

Brooks   V.   Staton's  Admr.,   79  Ky.  65  Am.  Dec.  226;  Dows  v.  Greene, 

174;  Hoffman    v.    Brungs,    83    Ky.  16  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  72,  afifd.  24  N.  Y. 

400;    Ermeling   v.    Gibson    Canning  638;  Holbrook  v.  Wight,  24  Wend. 

Co.,  105  111.  App.  196.  (N.  Y.)  169,  35  Am.  Dec.  607;  Gros- 

48Kinloch  v.  Craig,  3  T.   R.  783;  venor   v.    Phillips,    2    Hill    (N.    Y.) 

Bruce  v.  Wait,  3  M.  &  W.  15;  Kin-  147;   Jordan   v.   James,    5    Ohio   88. 

loch  V.  Craig,  3  T.  R.  119;  Farnum  See   Rice  v.  Austin,    17   Mass.    197; 

V.  Boutelle,  13  Mete.   (Mass.)   159;  Valle  v.  Cerre's  Admr.,  36  Mo.  575, 

Elwell  V.  Coon  (N.  J.  Eq.),  46  Atl.  88  Am.   Dec.   161;   Hollins  v.   Hub- 

580.  bard,  165  N.  Y.  534,  59  N.  E.  317. 


§  465 


LIENS. 


420 


conferring  the  right  of  possession  and  constructively  pos- 
session itself.  Therefore  a  factor,  upon  receiving  a  bill  of 
lading,  has  the  right  to  take  possession  of  the  goods,  and 
his  lien  attaches  immediately. ""^  The  transaction  is  no  longer 
an  intended  consignment,  but  it  has  become  an  actual  con- 
signment by  the  transmission  and  delivery  of  the  bill  of 
lading.  ^'- 

But  a  consignment  under  a  bill  of  lading  is  not  essential 
to  the  vesting  of  a  lien  in  the  factor.  That  document  may 
itself  confer  a  title:  it  certainly  manifests  the  intent  of  the 
consignor  to  have  the  carrier  hold  the  property  and  deliver 
it  to  the  factor;  but  this  intent  may  be  manifested  in  other 
ways.  Any  other  competent  evidence  of  such  intent  is  ad- 
missible, and  may  be  equally  conclusive.''^ 

Yet  it  has  been  held  in  some  cases  that  a  delivery  to  a 


siHaille  v.  Smith,  1  Bos.  &  Pul. 
564.  See,  also,  Bryans  v.  Nix,  4 
M.  &  W.  775,  791;  Vertue  v.  Jewell, 

4  Camp.   31;    Patten  v.  Thompson, 

5  M.  &  S.  350;  Meyerstein  v.  Bar- 
ber, L.  R.  2  C.  P.  83;  Schmertz 
V.  Dwyer,  53  Pa.  St.  335;  Holmes 
V.  Bank,  87  Pa.  St.  525;  Holmes  v. 
Bailey,  92  Pa.  St.  57.  Thus, 
merchants  in  Cuba  contracted, 
through  their  factors  in  New 
York,  to  deliver  to  merchants 
in  New  York  a  certain  quantity  of 
sugar.  There  was  an  arrangement 
of  long  standing,  by  which  the 
factors  made  advances  to  the 
Cuban  merchants  on  an  agreement 
by  the  latter  to  consign  to  them 
on  which  they  were  to  have  a 
lien  for  their  advances,  and,  when 
the  sugar  was  sold,  credit  the  con- 
signors with  the  proceeds.  Deliv- 
eries were  made  through  the  fac- 
tors on  the  contract  with  the  New 
York  merchants,  when  a  dispute 
arose  as  to  the  quantity  necessary 


to  complete  the  contracts.  The 
Cuban  merchants  shipped  seventy 
tons  of  sugar  to  their  factors,  with 
bill  of  lading  to  the  latter's  order, 
and  instructed  them  not  to  deliver 
to  the  New  York  merchants,  un- 
less they  accept  a  draft  for  the 
balance  due  on  the  former  deliv- 
eries, together  with  the  price  of 
the  seventy  tons  then  shipped.  The 
New  York  merchants  refused  to 
accept,  and  seized  the  sugar  and 
the  balance  in  their  own  hands 
by  writ  of  foreign  attachment.  It 
was  held  that  the  factors  were 
entitled  to  a  lien  on  the  balance, 
and  on  the  seventy  tons  for  the 
advances  made  to  the  consignors. 
Harrison  v.  Mora,  150  Pa.  St.  481, 
24  Atl.  705. 

52Desha  v.  Pope,  6  Ala.  690,  41 
Am.  Dec.  76. 

53  Nesmith  v.  Dyeing  Co.,  1  Cur- 
tis (U.  S.)  130,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  10124, 
per  Curtis,  J.;  Bryans  v.  Nix,  4  M. 
&  W.  775,  per  Parke,  B. 


421 


LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,   CONSIGNEES,   ETC. 


466 


carrier  is  not  sufficient  to  give  a  lien  to  a  consignee  who 
has  made  advances  under  an  agreement  that  he  should  re- 
ceive and  sell  the  goods,  and  apply  the  proceeds  towards 
the  advances  made,  in  preference  to  a  creditor  who  has 
levied  an  attachment  upon  the  goods  before  the  shipping- 
receipts  have  been  forwarded  to  the  consignee,  provided  no 
bill  of  lading  or  shipping-receipt  has  been  delivered  to  the 
consignee. ^^ 

Some  authorities  even  go  to  the  extent  of  holding  that  the 
factor  must  have  actual  possession  before  he  can  have  a 
lien.  Although  the  factor  has  a  bill  of  lading  of  a  consign- 
ment to  him,  and  has  made  advances  upon  it  and  paid  the 
freight,  he  has  no  lien  without  possession  of  the  goods.  The 
lien  does  not  attach  to  goods  in  transit  to  the  factor,  or  to 
goods  of  which  the  factor  has  only  the  right  of  posses- 
sion.^^ 

§  466.  Lien  lost  by  losing  possession. — The  lien  of  a  factor 
is  lost  by  parting  with  the  possession  of  the  goods  on  which 
the  lien  is  claimed,  so  that  neither  the  goods  nor  their  pro- 
ceeds are  within  his  control.'"'*'  If  he  reships  them  to  his 
principal,  he  can  not  afterwards  stop  them  in  transitu.^"     If 


^^Elliot  V.  Bradley,  23  Vt.  217; 
Bank  of  Rochester  v.  Jones,  4  N. 
Y.  497,  55  Am.  Dec.  290;  Desha 
V.  Pope,  6  Ala.  690,  41  Am.  Dec. 
76;  Hodges  v.  Kimball,  49  Iowa 
577,  31  Am.  Rep.  158.  See  Davis 
V.  Bradley,  28  Vt.  118,  in  connec- 
tion with  Elliott  V.  Bradley,  23 
Vt.  217. 

55  Oliver  V.  Moore,  12  Heisk. 
(Tenn.)  482;  Woodruff  v.  Nash- 
ville &c.  R.  Co.,  2  Head  (Tenn.) 
87. 

5*5Kruger  v.  Wilcox,  1  Ambler, 
252;  Godin  v.  London  Assurance 
Co.,  1  Burr.  489;  Lickbarrow  v. 
Mason,   6   East  21,   per    Buller,  J.; 


Sharp  v.  Whipple,  1  Bosw.  (N.  Y.) 
557;  Bligh  v.  Davies,  28  Beav.  211; 
Matthews  v.  Menedger,  2  McLean 
(U.  S.)  145,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  9289; 
Rowland  v.  Dolby,  100  Md.  272,  59 
Atl.  666;  Ermeling  v.  Gibson  Can- 
ning Co.,  105  111.  App.  196;  Garri- 
son v.  Vermont  Mills,  152  N.  Car. 
643,  68  S.  E.  142,  69  S.  E.  743; 
Rosenbaum  v.  Hayes,  8  N.  Dak. 
461,  19  N.  W.  987;  Warren  v.  First 
Nat.  Bank,  149  111.  9,  50  111.  App. 
193,  38  N.  E.  122,  25  L.  R.  A.  746; 
Fallen  v.  Bogy,  78  Mo.  App.  88. 

•j"Sweet     V.     Pym,     1      East     4; 
Kruger   v.   Wilcox,    1    Ambler   252, 


§    467  LIENS.  422 

in  any  way  he  allows  his  principal  to  have  control  of  the 
goods,  he  waives  his  lien.  But  if  he  sells  the  goods  to  a 
third  person,  who  is  accountable  to  him  for  the  price,  his 
lien  upon  the  goods  is  transferred  to  a  lien  on  the  price. ^* 
"Where  a  factor  is  in  advance  for  goods  by  actual  payment, 
or  where  he  sells  under  a  del  credere  commission,  whereby 
he  becomes  responsible  for  the  price,  there  is  as  little  doubt 
that  he  has  a  lien  on  the  price,  though  he  has  parted  with 
the  possession  of  the  goods.  If  he  acts  under  a  del  credere 
commission,  he  is  to  be  considered,  as  between  himself  and 
the  vendee,  as  the  sole  owner  of  the  goods.  There  is  no 
doubt  of  the  authority  of  a  factor  to  sell  upon  credit,  though 
not  particularly  authorized  by  the  terms  of  his  commission 
so  to  do;  but  if  he  so  sell  without  a  del  credere  commission, 
it  is  well  established  that  he  does  not  become  a  surety:  the 
debt  is  due  to  the  owner  of  the  goods  only."^^ 

§  467.  Possession  necessary  to  lien. — A  broker  who  has 
not  had  possession  of  the  merchandise  sold  by  him  can  not 
maintain  a  lien  against  the  proceeds  of  the  sales,  if  these 
come  into  his  hands  after  the  principal  has  assigned  such 
proceeds  with  notice  to  the  broker  of  the  assignment.  An 
iron-master  employed  brokers  to  sell  iron  and  collect  the 
proceeds  for  a  stipulated  commission.  A  large  contract  of 
a  sale  was  made  and  several  shipments  made  under  it,  the 
brokers  making  the  collections.  Upon  a  further  shipment 
the  iron-master  assigned  the  bill  for  it  with  notice  to  the 
brokers,  who  collected  the  amount  of  the  bill  and  claimed 
the  right  to  deduct  this  from  their  commissions  for  the  en- 
tire contract,  both  for  the  iron  delivered  and  that  which  had 
not  been   delivered.     It  was   held  that  they  had  no  lien.®*^ 

i^sHoughton  V.  Matthews,  3  Bos.  ^^'Houghton  v.  Matthews,  3  Bos. 

&  Pul.  485;  Commercial  Nat.  Bank  &    Pul.   485,   per   Chambre,   J. 

V.    Heilbronner,    108   N.    Y.  439,    15  eoshoener    v.    Cabeen.    15    Phila. 

N.    E.    701,    reversing,    20    J.    &    S.  (Pa.)   65. 
(N.   Y.)   388. 


423  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,   ETC.         §    469 

The  court  said:  "They  were  simply  brokers  for  the  sale  of 
the  iron,  and  agents  for  the  collection  of  the  proceeds  of 
the  sale.  They  were  not  factors  or  commission  merchants 
to  whom  the  iron  was  consigned  for  sale.  They  had  no 
possession  of  it,  or  right  of  possession  of  it,  and  therefore 
had  no  lien  on  it  or  its  proceeds  for  their  commissions. 
Their  claim  was  a  mere  personal  claim  for  the  services  ren- 
dered and  to  be  rendered,  by  them  as  brokers  and  agents 
for  collection.  They  therefore  could  not  retain  this  money 
as  against  the  assignee,  whose  claim  it  had  become  before 
the  money  came  into  their  hands." 

§  468.     Loss  of  temporary  possession  no  waiver. — The 

agent,  however,  may  allow  his  principal  to  have  temporary 
possession  of  the  goods  under  an  agreement  reserving  the 
right  of  lien,  and  still  retain  his  lien.  The  possession  of  the 
principal  is  in  such  case  regarded  as  the  possession  of  the 
agent. ®^ 

Possession  obtained  by  the  principal  by  means  of  fraud 
or  misrepresentation,^-  or  by  compulsion,  does  not  destroy 
the  factor's  lien.^^ 

If  a  factor  at  the  request  of  his  principal  reships  goods 
upon  which  he  has  made  advances  to  the  place  from  which 
they  were  consigned,  he  has  the  right  to  retain  them  in  the 
hands  of  his  agent  at  that  place,  until  his  advances  are  paid; 
and  the  principal  can  not  obtain  the  possession  of  them  until 
he  has  paid  or  tendered  the  amount  of  such  advances. ^^ 

§  469.  Revival  of  the  lien. — An  insurance  broker  who 
has  a  lien,  whether  special  or  general,  upon  policies  taken 
out  for  his  principal,  waives   it  by  delivering  them   to   his 

ci  Reeves  v.  Capper,  6  Scott  877.  63  Ex     parte     Goode,     2     Deac. 

C2  Wallace  v.  Woodgate,  1  Car.  &      Bkrptcy.  R.  389. 
P.  575.  64Griefif  v.  Cowgill,  2  Dis.  (Ohio) 

58,  13  Ohio  Dec.  37. 


§    470  LIENS.  424 

principal  or  his  agent. ''•"'  But  if  the  poHcies  are  returned  to 
the  broker  after  a  loss  has  occurred,  to  enable  him  to  collect 
the  insurance,  his  lien  will  revive.  Such  revival  is  not  in 
strictness  a  revival  of  a  pre-existing  lien;  but  when  the  poli- 
cies come  back  into  the  l^roker's  possession  a  lien  attaches, 
as  it  would  upon  new  policies  coming  into  his  hands.  But 
his  lien  for  a  general  balance  will  not  attach  again  if,  at  the 
time  the  policies  come  ag'ain  into  his  hands,  circumstances 
have  occurred  which  would  prevent  the  attaching  of  a  gen- 
eral lien  if  they  then  for  the  first  time  came  into  his  hands. 
If,  for  instance,  the  policies  are  not,  at  the  time  of  their 
return  to  the  broker,  the  property  of  the  principal  for  whom 
the  broker  took  them  out,  he  can  have  no  lien  upon  them.^^ 

§  470.  Disclosure  of  his  principal  does  not  defeat  the 
factor's  lien. — A  factor  having  a  lien  on  goods  does  not  pre- 
clude himself  from  insisting  on  his  lien,  by  holding  out  his 
principal  as  the  owner  of  the  goods. *^^ 

Upon  a  sale  by  a  factor  to  a  purchaser  to  whom  the  prin- 
cipal is  disclosed,  the  purchaser  can  not  offset  a  debt  due  to 
him  from  the  principal  so  as  to  defeat  the  factor's  lien.*^^ 

If  a  purchaser  from  a  factor,  having  knowledge  of  the 
factor's  lien,  pays  over  the  purchase-money  to  the  principal, 
he  renders  himself  liable  to  the  factor  for  the  amount  of  his 
lien.*^^  It  is  said  that  in  order  to  charge  the  purchaser,  the 
factor  should,  in  addition  to  giving  notice  of  his  lien,  offer 
to  indemnify  him  from  the  consequences  of  an  adverse  suit 
by  the  principal, ''^'  but  this  is  regarded  by  Judge  Story  as 
a  questionable  point. "^ 


OJLevy  V.  Barnard,  8  Taunt.  149 
Sharp  V.  Whipple,  1  Bosw.  (N.  Y.) 
557;  Cranston  v.  Philadelphia  Ins 
Co.,  5   Binn.   (Pa.)  438. 

66Levy  V.  Barnard,  8  Taunt.  149 
Sharp  V.  Whipple,  1  Bosw.  (N.  Y.) 
557;  Spring  v.  South  Carolina  Ins 
Co.,    8    Wheat.    (U.    S.)    268,    5    L 


•j'Seymour  v.  Hoadley,  9  Conn. 
418. 

'>*Alkyns  v.  Amber,  2  Esp.  Cas. 
493. 

^i^Drinkwater  v.  Goodwin,  1 
Cowp.  251. 

"OLord  Mansfield  in  Drinkwater 
V.  Goodwin,  1  Cowp.  251. 


ed.  614.  "1  Story,  Agency,  §  409. 


425  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,   ETC.         §    472 

§  470a.  Factor  waives  his  lien  by  failing  to  follow  princi- 
pal's instructions. — A  factor  waives  his  lien  by  disobeying 
his  principal's  instructions  to  sell  the  merchandise  he  has 
bought  for  his  principal;  and  if  his  principal  has  deposited 
money  with  him  as  margins,  the  principal  may  recover  the 
money  under  the  common  courts  in  an  action  of  assumpsit.'^- 

§  471.  Lien  ends  with  payment  of  the  debt. — The  lien 
ceases  to  exist  upon  the  payment  of  the  debt  due  him  from 
his  principal.'''^  But  a  factor  does  not  lose  his  lien  by  draw- 
ing a  draft  on  his  principal  for  the  amount  of  his  advances 
and  charges,  especially  if  the  draft  has  not  been  paid,  and 
the  principal  has  become  insolvent  before  the  draft  has  be- 
come due."^ 

§  472.  Enforcement  of  factor's  lien. — As  regards  the  en- 
forcement of  his  lien,  a  factor  has  an  advantage  over  other 
persons  having  liens  at  common  law  or  by  custom ;  for  he  is 
intrusted  with  the  goods  for  the  purpose  of  selling  them, 
and  ordinarily  it  is  his  right  to  sell  them  and  apply  the  pro- 
ceeds to  the  payments  of  his  principal's  indebtedness  to  him. 
He  has  a  lien,  therefore,  not  only  upon  the  goods  while  he 
holds  them,  but  when  he  has  sold  them  his  lien  attaches  to 
the  proceeds. '^^ 

Moreover,  by  virtue  of  the  Factors'  Acts  and  recent  stat- 

'-•Jones    V.    Marks,    40    111.    313;  '^De  Wolf  v.   Howland,  2  Paine 

Larminie    v.    Carley,    114    111.    196,  C.    C.    (U.    S.)    356,    Fed.    Cas.    No. 

29  N.  E.  382.  3852. 

'SWoodrufif   V.    N.    &    C.    R.    Co.,  '^^Hudson  v.  Granger,  5  B.  &  Aid. 

2  Head    (Tenn.)    87;    Ship    Packet,  27,     per      Bayley,     J.;      Jones     on 

3  Mason  (U.  S.)  334,  Fed.  Cas.  Pledges,  §§  333-353.  But  a  factor 
No.  10655.  Where  the  owner  of  for  the  purpose  of  sale  having  a 
goods,  before  suing  to  recover  factor's  lien  is  not  authorized  to 
them  from  the  factors,  tenders  the  pledge  the  goods  for  his  own  debt 
amount  due  the  factors  for  ad-  or  for  advances.  Castikyan  v. 
vances  and  expenses,  he  is  entitled  Sloan,  33  App.  D.  C.  420. 

to  recover.     Miller  v.  Price,  4  Cal. 
Unrep.  Cas.  983,  39  Pac.  781. 


§  473  LIENS.  426 

utes  giving  bills  of  lading  a  negotiable  character,  a  factor 
may  take  advantage  of  his  lien  by  pledging  the  goods  re- 
ceived for  sale,  for  these  statutes  enable  third  persons  to 
deal  with  a  factor  for  sale  as  though  he  w^ere  the  absolute 
owner  of   the   goods. 

§  473.  Factor  employed  to  purchase  goods. — The  case 
of  a  factor  employed  to  purchase  goods  is  different  from 
that  of  one  employed  to  sell  them;  for  while  the  latter  has 
by  the  very  nature  of  his  employment  the  implied  consent 
of  his  principal  to  sell  the  property  and  satisfy  his  lien  from 
the  proceeds,  the  former  has  no  such  implied  consent;  and 
therefore,  while  the  factor  for  purchase  has  a  lien  on  the 
goods  purchased  for  advances  made  on  the  purchase,  the 
additional  right  of  selling  the  goods  in  order  to  reimburse 
himself  for  his  advances  is  not  conferred  upon  him.'^*' 

Moreover,  a  factor  for  purchase  has  no  advantages  under 
the  Factors'  Acts."*" 

§  474.  Factor's  special  property  in  goods. — A  factor  has 
a  special  property  in  the  goods  intrusted  to  him  for  sale. 
He  has  the  right  to  manage  the  property  and  to  sell  it  at 
his  discretion,  unless  expressly  restricted  by  instructions 
from  his  principal.  He  is  not,  however,  the  owner  of  the 
goods,  and  unless  he  sells  them  in  the  usual  course  of  his 
business,  or  forecloses  his  lien  as  authorized  b}-  statute  in 
some  states,  he  has  no  right  except  to  detain  the  goods  until 
his  demands  against  his  principal  are  satisfied.  He  has  no 
general  property  in  the  goods.  "No  doubt  a  factor  who  has 
made  advances  upon  goods  consigned  to  him,  may  be  re- 
garded, in  a  limited  sense,  and  to  the  extent  of  his  advances, 
as  an  owner.  Yet,  in  reality,  he  has  but  a  lien,  with  a  right 
of  possession  of  the  goods  for  its  security.  He  may  protect 
that  possession  by  suit  against  a  trespasser  upon  it,  and  he 

"•'Lienard    v.     Dresslar,    3    Fost.  "~  Jones  on  Pledges,  §§  344,  345. 

&   Fin.  212. 


427  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    475 

may  sell  the  property  to  reimburse  advances,  remaining, 
however,  accountable  to  his  consignor  for  any  surplus.  But 
after  all  he  is  not  the  real  owner.  He  is  only  an  agent  of 
the  owner  for  certain  purposes.  The  owner  may,  at  any 
time  before  his  factor  has  sold  the  goods,  reclaim  the  pos- 
session upon  paying  the  advances  made  with  interest  and 
expenses.  He  has  not  lost  his  ownership  by  committing  the 
custody  of  the  goods  to  a  factor  and  by  receiving  advances 
upon  them.  He  is  still  entitled  to  the  proceeds  of  any  sale 
which  may  be  made,  even  by  his  agent,  the  factor,  subject 
only  to  a  charge  of  the  advances  and  expenses.  A  factor, 
therefore,  notwithstanding  he  may  have  made  advances  upon 
the  property  consigned  to  him,  has  but  a  limited  right.  That 
right  is  sometimes  called  a  special  property,  but  it  is  never 
regarded  as  a  general  ownership.  At  most  it  is  no  more 
than  ownership  of  a  lien  or  charge  upon  the  property.""^ 

§  475.  Factor's  right  to  sell  goods. — A  factor  who  has 
made  advances,  or  incurred  liabilities,  on  a  consignment, 
has  a  right  to  sell  so  much  of  the  consignment  as  may  be 
necessary  to  reimburse  such  advances,  unless  there  is  some 
agreement  between  him  and  the  consignor  which  varies  the 
right. '^^  "Thus,  for  example,  if,  contemporaneous  with  the 
consignment  and  advances  or  liabilities,  there  are  orders 
given  by  the  consignor,  which  are  assented  to  by  the  factor, 

"sUnited  States  v.  Villalonga,  23  '9  Brown  v.  McGran,  14  Pet.  (U. 

Wall.    (U.   S.)   35,  23  L.  ed.  64,   10  S.)   479,   10  L.  ed.  550;   Brander  v. 

Ct.  CI.  22,  per  Strong,  J.     The  fac-  Phillips,  16  Pet.  (U.  S.)   121,  10  L. 

tor's  possession  where  he  has  made  ed.    909;     Beadles    v.     Hartmus,    7 

advances  of  the  goods  in  his  pos-  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  476;  Mooney  v.  Mus- 

session  and  not  that  of  the  owner.  ser,  45  Ind.  115;  Walker  Co.  v.  Du- 

Couturie    v.    Roensch,    (Tex.)     134  buque    Fruit    Co.,     113    Iowa    428, 

S.    W.   413.      He    can    only    satisfy  85    N.    W.    614,    53    L.    R.    A.    775. 

his    lien,    where    he    has    one,    by  Also    Willingham    v.    Rushing,    105 

some  proceeding  provided  by  law  Ga.  12,  31   S.   E.    130,   holding   that 

for  its  foreclosure.    People's   Bank  the  right  is  not  terminated  by  the 

V.  Frick  Co.,  13  Okla.  179,  73  Pac.  death  of  the  principal. 
949. 


§    47^  LIENS.  428 

that  the  goods  shall  not  be  sold  until  a  fixed  time,  in  such  a 
case,  the  consignment  is  presumed  to  be  received  by  the 
factor  subject  to  such  orders;  and  he  is  not  at  liberty  to 
sell  the  goods  to  reimburse  his  advances  or  liabilities,  until 
after  that  time  has  elapsed.  The  same  rule  will  apply  to 
orders  not  to  sell  below  a  fixed  price ;  unless,  mdeed,  the 
consignor  shall,  after  due  notice  and  request,  refuse  to  pro- 
vide any  other  means  to  reimburse  the  factors.  And  in  no 
case  will  the  factor  be  at  liberty  to  sell  the  consignment, 
contrary  to  the  orders  of  the  consignor,  although  he  has 
made  advances,  or  incurred  liabilities  thereon,  if  the  con- 
signor stands  ready,  and  offers  to  reimburse  and  discharge 
such  advances  and  liabilities.  On  the  other  hand,  wdiere  the 
consignment  is  made  generally,  without  any  specific  orders 
as  to  the  time  or  mode  of  sale,  and  the  factor  makes  ad- 
vances or  incurs  liabilities  on  the  footing  of  such  consign- 
ment, there  the  legal  presumption  is,  that  the  factor  is  in- 
tended to  be  clothed  with  the  ordinary  rights  of  factors,  to 
sell,  in  the  exercise  of  a  sound  discretion,  at  such  time  and 
in  such  mode  as  the  usage  of  trade  and  his  general  duty  re- 
quire;  and  to  reimburse  himself  for  his  advances  and  liabili- 
ties out  of  the  proceeds  of  the  sale;  and  the  consignor  has  no 
right,  by  any  subsequent  orders  given  after  advances  have 
been  made  or  liabilities  incurred  by  the  factor,  to  suspend  or 
control  this  right  of  sale,  except  so  far  as  respects  the  surplus 
of  the  consignment  not  necessary  for  the  reimbursement  of 
such  advances  or  liabilities.  Of  course,  this  right  of  the 
factor  to  sell  to  reimburse  himself  for  his  advances  and  lia- 
bilities, applies  with  stronger  force  to  cases  where  the  con- 
signor is  insolvent,  and  where,  therefore,  the  consignment 
constitutes   the   only  fund   for  indemnity. "^'^ 

§  476.     Factor  may  sell  at  a  fair  price. — A  factor  may  sell 
the  goods  at  a  fair  market  price  and  reimburse  himself  for 

so  Brown  v.  McGran,  14  Pet.  (U.    S.)  479,  10  L.  ed.  550,  per  Story,  J. 


429 


LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,  ETC. 


476 


advances,  after  a  reasonable  notice  to  his  principal,  although 
the  latter  has  limited  him  to  a  higher  price,  or  given  express 
instructions  not  to  sell.*^^ 

The  English  rule  is  otherwise;  the  factor  there  having  no 
right  to  sell  against  his  principal's  consent  in  order  to  satisfy 
his  advances,  after  giving  notice  of  his  intention  to  do  so.^^ 


J^iBrandei-  v.  Phillips,  16  Pet. 
(U.  S.)  121,  10  L.  ed.  909;  Landis 
V.  Gooch,  1  Disn.  (Ohio)  176,  12 
Ohio  Dec.  559;  Watson  v.  Beatty, 
10  Sad.  (Pa.)  108,  22  Wkly. 
Notes  Cas.  169,  13  Atl.  521; 
Hallowell  v.  Fawcett,  30  Iowa  491; 
Parker  v.  Brancker,  22  Pick. 
(Mass.)  40,  per  Wilde,  J.  "But  after 
such  a  reasonable  time  had  elapsed, 
knd  a  demand  had  been  made  upon 
the  plaintifif  to  repay  the  money 
advanced,  and  he  had  refused  so 
to  do,  he  had  no  further  power, 
by  any  principle  of  law  or  justice, 
to  control  the  defendant's  right 
of  sale  to  his  prejudice.  Such  a 
power  would  be  inconsistent  with 
the  understanding  of  the  parties  as 
it  must  be  presumed  to  have  been 
when  the  advances  were  made;  and 
it  would  enable  the  principal  to 
impair  the  defendants'  security  at 
his  own  will  and  pleasure  for  an 
unlimited  time,  if  he  were  disposed 
so  to  do.  To  sanction  such  a  right 
would  operate  injuriously  on  the 
interests  of  consignees,  and  would 
check  the  continuance  of  those 
large  advances,  by  the  aid  of  which 
a  flourishing  trade  has  been  carried 
on,  for  years  past,  to  the  great 
profit  of  the  mercantile  community. 
Although  such  advances  may  some- 
times lead  to  over-trading,  and 
may  induce  individuals  to  venture 
upon  rash  speculations,  yet  it  can- 
not be  doubted,  that  on  the  whole 


they  have  contributed  to  the  in- 
crease of  the  wealth  and  prosper- 
ity of  the  country.  The  principle, 
therefore,  involved  in  this  case  is 
of  great  importance,  and  has  been 
considered  by  the  court  with  great 
care." 

S-Smart  v.  Sanders,  5  C.  B.  895. 
Chief  Justice  Wilde,  delivered  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  said:  "The 
substantial  question  in  this  case 
is,  whether  a  factor  who  has  made 
advances  on  account  of  his  princi- 
pal, has  a  right  to  sell  the  goods 
in  his  hands,  contrary  to  the  orders 
of  his  principal,  on  the  principal's 
making  default  in  repajang  those 
advances.  It  is  now  settled  law, 
that  a  factor  has  a  lien  for  his  ad- 
vances. But  the  defendant  claims 
more  than  a  lien;  he  claims  a  right, 
if  the  principal,  when  called  on  to 
repay  the  advances,  makes  a  default 
in  doing  so,  to  sell  the  goods  at 
such  prices  and  times,  as,  in  the 
exercise  of  a  sound  discretion,  he 
thinks  best  for  his  principal.  Xo 
case  in  an  English  court  can  be 
produced  in  support  of  this  doc- 
trine; yet  it  is  a  right  which  one 
would  expect  to  find  enforced  every 
day,  if  it  existed.  The  silence  of 
our  law  books  is  a  strong  argu- 
ment against  the  existence  of  such 
a  right.  *  *  *  But,  it  is  said,  a 
factor  for  sale  has  an  authority  as 
such  (in  the  absence  of  all  special 
orders)  to  sell;  and,  when  he  after- 


§  477 


LIENS. 


430 


Where  a  consignor,  after  advances  have  been  made  by  his 
factor,  instructs  him  not  to  sell  for  less  than  a  certain  price, 
and  the  factor  replies  that  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  goods 
could  be  sold  at  the  price  fixed,  and  that  he  would  await 
further  instructions,  and  that  he  would  return  the  goods  and 
remit  on  account  if  desired,  and  after  the  lapse  of  a  reason- 
able time  without  receiving  any  response  from  the  consignor, 
it  was  held  that  the  factor  might  sell  the  goods  for  the  best 
price  he  could  get  in  the  market.^'' 


§  477.  Rule  in  certain  states. — In  two  or  three  states  the 
right  of  the  factor  to  reimburse  himself  by  sales  is  declared 
by  statute.  Thus,  in  California, ^^  a  factor  has  a  general 
lien,  dependent  on  possession,  for  all  that  is  due  to  him  as 
such,  upon  all  articles  of  commercial  value  that  are  intrusted 
to  him  by  the  same  principal.  A  factor  must  obey  the  in- 
structions of  his  principal  to  the  same  extent  as  any  other 
employe,  notwithstanding  any  advances  he  may  have  made 
to  his  principal  upon  the  property  consigned  to  him,  except 
that,  if  the  principal  forbids  him  to  sell  at  the  market  price, 
he  may  nevertheless  sell  for  his  reimbursement,  after  giving 
to  his  principal  reasonable  notice  of  his  intention  to  do  so, 


wards  comes  under  advances,  he 
thereby  acquires  an  interest;  and, 
having  thus  an  authority  and  an 
interest,  the  authority  becomes 
thereby  irrevocable.  The  doctrine 
here  implipd,  that,  whenever  there 
is  in  the  same  person  an  authority 
and  an  interest,  the  authority  is 
irrevocable,  is  not  to  be  admitted 
without  qualification.  In  the  case 
of  Raleigh  v.  Atkinson,  6  M.  & 
W.  670,  goods  had  been  consigned 
to  a  factor  for  sale,  with  a  limit 
as  to  price.  The  factor  had  a  lien 
on  the  goods  for  advances;  and  the 
principal,  in  consideration  of  those 
advances    agreed    with    the    factor 


that  he  should  sell  the  goods  at  the 
best  market  prices,  and  realize 
thereon  against  his  advances:  the 
court  held  that  this  authority  was 
revocable,  on  the  ground  that  there 
was  no  consideration  for  the  agree- 
ment. Now,  in  that  case,  there  was 
an  authority  given,  and  one  which 
the  principal  was  fully  at  liberty  to 
give;  the  party  to  whom  it  was 
given  had  an  interest  in  it,  yet  the 
authority  was  held  to  be  revocable." 

^3Mooney  v.  Musser,  45  Ind.  115. 

84  Civ.  Code  1906,  §§  2027,  3053; 
North  Dakota  Rev.  Code  1905, 
§§  5583,  6287;  South  Dakota  Code 
(Civ.)  1903.  §§  1488,  2154. 


431  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,  CONSIGNEES,   ETC.         §    478 

and  of  the  time  and  place  of  sale,  and  proceeding  in  all 
respects  as  a  pledgee. 

In  Georgia, ^^  a  factor's  lien  extends  to  all  balances  on  gen- 
eral account,  and  attaches  to  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of 
goods  consigned,  as  well  as  to  the  goods  themselves.  Pe- 
culiar confidence  being  reposed  in  the  factor,  he  may,  in  the 
absence  of  instructions,  exercise  his  discretion  according  to 
the  general  usages  of  the  trade.  In  return,  greater  and  more 
skilful  diligence  is  required  of  him.  and  the  most  active  good 
faith. 

§  478.     Factor's  lien  attaches  to  proceeds  of  sale. — The 

factor's  lien  attaches  to  the  proceeds  of  all  sales  made  by 
him,  whether  these  be  in  money  or  securities,  so  long  as 
he  retains  them  in  his  possession.  The  factor  sells  the 
goods,  and  thereby  parts  with  the  lien  on  the  goods ;  but 
at  the  same  moment  he  takes  the  proceeds,  whether  the 
money  or  security,  which  he  may  take  in  his  own  name, 
and  thus,  as  between  him  and  his  principal,  the  lien  is  imme- 
diately transferred  to  the  proceeds. ^"^ 

But  the  fact  that  the  factor  has  a  lien  on  the  proceeds  of  a 
sale  of  goods  on  which  he  had  a  lien  does  not  authorize  him 
to  sell  them  or  pledge  them  in  payment  or  for  the  security 
of  his  own  debt,  or  in  an  unusual  and  irregular  manner  f^ 
unless  the  principal's  indebtedness  to  him  equals  or  exceeds 
the  value  of  the  goods,  so  that  the  factor  is  substantially  the 
owner. ^^  But  while  a  factor  or  commission  merchant  has 
no  authority  to  pledge  the  goods  consigned  to  him,  if  he 
has  advanced  money  upon  the  goods,  he  thereby  acquires 
a  lien  upon  and  special  property  in  them  to  the  amount  of 
such  advances,  and  he  may  pledge  such  special  interest  in 

S5Code    1911,    §    3502.  s^Benny  v.   Rhodes,   18   Mo.    147, 

86  Brander  v.  Phillips,  16  Pet.  (U.  59  Am.  Dec.  293;  Buckley  v.  Pack- 

S.)   121,  10  L.  ed.  909;  Commercial  ard,  20  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  421;  Graham 

Nat.    Bank  v.   Heilbronner,    108   N.  v.  Dyster.  6  Maule  &  S.  1. 

Y.  439,  15  N.  E.  701.  ssEaton  v.  Bell,  5  B.   &  Aid.  34. 


§  479  LIENS.  432 

them  for  his  own  use.^^  He  has  no  authority  to  dispose 
of  the  goods  consigned  to  him  out  of  the  ordinary  course  of 
business,  nor  can  he  dispose  of  them  in  violation  of  the  order 
of  his  principal,  even  to  repay  advances,  at  least  until  he  has 
called  upon  his  principal  for  reimbursement.  He  can  not 
sell  a  debt  existing  in  open  account  and  not  yet  due,  arising 
from  a  sale  of  the  goods,  so  as  to  transfer  a  good  title  to 
the  claim,  when  the  principal  is  not  in  default  and  has  not 
been  called  upon  to  repay  the  advances. °^ 

§  479.  Factor's  right  to  retain  proceeds  of  sale.— A  fac- 
tor who  sells  his  principal's  property,  on  which  he  has  a 
lien  for  his  services  and  advances,  may  retain  the  amount 
of  his  lien  out  of  the  proceeds,  whether  the  sale  was  author- 
ized or  not.  Thus,  if  the  factor  sell  the  goods  after  the  death 
of  his  principal,  without  waiting  for  the  appointment  and 
consent  of  an  administrator,  in  an  action  against  him  for  the 
value  of  the  goods,  the  measure  of  damages  is  the  value  of 
the  property,  less  the  amount  of  his  lien ;  and  if  no  question 
is  made  in  regard  to  the  price  obtained,  the  damages  would 
be  such  price  less  the  amount  of  his  lien.'^^  Though  the  sale 
be  a  conversion,  he  may  insist  upon  his  lien  in  defence  to  an 
action  for  the  conversion. 

§  480.  Bill  of  sale  from  principal  to  agent. — An  agent  un- 
der a  del  credere  commission  has  a  lien  for  his  advances  and 
commissions,  and  a  bill  of  sale  to  him  by  his  principal  of 
the  goods  in  his  possession  is  in  effect  a  foreclosure  of  his 
lien  upon  them.  Even  if  his  principal  be  insolvent  at  the 
time,  the  bill  of  sale,  though  perhaps  technically  illegal,  will 
be  sustained  as  a  foreclosure  of  the  lien.  In  such  a  case, 
when  the  agent  has  used  large  acceptances  of  his  principal 

S9Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Pope,  701;  Hilton  v.  Vanderbilt,  82  N.  Y. 

19  Ore.  35,  26  Pac.  622.  591;   Mart^eld  v.  Goodhue,  3  N.  Y. 

90Conimercial  Nat.  Bank  v.  Heil-  62. 

bronner,    108   N.   Y.   439,    15    N.    E.  'JiShaw  v.  Ferguson,  78  Ind.  547. 


433  LIENS  OF  FACTORS,  BROKERS,   CONSIGNEES,  ETC.         §    482 

for  his  own  benejfit,  he  is  not  obliged,  for  the  benefit  of  cred- 
itors of  his  principal,  to  set  off  these  against  his  principal's 
indebtedness  to  him,  and  release  the  security  of  his  lien  to 
that  extent.  It  was  not  unlawful  for  him  to  retain,  with  his 
principal's  consent,  his  lien  for  the  entire  indebtedness. '^- 

§  481.  Factor  may  sue  for  the  debt  nothwithstanding  he 
has  lien. — A  factor  may  maintain  an  action  for  the  debt,  al- 
though he  has  a  lien  on  the  goods  in  his  possession  for  the 
debt;  and  in  an  action  by  trustee  process,  or  process  of  gar- 
nishment, by  a  third  person  against  the  factor,  the  principal 
may  be  charged  as  trustee  or  garnishee,  and  judgment  en- 
tered against  the  principal. ^^ 

§  482.  Carrier  may  enforce  consignee's  lien. — A  carrier 
who  has  been  compelled  to  pay  the  consignee's  lien  may  him- 
self enforce  it.  Thus,  when  a  consignee  has  a  lien  for  ad- 
vances upon  goods  on  board  ship,  which  are  taken  from  the 
ship  by  an  attaching  officer  on  a  writ  against  the  consignor, 
without  tendering  to  the  carrier  or  the  consignee  the  amount 
of  the  consignee's  lien,  the  carrier,  after  having  been  com- 
pelled to  pay  the  amount  to  the  consignee,  may  maintain  an 
action  therefor  against  the  officer.  The  carrier  is  bound  to 
the  consignee  for  the  safe  delivery  of  the  goods.  The  prop- 
erty having  been  taken  from  the  carrier's  possession  upon 
legal  process  against  the  consignor,  the  carrier,  being  thus 
prevented  from  delivering  it  to  the  consignee  according  to 
his  contract,  has  the  consignee's  rights  and  remedies  to  en- 
able him  to  answer  over  to  the  consignee  for  the  value  of 
his  interests.  Certainly,  if  he  pays  such  consignee  for  his 
interest  with  or  without  suit,  he  succeeds  to  all  his  rights 
of  recapture   or   rights   of   action.^* 

92Fourth  Nat.  Bank  v.  American  o^Vermilye    v.    Adams     Exp-vess 

Mills  Co.,  29  Fed.  611,  30  Fed.  420.  Co.,  21  Wall.  (U.  S.)  138,  22  L.  ed. 

93Mobile  &  Ohio  R.  Co.  v.  WJiit-  609;   Holmes  v.  Balcom,  84  Maine 

ney,  39  Ala.  468.  226,  24  Atl.  821. 

28 


CHAPTER  X. 


LIEN  OF  A  FINDER  OF  LOST  GOODS. 


Sec. 

483.  Finder  of  goods  has  no  lien 

thereon    at    common    law. 

484.  A     riparian     owner     has     no 

lien  on  property  cast  adrift 
on   his    land. 

485.  Finder's    right   t6  compensa- 

tion  for  his   services. 

486.  Landlord     has     no     lien     on 

chattels    left   on   his    prem- 
ises. 

487.  Reward    offered. 

488.  Offer   of   a    reward    becomes 

a  contract. 

489.  Offer  of  reward  by  a  sheriff. 


Sec. 

490.  Rendition  of   services   in   se- 

curing  reward. 

491.  Conditions     in    offer    of    re- 

ward    must      be     complied 
with. 

492.  No    lien    implied    from   offer 

of  "Liberal   Reward." 

493.  Withdrawal    of    offer    of    re- 

ward. 

494.  Finder  entitled  to  a  portion 

of   reward. 

495.  Reward  to  detective. 

496.  Waiver    of    reward    for    lost 

property. 

497.  State    statutes. 


§  483.  Finder  of  goods  has  no  lien  thereon  at  common 
law. — The  finder  of  a  chattel  has  at  common  law  no  lien 
upon  it  for  the  labor  and  expenses  he  may  have  been  to  in 
securing  it,  and  in  taking  care  of  it  for  the  owner.  A  quan- 
tity of  timber  belonging  to  one  Nicholson  was  accidentally 
loosened  from  a  dock  in  which  it  was  placed  on  the  bank 
of  the  Thames,  and  was  carried  a  considerable  distance  by 
the  tide  and  left  at  low  water  upon  a  towing-path.  Chap- 
man, finding  it  there,  placed  it  in  a  safe  place  beyond  the 
reach  of  the  tide  at  high  water.  The  owner  then  demanded 
the  timber  of  Chapman,  who  refused  to  deliver  it  up,  unless 
a  certain  sum  should  be  paid  to  him  for  his  trouble  in  secur- 
ing and  taking  care  of  the  timber.  In  an  action  of  trover  by 
the  owner  against  Chapman,  the  court  held  that  he  had  no 

434 


435  LIEN    OF    A    FINDER    OF    LOST    GOODS.  §    483 

lien  on  the  timber.^  Lord  Chief  Justice  Eyre,  delivering  the 
opinion,  said:  "It  is  therefore  a  case  of  mere  finding  and 
taking  care  of  the  thing  found  (I  am  willing  to  agree)  for 
the  owner.  This  is  a  good  office,  and  meritorious,  at  least 
in  the  moral  sense  of  the  word,  and  certainly  entitles  the 
party  to  some  reasonable  recompense  from  the  bounty,  if 
not  from  the  justice  of  the  owner;  and  of  which,  if  it  were 
refused,  a  court  of  justice  would  go  as  far  as  it  could  go, 
towards  enforcing  the  payment.  *  *  *  So  it  would  be  if 
a  horse  had  strayed,  and  was  not  taken  up  as  an  estray  by 
the  lord  under  his  manorial  rights,  but  was  taken  up  by  some 
good-natured  man,  and  taken  care  of  by  him,  till  at  some 
trouble  and  perhaps  at  some  expense,  he  had  found  out  the 
owner.  So  it  would  be  in  every  other  case  of  finding  that 
can  be  stated  (the  claim  to  recompense  differing  in  degree, 
but  not  in  principle) ;  which  therefore  reduces  the  merits  of 
this  case  to  this  short  question,  whether  every  man  who 
finds  the  property  of  another,  which  happens  to  have  been 
lost  or  mislaid,  and  voluntarily  puts  himself  to  some  trouble 
and  expense  to  preserve  the  thing,  and  to  find  the  owner, 
has  a  lien  upon  it  for  the  casual,  fluctuating  and  uncertain 
amount  of  the  recompense  which  he  may  reasonably  de- 
serve? It  is  enough  to  say,  that  there  is  no  instance  of  such 
a  lien  having  been  claimed  and  allowed;  the  case  of  the 
pointer  dog-  was  a  case  in  which  it  was  claimed  and  dis- 
allowed, and  it  was  thought  too  clear  a  case  to  bear  an  argu- 
ment. Principles  of  public  policy  and  commercial  necessity 
support  the  lien  in  the  case  of  salvage.  Not  only  public  pol- 
icy and  commercial  necessity  do  not  require  that  it  should  be 
established  in  this  case,  but  very  great  inconvenience  may 
be  apprehended  from  it,  if  it  were  to  be  established.  *  *  * 
I  mentioned  in  the  course  of  the  cause  another  great  incon- 
venience, namely,  the  situation  in  which  an  owner  seeking 

1  Nicholson    v.    Chapman,    2    H.  -  Binstead    v.     Buck,    2    W.    Bl. 

Black.  254,  1117. 


§    484  LIENS.  436 

to  recover  his  property  in  an  action  of  trover  will  ])e  placed, 
if  he  is  at  his  peril  to  make  a  tender  of  a  sufficient  recom- 
pense, before  he  brings  his  action:  such  an  owner  must  al- 
ways pay  too  much,  because  he  has  no  means  of  knowing 
exactly  how  much  he  ought  to  pay,  and  because  he  must 
tender  enough.  I  know  there  are  cases  in  which  the  owner 
of  property  must  submit  to  this  inconvenience;  but  the  num- 
ber of  them  ought  not  to  be  increased:  perhaps  it  is  better 
for  the  public  that  these  voluntary  acts  of  benevolence  from 
one  man  to  another,  which  are  charities  and  moral  duties, 
but  not  legal  duties,  should  depend  altogether  for  their  re- 
ward upon  the  moral  duty  of  gratitude.  But  at  any  rate,  it 
is  fitting  that  he  who  claims  the  reward  in  such  case  should 
take  upon  himself  the  burthen  of  proving  the  nature  of  the 
service  which  he  has  performed,  and  the  quantum  of  the  rec- 
ompense which  he  demands,  instead  of  throwing  it  upon  the 
owner  to  estimate  it  for  him,  at  the  hazard  of  being  nonsuited 
in  an  action  of  trover." 

§  484.     A  riparian  owner  has  no   lien   on  property   cast 

adrift  on  his  land.-^ — If  a  bridge  be  swept  away  by  a  flood, 
and  parts  of  it  lodge  upon  the  land  of  a  riparian  owner,  who 
removes  them  at  his  own  expense  after  the  owner  of  the 
bridge  had  refused  to  do  so,  the  landowner  is  liable  in 
trover  for  a  conversion  of  the  fragments  of  the  bridge.* 
A  riparian  owner  cannot  even  claim  a  lien  for  preserving  a 
raft  cast  upon  his  land.^  The  claim  in  these  cases  is  very 
unlike  that  of  salvage  of  goods  at  sea.  The  distinction  be- 
tween salvage,  properly  so  called,  and  the  taking  care  of 
goods  found  upon  the  banks  of  rivers,  is  fully  pointed  out  by 
Chief  Justice   Eyre,    in   the   leading   case   already  noticed:® 

3  Nicholson    v.    Chapman,    2    H.  ^  Eter     v.     Edwards,     4     Watts 
Bl.   254;    Baker   v.    Hoag,   3   Barb.      (Pa.)   63. 

(N.  Y.)   203,   7   Barb.   (N.   Y.)   113.  6  Nicholson    v.    Chapman,    2    H. 

4  Foster   v.   Juniata    Bridge   Co.,      Bl.   254. 
16  Pa.  St.  393. 


437  LIEN    OF    A    FINDER    OF    LOST    GOODS.  §    484 

"The  only  difficulty  that  remained  with  any  of  us,  after  we 
had  heard  this  case  argued,  was  upon  the  question  whether 
this  transaction  could  be  assimilated  to  salvage?  The  taking 
care  of  goods  left  by  the  tide  upon  the  banks  of  a  navigable 
river,  communicating  with  the  sea,  may  in  a  vulgar  sense  be 
said  to  be  salvage;  but  it  has  none  of  the  qualities  of  salvage, 
in  respect  of  which  the  laws  of  all  civilized  nations,  the  laws 
of  Oleron,  and  our  own  laws  in  particular,  have  provided  that 
a  recompense  is  due  for  the  saving,  and  that  our  law  has 
also  provided  that  this  recompense  should  be  a  lien  upon  the 
goods  which  have  been  saved.  Goods  carried  by  sea  are 
necessarily  and  unavoidably  exposed  to  the  perils  which 
storms,  tempests,  and  accidents  (far  beyond  the  reach  of 
human  foresight  to  prevent)  are  hourly  creating,  and 
against  which,  it  too  often  happens  that  the  greatest  dili- 
gence and  the  most  strenuous  exertions  of  the  mariner  can- 
not protect  them.  When  goods  are  thus  in  imminent  danger 
of  being  lost,  it  is  most  frequently  at  the  hazard  of  the  lives 
of  those  who  save  them,  that  they  are  saved.  Principles  of 
public  policy  dictate  to  civilized  and  commercial  countries, 
not  only  the  propriety,  but  even  the  absolute  necessit}',  of 
establishing  a  liberal  recompense  for  the  encouragement  of 
those  who  engage  in  so  dangerous  a  service.  Such  are 
grounds  upon  which  salvage  stands.  *  *  *  But  see  how 
very  unlike  this  salvage  is  to  the  case  now  under  considera- 
tion. In  a  navigable  river  within  the  flux  and  reflux  of  the 
tide,  but  at  a  great  distance  from  the  sea,  pieces  of  timber  lie 
moored  together  in  convenient  places;  carelessness,  a  slight 
accident,  perhaps  a  mischievous  boy,  casts  off  the  mooring- 
rope,  and  the  timber  floats  from  the  place  where  it  was 
deposited,  till  the  tide  falls  and  leaves  it  again  somewhere 
upon  the  banks  of  the  river.  *  *  '-^  The  timber  is  found 
lying  upon  the  banks  of  the  river,  and  is  taken  into  the  pos- 
session and  under  the  care  of  the  Defendant,  without  any 
extraordinary  exertions,  without  the  least  personal  risk,  and 


§    485  LIENS.  438 

in  truth,  with  very  little  trouble.  It  is  therefore  a  case  of 
mere  finding,  and  taking  care  of  the  thing  found  (I  am  will- 
ing to  agree)  for  the  owner." 

§  485.     Finder's  right  to  compensation  for  his  services. — 

Whether  a  finder  can  recover  compensation  for  his  services 
in  respect  of  the  property  found  seems  to  have  been  an  un- 
settled question  at  the  time  of  the  decision  of  Nicholson  v. 
Chapman,'^  in  1793.  But  in  a  Kentucky  case,  in  1836,^  it  was 
held  that  the  finder  may  recover  for  his  time  and  expenses, 
on  the  ground  that  there  is  an  implied  request  on  the  part  of 
one  who  has  lost  a  chattel  to  every  one  else  to  aid  him  in 
recovering  it.  It  now  seems  to  be  an  established  doctrine 
that  the  finder  is  entitled  to  be  paid  his  reasonable  expenses 
incurred  in  respect  of  the  thing  found.''  Thus,  the  owner  of 
a  boat,  who  has  taken  it  from  a  person  who  found  it  adrift 
on  tidewater  and  brought  it  to  shore,  is  liable  for  the 
necessary  expense  of  preserving  the  boat  while  it  remained 
in  his  possession.  "His  claim  is  for  the  reasonable  expenses 
of  keeping  and  repairing  the  boat  after  he  had  brought  it  to 
the  shore;  and  the  single  question  is,  whether  a  promise  is 
to  be  implied  by  law  from  the  owner  of  a  boat,  upon  taking 
it  from  a  person  who  has  found  it  adrift  on  tide  water  and 
brought  it  ashore,  to  pay  him  for  the  necessary  expenses  of 
preserving  the  boat  while  in  his  possession.  We  are  of 
opinion  that  such  a  promise  is  to  be  implied.  The  plaintiff, 
as  the  finder  of  the  boat,  had  the  lawful  possession  of  it,  and 
the  right  to  do  what  was  necessary  for  its  preservation. 
Whatever  might  have  been  the  liability  of  the  owner  if  he 
had  chosen  to  let  the  finder  retain  the  boat,   by  taking  it 

7  2   H.    Bl.   254.  Y.)   102,  6  Am.  Dec.  316;  Tome  v. 

8  Reeder   v.   Anderson's   Admrs.,  Four  Cribs  of  Lumber,  Fed.  Cas. 
4  Dana  (Ky.)   193.  14083,  Taney  (U.  S.)  533.     Contra, 

9  Chase    v.    Corcoran,    106    Mass.  Watts   v.   Ward,    1    Oregon  86,    62 
286;  Amory  v.  Flyn,  10  Johns.  (N.  Am.   Dec.  299. 


439  LIEN  OF  A  FINDER  OF  LOST  GOODS.         §  487 

from  him  he  made  himself  liable  to  pay  the  reasonable  ex- 
penses incurred  in  keeping  and  repairing  it."^^ 

§  486.  Landlord  has  no  lien  on  chattels  left  on  his 
premises. — In  the  absence  of  an  agreement,  a  landlord,  un- 
less he  is  an  innkeeper,  has  no  lien  on  chattels  left  on  his 
premises  by  an  outgoing  tenant. ^^  The  law  applicable  to 
cases  of  deposits  by  the  finding  of  goods  lost  on  land,  and 
deposits  of  property  made  by  the  force  of  winds  or  floods, 
which  are  termed  involuntary  deposits,  is  applicable  to  the 
case  of  goods  left  by  the  outgoing  tenant.  The  law  in'those 
cases  gives  no  lien  for  the  care  and  expense  of  the  finder  in 
keeping  and  preserving  the  property.^^  It  is  only  in  case  that 
the  loser  offers  a  reward  for  the  restoration  of  the  property 
that  the  finder  has  a  lien  upon  it  to  the  extent  of  the  reward 
so  offered. 

§  487.  Reward  offered. — Though  the  finder  of  lost  prop- 
erty has  no  lien  upon  it  at  common  law  for  his  services  in  re- 
covering and  restoring  it  to  the  owner,  yet,  if  the  owner  has 
offered  a  reward  for  the  return  of  the  property,  or  has  en- 
tered into  an  agreement  to  pay  for  its  discovery  and  restora- 
tion, the  finder  has  a  lien  upon  the  property  for  the  payment 
of  the  reward, ^^  or  of  the  labor  and  expense  of  rescuing  it 

10  Chase  v.   Corcoran,   106   Mass.  the  latter  case  Dorsey,  C.  J.,  said: 
286,  per  Gray,  J.  "If  any  article  of  personal   prop- 
yl Preston   v.      Neale,     12     Gray  erty    has    been    lost,    or    strayed 
(Mass.)   222.  away,  or  escaped  from  its  owner, 

12  Preston  v.  Neale,  12  Gray  and  he  offers  a  certain  reward, 
(Mass.)  222,  per   Metcalf,  J.  payable  to  him  who   shall  recover 

13  Wentworth  v.  Day,  3  Mete.  and  deliver  it  back  to  his  posses- 
(Mass.),  352,  2)1  Am.  Dec.  145;  sion,  it  is  but  a  just  exposition 
Preston  v.  Neale,  12  Gray  of  his  offer,  that  he  did  not  ex- 
(Mass.),  222;  Cummings  v.  Gann,  pect  that  he  who  had  expended 
52  Pa.  St.  484;  Wood  v.  Pierson,  his  time  and  money  in  the  pursuit 
45  Mich.  313,  7  N.  W.  888;  Har-  and  recovery  of  the  lost  or  es- 
son  v.  Pike,  16  Ind.  140;  Wilson  caped  property,  would  restore  it 
V.   Guyton,  8  Gill   (Md.)   213.       In  to  him,  but  upon  the  payment  of 


488 


LIENS. 


440 


under  the  agreement.^'*  The  finder  in  such  case  is  entitled 
to  receive  his  compensation  before  he  parts  with  the  pos- 
session of  the  property.  He  stands  in  the  same  position  as  a 
mechanic  or  artisan  who  performs  services  upon  property  at 
the  request  of  the  owner;  and,  Hke  a  mechanic  or  artisan,  he 
has  a  lien  upon  the  property  itself  for  the  amount  of  his  com- 
pensation.^^ 

§  488.  Offer  of  a  reward  becomes  a  contract. — An  ofTer 
of  a  reward  becomes  a  contract  with  any  one  who  complies 
with  the  terms  of  the  ofTer.  Thus,  where  one  offered  a  re- 
ward of  twenty  dollars  for  the  return  of  a  watch  which  he 
had  lost,  but  refused  to  pay  the  reward,  and  the  finder  re- 
fused to  deliver  the  watch,  in  an  action  of  trover  by  the 
owner  against  the  finder,  judgment  was  given  for  the  de- 
fendant.^^^  Chief  Justice  Shaw,  delivering  the  opinion  in  the 
leading  case  of  Wentworth  v.  Day,  said :  "The  duty  of  the 
plaintiff  to  pay  the  stipulated  reward  arises  from  the  prom- 
ise contained  in  his  advertisement.  That  promise  was,  that 
whoever  should  return  his  watch  to  the  printing-office  should 
receive  twenty  dollars.  No  other  time  or  place  of  payment 
was  fixed.     The  natural,  if  not  the  necessary  implication  is, 


the  proffered  reward,  and  that  as 
security  for  this,  he  was  to  re- 
main in  possession  of  the  same 
until  its  restoration  to  its  owner, 
and  then  the  payment  of  the  re- 
ward was  to  be  a  simultaneous 
act.  It  is  no  forced  construction 
of  his  act  to  say  that  he  designed 
to  be  so  understood  by  him  who 
should  become  entitled  to  the  re- 
ward. It  is,  consequently,  a  lien 
created  by  contract.  It  is  for  the 
interest  of  property  holders  so 
to  regard  it.  It  doubles  their 
prospect  of  a  restoration  to  their 
property.  To  strangers  it  is 
everything;        for      few,       indeed, 


would  spend  their  time  and 
money,  and  incur  the  risks  inci- 
dent to  bailment,  but  from  a  be- 
lief in  the  existence  of  such  a 
lien.  Public  convenience,  sound 
policy,  and  all  the  analogies  of 
the  law,  lend  their  aid  in  support 
of   such   a   principle." 

14  Baker  v.  Hoag,  7  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  113,  reversed  7  N.  Y.  555,  Seld. 
Notes  45,  59  Am.  Dec.  431. 

15  Baker  v.  Hoag,  7  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  113,  reversed  7  N.  Y.  555,  Seld. 
Notes  45,  59  Am.  Dec.  431. 

iG  Wentworth  v.  Day,  3  Mete. 
(Mass.)  352,  2,1  Am.  Dec.  145;  Har- 
son  V.   Pike,  16  Ind.   140. 


441  LIEN    OF    A    FINDER    OF    LOST    GOODS.  §    489 

that  the  acts  of  performance  were  to  be  mutual  and  simul- 
taneous: the  one  to  give  up  the  watch,  on  payment  of  the 
reward;  the  other  to  pay  the  reward,  on  receiving  the  watch. 
Such  being,  in  our  judgment,  the  nature  and  legal  effect  of 
this  contract,  we  are  of  opinion  that  the  defendant,  on  being 
ready  to  deliver  up  the  watch,  had  a  right  to  receive  the 
reward,  in  behalf  of  himself  and  his  son,  and  was  not  bound 
to  surrender  the  actual  possession  of  it,  till  the  reward  was 
paid;  and  therefore  a  refusal  to  deliver  it,  without  such  pay- 
ment, was  not  a  conversion.  It  was  competent  for  the  loser 
of  the  watch  to  propose  his  own  terms.  He  might  have 
promised  to  pay  the  reward  at  a  given  time  after  the  watch 
should  have  been  restored,  or  in  any  other  manner  incon- 
sistent with  a  lien  for  the  reward  on  the  article  restored;  in 
which  case,  no  such  lien  would  exist.  The  person  restoring 
the  watch  would  look  only  to  the  personal  responsibility  of 
the  advertiser.  It  was  for  the  latter  to  consider,  v/hether 
such  an  offer  would  be  equally  efficacious  in  bringing  back 
his  lost  property,  as  an  offer  of  a  reward  secured  by  a  pledge 
of  the  property  itself;  or  whether,  on  the  contrary,  it  would 
not  afford  to  the  finder  a  strong  temptation  to  conceal  it. 
With  these  motives  before  him,  he  made  an  offer,  to  pay  the 
reward  on  the  restoration  of  the  watch ;  and  his  subsequent 
attempt  to  get  the  w^atch,  without  performing  his  promise, 
is  equally  inconsistent  with  the  rules  of  law  and  the  dictates 
of  justice." 

§  489.  Offer  of  reward  by  a  sheriff. — A  telegram  to  a 
sheriff  offering  a  reward  for  the  recovery  of  a  stolen  horse 
is  a  general  offer,  and  binds  the  sender  to  any  person  who 
recovers  the  horse,  and  gives  a  lien  on  it  till  the  reward  is 
paid.  The  reward  in  this  case  was  claimed  by  one  Cum- 
mings,  an  innkeeper,  who  had  previously  detained  the  horses 
of  two  men  who  had  stopped  at  his  inn,  suspecting  that  the 
horses  had  been  stolen.  He  sent  for  the  sheriff,  and  had  one 
of  the  men  arrested.     When  the   sheriff'  received  the  tele- 


§    490  LIENS.  442 

gram,  he  showed  it  to  Cunimings,  who  had  the  horse  in  his 
possession.  The  sheriff  claimed  the  reward,  and  it  was  paid 
to  him;  and  the  owner  of  the  horse  took  it  by  replevin  from 
Cummings.  Judge  Thompson,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the 
court,  said:^'  "The  recovery  of  the  property  was  the  object, 
and  the  hands  by  which  the  result  should  be  accomplished 
were  no'thing  to  the  [owner]  plaintiff.  It  was  as  much  an 
offer  to  Cummings  as  to  the  sheriff  or  anybody.  It  amounted 
to  nothing  unless  to  a  successful  party.  It  was  but  an  offer 
until  its  terms  were  complied  with.  When  that  was  done,  it 
thenceforth  became  a  binding  contract,  which  the  offerer 
was  bound  to  perform  his  share  of.  *  *  *  The  service  is 
to  be  performed  for  a  reward  offered,  not  especially  to  any 
one,  but  to  any  one  who  may  undertake  and  perform  the 
request.  It  is  valuable  towards  both  the  owner  and  his  prop- 
erty, and  why  should  there  not  be  a  lien  ?  The  owner  may 
live  at  a  distance,  and  if  the  finder  is  required  to  yield  up  the 
property  and  then  look  to  the  owner,  it  might  be  great  in- 
justice to  him;  whereas  it  is  no  injury  to  the  owner,  who 
constitutes  the  finder  his  bailee  by  his  advertisement  to  per- 
form the  services  of  seizure  and  taking  care  of  the  property." 

§  490.  Rendition  of  services  in  securing  reward. — To  en- 
title a  person  to  a  reward  he  must  show  a  rendition  of 
services  with  a  view  of  obtaining  the  reward.  The  finding  of 
property  lost,  and  advertising  it  without  knowledge  of  the 
offer  of  a  reward,  does  not  entitle  the  finder  to  a  reward  of- 
fered. If  a  finder  has  any  claim,  it  is  in  fact  a  claim  upon  a 
contract.  Where  a  contract  is  proposed  to  all  the  world,  in 
the  form  of  an  offer  of  a  reward  for  the  recovery,  or  for  in- 
formation leading  to  the  recovery  of  property  lost,  any  one 
may  assent  to  it,  and  it  is  binding  if  he  complies  with  the 
terms  of  the  offer;  but  he  cannot  assent  without  knowledge 

17  Cummings  v.  Gann,  52  Pa.  Day,  3  Mete.  (Mass.)  352,  Zl  Am. 
St.  484.     See,  also,   Wentworth   v.      Dec.  145,  per  Shaw,  C.  J. 


443  LIEN    OF    A    FINDER    OF    LOST    GOODS.  §    492 

of  the  proposition.^^  But  it  is  not  necessary  that  notice 
should  be  given  to  the  party  offering  the  reward  that  his 
proposal  is  being  acted  upon.^^ 

§  491.  Conditions  in  offer  of  reward  must  be  complied 
with. — A  finder  must  comply  with  all  the  conditions  of  an 
offer  of  reward.  If  this  be  payable  at  a  certain  place,  it  must 
be  demanded  at  that  place.  But  a  demand  at  a  place  named 
may  be  waived.^*' 

§  492.     No  lien  implied  from  offer  of  "liberal  reward." — 

But  no  lien  is  implied  by  an  offer  of  "a  liberal  reward."' 
Under  such  an  offer  it  may  well  be  asked,  as  it  was  by  the 
Court  of  Appeals  of  Maryland,^^  "Who  was  to  be  the  arbiter 
of  the  liberality  of  the  offered  reward?  It  cannot  be  sup- 
posed that  the  owner,  by  his  offer,  designed  to  constitute 
the  recoverer  of  his  property  the  exclusive  judge  of  the 
amount  to  be  paid  him  as  a  reward.  And  it  is  equally  unrea- 
sonable and  unjust  to  say  that  the  owner  should  be  such  ex- 
clusive judge.  In  the  event  of  a  difference  between  them 
upon  the  subject,  the  amount  to  be  paid  must  be  ascertained 
by  the  judgment  of  the  appropriate  judicial  tribunal.  This 
would  involve  the  delays  incident  to  litigation,  and  it  would 
be  a  gross  perversion  of  the  intention  of  the  owner  to  infer, 
from  his  offered  reward,  an  agreement  on  his  part,  that  he 
was  to  be  kept  out  of  the  possession  of  his  property  till  all 
the  delays  of  litigation  were  exhausted.     To  the  bailee  thus 

18  Howland  v.   Lounds,  51   N.  Y.  proposition  stated  in  the  text,  but 

604,     10    Am.    Rep.    654.     And   see  the   case   is  not  in  point. 
Fitch   V.    Snedaker,   38    N.    Y.   248,  lo  Harson  v.  Pike,  16  Ind.  140. 

97  Am.  Dec.  791;  Lee  v.  Flemings-  20  Wood    v.    Pierson,     45     Mich, 

burg,  7  Dana  (Ky.)  28.    The  Court  313,  7  N.  W.  888.     And  see  Went- 

of  Appeals  of  Kentucky  departed  worth    v.    Day,    3    Mete.    (Mass.) 

from   this  authority  in  Auditor  v.  352,  27  Am.   Dec.   145. 
Ballard,     9     Bush     (Ky.)     572,     15  21  Wilson     v.     Guyton,     8     Gill 

Am.   Rep.   728.     Williams   v.    Car-  (Md.)  213,  per  Dorsey,  C.  J.     See 

wardine,  4  B.  &  Ad.  621,  is  some-  Shuey  v.   United   States,  92  U.   S. 

times  cited  to  the  contrary  of  the  7Z,  23   L.    ed.   697. 


§  493  LIENS.  444 

in  possession  of  property,  such  a  lien  would  rarely  be  valu- 
able except  as  a  means  of  oppression  and  extortion;  and, 
therefore,  the  law  will  never  infer  its  existence  either  from 
the  agreement  of  the  parties,  or  in  furtherance  of  public  con- 
venience or  policy." 

§  493.  Withdrawal  of  offer  of  reward. — An  offer  of  a  re- 
ward for  lost  property  may  be  withdrawn  at  any  time,  until 
something-  is  accomplished  in  pursuance  of  the  offer.  Serv- 
ices afterwards  rendered  by  one  who  was  ignorant  of  the 
withdrawal  of  the  offer  do  not  entitle  him  to  the  reward. ^^ 
"Until  something  is  done  in  pursuance  of  it,  it  is  a  mere  offer, 
and  may  be  revoked.  But  if,  before  it  is  retracted,  one  so 
far  complies  with  it,  as  to  perform  the  labor,  for  which  the 
reward  is  stipulated,  it  is  the  ordinary  case  of  labor  done  on 
request,  and  becomes  a  contract  to  pay  the  stipulated  com- 
pensation. It  is  not  a  gratuitous  service,  because  something 
is  done  which  the  party  was  not  bound  to  do,  and  without 
such  offer  might  not  have  done."-^ 

§  494.  Finder  entitled  to  a  portion  of  reward. — A  finder 
may  be  entitled  to  a  portion  of  a  reward  offered  proportioned 
to  the  value  of  the  property  returned.  Thus,  where  a  person 
had  lost  from  his  pocket  a  number  of  bank-bills,  contained 
in  a  paper  wrapper,  amounting  to  more  than  fifteen  hundred 
dollars,  he  published  an  advertisement,  in  which  he  described 
the  money  lost,  and  offered  a  reward  of  two  hundred  dollars 
to  any  person  who  would  find  and  restore  the  same.  The 
plaintiff  having  seen  the  advertisement,  and  having  ob- 
served an  unusual  number  of  bank-bills  in  the  possession  of  a 
man  whom   he  suspected  of  having  stolen  or  found  them, 

22Wentworth    v.    Day,    3    Mete.  (Mass.)  352,  Zl  Am.   Dec.   145,  per 

(Mass.)   352,     Zl     Am.     Dec.     145;  Shaw,     C.     J.      And    see    Symmes 

Shuey  v.    United   States,  92  U.    S.  v.  Frazier,  6  Mass.  344,  4  Am.  Dec. 

IZ.  23  L.   ed.  697.  142,  per   Parker,  J. 

23Wentworth    v.    Day,    3    Mete. 


445  LIEN    OF    A    FINDER   OF    LOST    GOODS.  §    496 

gave  notice  to  the  defendant,  who  in  consequence  recovered 
a  large  part  of  the  sum  lost.  It  was  held  that  the  finder  was 
entitled  to  be  paid  a  pro  rata  proportion  of  the  reward  of- 
fered.''^ "An  offer  of  a  reward  might  undoubtedly  be  so  ex- 
pressed as  to  exclude  any  apportionment ;  for  the  owner  of 
the  property  may  prescribe  his  terms  for  the  restoration  of 
it,  he  having  a  right  to  reclaim  it  wherever  it  might  be  found. 
But  where  a  compensation  is  offered  in  general  terms,  like 
those  in  the  present  case,  it  is  consistent  with  honesty  and 
fair  dealing,  and  with  the  interest  of  the  loser  himself,  and 
not  inconsistent  with  any  principle  of  law,  that  a  proportion 
of  the  reward  should  be  recovered,  according  to  the  sum 
actually  restored. "^^ 

§  495.  Reward  to  detective. — A  detective  officer  may 
have  a  lien  upon  property  recovered  from  the  wrongful  pos- 
session of  another,  under  an  agreement  that  he  shall  be  paid 
for  his  services ;  but  he  has  no  lien  in  case  the  wrongful 
holder  has  already  sent  the  property  to  the  owner,  and  the 
officer  compels  him  by  arrest  to  recall  it  before  it  was  de- 
livered to  the  owner.-*' 

§  496.  Waiver  of  reward  for  lost  property. — A  reward 
for  lost  property  is  not  waived  by  insisting  on  its  identifica- 
tion.-' It  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury  whether  the  finder 
of  a  chattel  has  given  a  fair  and  reasonable  opportunity  for 
its  identification  before  restoring  it,  and  whether  the  claim- 
ant should  have  been  given  an  opportunity  to  inspect  it  in 
order  to  decide  whether  it  belonged  to  him.  Lord  Coke 
states  the  duties  of  a  finder  thus:-^  "If  a  man  therefore  which 

2i  Symmes    v.    Frazier,    6    Mass.  2G  Hoffman    v.     Barthelmess,    63 

344,  4  Am.   Dec.   142.  Ga.  759,  36  Am.  Rep.  129. 

25  Per   Parker,  J.,  in   Symmes  v.  27  Wood   v.    Pierson,     45     Mich. 

Frazier,  6   Mass.   344,  4  Am.    Dec.      313,  7  N.   W.  888. 
142.  28  Isaack  v.   Clark,  2  Bulst.   306, 

312. 


§  497  LIENS.  446 

finds  goods,  if  he  be  wise,  he  will  then  search  out  the  right 
owner  of  them,  and  so  deliver  them  unto  him;  if  the  owner 
comes  unto  him,  and  demands  them,  and  he  answers  him, 
that  it  is  not  known  unto  him  whether  he  be  the  true  owner 
of  the  goods,  or  not,  and  for  this  cause  he  refuseth  to  deliver 
them;  this  refusal  is  no  conversion,  if  he  keep  them  for 
him."  In  a  Michigan  case  on  this  point,  Mr.  Justice 
Graves,  after  quoting  this  passage,  says  :-^  "Lord  Coke 
very  clearly  enforces  the  right  and  duty  of  the  finder 
to  be  certain  of  the  true  owner  before  he  makes  delivery.  As 
he  is  bound  to  hold  for  the  true  owner,  and  is  liable  in  case 
of  misdelivery,  the  law  makes  it  his  duty  as  well  as  his  right, 
even  when  there  is  no  reward,  to  'search  out,'  or  in  other 
language,  find  the  'right  owner,'  or  see  to  it  that  he  submits 
to  no  other  than  the  'right  owner.'  Undoubtedly  if 
Chapman's  [the  finder's]  conduct  was  such  that  a  jury  would, 
under  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  feel  satisfied  that  he  was 
actually  perverse  and  unreasonable,  and  pursued  a  course 
which  was  adapted  to  baffle  fair  investigation,  instead  of 
maintaining  the  attitude  of  a  man  whose  duty  it  was,  in  the 
quaint  terms  of  Lord  Coke,  to  'search  out  the  right  owner,' 
it  would  be  just  to  regard  him  as  having  detained  the  prop- 
erty unlawfully." 

§  497.  State  statutes. — In  several  states  there  are  stat- 
utes which  confer  a  lien  upon  the  finder  of  a  chattel  for  his 
services  and  expenses  in  recovering  it  and  taking  care  of  it. 
Some  of  these  statutes  are  confined  wholly  to  estrays,  others 
apply  to  goods,  and  still  others  to  both  estrays  and  goods. ^^ 

20  Wood     V.     Pierson,    45    Mich.  Iowa:     Code  1897,  §  2373. 

313,  7  N.   W.  888.  Maine:  Rev.  Stats.  1903,  ch.   100, 

30  Connecticut:     Gen.  Stat.   1902,  §§   10-18. 

§§  4680,  4681.  Oregon:     Bellinger    &    Cotton's 

Illinois:       Kurd's      Rev.      Stats.  Ann.      Codes      and      Stats.       1902, 

1913,  ch.  50.  §§  3887-3891. 

Indiana:  Burns'  Ann.  Stats.  1914, 
§§  7155-7186. 


447  LIEN    OF    A    FINDER    OF    LOST    GOODS.  §    49/ 

It  is  not  practicable  to  give  a  statement  of  the  provisions 
of  these  statutes,  and  therefore  only  a  reference  is  made  to 
them,  with  the  exception  only  of  the  statute  in  force  in  Cali- 
fornia, North  Dakota,  and  South  Dakota,  which  is  given  on 
account  of  its  comprehensiveness  and  brevity  as  well. 

In  California,^^  North  Dakota,  and  South  Dakota,^-  it  is 
provided  that — 

The  finder  of  a  thing  is  entitled  to  compensation  for  all 
expenses  necessarily  incurred  by  him  in  its  preservation,  and 
for  any  other  service  necessarily  performed  by  him  about  it, 
and  to  a  reasonable  reward  for  keeping  it. 

The  finder  of  a  thing  may  exonerate  himself  from  liability 
at  any  time  by  placing  it  on  storage  with  any  responsible 
person  of  good  character,  at  a  reasonable  expense. 

The  finder  of  a  thing  may  sell  it,  if  it  is  a  thing  which  is 
commonly  the  subject  of  sale,  when  the  owner  cannot,  with 
reasonable  diligence,  be  found,  or,  being  found,  refuses  upon 
demand  to  pay  the  lawful  charges  of  the  finder,  in  the  follow- 
ing cases:  1.  When  the  thing  is  in  danger  of  perishing  or  of 
losing  the  greater  part  of  its  value;  or,  2.  When  the  lawful 
charges  of  the  finder  amounts  to  two-thirds  of  its  value. 

A  sale  under  the  provisions  of  the  last  section  must  be 
made  in  the  same  manner  as  the  sale  of  a  thing  pledged. 
The  owner  of  a  thing  may  exonerate  himself  from  the  claims 
of  the  finder  by  surrendering  it  to  him  in  satisfaction  thereof. 

31  Civ.    Code,    1906,    §§    1864-1872.  32  North      Dakota,     Rev.      Code 

See  as  to   lost  money,   Pol.   Code      1905,    §§    5478-5486;   South    Dakota, 
1906,  §  3136  et  seq.  Rev.  Code  1903,  §§  1384-1392,  2976. 


CHAPTER  XL 


INNKEEPERS'  AND  BOARDING-HOUSE  KEEPERS'  LIENS. 


Sec. 

498.  An      innkeeper's       particular 

lien. 

499.  Lien  on  goods  of  a  third  per- 

son. 

500.  Attempt  to  limit  lien  of  inn- 

keeper on  goods  of  a  third 
person. 
$01.     Settled   rule. 

502.  Knowledge    of    innkeeper    as 

to  ownership  of  baggage. 

503.  Innkeeper's   lien   on  goods. 

504.  No  lien  on  a  horse  unless   it 

belongs  to  his  guest. 

505.  Innkeeper  defined. 

506.  What        constitutes      one      a 

guest. 

507.  Husband     liable     for     wife's 

bill   at   an   inn. 

508.  Lien   on   infant's   baggage. 

509.  Innkeeper       cannot       detain 

guest's   person. 

510.  Property    exempt    from    exe- 

cution. 

511.  Distinction      between      guest 

and  boarder. 

512.  A   lodging  house  keeper   not 

an   innkeeper. 

513.  Lien       affected     by      special 

agreement. 

514.  When    boarding-house    keep- 

er's  lien  attaches. 

515.  Statutes      giving      liens        to 

boarding-house    keepers. 

516.  Lien  secures  only  reasonable 

charges. 

517.  Liens  for  advanced  money. 


Sec. 

518. 

General    lien    for   amount    of 

the  bill. 

519. 

Possession  is  essential  to  the 

preservation   of  this  lien. 

520. 

Guest's     possession     secured 

by    fraud    will    not    prevent 

innkeeper's  lien. 

521. 

Temporary    loss    of    posses- 

sion will  not  waive  lien. 

522. 

No  waiver  by  accepting  other 

security. 

522a. 

Priority. 

523. 

Lien     waived     by     unlawful 

sale. 

524. 

Care  and  use  of  the  property 

detained. 

525. 

Innkeeper's    lien    confers    no 

right  of  sale. 

525a. 

Alabama. 

525b. 

Arizona. 

526. 

California. 

526a. 

Colorado. 

527. 

Connecticut. 

527a. 

District  of   Columbia. 

527b. 

Florida. 

527c. 

Georgia. 

527d. 

Illinois. 

527e. 

Iowa. 

528. 

Kansas. 

529. 

Kentucky. 

530. 

Louisiana. 

531. 

Maine. 

531a. 

Maryland. 

531b. 

Massachusetts. 

531c. 

Michigan. 

532. 

Minnesota. 

448 


bee. 

536d. 

Oregon. 

537. 

Pennsylvania. 

S37a. 

South  Carolina. 

537b. 

South   Dakota. 

537c. 

Tennessee. 

537(1. 

Texas. 

538. 

Utah. 

538a. 

Virginia. 

539. 

Washington. 

539a. 

West  Virginia. 

539b. 

Wisconsin. 

539c. 

Wyoming. 

449  innkeepers'  liens.  §  499 

Sec. 

532a.  Mississippi. 

533.  Missouri. 
533a.  Montana. 
533b.  Nebraska. 

534.  Nevada. 
534a.  New  Hampshire. 

535.  New  Jersey.  ' 
S35a.  New  Mexico. 

536.  New  York. 
536a.  North   Carolina. 
536b.  North  Dakota. 
536c.  Ohio. 

§  498.  An  innkeeper's  particular  lien. — An  innkeeper  has 
a  particular  lien,  for  the  reason  that  he  is  under  an  obliga- 
tion to  serve  the  public.  He  is  bound  to  receive  a  guest  and 
his  ordinary  luggage,  and  is  liable  for  the  value  of  this  if 
stolen.  His  liabiHty  for  the  goods  of  his  guest  is  a  special 
and  extraordinary  one,  and  is  founded  upon  grounds  of  pub- 
lic policy.  In  this  respect  his  lien  is  similar  to  that  of  a  com- 
mon carrier,  though  the  two  liens  are  distinct,  and  are  not 
to  be  confounded.  The  innkeeper,  in  return  for  the  obliga- 
tion imposed  upon  him  to  entertain  any  guest  who  may  come 
to  his  house,  and  the  liability  incurred  for  the  safe  keeping 
of  his  goods,  is  invested  with  a  lien  upon  the  property  of  his 
guest;  and  this  lien  has  some  exceptional  characteristics. 
Perhaps  the  most  noteworthy  of  these  characteristics  is  that 
the  lien  is  not  confined  to  property  owned  by  the  guest,  but 
attaches  to  all  property  brought  with  him,  and  in  good  faith 
received  by  the  innkeeper  as  the  property  of  the  guest. ^ 

§  499.  Lien  on  goods  of  a  third  person. — An  innkeeper 
has  a  lien  upon  the  goods  of  a  third  person  brought  to  the 

1  Cook  V.  Prentice,     13     Oregon  34,  19  Am.  Rep.  244;  Shaw  v.  Berry, 

482,  11  Pac.  226,  57  Am.  Rep.  28,  25  31  Maine  478,  52  Am.  Dec.  628.  But 

Am.  L.  Reg.  (N.  S.)   700;   Black  v.  see    Elliott    v.    Martin,    105    Mich. 

Brennan,   5   Dana   (Ky.)   310.     See  506,  63  N.  W.  525,  55  Am.  St.  461. 
also,  Mowers  v.  Fethers,  61  N.  Y. 

29 


§  499 


LIENS. 


450 


inn  by  a  guest.  At  first  the  judges  were  equally  divided  on 
the  question  whether  an  innkeeper  had  a  lien  upon  a  horse 
brought  to  the  inn  by  a  stranger.-  In  the  next  case  they 
were  divided  three  to  one  in  favor  of  the  lien.^  In  Johnson 
V.  Hill'*  it  was  stated  by  counsel  to  have  been  held  by  all  the 
judges,  that  even  in  the  case  where  a  robber  had  brought  a 
horse,  which  he  had  stolen,  to  an  inn,  the  innkeeper  was  en- 
titled to  receive  compensation  from  the  owner  before  the 
latter  could  insist  on  a  redelivery  to  himself.  Chief  Justice 
Abbot  said  he  had  no  doubt  as  to  the  law  as  stated. 

Thus  it  has  become  the  settled  law  with  reference  to  this 
lien,  that  there  is  no  distinction  between  the  goods  of  a  guest 
and  those  of  a  third  person  brought  by  a  guest,  and  in  good 
faith  received  by  the  innkeeper  as  the  property  of  the  guest. ^ 


Skipwith    V. 


the     Inn- 


keeper,  1   Bulst.   170. 

3  Robinson  v.  Walter,  3  Bulst. 
269,  1  Roll.  449,  Poph.  127. 

43  Stark.  172  (1822). 

5  Robinson  v.  Walter,  3  Bulst. 
269,  1  Roll.  449n;  Johnson  v. 
Hill,  3  Stark.  172;  Worke  v.  Gre- 
naugh.  2  Ld.  Raym.  866,  1  Salk. 
388;  Snead  v.  Watkins,  1  C.  B.  (N. 
S.)  267;  Turrill  v.  Crawley,  13  Q. 
B.  197;  Threfall  v.  Borwick,  L.  R. 
7  Q.  B.  711;  Manning  v.  Hollen- 
beck,  27  Wis.  202;  Fox  v.  Mc- 
Gregor, 11  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  41;  Grin- 
nell  V.  Cook,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.)  485,  38 
Am.  Dec.  663;  Black  v.  Brennan, 
5  Dana  (Ky.)  319;  Woodworth  v. 
Morse,  18  La.  Ann.  156;  Peet  v. 
McGraw,  25  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  653; 
Covington  v.  Newberger,  99  N. 
Car.  523,  6  S.  E.  205;  McGhee  v. 
Edwards,  87  Tenn.  506,  11  S.  W.  316, 
3  L.  R.  A.  654,  per  Folkes,  J.;  Polk 
V.  Melenbacker,  136  Mich.  611,  99 
N.  W.  867.  In  Waugh  v.  Denham. 
16  Irish  C.  L.  405,  410,  Pigot,  C.  B., 


said,  as  to  the  reason  of  this  rule  : 
"When  an  innkeeper  receives  a 
guest,  with  the  horse  on  which  he 
travels,  or  when,  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  business,  a  carrier  re- 
ceives goods  from  the  possession 
of  the  sender,  he  deals  with  a  per- 
son having  all  the  indicia  of  prop- 
erty. Possession  is,  in  itself, 
prima  facie  evidence  of  ownership. 
To  incumber  an  innkeeper,  or  a 
carrier,  with  the  obligation  of  in- 
quiring and  determining  the  rela- 
tion in  which  the  guest  or  the 
sender  of  the  goods,  stands  in  ref- 
erence to  his  possession  of  what  he 
brings,  would  be  totally  inconsist- 
ent with  the  relation  in  which  both 
the  innkeeper  and  the  carrier  stand 
towards  the  public,  for  whose 
benefit  they  profess  to  act,  and  do 
act,  in  their  respective  callings. 
The  business  of  either  could  not 
be  carried  on  if,  in  the  one  case, 
the  doors  of  the  inn  were  closed 
against  a  traveler,  or  in  the  other, 
if    the    carrier's    conveyance    were 


451  INNKEEPERS     LIENS.  §    5OO 

The  innkeeper  cannot  investigate  the  title  of  property 
brought  by  his  guests,  and  is  bound,  unless  there  is  some- 
thing to  excite  suspicion,  to  receive,  not  only  the  guest,  but 
his  horse  or  other  property  brought  by  him,  as  belonging  to 
him  because  it  is  in  his  possession.  Therefore,  if  a  guest  de- 
parts leaving  his  horse,  and  after  many  months  it  appears 
that  the  guest  had  stolen  the  horse,  and  the  owner  demands 
possession,  the  innkeeper  may  retain  him  for  his  charges  in 
keeping  him.°  Of  course  there  is  no  personal  obligation  on 
the  part  of  the  owner  to  pay  the  charges  for  keeping  the 
horse;  and  if,  upon  a  sale  by  virtue  of  the  lien,  the  proceeds 
are  insufficient  to  pay  the  innkeeper's  charges,  he  has  no 
claim,  and  can  have  no  judgment  or  decree  against  the  owner 
for  the  balance.'^ 

An  innkeeper  has  a  lien  on  a  carriage  brought  to  the  inn 
by  a  guest  for  its  standing-room,  though  the  carriage  does 
not  belong  to  the  guest  himself.'^ 

§  500.  Attempt  to  limit  lien  of  innkeeper  on  goods  of  a 
third  person. — It  has  sometimes  been  attempted  to  limit  this 
principle,  that  the  lien  of  an  innkeeper  attaches  to  goods  of 
a  third  person  brought  to  an  inn  by  a  guest,  to  such  articles 
and  property  as  a  guest  may  ordinarily  travel  with. 

delayed  at  each  stopping  place  on  rendered  to  the  thief  in  the  carry- 
his  journey,  until  such  inquiry  ing  of  the  goods."  See  also.  Rob- 
should  be  made.  But  no  such  mis-  ins  v.  Gray,  2  Q.  B.  501,  14  Reports 
chief   can  result   from  the   qualifi-  671. 

cation  which   Lord  Tenterden  ap-  '"  Black  v.  Brennan,  5  Dana  (Ky.) 

plied  to  the  rights  and  obligations  310.     But  see  Elliott  v.  Martin,  105 

of  an  innkeeper.    There  can,  I  ap-  Mich.  506,  63  N.  W.  525,  55  Am.  St. 

prehend,  be  no  room  for  doubt  that  46t,  where  it  is  held  that  an  hotel 

a  similar  qualification  applies  to  the  keeper  has  no  lien  on  a  horse  for 

rights  and  liabilities  of  a  carrier:  his  board  under  an  agreement  with 

and  that  if  a  carrier  knows  (for  ex-  one    leaving   the    horse    with   him, 

ample)  that  a  thief  gives  him  the  who  was  not  the  owner, 

goods  of  the  true  owner  to  carry,  '^  Black  v.  Brennan,  5  Dana  (Ky.) 

he    cannot    charge    the    owner    for  310. 

the  service  which  he  has  knowingly  ^  Turrill  v.  Crawley,  13  Q.  B.  197. 


§    50I  LIENS.  452 

This  claim  was  set  up  in  a  case  where  an  attorney's  clerk 
had  put  up  at  a  public  house  and  had  departed  without  pay- 
ing his  bill,  but  leaving  the  lawyer's  blue  bag  and  his  letter- 
book  behind  him.  The  innkeeper  wrote  to  the  lawyer  stat- 
ing that  the  clerk  had  left  his  bill  unpaid,  and  that  he  held 
the  letter-book,  which  he  would  forward  on  receiving  the 
amount  of  the  bill.  The  attorney's  counsel  contended  that 
the  innkeeper's  lien  extends  only  to  those  things  wnth  which 
a  man  ordinarily  travels ;  but  the  court  were  of  opinion  that 
there  was  a  clear  case  of  lien.^  The  bag,  they  said,  was 
brought  by  the  guest  to  the  inn,  wuth  some  things  of  his  own 
in  it,  in  the  ordinary  way.  The  innkeeper  could  have  no  sus- 
picion that  it  contained  property  belonging  to  a  third  per- 
son. They  regarded  the  case  as  very  distinguishable  from 
Broadwood  v.  Granara,^**  in  which  case  there  appear  dicta  to 
the  effect  that  an  innkeeper  is  not  bound  to  receive  and  pro- 
tect as  the  property  of  a  guest  such  an  article  as  a  piano. ^^ 

§  501.  Settled  rule. — It  is  now^  settled,  however,  that  the 
lien  is  not  limited  to  such  things  as  a  guest  ordinarily  takes 
with  him.  An  innkeeper  who  receives  a  piano  in  his  charac- 
ter as  innkeeper,  believing  it  to  be  the  property  of  his  guest, 
is  entitled  to  a  lien  upon  it  for  his  guest's  board  and  lodging, 
although  in  fact  the  piano  is  the  property  of  another  person, 
who  had  consigned  it  to  the  guest  to  sell  on  commission.^- 
In  a  case  before  the  Queen's  Bench, ^^  where  an  innkeeper 

9  Snead  v.  Watkins,   1   C.   B.   (N.  keeper  knew  that  the  piano  was  the 

S.)    267.     The   bill    seems    to   have  property     of     the     manufacturer, 

been  somewhat  after  the  style   of  who    had    loaned    it    to    the    guest. 

Falstaff's — but       one       half-penny  12  Cook   v.    Prentice,    13   Oregon 

worth  of  bread  to  this  intolerable  482,    11    Pac.   226,   57  Am.   Rep.   28, 

deal    of    sack.      (King    Henry    IV.,  25  Am.  L.   Reg.  700;  and  see  note 

Part  I,  Act.  ii,  So.  4.)  to  the  same,  p.  704,  by  C.  A.  Rob- 

1010  Ex.  417.  bins;    Jones    v.    Morrill,   42    Barb. 

11  Broadwood  v.  Granara,  10  Ex.  (N.   Y.)   623. 

417.    The  real  ground  of  the  decis-  i3  Threfall   v.    Berwick,   L.    R.   7 

ion  in  this  case  was  that  the  inn-  Q.  B.  711,  afifd.,  L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  210. 


453  innkeepers'  liens.  §  502 

had  received  in  good  faith  a  piano  as  part  of  the  goods  of 
his  guest,  it  was  held  that  he  had  a  lien  upon  it.  Mr.  Justice 
Lush  said:  "The  innkeeper's  lien  is  not  restricted  to  such 
things  as  a  traveling  guest  brings  with  him  in  journeying; 
the  contrary  has  been  laid  down  long  ago.  It  extends  to  all 
goods  the  guest  brings  with  him,  and  the  innkeeper  receives 
as  his.  *  *  *  If  he  has  this  lien  as  against  the  guest,  the 
cases  have  established  beyond  all  doubt  that  he  has  the 
same  right  as  against  the  real  owner  of  the  article,  if  it  has 
been  brought  to  the  inn  by  the  guest  as  owner."  And  in  the 
same  case  Mr.  Justice  Quain  said:  "There  is  no  authority 
for  the  proposition  that  the  lien  of  the  innkeeper  only  ex- 
tends to  goods  which  a  traveler  may  be  ordinarily  expected 
to  bring  with  him.  *  *  *  The  liability,  as  shewn  by  the 
old  cases,  extends  to  all  things  brought  to  the  inn  as  the 
property  of  the  guest  and  so  received,  even  a  chest  of  chart- 
ers, or  obligations:  and  why  not  a  pianoforte?  If,  therefore, 
the  innkeeper  be  liable  for  the  loss,  it  seems  to  follow  that 
he  must  also  have  a  lien  upon  them.  And  if  he  has  a  lien 
upon  them  as  against  the  guest,  the  two  cases  cited  (and 
there  are  more)  shew  that  if  the  thing  be  brought  by  the 
guest  as  owner,  and  the  landlord  takes  it  in  thinking  it  is  the 
guest's  own,  he  has  the  same  rights  against  the  stranger, 
the  real  owner,  as  against  the  guest." 

§  502.  Knowledge  of  innkeeper  as  to  ownership  of  bag- 
gage.— If  the  innkeeper  knows  that  the  goods  brought  to  the 
inn  by  a  guest  belong  to  another  person,  he  can  have  no 
lien  upon  them  for  the  guest's  personal  expenses.^ ^  Thus, 
if  a  manufacturer  sends  a  piano  to  a  guest  at  a  hotel  for  his 

14  Johnson  v.  Hill,  3  Stark.  172;  Wright  v.  Sherman,  3  S.  Dak.  290, 

Broadwood    v.    Granara,      10     Ex.  52   N.   W.    1093,   1094,   17   L.    R.   A. 

417,  425;   McGhee   v.   Edwards,   87  792;  Lurch  v.  Wilson,  114  N.  Y.  S. 

Tenn.     506,     509,     11     S.     W.     316,  789,  62  Misc.   (N.  Y.)  259. 
3    L.     R.     A.    654,     quoting    text; 


§  503 


LIENS. 


454 


temporary  use,  and  the  hotel-keeper  knows  that  it  does  not 
belong  to  the  guest,  he  acquires  no  lien  upon  it.^'^ 

§  503.  Innkeeper's  lien  on  goods. — The  innkeeper's  lien 
can  only  attach  to  goods  received  by  one  in  his  capacity  as 
innkeeper.^*'  Neither  the  liability  nor  the  privileges  of  an 
innkeeper  attach  to  one  who  is  not  the  keeper  of  a  public 
house.  The  owner  of  a  steamship  carrying  passengers  for 
hire  is  not  an  innkeeper,  although  the  passenger  pays  a 
round  sum  for  transportation,  board,  and  lodging. ^^  An 
innkeeper  may  also  be  a  stable-keeper;  but  as  an  innkeeper 
he  cannot  claim  a  lien  for  stabling  the  horses  of  one  who  is 
not  a  guest, ^^  as,  for  instance,  a  mail  contractor. ^^  Where 
an  innkeeper  receives  horses  and  a  carriage  to  stand  at  livery, 
the  circumstance  that  the  owner,  at  a  subsequent  time,  oc- 
casionally took  refreshment  at  the  inn,  and  sent  a  friend  to 
be  lodged  there  at  his  charge,  was  held  not  to  entitle  the  inn- 
keeper to  a  lien  in  respect  of  any  part  of  the  demand.^'' 


15  Broadwood  v.  Granara,  10 
Ex.  417,  425. 

16  Binns  v.  Pigot,  9  Car.  &  P. 
208;  Orchard  v.  Rackstraw,  9  C. 
B.  698;  Fox  v.  McGregor,  11 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  41;  Ingallsbee  v. 
Wood,  33  N.  Y.  577,  88  Am.  Dec. 
409;  Miller  v.  Marston,  35  Maine 
153,  56  Am.  Dec.  694;  Walker  v. 
Kennedy,  20  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  433,  7  Pa. 
Dist.   516. 

17  Clark  V.  Burns,  118  Mass.  275, 
19  Am.   Rep.  456. 

18  Binns  v.  Pigot,  9  Car.  &  P. 
208;  Ingallsbee  v.  Wood,  33  N. 
Y.  577,  88  Am.  Dec.  409;  Grinnell 
V.  Cook,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.)  485,  38 
Am.  Dec.  663.  A  different  view 
was  taken  in  Mason  v.  Thomp- 
son, 9  Pick.  (Mass.)  280,  284,  20 
Am.  Dec.  471,  which  related  to 
the  liability  of  an  innkeeper  for 
a   harness    belonging    to    one    who 


was  not  himself  a  guest.  Wilde, 
J.,  said:  "To  constitute  a  guest, 
in  legal  contemplation,  it  is  not 
essential  that  he  should  be  a 
lodger  or  have  any  refreshment 
at  the  inn.  If  he  leaves  his  horse 
there,  the  innkeeper  is  charge- 
able on  account  of  the  benefit  he 
is  to  receive  for  the  keeping  of 
the  horse."  Lord  Holt  held  a 
different  opinion  in  the  case  of 
Yorke  v.  Grenaugh,  2  Ld.  Raym. 
866;  but  the  opinion  of  the  ma- 
jority of  the  court  has  ever  since 
been  considered  as  well  settled 
law.  See  also,  McDaniels  v. 
Robinson,  26  Vt.  316,  62  Am.  Dec. 
574;  Wall  v.  Garrison,  11  Colo. 
515,   19   Pac.   469. 

19  Hickman    v.    Thomas,    16    Ala. 
666. 

20  Smith    v.    Dearlove,    6    C.    B. 
132. 


455 


INNKEEPERS     LIENS. 


§    504 


§  504.  No  lien  on  a  horse  unless  it  belongs  to  his  guest. 
— An  innkeeper  has  no  lien  on  a  horse  placed  in  his  stable, 
unless  placed  there  by  a  guest,  or  by  his  authority."^  Thus, 
if  a  person  is  stopped  upon  suspicion,  and  his  horse  is  placed 
at  an  inn  by  the  police,  the  innkeeper  has  no  lien  on  the 
horse,  and  if  he  sells  him  for  his  keeping  he  is  lial^le  in  trover 
to  the  owner. ^- 

But  if  one  sends  his  horse  or  his  trunk  in  advance  to  an 
inn,  saying  he  will  soon  be  there  himself,  it  may  be  that  he 
should  be  deemed  a  guest  from  the  time  the  property  is 
taken  in  charge  by  the  host.^^ 

If  one  leaves  a  horse  and  carriage  in  the  care  of  an  inn- 
keeper, the  latter  has  a  lien  upon  them  for  such  care,  though 
the  guest  lodges  elsewhere.^^ 

The  innkeeper  is  bound  to  provide  for  his  guest's  horse  as 
well  as  for  the  guest  himself,  and  he  has  a  lien  upon  the 
horse,  and  may  refuse  to  deliver  him  to  the  guest  until  the 
charges  against  the  guest  are  paid.  If  the  guest  goes  away 
and  leaves  the  horse,  the  innkeeper  is  not  bound  to  turn  the 
horse  loose,  and  give  up  his  lien,  but  may  still  keep  the  horse 
and  look  to  his  lien  for  remuneration.^^ 

If  an  innkeeper  is  also  a  keeper  of  a  livery  stable,  and  he 


21  Binns  v.  Pigot,  9  Car.  &  P. 
208;  Fox  v.  McGregor,  11  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  41;  McGhee  v.  Edwards, 
87  Tenn.  506,  11  S.  W.  316,  3  L. 
R.  A.  654;  Elliott  v.  Martin,  105 
Mich.  506,  63  N.  W.  525,  55  Am. 
St.  461. 

22  Binns  v.  Pigot,  9  Car.  &  P. 
208. 

23  Grinnell  v.  Cook,  3  Hill  (N. 
Y.)  485,  490,  38  Am.  Dec.  663. 

24  Yorke  v.  Grenaugh,  2  Ld. 
Raym.  866,  1  Salk.  388;  McDan- 
iels  V.  Robinson,  26  Vt.  316,  62 
Am.  Dec.  574;  Peet  v.  McGraw, 
25  Wend  (N.  Y.)  653.  In  the  lat- 
ter    case     Chief     Justice     Nelson 


said:  "It  is  not  necessary  in 
point  of  fact,  that  the  owner  or 
person  putting  the  horses  to  be 
kept  at  a  public  inn,  should  be  a 
guest  at  the  time,  in  order  to 
charge  the  innkeeper  for  any  loss 
that  may  happen  or  to  entitle  him 
to  the  right  of  lien.  *  *  *  jf 
the  horses  be  left  with  the  inn- 
keeper, though  the  owner  may 
put  up  at  a  different  place,  the 
former  is  answerable  for  the  safe 
keeping,  and  should  of  course  be 
entitled  to  the  summary  remedy 
for  his  reasonable  charges." 

25  Black    V.    Brennan,      5      Dana 
(Ky.)  310. 


505 


LIENS. 


456 


receives  a  horse  in  the  latter  capacity,  and  the  owner  after- 
wards becomes  a  guest  at  his  house,  no  lien  upon  the  horse 
arises  in  favor  of  the  innkeeper  for  the  entertainment  of  the 
guest.^^ 

§  505.  Innkeeper  defined. — An  innkeeper  is  defined  to  be 
one  who  keeps  a  house  where  a  traveler  is  furnished  with 
everything  which  he  has  occasion  for  whilst  upon  his  way;^'^ 
or  one  who  holds  out  that  he  will  receive  all  travelers  and 
sojourners  who  are  willing  to  pay  a  price  adequate  to  the 
sort  of  accommodation  provided.-^  A  house  of  public  en- 
tertainment in  London,  where  beds  and  provisions  were  fur- 
nished, but  which  was  called  a  tavern  and  cofTee-house,  and 
was  not  frequented  by  stage-coaches,  and  had  no  stable,  was 
held  to  be  an  inn.  The  keeper  of  the  house  did  not  charge, 
as  a  mere  lodging-house  keeper,  by  the  week  or  month,  but 
for  the  number  of  nights.  He  did  not,  like  a  lodging-house 
keeper,  make  a  special  contract  with  every  man  who  came; 
but  held  himself  ready,  without  making  a  special  contract, 
to  provide  lodging  and  entertainment  for  all,  at  a  reasonable 
price.^^ 

One  may  be  at  the  same  time  an  innkeeper  and  a  board- 
ing-house keeper,  and  in  such  case  it  may  be  difTficult  to  de- 
termine whether  a  person  entertained  at  the  house  is  a  guest 
of  the  innkeeper  or  a  boarder.      Perhaps  the   more   prom- 


26  Smith  V.  Dearlove,  6  C.  B. 
132.  In  Mason  v.  Thompson,  9 
Pick.  (Mass.)  280,  285,  20  Am. 
Dec.  471,  it  was  held  in  effect, 
that  if  an  innkeeper,  who  is  also 
a  keeper  of  a  livery  stable,  re- 
ceives a  horse  to  be  fed,  without 
giving  notice  that  he  receives  it 
as  a  keeper  of  a  livery  stable,  he 
is  answerable  as  an  innkeeper. 
It  was  found  by  the  jury,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  that  he  received 
the   horse  as  an   innkeeper. 


-'  Thompson  v.  Lacy,  3  B.  & 
Aid.    283,    286,    per    Bayley,    J. 

2S  Thompson  v.  Lacy,  3  B.  & 
Aid.    283,   286,   per    Best,   J. 

29  Thompson  v.  Lacy,  3  B.  & 
Aid.  283,  286.  A  mere  lodging- 
house  keeper  is  not  entitled  to  a 
lien  provided  by  statute  for  an 
innkeeper  or  boarding  house 
keeper.  Hardin  v.  State,  47  Tex. 
Cr.  493.  84  S.  W.  591. 


457  innkeepers'  liens.  §  507 

inent  occupation  might  control,  and  afford  a  presumption  in 
a  case  where  there  is  no  other  evidence.  But  if  there  is  any 
evidence  in  the  matter,  the  question  is  one  for  the  jury,  and 
not  a  matter  of  law  for  the  court.  The  duration  of  the  stay 
of  the  guest  or  boarder,  the  price  paid,  the  amount  of  ac- 
commodation afforded,  the  transient  or  permanent  charac- 
ter of  his  residence  and  occupation,  his  knowledge  or  want 
of  knowledge  of  any  difference  of  accommodation  afforded 
to,  or  price  paid  by,  boarders  and  guests,  are  all  to  be  re- 
garded in  settling  the  question. ^^ 

It  is  not  necessary  that  one  should  be  licensed  as  an  inn- 
keeper in  order  to  subject  him  to  the  liabilities  or  entitle  him 
to  the  privileges  of  an  innkeeper. 

§  506.  What  constitutes  one  a  guest. — To  constitute  one 
a  guest,  it  is  not  necessary  that  he  should  be  at  the  inn  in 
person.  It  is  enough  that  his  property  is  there  in  charge  of 
his  wife,  or  servant,  or  any  agent  who  is  there  in  his  em- 
ployment, or  as  a  member  of  his  family,  provided  such  per- 
son is  there  in  such  a  way  that  the  law  will  imply  that  the 
property  is  in  the  possession  of  the  owner,  and  not  merely 
in  the  possession  of  his  agent.^^ 

§  507.  Husband  liable  for  wife's  bill  at  an  inn. — Where  a 
husband  and  wife  board  at  a  hotel,  the  husband  is  presump- 
tively liable  for  the  bill.  It  is  competent,  however,  for  the 
hotel-keeper  to  show  that  the  husband  was  impecunious,  and 
that  credit  was  given  to  the  wife  so  as  to  justify  the  deten- 
tion of  her  property  for  their  bill.^- 

30  Hall  V.  Pike,  100  Mass.  495,  32  Birney  v.  Wheaton,  2  How. 
per  Colt,  J.;  Danforth  v.  Pratt,  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  (N.  S.)  519.  So  de- 
42  Maine  50;  Norcross  v.  Nor-  cided  independently  of  the 
cress.  53   Maine   163.  statute  of  1884,   ch.  381,   providing 

31  Coykendall  v.  Eaton,  55  Barb.  that  married  women  may  make 
(N.  Y.)  188,  Zl  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  contracts  in  the  same  manner  as 
438;   Smith  v.   Keyes,  2  Thomp.   &  if    single. 

C.   (N.  Y.)  650. 


§    508  LIENS.  458 

If  board  is  furnished  to  a  man  and  his  wife  under  a  con- 
tract with  the  husband,  the  innkeeper  or  boarding-house 
keeper  has  no  Hen  upon  the  wife's  effects,  which  are  her 
separate  property,  brought  with  her  to  the  house;  for  no  Hen 
can  exist  against  a  guest  who  does  not  become  Hable  to  the 
keeper  of  the  house.^^ 

A  boarding-house  keeper  has  no  Hen  on  the  separate  prop- 
erty of  a  married  woman  boarding  at  the  house,  Hving  apart 
from  her  husband,  where  the  husband  has  engaged,  and  by 
express  agreement  promised,  to  pay  her  board. "^ 

Where  a  father  and  his  two  daughters  boarded  at  a  hotel, 
and  the  board  of  the  three  was  charged  to  the  father,  it  was 
held  that  the  hotel-keeper  could  not  detain  the  trunks  of 
one  of  the  daughters  for  the  board  of  the  three,  but  only  for 
that  of  such  daughter  alone ;  and  not  for  her  board  if  this 
was  charged  to  the  father.^^ 

§  508,  Lien  on  infant's  baggage. — An  innkeeper  has  a 
lien  on  the  baggage  of  an  infant  guest  for  the  price  of  his 
entertainment,  and  also  for  money  furnished  him  and  ex- 
pended by  him  in  procuring  necessaries.  The  innkeeper  is 
legally  bound  to  receive  and  entertain  an  infant  as  well  as 
an  adult  applicant.  The  price  of  his  entertainment  is  re- 
coverable from  him  or  his  guardian  on  the  ground  that  the 
entertainment  is  necessary.-^^ 

§  509.  Innkeeper' cannot  detain  guest's  person. — An  inn- 
keeper cannot  detain  the  guest's  person,  or  the  clothes  or 
ornaments  on  his  person,  as  security  for  his  bill,"'^  although 

33  Mcllvane  v.  Hilton,  7  Hun  36  Watson  v.  Cross,  2  Duv.  (Ky.) 
(N.  Y.)  594;  Chickering-Chase  147.  And  see  Read  v.  Amidon,  41 
Bros.  Co.  V.  White,  127  Wis.  83,  Vt.  15,  98  Am.  Dec.  560.  Other- 
106  N.  W.  797.  wise  in  England,  §  516. 

34  Baker  v.  Stratton,  52  N.  J.  L.  37  Sunbolf  v.  Alford,  3  Mees. 
277,  19  Atl.  661.  &  W.  248,  1  H.  &  H.  13;  Wolf  v. 

35  Clayton      v.      Butterfield,      10  Summers,  2   Camp.   631. 
Rich.    (S.   Car.)   300. 


459  innkeepers'  liens.  §  509 

there  are  some  dicta  by  early  authorities  to  the  effect  that 
he  had  this  right. ^^  There  has,  however,  been  no  claim  of 
such  a  right  since  the  case  of  Sunbolf  v.  Alford  in  the  Court 
of  the  Exchequer.^^  In  that  case  Sunbolf  sued  his  inn- 
keeper in  trespass  for  assaulting  and  beating  him,  shaking 
and  pulling  him  about,  stripping  ofi  his  coat,  carrying  it 
away,  and  converting  it  to  his  own  use.  The  innkeeper 
pleaded  his  lien.  Lord  Abinger,  chief  baron,  giving  an 
opinion  against  the  innkeeper,  said:  "If  an  innkeeper  has  a 
right  to  detain  the  person  of  his  guest  for  the  nonpayment 
of  his  bill,  he  has  a  right  to  detain  him  until  the  bill  is  paid, 
— which  may  be  for  life;  so  that  this  defence  supposes,  that, 
by  the  common  law,  a  man  who  owes  a  small  debt,  for  which 
he  could  not  be  imprisoned  by  legal  process,  may  yet  be  de- 
tained by  an  innkeeper  for  life.  The  proposition  is  mon- 
strous. Again,  if  he  have  any  right  to  detain  the  person, 
surely  he  is  a  judge  in  his  own  cause:  for,  he  is  then  the 
party  to  determine  whether  the  amount  of  his  bill  is  reason- 
able, and  he  must  detain  him  till  the  man  brings  an  action 
against  him  for  false  imprisonment,  and  then  if  it  were  de- 
termined that  the  charge  was  not  reasonable,  and  it  appeared 
that  the  party  had  made  an  offer  of  a  reasonable  sum,  the 
detainer  would  be  unlawful.  But,  where  is  the  law  that  says 
a  man  shall  detain  another  for  his  debt  without  process  of 
law?  As  to  a  lien  upon  the  goods,  there  are  undoubtedly 
cases  of  exception  to  the  general  law  in  favor  of  particular 
claims;  and  if  an  innkeeper  has  the  possession  of  the  goods, 
and  his  debt  is  not  paid,  he  has  a  right  to  detain  them  by 
virtue  of  that  possession ;  but  I  do  not  agree  that  he  has  any 
right  to  take  a  parcel  or  other  property  out  of  the  possession 
of  the  guest.  If  the  guest  is  robbed  of  goods  while  they  are 
in  his  own  hands,  the  innkeeper  is  not  liable.     It  appears  to 

38  Bacon's   Abr.    Inns,    D ;    New-      213;   Grinnell  v.   Cook,  3   Hill    (N. 
ton  V.  Trigg,  1  Shower  269;  Dun-      Y.)  485,   38  Am.   Dec.  663. 
lap    V.    Thorne,    1    Rich.    (S.    Car.)  39  3    Mees.    &   W.    248,   254. 


§    5IO  LIENS.  460 

me.  therefore,  being  without  any  authorities  on  the  subject, 
that  the  plea  is  in  principle  utterly  bad,  and  that  there  is  no 
ground  for  the  attempt  to  justify  an  assault,  under  the  pre- 
tence of  detaining  a  man  for  a  debt  due  to  an  innkeeper.  It 
is  also  bad  under  the  pretence  of  justifying  the  stripping  the 
plaintiff's  coat  off  his  back,  and  thereby  inviting  a  breach  of 
the  peace,  and  making  an  assault  necessary  in  order  to  exer- 
cise the  right  to  the  lien  on  the  coat." 

§510.  Property  exempt  from  execution. — Property  of  a 
guest  is  not  exempt  from  an  innkeeper's  lien  by  reason  of  the 
fact  that  it  is  property  which  would  be  exempt  from  general 
execution.  Thus,  the  lien  may  attach  to  the  coat  of  a  guest, 
notwithstanding  his  claim  that  it  is  a  part  of  his  ordinary 
wearing  apparel,  and  is  exempt  from  execution. '^'^  "An  inn- 
keeper's lien  exists  by  common  law,  and  we  see  nothing  in 
the  statute  exempting  certain  property  from  execution  to 
indicate  an  intention  to  abrogate  the  common  law  in  this 
respect.  The  statute  exempts  only  from  general  execution. 
It  was  never  designed  to  prevent  persons  from  giving  a  lien 
upon  whatever  property  they  see  fit.  Where  a  lien  is  given 
it  may  of  course  be  enforced.  Had  the  plaintiff  given  a 
chattel  mortgage  upon  his  coat  to  secure  his  hotel  bill,  no 
one  would  doubt  the  right  of  the  defendant  to  foreclose  it, 
notwithstanding  the  coat  might  have  been  part  of  the  plain- 
tiff's ordinary  wearing  apparel.  When  the  plaintiff  became 
defendant's  guest  at  his  hotel  he  gave  the  defendant  a  lien 
upon  his  coat  as  effectually  as  if  he  had  given  him  a  mort- 
gage upon  it.  The  law  implied  that  from  the  act  of  becom- 
ing the  defendant's  guest  and  taking  his  coat  with  him.  The 
rule  is  too  well  established  to  require  support  from  author- 
ities." 


§511.     Distinction  between  guest  and  boarder. — The  dis- 
inction  between  a  guest  and  a  boarder  is  that  the  former 

40  Swan     V.     Bournes,    47     Iowa   501,   503,  29  Am.   Rep.  492. 


461  innkeepers'  liens.  §   512 

comes  without  any  bargain  as  to  the  length  of  time  he  is  to 
stay,  and  therefore  may  go  when  he  pleases.  A  guest  may 
remain  a  long  time  at  an  inn  without  becoming  a  boarder. 
He  may  contract  to  pay  by  the  week  or  month  without  los- 
ing his  character  as  a  guest  and  assuming  that  of  a  boarder."*^ 
If  one  goes  to  a  hotel  as  a  wayfaring  man  and  a  traveller, 
and  the  relation  of  innkeeper  and  guest  is  once  established, 
the  presumption  is  that  this  relation  continues  so  long  as  the 
traveller  remains,  and  the  length  of  his  stay  is  immaterial 
so  long  as  he  retains  his  character  as  a  traveller.  The  simple 
fact  of  his  agreeing  to  pay  a  certain  price  by  the  week  does 
not  take  away  his  character  as  a  traveller  and  guest.  "A 
guest  for  a  single  night  might  make  a  special  contract,  as  to 
the  price  to  be  paid  for  his  lodging,  and  whether  it  were  more 
or  less  than  the  usual  price,  it  would  not  affect  his  character 
as  a  guest.  The  character  of  guest  does  not  depend  upon 
the  payment  of  any  particular  price,  but  upon  other  facts. 
If  an  inhabitant  of  a  place  makes  a  special  contract  with  an 
innkeeper  there,  for  board  at  his  inn,  he  is  a  boarder,  and  not 
a  traveller  or  a  guest,  in  the  sense  of  the  law.""*^ 

§512.     A  lodging-house  keeper  not  an  innkeeper. — One 

who  keeps  a  lodging-house,  in  which  no  provision  is  made 
by  him  for  supplying  his  lodgers  with  meals,  is  not  an  inn- 
keeper. That  there  is  a  restaurant  in  the  basement  of  the 
house  which  is  leased  to  and  managed  by  another  person, 
and  that  this  is  connected  by  passageways  and  doors  with 
the  upper  part  of  the  house  to  facilitate  access  to  the  restau- 

41  Berkshire    Woollen      Co.      v.  657;    Jalie    v.    Cardinal,     35     Wis. 

Proctor,     7     Cush.      (Mass.)    417;  118;     Polk     v.     Melenbacker,     136 

Shoecraft  v.   Bailey,  25  Iowa  533;  Mich.  611,  99  N.  W.  867, 

Norcross    v.    Norcross,    53    Maine  42  Berkshire      Woollen      Co.    v. 

163;     Chamberlain    v.     Masterson,  Proctor,   7  Cush.    (Mass.)   417,  per 

26   Ala.    371;    Pinkerton    v.   Wood-  Fletcher,    J. 
ward,   33   Cal.   557,   91     Am.     Dec. 


§    513  LIENS.  462 

rant  from  the  lodging-rooms,  does  not  make  the  keeper  of 
the  lodgings  an  innkeeper. ^^ 

§  513.  Lien  affected  by  special  agreement. — The  inn- 
keeper's lien  does  not  at  common  law  apply  to  goods  of  a 
boarder,'*^  or  to  the  goods  of  a  person  received  under  a 
special  agreement, ^^  for  in  such  case  the  innkeeper  does  not 
assume  an  innkeeper's  responsibility,  nor  is  he  obliged  to 
receive  the  boarder  or  other  person  under  a  special  agree- 
ment. By  statute,  however,  in  several  states,  boarding- 
house  keepers  are  given  the  same  lien  that  innkeepers  have. 

A  boarding-house  keeper  has  no  lien  except  by  virtue  of  a 
statute  upon  the  property  of  his  boarders;  and  a  lodging- 
house  keeper  has  no  lien  except  by  virtue  of  a  statute  on  the 
property  of  his  lodgers  for  rent  due.  The  latter  can  neither 
be  regarded  as  an  innkeeper  nor  as  a  boarding-house  keeper.'*^ 

§514.  When  boarding-house  keeper's  lien  attaches. — A 
boarding-house  keeper's  lien  under  a  statute  attaches  as  and 
when  the  board  is  furnished.  Thus,  if  a  guest  of  a  boarding- 
house  keeper  pays  board  by  the  week,  though  by  his  contract 
nothing  is  due  until  the  end  of  the  week,  the  lien  neverthe- 
less attaches  in  the  meantime. ^^  Otherwise,  a  guest  who 
had  obtained  credit  upon  the  strength  of  the  lien  might 
destroy  the  security  by  selling  or  removing  the  goods  before 

43  Cochrane    v.    Schryer,     17    N.  Landis,    36    Iowa    651 ;      Reed      v. 

Y.    Week.    Dig.   442.  Teneyck,    103    Ky.    65,    19    Ky.    L. 

•i4Drope    V.    Thaire,    Latch    126;  1690,  44  S.  W.  356. 

Grinnell   v.    Cook,   3   Hill    (N.    Y.)  45  Wintermute      v.      Clarke,      5 

485;    Bayley    v.    Merrill,    10   Allen  Sandf.      (N.      Y.)      242;    Hursh    v. 

(Mass.)    360;    Brooks   v.    Harrison,  Byers,   29   Mo.   469. 

41    Conn.    184;    Ewart    v.    Stark,   8  46  Cochrane    v.    Schryver,    17    N. 

Rich.   L.    (S.    Car.)   423;    Hursh   v.  Y.    Week.    Dig.    442.      See    Atter- 

Byers,     29     Mo.     469;     Coates    v.  bury  v.   Somers,   35   Misc.    (N.  Y.) 

Acheson,  23   Mo.   App.   255 ;    Man-  805,  72  N.  Y.  S.  1094. 

ning  V.   Wells,  9  Humph.    (Tenn.)  47  Smith    v.    Colcord,    115    Mass. 

746.    51   Am.   Dec.   688;    Nichols   v.  70;    Bayley    v.    Merrill,    10   Allen 

Halliday,  27  Wis.   406;   Pollock  v.  (Alass.)    360. 


463  innkeepers'  liens.  §   515 

the  bill  for  board  had  become  payable  by  the  contract.  Such 
a  result  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  nature  and  purpose 
of  the  lien.  A  sale  of  such  property  by  the  boarder  is  in- 
effectual as  against  the  lien,  except  from  the  time  that  notice 
of  the  sale  is  given  to  the  boarding-house  keeper,  or  the 
property  is  actually  removed  ;^^  and  in  the  case  of  a  notice 
of  a  sale  to  a  third  person,  the  lien  is  effectual  to  secure  the 
amount  due  up  to  the  time  of  such  notice. ^^ 

§  515.     Statutes  giving  liens  to  boarding-house  keepers. — 

By  statute  in  several  states,  boarding-house  keepers  and 
others  have  a  lien  similar  to  that  of  an  innkeeper.  These 
statutes  generally  apply  to  innkeepers  as  well,  and  these 
common-law  rights  are  sometimes  modified.  These  statutes 
are,  therefore,  important  not  only  as  conferring  a  lien  similar 
to  that  of  an  innkeeper  upon  other  persons,  but  also  in  de- 
termining the  extent  of  the  innkeeper's  lien. 

In  Alabama,^°  keepers  of  hotels,  inns,  boarding-houses,  and 
restaurants  have  a  lien  on  the  goods  and  personal  bag- 
gage of  their  guests  and  boarders  to  secure  the  payment  of 
any  money  due  from  them  for  board  and  lodging,  and  may 
enforce  the  same  by  a  seizure  and  sale  of  such  goods  and 
baggage  in  the  manner  provided  by  law. 

In  Arizona,  proprietors  of  hotels,  inns,  boarding,  and  lodg- 
ing-houses have  a  lien  on  baggage  and  other  property  of 
value  of  their  guests  or  boarders  or  lodgers,  for  their  ac- 
commodation, board  or  lodging  and  room  rent,  and  such 
extras  as  are  furnished  at  their  request,  with  the  right  of 
possession  of  such  baggage  or  other  property  of  value,  until 
all  such  charges  are  paid.^^ 

In  Arkansas,  every  person  operating  any  hotel,  inn  or 
boarding-house    has    a    lien    upon    the    baggage    and    per- 

48  Bayley    v.  Merrill,    10    Allen  50  Civ.  Code,  1907,  §  4827. 
(Mass.)   360.                                                    ^i  Rev.    Stats.    1901,    §    2916.     As 

49  Bayley    v.  Merrill,    10    Allen       to    enforcement,    see    §    1049b. 
(Alass.)    360. 


§515  LIENS.  464 

sonal  effects  of  all  persons  receiving  food,  entertainment  or 
accommodation.^^ 

In  California,''"  hotel  men,  boarding-house  and  lodging- 
house  keepers  have  a  lien  upon  the  baggage  and  other  prop- 
erty of  value  of  their  guests,  or  boarders,  or  lodgers,  brought 
into  such  hotel,  inn,  or  boarding  or  lodging  house,  by  such 
guests,  boarders  or  lodgers,  for  the  proper  charges  due  from 
such  guests,  or  boarders,  or  lodgers,  for  their  accommodation, 
board  and  lodging,  and  room  rent,  and  such  extras  as  are 
furnished  at  their  request,  with  the  right  to  the  possession 
of  such  baggage,  or  other  property  of  value,  until  all  such 
charges  are  paid. 

In  Colorado,^"*  the  keeper  of  any  hotel,  tavern,  or  board- 
ing-house, and  any  person  v^ho  rents  furnished  or  un- 
furnished rooms,  has  a  lien  upon  the  baggage  and  furniture 
of  his  or  her  patrons,  boarders,  guests,  or  tenants,  for  such 
boarding,  lodging  or  rent,  and  for  all  costs  incurred  in  en- 
forcing such  lien. 

In  Connecticut,^^  when  a  special  agreement  shall  have  been 
made  between  the  keeper  of  any  boarding  or  lodging  house 
and  any  person  boarding  or  lodging  at  such  house,  regarding 
the  price  of  such  board  or  lodging,  all  the  baggage  and 
effects  kept  by  such  person  at  such  house  shall  be  subject  to 
a  lien  in  favor  of  the  keeper  of  such  house,  for  all  such  sums 
as  shall  be  at  any  time  due  him  from  such  person  for  board  or 
lodging;  and  such  boarding-house  or  lodging-house  keeper 
may  detain  such  baggage  and  effects  until  such  debts  shall 
be  paid;  and,  if  not  paid  within  sixty  days  after  it  is  due,  he 
may  sell  said  property,  or  such  part  thereof  as  shall  be  neces- 
sary, and  apply  the  proceeds  to  the  payment  of  such  debt. 

In  the  District  of  Columbia,^*^  every  innkeeper,  keeper  of 
a    boarding-house    or    house    of    private    entertainment    has 

52  Kirby's     Dig.    of    Stats.     1904,  The  lien  may  be  enforced  by  sale 
§  5054.  after  notice,   §   3441. 

53  Civ.   Code    1906,    §§   1861,   1862.  55  Gen.   Stats.   1902,  §   4165. 

54  Mills'  Ann.  Stats.  1912,  §  4568.  56  Code    1901,    §    1261. 


465  innkeepers'  liens.  §  515 

a  lien  upon  and  may  retain  possession  of  the  baggage 
and  effects  of  any  guest  or  boarder  for  the  amount  which 
may  be  due  him  from  such  guest  for  board  and  lodging  until 
such  amount  is  paid. 

In  Florida,'''  a  lien  prior  in  dignity  to  all  others  exists  in 
favor  of  keepers  of  hotels  and  boarding-houses  for  the  board 
and  lodging  of  and  for  moneys  advanced  to  guests,  upon  the 
goods  and  chattels  belonging  to  such  guests  in  such  hotel  or 
boarding-house. 

In  Georgia, ^^  innkeepers  and  boarding-house  keepers  have 
a  lien  for  their  dues  on  the  baggage  of  their  guests,  which 
is  superior  to  other  liens,  except  liens  for  taxes,  special  liens 
of  landlords  for  rent,  liens  of  laborers,  and  all  general  liens 
of  which  they  had  actual  notice  before  the  property  claimed 
to  be  subject  to  lien  came  into  their  control,  to  which  ex- 
cepted liens  they  are  inferior. 

The  innkeeper  has  a  lien  on  the  goods  of  all  his  guests  for 
all  his  reasonable  charges,  and  may  retain  possession  until 
they  are  paid;  his  lien  attaches  though  the  guest  has  no  title, 
or  even  stole  the  property,  and  the  true  owner  must  pay  the 
charges  upon  that  specific  article  before  receiving  the  same.^^ 

In  Idaho, *^*^  an  innkeeper  has  a  lien  on  goods  and  property 
received  by  him  for  safe  keeping,  and  may  hold  or  store  the 
same  with  some  responsible  person  until  all  his  just  and  rea- 
sonable charges  are  paid. 

In  Illinois,^^  hotel,  inn,  and  boarding-house  keepers  have 
a  lien  upon  the  baggage  and  other  valuables  of  their  guests 
or  boarders  brought  into  such  hotel,  inn,  or  boarding-house 
by  such  guests  or  boarders,  for  the  proper  charges  due  from 
such   guests   or  boarders   for   their   accommodation,    board, 

5"  Gen.  Stats.  1906,  §§  2195,  2206.  specific  article   on  which    the   lien 

58  Code    1911,    §    3360.  is    claimed.        Domestic      Sewing- 

59  An   innkeeper  has  no   lien    on  Machine    Co.    v.    Watters,    50    Ga. 
the    goods    in    possession    of    his  573. 

guest,   as  against  the   true   owner,  60  Rev.    Code    1908,    §    1546. 

unless  there  be  charges   upon   the  ^i  Rev.  Stats.  1913,  p.  1557,  §  1. 

30 


§    515  LIENS.  466 

and  lodging,  and  such  extras  as  are  furnished  at  their  re- 
quest. 

In  Indiana,"-  the  owner  or  keeper  of  any  hotel,  inn,  restau- 
rant, boarding  or  eating-house,  shall,  after  demand  for  pay- 
ment, be  made  of  the  person  or  persons  owing  any  such 
claims  or  bills,  have  a  lien  against  the  personal  property  and 
the  wages  due  of  any  person  or  persons  who  may  owe  said 
owner  or  keeper  for  food,  lodging,  entertainment  or  other 
accommodation,  to  the  extent  only  of  his  said  claim,  and  the 
property  may  be  sold  to  satisfy  such  claim,  by  said  owner  or 
keeper,  after  obtaining  judgment  for  the  same  in  any  court 
of  competent  jurisdiction  and  posting  a  written  notice  on  the 
outer  door  of  his  hotel,  inn,  restaurant,  boarding  or  eating- 
house,  at  least  ten  days  before  the  day  of  sale  at  public  out- 
cry to  the  highest  bidder;  and  any  sum  of  money  remaining 
from  said  sale,  after  satisfying  the  claim,  costs  and  expenses 
of  sale,  shall  be  turned  over  to  the  person  or  persons  whose 
property  was  sold.  When  proper  divisions  of  such  property 
can  be  made,  such  part  only  as  shall  be  necessary  to  satisfy 
the  claim,  cost  and  expenses  shall  be  sold. 

In  lowa,^^  hotel,  inn,  rooming-house  and  eating-house 
keepers  have  a  lien  upon,  and  may  take  and  retain  possession 
of,  all  baggage  and  other  property  belonging  to  or  under  con- 
trol of  their  guests  or  patrons,  which  may  be  in  such  hotel, 
inn,  rooming-house  or  eating-house,  for  the  value  of  their 
accommodations  and  keep,  and  for  all  money  paid  for  or  ad- 
vanced to,  and  for  such  extras  and  other  things  as  shall  be 
furnished  such  guests,  or  patrons;  and  such  property  so  re- 
tained shall  not  be  exempt  from  attachment  or  execution  to 

62  Burns'  Rev.  Stats.  1908.  hotel,  etc.,  lien  will  attach  to 
§  7850.  sample    case    carried   by    traveling 

63  Code  Supp.  1907,  §  3138,  as  salesman,  although  the  hotel 
amended  by  Laws  1909,  p.  185.  keeper  knows  when  he  receives 
Under  statute  giving  lien  to  hotel  salesman  as  guest  that  goods  be- 
keepers  on  all  property  belong-  long  to  his  employer.  Brown 
ing  to  or  under  control  of  their  Shoe  Co.  v.  Hunt,  103  Iowa  586. 
guests     which     may     be     in     such 


467  innkeepers'  liens.  §  515 

the  amount  of  reasonable  charges  of  such  hotel,  inn,  room- 
ing-house or  eating-house  keeper,  against  such  guests  or 
patrons  and  the  costs  of  enforcing  the  lien  thereon. 

In  Kansas,*'^  the  keeper  of  an  inn,  hotel  or  boarding-house, 
whether  individual,  partnership  or  corporation,  has  a 
lien  on  the  baggage  and  other  property  in  and  about  such  inn 
brought  to  the  same  by  or  under  the  control  of  his  guests  or 
boarders,  for  the  proper  charges  due  him  from  such  guests  or 
boarders  for  the  accommodation,  board  and  lodging,  and  for 
all  money  paid  for  or  advanced  to  them  not  to  exceed  the 
sum  of  two  hundred  dollars,  and  for  such  other  extras  as  are 
furnished  at  the  request  of  such  guests. 

In  Kentucky,^^  all  hotel-keepers,  innkeepers,  boarding- 
house  keepers  and  keepers  of  houses  of  private  entertain- 
ment have  a  lien  on  all  baggage  and  all  personal  prop- 
erty owned  by,  and  brought  to,  such  houses  of  entertainment 
by  the  persons  receiving  the  board,  nursing,  care  or  attention 
from  such  landlords,  for  the  contract  price  of  such  board,  care 
and  attention  as  are  received,  and  in  case  of  no  contract  price 
for  such  board,  nursing,  care  or  attention,  then  for  a  reason- 
able price  for  same. 

In  Louisiana, ^^  innkeepers  and  all  others  who  let  lodgings 
or  receive  or  take  boarders  have  a  privilege,  or  more  proper- 
ly a  right  of  pledge,  on  the  property  of  all  persons  who  take 
their  board  or  lodging  with  them,  by  virtue  of  which  they 
may  retain  property,  and  have  it  sold,  to  obtain  payment  of 
what  such  persons  may  owe  them,  on  either  account  above 
mentioned,  and  this  privilege  shall  extend  to  extras  not  to 
exceed  ten  dollars,  supplied  by  the  proprietors  of  hotels,  inns 
and  boarding-house  keepers.  Innkeepers,  hotel,  boarding- 
house  and  lodging-house  keepers  enjoy  this  privilege  on  all 
the  property  which  the  sojourners  have  brought  to  their 
place,  whether  it  belongs  to  them  or  not,  because  this  prop- 

64  Laws    1913,    p.    360.  66  Merricks'      Rev.      Civ.      Code 

65  Carroll's   Stats.    1909,    §   2179a.      1900,  §§  3217,  3232-3235,  3264. 


§5^5  LIENS.  468 

erty  so  brought  into  their  place  has  become  pledged  to  them 
by  the  mere  fact  of  its  introduction  into  their  place. 

The  term  "travellers"  applies  to  strangers  and  such  as, 
being  transiently  in  a  place  where  they  have  no  domicile, 
take  their  board  and  lodging  at  an  inn. 

In  Maine, ^^  innkeepers  or  keepers  of  boarding-houses  have 
a  lien  on  the  goods  and  personal  baggage  of  their  guests  and 
boarders,  to  secure  the  payment  of  any  money  due  from  them 
for  board  or  lodging. 

In  Maryland,*^^  persons  taking  boarders  or  lodgers  have  a 
lien  upon  their  personal  effects,  goods,  or  furniture,  brought 
upon  the  premises,  for  such  board  or  lodging,  w^hether  the 
price  be  due  or  not. 

In  Massachusetts,*'^  boarding-house  keepers  have,  for  all 
proper  charges  due  for  fare  and  board  or  lodging,  a  lien  on 
the  baggage  and  effects  brought  to  their  houses  and  belong- 
ing to  their  guests,  boarders  or  lodgers,  except  when  such 
guests  or  boarders  are  mariners."*^ 

In  Michigan,"^^  whenever  the  keeper  of  any  hotel  or  inn  or 
boarding  or  lodging  house  shall  receive  into  his  hotel  or  inn 
or  boarding  or  lodging  house  any  person  as  a  guest  or 
boarder  or  lodger,  he  shall  have  a  lien  upon  and  right  to  de- 
tain the  baggage  and  effects  of  such  guest  or  boarder  or 
lodger  to  secure  and  compel  payment  of  his  customary 
charges  for  the  food  and  lodging  furnished  such  guest  or 

6"  Rev.   Stats.    1903,   ch.  93,    §   65.  of  a  husband  brought  to  a  board- 

68  Pub.  Gen.  Laws  1904,  art.  71,  ing-house  by  his  wife,  for  board 
§  8.  furnished    to    his    wife    and    child, 

69  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  198,  §  28.  who  had  been  driven  from  home 
See  Smith  v.  Colcord,  115  Mass.  by  the  husband's  cruelty  and  neg- 
70.  lect.      Mills   v.    Shirley,    110   Mass. 

'''0  This   lien   is   not   so   broad    in  158. 

some    respects     as     the    common-  "i  Comp.      Laws      1897,    §§    5317- 

law  lien  of  an  innkeeper.     It   at-  5323;    Howell's    Stats.    Ann.    1912, 

taches    only    to    property    belong-  §   4208;    Polk   v.    Melenbacker,    136 

ing  to  the  guests  or  boarders.     It  Mich.  611,  99  N.  W.  867. 
does    not    attach    to    the    property 


469  innkeepers'  liens.  §  515 

boarder  or  lodger.  It  has  been  held  that  this  statute  in  no- 
wise affects  the  rights  of  an  innkeeper  to  the  lien  existing  at 
common  law. 

In  Mississippi,'^  keepers  of  hotels,  boarding-houses  and 
restaurants  have  a  lien  on  the  goods  and  personal  bag- 
gage of  their  guests  and  boarders  to  secure  the  payment  of 
any  money  due  from  them  for  board  and  lodging. 

In  Missouri,'^^  hotel,  inn,  and  boarding-house  keepers  have 
a  lien  upon  the  baggage  and  other  valuables  of  their  guests 
or  boarders,  brought  into  such  hotel,  inn,  or  boarding-house 
by  such  guests  or  boarders,  and  upon  the  wages,'^'*  of  such 
guests  or  boarders,  for  their  proper  charges  due  from  such 
guests  or  boarders,  for  their  accommodation,  boarding  and 
lodging,  and  such  extras  as  are  furnished  at  their  request. 

In  Montana,"^  hotel  men,  boarding-house  and  lodging- 
house  keepers  have  a  lien  upon  the  baggage  and  other  prop- 
erty of  value  brought  into  such  hotel,  inn  or  boarding  or  lodg- 
ing house,  by  such  guests  or  boarders,  for  their  accommo- 
dation, board,  or  lodging  and  room  rent,  and  such  extras  as 
are  furnished  at  their  request,  with  the  right  to  the  posses- 
sion of  such  baggage  or  other  property  of  value,  until  all 
such  charges  are  paid,  provided,  however,  that  nothing 
in  the  act  shall  be  construed  to  give  a  lien  upon  prop- 
erty sold  on  the  installment  plan  and  title  to  which  is  to 
remain  in  the  vendor  until  final  payment. 

'-  Code  1906,  §  3057.  ment  of  a  lien  upon  wages.     In  a 

■"■s  Rev.   Stats.   1909,   §  8247.     The  process    by    garnishment    the    last 

lien  does  not  cover  goods  belong-  thirty    days'    wages    are    exempt. 

ing    to    a    third    person    taken    to  Hodo    v.    Benecke,    11    Mo.    App. 

the  inn  or  boarding  house  by  the  393.     Where   the   plaintiff    fails   to 

guest.        Wyckoff      v.        Southern  establish   his    lien,   he    is    entitled 

Hotel  Co.,  24  Mo.  App.  382.  to    a    general    judgment    for    the 

'4    A  lien  for   wages   cannot  be  debt   for  board   shown  to   be   due. 

enforced    in   the    manner  provided  Hodo    v.    Benecke,    11    Mo.    App. 

by    the    statute    for    the    enforce-  393. 

ment  of  the  innkeeper's  lien.  The  '5  Code  Ann.   (Civ.)   1895,  §  2502, 

mode    provided    is    by    sale,    and  as  amended  by  Laws  1899,  p.  132. 

this    is    not   apt    for   the    enforce- 


§515  LIENS.  470 

In  Nebraska,""  the  keeper  of  any  inn  or  hotel,  whether 
individual,  partnership  or  corporation,  has  a  lien  on 
the  baggage  and  other  property  in  and  about  such  inn  be- 
longing to  or  under  the  control  of  his  guests  or  boarders  for 
the  proper  charges  due  him  from  such  guests  or  boarders 
for  the  accommodation,  board  and  lodging,  and  for  all  money 
paid  for  or  advanced  to  them  not  to  exceed  the  sum  of  two 
hundred  dollars,  and  for  such  other  extras  as  are  furnished 
at  their  request;  and  said  innkeeper  or  hotel-keeper  shall 
have  the  right  to  detain  such  baggage  and  other  property 
until  the  amount  of  such  charges  is  paid,  and  such  baggage 
and  other  property  shall  be  exempt  from  attachment  or  exe- 
cution until  such  innkeeper's  lien  and  the  cost  of  satisfying 
it  are  satisfied. 

In  New  Hampshire,^'^  any  person  keeping  a  boarder  or 
lodger,  not  a  mariner  or  seaman,  has  a  lien  upon  the 
baggage  and  effects  of  such  boarder  or  lodger  brought  to 
his  boarding  house  or  lodging  house  until  all  proper  charges 
for  the  fare  and  board  or  room  rent  of  such  boarder  or  lodger 
are  paid  or  tendered. 

In  New  Jersey,'''^  all  hotel,  inn,  and  boarding-house  keep- 
ers have  a  lien  on  all  baggage  and  property  belonging  to 
guests,  boarders  and  lodgers  at  said  hotel,  inn,  or  boarding- 
house,  for  the  amount  of  their  bill  or  bills  due  to  the  pro- 
prietor thereof  for  the  hire  of  rooms  or  board  in  said  hotel, 
inn,  or  boarding-house,  and  have  the  right,  without  the  pro- 

76  Laws   1913,   ch.   58,   §    5.  They  have  a   lien  upon  the  horse 

"^■7  Pub.     Stats,    and    Sess.    Laws  of  a  boarder  for  his  own  fare  and 

1901,   ch.    141,   §    1,  as  amended   by  board,  but  not  for  the  keeping  of 

Laws    1909,    ch.    80.      The    statute  the     horse.       The     terms     of     the 

embraces    innkeepers   who,    in   ad-  statute   limit  the    lien   to  the   fare 

dition    to    their    business    as    inn-  and   board  of   the  guest.     It   does 

keepers   strictly,   also   take  board-  not    include    the    fare    and    board 

ers.      Such    keepers    of    boarders  of    his    horse.      Cross    v.    Wilkins, 

are    entitled    to    a    lien    upon    the  43   N.   H.  332. 

baggage      and      effects      of      their  ''^  Comp.     Stats.     1910,     p.     3134, 

boarders  for  their  fare  and  board.  §    44. 


471 


INNKEEPERS     LIENS. 


§    515 


cess  of  law,  to  retain  the  same  until  the  said  amount  of  in- 
debtedness is  discharged. 

In  New  Mexico/^  innkeepers  and  those  who  board  others 
for  pay  have  a  lien  on  the  property  of  their  guests,  while  the 
same  is  in  their  possession,  and  until  the  same  is  paid. 

In  New  York,^'^  a  keeper  of  a  hotel,  apartment  hotel,  inn, 


'9  Comp.   Laws  1897,  §  2239. 

80  Birdseye's  C.  and  G.  Consol. 
Laws  1909,  p.  3230,  §  181.  A  stat- 
ute (1879,  ch.  530)  enumerates 
lodging-houses  keepers  among 
those  entitled  to  the  benefits  of 
the  act;  but  it  has  been  held  that 
a  mere  lodging-house  keeper  has 
no  lien  upon  the  effects  of  the 
lodger  by  force  of  the  latter  stat- 
ute, and  certainly  had  none  be- 
fore. Cochrane  v.  Schryner,  17  N. 
Y.  Week.  Dig.  442.  No  lien  can 
be  acquired  under  this  act  upon 
the  goods  of  a  third  person 
brought  to  the  house  by  a  board- 
er. Misch  V.  O'Hara,  9  Daly  (N. 
Y.)  361.  Under  this  statute  it  is 
only  the  baggage  and  effects  of  a 
boarder  that  are  affected  by  the 
lien,  and  the  lien  is  given  only 
for  the  amount  that  may  be  due 
for  board  by  such  boarder.  Mc- 
Ilvane  v.  Hilton,  7  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
594.  This  statute  applies  to  cases 
of  special  contracts  for  board  at  a 
fixed  rate  by  the  week  or  month, 
although  an  innkeeper,  under  such 
circumstances,  would  have  no 
lien.  Misch  v.  O'Hara,  9  Daly  (N. 
Y.)  361.  The  statute  applies  only 
to  those  who  make  a  business,  in 
whole  or  in  part,  of  keeping 
boarders.  Cady  v.  McDowell,  1 
Lans.  (N.  Y.)  484.  See  Barnett  v. 
Walker,  39  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  323,  79 
N.     Y.     S.     859.       The     lien     ex- 


ists with  reference  to  perma- 
nent as  well  as  transient  board- 
ers. Stewart  v.  McCready,  24 
How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  62.  The 
Legislature  has  a  constitutional 
right  to  give  an  innkeeper  a  lien 
on  the  goods  of  a  third  person 
brought  to  the  inn  by  a  guest. 
Horace  Waters  &  Co.  v.  Gerard, 
189  N.  Y.  302,  82  N.  E.  143,  affg. 
106  App.  Div.  431,  94  N.  Y.  S.  702. 
A  boarding  house  keeper  under 
the  Statute  of  1897,  ch.  418,  §  71, 
may  have  a  lien  on  a  piano 
brought  to  the  inn  by  a  guest 
even  where  the  piano  is  owned 
by  a  third  person.  Leonard  v. 
Harris,  147  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  458, 
131  N.  Y.  S.  909.  Under  Lien  Law 
(Consol.  Laws  1909,  ch.  33,  §  181), 
which  provides  that  an  innkeeper 
shall  have  no  lien  on  property 
brought  by  a  guest,  where  he 
knows  the  property  is  not  legally 
in  the  possession  of  the  guest  or 
when  he  has  notice  that  such 
property  does  not  belong  to  the 
guest,  it  is  held  that  the  required 
notice  to  the  hotel  keeper  must 
be  an  actual  notice  and  that  he 
will  not  be  charged  with  con- 
structive notice.  Mathews  v. 
Victor  Hotel  Co.,  132  N.  Y.  S. 
375,  74  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  426.  Notice  to 
a  servant  of  the  Hotel  Co.  that 
property  brought  to  the  house  by 
a    guest    does    not    belong   to    the 


515 


LIENS. 


472 


boarding  house  or  lodging  house,  except  an  emigrant  lodg- 
ing house,  has  a  lien  upon,  while  in  possession,  and  may  de- 
tain the  baggage  and  other  property  brought  upon  their 
premises  by  a  guest,  boarder  or  lodger,  for  the  proper 
charges  due  from  him,  on  account  of  his  accommodation, 
board  and  lodging,  and  such  extras  as  are  furnished  at  his  re- 
quest. If  the  keeper  of  such  hotel,  apartment  hotel,  inn, 
boarding  or  lodging  house  knew  that  the  property  brought 
upon  his  premises  was  not,  when  brought,  legally  in  posses- 
sion of  such  guest,  boarder  or  lodger,  or  had  notice  that  such 
property  was  not  the  property  of  such  guest,  boarder  or 
lodger,  a  lien  thereon  does  not  exist. 

In  North  Carolina,^^  every  hotel  and  boarding-house 
keeper  wdio  shall  furnish  board,  bed  or  room  to  any  person 
shall  have  the  right  to  retain  possession  of  and  a  lien  upon 
all  baggage  or  other  property  of  such  person  that  may  have 
been  brought  to  such  hotel  or  boarding  house,  until  all  rea- 
sonable charges  for  such  room,  bed  and  board  are  paid. 

In  North  Dakota, ^^  hotel,  inn,  boarding-house  and  lodging- 
house  keepers  shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  baggage  and  other 
property  of  their  guests,  boarders  or  lodgers,  brought  into 
such  hotel,  inn,  boarding  or  lodging  house  by  such  guests, 
boarders  or  lodgers  for  the  proper  charges  due  from  such 
guests,  boarders  or  lodgers  for  their  accommodation,  board 
and  lodging  and  room  rent  and  such  extras  as  are  furnished 


guest  is  notice  to  the  company. 
Lurch  V.  Brown,  119  N.  Y.  S.  637, 
65  Misc.  Rep.  190.  Notice  to  the 
innkeeper  that  property  brought 
by  a  guest  does  not  belong  to 
him,  where  the  notice  is  received 
after  the  property  is  brought  will 
not  prevent  the  innkeeper  from 
having  a  lien  on  it  for  the  board 
and  lodging  of  the  guest  prior  to 
the  time  when  such  notice  is 
given.  Lurch  v.  Wilson,  114  N. 
Y.  S.  789,  62  Misc.  Rep.  259.     Un- 


der the  Laws  of  1897,  ch.  118,  §  71, 
an  innkeeper  has  a  lien  on  the 
property  of  the  guest  brought  to 
the  house  unless  the  innkeeper 
knows  the  property  does  not  be- 
long to  the  guest  or  is  legally  in 
his  possession.  Barnett  v.  Wal- 
ker. 39  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  323,  79  N. 
Y.  S.  859. 

SI  Revisal    1905,    §    2037. 

82  Rev.  Code  1905,  p.  1000, 
§    6292. 


473  innkeepers'  liens.  -  §  515 

at  their  request,  and  the  right  to  the  possession  of  such  bag- 
gage or  other  property  until  all  such  charges  are  paid. 

In  Ohio,^^  the  keeper  of  any  inn,  whether  individual,  part- 
nership or  corporation,  has  a  lien  on  the  baggage  and 
other  property  in  and  about  such  inn  belonging  to  or  under 
the  control  of  his  guests  or  boarders  for  the  proper  charges 
due  him  from  such  guests  or  boarders  for  the  accommoda- 
tion, board,  lodging,  and  for  all  money  paid  for  or  advanced 
to  them,  and  for  such  extras  as  are  furnished  at  their  re- 
quest. 

Boarding-house  keepers  furnishing  board  to  persons  em- 
ployed by  any  contractor  or  sub-contractor,  in  the  construc- 
tion of  a  railroad,  shall  have  a  lien  for  the  payment  of  the 
same  upon  such  railroad  and  such  lien  shall  have  and  main- 
tain precedence  over  any  lien  taken,  or  to  be  taken. ^^ 

In  Oklahoma  innkeepers  and  boarding-house  keepers 
have  a  lien  on  the  baggage  of  their  guests. ^^ 

In  Oregon, ^"^  hotel-keepers,  innkeepers,  lodging-house 
keepers  and  boarding-house  keepers  have  a  lien  upon  the 
baggage  and  other  valuables  of  their  guests,  lodgers  or 
boarders  brought  into  such  hotel,  inn,  lodging  house  or 
boarding  house  by  such  guests,  lodgers  or  boarders,  for  the 
reasonable  charges  due  from  such  guests,  lodgers  or  board- 
ers for  their  accommodation,  board  and  lodgings,  and  such 
extras  as  are  furnished  at  the  request  of  such  guests,  lodgers 
or  boarders,  and  they  may  retain  possession  of  such  property 
until  such  charges  be  paid. 

In  Pennsylvania,^^  the  keeper  of  any  inn  or  hotel,  v/hether 
individual,  partnership,  or  corporation,  shall  have  a  lien  on 
the  baggage  and  other  property,  in  and  about  such  inn,  belong- 
ing to,  or  under  the  control  of,  his  guests  or  boarders,  for  the 
proper  charges  due  him  from   such  guests  or  boarders  for 

83  Gen.  Code  1910,  §§  5981,  5984;  s^  Comp.    Laws    1909,   §   4148. 

Thomas      v.      Remington       Type-  S6  Bellinger      &      Cotton's    Ann. 

writer  Co.,  30  Ohio  C.  C.  691'.  Codes   and   Stats.   1902,   §   5703. 

S4  Gen.  Code  1910,  §  8345.  87  Laws  1913,  p.  483. 


§515  LIENS.  474 

the  accommodation,  board  and  lodging,  and  for  all  money 
paid  for  or  advanced  to  them,  not  to  exceed  the  sum  of  two 
hundred  dollars,  and  for  such  other  extras  as  are  furnished 
at  their  request;  and  said  inn-keeper  or  hotel  keeper  shall 
have  the  right  to  detain  such  baggage  and  other  property  un- 
til the  amount  of  such  charges  is  paid,  and  such  baggage  and 
other  property  shall  be  exempt  from  attachment  or  execu- 
tion until  such  inn-keeper's  lien,  and  the  cost  of  satisfying  it, 
are  satisfied. 

In  South  Dakota,^^  an  innkeeper  or  keeper  of  a  boarding- 
house  is  liable  for  all  losses  of  or  injury  to  personal  property 
placed  by  his  guests  or  boarders  under  his  care,  unless  oc- 
casioned by  an  irresistible  superhuman  cause,  by  a  public 
enemy,  by  the  negligence  of  the  owner,  or  by  the  act  of  some 
one  whom  he  brought  into  the  inn  or  boarding  house ;  and 
upon  such  property  the  innkeeper  or  keeper  of  a  boarding- 
house  has  a  lien  and  a  right  of  detention  for  the  payment 
of  such  amount  as  may  be  due  him  for  lodging,  fare,  board- 
ing or  other  necessaries  by  such  guest  or  boarder;  and  the 
said  lien  may  be  enforced  by  a  sale  of  the  property. 

In  Tennessee,^^  keepers  of  hotels,  boarding-houses,  and 
lodging-houses,  whether  licensed  or  not,  have  a  lien  on  all 
furniture,  baggage,  wearing  apparel,  or  other  goods  and 
chattels  brought  into  any  such  hotel,  boarding  or  lodging- 
house,  by  any  guest  or  patron  of  the  same,  to  secure  the  pay- 
ment by  such  guest  of  all  sums  due  for  board  or  lodging. 

In  Texas, ^°  proprietors  of  hotels  and  boarding-houses  have 
a  special  lien  upon  all  property  or  baggage  deposited  with 
them  for  the  amount  of  the  charges  against  them  or  their 
owners,  if  guests  at  such  hotel  and  boarding-house. 

88  Rev.  Code   (Civ.)   1903,  §   1381.  Dak.  227,  76  N.  W.  930,  49  L.  R.  A. 

Under    the    South    Dakota    statute  610,  74  Am.  St.  791. 

it    is  held   that   an    innkeeper    has  89  Ann.    Code    1896,   §   3590. 

no  lien  on  the  property  of  a  third  ^^  Rev.     Civ.     Stats.     1911,     art. 

person    brought    to    the    inn    by    a  5663. 
guest.     McClain  v.  Williams,  11  S. 


475  innkeepers'  liens.  §  515 

In  Utah,^^  every  hotel,  tavern,  boarding-house 
keeper,  or  person  who  lets  furnished  rooms  has  a  lien 
upon  the  baggage  of  his  patrons,  boarders,  guests,  and  ten- 
ants, for  the  amount  that  may  be  due  from  any  such  persons 
for  such  boarding,  lodging,  or  rent,  and  he  is  authorized  to 
hold  and  retain  possession  of  such  baggage  until  the  amount 
so  due  for  boarding,  lodging,  or  rent,  or  either,  is  paid. 

In  Virginia,^-  every  innkeeper,  keeper  of  an  ordinary, 
boarding-house,  and  a  house  of  private  entertainment  has  a 
lien  upon  the  baggage  and  effects  of  any  guest  or  boarder 
for  the  amount  which  may  be  due  for  board  and  lodging  until 
such  amount  is  paid. 

In  Washington, ^^  all  hotel  keepers,  innkeepers,  lodging- 
house  keepers,  and  boarding-house  keepers  in  this  state  has 
a  lien  upon  baggage,  property,  or  other  valuables  of 
their  guests,  lodgers,  or  boarders  brought  into  such  hotel, 
inn,  lodging  house  or  boarding-house  by  such  guests,  lodgers, 
or  boarders,  for  the  proper  charges  due  from  such  guests, 
lodgers  or  boarders  for  their  accommodation,  board  or  lodg- 
ing, and  such  other  extras  as  are  furnished  at  their  request, 
and  shall  have  the  right  to  retain  in  their  possession  such  bag- 
gage, property  or  other  valuables  until  such  charges  are  fully 
paid,  and  to  sell  such  baggage,  property  or  other  valuables 
for  the  payment  of  such  charges. 

In  West  Virginia,^*  the  owner  or  keeper  of  any  hotel,  inn, 
eating,  boarding  or  lodging  house  or  restaurant  has  a 
lien  upon  and  may  keep  possession  of  the  baggage  or  other 
personal  property  of  any  kind,  of  any  person  or  persons 
which  he  or  they  may  have  therein,  for  all  such  claims  or 
bills  for  lodging,  entertainment  or  accommodation,  to  the  ex- 
tent only  of  his  said  claim  or  bill. 

91  Comp.  Laws  1907,  §  1402.  93  Remington  &  Ballinger's  Ann. 

92  Pollard's      Ann.      Code      1904,       Codes  and  Stats.  1910,  §   1201. 
§  2489.  94  Code  1906,  §  4283. 


§515  LIENS.  476 

In  Wisconsin, ^'^  every  innkeeper,  hotel  keeper  and 
keeper  of  a  boarding-house  or  lodging  house,  whether  indi- 
vidual, copartnership,  or  corporation,  has  a  lien  upon 
and  may  retain  the  possession  of  all  the  baggage  and  other 
effects  brought  into  his  inn,  hotel,  boarding-house  or  lodg- 
ing house  by  any  guest,  boarder  or  lodger,  whether  the  same 
is  the  individual  property  of  such  guest,  boarder,  or  lodger, 
or  under  his  control,  or  the  property  of  any  other  person  for 
whose  board,  lodging,  or  other  accommodation  the  person 
contracting  for  such  board  and  lodging  is  liable,  for  the 
proper  charges  owing  such  innkeeper,  hotel  keeper,  or  keeper 
of  a  boarding-house  or  lodging  house  for  any  board,  lodging 
or  other  accommodation  furnished  to  or  for  such  guest, 
boarder,  or  lodger,  and  for  all  money  paid  or  advanced  to 
any  such  guest,  boarder,  or  lodger,  not  exceeding  the  sum  of 
fifty  dollars,  and  for  such  extras  as  are  furnished  at  the 
written  request  signed  by  such  guest,  boarder  or  lodger, 
until  the  amount  of  such  charges  is  paid;  and  any  execution 
or  attachment  levied  upon  any  such  baggage  or  effects  shall 
be  subject  to  such  innkeeper's  lien  and  the  costs  of  satisfying 
it.  It  is  provided,  however,  that  no  lien  shall  be  placed  upon 
any  property  mentioned  in  this  paragraph  for  any  bill  or  ac- 
count which  is  chargeable  against  any  person  mentioned 
herein  for  malt,  spirituous,  ardent  or  intoxicating  liquors  fur- 
nished to  any  of  the  aforesaid  persons.^^ 

In  Wyoming,^"  any  keeper  of  a  hotel  or  boarding-house  or 
lodging-house  or  restaurant  has  a  lien  upon  the  baggage  or 
other  personal  property  of  any  person  who  shall  obtain  board 
or  lodging,  or  both,  from  such  keeper,  for  the  amount  due  for 

05  Stats.  1898,  §  3344,  as  amended  for  his  charges  which  an  innkeep- 

by  Laws   1913,   ch.  341.  er   had  at   common    law   upon   the 

96  This     statute     is    changed     in  goods    of  his   guest   for   the  price 

form,    though    apparently    not    in  of  his  board  and  lodging.     Nichols 

substance,   from    that   of   1863,   ch.  v.  Halliday,  27  Wis.  406.     Chicker- 

89,  §   1.     That  was  held  to  give  to  ing-Chase  Bros.  Co.  v.  White,  127 

a  boarding-house  keeper  the  same  Wis.  83,   106  N.   W.  797. 
lien  upon  the  effects  of  a  boarder         9"  Comp.  Stats.  1910,  §  3770. 


477  innkeepers'  liens.  §  518 

such  board  or  lodging,  and  is  hereby  authorized  to  retain  the 
possession  of  such  baggage  or  personal  property  until  the 
said  amount  is  paid. 

§516.  Lien  secures  only  reasonable  charges. — The  land- 
lord has  a  lien  for  his  reasonable  charges,  whatever  may  be 
the  amount  of  his  bill,  provided  the  guest  be  possessed  of  his 
reason  and  be  not  an  infant.  If  the  goods  of  a  guest  be 
seized  upon  execution,  or  be  attached,  they  can  only  be  taken 
subject  to  the  landlord's  reasonable  charges,  and  not  merely 
subject  to  a  lien  for  a  reasonable  quantity  of  wines. '^^  Lord 
Abinger,  in  his  summing  up  to  the  jury,  said:  "It  has  been 
urged  that  the  plaintiff  was  asked  not  to  allow  his  guest  more 
than  a  certain  quantity  of  brandy  and  water,  and  the  guest's 
mother  sent  to  him  to  that  efTect ;  however,  I  must  say  that 
I  never  heard  that  the  landlord  of  an  inn  was  bound  to  in- 
vestigate the  nature  of  the  articles,  which  were  ordered  by  a 
guest  before  he  supplied  them.  The  landlord  of  an  inn  may 
supply  whatever  things  the  guest  orders,  and  the  guest  is 
bound  to  pay  for  them,  provided  that  the  guest  be  possessed 
of  his  reason,  and  is  not  an  infant.  In  either  of  these  latter 
cases  the  landlord  must  look  to  himself." 

§517.  Liens  for  advanced  money. — The  lien  covers  ad- 
vances of  money  made  to  a  guest  on  the  credit  of  his  effects. ^^ 

§  518.  General  lien  for  smiount  of  the  bill. — The  lien  of  an 
innkeeper  is  a  general  one  for  the  whole  amount  of  his  bill. 
The  lien  covers  the  charges  for  the  guest's  personal  enter- 
tainment, and  the  charges  made  specially  against  the  prop- 

98  Proctor  V.  Nicholson,  7  Car.  between  the  innkeeper  and  the 
&    P.    67.  guest,  at  the  time  of  the  advances, 

99  Proctor  V.  Nicholson,  7  Car.  that  the  goods  in  question  were 
&  P.  67.  Lord  Abinger  instructed  to  be  considered  as  security  for 
the  jury  that  they  were  to  con-  these  sums.  See  Watson  v.  Cross, 
sider   whether    it    was    understood  2  Duvall   (Ky.)    147. 


5i8 


LIENS. 


478 


erty  brought  by  the  guest,  such  as  horses  and  a  carriage.^  In 
a  case  before  the  Queen's  Bench  Division,  Lord  Justice 
Bramwell  fully  and  clearly  stated  the  law,  saying:-  "The 
first  question  for  our  decision  is,  What  was  the  innkeeper's 
lien;  was  it  a  lien  on  the  horses  for  the  charges  in  respect  of 
the  horses,  and  on  the  carriage  in  respect  of  the  charges  of 
the  carriage  and  no  lien  on  them  for  the  guest's  reasonable 
expenses,  or  was  it  a  general  lien  on  the  horses  and  carriage 
and  guest's  goods  conjointly  for  the  whole  amount  of  the  de- 
fendant's claim  as  innkeeper.  I  am  of  opinion  that  the  latter 
w^as  the  true  view  as  to  his  lien,  and  for  this  reason,  that  the 
debt  in  respect  of  wdiich  the  lien  was  claimed  was  one  debt, 
although  that  debt  was  made  up  of  several  items.  An  inn- 
keeper may  demand  the  expenses  before  he  receives  the 
guest,  but  if  he  does  not,  and  takes  him  in  and  finds  him  in 
all  things  that  the  guest  requires  it  is  one  contract,  and  the 
lien  that  he  has  is  a  lien  in  respect  of  the  whole  contract  to 
pay  for  the  things  that  are  supplied  to  him  while  he  is  a 
guest.  If  this  was  not  the  case  a  man  might  go  to  an  hotel 
with  his  wife,  and  then  it  might  be  said  that  the  innkeeper's 
lien  was  on  the  guest's  luggage  for  what  he  had  consumed, 
and  on  the  wife's  luggage  for  what  she  had  had.  The  con- 
tract was,  that  the  guest  and  his  horses  and  carriage  shall  be 
received  and  provided  for.  There  was  one  contract,  one 
debt,  and  one  lien  in  respect  of  the  whole  of  the  charges." 


1  Thompson  v.  Lacy,  3  B.  &  Aid. 
283;  Pollock  v.  Landis,  36  Iowa 
651 ;  Mason  v.  Thompson,  9  Pick. 
(Mass.)  280,  20  Am.  Dec.  471 ;  Mc- 
Daniels  v.  Robinson,  26  Vt.  316, 
62  Am.  Dec.  574;  Fox  v.  Mc- 
Gregor, 11  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  41. 
In  some  early  cases  it  was  said 
that  the  horse  of  a  guest  might 
be  detained  for  his  own  meals, 
and  not  for  the  guest's  personal 
entertainment.  Bac.  Abr.  Inns,  D, 
citing  Rosse   &    Bramsteed's   case, 


2  Roll.  438,  and  2  Roll.  Abr.  85; 
but  these  cases  do  not  support 
the  doctrine.  The  reason  for  the 
doctrine  is  said  to  be,  that  chat- 
tels are  in  the  custody  of  the  law 
for  the  debt  which  arises  from  the 
thing  itself,  and  not  for  any  other 
debt  due  from  the  same  party. 
Story  Bailm.  §  476.  As  remarked 
in  effect  by  Story,  this  doctrine  is 
without  substantial  support. 

-  Mulliner   v.    Florence,    L.    R.   3 
Q.  B.  Div.  484,  488. 


479  innkeepers'  liens.  §   519 

Lord  Justice  Colton,  in  the  same  case,  to  like  effect  said: 
"The  innkeeper  has  a  general  lien  for  the  whole  amount  of 
his  bill.  As  to  the  horses,  harness,  and  carriage,  there  would 
be  a  lien  for  any  special  expenditure,  and  there  is  no  reason 
for  exempting  the  horses,  harness,  and  carriage  from  the 
general  lien  an  innkeeper  has  in  the  guest's  goods  by  the  gen- 
eral law.  The  innkeeper  is  bound  to  receive  the  horses, 
harness,  and  carriage  with  the  guest  as  much  as  he  is  bound 
to  receive  the  guest  himself — the  liability  of  the  innkeeper 
with  respect  to  them  is  the  same  as  his  liability  with  respect 
to  the  other  goods  of  the  guest,  and  there  is  no  reason  for 
excluding  the  claim  of  the  innkeeper  although  the  horses, 
harness,  and  carriage  are  not  received  in  the  dwelling-house, 
but  in  adjoining  buildings.  There  is  no  authority  for  saying 
that  the  innkeeper's  lien  does  not  extend  to  the  horses,  har- 
ness, and  carriage  the  guest  brings  with  him,  as  much  as  to 
other  things  of  the  guest." 

If  one  who  is  already  a  guest  at  a  hotel  brings  his  horses 
and  carriages  there,  a  lien  attaches  to  them  for  the  charges 
then  existing  against  the  guest,  as  well  as  for  the  subsequent 
entertainment  of  the  guest  and  his  horses.^ 

The  lien  does  not  cover  board  to  become  due  in  the  future, 
but  only  that  which  is  due  at  the  time  of  the  detention.^ 

A  lien  for  charges  for  the  entertainment  of  a  servant  who 
is  a  guest  at  a  hotel  alone  without  his  master,  may  be  en- 
forced against  the  master's  horse  and  wagon  which  the  ser- 
vant brought  with  him  and  used  in  his  master's  business.^ 

§  519.  Possession  is  essential  to  the  preservation  of  this 
lien. — If  the  guest  be  allowed  to  take  his  goods  away  with 
him,  the  innkeeper  cannot  retake  the  goods  and  assert  his 

3  Mulliner    v.   Florence,   3   Q.    B.  ^  Smith    v.    Keyes,    2    Thomp. 

Div.  484.  &    C.   650. 

4Shafer   v.    Guest,   35   How.    Pr. 
(N.  Y.)   184,  6  Robt.  264,  268. 


§    520  LIENS.  480 

lien;  and  even  if  the  guest  returns  again  with  the  same 
goods,  the  innkeeper  cannot  hold  them  for  a  prior  debt.^ 

But  a  boarding-house  keeper,  having  a  valid  lien  under  the 
laws  of  Massachusetts  upon  the  trunk  of  a  boarder,  does  not 
lose  it  by  sending  it  by  an  express  company  to  New  Hamp- 
shire, with  instructions  not  to  deliver  it  until  the  amount  of 
the  claim  for  which  the  trunk  was  detained  should  be  paidJ 

§  520.  Guest's  possession  secured  by  fraud  will  not  pre- 
vent innkeeper's  lien. — If  the  guest  fraudulently  removes 
his  goods,  or  even  through  fraudulent  representations  ob- 
tains the  consent  of  the  innkeeper  to  th^ir  removal,  the  right 
of  lien  remains.  Thus,  if  the  guest  pays  his  bill  with  a  fraud- 
ulent draft,  which  he  represents  to  be  good,  the  lien  is  not 
released.* 

§  521.     Temporary  loss  of  possession  will  not  waive  lien. — 

The  lien  is  not  defeated  by  the  occasional  absence  of  the 
guest,  if  he  has  the  intention  of  returning.®  For  example,  if 
a  traveller  leave  his  horse  at  the  inn,  and  then  go  out  to  dine 
or  lodge  with  a  friend,  he  does  not  thereby  cease  to  be  a 
guest,  and  the  rights  and  liabilities  of  the  parties  remain  the 
same  as  though  the  traveller  had  not  left  the  inn.  And  if 
the  owner  leave  the  inn  and  go  to  another  town,  intending 
to  be  absent  two  or  three  days,  it  seems  that  the  same  rule 
holds  good.^^  And  so  if  one  goes  to  an  inn  with  two  race- 
horses and  a  groom,  in  the  character  of  a  guest,  and  remains 
there  for  several  months,  taking  the  horses  out  every  day  for 
exercise  and  training,  though  he  is  occasionally  absent  for 

c  Jones  V.  Pearle,  1  Strange  556;  S.)    638;   Grinnell   v.   Cook,   3   Hill 

Jones  V.   Thurloe,  8  Mod.   172.  (N.  Y.)  485,  38  Am.  Dec.  663;  Cald- 

■^  Jaquith    v.    American    Express  well   v.   Tutt,   10  Lea   (Tenn.)   258, 

Co.,   60   N.   H.   61.  43   Am.   Rep.   307. 

8  Manning     v.      Hollenbeck.     27  10  Grinnell   v.    Cook,   3    Hill    (N. 
Wis.   202.  Y.)  485,  38  Am.  Dec.  663,  per  Bron- 

9  Allen   V.    Smith,    12    C.    B.    (N.  son,  J. 


481  innkeepers'  liens.  §  523 

several  days,  but  always  with  the  intention  of  returning  to 
the  inn,  the  innkeeper's  lien  is  not  destroyed.  In  the  ab- 
sence of  any  alteration  in  the  relation  of  the  parties,  that  of 
innkeeper  and  guest  is  presumed  to  continue. ^^ 

§  522.  No  waiver  by  accepting  other  security. — An  inn- 
keeper who  accepts  security  from  a  guest  for  the  payment 
of  hotel  charges  does  not  waive  his  lien  at  common  law  upon 
the  goods  of  his  guest  for  the  amount  of  such  charges,  unless 
there  is  something  in  the  nature  of  the  security,  or  in  the  cir- 
cumstances under  which  it  was  taken,  which  is  inconsistent 
with  the  existence  or  continuance  of  the  lien,  and  therefore 
destructive  of  it.^^ 

This  lien,  like  other  liens,  is  waived  by  an  arrangement  for 
payment  at  a  future  day. 

§  522a.  Priority. — This  lien  takes  precedence  of  a  chattel 
mortgage  not  recorded  until  after  the  indebtedness  was  in- 
curred for  which  the  lien  is  claimed. ^^ 

§  523.  Lien  waived  by  unlawful  sale. — An  innkeeper  who 
sells  the  goods  of  a  guest  without  judicial  or  statutory  au- 
thority waives  his  lien,  and  renders  himself  liable  in  trover 
for  the  value  of  the  property,  and  it  is  no  excuse  for  such  a 
sale  that  the  retention  of  the  chattel  is  attended  with  ex- 
pense.^^  In  an  action  by  the  owner  of  the  property  for  the 
conversion,  the   innkeeper  might  set  off  his  charges  if  the 

11  Allen  V.  Smith,  12  C.  B.  (N.  (Mass.)  382;  Case  v.  Fogg,  46  Mo. 
S.)  638.  44.     In   Jones   v.  Thurloe,  8  Mod. 

12  Angus  V.  McLachlan,  23  Ch.  172,  Chief  Justice  Pratt  is  report- 
D.  330;  Reed  v.  Teneyck,  103  Ky.  ed  as  saying,  "that,  though  the  inn- 
65,  19  Ky.  L.  1690,  44  S.  W.  356.  keeper   might   detain   a  horse   for 

13  Corbett  V.  Cushing,  4  N.  Y.  his  meat  for  one  night,  yet  he 
Supp.  616,   23   N.  Y.   St.  55.  could  not  sell  the  horse  and  pay 

14  Jones  V.  Pearle,  1  Strange  556;  himself;  if  he  did  it  was  a  conver- 
Mulliner  v.  Florence,  3  Q.  B.  D.  sion,  for  he  is  not  to  be  his  own 
484;     Doane    v.    Russell,    3    Gray  carver." 


31 


§    5^4  LIENS.  482 

owner  was  his  guest  and  liable  for  the  debt;  but  if  the  prop- 
erty detained  belonged  to  a  third  person,  there  could  be  no 
set-of¥  in  a  suit  by  him  for  a  conversion  of  the  property. 
Thus,  if  the  property  be  horses,  which  had  been  stolen  or  ob- 
tained by  fraud  from  the  owner,  the  damages  to  which  the 
owner  would  be  entitled  in  an  action  against  the  innkeeper, 
for  an  unlawful  sale  of  them,  would  be  the  full  value  of  the 
horses  at  the  time  of  sale.  In  a  leading  case  on  this  subject 
before  the  Queen's  Bench  Division,  Lord  Justice  Bramwell 
said:^^  "The  defendant,  who  had  only  a  lien  on  the  horses, 
was  not  justified  in  selling  them,  and  he  has  therefore  been 
guilty  of  a  conversion,  and  that  enables  the  plaintiff  to  main- 
tain this  action  for  the  proceeds  of  the  sale.  The  very  notion 
of  a  lien  is,  that  if  the  person  who  is  entitled  to  the  lien,  for 
his  own  benefit  parts  with  the  chattel  over  which  he  claims 
to  exercise  it,  he  is  guilty  of  a  tortious  act.  He  must  not 
dispose  of  the  chattel  so  as  to  give  some  one  else  a  right  of 
possession  as  against  himself.  The  lien  is  the  right  of  the 
creditor  to  retain  the  goods  until  the  debt  is  paid.  *  *  * 
If  the  plaintiff  after  the  sale  of  the  horses  had  thought  fit  to 
go  to  the  vendee  and  say  to  him,  'Those  horses  are  mine,' 
and  the  vendee  had  refused  to  give  them  up,  he  could  have 
maintained  an  action  against  the  vendee  for  the  full  value  of 
the  horses;  but  instead  of  acting  in  this  manner  he  has 
treated  the  sale  by  the  defendant  as  a  conversion.  He  is  not 
to  be  worse  off  because  he  has  brought  his  action  against  the 
defendant  instead  of  against  the  vendee.  It  is  said  if  the 
plaintiff  succeeds  that  the  defendant's  lien  would  be  useless 
to  him,  and  that  the  plaintiff  would  be  better  off  than  he  was 
before  the  sale  of  the  horses  by  the  defendant.  I  do  not 
think  there  is  anything  unreasonable  in  holding  the  defend- 
ant liable  if  the  defendant  was  not  bound  to  feed  the  horses."' 

§  524.     Care  and  use  of  the  property  detained. — An  inn- 
keeper retaining  the  goods  of  his  guest  by  virtue  of  a  lien  is 

1--5  Mulliner  v.  Florence,  3  Q.  B.  Div.  484,  489,  491. 


483  innkeepers'  liens.  §  525 

not  bound  to  use  greater  care  as  to  their  custody  than  he 
uses  as  to  his  own  goods  of  a  similar  description.^*^ 

Whether  the  innkeeper  has  the  right  to  use  the  property 
may  depend  in  some  degree  upon  circumstances.  It  seems 
that  he  may  do  so  if  the  property  is  of  a  nature  that  involves 
expense  to  keep  it,  such  as  a  horse.  Where,  soon  after  a 
horse  and  w^agon  and  other  articles  were  left  with  an  inn- 
keeper to  be  kept  for  a  few  days,  he  had  good  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  the  person  leaving  the  property  did  not  own  it,  and 
had  abandoned  it  and  was  acting  in  bad  faith  towards  the 
owner,  and  the  innkeeper  did  not  know  who  or  where  the 
owner  was,  and  the  owner,  as  the  innkeeper  had  reason  to 
believe,  did  not  know  where  the  property  was,  it  was  held 
that  the  innkeeper  had  the  right  to  use  the  property  mod- 
erately and  prudently  to  the  extent  of  compensating  him  for 
his  charges  for  keeping;  and  such  use,  being  lawful,  was  not 
a  conversion. ^'^ 

§  525.  Innkeeper's  lien  confers  no  right  of  sale. — The  inn- 
keeper's lien,  like  other  liens  at  common  law,  confers  no  right 
of  sale  in  satisfaction  of  the  debt.  It  is  a  right  to  retain  and 
nothing  more.^^  By  statute,  however,  a  remedy  by  sale  is 
quite  generally  provided.  In  several  states  the  statutes  which 
authorize  carriers  to  sell  property  on  which  they  have  a  lien 
apply  also  to  innkeepers.^''  In  a  few  states  there  are  general 
statutes  applicable  to  all  holders  of  liens,  which  authorize  the 
sale  of  any  property  for  the  satisfaction  of  the  lien  debt  in  the 
manner  prescribed.^^ 

16  Angus    V.    McLachlan,    23    Ch.  Fox    v.    AlcGregor,    11    Barb.    (N. 

D.   330.  Y.)   41. 

1"^  Alvord    V.    Davenport,    43    Vt.  ^9  Such    is    the    case    in    Illinois, 

30.  Kansas.  Michigan,  Nebraska,   New 

IS  Mulliner  v.   Florence,  3  Q.  B.  Mexico,  New  York,  Oregon,  Wis- 

Div.   84;    Thames    Iron    W.    Co.   v.  consin,    Wyoming. 

Patent  Derrick  Co.,  1  Johns.  &  H.  20  Arizona :   §    r049a.     Colorado: 

93,  97;   Case   v.   Fogg,  46   Mo.  44;  §  1050.     Florida:  §  1052.     Georgia: 

People  V.   Husband,  Z6  Mich.  306;  §    1053.     Idaho:   §    1053a.     Illinois: 


§    525a  LIENS.  484 

§  525a.  Alabama.^^ — If  the  charges  when  due  are  not  paid 
within  ten  days  after  demand  therefor,  such  hotel,  inn,  board- 
ing house  or  restaurant  keeper  may,  on  giving  ten  days' 
notice  of  the  time  and  place  of  such  sale,  by  advertisement 
in  some  newspaper  published  in  the  county  in  which  the 
hotel,  inn,  boarding  house  or  restaurant  is  located,  once  a 
week  for  two  successive  weeks,  or,  if  there  be  no  such  paper, 
by  posting  the  notice  in  three  conspicuous  places  in  the 
county,  sell  the  goods  and  baggage  for  the  payment  of  the 
charges  and  expenses  of  keeping  and  of  the  sale;  and  the 
balance,  if  any  there  be,  he  shall  pay  over  to  the  owner. 

§  525b.  Arizona.^^ — Whenever  any  trunk,  carpet  bag, 
valise,  box,  bundle,  furniture,  merchandise  or  baggage  has 
heretofore,  or  hereafter  come  into  the  possession  of  the 
keeper  of  any  hotel,  inn,  boarding  or  lodging  house  as  such, 
and  has  remained  or  shall  remain  unclaimed  for  the  period 
of  six  months,  such  keeper  may  proceed  to  sell  the  same  by 
public  auction,  and  out  of  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  may  re- 
tain the  charges  for  storage,  if  any,  and  the  expenses  of  ad- 
vertising and  sale  thereof;  but  no  such  sale  shall  be  made 
until  the  expiration  of  four  weeks  from  the  first  publication 
of  notice  of  such  sale  in  a  newspaper  published  in  the  nearest 
city,  town,  village,  or  place  in  which  said  hotel,  inn,  boarding 
or  lodging  house  or  warehouse  is  situated.  Said  notice  shall 
be  published  once  a  week  for  four  weeks  in  some  newspaper, 
daily  or  weekly,  of  general  circulation,  and  shall  contain  a 
description  of  each  trunk,  carpet  bag,  valise,  bundle,  box, 
furniture,  merchandise,  or  baggage,  as  near  as  may  be,  the 
name  of  the  owner,  if  known,  the  name  of  such  keeper,  and 

§  10S4.     Maine:  §  1055.     Massachu-  Utah:  §  1060a.     Virginia:   §   1060b. 

setts:    §    1056.      New    Hampshire:  Wisconsin:    §     1060c.      Wyoming: 

§     1057.      New    Mexico:    §     1057a.  §   1060e. 

North   Dakota:  §    1057b.     Oregon:  21  Civ.   Code  1907,   §  4828. 

§    1058.      South    Dakota:    §    1057b.  22  Rev.  Stats.   1901,  §  2917. 

Tennessee :  §  1059a.   Texas :  §  1060. 


485  innkeepers'  liens.  §  526 

the  time  and  place  of  such  place  (sale);  and  the  expenses 
incurred  for  advertising  shall  be  a  lien  upon  such  trunk,  car- 
pet bag,  valise,  box,  bundle,  furniture,  merchandise,  or  bag- 
gage at  a  ratable  proportion,  according  to  the  value  of  such 
property  or  thing  or  article  sold;  and  in  case  any  balance 
arising  from  such  sale  shall  not  be  claimed  by  the  rightful 
owner  within  one  week  from  the  day  of  said  sale,  the  same 
shall  be  paid  into  the  treasury  of  the  county  in  which  such 
sale  took  place;  and  if  the  same  be  not  claimed  by  the  owner 
thereof  or  his  legal  representatives  within  one  year  there- 
after, the  same  shall  be  paid  into  the  general  fund  of  said 
county. 

§  526.  California.-^ — Whenever  any  trunk,  carpet-bag, 
valise,  box,  bundle,  or  other  baggage  has  heretofore  come, 
or  shall  hereafter  come,  into  the  possession  of  the  keeper  of 
any  hotel,  inn,  boarding  or  lodging  house,  as  such,  and  has 
remained,  or  shall  remain,  unclaimed  for  the  period  of  six 
months,  such  keeper  may  proceed  to  sell  the  same  at  public 
auction,  and  out  of  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  may  retain  the 
charges  for  storage,  if  any,  and  the  expenses  of  advertising 
and  sale  thereof;  but  no  such  sale  shall  be  made  until  the  ex- 
piration of  four  weeks  from  the  first  publication  of  notice  of 
such  sale,  in  a  newspaper  published  in  or  nearest  the  city, 
town,  village,  or  place  in  which  said  hotel,  inn,  boarding  or 
lodging  house  is  situated.  Said  notice  shall  be  published 
once  a  week,  for  four  successive  weeks,  in  some  newspaper, 
daily  or  weekly,  of  general  circulation,  and  shall  contain  a  de- 
scription of  each  trunk,  carpet-bag,  valise,  box,  bundle,  or 
other  baggage,  as  near  as  may  be,  the  name  of  the  owner, 
if  known,  the  name  of  such  keeper,  and  the  time  and  place  of 
such  sale;  and  the  expenses  incurred  for  advertising  shall  be 
a  lien  upon  such  trunk,  carpet-bag,  valise,  box,  bundle,  or 
other  baggage,   in   a   ratable   proportion,   according  to   the 

23  Civ.   Code   1906,   §   1862. 


§  •  526a  LIENS.  486 

value  of  such  piece  of  property,  or  thing,  or  article  sold;  and 
in  case  any  balance  arising  from  such  sale  shall  not  be 
claimed  by  the  rightful  owner  within  one  week  from  the  day 
of  said  sale,  the  same  shall  be  paid  into  the  treasury  of  the 
county  in  which  such  sale  took  place ;  and  if  the  same  be  not 
claimed  by  the  owner  thereof,  or  his  legal  representativ^es, 
within  one  year  thereafter,  the  same  shall  be  paid  into  the 
general  fund  of  said  county. 

§  526a.  Colorado.^^ — After  appraisement  as  prescribed  by 
statute,  the  keeper  of  any  hotel,  tavern  or  boarding-house. 
or  any  person  who  rents  furnished  or  unfurnished  rooms, 
may,  after  giving  ten  days'  prior  notice  of  the  time  and  place 
of  such  sale,  with  a  description  of  the  property  to  be  sold, 
by  publication  in  some  newspaper  published  in  the  county 
where  he  resides  (or  if  there  be  no  such  newspaper,  then  by 
posting  in  three  public  places  within  such  county)  and  de- 
livering to  the  owner  of  such  personal  property,  or  if  he  do 
not  reside  in  the  county,  transmitting  by  mail  to  him  at  his 
usual  place  of  abode,  if  known,  a  copy  of  such  notice,  proceed 
to  sell  all  such  personal  property,  or  so  much  thereof  as  may 
be  necessary,  at  public  auction,  for  cash  in  hand,  at  any  pub- 
lic place  within  such  county,  between  the  hours  of  ten  a.  m. 
and.  four  p.  m.  of  the  day  appointed,  and  from  the  proceeds 
thereof  may  pay  the  reasonable  costs  of  such  appraisement, 
notice  and  sale,  and  his  reasonable  charges  for  which  he  has 
a  lien,  together  with  the  reasonable  costs  of  keeping  such 
property  up  to  the  time  of  sale.  The  residue  of  the  proceeds 
and  of  the  property  unsold  he  shall  render  to  the  owner. 

§  527.  Connecticut.^^ — Whenever  the  keeper  of  any  hotel 
or  inn  shall  receive  into  his  hotel  or  inn  any  person  as  a 

-^  Mills'       Ann.        Stats.  1912,  place    of    sale    is    necessary.      The 

§§•  4571-4576.  attachment    of    the    lien,    coupled 

25  Gen.   Stats.    1902,    §   4166.  No  with  the  right  to  sell  on  the  ex- 

•special    notice    of    the    time  and  piration    of   a    definite    limitation, 


487  innkeepers'  liens.  §  527a 

boarder,  he  shall  have  a  Hen  upon  and  right  to  detain  the 
baggage  and  effects  of  such  boarder;  and  such  lien  may  be 
enforced  in  the  manner  hereinafter  provided.  At  any  time 
after  thirty  days  after  the  person  incurring  any  debt  or 
obligation  has  left  the  hotel  or  inn  wherein  such  debt  or 
obligation  was  incurred,  the  debt  or  obligation  being  still  due 
and  unpaid,  the  proprietor  of  said  hotel  or  inn  may  sell  at 
public  auction  for  cash  at  the  office  of  said  hotel  or  inn  any 
or  all  baggage  or  property  left  at  said  hotel  or  inn,  and  apply 
the  avails  of  said  sale  toward  the  payment  of  said  debt  or 
obligation;  provided,  that  such  sale  shall  be  advertised  three 
times  in  a  newspaper  published  or  having  a  circulation  in  the 
town  where  said  hotel  or  inn  is  situated,  commencing 
at  least  five  da3^s  before  said  sale ;  and  that,  in  case  the  last 
usual  place  of  abode  of  said  debtor  is  known  to  or  can  rea- 
sonably be  ascertained  by  said  hotel  keeper,  notice  of  the 
time  and  place  of  sale  shall  be  given  him  by  mailing  such 
notice  to  him  in  a  registered  letter,  postage  paid,  at  such 
last  usual  place  of  abode  at  least  five  days  before  the  time  of 
sale.  The  proceeds  of  such  sale,  after  deducting  the  amount 
due  to  the  proprietor  of  such  hotel  or  inn,  and  all  expenses 
connected  with  such  sale,  shall  be  paid  to  the  owmer  of  the 
property,  or  his  legal  representatives,  if  called  for  or  claimed 
by  him  or  them  at  any  time  within  one  year  from  the  date  of 
said  sale,  and  if  such  balance  is  not  claimed  or  called  for  as 
aforesaid  within  said  period,  then  it  shall  escheat  to  the  state. 

§  527a.  District  of  Columbia.-^ — If  the  amount  due  and  for 
which  such  a  lien  is  given  is  not  paid  after  the  end  of  a 
month  after  the  same  is  due,  and  the  property  bound  by  said 
lien  does  not  exceed  the  sum  of  fifty  dollars,  then  the  party 
entitled   to  such  lien,   after   demand   of   payment   upon   the 

is,    in    legal    efifect,    if    not    in    ex-  at     the     option     of     the     creditor, 

press  terms,  notice  to   the  debtor  Brooks  v.   Harrison,  41   Conn.   184. 

that,    at    the    termination     of    the  26  Code    1901,   §    1263. 
time    fixed,   a   sale   may   be    made 


§    527b  LIENS.  488 

debtor,  if  he  be  within  the  District,  may  proceed  to  sell  the 
property  so  subject  to  lien  at  public  auction,  after  giving  no- 
tice once  a  week  for  three  successive  weeks  in  some  daily 
newspaper  published  in  the  District,  and  the  proceeds  of 
such  sale  shall  be  applied,  first,  to  the  expenses  of  such  sales 
and  the  discharge  of  such  lien,  and  the  remainder,  if  any, 
shall  be  paid  over  to  the  owner  of  the  property. 

§  527b.  Florida.^'^ — The  liens  of  a  hotel  or  boarding-house 
keeper  may  be  enforced  by  retaining  the  personal  property 
and  chattels  of  their  guests,  for  a  period  not  exceeding  three 
months,  and  by  a  bill  in  equity  or  by  an  ordinary  suit  at  law 
and  the  levy  of  an  execution  on  such  retained  property. 

§  527c.  Georgia.-^ — Boarding-house  keepers  may  satisfy 
their  liens,  where  there  is  no  notice  of  conflicting  liens,  by 
giving  notice  for  thirty  days  of  their  intention  to  sell,  and  by 
selling  publicly  to  the  highest  bidder.  If  there  is  a  conflict- 
ing lien,  they  shall  be  satisfied  as  other  liens  on  personal 
property  not  mortgaged. 

§  527d.  Illinois.-^ — Unless  charges  for  hotel  accommoda- 
tions are  paid  within  sixty  days  from  the  time  when  the 
same  accrues,  the  hotel  proprietor  shall  have  the  right  to 
sell  the  baggage  and  effects  of  delinquent  guests  at  public 
auction  after  giving  ten  days'  notice  of  the  time  and  place  of 
such  sale,  by  publication  of  such  notice  in  a  newspaper  of 
general  circulation  in  the  county  in  which  said  hotel  is  sit- 
uated, and  also  by  mailing  ten  days  before  such  sale,  a  copy 
addressed  to  such  guest  at  his  postoffice  address,  if  known 
to  said  hotel  proprietor,  and  if  not  known,  then  to  his  place 
of  residence  registered  by  said  guests  in  the  register  of  such 
hotel;  and  after  satisfying  such  lien  out  of  the  proceeds  of 

27  Gen.  Stats.  1906,  §  2212.        29  Rev.  Stats.  1913,  p.  1371,  §  2. 

28  Code  1911,  §§  3366,  3368,  3530. 


489  innkeepers'  liens.  §  5276 

such  sale,  together  with  any  costs  that  may  have  been  in- 
curred in  enforcing  said  lien,  the  residue  of  said  proceeds  of 
sale,  if  any,  shall,  within  six  months  after  such  sale,  on  de- 
mand, be  paid  by  said  hotel  proprietor  to  such  guest;  and  if 
not  demanded  within  six  months  from  the  date  of  such  sale, 
such  residue  or  remainder  shall  be  deposited  by  such  hotel 
proprietor  with  the  county  treasurer  of  the  county  in  which 
such  hotel  is  situated,  together  with  a  statement  of  such  hotel 
proprietor's  claim,  the  amount  of  costs  incurred  in  enforcing 
the  same,  a  copy  of  the  published  notice,  and  the  amount 
received  from  the  sale  of  said  property  so  sold  at  said  sale; 
and  said  residue  shall,  by  said  county  treasurer,  be  accredited 
to  the  general  revenue  fund  of  said  county,  subject  to  the 
right  of  said  guest  or  his  representatives  to  reclaim  the  same 
at  any  time  within  three  years  from  and  after  the  date  of  such 
deposit  with  said  county  treasurer,  and  such  sale  shall  be  a 
perpetual  bar  to  any  action  against  said  hotel  proprietor  for 
the  recovery  of  such  baggage  or  property,  or  of  the  value 
thereof,  or  for  any  damages  growing  out  of  the  failure  of  such 
guest  to  receive  such  baggage  or  property. 

§  527e.  lowa.-^^ — The  innkeeper  or  hotel  keeper  shall  re- 
tain such  baggage  and  other  property  upon  which  he  has  a 
lien  for  a  period  of  ninety  (90)  days,  at  the  expiration  of 
which  time,  if  such  lien  is  not  satisfied,  he  may  sell  such  bag- 
gage and  other  property  at  public  auction  after  giving  ten 
(10)  days'  notice  of  the  time  and  place  of  sale  in  a  newspaper 
of  general  circulation  in  the  county  vvhere  the  inn  or  hotel  is 
situated,  and  also  by  mailing  a  copy  of  such  notice  addressed 
to  said  guest  or  boarder  at  the  place  of  residence  registered 
by  him  in  the  register  of  such  inn  or  hotel. 

After  satisfying  the  lien  and  any  costs  that  may  accrue, 
any  residue  remaining  shall,  on  demand  within  six  (6) 
months,  be  paid  to  such  guest  or  boarder,  and  if  not  so  de- 
manded within  six  (6)  months  from  date  of  such  sale,  such 

29a  Laws  1913,  p.  286. 


§    5-8  LIENS.  490 

residue  shall  be  deposited  by  such  innkeeper  or  hotelkeeper 
with  the  treasurer  of  the  county  in  which  the  inn  or  hotel  is 
situated,  together  with  a  statement  of  the  innkeeper's  claim 
and  the  costs  of  enforcing  same,  a  copy  of  the  published  no- 
tice, and  the  amounts  received  for  the  goods  sold  at  said  sale; 
said  residue  shall  by  said  county  treasurer  be  credited  to  the 
general  revenue  fund  of  said  county,  subject  to  a  right  of  said 
guest  or  boarder,  or  his  representative,  to  reclaim  at  any  time 
within  three  (3)  years  of  the  date  of  deposit  with  the  said 
treasurer. 

§  528.  Kansas.^*^ — An  innkeeper  or  hotel  keeper  shall  have 
the  right  to  detain  baggage  and  other  property  until  the 
amount  of  his  proper  charges  are  paid,  and  such  baggage  and 
other  property  shall  be  exempt  from  attachment  or  execution 
until  such  innkeeper's  lien  arid  cost  of  satisfying  it  are  paid. 
Said  innkeeper,  boarding  house  or  hotel  keeper  shall  retain 
such  baggage  and  other  property  upon  which  he  has  a  lien  for 
a  period  of  ninety  days,  at  the  expiration  of  which  time,  if 
such  lien  is  not  satisfied,  he  may  sell  such  baggage  and  other 
property  at  public  auction,  first  giving  notice  of  the  time  and 
place  of  sale  by  posting  at  least  three  notices  thereof  in  public 
places  in  the  county  where  the  inn  or  hotel  is  situated,  and 
also  by  mailing  a  copy  of  such  notice  addressed  to  said  guest 
or  boarder  at  the  place  of  residence  designated  by  the  register 
of  such  inn  or  hotel. 

§529.  Kentucky .^^ — AYhen  any  lien  exists  in  favor  of  any 
hotel-keeper,  inn-keeper,  boarding-house  keeper  and  keeper 
of  a  house  of  private  entertainment,  he  may,  before  a  justice 
of  the  peace  or  a  judge  of  the  quarterly  court  of  the  county 
where  the  debt  is  created,  by  himself  or  agent  or  attorney, 
make  affidavit  to  the  amount  due  him  and  in  arrears  for 
board,  nursing,  keeping,  care  and  attention  to  the  person  so 

?.<•  Laws   1913,   p.  360.  si  Carroll's  Stats.  1909.  §  2179a,  3, 

p.   964. 


491  INNKEEPERS     LIENS.  S    531 

receiving  same,  and  describing,  as  near  as  may  be,  the  bag- 
gage or  other  personal  property  owned  by,  and  brought  to 
such  house  of  entertainment ;  and,  thereupon  such  officer 
shall  issue  a  warrant,  directed  to  the  sheriff  or  any  constable 
or  town  marshall  of  said  county,  authorizing  him  to  levy 
upon  and  seize  the  said  goods  for  the  amount  due,  with  in- 
terest and  costs ;  but  if  the  said  goods  have  been  removed 
from  said  place  with  the  consent  of  such  landlord,  the  lien 
herein  provided  for  shall  not  continue  longer  than  ten  days 
from  and  after  such  removal. 

§  530.  Louisiana."- — Whenever  any  trunk,  carpet  bag, 
valise,  box,  bundle,  or  other  baggage  which  shall  hereafter 
come  into  the  possession  of  the  keeper  of  any  hotel,  inn, 
boarding  or  lodging  house,  as  such,  and  shall  remain  un- 
claimed or  unredeemed  for  the  period  of  six  months,  such 
keeper  may  proceed  to  sell  the  same  at  public  auction,  and 
without  judicial  proceeding,  and  out  of  the  proceeds  of  such 
sale  may  retain  the  amount  due  him  for  board,  lodging  and 
extras,  and  the  charges  for  storage,  if  any,  and  the  expense 
of  advertising  and  sale  thereof,  but  no  such  sale  shall  be 
made  until  the  expiration  of  four  weeks  from  the  first  pub- 
lication of  notice  of  such  sale  in  a  newspaper  published  in  or 
nearest  the  city,  town,  village  or  place  in  which  said  hotel, 
inn,  boarding  or  lodging  house  is  situated.  In  case  any  bal- 
ance arising  upon  such  sale  shall  not  be  claimed  by  the  right- 
ful owner  within  one  week  from  the  day  of  said  sale,  the 
same  shall  be  paid  to  the  Charity  Hospital  of  New  Orleans. 

§  531.  Maine.^^ — Innkeepers  and  keepers  of  boarding- 
houses,  having  liens  on  the  goods  and  personal  baggage  of 
their  guests  and  boarders,  may  enforce  the  same  by  a  sale 
of  such  goods  or  baggage,  in  the  manner  following:     After 

32  Merrick  Rev.   Civ.   Code   1900.  33  Rev.  Stat.   1903,  ch.  93,  §  65. 

art.  3236. 


§  53ia         ,  LIENS.  492 

such  goods  or  personal  baggage  have  remained  in  the  pos- 
session of  such  innholder  or  boarding-house  keeper  for  six 
months,  unredeemed,  they  may  be  sold  at  auction  to  pay  the 
sum  due  for  board  or  lodging,  and  the  expense  of  advertising 
and  selling  the  same.  Thirty  days'  notice  of  the  time  and 
place  of  sale  must  be  given  in  a  newspaper  published  in  the 
tow^n  where  such  articles  are  held,  if  any,  otherwise  by  post- 
ing in  three  conspicuous  places  therein;  with  a  description  of 
such  articles,  and  the  name  of  the  owner;  and  the  proceeds 
of  sale,  after  deducting  all  charges  and  expenses  of  advertis- 
ing and  notice,  shall  be  applied  in  satisfaction  of  the  claim 
upon  which  such  articles  are  sold,  and  the  balance,  if  any, 
shall  be  held  for  the  benefit  of  the  person  entitled  thereto. 
All  such  sales  shall  be  recorded  in  the  office  of  the  town  clerk 
where  the  sale  took  place,  with  a  description  of  the  articles 
sold,  the  charges  and  expenses,  and  the  prices  at  which  they 
were  sold. 

§  531a.  Maryland.^^ — The  lien  of  persons  taking  boarders 
or  lodgers  is  enforced  by  sale  of  the  personal  effects,  goods, 
and  furniture  of  their  guests,  upon  reasonable  notice  of  not 
less  than  ten  days  after  the  debt  for  such  board  or  lodging 
shall  have  become  due  and  payable,  at  either  public  or  private 
sale,  to  satisfy  such  debt,  the  proceeds  after  paying  expenses 
of  such  sale  to  be  applied  in  liquidation  of  such  indebtedness, 
and  the  balance,  if  any,  paid  over  to  such  debtors. 

§531b.  Massachusetts.^^ — A  person  having  a  lien,  other 
than  for  work  and  labor  or  for  money  expended  on  or  about 
personal  property  under  a  contract,  express  or  implied,  after 
demand  of  payment  in  writing,  may  file  a  petition  in  the 
superior  court,  a  police,  district  or  municipal  court  or  with  a 
trial  justice  of  the  county  in  which  the  petitioner  resides  for 

34  Pub.  Gen.  Laws  1904,  art.  71,  35  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  198,  §§  23- 
§  8.  28. 


493  innkeepers'  liens.  §   532 

an  order  for  the  sale  of  the  property  to  satisfy  his  hen.  A 
notice  must  then  be  served  on  the  owner  of  the  property  by 
the  court's  officer  or  by  the  petitioner,  and  if  the  owner  is 
unknown  or  a  non-resident  the  notice  may  be  pubHshed.  At 
the  hearing,  if  the  Hen  is  found  to  exist,  the  court  may  order 
the  property  sold.  The  liens  of  lodging  and  boarding-house 
keepers  may  also  be  enforced  as  above  designated. 

§  531c.  Michigan.^*' — Any  hotel-keeper  or  innkeeper  or 
boarding  or  lodging-house  keeper  who  shall  have  a  lien  for 
fare,  accommodations  or  board  upon  any  goods,  baggage  or 
other  chattel  property,  and  in  his  possession  for  three  months 
at  least  after  the  departure  of  the  boarder  or  lodger  or  guest 
leaving  the  same,  or  who  for  a  period  of  six  months  shall 
have  in  his  custody  any  unclaimed  trunk,  box,  valise,  pack- 
age, parcel  or  other  chattel  property  whatever,  may  proceed 
to  sell  the  same  at  public  auction,  after  first  having  given 
notice  to  the  county  treasurer  of  such  intended  sale,  and  out 
of  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  may,  in  case  of  lien,  retain  the 
amount  thereof  and  the  expense  of  storage,  advertisement 
and  sale  thereof. 

§  532.  Minnesota."" — Property  held  by  the  proprietor  or 
manager  of  a  hotel  or  boarding-house  for  non-payment  of 
charges  for  food,  entertainment  or  accommodation,  may  be 
sold  at  public  auction  ninety  days  after  such  default  occurs. 
The  sale  shall  be  made  by  sheriff  or  constable  upon  the  notice 
and  in  the  manner  provided  for  in  the  case  of  sales  under 
execution  from  justices'  courts. 

36  Howell's  Stats.  Ann.  1912,  belong  to  strangers,  provided  the 
§§  4209-4212.  innkeepers  have  no  knowledge   of 

37  Gen.  Stats.  1913,  §  6081.  Inn-  the  fact.  Singer  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Mil- 
keepers'  liens  attach  to  goods  in  ler,  52  Minn.  516,  55  N.  W.  56,  21 
possession  of  guests,  though  they  L.  R.  A.  229n,  38  Am.  St.  568. 


§  532a  LIENS.  494 

§  532a.  Mississippi.^^ — Keepers  of  hotels,  boarding-houses 
and  restaurants  may  enforce  their  liens  by  a  seizure  and  sale 
of  such  goods  and  baggage  in  the  manner  provided  by  law 
for  enforcing  liens  for  purchase-money  of  goods. 

§  533.  Missouri.^-' — Hotel,  inn  and  boarding-house  keep- 
ers may  sell  for  cash  the  baggage  and  other  valuables  of  their 
guests  or  boarders,  upon  which  they  may  have  a  lien  for 
charges  or  which  may  be  left  with  them  unclaimed,  after 
having  retained  possession  of  the  same  for  the  period  of  not 
less  than  six  months,  first  giving  five  days'  notice  of  such 
sale,  stating  the  time,  place,  and  terms  of  the  sale,  by  ad- 
vertisement in  a  newspaper  published  in  the  city  or  county 
where  said  sale  is  to  take  place,  and  if  no  daily  paper  is  pub- 
lished therein,  then  by  one  week's  notice  in  a  weekly  paper 
published  therein,  or  by  printed  or  written  handbills  put  up 
at  five  places  in  such  city  or  county  aforesaid;  and  any  sums 
of  money  received  from  the  proceeds  of  such  sale,  after  pay- 
ing all  charges,  and  the  expense  of  the  sale  and  of  storing 
the  articles  (which  said  expense  of  storage  shall  be  fifty 
cents  on  each  parcel),  shall  be  paid  into  the  county  treasury, 
and  in  the  city  of  St.  Louis  into  the  city  treasury,  for  the 
benefit  of  the  owner,  if  he  shall  thereafter  appear;  but  if 
such  money  be  not  claimed  within  one  A^ear,  it  shall  go  into 
the  school  fund  of  the  county  or  city :  provided,  that  when 
such  lien  is  claimed  upon  the  wages  of  any  such  guest  or 
boarder,  the  justice  shall  notify  the  party  designated  by  the 
plaintiff  as  owing  such  guest  or  boarder,  that  suit  has  been 
instituted  to  enforce  such  lien,  and  such  notice  shall  be  served 
in  the  same  manner  and  have  the  same  force  and  effect  as 
garnishments  in  attachments,  and  the  party  served  shall  be 
required  to  answer,  and  shall  receive  the  same  fees  as  pro- 
vided by  statute. 

3S  Code  1906,  §  3057.  so  Rev.  .Stats.  1909,  §  8248. 


495  innkeepers'  liens.  §   533b 

§  533a.  Montana.^*' — Whenever  any  trunk,  carpet  bag, 
valise,  box,  bundle,  furniture,  merchandise  or  baggage  has 
heretofore,  or  hereafter  come  into  the  possession  of  the 
keeper  of  any  hotel,  inn,  boarding  or  lodging  house  as  such, 
and  has  remained  or  shall  remain  unclaimed  for  the  period  of 
six  months,  such  keeper  may  proceed  to  sell  the  same  by 
public  auction,  and  out  of  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  may  re- 
tain the  charges  for  storage,  if  any,  and  the  expense  of  ad- 
vertising and  sale  thereof;  but  no  such  sale  shall  be  made 
until  the  expiration  of  four  weeks  from  the  first  publication 
of  notice  of  such  sale  in  a  newspaper  published  in  the  nearest 
city,  town,  village,  or  place  in  which  said  hotel,  inn,  boarding 
or  lodging-house  or  warehouse  is  situated.  Said  notice  shall 
be  published  once  a  week  for  four  weeks  in  some  daily  or 
weekly  newspaper,  of  general  circulation,  and  shall  contain  a 
description  of  each  trunk,  carpet  bag,  valise,  bundle,  box, 
furniture,  merchandise,  or  baggage,  as  near  as  may  be.  the 
name  of  the  owner,  if  known,  the  name  of  such  keeper,  and 
the  time  and  place  of  such  sale;  and  the  expenses  incurred 
for  advertising  shall  be  a  lien  upon  such  trunk,  carpet  bag, 
valise,  box,  bundle,  furniture,  merchandise,  or  baggage  at  a 
ratable  proportion,  according  to  the  value  of  such  property 
or  thing  or  article  sold;  and  in  case  any  balance  arising  from 
such  sale  shall  not  be  claimed  by  the  rightful  owner  within 
one  w^eek  from  the  day  of  said  sale,  the  same  shall  be  paid 
into  the  treasury  of  the  county  in  which  such  sale  took  place ; 
and  if  the  same  be  not  claimed  within  one  year  thereafter, 
the  same  shall  be  paid  into  the  general  fund  of  said  county. 

§  533b.  Nebraska.^^ — The  innkeeper  or  hotel-keeper  shall 
retain  such  baggage  and  other  property,  upon  which  he  has  a 
lien,  for  a  period  of  ninety  days,  at  the  expiration  of  which 
time,  if  such  lien  is  not  satisfied,  he  may  sell  such  baggage 
and  other  property  at  public  auction,  after  giving  ten  days' 

40  Civ.  Code  1895,  §  2503,  p.  1171.  ^^  Laws   1913,   cli.   58.   §   6. 


§  534  LIENS.  496 

notice  of  the  time  and  place  of  sale  in  a  newspaper  of  circu- 
lation in  the  county  where  the  inn  or  hotel  is  situated,  and 
also  by  mailing  a  copy  of  such  notice  addressed  to  said  guest 
or  boarder  at  the  place  of  residence  registered  by  him  in  the 
register  of  such  inn  or  hotel. 

§  534.  Nevada.^^ — Whenever  any  person  shall  leave  a 
hotel  or  lodging-house  indebted  to  the  proprietor  or  proprie- 
tors thereof,  and  shall  remain  absent  for  the  period  of  six 
months,  it  shall  be  lawful  for  such  proprietor  or  proprietors 
to  sell,  or  cause  to  be  sold,  at  public  auction,  any  baggage  or 
property  of  such  person  so  indebted,  or  so  much  thereof  as 
may  be  necessary  to  pay  such  indebtedness,  expenses,  and 
charges  of  sale,  which  may  have  been  left  at  such  hotel  or 
lodging-house  by  such  person. 

All  baggage  or  property,  of  whatever  description,  left  at  a 
hotel  or  lodging-house  for  the  period  of  twelve  months,  may 
be  sold  at  public  auction  by  the  proprietor  or  proprietors 
thereof,  and  the  proceeds  arising  from  such  sale,  after  deduct- 
ing the  expenses  and  charges  of  sale  and  storage,  shall  be 
paid  over  to  the  county  treasurer  of  the  county  in  which  such 
baggage  or  property  is  left,  to  be  held  by  him  for  the  period 
of  six  months  for  the  benefit  of  the  owner  thereof,  at  which 
time,  if  the  same  is  not  paid  to  the  owner,  or  some  person 
legally  entitled  to  the  same,  it  shall  be  transferred  to  the 
school  fund  of  the  county. 

All  sales  made  under  the  preceding  provisions  shall  be 
made  by  a  licensed  auctioneer,  or  by  some  constable  of  the 
township  in  which  such  baggage  or  property  may  be  left; 
provided  that  no  sale  shall  be  valid  unless  a  notice  of  such 
sale  shall  be  posted  up  in  three  public  places  in  such  township 
for  the  period  of  twenty  days  immediately  preceding  the  day 
of  sale,  giving  a  particular  description  of  the  property  to  be 
sold,  the  time  and  place  of  such  sale,  the  name  of  the  hotel  or 

42  Rev.   Laws.   1912,   §§  2151-2153. 


497  INNKEEPERS     LIENS.  i;     535a 

lodging-house  at  which  such  baggage  or  property  may  be 
left,  the  name  of  the  owner  or  owners  of  such  baggage  or 
property,  when  known,  and  signed  by  such  auctioneer  or 
constable. 

§  534a.  New  Hampshire.''" — Any  person  having  a  lien  on 
personal  property,  by  pledge  or  otherwise,  where  no  time  is 
limited  for  the  payment  of  the  debt  or  redemption  of  the 
property,  may  sell  the  same  or  so  much  thereof  as  is  needful, 
at  auction,  notice  of  the  sale  being  given  as  required  by  the 
statute,  and  from  the  proceeds  he  may  reimburse  himself  for 
his  debt  and  the  expenses  incident  to  the  sale. 

§  535.  New  Jersey.^^ — All  baggage  and  property  held  by 
any  hotel,  inn,  and  boarding-house  keeper  for  a  guest's  un- 
paid bills  shall,  after  the  expiration  of  six  months  from  the 
date  of  such  detention,  be  sold  at  public  auction,  upon  a  no- 
tice published  for  three  days  in  a  public  newspaper  published 
in  the  city  or  town  where  said  hotel,  inn,  or  boarding-house 
shall  be  kept,  and  the  proceeds  thereof  shall  be  applied  to  the 
payment  of  such  lien  and  the  expenses  of  such  sale,  and  the 
balance,  if  any  remaining,  shall  be  paid  over  to  the  owner  of 
such  property  or  his  representatives;  and  if  said  balance  is 
not  claimed  by  such  owners  within  thirty  days,  then  the  said 
balance  to  be  paid  to  the  overseer  of  poor-house  of  said  city 
or  town  for  the  support  of  the  poor. 

§  535a.  New  Mexico.^^ — In  order  to  enforce  their  liens 
innkeepers  and  those  who  board  others  for  pay,  may,  after 
the  debt  for  which  the  lien  is  claimed  becomes  due  and  paya- 
ble, serve  the  party  or  parties  against  whom  the  lien  is  sought 
to  be  enforced  with  a  written  notice,  setting  forth  the  amount 
of  the  indebtedness,  upon  what  account  or  cost  the  same  ac- 
crued, and  that  if  the  same  is  not  paid  within  ten  days  after 

43  Pub.  Stats.  &  Sess.  Laws  1901,       44  Comp.  Stats.  1910,  p.  3134,  §  45. 
ch.  141,  §  3.  45  Comp.  Laws  1897,  §§  2240-2242. 

32 


§  536  LIENS.  498 

the  service  of  said  notice,  the  property  will  be  advertised  for 
sale  to  satisfy  said  indebtedness.  If  default  be  made  in  the 
payment  of  the  debt,  after  notice,  then  it  shall  be  lawful  for 
the  lien  claimant  or  creditor  to  advertise  and  sell  such  prop- 
erty at  public  auction  to  the  highest  bidder  for  cash  after 
giving  twenty  days'  notice  of  such  sale  by  at  least  six  hand- 
bills posted  up  in  public  places  in  the  county  in  which  such 
sale  is  to  be  made;  such  notices  of  sale  shall  set  forth  time 
and  place  of  sale  and  a  description  of  the  property  to  be  sold. 
After  sale  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  shall  be  applied  to  the 
payment  of  the  costs  of  advertising  and  making  the  sale  and 
the  satisfaction  of  the  demand  of  the  lien  claimant,  and  the 
residue,  if  any,  shall  be  refunded  to  the  lien  debtor;  provided, 
that  the  lien  claimant  shall  not  be  precluded  from  bidding  on 
or  purchasing  the  property  of  such  sale. 

§  536.  New  York.^^ — Any  hotel-keeper,  innkeeper, 
boarding-house,  apartment-hotel  or  lodging-house  keeper, 
except  an  emigrant  lodging-house  keeper,  has  a  lien  upon, 
while  in  possession,  and  may  detain  the  baggage  and  other 
property  brought  upon  his  premises  by  a  guest,  boarder  or 
lodger,  for  the  proper  charges  due  from  him,  on  account 
of  his  accommodation,  board  and  lodging  and  such  extras  as 
are  furnished  at  his  request.  If  the  keeper  of  such  hotel, 
apartment-hotel,  inn,  boarding  or  lodging-house  knew  that 
the  property  brought  upon  his  premises  was  not,  when 
brought,  legally  in  possession  of  such  guest,  boarder,  or 
lodger,  a  lien  thereon  does  not  exist. 

A  lien  against  personal  property,  other  than  mortgage  on 
chattels,  if  in  the  legal  possession  of  the  lienor,  may  be  satis- 
fied by  the  public  sale  of  such  property.  Notice  must  be 
given  to  the  owner  of  the  property  if  within  the  county,  and 
if  not,  by  mailing  to  him  at  his  last  known  place  of  residence. 

46Birdseye's    C.    &    G.    Consol.    Laws     1909,    pp.    3230,    3231,    3237, 
3238,  3239. 


499  innkeepers'  liens.  §  536 

The  notice  must  state  the  nature  of  the  debt  or  agreement 
with  an  itemized  statement  of  the  claim;  a  brief  description 
of  the  property  against  which  the  lien  exists  and  its  estimated 
value;  and  the  amount  of  such  lien  at  the  date  of  the  notice. 
The  notice  shall  also  require  the  owner  to  pay  the  amount 
due  within  ten  days  from  the  service  thereof  and  shall  state 
the  time  when  and  place  where  such  property  shall  be  sold. 

Each  sale  of  personal  property  to  satisfy  a  lien  thereon 
shall  be  at  public  auction  to  the  highest  bidder,  and  shall  be 
held  in  the  city  or  town  where  the  lien  was  acquired.  After 
the  time  for  the  payment  of  the  lien,  specified  in  the  notice 
required  to  be  served  by  the  preceding  section,  notice  of 
such  sale  describing  the  property  to  be  sold,  and  stating  the 
name  of  the  owner  and  the  time  and  place  of  such  sale,  shall 
be  published  once  a  week,  for  two  consecutive  weeks,  in'  a 
newspaper  published  in  the  town  or  city  where  such  sale  is 
to  be  held,  and  such  sale  shall  be  held  not  less  than  fifteen 
days  after  such  notice  published  or  posted  in  not  less  than 
six  conspicuous  places  therein. 

Redemption  may  be  made  before  sale,  and  after  sale  the 
lienor  shall  retain  an  amount  sufficient  to  satisfy  his  lien  and 
expenses.  The  balance  shall  be  held  by  the  lienor  subject  to 
the  demand  of  the  owner.  If  this  is  not  claimed  within  thirty 
days  of  sale,  such  balance  must  be  deposited  with  the  treas- 
urer of  the  city  or  village  or  supervisor  of  the  town.  With 
such  deposit  there  must  be  an  affidavit  of  the  lienor  stating 
the  name  and  place  of  residence  of  the  owner  of  the  property 
sold,  if  known,  and  articles  sold,  the  prices  obtained  therefor, 
that  the  notice  required  by  this  article  was  duly  served  and 
how  served  upon  such  owner,  and  that  such  sale  was  legal 
and  how  advertised.  There  shall  also  be  filed  therewith  a 
copy  of  the  notice  of  sale  published  or  posted.  The  officer 
with  whom  such  balance  is  deposited  shall  credit  the  same 
to  the  owner  of  the  property,  and  pay  the  same  to  such 
owner,  his  assignee  or  legal  representative  on  demand  and 


§  536a  LIENS.  500 

satisfactor}''  evidence  of  identity.  If  such  balance  remain  in 
the  possession  of  such  ofBcer  for  a  period  of  five  years  un- 
claimed by  the  person  legally  entitled  thereto,  it  shall  be 
transferred  to  the  general  funds  of  the  town,  village  or  city, 
and  be  applied  and  used  as  other  moneys  belonging  to  such 
town,  village  or  city. 

This  remedy  is  not  exclusive. 

§  536a.  North  Carolina.'^^ — If  the  charges  of  a  hotel  or 
boarding-house  keeper  are  not  paid  within  ten  days  after  they 
become  due  then  the  hotel  or  boarding-house  keeper  is  au- 
thorized to  sell  said  baggage  or  other  property  at  the  court- 
house door,  after  first  advertising  such  sale  for  ten  days  at 
said  courthouse  door  and  three  other  public  places  in  the 
county,  and  out  of  the  proceeds  of  sale  to  pay  the  costs  and 
expenses  of  sale  and  all  costs  and  charges  due  for  said  board, 
bed  or  room,  and  the  surplus,  if  any,  pay  to  the  owner  of 
said  baggage  or  other  property. 

§  536b.  North  Dakota.^" — Upon  default  being  made  in  the 
payment  of  a  debt  secured  upon  personal  property,  such  lien 
may  be  foreclosed  upon  the  notice,  and  in  the  manner  pre- 
scribed for  the  foreclosure  of  mortgages  upon  personal  prop- 
erty, and  the  holder  of  such  lien  shall  be  entitled  to  the  pos- 
session of  the  property  covered  thereby  for  the  purpose  of 
foreclosing  the  same. 

§  536c.  Ohio.'*'^ — The  innkeeper  shall  retain  such  baggage 
and  other  property,  upon  which  he  has  a  lien,  for  sixty  days, 
at  the  expiration  of  which  time,  if  such  lien  is  not  satisfied, 
he  may  sell  it  at  public  auction,  after  giving  ten  days'  notice 
of  the  time  and  place  of  such  auction  in  a  newspaper  of  gen- 
eral circulation  and  in  the  county  where  such  inn  is  situated, 
and  by  mailing  a  copy  of  such  notice  addressed  to  such  guest 

^-  Revisal  1905,  §  2038.  ^9  Gen.  Code  1910,  §§  5985,  5986. 

4«Rev.  Code  1905,  §  6296. 


50I  innkeepers'  liens.  §  537 

or  boarder  at  the  place  of  residence  registered  by  him  in  the 
register  of  such  inn.  After  satisfying  the  lien  and  costs  that 
may  accrue,  the  residue,  on  demand  within  six  months  there- 
after, shall  be  paid  to  the  guest  or  boarder,  to  whom  the  prop- 
erty belonged  or  [by  whom  it]  was  controlled,  and  if  not  so 
demanded,  shall  be  deposited  by  such  innkeeper  with  the 
treasurer  of  the  county  in  which  such  inn  is  situated,  with  a 
statement  of  the  innkeeper's  claim,  the  cost  of  enforcing  it,  a 
copy  of  the  published  notice,  and  the  amount  received  for 
such  property  sold  at  such  sale.  Such  residue  shall  be  cred- 
ited by  the  county  treasurer  to  the  general  revenue  fund  of 
the  county,  subject  to  the  right  of  such  guest  or  boarder,  or 
the  representatives,  to  reclaim  it  within  three  years  from  the 
date  of  such  deposit. 

§  536d.  Oregon.^*^ — If  the  charges  for  which  hotel-keep- 
ers, innkeepers,  and  boarding-house  keepers  have  a  lien  are 
not  paid  within  sixty  days  after  they  become  due,  the  prop- 
erty may  be  sold  at  public  auction  after  advertisement  for 
three  weeks.  The  proceeds  shall  be  applied  first  to  the  dis- 
charge of  such  lien  and  the  cost  of  selling  such  property,  and 
the  remainder,  if  any,  shall  be  paid  over  to  the  owner  on 
demand. 

§  537.  Pennsylvania.^^ — The  innkeeper  or  hotelkeeper 
shall  retain  such  baggage  and  other  property  upon  which  he 
has  a  lien  for  a  period  of  ninety  days,  at  the  expiration  of 
which  time,  if  such  lien  is  not  satisfied,  he  may  sell  such  bag- 
gage and  other  property  at  public  auction,  after  giving  ten 
days'  notice  of  the  time  and  place  of  sale  in  a  newspaper  of 
circulation  in  the  county  where  the  inn  or  hotel  is  situated, 
and  also  by  mailing  a  copy  of  such  notice,  addressed  to  said 
guest  or  boarder  at  the  place  of  residence  registered  by  him 
in  the  register  of  such  inn  or  hotel. 

50  Bellinger     &     Cotton's     Ann.         ^i  Laws   1913,   p.  483. 
Codes  &  Stats.  1902,  §  5704. 


§  537a  LIENS.  502 

After  satisfying  the  lien  and  any  costs  that  may  accrue,  any 
residue  remaining  shall,  on  demand  within  six  months,  be 
paid  to  such  guest  or  boarder;  and  if  not  so  demanded  with- 
in six  months  from  date  of  such  sale,  such  residue  shall  be 
deposited  by  such  innkeeper  or  hotelkeeper  with  the  treas- 
urer of  the  county  in  which  the  inn  or  hotel  is  situated,  to- 
gether with  a  statement  of  the  claim  of  the  innkeeper 
or  hotel  proprietor  and  the  costs  of  enforcing  the  same,  a 
copy  of  the  published  notice,  and  of  the  amounts  received  for 
the  goods  sold  at  said  sale.  Said  residue  shall,  by  said  county 
treasurer,  be  credited  to  the  general  revenue  fund  of  said 
county,  subject  to  a  right  of  said  guest  or  boarder,  or  his 
representative,  to  reclaim  at  any  time  within  three  years  of 
the  date  of  deposit  with  said  treasurer. 

§  537a.  South  Carolina.^^ — At  any  time  after  the  expira- 
tion of  ten  days  after  the  person  incurring  the  debt  or  obliga- 
tion has  left  the  hotel  the  proprietor  of  any  hotel,  inn  or 
boarding-house  may  sell,  at  public  auction,  for  cash,  at  hotel 
or  boarding-house  ofifice,  any  or  all  baggage  or  property  left 
at  said  hotel,  inn  or  boarding-house,  to  satisfy  said  debt  or 
obligation  without  any  process  at  law  or  equity;  provided, 
that  said  sale  shall  be  advertised  by  written  or  printed  posters 
at  three  public  places  in  the  vicinity  for  at  least  ten  days 
before  said  sale. 

§  537b.  South  Dakota^^ — Baggage  or  other  property  and 
effects  belonging  to  the  person  who,  after  obtaining  board, 
lodging  or  other  accommodation  at  any  hotel  or  inn,  shall 
abscond  or  absent  himself  or  herself  from  such  hotel  or  inn 
without  having  paid  for  such  board,  lodging  or  other  accom- 
modations, may  at  the  expiration  of  thirty  days  be  sold  by 
the  keeper  of  such  hotel  or  inn  at  private  or  public  sale,  and 
the  net  amount  realized  from  such  sale  shall  be  credited  to 
the  unpaid  account  of  the  absconder. 

52  Code  of  Laws  1912,  §  2617.  53  Rev.  Code  (Civ.)  1903,  §  1382. 


503  innkeepers'  liens.  §   537d 

§  537c.  Tennessee.''^ — At  any  time  after  thirty  days  after 
the  person  incurring  the  debt  or  obligation  has  left  the  hotel, 
inn,  or  boarding-house,  and  the  debt  or  obligation  being  still 
due  and  unpaid,  the  owner  or  proprietor  of  such  hotel,  inn,  or 
boarding-house  may  sell,  at  public  auction,  for  cash,  at  hotel 
or  boarding-house  office,  any  or  all  baggage  or  property  left 
at  said  hotel,  inn,  or  boarding-house,  to  satisfy  said  debt  or 
obligation,  without  any  process  at  law  or  equity,  provided 
that  said  sale  shall  be  advertised  by  written  or  printed  posters 
for  at  least  ten  days  before  said  sale. 

§  537d.  Texas.^^ — When  possession  of  any  of  the  prop- 
erty left  in  a  hotel  or  boarding-house  has  continued  for  sixty 
days  after  the  charges  accrue,  and  the  charges  so  due  have 
not  been  paid,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  persons  so  holding 
such  property  to  notify  the  owner,  if  in  the  state  and  his  resi- 
dence is  known,  to  come  forward  and  pay  the  charges  due, 
and,  on  his  failure  within  ten  days  after  such  notice  has  been 
given  him  to  pay  the  charges,  the  persons  so  holding  the 
property,  after  twenty  days'  notice,  are  authorized  to  sell 
the  same  at  public  sale  and  apply  the  proceeds  to  the 
payment  of  said  charges  and  shall  pay  over  the  balance  to  the 
person  entitled  to  the  same.  If  the  owner's  residence  is  be- 
yond the  state  or  is  unknown,  the  person  holding  said  prop- 
erty shall  not  be  required  to  give  ten  days'  notice  mentioned 
in  the  preceding  article  before  proceeding  to  sell.  If  the 
person  who  is  legally  entitled  to  receive  the  balance  men- 
tioned in  this  chapter  is  not  known,  or  has  removed  from  the 
state  or  from  the  county  in  which  such  property  was  so  held, 
it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  person  so  holding  said  property  to 
pay  the  balance  to  the  county  treasurer  of  the  county  in 
which  said  property  is  held,  and  take  his  receipt  therefor. 

Whenever  any  balance  shall  remain  in  the  possession  of 

54  Ann.  Code  1896,  §  3596.  55  Rev.     Civ.     Stats.     1911,     arts. 

5667-5670. 


§  538  LIENS.  504 

the  county  treasurer  for  the  period  of  two  years  unclaimed 
by  the  party  legally  entitled  to  the  same,  such  balance  shall 
become  a  part  of  the  county  fund  of  the  county  in  which 
the  property  was  so  sold,  and  shall  be  applied  as  any  other 
county  fund  or  mone)^  of  such  county  is  applied  or  used. 

§538.  Utah/'*^ — At  any  time  after  thirty  days 
after  default  made  in  the  payment  of  a  debt  se- 
cured by  a  lien  upon  personal  property,  such  lien 
may  be  foreclosed  by  advertisement,  upon  the  notice  in 
the  manner  provided  for  the  foreclosure  of  mortgages  on 
personal  property;  provided  that  a  copy  of  the  notice  shall, 
at  the  time  of  posting  or  publication,  be  delivered  to  the 
owner  of  the  property,  or  if  he  does  not  reside  in  the  county, 
shall  be  transmitted  to  him  by  mail  at  his  usual  place  of 
abode,  if  known.  After  paying  reasonable  expenses  of  the 
sale,  together  with  the  amount  due  and  the  cost  of  keeping 
the  property  up  to  the  time  of  the  sale,  the  residue,  if  any. 
shall  be  rendered  to  the  owner  of  the  property.  If  the  prop- 
erty be  sold  by -advertisement,  a  statement  shall  be  rendered 
to  the  owner  of  the  property  as  the  law  prescribes  shall  be 
made  to  a  mortgagor,  and  on  failure  to  render  such  state- 
ment, the  lienholder  shall  forfeit  to  the  owner  the  sum  of 
twenty-five  dollars  damages.  The  fees  for  the  publication 
of  notice  shall  in  no  case  exceed  the  sum  of  three  dollars,  and 
the  fees  of  the  person  crying  the  sale  shall  be  two  dollars 
per  day. 

§  538a.  Virginia.''" — If  the  debt  for  which  an  innkeeper's 
lien  exists  be  not  paid  within  ten  days  after  it  is  due  and  the 
value  of  the  property  affected  by  the  lien  does  not  exceed 
twenty  dollars,  he  may  sell  such  property  or  so  much  thereof 
as  may  be  necessary,  by  public  auction,  for  cash,  and  apply 
the  proceeds  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  debt  and  expenses  of 

56  Comp.   Laws  1907,  §   1405.  ^~  Code  Ann.   1904.  §§  2491,  3207. 


505  innkeepers'  liens.  §  539 

sale,  and  the  surplus,  if  any,  he  shall  pay  to  the  owner  of  the 
property.  Before  making  such  sale,  he  shall  advertise  the 
time,  place,  and  terms  thereof,  in  such  manner  as  to  give 
publicity  thereto,  and  also  give  to  the  owner,  if  he  be  in  the 
county  or  corporation,  ten  days'  written  notice  of  the  same 
and  of  the  amount  claimed  to  be  due.  If  the  owner  can  not 
be  found  in  such  county  or  corporation,  posting  the  notice  at 
three  public  places  therein  shall  be  sufficient  service  thereof. 
If  the  value  of  the  property  be  more  than  twenty  dollars  but 
does  not  exceed  one  hundred  dollars,  the  party  having  such 
lien,  after  giving  notice  as  hereinbefore  provided,  may  apply 
by  petition  to  any  justice  of  the  county  or  corporation  where- 
in the  property  is,  or,  if  the  value  of  the  property  exceed 
one  hundred  dollars  to  the  county  or  corporation  court  of 
such  county  or  corporation,  for  the  sale  of  the  property;  and 
if,  on  the  hearing  of  the  case  on  the  petition,  the  defense,  if 
any  made  thereto,  and  such  evidence  as  may  be  adduced 
by  the  parties  respectively,  the  court  or  justice  shall  be  satis- 
fied that  the  debt  and  lien  are  established  and  the  property 
should  be  sold  to  pay  the  debt,  such  court  or  justice  shall 
order  the  sale  to  be  made  by  the  sheriff  or  sergeant  of  the 
said  county  or  corporation  or  any  constable  thereof,  who 
shall  make  the  same  and  apply  and  dispose  of  the  proceeds 
in  the  same  manner  as  if  the  sale  were  made  under  a  writ  of 
fieri  facias.  If  the  owner  of  the  property  be  a  resident  of 
this  state,  the  notice  required  by  this  section  may  be  served 
in  the  usual  mode  prescribed  by  statute.  If  he  be  a  non-resi- 
dent, it  may  be  servd  by  posting  a  copy  threof  in  three  public 
places  in  the  county  or  corporation  wherein  the  property  is. 

§  539.  Washington.^^ — Whenever  any  baggage,  property, 
or  other  valuables  which  have  been  retained  by  any  hotel- 
keeper,  innkeeper,  lodging-house  keeper,  or  boarding-house 
keeper  in  his  possession  by  virtue  of  a  lien  thereon  shall  re- 
main unredeemed  for  the  period  of  three  months  after  the 

58  Remington  &  Ballingcr's  Ann.    Codes  and  Stats.  1910,  §   1202. 


§  539^  LIENS.  506 

same  shall  have  been  so  retained,  then  it  shall  be  lawful  for 
such  hotel-keeper,  innkeeper,  lodging-house  keeper,  or  board- 
ing-house keeper  to  sell  such  property  at  public  auction,  after 
giving  the  owner  thereof  ten  days'  notice  of  the  time  and 
place  of  such  sale,  through  the  post-of^ce,  or  by  advertising 
in  some  newspaper  published  in  the  county  where  such  sale 
is  made,  or  by  posting  notices  in  three  conspicuous  places  in 
such  county,  and  out  of  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  to  pay  all 
legal  charges  due  from  the  owner  of  such  property,  including 
proper  charges  for  storage  of  the  same,  and  the  overplus,  if 
any,  shall  be  paid  to  the  owner  upon  demand. 

539a.  West  Virginia.^'' — The  owner  or  keeper  of  any 
hotel,  inn,  eating,  boarding  or  lodging  house,  or  restaurant, 
shall  have  a  lien  upon  and  may  keep  possession  of,  the  bag- 
gage or  other  personal  property  of  any  kind,  of  any  person 
or  persons  which  he  or  they  may  have  therein,  for  all  such 
claims  or  bills  for  lodging,  entertainment  or  accommodation, 
to  the  extent  only  of  his  said  claim  or  bill ;  and  after  the  ex- 
piration of  three  months  from  the  date  of  the  departure  of 
such  person  or  persons,  and  all  or  part  of  such  claims  re- 
maining unpaid  and  not  arranged,  said  property  or  such  part 
thereof  as  may  be  neccessary,  shall  be  sold  to  the  highest 
bidder  for  cash,  in  the  same  way,  upon  the  same  advertise- 
ment, and  by  the  same  ofificers,  that  personal  property  is  now 
sold  by  execution;  and  any  money  remaining  from  said  sale 
after  satisfying  the  claim,  costs  and  expenses  of  sale,  shall 
be  paid  to  the  person  or  persons,  whose  property  was  sold. 

§  539b.  Wisconsin.*^^ — Every  innkeeper  or  boarding-house 
keeper  having  a  lien  upon  baggage  and  effects  of  guests  or 
boarders  for  board  due,  may,  in  case  such  debt  remain  unpaid 
for  three  months  and  the  value  of  the  property  effected  there- 
by does  not  exceed  one  hundred  dollars,  sell  such  property  at 
public  auction  and  apply  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  to  the  pay- 

59  Code  Ann.  1906,  §  4283.         eo  Stats.  1898,  §  3347. 


507  innkeepers'  liens.  §  539c 

ment  of  the  amount  clue  him  and  the  expenses  of  such  sale. 
Notice,  in  writing,  of  the  time  and  place  of  such  sale  and  of 
the  amount  claimed  to  be  due  shall  be  given  to  the  owner  of 
such  property  personally  or  by  leaving  the  same  at  his  place 
of  abode,  if  a  resident  of  this  state,  and  if  not,  by  publication 
thereof  once  in  each  week,  for  three  weeks  successively,  next 
before  the  time  of  sale  in  some  newspaper  published  in  the 
county  in  which  such  lien  accrues,  if  there  be  one,  and  if  not, 
by  posting  such  notice  in  three  public  places  in  such  county. 
If  such  property  exceed  in  value  one  hundred  dollars,  then 
such  lien  may  be  enforced  against  the  same  by  action  in  any 
court  having  jurisdiction. 

§  539c.  Wyoming.^^ — If  the  amount  due  for  such  board 
or  lodging  is  not  paid  within  sixty  days  from  the  time  the 
same  shall  have  become  due  and  payable,  any  such  keeper 
may  proceed  to  have  such  baggage  or  other  personal  prop- 
erty sold  for  the  satisfaction  of  his  lien  in  the  following  man- 
ner: He  shall  give  ten  days'  prior  notice  of  the  sale  of  said 
articles  by  him  held  under  his  lien,  a  copy  of  which  he  shall 
immediately  transmit,  by  registered  letter,  to  the  owner  of 
the  articles  at  his  usual  place  of  abode  if  known,  and  he  shall 
post  said  notice  of  sale  in  three  conspicuous  and  public  places 
in  the  city,  town,  village  or  place  where  said  keeper  resides, 
giving  a  description  of  the  articles  to  be  sold  and  the  time  and 
place  of  sale,  one  of  which  notices  shall  be  posted  in  the  ofifice 
of  the  hotel,  lodging  house,  boarding-house  or  restaurant,  if 
still  maintained.  At  the  time  mentioned  in  said  notices,  the 
said  keeper  may  proceed  to  sell  to  the  highest  bidder  for  cash, 
all  of  such  personal  property  held  under  the  lien,  or  so  much 
thereof  as  shall  be  necessary  to  pay  his  claim,  and  the  residue 
of  the  unsold  property,  together  with  the  surplus  proceeds  of 
such  property  sold,  if  any,  he  shall  surrender  to  the  owner, 
his  heirs  or  legal  representatives,  on  application  therefor. 

eiComp.   Stats.   1910,  §   3770. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


Sec.  Sec. 

540.  In  general.  562. 

541.  Lien    by   agreement. 

542.  Lien  on  property  not  in  ex-      563. 

istence. 

543.  Chattel  mortgage   clause. 

544.  Lease     that     is    a    mortgage      564. 

must  be  recorded.  565. 

545.  Lease  of  farm  to  be  worked 

on   shares. 

546.  Rule    in    Missouri.  566. 

547.  Delivery     sufficient     to     pro- 

tect   a    lien.  567. 

548.  Provision        giving        lessor 

ownership.  568. 

549.  Lease   reserving   right   of  re-      569. 

entry. 

550.  Re-entry.  570. 

551.  Common-lav/     right     of     re- 

straint. 571. 

552.  Lien    of    a    distress    warrant. 

553.  Lien     attaches     from     begin- 

ning  of   tenancy.  572. 

554.  Lien     prior     to    that     of    at- 

tachment   or    execution.  573. 

555.  Priority    of    lien    to    tenant's 

mortgage.  574. 

556.  Landlord's     lien     paramount      575. 

to  mortgage   lien. 

557.  Lien     not    paramount    to    re- 

corded   chattel    mortgage.      576. 

558.  Fraudulent     cancellation     of      576a. 

mortgage   not  effective. 

559.  Tenant's    assignee    in    bank-      577. 

ruptcy. 

560.  Assignment       takes       prece-      578. 

dence   of  distress   warrant. 

561.  Distress     warrants     at     com- 

mon  law. 

508 


All  property  on  premises  lia- 
ble  to   distress   for  rent. 

Exemptions  from  distress 
on  the  ground  of  public 
policy. 

Privilege    of   trade. 

General  exemption  laws  do 
not  apply  as  against  a 
distress. 

Lien  for  rent  attaches  only 
on  tenant's  property. 

The  lien  attaches  only  to 
personal   property. 

Lien   covers   entire  crop. 

Lien  does  not  attach  to 
property  not  on  premises. 

Lien  attaches  to  mortgaged 
property. 

Distress  attaches  to  prop- 
erty only  where  demise 
exists. 

Rent  payable  must  be  fixed 
and  certain. 

Distress  only  after  rent  is 
due. 

Extent   of  landlord's   lien. 

The  statutory  lien  for  rent 
does  not  depend  upon  the 
maturity  of  the  rent. 

Expenses,  costs  and  the  like. 

Protection  of  bona  fide 
purchaser. 

Loss  of  lien  bj'  sale  of 
property. 

Loss  of  lien  by  sale  of  ten- 
ant to  innocenf  purchas- 
er. 


509 


LANDLORD  S  LIENS  FOR  RENT. 


Sec. 

578a.  Effect    of    removal    of    prop- 
erty to  another  state. 

579.  Consent    of    landlord    to    re- 

moval of  propert}'. 

580.  Notice    of    lien    to    purchaser 

of  crop. 

581.  Loss     of     lien     by     sale     of 

goods  in  usual  w^ay. 

582.  Sale    by    tenant   will    not    af- 

fect  landlord's   lien. 

583.  Estoppel  of  landlord. 

584.  Liability     of     purchaser     to 

landlord. 

585.  Lien    not    w^aived    by    taking 

note. 

586.  Lien    not    waived    by    taking 

mortgage. 

587.  Not   waived   by   taking   obli- 

gation of  third  person. 

588.  Remedy  of  landlord  who  has 

taken  security. 

589.  Tender  of  rent  due  must  be 

kept  good. 

590.  Lien  lost  by  levy  of  an   ex- 

ecution. 

591.  Lien    not    lost    by    appoint- 

ment of  receiver. 

592.  Lien   lost   by   accepting   sur- 

render     of     the     leasehold 
estate. 

593.  No    distraint    for    rent    after 

term   expires. 

594.  A     landlord's     lien     not     im- 

paired     by      his      tenant's 
subletting   the  premises. 

595.  Loss   of   lien    by   destruction 

of  the   property. 

596.  Notice   unnecessary    at   com- 

mon law. 

597.  Rule   in   United   States   as   to 

notice  to  tenant. 

598.  Who   may   distrain. 

599.  Rights  of  purchaser  at   fore- 

closure sale. 

600.  Against  whom   distraint  may 

be   had. 


Sec. 

601. 

Injunction   by   landlord. 

602. 

Alabama. 

603. 

Alabama    (continued).    Land- 

lord's   liens   upon   crops. 

604. 

Alabama   (continued).     Liens 

of  tenants  in  common. 

605. 

Arizona. 

606. 

Arkansas. 

607. 

Arkansas    (continued).      Lien 

for  supplies  advanced. 

608. 

Delaware. 

609. 

District    of    Columbia. 

610. 

Florida. 

611. 

Georgia. 

612. 

Georgia     (continued).       Dis- 

tress for  rent. 

613. 

Illinois. 

614. 

Illinois      (continued).        Lien 

upon   crops. 

615. 

Indiana. 

616. 

Iowa. 

617. 

Kansas. 

618. 

Kentucky. 

619. 

Kentucky    (continued).     Lien 

for  rent. 

620. 

Louisiana. 

621. 

Maine. 

622. 

Maryland — Distress  for  rent. 

623. 

Maryland    (continued).    Lien 

on  crops. 

624. 

Minnesota. 

625. 

Mississippi. 

626. 

Missouri. 

627. 

New       Jersey — Distress      for 

rent. 

628. 

New       Jersey       (continued). 

Liens  for  rent — When  ten- 

ant's goods  seized  on  exe- 

cution. 

629. 

New  York. 

630. 

New   Mexico. 

631. 

North   Carolina. 

631a. 

North  Dakota. 

631b. 

,  Oklahoma. 

631c. 

Oregon. 

632. 

Pennsylvania. 

§    540  LIENS.  510 

Sec.  Sec. 

633.  Pennsylvania         (continued).      637.    Tennessee  (continued).    Fur- 

Tenant's    good    seized    on  nishers'   liens, 

execution.  638.     Texas. 

634.  South   Carolina.  638a.  Utah. 

635.  South    Carolina    (continued).  639.    Virginia. 

Lien     for     rent     and     ad-  639a.  Washington, 

vances       for      agricultural  639b.  West  Virginia, 

purposes.  640.     Wisconsin 

636.  Tennessee. 

§  540.  In  general. — The  right  of  a  landlord  to  a  first  lien 
upon  his  tenant's  goods  for  his  rent  has  always  been  regarded 
as  just  and  proper.  It  is  a  right  greatly  to  the  interest  of 
tenants,  especially  those  of  the  poorer  class,  for  it  gives 
them  credit,  and  enables  them  to  hire  property  which  they 
otherwise  could  not.  This  lien  has  been  regarded  with  such 
favor  that  at  common  law  the  landlord  was  allowed  to  take 
the  enforcement  of  it  into  his  own  hands,  and  by  the  hands 
of  a  bailiff  of  his  own  appointment  to  seize  and  sell  his 
tenant's  chattels  found  on  the  premises  for  the  rent  in  ar- 
rear.^  At  common  law,  however,  the  landlord  had  no  lien 
for  rent  upon  his  tenant's  goods;-  but  he  had  a  right  to 
seize  or  distrain  the  goods  found  upon  the  leased  premises 
for  rent  or  board  unpaid.  This  right  of  distraint  may  in 
some  sense  be  termed  a  lien,  though  it  differs  essentially 
from  the  landlord's  lien  created  by  statute.  One  essential 
difference  is,  that  by  the  common-law  process  no  fixed  lien 
upon  the  property  existed  until  the  property  was  actually 
seized  or  levied  upon;  while  by  statute  a  lien  is  ordinarily  im- 
posed upon  the  property  from  the  beginning  of  the  tenancy. 

The  process  of  distraint,  modified  more  or  less  by  statute, 
is  still  in  use  in  several  states,^  and  in  many  others  a  lien  is 

1  Gibson    v.    Gautier,    1    Mackey  some     form     in     Delaware,    §    608; 

(D.  C.)   35.  Florida,    for    the    enforcement    of 

sPowell  V.  Daily,  63  111.  646,  45  liens,    §610;    Georgia,    §612;    Illi- 

N.   E.   414,   affirmed    61     111.    App.  nois,  and  there   is   also  a  Hen  on 

552.  crops,    §§613,   614;   Kentucky,    and 

3The   right  of  distress   exists   in  there    is    also    a    lien,    §§618,    619; 


511 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


§  541 


given  to  landlords  by  statute  ;^  but  aside  from  the  one  or  the 
other,  it  is  competent  for  the  landlord  and  tenant  to  create  a 
lien  upon  the  tenant's  property  by  contract.  This  contract  is 
usually  in  the  form  of  a  mortgage  clause  in  the  lease.  This 
creates  a  lien  as  against  the  tenant  and  those  having  notice 
of  the  contract,  and  the  lien  can  be  made  effectual  against  all 
the  world  by  giving  notice  of  it  by  recording. 

§541.  Lien  by  agreement. — ^To  create  a  present  lien  by 
agreement,  the  words  used  should  indicate  that  the  lien  is 
created  and  attaches  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  in- 
strument; and  it  is  not  sufficient  that  they  indicate  that  the 
lien  is  to  be  created  at  a  future  time.  Thus  a  lease  of  a  hotel, 
stipulating  for  the  payment  of  a  certain  rent,  contained  these 
words :  "And  a  lien  to  be  given  by  said  lessees  to  said 
lessors,  to  secure  the  payment  thereof,  *  *  *  on  all  the 
furniture  which  shall  be  placed  in  said  hotel  by  said  lessees." 
It  was  held  that  these  words  indicated  a  covenant  on  the 
part  of  the  lessees  to  create  a  lien  by  future  action;  and  that 
no  present  lien  was  created  upon  the  furniture  then  in  the 
hotel,  or  upon  such  as  should  afterwards  be  placed  in  it.'""     It 


Maryland,  §§622,  623;  Mississippi, 
in  the  nature  of  an  attachment, 
§  625;  New  Jersey,  §§  627,  628; 
Pennsylvania,  §§  632,  633;  South 
Carolina,  also  a  lien,  §§  634,  635; 
Texas,  lien  enforced  by  distress, 
§638;  Virginia,  §639;  West  Vir- 
ginia, §  639b.  There  is  no  right  of 
distress  for  rent  in  California  and 
Colorado.  Herr  v.  Johnson,  11 
Colo.  393,  18  Pac.  342.  Distress  is 
expressly  abolished  in  District  of 
Columbia,  Minnesota,  New  York, 
Wisconsin   and   Utah. 

4Liens  in  favor  of  landlords  ex- 
ist in  some  form  in  Alabama, 
§§602-604;  Arizona,  §605;  Arkan- 
sas,   §§    606,    607;    District    of    Co- 


lumbia, §  609;  Florida,  though  en- 
forced by  distress,  §  610;  Georgia, 
§§  611,  612;  Illinois,  §§  613,  614; 
Indiana,  §  615;  Iowa,  §  616;  Kan- 
sas, §  617;  Kentucky,  §  619; 
Louisiana,  §  620;  Maine,  §  621; 
Maryland,  §  623;  Mississippi, 
§  625;  Missouri,  §  626;  New  Jer- 
sey, §  628;  New  Mexico,  §  630; 
North  Carolina,  §  631;  South  Car- 
olina, §§  634,  635;  Tennessee, 
§§  636,  637;  Texas,  §  638. 

5 Hale  V.  Omaha  Nat.  Bank,  49 
N.  Y.  626,  1  J.  &  S.  (N.  Y.)  40; 
New  Lincoln  Hotel  Co.  v.  Shears, 
57  Nebr.  478,  78  N.  W.  25,  43  L. 
R.  A.  588,  IZ  Am.  St.  524. 


§    541  LIENS.  •  512 

was  a  covenent,  however,  of  which  a  court  of  equity  would 
decree  specific  performance ;  for  while  a  contract  for  the  sale 
of  chattels  will  not  ordinarily  be  specifically  performed,  for 
the  reason  that  a  party  can  have  adequate  compensation  at 
law,  this  reason  does  not  apply  to  an  agreement  for  a  lien 
or  security  upon  personal  property  when  there  can  be  no 
remedy  at  law.®  Where  in  such  case  a  mortgagee  of  the 
tenant,  with  full  notice  of  the  equities  of  the  lessor,  seized 
the  furniture  and  sold  it,  so  that  a  specific  performance  was 
rendered  impossible,  it  was  held  that  the  lessor  could  have  a 
lien  declared  upon  the  proceeds  of  such  sale,  and  in  this  way 
obtain  the  benefit  of  the  lien  contracted  for."  If,  however, 
the  mortgagee  took  his  mortgage  and  made  a  loan  in  good 
faith  without  notice  of  the  provision  in  the  lease  in  respect  to 
a  lien  to  be  given  the  lessor,  no  equitable  lien  is  raised  in 
favor  of  the  latter  as  against  the  proceeds  of  the  furniture 
in  the  mortgagee's  hands. ^ 

A  lien  in  favor  of  the  landlord  as  against  his  tenant  may 
be  created  by  a  verbal  agreement  that  the  landlord  shall  have 
a  lien  upon  the  tenant's  crop  for  rent,  or  for  supplies  fur- 
nished him ;  and  it  will  be  operative  against  all  persons  ex- 
cept bona  fide  purchasers  without  notice.*^  Such  an  agree- 
ment does  not  contravene  any  provision  of  the  statute  of 
frauds. ^^  The  landlord  may  take  possession  of  the  crop 
under  such  verbal  agreement  whenever  by  its  terms  he  is 
entitled  to  do  so,  and  he  may  defend  the  possession  as  against 

CHale   V.   Omaha   Nat.    Bank,   49  Beck  v.  Venable,  59  Ind.  408.  Evi- 

N.  Y.  626,  633,    1   J,   &   S.    (N.   Y.)  dence    held   sufficient   to   sustain    a 

40,  per   Allen,    J.  finding  that  the  purchaser  paid  for 

"Hale   V.    Omaha    Nat.    Bank,   49  the     property     without     notice     of 

N.  Y.  626,  633,   1  J.  &  S.   (N.   Y.)  landlord's     lien.       See     Shelley    v. 

40.  .Tuckerman,   83   Nebr.    366,    119    N. 

sHale   V.    Omaha    Nat.    Bank,    7  W.  663. 

J.    &   S.    (N.    Y.)    207,    affd.    64    N.  lOMorrow     v.     Turney's     Admr., 

Y.  550.  35  Ala.  131. 

9Gafford  v.  Stearns,  51  Ala.  434; 


513  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  542 

the  tenant  or  any  one  claiming  under  him  who  is  not  a  bona 
fide  purchaser  for  value  without  notice. ^^ 

§  542.  Lien  on  property  not  in  existence. — A  lien  may  be 
imposed  by  contract  upon  property  not  then  in  existence, 
but  which  the  parties  contemplate  will  be  in  existence  dur- 
ing the  time  the  lien  is  to  operate;  the  lien  will  take  effect 
and  be  rated  in  equity  when  the  property  is  acquired  and 
used  as  contemplated. ^- 

Thus  a  clause  in  a  lease  which  mortgages  all  the  crops  to 
be  raised  on  the  leased  premises  for  the  current  year  is  valid 
in  equity,  and  the  lien  attaches  to  the  crops  as  they  come  into 
existence. ^^ 

A  lease  of  a  hotel  contained  a  stipulation  that  all  fixtures, 
furniture,  and  other  improvements  should  be  bound  for  the 
rent.  At  the  date  of  the  lease  the  house  was  unfurnished. 
It  was  held  that  the  stipulation  created  a  lien,  valid  at  least 
in  equity;  that  this  lien  was  for  the  full  amount  of  the  rent 
reserved  for  the  whole  term,  and  not  simply  for  any  portion 
that  might  from  time  to  time  become  delinquent,  and  that  it 
had  priority  of  a  mortgage  given  after  the  lease  took  effect, 
but  before  any  rent  became  delinquent,  to  a  person  having 
knowledge  of  the  stipulation  in  the  lease. ^"^ 

Inasmuch  as  the  essence  of  the  right  of  lien  at  law  is 
possession,  there  can  be  in  law  no  lien  by  contract  upon  a 

iiGafford     v.     Stearns,     51     Ala.  Y.    113;    McCaffrey  v.    Woodin,  65 

434;    Driver    v.    Jenkins,    30    Ark.  N.  Y.  459,  22  Am.  Rep.  644;  Coates 

120;  Roberts  v.  Jacks,  31  Ark.  597,  v.   Donnell,  16  J.   &  S.   (N.  Y.)  46, 

602,  25  Am.  Rep.  584.  affd.  94  N.  Y.  168.     See,  however, 

i2See   Jones    on     Chattel     Mort-  Borden    v.    Croak,    131    111.    68,    22 

gages,    §170;   Wright   v.    Bircher's  N.   E.  793,   19  Am.  St.  23;   Powell 

Exr.,  72  Mo.  179,  Z7  Am.  Rep.  433;  v.  Daily,  163  111.  646,  45  N.  E.  414, 

Webster   v.    Nichols,   104    111.    160;  affd.  61   111.  App.  552. 

First  Nat.   Bank  v.  Adam,  138  111.  i^Butt  v.  Ellett,  19  Wall.  (U.  S.) 

483,   28     N.    E.   955;      Everman    v.  544,  22  L.  ed.  183. 

Robb,   52    Miss.    653,   24   Am.    Rep.  i^Wright    v.    Bircher's    Exr.,    72 

682;  Wisner  v.   Ocumpaugh,  71   N.  Mo.  179,  Z7  Am.  Rep.  433. 

33 


§  543  LIENS.  514 

future  or  an  unplanted  crop,^^  at  least  until  possession  is 
taken  after  the  crop  has  been  raised  ;^^  but  such  a  lien  may 
be  created  by  statute, ^^  and,  as  already  noticed,  it  is  valid  in 
equity.  But  such  a  lien  not  being  good  at  law,  it  cannot  avail 
against  exemption  rights  in  favor  of  the  tenant's  family.^^ 

Under  a  contract  whereby  a  tenant  undertakes  to  secure 
his  landlord  by  a  lien  upon  a  crop  to  be  raised,  a  mortgage 
or  other  incumbrance  given  by  the  tenant  upon  the  crop  to 
another,  who  takes  it  in  good  faith  and  without  knowledge 
of  such  contract  before  the  landlord  takes  possession  of  the 
crop,  has  precedence. ^^ 

An  agreement  by  a  lessee  to  deliver  wool  to  his  lessor  in 
payment  or  security  for  rent  creates  no  lien  upon  wool  not 
shipped  to  the  lessor,  as  against  the  lessee's  assignee  in  in- 
solvency.^^ 

§  543.  Chattel  mortgage  clause. — A  clause  in  a  lease 
making  the  rent  a  charge  upon  property  while  not  a  lien 
by  statute,  is  in  effect  a  chattel  mortgage,  and  is  valid  and 
enforcible  as  such.^^  Thus  a  clause  making  rent  a  charge 
on  the  crops  and  farming  stock  upon  the  leased  premises, 
"whether  exempt  from  execution  or  not,"  is  in  effect  a  chat- 
tel mortgage.--  It  is  immaterial  that  the  instrument  does 
not  contain  any  words  of  grant  or  conveyance.  If  it  creates 
a  lien  or  equitable  charge,  its  validity  and  the  rights  of  the 
parties  depend  upon  the  same  principles  as  in  case  of  a  chat- 
tel mortgage  executed  in  technical  terms. ^^     But  an  instru- 

i^Hamlett  v.  Tallman,  30  Ark.  landlord  has  no  lien  for  rent  re- 
SOS;  Alexander  v.  Pardue,  30  Ark.  served. 

359;  Roberts  v.  Jacks,  31  Ark.  597,  2iMerrill    v.    Ressler,    37    Minn. 

25  Am.   Rep.   584.  82,  33  N.  W.  117;  Wisner  v.  Ocum- 

icGittings  V.  Nelson,  86  111.  591.  paugh,  71   N.  Y.   113. 

i^Abraham  v.   Carter,  53  Ala.  8.  22Fejavary  v.    Broesch,   52    Iowa 

isVinson  v.   Hallowell,   10   Bush  88,  2  N.  W.  963,  35  Am.  Rep.  261. 

(Ky.)    538.  saMcLean   v.    Klein,   3    Dill.    (U. 

isPerson  v.  Wright,  35  Ark.  169.  S.)   113,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8884;  Feja- 

20Hitchcock   v.    Hassett,    71    Cal.  vary  v.  Broesch,  52  Iowa  88,  2  N. 

331,  12  Pac.  228.     In  California  the  W.  963,  35  Am.  Rep.  261;  Atwater 


515 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


543 


ment  without  words  of  grant  or  conveyance  is  not  a  legal 
mortgage  vesting  the  title  and  giving  the  right  to  seize  and 
sell.-^  It  creates  merely  an  equitable  mortgage,  which  should 
be  enforced  in  equity. 

The  chattel  mortgage  or  agreement  for  a  lien,  unless  made 
to  cover  the  owner's  property,  or  the  crops  to  be  raised  in 
general,  affects  only  such  property  as  is  in  direct  terms  con- 
veyed to  the  landlord,  or  such  property  as  is  expressly  made 
subject  to  a  lien  for  his  benefit.  An  instrument  which  pro- 
vides that  the  legal  title  to  certain  parts  of  the  product  of  a 
farm,  such  as  the  butter  and  cheese  to  be  made  and  grain  to 
be  raised  upon  it  during  the  year,  shall  belong  to  the  land- 
lord until  the  rent  is  paid,  gives  no  lien  for  the  rent  upon  the 
hay  to  be  raised  on  the  farm.-^ 

If  the  mortgage  clause  contains  a  provision  which  in  a 
chattel  mortgage  would  render  it  fraudulent  as  to  creditors, 
the  mortgage  clause,  though  valid  between  the  parties,  will 
be  void  as  against  the  lessee's  assignee  under  a  general  as- 
signment for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors.  Thus,  where,  in  a 
lien  clause  of  a  lease  made  in  New  York,  a  lessor  agreed 


V.  Mower,  10  Vt.  75;  Merrill  v. 
Ressler,  37  Minn.  82,  33  N.  W. 
117;  Harris  v.  Jones,  83  N.  Car. 
317;  Whiting  v.  Eichelberger,  16 
Iowa  422;  Briggs  v.  Austin,  55 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  612,  29  N.  Y.  St. 
245,  8  N.  Y.  S.  786;  Smith  v.  Ta- 
ber,  46  Hun  (N.  Y.)  313,  14  N.  Y. 
St.  644. 

24Kennedy  v.  Reames,  15  S.  Car. 
548,  552;  Green  v.  Jacobs,  5  S. 
Car.  280.  In  this  case  at  the  bot- 
tom of  an  agricultural  lien  were 
added  the  words:  "I  consider  the 
above  instrument  of  writing  a 
mortgage  of  all  my  personal  prop- 
erty, such  as,"  etc. 

25 Briggs  V.  Austin,  55  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  612,  29  N.  Y.  St.  245,  8  N.  Y. 


S.  786.  The  court  say:  "We  may 
add,  in  the  language  of  Landon, 
J.,  in  McCombs  v.  Becker,  3  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  342,  5  Thomp.  &  C.  (N.  Y.) 
550,  in  dealing  with  a  similar  ques- 
tion, that  the  difficulty  with  the 
plaintiff's  case  is,  that  he  did  not, 
by  his  agreement  with  his  tenant, 
provide  that  the  title  to  the  hay 
should  remain  in  him.  He  made 
such  an  agreement  as  to  the  but- 
ter and  cheese  and  grain,  and  this 
agreement  as  to  them  discloses 
more  strikingly  the  lack  of  it  as 
to  the  hay."  See  also,  Smith  v. 
Taber,  46  Hun  (N.  Y.)  313,  14 
N.  Y.  St.  644;  Hawkins  v.  Giles, 
45  Hun  (N.  Y.)  318,  12  N.  Y. 
St.  426. 


§  544  LIENS.  516 

with  the  lessee,  a  retail  merchant,  that  in  default  of  paying 
the  rent,  or  in  a  case  of  seizure  of  his  goods  under  legal  pro- 
cess, the  lien  should  be  enforced  against  all  the  goods  and 
personal  propert)^  on  the  demised  premises  in  the  same  man- 
ner as  if  it  were  a  chattel  mortgage,  and  it  was  further  sti- 
pulated that  the  lessee  should  remain  in  possession  of  the 
mortgaged  goods,  and  might  continue  to  deal  with  them  in 
the  prosecution  of  his  business,  the  lien  clause,  though  valid 
between  the  parties,  both  as  to  property  in  existence  and  on 
the  demised  premises  when  the  lease  was  executed,  and  as 
to  that  afterwards  acquired,  is,  under  the  rule  established  in 
New  York,  fraudulent  on  its  face  as  to  creditors,  and  there- 
fore void  as  to  an  assignee  of  the  lessee.-® 

§  544.     Lease  that  is  a  mortgage  must  be  recorded. — A 

lease,  or  a  provision  of  a  lease,  which  is  in  legal  effect  a 
chattel  mortgage  of  the  lessee's  goods,  must  be  recorded  or 
filed  as  such  a  mortgage,  in  the  absence  of  any  statute  giving 
effect  to  the  lien,  in  order  to  make  the  stipulated  lien  effectual 
against  purchasers,  mortgagee,  and  creditors.-^  Thus,  a 
lease  which  provides  that  the  lessor  shall  have  a  lien  for  the 
rent  upon  all  goods  and  property  that  may  be  upon  the  de- 
mised premises,  belonging  to  the  lessee  or  to  any  one  claim- 
ing the  whole  or  any  part  of  the  premises  under  him  as  as- 
signee, under-tenant,  or  otherwise,  and  that  the  lien  might  be 
enforced  by  taking  possession  of  the  property  and  selling  the 
same,  in  the  same  manner  as  in  the  case  of  a  chattel  mort- 
gage, is  in  legal  effect  a  chattel  mortgage,  and  is  void  as  to 
the  lessee's  creditors  if  not  filed  or  recorded.     In  such  case, 

26Reynolds    v.    Ellis,    103    N.    Y.  Fla.     166;      Booth     v.     Oliver,     67 

115,  8  N.  E.  392,  57  Am.  Rep.  701,  Mich.    664,    35    N.    W.    793.      Such 

7   Eastern  Rep.   342.  a   provision    is    not    so    binding    as 

27McCaffrey    v.    Woodin,    65    N.  an  unrecorded  mortgage.     Holmes 

Y.  459,  22  Am.  Rep.  644;  Reynolds  v.    Hall,   8   Mich.   66,   11   Am.    Dec. 

V.   Ellis,  34  Hun   (N.  Y.)   47,  affd.  444;   Dalton  v.   Laudahn,   27   Mich. 

103  N.  Y.  115,  8  N.  E.  392,  57  Am.  529. 
Rep.    701;    Weed    v.     Standley,    12 


517  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  545 

the  only  way  to  give  effect  to  the  intention  of  the  parties  is 
to  treat  the  transaction  as  a  chattel  mortgage. 

A  stipulation  in  the  lease  that  the  rent  shall  be  a  first  lien 
on  the  buildings  and  improvements  that  may  be  put  upon  the 
premises  by  the  lessee,  and  upon  his  interest  in  the  lease  and 
premises,  is  a  security  in  the  nature  of  a  mortgage.  It  is  en- 
forcible  against  the  lessee  and  all  persons  claiming  under 
him,  except  creditors  and  purchasers  without  notice,  al- 
though it  be  not  acknowledged  or  recorded.  It  attaches  as 
a  lien  or  charge  upon  the  property  named  as  soon  as  the 
lessee  acquires  title  to  it,  not  only  as  against  him,  but  as 
against  all  persons  claiming  under  him,  either  voluntarily  or 
with  notice,  or  in  bankruptcy.-^ 

A  lien  given  by  a  lease  containing  a  mortgage  clause  can 
only  be  enforced  by  the  landlord  or  his  assignee.  It  is  in- 
separable from  the  lease.  A  purchaser  from  the  lessor  of 
the  leased  property,  subject  to  the  lease,  stands  in  place  of 
the  lessor,  and  may  enforce  the  lien.^^ 

§  545.  Lease  of  farm  to  be  worked  on  shares. — A  lease 
of  a  farm  to  be  worked  on  shares,  which  provides  that  the 
lessor  shall  have  a  lien  on  the  growing  crops,  and  that  the 
lessee  would  execute  a  chattel  mortgage  of  the  same  when 
requested,  must  be  filed  or  recorded  as  a  chattel  mortgage, 
in  order  to  preserve  the  lien  as  against  that  of  a  mortgage 
by  the  lessee,  duly  filed  or  recorded,  of  his  interest  in  the 
crops,  when  the  mortgagee  has  taken  the  mortgage  in  good 
faith  and  without  notice  of  the  terms  of  the  lease. ^'^ 

The  possession  of  the  lessor  in  such  case,  though  he  re- 

28Webster     v.     Nichols,    104    111.  buildings     afterwards     erected     by 

160;   Wright   v.    Bircher's    Exr.,   72  the  lessee  on  the  leased  premises. 

Mo.  179,  37  Am.  Rep.  433.     A  pro-  First  Nat.   Bank  v.  Adam,   138  111. 

vision  in  a  lease,  giving  the  lessor  483,  28  N.  E.  955. 

a  lien  for  rent  "upon  any  and   all  ^OHansen    v.     Prince,     45    Mich, 

goods,   chattels,  or   other  property  519,  8  N.  W.  584. 

belonging  to  the  lessee,"  does  not,  30Thomas  v.  Bacon,  34  Hun   (N. 

as    against    third    persons,    include  Y.)  88. 


§  546  LIENS.  518 

sided  upon  the  farm  with  the  lessee,  is  not  such  a  possession 
as  would  relieve  him  from  the  necessity  of  filing  or  recording 
his  lease,  in  order  to  preserve  the  lien  as  against  a  subse- 
quent purchaser  or  mortgagee  of  the  lessee."^  The  pos- 
session of  one  tenant  in  common  is  regarded  in  law  as  the 
possession  of  both,  as  between  themselves,  but  it  is  not  no- 
tice to  subsequent  purchasers  or  mortgagees  of  any  lien  he 
may  have  in  the  share  of  his  cotenant  who  is  in  actual  pos- 
session of  his  share. 

§  546.  Rule  in  Missouri. — In  a  case  in  Missouri,  the  court 
regarded  a  landlord  having  a  lien  reserved  by  his  lease  as  a 
pledgee,  rather  than  a  mortgagee,  of  the  property  subject  to 
the  lien.  The  lease  in  this  case  provided  that  the  landlord 
should  have  a  lien  on  the  furniture  which  the  lessee  should 
place  in  the  leased  building.  Afterwards  the  lessee  gave  a 
deed  of  trust  on  the  same  furniture  to  secure  a  loan.  The 
landlord  subsequently  entered  for  nonpayment  of  rent,  took 
possession  of  the  furniture,  used  it  for  a  time,  and  then  sold 
it  for  less  than  the  amount  of  his  claim.  In  a  suit  by  the 
mortgagee  against  the  landlord,  to  obtain  payment  for  the 
use  of  the  furniture  while  it  was  in  his  possession,  it  was  held 
that  the  landlord  was  merely  a  pledgee  of  the  property;  and 
that,  while  he  might  retain  possession  of  it,  he  could  not  use 
it  without  accounting  for  the  value  of  its  use."-  The  lien 
did  not  confer  upon  the  landlord  the  title  to  the  property. 
The  mortgagee  in  the  chattel  mortgage,  however,  became 
invested  with  the  title  of  ownership  of  such  property  after 
breach  of  the  condition;  and  though  the  landlord,  by  virtue 
of  his  lien,  was  entitled  to  the  immediate  possession,  he  had 
not  the  title,  and  could  not  use  the  property  without  liability 
to  the  mortgagee,  in  whom  the  title  was  vested. 

In  an  earlier  case  in  this  state  it  was  held,  that  the  lien  of 

siThomas  v.  Bacon,  34  Hun  (N.  s^State  v.  Adams,  Id  Mo.  605. 

Y.)   88. 


519  LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT.  §    547 

a  landlord  reserved  in  a  lease  of  land  rented  for  the  purpose 
of  cutting  timber  and  wood  is  not  equivalent  to  a  chattel 
mortgage,  so  as  to  preclude  the  lessee  from  disposing  of  the 
timber  and  w^ood  cut  before  the  landlord's  re-entry  for  con- 
dition broken.  The  lien  attaches  to  whatever  property,  upon 
which  the  lien  was  reserved,  that  may  be  found  upon  the 
premises  or  in  the  tenant's  possession  at  the  time  of  the  re- 
entry.^^ 

§  547.  Delivery  sufiicient  to  protect  a  lien. — There  may, 
however,  be  a  sufficient  delivery  to  a  third  person  to  protect 
the  lien.  Under  a  lease  of  a  farm,  the  lessor  was  to  have 
half  of  the  products  of  the  farm  for  rent,  and  a  lien  upon  the 
other  half  for  advances  to  be  made.  Among  the  products  of 
the  farm  there  was  a  quantity  of  cheese,  which  the  parties 
carried  to  a  railroad  depot,  and  left  with  the  agent  for  ship- 
ment to  New  York  for  sale,  with  the  understanding  that  the 
lessor  should  receive  the  entire  proceeds,  and  should  account 
to  the  lessee  for  his  share  after  payment  of  the  advances 
made  on  a  general  settlement.  Afterwards,  on  the  same 
day,  the  lessee  sold  his  interest  in  the  cheese,  which  he 
pointed  out  to  the  purchaser  at  the  depot,  and  verbally  de- 
livered to  him,  without  the  knowledge  of  the  lessor,  and  with 
the  intention  to  embarrass  or  defeat  his  enforcement  of  his 
lien.  It  was  held  that  the  sale  was  void  as  to  the  lessor;  and 
that,  even  if  the  sale  was  made  in  good  faith,  there  was  no 
change  of  possession  sufificient  to  affect  the  lessor. ^^ 

If  a  lessor,  having  an  equitable  lien  under  a  provision  of 
the  lease,  does  not  take  possession  before  the  property  passes 
into  the  hands  of  an  assignee  of  the  lessee  for  the  benefit  of 
his  creditors,  the  equities  of  the  other  creditors  are  as  great 
as  his,  and  the  court  will  not  interfere  to  give  his  lien  pre- 
ference.^^ 

ssBurgess  v.   Kattleman,  41    Mo.  35Reynolds  v.  Ellis,  34  Hun  (N. 

480.  Y.)   47,  affd.   103   N.  Y.   115,  8  N. 

34Shepard  v.   Briggs,  26  Vt.  149.      E.  392,  57  Am.  Rep.  701. 


§  548  LIENS.  520 

A  provision  in  a  lease,  that  the  lessor  shall  hold  the  crop  to 
be  raised  as  security  for  the  rent,  is  inoperative  as  a  lien 
against  a  purchaser  in  good  faith,  but  is  good  as  against  a 
mere  wrongdoer,  who  has  no  claim  but  possession  derived 
through  the  wrongful  act/"^*^ 

A  provision  in  a  lease  of  a  farm,  that  whenever  any  of  the 
products  shall  be  sold  the  proceeds  shall  be  paid  to  the  lessor 
until  he  shall  receive  the  full  rent  of  it,  is  a  mere  personal 
covenant,  and  gives  the  lessor  no  lien  upon  such  proceeds. ^''^ 

The  mere  fact  that  the  landlord  agrees  for  rent  to  be 
paid  in  a  share  of  the  crop  to  be  raised  by  the  tenant  gives 
the  landlord  no  lien  upon  the  crop.^^ 

No  lien  attaches  to  a  promissory  note  given  for  rent  of 
land.  The  fact  that  it  is  given  for  rent  adds  nothing  to  its 
legal  efYect.^*^ 

§  548.  Provision  giving  lessor  ownership. — A  provision 
which  in  effect  gives  the  lessor  the  ownership  and  control 
of  a  crop  to  be  raised  on  the  leased  premises,  makes  his  lien 
effectual  against  the  lessee  and  all  persons  claiming  under 
him.  Such  is  the  effect  of  a  provision  in  a  lease  of  a  farm 
that  the  crops  to  be  raised  should  be  and  remain  the  sole 
property  of  the  lessor  as  a  lien  and  security  for  the  payment 
of  the  rent.**^  A  provision  in  a  lease  of  a  farm,  that  the 
lessor  retains  a  full  lien  on  all  the  crops  as  security  for  the 
payment  of  the  rent,  was  held  to  constitute  him  the  sole 
owner   of   the   crops,   and   to   entitle   him   to   the   control   of 

36FowIer    v.    Hawkins,     17    Ind.  40Paris     v.     Vail,     18     Vt.     277; 

211.     See  also,   Broders   v.   Bohan-  Smith    v.    Atkins,    18    Vt.   461,    vir- 

non,  30  Ore.  599,  48  Pac.  692.  tually  overruling  Brainard  v.   Bur- 

STBarber    v.    Marble,    2    Thomp.  ton,    5    Vt.    97,    which    held    that   a 

&  C.    (N.   Y.)    114.     See   Brown  v.  lessor    could    acquire    no    property 

Thomas,   14  111.   App.  428.  in    crops    before    they    are    grown 

ssDeaver   v.    Rice,   4   Dev.    &    B.  and   delivered  to  him.     Broders  v. 

L.  (N.  Car.)  431,  34  Am.  Dec.  388.  Bohannon,    30    Ore.    599,    48    Pac. 

soRoberts  v.  Jacks,  31   Ark.  597,  692;   Sanford  v.    Modine,   51    Nebr. 

25  Am.  Rep.  584.  728,    71    N.   W.   740. 


521'  LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT.  §    549 

them.'*^  Such  a  provision  was  regarded  as  the  same  in  prin- 
ciple as  that  in  the  cases  cited  above,  where  the  lessor  was  to 
have  the  sole  property  in  the  crops  as  a  lien.  The  provision 
that  the  lessor  should  have  a  lien  on  the  crops  is  a  legal  im- 
plication of  the  control  and  ownership  which  were  expressed 
in  the  other  cases. 

In  a  perpetual  lease  of  real  estate  with  fixtures  and  ma- 
chinery, the  lessor  reserved  a  lien  upon  the  property  for  the 
purchase-money  and  rents,  but  giving  tlie  lessee  liberty  to 
remove  at  his  pleasure  any  portion  of  the  machinery  upon 
condition  of  substituting  other  machinery  equally  good.  It 
was  held  that  this  reservation  of  a  lien  was  not  in  legal  effect 
a  chattel  mortgage,  which  the  law  required  to  be  filed  to 
make  it  valid,  but  that  to  the  extent  of  the  reservation  the 
property  never  passed  to  the  lessee;  and  therefore  that  the 
lien  in  favor  of  the  lessor  w^as  superior  to  that  of  creditors  of 
the  lessee  who  had  attached  the  property."*^ 

If  a  lease  be  wholly  inoperative,  or  operative  only  between 
the  parties  as  an  agreement,  so  that  no  legal  title  or  estate 
passes  to  the  lessee,  then  the  title  to  crops  raised  upon  the 
leased  premises  is  in  the  landlord  and  not  in  the  lessee,  and 
a  lien  given  by  the  lease  may  be  enforced,  not  only  as  be- 
tween the  parties,  but  also  as  against  attaching  creditors  of 
the  lessee.  Such  creditors  would  acquire  under  the  attach- 
ment only  such  title  to  the  crops  raised  upon  the  leased  prem- 
ises as  the  lessee  had;  and  the  lessee  in  such  case  has  no  at- 
tachable interest. ^^ 

§  549.  Lease  reserving  right  of  re-entry. — A  lease  which 
reserves  a  right  of  re-entry  upon  nonpayment  of  rent  is  in 

4iBaxter  v.  Bush,  29  Vt.  465,  70  426;     Briggs    v.    Austin,    55     Hun 

Am.   Dec.   429.     See    McCombs    v.  (N.  Y.)  612,  29  N.  Y.  St.  245,  8  N. 

Becker,    3    Hun    (N.    Y.)    342,    5  Y.  S.  786. 

Thomp.    &  C.    (N.   Y.)    550;   Smith  42Metca!f   v.    Fosdick,     23     Ohio 

V.  Taber,  46  Hun  (N.  Y.)  313,  14  N.  St.  114. 

Y.   St.   644;    Hawkins   v.    Giles,   45  -isBuswell    v.    Marshall,    51     Vt. 

Hun    (N.    Y.)    318,    12    N.    Y.    St.  87. 


§    550  LIENS.  522 

effect  a  lien  for  the  rent.  And  so,  for  a  stronger  reason,  a 
conveyance  of  land  in  fee,  subject  to  the  payment  of  annual 
rents  by  the  grantee  to  the  grantor,  with  a  reservation  to 
the  grantor  of  the  right  to  enter  and  avoid  the  conveyance 
upon  default  of  payment,  gives  the  grantor  a  lien  upon  the 
premises  for  the  rent,  superior  to  that  of  a  mortgagee  of  the 
grantee. ■^^ 

§  550.  Re-entry. — A  provision  in  a  lease  that  the  lessor 
may  enter  upon  the  leased  land  and  hold  or  sell  the  crops  for 
the  payment  of  the  rent  due  him,  gives  no  priority  until  he 
takes  possession  over  subsequent  purchasers  and  creditors 
of  the  lessee.  Until  the  lessor  takes  possession,  the  crops 
remain  the  property  of  the  lessee,  who  may  sell  them,  or  his 
creditors  may  attach  or  levy  execution  upon  them.^^  But 
where  a  lessor  was  to  have  part  of  a  grain  crop  as  rent,  and 
was  to  have  possession  of  the  whole  crop  until  the  rent 
should  be  paid,  a  sale  of  the  crop  by  the  lessee  was  held  not  to 
pass  the  title  as  against  the  lessor.  The  purchaser  took  pos- 
session of  the  crop  in  the  field,  and  placed  it  in  charge  of  an 
agent,  but  the  lessor  took  the  grain  from  the  agent  and  re- 
moved it  to  his  w^arehouse.  The  court  declared  that  so  far 
as  the  crop  was  in  possession  of  the  lessee,  he  held  it  simply 
as  a  servant  of  the  lessor,  and  that  the  lessee  could  give  no 
right  to  the  possession  as  against  the  lessor. ^^ 

§  551.    Common-law  right  of  distraint.— At  common  law 

the  landlord's  right  under  a  distraint  attached  only  from  the 
time  of  seizure  for  rent  then  due  and  payable,  while  a  land- 
lord's statutory  lien  attaches  from  the  commencement  of  the 
tenancy.'*'     "At  common  law  the  landlord  could  distrain  any 

44Stephenson  v.  Haines,  16  Ohio  rew,   2   Cush.    (Mass.)    50;    Wilkin- 

St.  478.  son  v.   Ketler,  69  Ala.  435. 

45ButterfieId    v.    Baker,    5    Pick.  ^GWentvvorth    v.    Miller,    53    Cal. 

(Mass.)    522;    Lewis   v.    Lyman,  22  9. 

Pick.   (Mass.)  437;  Munsell  v.   Ca-  4TMorgan  v.  Campbell,  22  Wall. 


523  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  552 

goods  found  upon  the  premises  at  the  time  of  the  taking, 
but  he  had  no  lien  until  he  had  made  his  right  active  by  actual 
seizure.  A  statutory  lien  implies  security  upon  the  thing  be- 
fore the  warrant  to  seize  it  is  levied.  It  ties  itself  to  the 
property  from  the  time  it  attaches  to  it,  and  the  levy  and  sale 
of  the  property  are  only  means  of  enforcing  it.  In  other 
words,  if  the  lien  is  given  by  statute,  proceedings  are  not  nec- 
essary to  fix  the  status  of  the  property.  But  in  the  absence  of 
this  statutory  lien  it  is  necessary  to  take  proceedings  to  ac- 
quire a  lien  on  the  property  of  the  tenant  for  the  benefit  of 
the  landlord.  This  the  landlord  is  enabled  to  do  in  a  sum- 
mary way  to  satisfy  the  rent  which  is  due  him,  and  in  this  he 
has  an  advantage  as  creditor  over  creditors  at  large  of  the 
tenant. "^^ 

§  552.  Lien  of  a  distress  warrant. — The  lien  of  a  distress 
warrant  dates  from  the  time  of  its  levy.'*'^  Consequently  a 
prior  levy  of  a  general  execution  or  attachment  takes  prior- 
ity of  the  landlord's  lien  under  the  distress  warrant. ^"^  This 
was  the  common  law  before  the  passage  of  the  English  stat- 
ute of  8  Anne,^^  which  provided  that  after  the  first  day  of 
May,  1710.  no  goods  upon  leased  lands  should  be  liable  to 
be  taken  on  execution,  unless  the  party  at  whose  suit  the 
execution  is  sued  out  shall,  before  the  removal  of  such  goods, 

(U.  S.)  381,  22  L.  ed.  796;  Wood-  Woodside  v.   Adams,   40   N.   J.   L. 

side   V.    Adams,    40   N.   J.    L.    417;  417;    Herron   v.    Gill,    112    III.   247, 

Gibson  v.   Gautier,    1    Mackey    (D.  252. 

C.)     35;     Stamps     v.     Gilman,     43  ^OLevy  v.  Twiname,  42  Ga.  249; 

Miss.    456;    Marye     v.     Dyche,    42  Rowland  v.   Hewitt,    19    III.    App. 

Miss.  347.  450;    Hamilton    v.    Reedy,    3    Mc- 

48Morgan  v.   Campbell,  22  Wall.  Cord   (S.   Car.)   38.     Where  a  dis- 

(U.    S.)    381,   22    L.     ed.     796,    per  tress  warrant  for  rent  and  an  at- 

Davis,    J.      See      also,    Hobbs      v.  tachment  for  an  ordinary  debt  are 

Davis,     50     Ga.    213;    Johnson     v.  levied   at    the    same    time,   and   on 

Emanuel,   50   Ga.  590.  the     same    property,     the     distress 

49Pierce  v.   Scott,  4  Watts  &  S.  has   priority.      Canterberry   v.   Jor- 

(Pa.)    344;    Hamilton   v.    Reedy,    3  dan,  27  Miss.  96. 

McCord    (S.   Car.)   38;   Leopold   y.  siCh.  14. 
Godfrey,     11     Biss.     (U.    S.)     158; 


§  553  LIENS.  524 

pay  to  the  landlord  all  sums  due  for  the  rent  of  the  premises 
at  the  time  of  the  taking  of  such  goods,  provided  the  arrears 
do  not  amount  to  more  than  one  year's  rent.  This  statute 
was  always  in  force  in  Maryland,^-  and,  being  in  force  when 
the  District  of  Columbia  was  set  off  in  1801,  it  became  a  part 
of  the  law  of  that  District, ^^  and  continues  in  force  to  the 
present  day.  That  statute  does  not,  however,  form  a  part 
of  the  common  law  as  generally  adopted  in  this  country,  and 
therefore  the  old  common-law  rule  would  prevail  here  when 
not  modified  by  statute,  and  a  creditor's  execution,  levied 
on  the  tenant's  goods  prior  to  a  distraint,  would  take  pre- 
cedence of  the  landlord's  claim  for  rent.''^^  But  the  statutes 
similar  to  the  English  statute  have  been  generally  adopted  in 
this  country  in  states  where  the  right  of  distress  exists. 

§  553.     Lien   attaches   from   beginning   of  tenancy. — The 

landlord's  statutory  lien  for  rent  attaches  from  the  beginning 
of  the  tenancy. ^^  The  lien  exists  independently  of  the  pre- 
scribed methods  for  enforcing  it.  The  lien  attaches  to  the 
property  from  the  commencement  of  the  tenancy,  and  the 
levy  upon  the  property  and  the  sale  of  it  in  the  manner  pre- 

52Washington  v.  Williamson,  23  v.    Stearns,   52   Iowa  345,  3   N.   W. 

Md.   244.     Also   in   force    in    South  92;     Garner    v.     Cutting,    32    Iowa 

Carolina,   Margart  v.   Swift,  3   Mc-  547;    Grant   v.    Whitwell,    9     Iowa 

Cord  (S.  Car.)  378.  152,  156;  Carpenter  v.  Gillespie,  10 

s^Gibson    v.    Gautier,    1    Mackey  Iowa  592;    Doane  v.   Garretson,  24 

(D.  C.)  35.  Iowa    351,    355;    Gilbert    v.    Green- 

54Rowland      v.      Hewitt,     19    111.  baum,   56   Iowa  211.  9   N.   W.    182; 

App.  450;    Herron   v.    Gill,    112   111.  Milner  v.   Cooper,  65  Iowa  190,  21 

247,    252;    Ege    v.     Ege,     5     Watts  N.  W.  558;   Bryan  v.  Sanderson,  3 

(Pa.)    134,   139;   Pierce  v.   Scott,  4  McArthur   (D.   C.)   431;   Gibson  v. 

Watts    &   S.    (Pa.)    344;    Hamilton  Gautier,  1  Mackey  (D.  C.)  35.    But 

V.   Reedy,  3  McCord    (S.   Car.)   38;  such  landlord  can  not  secure  title 

Grant   v.    Whitwell,    9     Iowa     152,  to  such  property  as  against  an  in- 

156;   Doane  v.   Garretson,   24  Iowa  terested    third    person    by    taking 

351;   Craddock  v.   Riddlesbarger,  2  the    possession    of    the    property. 

Dana  (Ky.)  205,  208.  Hall   v.    McGaughey,    114   Ga.   405, 

55Morgan  v.   Campbell,  22  Wall.  40  S.    E.  246. 
(U.  S.)  381,  22  L.  ed.  796;   Martin 


525  LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT.  §    554 

scribed  by  the  statute  are  only  the  means  of  enforcing  the 
lien.  The  lien  is  given  by  the  statute,  and  not  by  the  pro- 
ceedings tp  enforce  the  lien.  A  subsequent  mortgage  of  the 
property  or  levy  of  execution  upon  it  is  subject  to  the  lien 
for  rent,  and  upon  a  sale  of  the  property  under  such  mort- 
gage or  execution  the  landlord  may  intervene,  and  is  entitled 
to  payment  of  his  rent  in  arrear  out  of  the  proceeds  before 
any  payment  is  made  on  account  of  the  mortgage  or  judg- 
ment, although  he  has  taken  no  steps  to  enforce  his  lien."*^ 
And  so,  if  the  property  subject  to  such  lien  comes  into  the 
possession  of  a  court  of  equity,  or  of  its  officers,  it  comes  into 
such  possession  subject  to  the  lien  created  by  the  statute  in 
favor  of  the  landlord. ^'^ 

§  554,     Lien  prior  to  that  of  attachment  or  execution. — 

A  statutory  lien  takes  precedence  of  a  subsequent  lien  by 
attachment  or  execution  levied  upon  the  tenant's  property.^^ 
This  is  so  even  as  regards  crops  which  are  raised  by  a  tenant 
upon  shares ;  for  while  the  right  of  property  as  between  him 
and  his  landlord  is  in  the  tenant  until  a  division  of  the  crop 
takes  place,  yet  a  creditor  of  the  tenant  cannot  seize  the 
whole  crop  by  execution  or  attachment  regardless  of  the 
landlord's  lien.^^ 


56Bryan  v.   Sanderson,   3    McAr-  72;    O'Hara   v.    Jones,   46    111.    288; 

thur    (D.    C.)    431;    Fox    v.    David-  Finney  v.  Harding,  136  111.  573,  27 

son,  1  Mackey  (D.  C.)  102;  Liquid  N.    E.   289,    12   L.    R.    A.    60S,    per 

Carbonic  Acid  Mfg.  Co.  v.   Lewis,  Shope,  J.;  Thompson  v.   Mead,  67 

32   Tex.    Civ.   App.   481,   75    S.   W.  111.  395;  Wetsel  v.  Mayers,  91   111. 

47;  Beall  v.   Folmar,  122  Ala.  414,  497;  Atkins  v.  Womeldorf,  53  Iowa 

26    So.    1;    Shapiro    v.    Thompson,  150,  4  N.  W.  905;  Neeb  v.  McMil- 

160  x\la.  363,  49  So.  391;   Evans  v.  Ian,  98  Iowa  718,  68  N.  W.  438;  Sul- 

Groesbeck,   42   Tex.    Civ.    App.   43,  livan    v.    Cleveland,    62    Tex.    677; 

93   S.   W.    1005.  Berkey,  etc.,  Furniture  Co.  v.  Sher- 

a'J'Bryan   v.    Sanderson,   3    McAr-  man  Hotel  Co.,  81  Tex.   135,   16  S. 

thur  (D.  C.)  431;  Fox  v.  Davidson,  W.  807. 

1  Mackey  (D.  C.)   102.  soAtkins  v.  Womeldorf,  53  Iowa 

ssMiles    V.   James,    36    III.    399;  150,  4  N.  W.  905. 
Cunnea    v.    Williams,    11    111.    App. 


§  555  LIENS.  526 

A  landlord's  lien  upon  a  crop  of  cotton  raised  upon  the 
leased  premises,  and  surrendered  to  him  by  the  tenant  in 
payment  of  rent  and  supplies  furnished,  is  paramount  to  a 
judgment  lien  operative  against  the  cotton  before  it  was  de- 
livered to  the  landlord. ^"^ 

§  555.  Priority  of  lien  to  tenant's  mortgage. — The  lien  of 
a  landlord  for  rent  attaches  to  the  tenant's  chattels  upon  the 
premises  at  the  commencement  of  the  tenancy,  and  to  such 
chattels  of  his  as  he  may  afterward  bring  upon  the  premises 
at  any  time  during  the  continuance  of  the  tenancy,  from  the 
time  he  brings  them  upon  the  premises.*'^  The  lien  of  the 
landlord  has  priority,  therefore,  over  a  deed  of  trust  or  mort- 
gage made  by  the  tenant  after  the  commencement  of  the 
tenancy,  whether  the  chattels  covered  by  the  deed  were  upon 
the  premises  when  it  was  executed,  or  were  subsequently 
acquired  and  placed  upon  them  by  the  tenant.^-  It  is  imma- 
terial that  the  mortgage  purports  to  cover  chattels  to  be 
acquired  and  placed  upon  the  premises  in  the  future;  for  in 
such  case  the  terms  of  the  deed  are  inconsistent  with  the 
statutory  rights  of  the  landlord,  and  must  give  place  to  them. 
Effect  will  not  be  given  to  a  mortgage  of  after-acquired  prop- 
erty to  the  prejudice  of  the  rights  of  third  persons.  A  land- 
lord's lien  attaches  to  after-acquired  chattels,  such  as  machin- 
ery, placed  upon  the  leased  premises,  in  preference  to  a  mort- 
gage of  such  chattels  by  the  tenant  after  the  chattels  had 
been  placed  on  such  premises. *^^ 

eoOkolona       Savings       Inst.      v.  Bartlett   v.   Loundes,     34     W.     Va. 

Trice,  60  Miss.  262.  493,  12  S.  E.  762.    Where  a  record- 

eiBeall  v.   White,   94  U.   S.  382,  ed   mortgage   is   placed   on   a   crop 

24   L.    ed.    173;    Fowler   v.    Rapley,  and  it  is  subject  to  the  landlord's 

IS  Wall.   (U.  S.)  328,  21  L.  ed.  35;  lien  and  the  landlord  has  the  crop 

Webb  V.    Sharp,    13   Wall.    (U.   S.)  sold    to   pay   his    lien,    any   surplus 

14,     20     L.     ed.     478;     Hadden     v.  must    be    paid    to    the    mortgagee. 

Knickerbocker,  70  111.  677,  22  Am.  Peeples  v.  Hayley,  89  Ark.  252,  116 

Rep.  80.  S.  W.  197.     See  also  Beall  v.  Fol- 

62Beall  V.   White,   94  U.   S.   382,  mar,  122  Ala.  414,  26  So.  1. 
24  L.  ed.   173;   Richmond  v.  Dues-  esUnion    Warehouse    Co    v.    Mc- 

berry,   27    Gratt.     (Va.)     210,     213;  Intyre,  84  Ala.  78,  4  So.  175. 


527  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  556 

When  the  landlord's  lien  is  created  by  statute  and  attaches 
from  the  beginning  of  the  tenancy,  or  from  the  time  the 
property  subject  to  it  is  placed  upon  the  demised  premises, 
the  lien  necessarily  attaches  before  the  mortgage,  unless 
the  mortgage  was  made  before  the  tenancy  commenced,  or 
before  the  property  was  placed  upon  the  premises.  The 
landlord's  lien  does  not  prevail  against  the  tenant's  mort- 
gagee whose  mortgage  is  delivered  and  recorded  before  the 
lien  attaches.  When  the  lien  attaches  only  upon  the  levy  of 
a  distress  warrant,  a  mortgage  executed  and  made  an  effect- 
ual lien  before  such  levy  must  prevail  as  against  the  land- 
lord.«* 

§  556.  Landlord's  lien  paramount  to  mortgage  lien. — A 
landlord's  statutory  lien  upon  his  tenant's  crop  is  paramount 
to  a  mortgage  of  the  crop  executed  by  the  tenant. ^°  The 
landlord's  lien  accrues  as  soon  as  there  is  any  crop  upon 
which  it  may  attach,  and  though  the  mortgage  lien  may  at- 
tach at  the  same  time,  inasmuch  as  the  statutory  lien  was 
created  and  was  ready  to  attach  from  the  beginning  of  the 
tenancy,  it  takes  priority  of  a  mortgage  lien  subsequently 
created  by  the  tenant. 

Although  the  owner  of  land  has  given  a  bond  to  convey  it 
which  does  not  provide  for  possession,  but  does  provide  that 
the  obligee  shall  pay  rent  if  he  fails  to  pay  the  purchase- 
money,  he  has  a  lien  for  the  rent  which  is  superior  to  a  chat- 
tel mortgage  executed  by  the  obligee  upon  the  crop  to  be 
grown  upon  the  land.  The  mortgagee  relies  on  the  title 
bond  at  his  peril.  He  is  bound  to  take  notice  of  the  limita- 
tion of  the  obligee's  rights  under  the  contract  of  sale.'^^ 

64Woodside  v.  Adams,  40  N.  J.  beth  v.  Ponder,  33  Ark.  707;  Wat- 

L.  417;  Hood  v.  Harming,  4  Dana  son  v.  Johnson,  33  Ark.  737;  Roth 

(Ky.)  21;   Snyder  v.   Hitt,  2   Dana  v.  Williams,  45  Arkk.  447;  Adams 

(Ky.)    204.  V.    Hobbs,    27    Ark.    1;    McGee    v. 

65Tomlinson     v.     Greenfield,     31  Fitzer,  37  Tex.  27;  Perry  v.  Perry, 

Ark.  557;  Meyer  v.  Bloom,  37  Ark.  127  N.   Car.  23,  37  S.  E.  71;   Dun- 

43;   Smith   v.   Meyer,  25  Ark.   609;  lap  v.  Dunseth,  81   Mo.  App.  17. 
Buck   V.    Lee,   36   Ark.   525;    Lam-  ceBacon  v.  Howell,  60  Miss.  362. 


§  557 


LIENS. 


528 


§  557.     Lien  not  paramount  to  recorded  chattel  mortgage. 

— A  landlord's  lien  does  not  take  precedence  of  a  recorded 
chattel  mortgage  existing  when  the  lien  attaches. ^''^  There  are 
some  statutory  liens  that  are  given  precedence  over  existing 
mortgages,  such  as  the  lien  for  repairing  vessels.  Such  pre- 
ference is  given  upon  the  principle  that  the  mortgagee  is  as 
much  benefited  by  the  repairs  of  the  vessel,  as  is  the  mort- 
gagor. There  may  also  be  in  many  cases  an  implied  author- 
ity in  the  mortgagor  left  in  possession  to  incur  upon  the 
faith  of  the  property  whatever  expense  is  necessary  for  its 
preservation.^^  But  no  such  reason  exists  in  the  case  of  a 
landlord's  lien.  The  mortgagee  is  not  benefited  by  the  rent- 
ing of  the  premises  to  the  mortgagor,  out  of  which  act  the 
landlord's  lien  has  its  origin,  nor  is  the  mortgaged  property 
thereby  preserved  or  enhanced  in  value.  The  lien  of  a  mort- 
gage of  chattels  executed  before  a  lease  is  prior  to  the  land- 
lord's lien  under  the  lease,  although  the  mortgagee  has  act- 
ual knowledge  that  such  chattels  are  being  used  upon  the 
leased  premises.*'^  But  an  unrecorded  chattel  mortgage  on 
goods  of  a  tenant  is  not  good  as  against  the  landlord's  statu- 
tory lien  for  rent."^" 


67 Rand  v.  Barrett,  66  Iowa  731, 
24  N.  W.  530;  Perry  v.  Waggoner, 
68  Iowa  403,  27  N.  W.  292;  Jar- 
chow  V.  Pickens,  51  Iowa  381,  1  N. 
W.  598;  Hempstead  Real  Estate, 
etc.,  Assn.  v.  Cochran,  60  Tex.  620; 
Souders  v.  Vansickle,  3  Halst.  (N. 
J.)  313;  Breckenbridge  v.  Millan, 
81  Tex.  17,  16  S.  W.  555;  Bruns- 
wick, etc.,  Co.  V.  Murphy,  89  Miss. 
264,  42  So.  288.  Where  one  in 
possession  of  land  under  a  con- 
tract of  purchase  executes  a  trust 
deed  on  his  crops,  he  can  not,  by 
surrendering  the  contract,  and 
agreeing  to  pay  rent  for  that  year, 
create  a  landlord's  lien  superior 
to    the    trust    deed.      Wilczinski    v. 


Lick,  68  Miss.  596,  10  So.  1Z.  The 
law  is  otherwise  in  Delaware. 
Ford  V.  Clewell,  9  Houst.  (Del.) 
179,  31  Atl.  715,  Chief  Justice  dis- 
senting. As  to  when  lien  at- 
taches see  Davis  Gasoline  Engine 
Co.  V.  McHugh,  115  Iowa  415,  88 
N.  W.  948.     See  post,  §  570. 

6SJones  on  Chattel  Mortgages, 
§  474;  Hempstead  Real  Estate, 
etc.,  Assn.  v.  Cochran,  60  Tex. 
620. 

cojarchow  v.  Pickens,  51  Iowa 
381,  1   N.  W.  598. 

'''OBerkey,  etc..  Furniture  Co.  v. 
Sherman  Hotel  Co.,  81  Tex.  135, 
16  S.  W.  807. 


529  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  559 

A  mortgage  of  the  tenant's  personalty  on  the  leased  prem- 
ises, executed  before  the  beginning  of  the  second  term  of  his 
tenancy,  is  superior  to  the  landlord's  lien  for  rent  accruing 
under  such  second  term/^  Where  a  landlord  entitled  to  a 
share  of  a  crop  in  place  of  rent  purchases  the  tenant's  share 
for  a  consideration  which  includes  the  satisfaction  of  the 
rent,  his  lien  is  extinguished,  and  his  title  acquired  by  such 
purchase  is  subject  to  a  chattel  mortgage  of  the  crop  given 
by  the  tenant  to  a  third  person. '^^ 

The  same  rule  applies  to  conditional  sales  thus,  if  goods  be 
sold  to  a  tenant  with  the  proviso  that  the  vendor  shall  retain 
title  until  the  purchase-money  is  paid,  this  is  a  conditional 
sale,  and  the  landlord  can  only  subject  them  to  his  lien  by 
paying  the  purchase-money  due,  or  keeping  good  a  tender 
thereof.''^^ 

§  558,     Fraudulent  cancellation  of  mortgage  not  effective. 

— A  fraudulent  cancellation  of  the  prior  chattel  mortgage 
does  not  give  the  landlord's  lien  priority.  Thus,  if  the  mort- 
gage note  be  assigned  after  the  landlord's  lien  has  attached, 
without  an  assignment  of  the  mortgage,  and  the  mortgagee 
fraudulently  enters  satisfaction  on  the  margin  of  the  record, 
and  after  this  a  third  person  is  substituted  for  one  of  the 
original  lessees  without  making  a  new  lease,  the  mortgage  is 
still  entitled  to  priority."'* 

§  559.  Tenant's  assignee  in  bankruptcy. — The  tenant's  as- 
signee in  bankruptcy  or  insolvency,  or  for  the  benefit  of 
creditors,  takes  the  property  subject  to  the  landlord's  lien. 
If  the  lien  is  created  by  the  lease  or  by  statute,  the  assignee 
takes  the  property  subject  to  the  lien,  whether  the  assign- 
ment took  place  before  or  after  a   distraint  or  attachment 

"iLyons  v.   Deppen,  90  Ky.   305,  73Bingham      v.      Vandegrift,      93 

14  S.  W.  279,   12  Ky.  L.  202.  Ala.  283,  9  So.  280. 

i'2Titsworth     v.     Frauenthal,     52  "4Rand  v.    Barrett,  66  Iowa  731, 

Ark.  254,  12  S.  W.  498.  24  N.   W.  530. 

34 


§    S^O  LIENS.  530 

Upon  the  property  by  the  landlord.  His  right  is  not  affected 
by  the  assignment. '^^  At  common  law  the  right  of  distraint 
would  be  cut  off  by  a  prior  assignment  in  insolvency  or  for 
the  benefit  of  creditors."^  Where  at  the  present  time  a  lien 
is  given  by  statute,  but  a  distress  warrant  is  one  of  the  reme- 
dies for  enforcing  it,  the  lien  does  not  depend  upon  a  levy  of 
the  distress  warrant,  but  exists  independently  of  that,'^'^  and 
therefore  takes  precedence  of  an  assignment  in  insolvency  or 
for  the  benefit  of  creditors. 

§  560.     Assignment  takes  precedence  of  distress  warrant. 

— An  assignment  in  bankruptcy  of  a  tenant's  property  takes 
precedence  of  a  distress  warrant  levied  after  the  commence- 
ment of  the  proceedings  in  bankruptcy.  The  assignment  re- 
lates back  to  the  commencement  of  the  proceedings,  and  by 
operation  of  law  vests  the  title  to  the  estate  of  the  bankrupt 
in  the  assignee.  No  lien  attaches  under  a  distress  warrant 
until  the  property  is  actually  seized  under  it.  If  the  lien  at- 
tached before  the  filing  of  the  petition,  it  could  be  enforced 
in  the  bankruptcy  court;  but  if  it  did  not  exist  then,  it  could 
not  be  brought  into  existence  afterwards."^ 

In  Pennsylvania,  a  landlord  having  a  right  to  distrain  for 
rent  in  arrear,  at  the  date  of  the  issuing  of  a  warrant  in  bank- 

■^sEames   v.   Mayo,    6    III.    App.  ^THunter    v.    Whitfield,    89    111. 

334;    Hoskins   v.    Paul,   9    N.   J.    L.  229;   In   re   Wynne,   Chase    (U.  S.) 

110,   17  Am.   Dec.  455;   Rosenberg  227,  256,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  18117;  Ros- 

V.     Shaper,     51     Tex.     134;     In     re  enberg     v.    Shaper,    51     Tex.    134; 

Wynne,  Chase  (U.  S.)  227,  256,  per  Dutcher    v.    Culver,   24    Minn.   584. 

C.  J.   Chase,   Fed.   Cas.   No.   18117.  Though    the    landlord    himself   be 

Landlord's   right   of   lien   for   rent  the  assignee,  his  acceptance  of  the 

secured  by  notes  is  not  negotiable.  trust  is  not  a  waiver  of  his  right. 

The      purchaser      of      such      notes  In  Pennsylvania,  whenever  an  exe- 

stands    in    the    shoes    of    the    land-  cution  will  carry  a  valid  sale  over 

lord   in  enforcing  the   lien.     Camp  the  assignee,    it   carries  with   it  a 

v.  West,  113  Ga.  304,  38  S.  E.  822.  claim  for  rent.    Barnes'  Appeal,  76 

'CIn    re    Wynne,    Chase    (U.    S.)  Pa.  St.  50. 

227,  256,  per  C.  J.  Chase,  Fed.  Cas.  'SMorgan  v.   Campbell,  22  Wall. 

No.   18117.  (U.  S.)  381,  22  L.  ed.  796. 


531  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  562 

rnptcy,  is  entitled  to  be  paid  in  full  by  the  assignee  in  bank- 
ruptcy, before  the  removal  of  the  goods,  rent  in  arrear  not 
exceeding  one  year,  in  preference  to  all  other  creditors. "^^ 

Whether  the  lien  of  a  distress  warrant,  which  has  already 
been  levied  upon  the  tenant's  property  at  the  time  of  the 
filing  of  a  petition  in  bankruptcy  against  him,  is  dissolved  by 
the  assignment  in  bankruptcy,  in  the  same  manner  as  an  at- 
tachment upon  mesne  process  is  dissolved,  is  a  question  that 
has  occasioned  some  discussion. ^^ 

§  561.  Distress  warrants  at  common  law. — At  common 
law  all  chattels  found  upon  the  demised  premises  were 
prima  facie  distrainable,  whether  they  belonged  to  the  tenant 
or  not.  The  landlord's  prerogative  of  distraint  is  an  ancient 
one,  having  its  origin  in  feudal  tenures.  It  seems  to  have 
originated  from  two  remedies  of  the  common  law  still  more 
ancient.  By  the  processes  of  gavelet  and  cessavit  the  land- 
lord could  seize  the  land  itself  for  rent  in  arrear,  and  hold  it 
until  payment  was  made.  These  processes  fell  into  disuse 
long  ago,  and  in  their  place  the  landlord's  right  of  distress 
arose,  whereby,  instead  of  seizing  the  land,  he  seized  all 
movables  upon  the  land,  and  held  them  until  he  received  pay- 
ment. In  process  of  time  he  was  authorized  by  statute  to 
sell  the  property  seized,  and  in  this  w'ay  we  have  the  modern 
process  of  distraint. ^^ 

§  562.     All  property  on  premises  liable  to  distress  for  rent. 

— The  general  rule  still  is,  that  all  chattels  found  upon  the 
demised  premises  are  prima  facie  liable  to  distress  for  rent. 
Certain  property  may  be  exempt  upon  grounds  of  public 
policy,  or  by  force  of  express  statute;  but  it  is  incumbent 

TOLongstreth     v.      Pennock,     20  (U.  S.)  381,  393,  22  L.  ed.  19(i.    The 

Wall.    (U.   S.)    575,   576,   22   L.   ed.  case  was  decided  on  another  point. 

451;   Gibson   v.    Gautier,    1    Mackey  81  Emig  v.   Cunningham,  62  Md. 

(D.   C.)   35.  458,   per    Bryan,   J. 

so  Morgan  \r.  Campbell,  22  Wall. 


§  562 


LIENS. 


DO^ 


upon  the  claimant  of  such  property  to  show  that  it  falls 
within  such  exemption.  The  fact  that  the  chattels  belong  to  a 
stranger  was  no  ground  for  exemption  at  common  law,  and 
is  not  now  except  when  so  declared  by  statute,  or  exempted 
on  grounds  of  public  policy.^-  The  goods  of  a  married 
woman  found  upon  the  demised  premises  may  be  distrained 
for  rent  due  by  her  husband  ;^^  so  the  goods  of  an  under- 
tenant.^^ 

This  common-law  rule  has  generally  been  modified  by 
statute  in  America,  so  that  the  goods  of  a  stranger  on  the 
premises  are  not  liable  to  distress,  but  only  the  goods  of  the 
tenant,  or  of  some  other  person  who  is  liable  for  the  rent.^^ 


82Kleber  v.  Ward,  88  Pa.  St. 
93;  Spencer  v.  McGowen,  13 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  256;  Ratclifif  v. 
Daniel,  6  Har.  &  J.  (Md.)  498; 
Cromwell  v.  Owings,  7  Har.  &  J. 
(Md.)  55,  58;  Kennedy  v.  Lange, 
50  Md.  91;  Giles  v.  Ebsworth,  10 
Md.  533;  Trieber  v.  Knabe,  12  Md. 
491,  71  Am.  Dec.  607.  In  the  latter 
case  a  distress  for  the  rent  of  a 
hotel  was  levied  upon  a  pianoforte 
belonging  to  a  stranger,  and  leased 
to  a  music  teacher  who  boarded 
in  the  hotel;  and  not  being  in 
use  as  an  instrument  of  trade  or 
profession,  and  there  not  being  a 
sufficiency  of  other  goods  on  the 
premises,  the  pianoforte  was 
held  liable  to  distraint.  See  also. 
Reeves  v.  McKenzie,  1  Bailey 
(S.  Car.)  497;  Kessler  v.  Mc- 
Conachy,  1  Rawle  (Pa.),  435; 
Price  V.  McCallister,  3  Grant. 
Cas.  (Pa.)  248;  Karns  v.  McKin- 
ney,  74  Pa.  St.  387;  Whiting  v. 
Lake,  91  Pa.  St.  349;  Stevens  v. 
Lodge,  7  Blackf.  (Ind.)  594;  Hime- 
ly  V.   Wyatt,   1   Bay   (S.   Car.)   102; 


Union  Water-Power  Co.  v.  Cha- 
bot,  93  Maine  339,  45  Atl.  30. 

S3  Emig  V.  Cunningham,  62  Md. 
458;  Blanche  v.  Bradford,  38  Pa. 
St.  344,  80  Am.   Dec.  489. 

8^  Lane  v.  Steinmetz,  9  W.  N. 
C.  (Pa.)  574;  Smoyer  v.  Roth,  10 
Sad.  (Pa.)  32,  13  Atl.  191.  A  sub- 
tenant can  not  compel  the  les- 
sor to  sell  the  goods  of  the  or- 
iginal lessee,  in  satisfaction  of 
the  rent  in  arrear,  before  having 
recourse  to  his  own.  Jimison  v. 
Reifsneider,  97  Pa.  St.  136.  If 
the  landlord  distrain  upon  a 
subtenant,  he  must  show  affirm- 
atively that  a  former  distress  up- 
on his  immediate  tenant  was  un- 
productive. Quinn  v.  Wallace,  6 
Whart.   (Pa.)  452. 

85  Mississippi :  Stamps  v.  Gil- 
man,  43  Miss.  456;  Marye  v. 
Dyche,  42  Miss.  347.  Kentucky: 
Hall  V.  Amos,  5  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 
89.  Virginia:  Act  of  1818,  p.  82, 
§15;  Davis  v.  Payne's  Admr.,  4 
Rand.  (Va.)  iZ2. 


533  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  563 

§  563.  Exemptions  from  distress  on  the  ground  of  public 
policy.- — The  landlord's  prerogative  of  distress  authorized 
the  seizure  of  any  chattels  found  upon  the  premises,  though 
they  might  not  belong  to  the  tenant,  on  the  ground  that  the 
landlord  may  be  supposed  to  have  given  credit  to  all  the 
visible  property  upon  the  premises.  Upon  considerations  of 
public  policy,  certain  property  was  exempt  from  seizure. 
Chief  Justice  Willes  in  1744  stated  clearly  the  exemtions  then 
established,  saying  :^^ 

"There  are  five  sorts  of  things  which  at  common  law  were 
not  distrainable : — 

"1.     Things  annexed  to  the  freehold. 

"2.  Things  delivered  to  a  person  exercising  a  public  trade 
to  be  carried  wrought  worked  up  or  managed  in  the  way  of 
his  trade  or  employ. 

"3.      Cocks  or  sheaves  of  corn. 

"4.     Beasts  of  the  plough  and  instruments  of  husbandry. 

"5.     The  instruments  of  a  man's  trade  or  profession. 

"The  first  three  sorts  were  absolutely  free  from  distress, 
and  could  not  be  distrained,  even  though  there  were  no  other 
goods  besides. 

"The  two  last  are  only  exempt  sub  modo,  that  is,  upon  a 
supposition  that  there  is  sufficient  distress  besides. 

"Things  annexed  to  the  freehold,  as  furnaces,  mill-stones, 
chimney-pieces,  and  the  like  cannot  be  distrained,  because 
they  cannot  be  taken  away  without  doing  damage  to  the 
freehold,  which  the  law  will  not  allow. 

"Things  sent  or  delivered  to  a  person  exercising  a  trade,  to 
be  carried  wrought  or  manufactured  in  the  way  of  his  trade, 
as  a  horse  in  a  smith's  shop,  materials  sent  to  a  weaver, 
or  cloth  to  a  tailor  to  be  made  up,  are  privileged  for  the  sake 
of  trade  and  commerce,  which  could  not  be  carried  on  if  such 

86  Simpson    v.    Hartopp,    Willes,  son,  7  M.  &  W.  450,  454,  per  Baron 

512.      And    see,    in    support,    Mus-  Parke;    Fenton   v.    Logan,  9   Bing. 

pratt  V.  Gregory,  3  M.  &  ,W.  677,  676,  per  Tindal,   C.  J. 
per  Lord  Denman;  Joule  v.  Jack- 


5^4 


LIENS. 


534 


things  under  these  circumstances  could  be  distrained  for  rent 
due  from  the  person  in  whose  custody  tliey  are."^' 

§  564.  Privilege  of  trade. — Upon  the  ground  of  the  privi- 
lege of  trade, ^^  it  is  well  settled  that  all  goods  delivered  to 
tradesmen, ^^  artificers,  manufacturers, ^°  carriers,  factors, ^^ 
auctioneers, '^-   and   the   like,    are    exempt   from    distress    for 


S7  In  further  explanation  of, 
and  comment  upon,  these  exemp- 
tions, Chief  Justice  Willes  con- 
tinues :  "Cocks  and  sheaves  of 
corn  were  not  distrainable  before 
the  statute  2  W.  &  M.  ch.  5 
(which  was  made  in  favor  of 
landlords),  because  they  could 
not  be  restored  again  in  the  same 
plight  and  condition  that  they 
were  before  upon  a  replevin,  but 
must  necessarily  be  damaged  by 
being  removed.  Beasts  of  the 
plough,  etc.,  were  not  distrainable 
in  favor  of  husbandry  (which  is  of 
so  great  advantage  to  the  nation), 
and  likewise  because  a  man  should 
not  be  left  quite  destitute  of  get- 
ting a  living  for  himself  and  his 
family.  And  the  same  reasons 
hold  in  the  case  of  the  instru- 
ments of  a  man's  trade  or  pro- 
fession. But  these  two  last  are 
not  privileged  in  case  there  is  dis- 
tress enough  besides;  otherwise 
they  may  be  distrained.  These 
rules  are  laid  down  and  fully 
explained  in  Co.  Lit.  47  a, 
b,  and  many  other  books  which 
are  there  cited;  and  there  are 
many  subsequent  cases  in  which 
the  same  doctrine  is  established, 
and  which  I  do  not  mention  be- 
cause I  do  not  know  any  one  case 
to   the   contrary." 

88  Muspratt  v.   Gregory,  3  M.   & 


W.  677,  678;  Oilman  v.  Elton,  3 
Brod.  &  B.  75;  Findon  v.  Mc- 
Laren, 6  Q.  B.  891;  Matthias  v. 
Mesnard,  2  Car.  &  P.  353;  Brown 
V.  Sims,  17  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  138; 
Connah  v.  Hale,  23  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
462;  Walker  v.  Johnson,  4  Mc- 
Cord  (S.  Car.)  552;  horse  at  liv- 
ery stable,  Youngblood  v.  Lowry, 
2  McCord  (S.  Car.)  39,  13  Am. 
Dec.  698;  cattle  reserved  for 
agistment,  Cadwalader  v.  Tindall, 
20  Pa.  St.  422;  a  merchant's  books 
of  account,  Davis  v.  Arledge,  3 
Hill  (N.  Y.)  170,  30  Am.  Dec.  360; 
St.  Louis  Type  Foundry  v.  Tay- 
lor (Tex.),  35  S.  W.  691. 

89  For  an  exceptional  case  see 
Goodrich  v.  Bodley,  35  La.  Ann. 
525. 

^^  Knowles  v.  Pierce,  5  Houst. 
(Del.)  178;  Hoskins  v.  Paul,  9 
N.  J.  L.   110,   17  Am.  Dec.  455. 

91  Howe  Machine  Co.  v.  Sloan, 
87  Pa.  St.  438,  30  Am.  Rep.  376; 
Walker  v.  Johnson,  4  McCord  (S. 
Car.)  552;  Brown  v.  Sims,  17  Serg. 
&  R.  (Pa.)  138;  Briggs  v.  Large, 
30  Pa.  St.  287;  McCreery  v. 
Claflflin,  37  Md.  435,  11  Am.  Rep. 
542;  Trieber  v.  Knabe,  12  Md.  491, 
71  Am.  Dec.  607. 

92  Himely  v.  Wyatt,  1  Bay 
(S.  Car.)  102;  Brown  v.  Arun- 
dell.  10  C  B.  54;  Williams  v. 
Holmes,  8   Exch.  861. 


535  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  565 

rent.  In  general  terms,  if  a  tenant  in  the  course  of  his  busi- 
ness is  necessarily  in  possession  of  the  property  of  those  with 
whom  he  deals,  or  those  who  employ  him,  such  property  is 
not  liable  for  distress  for  rents, ^^  but  goods  of  a  stranger,  in 
the  tenant's  possession  as  a  matter  of  favor  and  without  hire, 
are  not  exempt. '^^ 

Upon  a  like  principle  are  exempt  the  goods  of  a  traveler  at 
an  inn,^^  and  goods  of  a  boarder  in  his  own  use;^*^  other- 
wise if  the  boarder's  goods  are  with  his  consent  in  the  ten- 
ant's use.^'^ 

The  goods  of  others,  in  the  hands  of  tenants  who  are  such 
bailees,  are  exempt  from  distress,  not  on  account  of  a  special 
privilege  to  the  tenant,  but  for  the  benefit  of  trade  and  com- 
merce, and  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  owner  of  the 
goods,  who  has  confided  them  to  the  tenant  for  sale,  stor- 
age, transportation,  manufacture,  repair,  or  the  like  pur- 
pose.^^ 

The  fact  that  the  goods  belong  to  a  bailee  must  be  proved 
in  order  to  establish  the  exemption  on  this  ground. ^^ 

§  565.  General  exemption  laws  do  not  apply  as  against  a 
distress. — A  distress  is  not  an  execution  for  debt,  and  there- 
fore the  goods  of  a  tenant  have  never  been  held  to  be  pro- 
tected by  any  of  the  exemption  laws  which  put  the  property 
of  a  debtor  beyond  the  reach  of  his  creditors.  In  like  man- 
ner, although  the  constitution  of  a  state  declares  that  the 
property  of  a  wife  shall  be  protected  from  the  debt  of  her 
husband,  this  declaration  has  no  effect  upon  the  right  of  dis- 
ss Karns  V.  McKinney,  74  Pa.  173;  Lane  v.  Steinmetz,  9  W.  N. 
St.  387,  390.  C.   (Pa.)   574. 

94  Page    V.     Middleton,    118    Pa.  ^^Matthews  v.  Stone,  1  Hill   (N. 
St.  546;  12  Atl.  415.                                   Y.)  565,  revd.  7  Hill  (N.  Y.)  428. 

95  Harris    v.     Boggs,     5     Blackf.  98McCreery   v.    Claflflin,   Zl    Md. 
(Ind.)  489.                                                   435,  442,   11  Am.   Rep.  542. 

9CRiddle    V.    Welden,    5    Whart.  99Bevan     v.     Crooks,     7     Watts. 

(Pa.)     9;     Jones     v.     Goldbeck.    8      &  S.   (Pa.)  452. 
W.  N.  C.  (Pa.)  533,  14  Phila.  (Pa.) 


§  566  LIENS.  536 

tress.  If  the  goods  of  the  wife  were  upon  the  premises  of 
any  other  tenant,  they  would  be  liable  to  distraint,  and  in 
such  case  the  goods  of  an  unmarried  woman  could  be  seized. 
It  was  not  intended  to  give  any  greater  immunity  to  a  mar- 
ried woman's  property  than  was  extended  to  it  before  mar- 
riage.^ 

§  566.     Lien  for  rent  attaches  only  on  tenant's  property. 

— A  landlord's  statutory  lien  for  rent  does  not  generally  at- 
tach to  goods  of  other  persons  which  happen  to  be  upon  the 
demised  premises.-  It  does  not  attach  to  the  goods  of  a  sub- 
tenant of  a  part  of  the  demised  premises,^  unless  specially  so 
provided  by  statute,  as  is  the  case  in  Louisiana.*  The  terms 
of  the  statutes  in  the  different  states  are,  however,  quite  dis- 
similar, and  reference  must  be  had  to  these  statutes  to  de- 
termine the  extent  of  the  lien. 

Thus,  in  Iowa,  the  statute  gives  a  lien  upon  property  used 
upon  the  premises.  The  lien,  therefore,  attaches  to  all  per- 
sonal property  kept  by  the  tenant  upon  the  premises  for  the 
prosecution  of  the  business  for  which  the  tenancy  was  cre- 
ated. Therefore  the  lien  attaches  to  merchandise  kept  for 
sale  upon  the  leased  premises.  The  lien  is  given  not  merely 
in  case  of  leases  of  farms  and  agricultural  lands,  but  also  in 
case  of  leases  of  houses  and  storerooms.  The  property  used 
upon  the  premises  is  made  subject  to  the  lien.  The  word  is 
employed  in  a  large  and  liberal  sense,  and  the  only  limita- 
tion intended  is  that  incident  to  the  nature  and  purposes  of 
the  occupation  of  the  premises.  Thus,  the  cloths  and  goods 
of  a  merchant  tailor,  when  used  for  the  purposes  of  sale,  and 
for  making  into  garments  for  customers,  upon  premises  hired 

lEmig    V.    Cunningham,    62    Md.  ey    (D.    C.)    Z6;    Wells    v.    Sequin, 

458,     per     Bryan,     J.;     Noxon     v.  14    Iowa    143. 

Glaze,   11    Colo.    App.   503,   53    Pac.  •'^Gray  v.   Rawson,   11   111.  527. 

827.  4See  post,  §  620. 

2Johnson    v.    Douglass,   2    Mack- 


537  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  568 

for  such  purposes,  are  subject  to  the  statutory  Hen  of  the 
landlord.^ 

§  567.     The  lien  attaches  only  to  personal  property. — If  it 

be  sought  to  enforce  the  lien  or  to  levy  a  distress  warrant 
upon  a  dwelling-house,  some  agreement  changing  the  char- 
acter of  the  property  must  be  shown,  for  the  presumption  is 
that  it  is  part  of  the  realty.*'  The  lessee  may,  however,  by 
stipulation  in  the  lease,  give  the  lessor  a  lien  on  buildings  to 
be  erected  by  the  lessee,  and  such  a  lien,  like  the  landlord's 
ordinary  lien  by  statute,  will  prevail  against  the  lessee's  as- 
signee in  insolvency,  or  for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors.''' 

Things  fixed  to  the  realty  are  not,  as  a  general  rule,  sub- 
ject to  distress  or  to  a  lien;  but  a  tenant's  trade  fixtures, 
when  separated  from  the  realty  by  the  tenant,  may  be  dis- 
trained for  rent.^ 

A  fixture  which  is  removable  at  the  tenant's  pleasure,  it 
being  only  slightly  attached  to  the  realty,  so  that  it  may  be 
removed  without  destroying  its  character,  such,  for  instance, 
as  a  spinning-mule  fastened  to  the  floor  of  a  mill  with  screws, 
is  distrainable.'' 

§  568.  Lien  covers  entire  crop. — A  landlord's  lien  upon 
crops  covers  the  entire  crops  raised  upon  the  demised  prem- 
ises. Therefore,  where  land  is  rented  for  a  share  of  the 
crops,  and  the  tenant  delivers  to  the  landlord  his  share  of 
the  oats  raised  upon  the  land,  but  makes  default  in  paying 
the  rent  upon  the  land  planted  in  corn,  the  landlord  has  a 
lien  on  the  remainder  of  the  oats  for  the  payment  of  the  rent 
of  the  land  planted  with  corn.     The  lien  is  not  confined  to 

SGrant  v.  Whitwell,  9  Iowa  152;  "Webster     v.     Nichols,     104     111. 

Thompson    v.    Anderson,    86    Iowa  160. 

703,  53  N.  W.  418.  sReynolds  v.  Shuler,  5  Cow.  (N. 

CKassing  v.  Keohane,  4  111.  App.  Y.)    323;   Vausse  v.   Russel,  2  Mc- 

460;  Hamilton  v.  Reedy,  3  McCord  Cord   (S.   Car.)   329. 

(S.   Car.)   38.  OFurbush    v.    Chappell,    105    Pa. 

St.   187. 


§    569  LIENS.  538 

any  particular  crop,  but  embraces  all  the  crops,  or  any  por- 
tion of  them,  and  extents  to  crops  on  every  part  of  the  prem- 
ises for  the  whole  rent.^^  If,  however,  the  different  tracts 
are  not  all  rented  by  one  demise,  but  there  is  a  distinct  rent 
for  each,  the  crops  on  one  tract  are  not  subject  to  lien  for 
rent  of  another  tract. ^^ 

§  569.     Lien  does  not  attach  to  property  not  on  premises. 

— The  landlord's  lien  is  not  made  to  attach  to  property  not 
on  the  demised  premises,  unless  he  is  authorized  by  statute 
to  follow  it  after  removal,  as  in  case  he  can  show  that  the  re- 
moval was  fraudulent.^-  A  purchaser  from  a  tenant,  in  good 
faith,  of  property  not  on  the  demised  premises,  is  not  af- 
fected by  a  landlord's  lien  afterwards  established.  A  distress 
at  common  law  for  rent  must  be  made  upon  the  demised 
premises, ^^  and  the  right  terminates  with  removal,  unless 
the  right  be  expressly  extended  by  statute.  Even  where  the 
tenant  assigns  the  goods  to  a  receiver,  under  a  creditor's  bill, 
and  the  receiver  removes  them  from  the  demised  premises 
into  the  public  street,  they  are  not  then  liable  to  distraint, 
though  the  creditor  has  notice  that  the  tenant's  rent  is  in 
arrear,^^  Goods  removed  from  the  premises  by  assignees 
for  the  benefit  of  creditors  are  not  liable  to  distress. -^^ 

Goods  of  a  stranger  can  only  be  distrained  for  rent  while 
they  are  on  the  demised  premises. ^*^ 

§  570.    Lien   attaches   to   mortgaged   property. — A   land- 
lord's lien  attaches  to  property  which  is  already  subject  to  a 

loPrettyman    v.    Unland,    11    111.  i^Martin   v.    Black,  9   Paige    (N. 

206;    Thompson    v.    Mead,    67    111.  Y.)  641,  38  Am.  Dec.  574. 

395;    Andrew    v.    Stewart,    81    Ga.  i^Hastings   v.    Belknap,   1   Denio 

53,  7  S.  E.  169;  Madison  Supply  &  (N.    Y.)    190;    Martin    v.    Black,    3 

Hardware    Co.    v.    Richardson,    8  Edw.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  580,  affd.  9  Paige 

Ga.  App.  344,  69  S.   E.  45.  (N.  Y.)  641,  38  Am.  Dec.  574. 

iiQittings  V.  Nelson,  86  111.  591.  iGAdams    v.    La    Comb,    1    Dall. 

i2Nesbitt    V.    Bartlett,    14    Iowa  (U.  S.)  440,  1  L.  ed.  214;  Scott  v. 

485.  McEwen,     2      Phila.      (Pa.)      176; 

i3Bradley      v.      Piggot,      Walk.  Sleeper    v.    Parish,    7    Phila.    (Pa.) 

(Miss.)  348.  247. 


539 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


§    571 


mortgage  or  other  incumbrance,  when  it  is  placed  upon  the 
demised  premises,  but  the  lien  attaches  in  such  case  subject 
to  the  prior  mortgage  or  incumbrance.^'  Care  must  be  taken, 
however,  that  no  substantial  injury  be  done  to  the  interest 
of  the  mortgagee  in  seizing  and  selling  the  equity  of  redemp- 
tion.^^ 

A  distress  at  common  law  could  not,  however,  be  levied 
upon  an  equity  of  redemption. ^^  But  this  may  generally  be 
done  under  the  modern  statutes  modifying  the  common  law 
remedy.-*^ 

§571.  Distress  attaches  to  property  only  where  demise 
exists. — The  right  of  distress  at  common  law  cannot  arise 
until  there  has  been  an  actual  demise  at  a  fixed  rent,  payable 
either  in  money,  services,  or  a  share  of  the  crops.  Unless 
there  is  rent  due,  there  can  be  no  distress.  The  first  re- 
quisite to  support  the  proceeding  is  proof  of  a  demise  under 
which  rent  is  payable.-^     The  right  is  incident  to  the  reserva- 


I'i'Johnson  v.  Douglass,  2  Mack- 
ey  (D.  C.)  36;  Woodside  v. 
Adams,  40  N.  J.  L.  417;  Holliday 
V.  Bartholomae,  11  111.  App.  206; 
Johnson  v.  Douglass,  2  Mackey 
(D.  C.)  36;  Fisher  v.  Kollerts,  16 
B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  398,  408;  Williams 
V.  Wood,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  41,  42.  See 
ante,  §  557. 

isWoodside  v.  Adams,  40  N.  J. 
L.  417.  In  this  case  Mr.  Justice 
Depue  said:  "The  property  mort- 
gaged may  be  a  single  chattel  of 
considerable  value,  or  the  mach- 
inery in  a  factory,  or  the  stock  of 
goods  in  a  store,  which  may  be 
sold  in  entirety,  or  in  parcels, 
subject  to  the  lien  of  the  mort- 
gage, without  any  appreciable  in- 
jury to  the  right  of  the  mort- 
gage. To  permit  the  officer  to 
take  such  possession  only  as  will 
enable  him   to   make   a   legal   sale 


under  his  execution,  would  be 
consonant  with  public  policy,  and 
consistent  with  sound  legal  prin- 
ciples, provided  that,  in  doing  so, 
no  substantial  injury  be  done  to 
the    interests   of   the   mortgagee." 

lOSnyder  v.  Hitt,  2'  Dana  (Ky.) 
204;  Trescott  v.  Smyth,  1  Mc- 
Cord   Ch.    (S.   Car.)   486. 

20Prewett  v.  Dobbs,  13  Sm.  &  M. 
(Miss.)  431. 

2iCohen  v.  Broughton,  54  Ga. 
296;  Moulton  v.  Norton,  5  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  286;  Grier  v.  Cowan,  Ad- 
dison (Pa.)  347;  Wells  v.  Hornish, 
3  Pen.  &  W.  (Pa.)  30;  Helser  v. 
Pott,  3  Pa.  St.  179;  Johnson  v. 
Prussing,  4  111.  App.  575;  Jacks  v. 
Smith,  1  Bay  (S.  Car.)  315;  Mar- 
shall V.  Giles,  3  Brev.  (S.  Car.) 
488;  Reeves  v.  McKenzie,  1 
Bailey  (S.  Car.)  497;  Hale  v.  Bur- 
ton,  Dudley   (Ga.)    105. 


572 


LIENS. 


540 


tion  of  rent  where  the  reversiqnary  interest  remains  in  the 
lessor.--  The  rent  need  not  be  reserved  eo  nomine,  if  it  ap- 
pear that  it  is  really  payable.-^ 

The  rent  must  be  due  and  payable;-^  but  rent  payable  in 
advance  may  be  distrained  for  as  soon  as  it  is  payable  by  the 
terms  of  the  demise. ^^ 

§  572.  Rent  payable  must  be  fixed  and  certain. — For  the 
purpose  of  a  distress  the  rent  must  be  fixed  and  certain,  but 
it  is  sufficiently  fixed  and  certain  if  it  is  capable  of  being  re- 
duced to  a  certainty  by  computation.-^  If,  for  instance,  the 
rent  be  payable  in  cotton,  as  this  has  a  certain  commercial 
value  from  day  to  day  throughout  the  country,  the  exact 
money  value  of  the  rent  is  capable  of  exact  calculation.-^ 
If  the  rent  be  payable  in  grain  or  other  produce,  or  in  a  share 
of  the  crops,  or  in  merchandise,  and  the  price  of  these  be 
stipulated  in  the  contract,  or  can  be  determined  by  a  market 
price,  the  remedy  will  lie.-^     But  if  there  be  no  fixed  price 


-^Cornell  v.  Lamb,  2  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  652;  Schuyler  v.  Leggett,  2 
Cow.  (N.  Y.)  660;  Wells  v.  Hor- 
nish,  3  Pen.   &  W.    (Pa.)   30. 

23Price  V.  Limehouse,  4  McCord 
(S.  Car.)  544. 

24Anders  v.  Blount,  67  Ga.  41; 
Fry  V.  Breckinridge,  7  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  31;  Evans  v.  Herring,  27  N. 
J.  L.  243;  Burchard  v.  Rees,  1 
Whart.    (Pa.)    2,11. 

25Conway     v.     Starkweather,     1 
Denio     (N.     Y.)     113;     Russell     v 
Doty,  4  Cow.   (N.  Y.)   576;   Peters 
V.    Newkirk,   6   Cow.    (N.    Y.)    103 
Giles    V.    Comstock,    4    N.    Y.    270, 
272,    53    Am.    Dec.    374;    Bailey    v 
Wright,   3   McCord    (S.    Car.)  484 
O'Farrell  v.  Nance,  2  Hill  (S.  Car.) 
484;  Collins'  Appeal,  35  Pa.  St.  83 
Beyer  v.  Fenstermacher,  2  Whart 


(Pa.)  95;  Anderson's  Appeal,  3  Pa. 
St.  218. 

26Smith  V.  Colson,  10  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  91;  Valentine  v.  Jackson, 
9  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  302;  Smith  v. 
Fyler,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.)  648;  Dutch- 
er  V.  Culver,  24  Minn.  584; 
Brooks  V.  Cunningham,  49  Miss. 
108;  Tiflft  V.  Verden,  11  Sm.  &  M. 
(Miss.)  153;  Smith  v.  Sheriff,  1 
Bay  (S.  Car.)  443;  Fraser  v. 
Davie,  5  Rich.  L.  (S.  Car.)  59; 
Ege  v.  Ege,  5  Watts  (Pa.)  134; 
Detwiler  v.  Cox,  75  Pa.  St.  200. 

27  Brooks  v.  Cunningham,  49 
Miss.  108;  Fraser  v.  Davie,  5 
Rich.   L.    (S.   Car.)    599. 

28Briscoe  v.  McElween,  43 
Miss.  556;  Jones  v.  Gundrim,  3 
Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  531;  Fry  v. 
Jones,  2  Rawle  (Pa.)  11.     See  Mc- 


541  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  573 

for  the  rent,  or  this  be  payable  in  services  and  no  price  has 
been  agreed  upon  for  the  services,  there  can  be  no  distress 
for  the  rent.^^ 

A  share  of  the  profits  of  a  business  reserved  as  rent  may  be 
distrained  for,  if  the  amount  can  be  determined  from  the 
books  of  account. ^°  If  the  rent  be  payable  in  goods  upon 
the  order  or  demand  of  the  lessor,  a  prior  demand  is  neces- 
sary to  sustain  a  distress. ^^  Under  a  lease  for  a  fixed  rent  in 
money,  and  an  additional  rent  of  thirty  dollars  for  each  five 
hundred  dollars  of  improvements  made  on  premises  by  the 
lessor,  the  additional  rent  may  be  distrained  for,  for  the 
amount  of  the  rent  can  be  determined.^- 

Under  a  covenant  to  pay  rent  in  Indiana  scrip,  distress  was 
held  not  to  lie.     Presumably  the  value  was  too  uncertain. ^^ 

§  573,  Distress  only  after  rent  is  due. — At  common  law, 
the  landlord  could  distrain  his  tenant's  goods  for  rent  only 
after  the  rent  was  due  and  payable;^*  and  if,  in  the  mean 
w^hile,  and  before  the  rent  was  due,  a  judgment  creditor 
issued  an  execution  and  levied  upon  the  same  goods,  he  had 
priority  over  the  landlord.  By  the  statute  of  8  Anne^^  it  was 
provided,  that  whenever  execution  was  levied  upon  the  ten- 
ant's goods  on  the  premises,  the  judgment  creditor  should 
be  bound  to  pay  to  the  landlord  the  rent  due  at  the  time  of 
the  levy  to  the  extent  of  one  year's  rent,  and  the  sheriff 
might  include  this  in  the  levy  against  the  tenant.     Under  this 

Cray  v.   Samuel,  65   Ga.   739.     See  soMelick   v.    Benedict,   43    N.    J. 

however.      Bowser      v.      Scott,      8  L.  425. 

Blackf.  (Ind.)  86;  Clark  v.  Fraley,  siHelser  v.   Pott,  3  Pa.  St.  179. 

3  Blackf.  (Ind.)  264;  Poer  v.  Pee-  32Detwiler    v.    Cox,    75    Pa.    St. 

bles,   1    B.   Mon.    (Ky.)    1.  200. 

29Briscoe      v.       McElween,      43  33purcell    v.    Thomas,    7    Blackf. 

Miss.   556.     See  however,   Wilkins  (Ind.)    306. 

V.  Taliafero,  52  Ga.  208;  Dailey  v.  343  Bl.  Com.  6,  7;  Evans  v.  Her- 

Grimes,    27     Md.     440;     Wells     v.  ring,    27    N.    J.    L.    243;    Weiss    v. 

Hornish.    3    Pen.    &   W.    (Pa.)    30;  Jahn,  Z1  N.  J.   L.  93. 

Marshall      v.      Giles,     2     Treadw.  35Ch.  14. 
Const.    (S.    Car.)    (iZl. 


§  574  LIENS.  542 

statute  it  seems  to  be  settled  that  the  landlord  had  a  claim 
only  to  the  rent  which  had  actually  accrued  prior  to  the  levy 
of  an  execution  upon  the  tenant's  goods,  and  no  claim  for 
an  instalment  of  rent  then  accruing.^® 

But  generally,  under  the  statutes  in  this  country  modify- 
ing the  right  of  distress,  the  landlord  may  claim  the  accruing 
rent  up  to  the  time  of  the  levy  of  the  execution.  When  an 
execution  is  levied  upon  a  tenant's  goods  after  a  periodical 
instalment  of  rent  has  begun  to  accrue,  the  landlord  is  en- 
titled to  be  paid  not  only  the  rent  then  in  arrear,  but  the 
amount  for  the  periodical  instalment  then  accruing.  Thus, 
where  the  tenancy  is  from  month  to  month,  and  one  month 
has  commenced,  we  may  assume  that  the  landlord's  lien  for 
the  rent  of  that  month  commences  with  the  month.  It  com- 
mences before  the  rent  is  due,  and  has  priority  over  a  lien 
acquired  by  execution  issued  during  the  month.  The  land- 
lord is  entitled  to  the  whole  of  the  accruing  rent  for  that 
month. ^" 

§  574.  Extent  of  landlord's  lien. — But  the  landlord's  lien 
does  not  extend  beyond  the  accruing  rent  of  the  period  in 
which  the  execution  is  levied,  although  the  officer,  instead  of 
removing  the  goods,  keeps  them  upon  the  premises  for  a 
longer  period. ^^  The  landlord  may  have  his  remedy  against 
the  sheriff,  but  not  against  the  tenant's  goods. 

36Hoskins  v.  Knight,  1    M.   &  S.  -"58  Harris  v.  Dammann,  3  Mackey 

245,   247;    Trappan    v.     Morie,     18  (D.  C),  90,  94.     "If  we  should  go 

Johns.    (N.    Y.)    1 ;    Washington    v.  any  further,  and  hold  that  the  rent 

Williamson,  23  Md.  244;  Harris  v.  which  accrued  for  the  next  period 

Dammann,    3    Mackey    (D.    C.)    90,  afterwards    should    be   paid,    there 

per    Cox,    J.;    Denham    v.    Harris,  would  be  no  limit  in  time  in  cases 

13  Ala.  465;  Whidden  v.  Toulmin,  of    leases    running    for   a   term    of 

6  Ala.  104.  years.      We    should    have    to    hold 

37Joyce    V.    Wilkenning,    1    Mac-  that,  at  the  commencement  of  the 

Arthur     (D.     C.)     567;     Gibson    v.  term    the   landlord's    lien   attached 

Gautier,    1    Mackey     (D.     C.)     35;  for    the    rent    of    the   whole    term, 

Harris    v.     Dammann,    3     Mackey  giving   him    a    preference    for    the 

(D.   C.)   90.  whole  over  an   execution  creditor 


543  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  576 

§575.  The  statutory  lien  for  rent  does  not  depend  upon 
the  maturity  of  the  rent.  Even  before  the  rent  falls  due,  it 
takes  precedence  of  a  lien  by  attachment. ^^  The  lien  attaches 
at  the  commencement  of  the  tenancy  for  the  entire  term, 
although  it  is  not  enforcible  as  to  rent  which  has  not  accrued, 
so  long  as  the  property  is  dealt  with  in  the  usual  course  of 
business,  as  contemplated  by  the  lease. ^^  The  lien  may  be 
enforced  for  rent  not  due  whenever  this  is  necessary  to  pre- 
vent such  a  disposition  of  the  property  by  the  tenant  as  would 
make  the  security  worthless. ^^  Therefore,  Vv^here  a  building 
was  leased  as  a  store-room,  and  occupied  with  a  stock  of  mer- 
chandise, it  was  held  that  the  execution  of  an  absolute  sale 
or  of  a  mortgage  of  the  stock  by  the  tenant  rendered  the  lien 
enforcible  for  the  rent  of  the  entire  unexpired  term  of  the 
lease. ^^ 

§  576.  Expenses,  costs,  and  the  like. — Where  the  rent  is 
payable  in  a  share  of  the  crops  grown  on  the  demised  prem- 
ises, and  by  the  terms  of  the  lease  the  lessee  is  to  gather  and 
deliver  to  the  landlord  his  share,  and  he  fails  to  do  so,  and 
the  landlord  is  obliged  to  gather  it  himself,  he  has  a  lien  for 
the  value  of  such  labor  as  a  part  of  the  rent  which  the  tenant 
agreed  to  pay,  or  in  addition  thereto. ^^ 

The  lien  for  rent  includes  also  the  costs  of  the  action 
brought  to  enforce  the  lien  by  attachment. ^^ 

Under  a  covenant  to  pay  for  gas  used  upon  the  premises, 

who  levied  pending  tiie  term.  This  40  Martin    v.    Stearns,    52    Iowa 

would    effectually    cover    up    the  345,  3   N.   W.  92. 

tenant's    property   from    his    other  -ii  Martin  v.   Stearns,     52     Iowa 

creditors."      Per    Cox,    J.     To    the  345,  3  N.  W.  92. 

same    effect   see    Ballard    v.    John-  •*-  Gilbert  v.  Greenbaum,  56  Iowa 

son,   114  N.   Car.   141,  19  S.   E.  98;  211,  9  N.  W.  182. 

Fleming  v.  Davenport,  116  N.  Car.  ^3  Secrist     v.   Stivers,     35     Iowa 

153,  21  S.  E.  188;  Thostesen  v.  Dox-  580. 

see,  78  Nebr.  40,  110  N.  W.  567.  44  Conwell     v.     Kuykendall,     29 

39  Sevier   v.    Shaw,   25   Ark.   417;  Kans.    707. 
Martin  v.   Stearns,  52  Iowa  345,  3 
N.  W.  92. 


576a 


LIENS. 


544 


a  sum  due  for  gas  is  to  be  regarded  as  rent  in  arrear,  and  may- 
be distrained  for.^^ 

A  landlord  can  only  distrain  for  rent  in  arrear.  He  cannot 
distrain  for  interest,'*"  nor  for  a  claim  on  any  other  account, ^'^ 
nor  for  attorney's  fees,  though  embraced  in  a  note  given  for 
rent.-*^ 

§  576a.  Protection  of  bona  fide  purchaser. — Whether  a 
bona  fide  purchaser  for  value,  without  notice,  of  crops  grown 
on  rented  premises  is  protected  as  against  the  landlord,  is  a 
question  upon  which  the  authorities  are  not  in  accord.  The 
divergence  of  opinion  on  this  point  may  sometimes  be  ex- 
plained by  the  dissimilar  terms  of  the  statutes  by  which  the 
liens  are  created.  On  the  one  hand  it  is  held  that  the  lien 
of  the  landlord  does  not  follow  the  crops  into  the  hands  of  a 
bona  fide  purchaser  for  value  without  notice. ^^ 

Trover  or  trespass  by  the  landlord  against  one  who  has 
converted  the  crop  will  not  lie,  for  the  reason  that  the  land- 
lord is  not,  by  virtue  of  his  lien,  either  the  owner  or  entitled 
to  possession. ''^ 


45  Fernwood  Masonic  Hall 
Assn.  V.  Jones,  102  Pa.  St.  307. 

46  Lansing  v.  Rattoone,  6  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  43;  Vechte  v.  Brownell,  8 
Paige  (N.  Y.),  212. 

•*■!■  Sketoe   v.    Ellis,    14   111.   75. 

48  Jones  V.  Findley  84  Ga.  52,  10 
S.  E.  541. 

49  Finney  v.  Harding,  136  HI. 
573,  27  N.  E.  289,  12  L.  R.  A.  605, 
revg.  32  HI.  App.  98,  Craig,  J.,  dis- 
senting, citing  Nesbitt  v.  Bartlett, 
14  Iowa  485;  Westmoreland  v. 
Wooten,  51  Miss.  825;  Scaife  v. 
Stovall,  67  Ala.  237;  Fowler  v. 
Rapley,  15  Wall.  (U.  S.)  328,  21  L. 
ed.  35;  Beall  v.  White,  94  U.  S. 
382,  24  L.  ed.  173;  Frazer  v.  Jack- 
son, 46  Ga.  621 ;  Thornton  v.  Car- 
ver, 80  Ga.  397,  6  S.  E.  915;  Haifley 


V.  Haynes,  37  Mich.  535;  Smith  v. 
Shell  Lake  Lumber  Co.,  68  Wis. 
89,  31  N.  W.  694,— which,  with  more 
or  less  pertinency,  sustain  the 
view  that  the  lien  of  the  landlord 
does  not  follow  the  crops  into  the 
hands  of  a  bona  fide  purchaser 
without  notice.  Darby  v.  Jorndt, 
85  Mo.  App.  274;  Dawson  v.  Ellis, 
151  111.  App.  92.  But  see  Land  v. 
Roby,  56  Tex.  Civ.  App.  333,  120  S. 
W.  1057. 

T'OWatt  V.  Scofield,  76  111.  261; 
Frink  v.  Pratt,  130  111.  327,  22  N. 
E.  819;  Corbitt  v.  Reynolds,  68 
Ala.  378.  In  the  first  named  case 
the  court  said.  "It  is  true,  the 
plaintiff  had  a  lien  given  by  the 
statute,  but  it  is  a  mere  lien.  The 
landlord  had  not,  by  virtue  of  the 


545 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


§    576a 


One  having  a  lien  at  common  law,  being  necessarily  in 
possession,  could  maintain  trespass  against  a  wrongdoer,  or 
trover  against  one  who  should  convert  the  goods,  by  virtue 
of  his  special  property  therein.  The  possession  of  the  lienor 
is  notice  to  the  world  of  his  rights,  whatever  they  might  be. 
But  in  case  of  the  landlord's  statutory  lien,  "it  is  manifest, 
there  being  no  actual  possession  by  the  landlord,  and  no 
record  of  which  the  public  are  required  to  or  can  take  notice, 
the  lien,  although  not  a  secret  lien  within  the  meaning  of  that 
term  as  used  in  judicial  writings,  and  which  is  created  by 
contract  or  act  of  the  parties,  is  nevertheless  secret,  in  the 
sense  that  it  is  unknown  by  any  public  record,  or  by  the 
indicia  of  possession,  and  rests  in  the  breasts  of  the  landlord 
and  tenant. "^^ 

On  the  other  hand,  there  are  numerous  cases  which  hold 
that  the  lien  of  a  landlord  is  paramount  as  against  a  bona 
fide  purchaser  from  the  tenant  of  crops  grown  on  the  rented 
premises. ^^  There  are  also  cases  which  hold  that  one  who 
purchases  property  upon  the  leased  premises  takes  it  with 


lien  alone,  and  without  levy  of  a 
distress  warrant,  a  right  of  pos- 
session. He  could  not  take  pos- 
session of  the  tenant's  crops  at 
any  time  he  chose,  before  the  rent 
was  due,  nor  could  he,  after  it  was 
due,  by  virtue  of  the  lien  alone. 
The  statute  gives  no  such  author- 
ity. The  remedy  is,  therefore,  by 
action  on  the  case  for  a  fraudu- 
lent act,  intended  to  impair  the 
landlord's  security,  when  the  cir- 
cumstances warrant,  like  the  cases 
of  a  lien  by  mortgage  or  execu- 
tion." 

51  Finney  v.  Harding,  136  111. 
573,  583,  27  N.  E.  289;  Land  v. 
Roby,  56  Tex.,  Civ.  App.  333,  120 
S.  W.  1057. 

52  For      this     view,      the      cases 


mainly  relied  upon  are  Kennard  v. 
Harvey,  80  Ind.  Zl ;  Mathews  v. 
Burke,  32  Tex.  419;  Davis  v.  Wil- 
son, 86  Tenn.  519;  8  S.  W.  151; 
Richardson  v.  Peterson,  58  Iowa 
724,  13  N.  W.  63;  Holden  v.  Cox, 
60  Iowa  449,  15  N.  W.  269;  and 
perhaps  others, — the  holding  in 
which,  more  or  less  directly,  is 
that  the  lien  of  the  landlord  is 
paramount  as  against  a  bona  fide 
purchaser.  Lynch  v.  Smith,  154 
111.  App.  469.  See  also,  Maddox 
V.  Maddox,  146  Ala.  460,  41  So.  426; 
Land  v.  Roby,  56  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
2>ZZ,  120  S.  W.  1057;  White  v.  Mc- 
Allister Co.,  67  Mo.  App.  314;  Scul- 
ly v.  Porter,  57  Kans.  322,  46  Pac. 
313;  Frorer  v.  Hammer,  99  Iowa 
48,  68  N.  W.  564. 


35 


577 


LIENS. 


546 


constructive  notice  of  the  landlord's  rights  and  subject  to  his 
lien.^^ 

§  577.  Loss  of  lien  by  sale  of  property. — The  prevailing 
rule  is  that  the  landlord's  lien  upon  his  tenant's  goods  is  lost 
by  a  sale  to  a  purchaser  in  good  faith  for  a  valuable  con- 
sideration. If  the  property  was  not  upon  the  leased  premises 
at  the  time  of  the  purchase,  and  there  is  no  evidence  that  it 
had  been  fraudulently  removed,  there  is  strong  ground  to 
believe  that  the  purchaser  took  the  property  in  good  faith, 
and  therefore  free  of  the  landlord's  lien.^'*  A  purchaser  of  a 
crop  of  cotton,  who  buys  after  it  has  been  removed  by  the 
tenant  to  a  gin,  and  without  notice,  takes  it  discharged  of  the 
landlord's  lien.^"^  And  so  a  factor  who,  without  notice  of  any 
lien,  makes  advances  on  cotton  raised  upon  rented  land  and 
stored  with  him  by  the  tenant,  has  a  lien  on  the  cotton  in 


53  Smith  V.  Meyer,  25  Ark.  609; 
Lehman  v.  Stone,  4  Willson  Civ. 
Cas.  Ct.  App.  (Tex.)  8121,  16  S.  W. 
784;  Aderhold  v.  Bluthenthal,  95 
Ala.  66,  10  So.  230;  Weil  v.  Mc- 
Whorter,  94  Ala.  540,  10  So.  131 
Lomax  v.  Le  Grand,  60  Ala.  537 
Boggs  V.  Price,  64  Ala.  514 
Scaife  v.  Stovall,  67  Ala.  237. 
Where  chattels  at  the  time  they 
are  mortgaged  are  on  leased  lands, 
the  burden  is  on  the  holder  of  the 
mortgage  to  establish  the  priority 
of  his  mortgage  lien  over  that  of 
the  landlord.  Rogers  v.  Grigg 
Tex.  Civ.  App.,  29  S.  W.  654;  Land 
V.  Roby,  56  Tex.  Civ.  App.  333,  120 
S.  W.  1057;  Foxworth  v.  Brown, 
120  Ala.  59,  24  So.  1 ;  Kilpatrick  v. 
Harper,  119  Ala.  452,  24  So.  715.  See 
post,    §580. 

54Nesbit  V.  Bartlett,  14  Iowa 
485;  Grant  v.  Whitwell,  9  Iowa 
152.  See  also  Toney  v.  Goodley, 
57  Mo.  App.  235;  Gillespie  v.  Mc- 


Clesky,  160  Ala.  289,  49  So.  362; 
Laraway  v.  Tillotson,  81  Vt.  487,  70 
Atl.  1063.  But  if  one  buys  grain 
of  one  he  knows  to  be  a  tenant, 
knowing  that  the  grain  was  raised 
on  such  premises,  he  is  not  a  pur- 
chaser in  good  faith  under  the  rule 
in  Illinois.  Lynch  v.  Smith,  154  111. 
App.  469.  The  burden  to  prove 
that  the  lien  of  the  landlord  has 
been  waived  is  on  the  purchaser 
from  the  tenant.  Bivins  v.  West 
(Tex.   Civ.  App.),  46   S.  W.   112. 

ssPuckett  V.  Reed,  31  Ark.  131. 
But  if  he  has  notice  of  the  land- 
lord's lien,  he  buys  subject  there- 
to. Aikins  v.  Stadell,  9  Kans. 
App.  298,  61  Pac.  325.  But  see 
Frorer  v.  Hammer,  99  Iowa  48,  68 
N.  W.  564,  holding  that  the 
claims  of  a  bona  fide  purchaser 
are  subject  to  the  landlord's  lien. 
Lancaster  v.  Whiteside,  108  Ga. 
801,  33  S.  E.  995. 


547  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  578 

preference  to  the  landlord's  lien  for  rent.^^  In  like  manner  a 
landlord's  lien  does  not  prevail  against  any  bona  fide  pur- 
chaser from  the  tenant. ^'^  Whether  the  purchaser  buys  the 
goods  upon  the  leased  premises  and  himself  removes  them, 
or  whether  he  buys  them  of  the  tenant  after  they  have  been 
removed  by  the  latter,  is  chiefly  of  importance  with  reference 
to  the  question  whether  the  purchaser  bought  in  good  faith 
without  notice  of  the  lien,  for  a  lien  is  not  lost  by  a  sale  to  a 
purchaser  with  notice  of  the  lien.^^ 

§  578.     Loss  of  lien  by  sale  of  tenant  to  innocent  purchaser. 

— Clearly  the  landlord's  lien  on  a  crop  is  lost  by  a  sale  by  the 
tenant  to  a  purchaser  without  notice  after  its  removal  from 
the  leased  premises. ^^  The  lien  does  not  change  the  owner- 
ship of  the  crop,  nor  put  any  restraint  upon  the  incidents  of 
ownership,  except  as  against  persons  dealing  with  the  tenant 
with  notice  of  the  lien.  The  lien  of  course  prevails  against 
the  tenant  himself  so  long  as  he  has  possession,  and  against 
volunteers  and  purchasers  from  him  with  notice,  though 
upon  a  valuable  consideration.  The  statute  itself  may  be  a 
suflficient  notice  of  the  lien  so  long  as  the  tenant  remains  in 

56Clark  V.  Dobbins,  52  Ga.  656;  Ky.    141,   2   Ky.    L.   40;    Herron   v. 

Wilson    V.    Walker,    46    Ga.    319;  Gill,     112     111.     247;     Hadden     v. 

Frazer    v.    Jackson,    46    Ga.    621;  Knickerbocker,  70  111.  677,  22  Am. 

Rose  V.  Gray,  40  Ga.  156;  Beall  v.  Rep.   80;    Lamotte    v.    Wisner,    51 

Butler,    54    Ga.    43;    Thornton    v.  Md.  543;  Dawson  v.  Ellis,  151  111. 

Carver,  80  Ga.  397,  6  S.  E.  915 ;  May  App.    92;    Frorer    v.    Hammer,   99 

V.   McGaughey,  60  Ark.   357,  30  S.  Iowa  48,  68  N.  W.  564. 

W.  417.  ^sVolmer    v.    Wharton,   34   Ark. 

57Webb   V.    Sharp,    13   Wall.    (U.  691;    Scully    v.    Porter,    57    Kans. 

S.)   14,  20  L.    ed.    478;    Slocum   v.  il2,     46     Pac.    313;    Strickland    v. 

Clark,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.)  475;  Coles  v.  Thornton,  2  Ga.  App.  2>77,  58  S.  E. 

Marquand,   2   Hill     (N.     Y.)     447;  540. 

Frisbey  v.   Thayer,  25  Wend.   (N.  ^"Scaife  v.   Stovall,  67  Ala.  237; 

Y.)  396;  Martin  v.  Black,  9  Paige  Foxworth   v.    Brown,    120   Ala.   59, 

(N.  Y.)  641,  38  Am.  Dec.  574;  Hast-  24  So.   1;  Lancaster  v.  Whiteside, 

ings  V.   Belknap,  1   Denio   (N.  Y.)  100  Ga.  801,  2>2,  S.   E.  995;   Hunter 

190;     Davis     v.     Payne,     4     Rand.  v.  Mathews,  67  Ark.  362,  55  S.  W. 

(Va.)  ZiZ,  ZiZ;  Stone  v.   Bohm,  79  144. 


§  578a  LIENS.  548 

possession  upon  the  rented  land.  But  when  the  crop  is  re- 
moved from  the  rented  land  by  the  tenant,  he  then  has  a 
separate  possession  of  the  crop  only,  distinct  from  the  land, 
and  such  possession  must  furnish  security  to  all  who  deal 
with  him  in  good  faith  and  for  value;  otherwise  there  would 
be  no  safety  in  dealing  in  agricultural  products.  Statutes 
are  always  to  be  construed  in  accordance  with  the  common 
law,  and  are  not  regarded  as  infringing  upon  its  rules  and 
principles,  except  so  far  as  may  be  expressed,  or  fairly  im- 
plied to  give  them  full  operation.  When  a  charge  merely  is 
created  by  statute,  it  cannot  be  supposed,  unless  the  inten- 
tion is  clearly  expressed  or  may  be  justly  inferred,  that  the 
charge  is  to  have  a  superiority  which  the  common  law  does 
not  attach  to  such  a  charge.  The  common  law  protects  pur- 
chasers in  good  faith  from  secret  liens  of  which  they  have 
no  notice. ^^ 

§  578a.  Effect  of  removal  of  property  to  another  state. — 
If  goods  upon  which  there  is  a  statutory  lien  be  removed  to 
another  state  where  another  statutory  lien  attaches  to  them, 
the  latter  will  prevail;  for  a  statute  has  no  force  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  state  which  enacted  it,  and  if  another  state  per- 
mits the  statute  to  be  carried  into  effect  within  its  jurisdic- 
tion, it  does  so  upon  the  principle  of  comity.  Thus  the  lien 
upon  a  crop  of  cotton,  created  by  a  statute  of  Arkansas 
which  gives  a  lien  to  a  landlord  upon  a  crop  grown  on  de- 
mised premises  to  secure  accruing  rent,  is,  when  the  cotton 
comes  into  the  hands  of  a  broker  in  New  Orleans,  under  con- 
signment from  the  lessee,  and  without  knowledge  of  the  lien 
on  the  consignee's  part,  subordinated  to  the  consignee's  lien 
for  advances,  arising  under  the  laws  of  Louisiana.®^ 

soScaife  v.  Stovall,  (>1  Ala.  237,  May   v.    McGaughey,   60   Ark.   357, 

per   Brickell,   C.   J.  30   S.   W.   417;    Ball   v.   Sledge,   82 

61  Walworth  v.  Harris,  129  U.  S.  Miss.  749,  35  So.  447. 
355,  32  L.   ed.  712,  9  Sup.  Ct.  340; 


549  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  580 

§  579.     Consent  of  landlord  to  removal  of  property. — The 

mere  consent  of  a  landlord  to  a  removal  of  a  crop  from  the 
rented  premises  is  not  necessarily  a  waiver  of  his  lien  on  the 
crop.  Much  must  depend  upon  the  purpose  for  which  the 
consent  was  given.  If  the  landlord  consents  to  a  removal 
and  sale  of  the  crop,  a  sale  to  a  bona  fide  purchaser  would 
operate  as  a  destruction  of  the  lien.  But  if  he  should  consent 
to  a  removal  in  order  that  the  crop  might  be  better  prepared 
for  market,  or  more  safely  stored,  it  would  be  unjust  to  infer 
that  he  waived,  or  intended  to  waive,  the  lien.  All  the  at- 
tendant circumstances  should  be  considered,  and  from  these 
the  intention  of  the  landlord  should  be  inferred ;  and  from 
these  also  it  should  be  determined  whether  one  dealing  with 
the  tenant  in  good  faith,  and  finding  the  crop  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  tenant,  separated  from  the  possession  of  the 
rented  premises,  has  been  misled. ^^ 

§  580.  Notice  of  lien  to  purchaser  of  crop. — There  are, 
however,  some  decisions  that  go  to  the  extent  of  charging 
the  purchaser  of  a  crop  from  a  tenant,  with  notice  of  the 
statutory  lien,  in  the  same  way  that  a  purchaser  from  a 
mortgagor  is  chargeable  with  notice  of  a  duly  recorded  mort- 
gage of  the  property.  In  such  case  the  purchaser  can  ac- 
quire no  better  title  than  the  vendor  had,  and  the  removal  of 
the  crop  by  the  purchaser  amounts  to  a  conversion,  which 
renders  the  purchaser  liable  for  the  value  of  the  crop  con- 
verted, to  the  extent  of  the  rent  due  or  to  become  due  from 
the  tenant.®^ 

62Tuttle  V.  Walker,  69  Ala.  172;  conditionally  that  his  tenant  may 

Coleman    v.     Siler,     74    Ala.    435.  ship  and  sell  the  crop.     Foxworth 

Sanger  v.  Magee,  29  Tex.  Civ.  App.  v.    Brown,    120   Ala.   59,   24   So.    1 ; 

397,  69  S.  W.  234;  Keahey  v.  Bry-  Gilliam   v.    Smither    (Tex.),   33    S. 

ant    (Tex.    Civ.    App.),    134   S.    W.  W.  984;  White  v.   McAllister  Co., 

409;  Pape  v.  Steward,  69  Ark.  306,  67  Mo.  App.  314. 
63   S.  W.  47;   Hopper  v.   Hays,  82  63Kennard    v.    Harvey,    80    Ind. 

Mo.  App.  494.    The  landlord's  lien  2,1;   Watt  v.   Scofield,  Id  111.  261; 

is   waived   when   he    consents   un-  Volmer  v.   Wharton,  34  Ark.  691; 


§    58l  LIENS.  550 

The  purchaser  may  be  chargeable  with  such  notice  from 
a  knowledge  of  circumstances  from  which  he  should  infer 
the  existence  of  the  lien.  Thus,  if  one  purchasing  corn 
knows  that  the  seller  had  been  living,  during  the  year  in 
which  the  corn  was  raised,  upon  the  farm  of  another,  where 
the  corn  was  then  stored,  and  that  the  owner  of  the  land 
was  living  there  at  the  time  of  the  sale,  the  purchaser  is 
chargeable  with  notice  of  the  landlord's  lien.^*  The  pur- 
chaser's knowledge  of  the  fact  of  the  tenancy,  and  of  the  fact 
that  the  corn  was  raised  on  the  demised  premises,  has  been 
held  to  imply  notice  to  him  of  any  lien  the  landlord  may  have 
for  unpaid  rent  f^  but  the  better  opinion  seems  to  be  that 
mere  knowledge  by  the  purchaser  of  the  fact  that  rent  is  due 
and  owing  from  the  tenant  is  not  sufficient  to  invalidate  his 
purchase  as  against  the  landlord.^® 

§  581.  Loss  of  lien  by  sale  of  goods  in  usual  way. — A  lien 
upon  a  stock  of  goods  kept  as  merchandise  upon  the  leased 
premises  is  displaced  by  sales  in  the  usual  course  of  trade, 
if  the  goods  are  delivered  to  the  purchasers  and  they  remove 
them  from  the  leased  premises.  The  lien  in  such  case  is 
upon  the  chattels  in  bulk,  or  upon  the  stock  in  mass,  and  not 

Lamotte    v.    Wisner,    51    Mtl.    543;  65Watt    v.    Scofield,    76   111.    261; 

Lynch  v.  Smith,  154  111.  App.  469;  White   v.    McAllister   Co.,   67   Mo. 

Scully  V.   Porter,  57  Kans.  322,  46  App.  314;  Dawson  v.  Ellis,  151  111. 

Pac.  313;  Foxworth  v.  Brown,  120  App.  92;  Pape  v.  Steward,  69  Ark. 

Ala.    59,   21    So.    413;    McGrath    v.  306,   63   S.   W.   47;    Land   v.    Roby, 

Barlow   (Miss.),  21   So.  237;    Gra-  56   Tex.   Civ.   App.  333,   120  S.   W. 

ham   V.   Seignious,   53   S.    Car.    132,  1057;   Harvey  v.  Hampton,  108  111. 

31  S.   E.  51.  App.  501 ;  Graham  v.  Seignious,  53 

C4Hunter    v.    Whitfield,    89    111.  S.  Car.  132,  31  S.  E.  51;  Reinhardt 

229;  Prettyman  v.   Unland,  77  111.  v.  Blanchard,  78  111.  App.  26;  Mael- 

2(!)6;  Sloan  v.  Hudson,  119  Ala.  27,  zer  v.  Swan,  75  Kans.  496,  89  Pac. 

24   So.   458;    Maelzer   v.    Swan,    75  1037. 

Kans.    496,   89    Pac.    1037;    Ball    v.  66Herron    v.    Gill,    112    111.    247, 

Sledge,   82    Miss.    749,    35    So.   447,  251.    As  to  evidence  of  notice,  see 

100  Am.    St.  654;   Bush  v.    Willis,  Bledsoe   v.    Mitchell,   52  Ark.   158, 

130  Ala.  395,  30  So.  443;   Mangum  12  S.  W.  390. 
v.  Stadel,  76  Kans.  764,  92  Pac.  1093. 


551  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  581 

in  detail.*'^  Business  could  not  be  safely  carried  on  unless 
goods  sold  and  delivered  in  the  usual  course  of  business  be- 
came discharged  of  the  lien. 

In  the  case  of  goods  kept  for  sale,  it  would  seem  that  the 
lien  would  not  attach  to  goods  sold  in  good  faith  and  for  a 
valuable  consideration  before  proceedings  are  commenced 
to  enforce  the  lien.®^  In  case  the  leased  property  is  a  farm 
or  agricultural  land,  the  crops  and  stock  of  the  tenant,  his 
cows,  horses,  and  hogs,  are  not  kept  for  sale  to  the  same  ex- 
tent as  goods  in  a  store ;  and  yet  the  landlord  knows  that  they 
are  legitimate  and  very  common  subjects  of  traffic  and  trade; 
and  such  property,  equally  with  goods  kept  for  sale,  should 
not  be  affected  by  a  lien  established  after  a  sale  made  in  good 
faith  for  a  valuable  consideration.^'^  Whatever  the  goods 
may  be,  therefore,  the  general  rule  applies  that  third  persons 
purchasing  from  the  tenant  in  the  usual  course  of  business 
take  a  title  free  from  the  lien.  "If  the  cattle  and  hogs  in 
question  were  used  upon  the  premises  for  the  purpose  of 
being  fed  and  improved  in  the  usual  way  of  stockraising,  the 
lien  attached,  or,  if  kept  for  sale  only,  and  not  for  improve- 
ment, and  the  premises  were  leased,  in  whole  or  in  part,  for 
that  purpose,  then  the  lien  attached,  subject  to  the  right  of 
purchasers.  If  the  premises  were  leased  for  the  purpose  of 
keeping  cattle  and  hogs  for  sale,  and  the  cattle  and  hogs  in 
question  were  kept  for  that  purpose  only,  and  were  sold  in 
the  ordinary  course  of  business  before  any  action  to  enforce 
the  lien  was  brought,  the  lien  did  not  attach  as  against  the 
purchaser."'^^ 

6'Fowler    v.    Rapley,    15    Wall.  Burgin   v.    Marx,   158   Ala.   633,   48 

(U.   S.)   328,  336,  21   L.   ed.  35,  per  So.   348. 

Clifford,    J.;    Webb    v.    Sharp,    13  esGrant    v.     Whitwell,    9    Iowa 

Wall.  (U.  S.)  14,  15,  20  L.  ed.  478;  152. 

Holden  v.  Cox,  60  Iowa  449,  15  N.  esNesbitt    v.    Bartlett,    14    Iowa 

W.  269;  Knox  v.  Hunt,  18  Mo.  243;  485. 

Mathes  v.  Staed,  67  Mo.  App.  399;  '''OThompson     v.     Anderson,     86 

Iowa  703,  53  N.  W.  418. 


§    582  LIENS.  552 

§  582.     Sale  by  tenant  will  not  affect  landlord's  lien. — A 

sale  b}^  a  tenant  of  his  entire  stock  of  merchandise  upon 
which  a  landlord's  lien  has  attached,  does  not  displace  the 
lien,  in  case  the  sale  is  made  to  a  person  who  knows  that  the 
premises  are  leased,  and  who  continues  to  occupy  them,  and 
to  sell  the  goods  in  the  ordinary  way.''^^  Even  a  second  sale 
of  this  sort  does  not  displace  the  lien.  Purchasers  of  goods 
and  chattels  take  them  at  common  law,  subject  to  the  liens 
which  existed  against  the  vendor,  and  the  same  rule  applies 
f  in  case  of  a  sale  by  a  tenant  of  chattels  which  are  subject  to  a 
I  landlord's  statutory  lien,  where  the  sale  is  of  the  stock  in 
I  mass,  which  is  not  removed  from  the  premises,  or  with 
knowledge  of  the  lien,''^^  and  not  in  the  usual  course  of  trade. 
The  lien,  when  it  has  once  attached,  continues  to  attach  to 
the  chattels  into  whosesoever  hands  they  may  come  during 
the  time  allowed  for  instituting  proceedings  to  enforce  the 
lien,  unless  the  lien  is  displaced  by  the  removal  of  the  goods, 
or  by  a  sale  of  them  in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade. 

§  583.  Estoppel  of  landlord. — The  landlord  may  estop 
himself  by  his  declarations  and  conduct  from  claiming  his 
lien  as  against  a  purchaser  who  has  knowledge  of  his  lien. 
Thus,  a  tenant  sold  a  part  of  a  crop  of  corn  raised  upon  the 
leased  premises,  and  the  purchaser  before  he  paid  for  the 
corn  informed  the  landlord  of  his  purchase,  who  said  it  was 
all  right,  that  he  was  satisfied,  that  he  had  settled  with  the 
tenant,  and  that  nothing  was  due  except  a  part  of  the  crop 
which  remained,  and  which  he  was  to  gather  at  his  own  ex- 
pense. After  this  the  purchaser  sold  the  corn  to  a  second 
purchaser,  and  paid  the  tenant  for  the  corn.  It  was  held  that 

''■iMan   V.    Shiffner,   2    East    523;  "^Grant  v.  Whitwell,  9  Iowa  152; 

Godin  V.  London  Assurance  Co.,  1  Carpenter    v.    Gillespie,    10    Iowa 

Burrow  489;   Burton  v.    Smith,   13  592;   Doane  v.  Garretson,  24  Iowa 

Pet.  (U.  S.)  464,  483,  10  L.  ed.  24;  351;   Nesbitt  v.    Bartlett,   14  Iowa 

Fowler  v.  Rapley,  15  Wall.  (U.  S.)  485. 
328,  21  L.  ed.  35. 


553  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  585 

the   landlord   had   waived   his   lien   by   his   declarations   and 
conductJ^ 

Where  a  landlord  has  a  lien  for  advances  as  well  as  for  rent 
upon  his  tenant's  crop,  and  he  agrees  with  a  merchant  not  to 
make  any  advances  if  the  latter  will  furnish  his  tenant  with 
supplies,  and  the  merchant,  on  the  faith  of  such  agreement, 
makes  advances,  the  landlord's  lien  for  any  advances  subse- 
quently made  is  necessarily  postponed  to  the  merchant's  lien 
for  his  advances;  and  the  landlord  cannot  claim  to  appropri- 
ate any  part  of  the  proceeds  of  sale  of  the  tenant's  crop  to 
his  lien  for  such  advances,  until  the  merchant's  lien  is  fully 
paid.^* 

§  584.  Liability  of  purchaser  to  landlord. — On  the  other 
hand,  the  purchaser  may  by  his  declarations  or  acts  make 
himself  liable  to  the  landlord  for  the  rent.  Thus,  where  a 
factor  received  cotton  from  a  tenant  with  full  knowledge  of 
the  landlord's  special  lien  for  the  rent  of  the  premises,  and, 
as  the  landlord  was  about  to  seize  the  cotton  upon  a  distress 
warrant,  the  factor  informed  him  that  there  was  cotton 
enough  to  pay  his  advances  and  the  rent,  and  thereby  pre- 
vented the  landlord  from  asserting  his  lien  by  distress,  it  was 
held  that  an  implied  promise  to  pay  the  rent  arose  from  these 
facts,  and  that  the  landlord  could  recover  the  rent  from  the 
factor.'^^ 

§  585.  Lien  not  waived  by  taking  note. — A  landlord's 
lien  on  his  tenant's  property  for  rent  is  not  waived  by  his 

73Goeing    v.    Outhouse,    95    111.  rell    (Tex.    Civ.   App.),    131    S.    W. 

346.      To    like    effect,    Wright    v.  856;     Allen     v.     Houston     Ice     & 

Dickey  Co.,  83  Iowa  464,  50  N.  W.  Brew.   Co.,  44  Tex.   Civ.  App.   125, 

206;    Fishbaugh   v.   Spunangle,   118  97  S.  W.  1063;  Wood  v.  Duval,  100 

Iowa  ZZ7,  92  N.  W.  58;  Chancellor  Iowa  724,  69  N.  W.  1061. 

v.    Law,   148  Ala.   511,  41   So.   514;  74Coleman  v.  Siler,  74  Ala.  435; 

Church    V.    Bloom,    111    Iowa    319,  Seavey  v.    Godbold,   99   Miss.    113, 

82  N.  W.  794;  Planters'  Compress  54  So.  838. 

Co.  v.  Howard,  41  Tex.   Civ.  App.  '''SSaulsbury  v.  McKellar,  59  Ga. 

285,  92  S.  W.  44;   Melasky  v.  Jar-  301. 


§  585 


LIENS. 


554 


taking  his  tenant's  note  or  bond,  even  with  personal  security, 
though  a  vendor's  Hen  would  be  waived  by  his  taking  such 
note  and  security.'''^  The  distinction  is  that  the  right  or  lien 
of  a  landlord  is  a  legal  right,  not  a  mere  equitable  lien;  and 
before  the  court  can  say  that  the  landlord  has  waived  this 
legal  right,  there  must  be  some  plain  evidence  to  show  it.''^^ 
The  taking  of  a  note  of  course  suspends  the  remedy  by  dis- 
tress or  by  suit  to  foreclose  the  lien  until  the  note  becomes 
due.^^  But  after  this  he  may  proceed,  although  he  has  pre- 
viously negotiated  the  note,  provided  he  has  taken  it  up  be- 
fore commencing  proceedings/'' 

The  landlord's  lien  is  not  lost  by  his  assigning  the  tenant's 
promissory  note  for  the  rent,  and  afterwards  taking  it  up 


"6Rollins  V.  Proctor,  56  Iowa 
326,  9.  N.  W.  235;  Giles  v.  Ebs- 
worth,  10  Md.  333 ;  Snyder  v.  Kun- 
kleman.  3  Pen.  &  W.  (Pa.)  487; 
Coleman  v.  Siler,  74  Ala.  435; 
Lewis  V.  Lozee,  3  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
79;  Story  v.  Flournoy,  55  Ga.  56; 
Sullivan  v.  Ellison,  20  S.  Car.  481 ; 
Bailey  v.  Wright,  3  McCord  (S. 
Car.)  484;  Coleman  v.  Siler,  74  Ala. 
435;  Stephens  v.  Adams,  93  Ala. 
117,  9  So.  529;  Smith  v.  Wells' 
Admx.,  4  Bush.  (Ky.)  92;  Atkins 
V.  Byrnes,  71  111.  326;  Cunnea  v. 
Williams,  11  111.  App.  72;  Frank- 
lin V.  Meyer,  36  Ark.  96;  Gordon 
V.  Correy,  5  Binn.  (Pa.)  552; 
Paulding  v.  Ketty,  9  Mart.  (La.) 
(O.  S.)  186,  187.  Otherwise  where 
tenant's  note  for  a  share  of  the 
produce  reserved  as  rent  is  taken. 
Warren  v.  Forney,  13  Serg.  &  R. 
(Pa.)  52. 

""Denham  v.  Harris,  13  Ala. 
465;  Smith  v.  Wells'  Admx.,  4 
Bush   (Ky.)  92. 


"sPiske  V.  Judge,  2  Speers  (S. 
Car.)  436;  Fife  v.  Irving,  1  Rich. 
L.  (S.  Car.)  226;  Hornbrooks  v. 
Lucas.  24  W.  Va.  493,  49  Am.  Rep. 
277;  Worsham  v.  McLeod  (Miss.), 
11  So.  107.  In  the  English  case 
of  Davis  v.  Gyde,  2  Ad.  &  El.  623, 
it  is  held  the  taking  of  a  note  does 
not  suspend  the  right  of  distress, 
unless  there  be  a  special  agree- 
ment that  the  note  shall  have  this 
effect.  This  case  and  the  South 
Carolina  case  are  fully  and  ably 
discussed  by  Judge  Green  in  Horn- 
brooks  V.  Lucas,  24  W.  Va.  493, 
49  Am.  Rep.  277,  and  the  position 
taken  by  the  South  Carolina  case 
is  sustained.  This  position  seems 
to  be  clearly  right.  The  decision 
of  the  English  court  seems  to  be 
based  upon  the  peculiar  favor  in 
which  the  right  of  distress  is  held 
in  England.  But  in  this  country 
no  such  favor  is  extended  to  the 
right  of  distress. 

79Giles  v.  Ebsworth,  10  Md.  333. 


555  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  586 

upon  non-payment  by  the  maker.^*'  And  so,  if  he  has  trans- 
ferred the  note  under  an  agreement  that  he  would  collect 
the  rents  and  pay  them  to  the  transferee,  the  landlord,  still 
retaining  possession  of  the  note,  may  maintain  a  distress 
warrant  against  the  tenant  for  the  rent  represented  by  the 
note.^^ 

§  586.  Lien  not  waived  by  taking  mortgage. — A  land- 
lord's lien  upon  goods  for  rent  is  not  displaced  by  his  taking 
a  mortgage  upon  the  same  goods  for  the  rent.  The  mort- 
gage is  regarded  as  a  cumulative  security,  and  he  may  en- 
force either  security.^-  The  acceptance  of  an  obligation  of 
an  inferior  or  even  of  an  equal  degree  does  not  extinguish  a 
prior  obligation,  unless  such  is  the  express  agreement  of  the 
parties.  Rent  is  regarded  as  an  obligation  of  a  higher  degree 
than  any  simple  contract,  and  therefore  the  execution  of  a 
promissory  note  for  rent,  secured  also  by  a  chattel  mortgage, 
does  not  operate  as  a  waiver  of  the  right  to  enforce  payment 
by  distress, ^^  without  an  express  understanding  to  that  efifect, 
even  if  by  such  an  understanding  it  would  so  operate ;  for 
this  has  been  questioned. ^^ 

soFarwell   v.    Grier,  38   Iowa  83.  expressly  renounced,   or    there   be 

siBolton  V.   Duncan,  61   Ga.   103.  some    contract    between    the    par- 

82Franklin  v.  Meyer,  36  Ark.  96.  ties  inconsistent  with  it.     Per  Ea- 

The    rule    in    this    case    is    distin-  kin,    J.      The    foreclosure     of    the 

guished    from   that   which   applies  mortgage    waives     the    landlord's 

to    a    vendor's    lien    for    purchase-  lien.     Citizens'  Sav.  Bank  of  Olin 

money.     The  vendor's  lien   is   the  v.  Woods,  134  Iowa  232,  111  N.  W. 

mere  creation  of  courts  of  equity,  929.     See  also,   Ladner  v.   Balsley, 

independent    of    common    law^    or  103  Iowa  674,  72  N.  W.  787. 

statute.    Courts  of  equity  apply  to  ssDavis    v.    Gyde,    2   Ad.    &    El. 

this   lien  such   equitable   qualifica-  623;  Atkins  v.  Byrnes,  71  111.  326; 

tions  as  they  see  fit;  and  one  of  O'Hara  v.   Jones,  46  111.  288,  291; 

these    qualifications     is     that     this  Hornbrooks   v.    Lucas,   24  W.    Va. 

lien   can   not   coexist   with   an   ex-  493,    497,    49    Am.     Rep.    277,    per 

press  lien,  or  with  other  security,  Green,    J.;    Cornell    v.     Lamb,    20 

unless  there  be  shown  a  manifest  Johns.   (N.  Y.)  407. 

intention  to   retain   it.     The   land-  84Hornbrooks    v.    Lucas,    24    W. 

lord's    lien,    however,    is    a    legal  Va.  493,  497,  49  Am.   Rep.  211. 
right,  and  it  remains  unless  it  be 


§    587  LIENS.  556 

There  are  authorities  which  hold  that  the  lien  must  be  re- 
garded as  waived  whenever,  from  the  circumstances,  it  can 
be  inferred  that  the  lien  was  not  relied  upon.®^  But  this 
inference  cannot  be  drawn  from  the  taking  of  a  security 
which  is  not  enforcible  against  third  persons,  such,  for 
instance,  as  a  chattel  mortgage  which  is  not  recorded.^® 

If  a  landlord  receives  from  his  tenant  his  draft  upon  a  third 
person,  accepted  by  such  person,  and  thereupon  gives  his 
tenant  a  receipt  for  the  rent,  he  waives  his  lien  though  the 
draft  is  never  paid.^''^ 

§  587.  Not  waived  by  taking  obligation  of  third  person. — 
A  landlord's  lien  is  not  released  by  a  voluntary  obligation 
executed  by  a  third  person  upon  purchasing  the  tenant's 
goods  upon  the  demised  premises,  not  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  business,  whereby  the  obligor  binds  himself  to  pay  for  the 
tenant  the  rent  due  from  him  to  the  landlord  at  that  time, 
if  the  consideration  for  such  obligation  moves  from  the  ten- 
ant and  not  from  the  landlord. ^^  In  such  case  the  landlord, 
who  has  seized  the  goods  on  the  premises  for  the  rent,  can- 
not be  compelled  by  other  attaching  creditors,  who  attack 
the  purchase  of  the  goods  as  fraudulent,  to  resort  first  to  the 
voluntary  promise  of  the  purchaser  to  pay  the  rent,  before 
seeking  satisfaction  out  of  the  goods  themselves  under  his 
lien.^^ 

§  588.  Remedy  of  landlord  who  has  taken  security. — A 
landlord  who  has  taken  collateral  security  for  his  rent  may 

85In  a  Mississippi  case  it  was  Bond  v.  Carter  (Tex.),  T^  S.  W. 
held  that  a  landlord  who  had  tak-  45.  The  statutory  lien  of  the 
en  a  mortgage  on  his  tenant's  landlord  on  a  tenant's  crop  may- 
crops  to  be  raised  must,  as  against  be  waived  by  the  landlord's  agent, 
third  persons,  confine  himself  to  Wimp  v.  Early,  104  Mo.  App.  85, 
the  security  afforded  by  the  deed  78  S.  W.  343. 

of     trust,     and     can    not     recover  sepjtkin  v.  Fletcher,  47  Iowa  53. 

from  a  purchaser  in  good  faith  the  87Cambria     Iron     Co.'s    Appeal, 

value    of    crops   sold   to    him   and  114  Pa.  St.  58,  6  Atl.  563. 

raised    by    subtenants.      Gaines    v.  ^^Block  v.  Latham,  63  Tex.  414. 

Keeton,    68   Miss.   473,    10   So.    71;  soRlock  v.  Latham,  63  Tex.  414. 


557  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  589 

pursue  all  his  remedies  at  the  same  time.  He  may  sue  the 
tenant  personally,  may  seize  his  goods  by  distress  where  this 
remedy  is  given,  or  may  foreclose  his  statutory  lien  for  the 
rent  in  the  manner  provided,  and  he  may  at  the  same  time 
proceed  to  enforce  the  collateral  security.^" 

A  landlord  may  distrain  although  he  has  recovered  a  per- 
sonal judgment  for  the  rent,  and  special  bail  has  been  entered 
for  a  stay  of  execution. ^^ 

A  landlord  waives  his  lien  on  property  seized  under  a  dis- 
tress warrant  when  he  proceeds  to  take  a  personal  judgment 
without  foreclosing  his  lien  on  the  property.^- 

The  reservation  of  a  lien  by  the  terms  of  the  lease  is  not  a 
waiver  of  the  right  to  distrain,  although  the  lien  reserved  is 
more  extensive  than  that  given  by  statute. ^^ 

A  stipulation  in  a  lease  that  the  landlord  may  re-enter  if 
the  rent  remain  unpaid  for  a  certain  period  after  it  becomes 
due,  does  not  take  away  or  suspend  his  immediate  right  of 
distress.^* 

§  589.  Tender  of  rent  due  must  be  kept  good. — A  tender  of 
the  rent  due  does  not  release  or  discharge  a  landlord's  lien, 
unless  the  tender  be  kept  good  by  payment  of  the  money 
into  court. ^^  And  so  a  distress  for  rent  after  a  tender  of  the 
rent  and  charges  due  is  unlawful,  unless  the  tenant  fails  to 
make  the  tender  good  on  demand. ^^ 

A  tender  made  after  costs  have  been  properly  incurred  is 
not  effectual  unless  such  costs  are  included  in  the  tender.^'' 

soCunnea    v.    Williams,    11    111.  95Bloom    v.     McGehee,   38   Ark. 

App.    72;    King    v.    Blackmore,    72  329;   Hamlett   v.   Tallman,  30  Ark. 

Pa.  St.  347,  13  Am.  Rep.  684.  505. 

9iShetsline    v.    Keemle,    1    Ash-  96  Smith    v.     Goodwin,    4    B.    & 

mead   (Pa.)  29.  Ad.  413;  Davis  v.  Henry,  63  Miss. 

92Wise    V.     Old,    57    Tex.    514;  110. 

Bond  V.  Carter  (Tex.),  IZ  S.  W.  45.  97Hunder   v.   Le    Conte,   6   Cow. 

930'Hara  v.  Jones,  46  111.  288.  (N.  Y.)  728. 

94Smith   V.    Meanor,    16   Serg.    & 
R.    (Pa.)    375. 


§    590  LIENS.  558 

§  590.  Lien  lost  by  levy  of  an  execution. — As  against  a 
distress  warrant  at  common  law,  a  landlord's  lien  is  destroyed 
by  the  levy  of  an  execution  upon  the  tenant's  goods,  for  an 
execution  takes  precedence  of  all  debts  except  specific  liens. ^^ 
But  to  place  the  tenant's  goods  in  custodia  legis  by  an  execu- 
tion and  levy,  the  sheriff  must  not  only  take,  but  must  keep, 
the  actual  possession  of  the  goods.  The  landlord's  right  to 
distrain  is  not  suspended  unless  the  sheriff  takes  possession 
of  the  goods,  and  his  right  revives  if  the  officer  withdraws 
from  the  premises  without  leaving  a  bailiff  in  charge. °^ 

Goods  which  have  previously  been  levied  upon  by  foreign 
attachment  are  in  the  custody  of  the  law  and  cannot  be 
distrained.^     And  so  are  goods  taken  on  replevin. - 

If  the  landlord  consents  to  a  sale  of  his  tenant's  goods 
taken  in  execution,  upon  the  promise  of  the  officer  made  be- 
fore the  sale  that  he  would  pay  the  rent  claimed,  he  waives 
his  right  to  sue  the  sheriff  under  the  statute.^  To  render 
such  waiver  eft'ectual,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  jury  should 
believe  that  the  landlord  actually  waived  his  right  under  the 
statute  and  relied  upon  the  promise  of  the  sheriff',  and  it  is 
error  to  submit  such  an  incjuiry  to  them.* 

J>SHarris  v.  Dammann,  3  Mackey  made   in   the   same   manner  as   the 

(D.    C.)    90;    Gibson   v.    Gautier,    1  levy  of  a  second  execution. 

Mackey     (D.     C.)     35;     Pierce     v.  iPierce  v.   Scott,  4  Watts   &   S. 

Scott,    4    Watts    &    S.    (Pa.)    344;  (Pa.)  344. 

Kelly    V.     Davenport,     1     Browne  ^Commonwealth  v.  Leiar,  8  Leg. 

(Pa.)    231;    Dawson   v.    Dewan,    12  Int.   50,   1    Phila.     (Pa.)     173.     But 

Rich.    L.    (S.    Car.)    499;    Potter   v.  goods      replevied     may     be      dis- 

Greenleaf,  21  R.  I.  483,  44  Atl.  118.  trained  for  subsequent  arrears  of 

ooBeekman  v.  Lansing,  3  Wend.  rent.,-    Woglam  v.   Cowperthwaite, 

(N.  Y.)  446,  20  Am.  Dec.  707;  New-  2   Dall.    (U.    S.)    68,    1    L.    ed.   292; 

ell   V.   Clark,  46   N.   J.   L.   363.     In  Gray  v.  Wilson,  4  Watts  (Pa.)  39, 

New    Jersey,    however,    a    levy    is  42. 

valid    without    an    actual    seizure  -Rothery  v.  Wood,  3  Camp.  24; 

and  continued  possession.     A  dis-  Cloud  v.  Needles,  6  Md.  501. 

tress  for  rent  of  property  already  -^Cloud  v.   Needles,  6  Md.  501. 
seized     upon     execution     may     be 


559  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  592 

§  591.    Lien  not  lost  by  appointment  of  receiver. — The 

landlord's  lien  is  not  lost  by  the  appointment  of  a  receiver  but 
property  rightfully  in  the  hands  of  a  receiver  is  in  the  custody 
of  the  court,  and  cannot  be  distrained  upon  without  permis- 
sion of  the  court  by  which  the  receiver  was  appointed.^  In 
such  case  the  landlord  should  apply  for  an  order  on  the  re- 
ceiver to  pay  the  rent,  or  for  leave  to  proceed  by  distress  or 
otherwise.^ 

A  receiver  of  the  tenant's  goods  does  not  ordinarily  be- 
come liable  for  the  rent  of  the  leased  premises  by  entering 
upon  them  in  order  to  take  possession  of  the  goods  and  to 
dispose  of  them  under  the  order  of  court.  Therefore,  for 
rent  becoming  due  after  a  sale  by  the  receiver  and  the  re- 
moval of  the  goods  by  the  purchaser,  the  landlord  has  no  lien 
upon  the  proceeds  of  the  sale,  notwithstanding  a  statutory 
provision  allowing  the  landlord  to  follow  and  distrain  goods 
for  rent  due  after  their  removal  from  the  premises,  in  case 
they  have  not  been  sold  to  a  bona  fide  purchaser  without 
notice.^ 

A  landlord's  statutory  lien  is  not  defeated  by  the  conver- 
sion of  the  tenant's  property  into  money  by  a  receiver,  under 
an  order  of  court,  but  will  attach  to  the  proceeds  in  the  re- 
ceiver's hands.  The  money  in  such  case  takes  the  place  of 
the  property,  and  is  distributed  to  the  persons  who  establish 
their  claims  to  it.^ 

§  592.  Lien  lost  by  accepting  surrender  of  the  leasehold 
estate. — Of  course  a  landlord's  lien  for  rent  is  lost  by  his  ac- 
ceptance of  a  surrender  of  the  leasehold  estate  by  the  lessee. 

^Noe  V.  Gibson,  7  Paige  (N.  Y.)  eEverett  v.   Neff,  28  Md.  176. 

513;  Riggs  v.  Whitney,  15  Abb.  Pr.  "Gaither  v.   Stockbridge,  67  Md. 

(N.    Y.)    388;    Martin   v.    Black,   3  222,  9  Atl.  632,  10  Atl.  309. 

Edw.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  580,  affd.  9  Paige  sGilbert  v.  Greenbaum,  56  Iowa 

(N.    Y.)    641,    38    Am.     Dec.     574;  211,  9  N.  W.  182. 
Gaither    v.     Stockbridge,    67    Md. 
222,  9  Atl.  632,  10  Atl.  309. 


§  593  LIENS.  560 

But  such  a  surrender  can  be  effected  only  by  express  words, 
by  which  the  lessee  manifests  his  intention  of  yielding  up  his 
interest  in  the  premises,  or  by  operation  of  law,  where  the 
parties,  without  express  surrender,  do  some  act  which  im- 
plies that  they  have  both  agreed  to  consider  the  surrender 
as  made.^  But  when  acts  are  relied  upon  as  evincing  such 
agreement,  they  should  be  such  as  are  not  easily  referable 
to  a  different  motive.  Even  the  delivery  by  the  tenant  to  the 
landlord  of  the  keys  of  a  leased  building,  and  the  leasing  of 
the  same  by  the  latter  to  another  tenant,  is  not  conclusive 
evidence  that  a  surrender  has  been  accepted. ^° 

But  a  surrender  and  acceptance  of  a  part  of  the  demised 
premises  does  not  destroy  the  landlord's  right  of  distress  as 
to  the  residue. ^^ 

As  between  the  landlord  and  tenant,  the  execution  of  a 
new  lease  during  the  term  of  an  existing  lease  is  a  surrender 
of  the  old  lease.  But  as  against  the  holder  of  a  chattel  mort- 
gage of  the  tenant's  goods,  executed  after  the  making  of  the 
first  lease,  but  before  the  making  of  the  second  lease,  the 
lien  of  the  landlord  upon  such  goods  for  rent  accruing  under 
the  second  lease,  for  the  period  covered  by  the  first  lease, 
is  not  postponed  to  that  of  the  chattel  mortgage,  if  the  land- 
lord had  no  knowledge  of  it  at  the  time  of  making  the  second 
lease. ^^ 

§  593.  No  distraint  for  rent  after  term  expires. — A  land- 
lord cannot  distrain  for  rent  after  the  term  has  expired,  and 
the  tenant  has  surrendered  the  possession. ^^  A  statutory 
right  to  distrain  goods  removed  from  the  premises  within 

9Beall  V.  White,  94  U.  S.  382,  389,  uPeters  v.  Newkirk,  6  Cow.  (N. 

24  L.  ed.  173.  per  Clifford,  J.;  Ca-  Y.)   103. 

hill    V.    Lee,   55    Md.    319;    Bain    v.  i^Rollins    v.    Proctor,    56    Iowa 

Clark,  10  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  424;  Wol-  326,  9  N.  W.  235. 

cott  V.  Ashenfelter,  5  N.  Mex.  442,  isTerboss    v.    Williams,    5    Cow. 

23   Pac.   780,   8   L.   R.   A.   691.  (N.  Y.)  407,  affd.  2  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

lOMartin  v.  Stearns,  52  Iowa  345,  148;    Greider's    Appeal,    5    Pa.    St. 

3  N.  W.  92.  422. 


56 1  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  596 

thirty  days,  or  other  certain  period,  exists  only  during  the 
continuance  of  the  lease  and  the  tenant's  possession  of  the 
premises,  unless  otherwise  specially  provided. ^^ 

A  landlord  cannot  distrain  after  the  determination  of  his 
own  estate  by  surrender  to  the  owner  of  the  paramount 
estate,  though  rent  be  in  arrear  and  due  from  his  former 
tenant,  and  the  goods  of  the  latter  remain  on  the  premises. ^^ 

§  594.  A  landlord's  lien  not  impaired  by  his  tenant's  sub- 
letting the  premises.  The  sub-lessee's  property  may  be 
thereby  subjected  to  a  double  lien, — that  of  the  landlord  and 
that  of  his  immediate  lessor;  but  the  lien  of  the  landlord  is 
paramount.  The  lessee  can  pass  no  better  estate  and  no 
better  right  to  the  use  of  the  land  than  he  himself  possessed. ^*^ 

A  lessee  who  has  parted  with  his  whole  term  cannot  dis- 
train on  his  sub-lessee. ^^ 

§  595.     Loss  of  lien  by  destruction  of  the  property. — A 

landlord's  Hen  or  privilege  upon  the  goods  of  his  tenant  is 
lost  by  their  destruction  by  fire,  and  does  not  attach  to  the 
insurance. ^^ 

§  596.  Notice  unnecessary  at  common  law. — In  a  pro- 
ceeding by  distress  for  rent,  notice  to  the  tenant  was  un- 
necessary at  common  law.  In  a  case  in  the  Exchequer 
Chamber,^^  Parke,  Baron,  delivering  the  judgment  of  the 
court,  said:  "We  think  that  the  common  law  casts  no  such 
obligation  on  the  distrainor.   It  has  been  expressly  laid  down 

i4Burr  V.    Van   Buskirk,  3   Cow.  Car.      276;      Trout      v.      McQueen 

(N.  Y.)  263;  Terboss  v.  Williams,  (Tex.),  62  S.  W.  928. 

5  Cow.   (N.  Y.)  407,  affd.  2  Wend.  i^Ragsdale   v.    Estis,  8   Rich.   L. 

(N.  Y.)  148.  (S.  Car.)  429. 

i^Walbridge   v.    Pruden,    102  Pa.  i^In   re    Reis,   3   Woods    (U.    S.) 

St.  1.  18,   Fed.    Cas.    No.    11684. 

i^Montague  v.   Mial,  89  N.   Car.  i^Tancred  v.   Leyland,   16  Q.    B. 

137;     Ledbetter     v.     Quick,    90    N.  669;   Trent   v.    Hunt,   9   Exch.    14; 


Keller  v.  Weber,  27  Md.  660,  666. 


36 


§  597  LIENS.  562 

that,  if  the  lord  distrain  for  rent  or  services,  he  has  no  oc- 
casion to  give  notice  to  the  tenant  for  what  thing  he  dis- 
trains; for  the  tenant,  by  intendment,  know^s  what  things  are 
in  arrears  for  his  lands  ;^^  *  *  *  ^l^^  ^j^g  authority  for  this 
is  Yearb.  Pasch.  45  E.  3,  fol.  9  A.  pi.  13;2i  where  Lord 
Chief  Justice  Fyncheden,  in  answer  to  the  argument  that  the 
lord,  on  the  taking  of  a  distress,  ought  to  give  notice  to  the 
tenant  of  the  cause  of  the  taking,  says  it  is  not  so,  for  the 
tenant  is  always  held,  by  common  intendment,  to  know  what 
things  are  in  arrear  from  his  land,  as  rent  and  service,  etc." 

§  597.     Rule  in  United  States  as  to  notice  to  tenant. — 

Under  statutes  which  substantially  adopt  the  common  law 
remedy  of  distress,  no  notice  to  the  tenant  is  necessary,  or 
demand  upon  him,^^  before  seizure.  The  statute  in  such 
case  becomes  a  part  of  the  contract  of  leasing,  and  regulates 
and  limits  the  rights  of  the  parties.  Virtually,  the  landlord, 
in  pursuing  this  remedy,  takes  possession  of  the  property  in 
pursuance  of  the  contract  of  leasing,  which  usually  embraces 
a  consent  that  the  possession  may  be  so  taken  in  default  of 
payment.  The  service  of  the  warrant  is  a  sufficient  notice. 
The  warrant  is  a  process  of  law  with  reference  to  this  con- 
tract. It  is  substantially  a  proceeding  in  rem,  under  which  a 
seizure  of  the  property  in  the  possession  of  the  owner,  for 
the  enforcement  of  a  lien  upon  it,  is  held  to  be  a  sufficient 
notice  to  the  owner,  if  no  other  notice  is  required  by  the 
statute. ^^ 

This  remedy,  by  which  the  property  liable  to  seizure  is 
levied  upon  without  personal  notice  to  the  tenant,  is  not  in 
conflict  with  the  constitutional  provisions  which  secure  the 

201   Roll.   Abr.  664   (a),   tit.   Dis-  666;    Bufifington    v.    Hilley,   55    Ga. 

tress  (8),  pi.  1.  655. 

21F0I.  9,  A.  pi.  13.  23Blanchard    v.    Raines,    20    Fla. 

22Blanchard    v.    Raines,    20    Fla.  467. 
467;  Keller  v.  Weber,  27  Md.  660, 


563  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  598 

right  of  trial  by  jury,  and  declare  that  no  person  shall  be  de- 
prived of  property  without  due  process  of  law.-"*  Especially 
is  this  the  case  under  statutes  which  provide  that  the  tenant 
may  replevy  the  property  taken  on  distress  within  a  limited 
time,  and  that  the  tenant  thereupon  may  have  the  matters  in 
dispute  tried  by  a  jury.-^ 

§  598.  Who  may  distrain. — At  common  law,  only  the 
lessor  could  distrain  for  rent.-^  By  statute  this  remedy  may 
of  course  be  given  to  the  landlord's  personal  representative 
for  rent  becoming  due  before  his  death,  or  to  his  grantee  or 
assignee.  Rent  accruing  after  the  death  of  the  landlord  be- 
longs to  the  heirs-"  or  devisees.-^  Under  statutes  conferring 
a  lien  for  rent,  this  may  be  enforced  by  the  landlord  himself, 
or  by  any  one  standing  legally  in  his  place,  as  by  his  grantor, 
assignee,  heir,  or  personal  representative.  In  either  case  the 
relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  must  exist  either  by  direct 
contract,  or  indirectly  by  operation  of  law.^° 

The  right  of  distress  is  inseparable  from  the  reversion.^" 
Therefore  a  tenant  who  has  sublet  a  portion  of  the  demised 
premises,  for  the  entire  period  of  the  term,  cannot  distrain 
for  rent;^^  otherwise  if  he  has  sublet  for  a  part  only  of  his 
term.^-  Tenants  in  common  may  distrain  severally ,^^  each  for 
his  own  share  of  the  rent;  or  one  may  distrain  in  the  name  of 
all  if  not  forbidden  by  the  others  to  do  so.^^    One  tenant  in 

24Blanchard    v.    Raines,    20    Fla.  ley,  16  Johns  (N.  Y.)  289;  Wright 

467.  V.   Link,  34  Miss.  266. 

25Blanchard    v.    Raines,    20    Fla.  30Cornell   v.    Lamb,  2   Cow.    (N. 

467.  Y.)    652;    Schuyler    v.     Leggett,    2 

2GCo.    Lit.     162    a;     Bagwell    v.  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  660. 

Jamison,  Cheeves  (S.  Car.)  249;  i2  siprescott     v.     De     Forest,     16 

Henry   VIII.,   ch.   Z7.  Johns.   (N.  Y.)  159. 

27Sherman  v.  Dutch,  16  111.  283;  32Ege    v.    Ege,    5    Watts.     (Pa.) 

Wright   V.    Williams,   5    Cow.    (N.  134. 

Y.)  501.  33De      Coursey     v.      Guarantee 

28Lewis'  Appeal,  66  Pa.   St.  312.  Trust  &  Safe  Deposit  Co.,  81  Pa. 

29McGillick    V.     McAllister,     10  St.  217. 

111.   App.  40;   McKircher   v.   Haw-  34Dutcher   v.   Culver,    24    Minn. 


§  599  LIENS.  564 

common  who  has  leased  his  interest  to  his  cotenant  may  dis- 
train for  rent.^^ 

If  the  lessors  be  joint  tenants,  all  must  join  in  the  distress, 
unless  one  distrains  in  the  name  of  all.^^  But  one  of  two 
executors  may  distrain  when  the  contract  of  rent  was  made 
with  him  alone. ^^ 

§  599.  Rights  of  purchaser  at  foreclosure  sale. — Whether 
a  purchaser  at  a  foreclosure  sale  can  distrain  for  the  rent  of 
the  premises  depends  upon  his  relation  to  the  tenant.  Where 
the  property  was  already  subject  to  a  lease  for  a  term  of 
years  at  the  time  of  making  the  mortgage,  the  mortgagee 
may  be  considered  as  the  assignee  of  the  reversion,  and  en- 
titled, after  condition  broken,  to  all  the  remedies  for  the  col- 
lection of  accruing  rent.  But  if  a  lease  be  made  of  premises 
already  subject  to  a  mortgage,  upon  the  foreclosure  of  the 
mortgage  the  leasehold  estate  is  extinguished  with  the  equity 
of  redemption.  A  purchaser  at  a  foreclosure  sale  of  such  a 
mortgage  cannot  distrain  for  accruing  rent  unless  the  tenant 
attorns  to  him ;  and  a  mere  notice  by  the  purchaser  to  the 
tenant,  to  pay  the  rent  to  him,  when  the  tenant  does  not  con- 
sent, does  not  make  the  tenant  liable  to  him  for  the  rent. 
The  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  does  not  exist  in  such 
case.^^ 

§  600.  Against  whom  distraint  may  be  had. — At  common 
law  the  remedy  by  distress  for  rent  was  confined  to  the  lessor 
and  his  representatives,  against  the  tenant  for  life,  or  in  tail, 
and  his  representatives,  but  did  not  exist  against  the  personal 
representatives  of  tenants  for  years.     Goods  in  their  hands 

584;    Waring   v.    SlingluflF,   63    Md.  -"Carter  v.  Walters,  63  Ga.   164. 

53;  Jones  v.  Gundrim,  3  Watts  &  ssReed   v.    Bartlett,   9    111.    App. 

S.  (Pa.)  531.  267.     And  see  McKircher  v.  Haw- 

35Luther   v.   Arnold,   8   Rich.    L.  ley,  16  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  289.    See  also, 

(S.  Car.)  24,  62  Am.  Dec.  422.  Drakford  v.  Turk,  75  Ala.  339. 

^GWaring  v.  Slingluff,  63  Md.  53. 


565  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  602 

are  in  custodia  legis.^^  By  statute  and  adjudication,  in  sev- 
eral states,  the  proceeding  by  distress  upon  the  death  of  any 
tenant  survives,  and  may  be  prosecuted  against  his  personal 
representative.^^ 

A  landlord,  by  accepting  administration  of  his  tenant's 
estate,  waives  his  right  to  distrain. ^^ 

Upon  the  death  of  tenant  the  landlord  may  distrain,  before 
administration  is  granted,  for  rent  due  and  in  arrear,  for  no 
notice  is  necessary  before  distress. ^^ 

§  601.  Injunction  by  landlord. — The  landlord  may  have 
an  injunction  against  the  tenant  or  his  assignee  to  restrain 
the  sale  or  removal  of  the  property  subject  to  the  lien  from 
the  demised  premises,  in  the  absence  of  a  special  statutory 
provision  for  the  purpose. ^^  But  if  the  landlord  can  enforce 
his  lien  by  attachment,  as  provided  by  statute,  an  injunction 
w^ill  not  be  issued.** 

§  602.  Alabama.*^ — Landlords  of  storehouses,  dwelling- 
houses,  and  other  buildings  have  a  lien  for  rent  upon  the 
goods,  furniture,  and  efifects  of  tenants  and  subtenants,  and 
this  lien  is  superior  to  all  other  liens  on  such  property  except 
that  for  taxes. *^     This  lien  may  be  enforced  by  attachment 

39So,    also,    by    Stat.    32    Henry  Admr.    v.    Sebre,    2   A.    K.    Marsh. 

VIII.,   ch.   2>7;   Smith   v.    Bobb,    12  (Ky.)   227. 

Sm.    &    M.    Miss.)    322;    Salvo    v.  -isGarner    v.     Cutting,    32     Iowa 

Schmidt,  2  Speers  (S.  Car.)   512.  547;    Gray    v.    Bremer,    122    Iowa 

40McLaughlin  v.  Riggs,  1  Cranch  110,  97  N.  W.  991;  Miller  v.  Bider, 

(U.  S.)  410,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8872.  Illi-  (Iowa),  105  N.  W.  594;  Shannon  v. 

nois :     Rauh  v.  Ritchie,  1  111.  App.  Cavenaugh,    12    Cal.    App.   434,    107 

188.     Mississippi:    Smith   v.    Bobb,  Pac.  574. 

12    Sm.    &    M.     (Miss.)    322    New  •*4Rotzler    v.    Rotzler,    46    Iowa 

York:   Morrill  v.  Jenkins.  2  N.  Y.  189. 

Leg.  Obs.  214.    Indiana:  Alerkle  v.  45Civ.    Code    1907,    §§   4747,   4748, 

O'Neal,  5  Blackf.   (Ind.)  289.  4752.     The  common-law  remedy  of 

4iHovey    v.  Smith,  1    Barb.   (N.  distress     was     abolished     in     1812. 

Y.)  372.  Frazier  v.  Thomas,  6  Ala.  169.  This 

42Keller   v.   Weber,  27   Md.  660;  lien  prevails  as  against  a  claim  of 

Longwell     v.      Ridinger,      1      Gill.  exemption.      Ex  parte    Barnes,    84 

(Md.)   57.     See,  however,   Hughes'  Ala.  540,  4  So.  769. 

46A11    property    kept    upon    the 


6o3 


LIENS. 


566 


when  the  rent  or  any  instalment  thereof  is  due,  and  the  ten- 
ant fails  or  refuses,  on  demand,  to  pay  such  rent  or  instal- 
ment, and  also  when  the  tenant  has  fraudulently  disposed  of 
the  goods,  or  is  about  to  do  so,  or  has  made  an  assignment 
for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors,  or  has  made  a  transfer  of  all, 
or  substantially  all,  of  his  goods  without  the  consent  of  his 
landlord.^''' 

This  lien  may  be  enforced  by  the  assignee  of  the  landlord's 
claim  for  rent. 

§603.     Alabama^^    (continued).     Landlords'    liens    upon 
crops. — A  landlord  has  a  lien"^^  on  the  crop  grown  on  rented 


premises,  and  used  in  connection 
with  such  tenancy,  is  subject  to 
the  lien,  whether  in  or  outside  of 
the  building.  Stephens  v.  Adams, 
93  Ala.  117,  9  So.  529.  A  landlord's 
lien  does  not  extend  to  a  mule 
and  dray  used  by  the  tenant  in 
connection  with  his  mercantile 
business.  Accounts  for  goods 
sold  by  a  tenant  on  credit  in  the 
"usual  course  of  trade"  are  not 
subject  to  a  landlord's  lien.  Mc- 
Kleroy  v.  Cantey,  95  Ala.  295,  11 
So.  258;  Bush  v.  Willis,  130  Ala. 
395,  30  So.  443.  A  stipulation  in 
a  lease,  that  the  tenant  shall  be 
taxed  with  attorneys'  fees  in  case 
of  his  violation  of  the  lease,  en- 
titles the  landlord  to  recover  at- 
torneys' fees  in  an  action  to  en- 
force his  lien.  Johnson  v.  Burner, 
88  Ala.  580,  7  So.  245;  Richards  v. 
Bestor,  90  Ala.  352,  8  So.  30; 
Seisel  v.  Folmar,  103  Ala.  491,  15 
So.   850. 

47  Where  the  tenant  assigned  a 
stock  of  goods  on  which  a  land- 
lord's lien  existed,  and  the  as- 
signee converted  the  same  into 
money,  the  landlord  may  recover 
by  garnishment  the  money   in  tlie 


hands  of  the  assignee  in  an  at- 
tachment suit  against  the  tenant. 
McKleroy  v.  Cantey,  95  Ala.  295, 
11  So.  258.  Where  the  tenancy  is 
continued  after  the  expiration  of 
the  original  term,  by  express  con- 
tract or  by  implication,  the  lien 
attaches  to  the  goods  afterwards 
brought  upon  the  premises,  and 
remaining  there  when  the  attach- 
ment to  enforce  the  lien  is  sued 
out;  and  this  lien  prevails  against 
the  claim  of  a  purchaser  from  the 
tenant.  Abraham  v.  Nicrosi,  87 
Ala.    173,    6.    So.    293. 

48  Code  1907,  §§  4734,  4737,  4739. 
A  landlord's  lien  for  rent  is  su- 
perior to  a  chattel  mortgage  of 
crops  for  supplies  furnished,  when 
the  mortgage  was  taken  under  cir- 
cumstances which  made  it  the 
duty  of  the  mortgagee  to  inquire 
as  to  the  existence  of  the  land- 
lord's lien.  Manasses  v.  Dent,  89 
Ala.  565,  8  So.  108;  Simpson  v. 
Hinson,  88  Ala.  527,  7  So.  264;  Wil- 
son v.  Curry,  149  Ala.  368,  42  So. 
753. 

■49This  lien  attaches  only  where 
the  relation  of  landlord  and  ten- 
ant exists,  and  not  where  there  is 


567  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  603 

land^^  for  rent  for  the  current  year,^^  and  for  advances,^^ 


an  implied  liability  for  use  and 
occupation,  or  where  one  of  sev- 
eral tenants  in  common  occupies 
and  cultivates  the  entire  premises. 
Kennon  v.  Wright,  70  Ala.  434; 
Tucker  v.  Adams,  52  Ala.  254; 
Hadden  v.  Powell,  17  Ala.  314.  It 
arises  under  a  contract  whereby 
the  landlord  rents  land  to  another 
to  l>e  cultivated  for  a  stipulated 
part  of  the  crops  to  be  grown 
thereon;  for  such  a  contract 
creates  the  relation  of  landlord 
and  tenant.  Wilson  v.  Stewart, 
69  Ala.  302.  The  statute  contem- 
plates only  the  conventional  rela- 
tion of  landlord  and  tenant  sub- 
sisting because  of  the  contract 
between  the  parties.  A  mortgagee 
under  a  mortgage  executed  prior 
to  the  entry  of  the  tenant  is  not, 
on  giving  notice  to  his  mortga- 
gor's tenant,  entitled  to  the  statu- 
tory lien  on  the  crops  grown  on 
the  rented  premises  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  rent,  and  he  can  not 
enforce  this  by  attachment.  Drak- 
ford  v.  Turk,  75  Ala.  339.  A  rent- 
al agent  is  not  given  a  lien  on 
crops  for  his  advancements.  Mc- 
Daniel  v.  Cain,  159  Ala.  344,  48 
So.  52. 

soThe  lien  attaches  to  the  crop 
whether  this  be  raised  by  the  ten- 
ant or  by  some  one  under  the  ten- 
ant. Givens  v.  Easley,  17  Ala. 
385.  But  it  seems  that  the  attach- 
ment must  issue  against  the  ten- 
ant, and  not  against  the  under-ten- 
ant, unless  the  contract  with  the 
latter  has  been  assigned  to  the 
landlord.  Simmons  v.  Fielder,  46 
Ala.  304. 

51  As    to    the    landlord's    rights 


against  an  under-tenant,  and  the 
equities  of  creditors  of  the  under- 
tenant, see  Robinson  v.  Lehman, 
72  Ala.  401.  The  landlord's  writ 
of  attachment  is  usually  in  the 
form  of  a  mandate  to  attach  so 
much  of  the  crops  grown  on  the 
rented  premises  as  may  be  suffi- 
cient to  satisfy  his  demand  with 
costs.  This  authorizes  an  attach- 
ment not  only  of  the  crops  be- 
longing to  his  tenant,  but  also  the 
crops  raised  on  the  premises  by 
an  under-tenant.  Agee  v.  Mayer, 
71  Ala.  88.  The  statute,  Code  1907, 
§  4744,  requires  in  express  terms 
that  the  crop  of  the  tenant  in 
chief  shall  be  exhausted  before  a 
levy  is  made  on  the  crop  of  the 
under-tenant,  unless  the  tenant  in 
chief  has  not  made  a  crop,  or  it 
is  insufficient  to  satisfy  the  lien; 
and  a  levy  made  in  violation  of 
this  provision  "shall  be  vacated  on 
motion,  at  the  first  term  there- 
after." But  the  under-tenant  may 
intervene  at  the  return  term  of 
the  writ,  and  move  a  vacation  of 
the  levy  on  his  crop.  Lehman  v. 
Howze,  7Z  Ala.  302.  The  landlord 
has  a  lien  for  tobacco  and  snuff 
supplied  to  the  tenant  and  for 
cash  advanced  to  prevent  the  ten- 
ant's mule  from  being  sold  on  ex- 
ecution. Donaldson  v.  Wilkerson, 
170  Ala.  507,  54  So.  234.  The  land- 
lord has  a  lien  for  blacksmith 
tools  furnished  to  the  tenant.  Hol- 
laday  v.  Rutledge,  145  Ala.  656, 
39  So.  613.  The  lien  does  not  ex- 
pire with  the  lease,  but  remains 
subject  to  the  lien.  Couch  v.  Dav- 
idson, 109  Ala.  313,  19  So.  507. 
52The    lien    for    advances    is    of 


6o3 


LIENS. 


568 


made  in  money  or  other  thing  of  value, '^^  whether  made 
directly  by  him,  or  at  his  instance  and  request  by  another 
person,  or  for  which  he  has  assumed  the  legal  responsibility,^^ 


equal  dignity  with  the  lien  for 
rent,— Wilson  v.  Stewart,  69  Ala. 
302;  Thompson  v.  Powell,  11  Ala. 
391, — unless  there  be  some  fact 
or  agreement  which  operates  as  a 
waiver,  as  in  Coleman  v.  Siler,  74 
Ala.  435.  See  also,  Foster  v.  Na- 
pier, 74  Ala.  393.  A  landlord's  lien 
for  rent  and  advances  extends  to 
the  crops  of  subtenants,  but  a 
statutory  lien  for  advances  to 
make  a  crop  does  not.  Albright  v. 
Mills,  86  Ala.  324,  5  So.  591.  A 
landlord's  lien  is  superior  to  that 
of  a  mere  hireling  under  sections 
4734  and  4743  of  the  Code  of  1907. 
Hudson  v.  Wright,  3  Ala.  App.  290, 
57  So.  90.  The  landlord's  lien  for 
advances  is  much  more  compre- 
hensive than  the  lien  given  to 
any  other  person  making  advances, 
and  embraces  everything  useful 
for  the  purposes  enumerated,  or 
tending  to  the  substantial  comfort 
and  well-being  of  the  tenant,  his 
family,  or  persons  employed  about 
the  service;  and  this  lien  laps  over 
from  year  to  year  for  any  balance 
due,  so  long  as  the  tenancy  con- 
tinues. Cockburn  v.  Watkins,  76 
Ala.  486;  Thompson  v.  Powell,  11 
Ala.  391.  Code  1907,  §  4736;  Bush 
v.  Willis,  130  Ala.  395,  30  So.  443; 
Bain  v.  Wells,  107  Atl.  562,  19  So. 
774.  A  landlord  may  have  a  lien 
for  advancements  made  before  the 
tenant  begins  to  put  in  the  crop. 
Ragsdale  v.  Kinney,  119  Ala.  454, 
24  So.  443. 

53AS  regards  the  landlord's  ad- 
vances, the  words  of  the  statute 
are    very     comprehensive,    and     it 


would  be  difficult  to  define  what 
articles  of  commerce  are  beyond 
its  terms.  Lake  v.  Gaines,  75  Ala. 
143;  Mooney  v.  Hough,  34  Ala.  80, 
4  So.  19.  The  fact  that  one  incon- 
siderable item  of  the  total  is  not 
of  the  character  for  which  a  lien 
is  given  does  not  vitiate  the  claim 
for  other  items,  and  a  motion  to 
discharge  the  levy  in  toto  on  that 
ground  is  properly  denied.  Gid- 
dens  V.  Boiling,  92  Ala.  586,  9  So. 
274.  If  the  advances  are  not  paid 
for  in  the  current  year,  the  resi- 
due becomes  a  lien  on  the  next 
crop,  if  the  tenancy  continues. 
Code  1907,  §  4736;  Lake  v.  Gaines, 
75  Ala.  143.  As  to  day  of  maturity 
see  Code  1907,  §  4735. 

^4  This  provision  was  not  in- 
tended to  confer  upon  the  land- 
lord the  power  to  appoint  an- 
other to  make  advances  to 
his  tenant,  and  thereby  clothe 
such  person  with  the  lien ;  but 
merely  to  afford  him  indemnity 
against  any  liability  he  might  as- 
sume for  his  tenant.  Therefore, 
if  advances  are  made  by  a  third 
person  with  the  understanding 
that  he  is  to  look  to  the  tenant, 
and  not  to  the  landlord,  for  pay- 
ment, although  made  at  the  in- 
stance of  the  landlord  and  on  his 
request,  if  there  is  no  liability 
resting  on  the  landlord  the  lien 
does  not  exist.  Bell  v.  Hurst,  75 
Ala.  44.  A  landlord  who,  without 
the  knowledge  and  consent  of  his 
tenant,  assumes  a  liability  to  a 
third  person  for  advances  to  the 
tenant,  and  pays  the  debt,  acquires 


569 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


§    603 


at  or  before  the  time  at  which  such  advances  were  made,  for 
the  sustenance  or  well-being  of  the  tenant  or  his  family,  for 
preparing  the  ground  for  cultivation,  or  for  cultivating, 
gathering,  saving,  handling,  or  preparing  the  crop  for  mar- 
ket; and  he  shall  have  a  lien  also  upon  all  articles  advanced, 
and  upon  all  property  purchased  with  money  advanced,  or 
obtained  by  barter  in  exchange  for  any  articles  advanced,  for 
the  aggregate  price  or  value  of  all  such  property  or  articles 
so  advanced;  and  such  liens  for  rent  and  advances  shall  be 
paramount,  and  have  preference  of  all  other  liens. ^^ 


no  lien,  but  the  Hen  will  attach 
if,  after  the  landlord  has  become 
liable,  he  informs  the  tenant,  who 
ratifies  his  act  by  promising  to 
pay  the  debt.  Clanton  v.  Eaton, 
92  Ala.  612,  8  So.  823;  Evans  v.  Bil- 
lingsley,  32  Ala.  395.  Under  this 
statute  a  landlord  has  no  lien  for 
advances  made  to  his  tenant  as  a 
hired  laborer,  to  be  paid  for  his 
labor.  Powell  v.  State,  84  Ala. 
444,  4  So.  719.  The  landlord  can 
not  transfer  to  another  the  right 
to  make  advances  and  to  have  a 
landlord's  lien  therefor.  Hender- 
son V.  State,  109  Ala.  40,  19  So.  7ZZ. 
See  also,  Ballard  v.  Mayfield,  107 
Ala.  396,  18  So.  29. 

55A  landlord's  lien  for  advances 
is  superior  to  the  lien  of  another 
person  for  advances  made  after 
the  renting,  though  before  any  ad- 
vances were  made  by  the  land- 
lord. Wells  V.  Thompson,  50  Ala. 
83.  Such  lien  is  superior  to  a 
subsequent  chattel  mortgage  made 
by  the  tenant  for  additional  ad- 
vances, as  the  mortgagee  is  charg- 
ed with  notice  of  the  tenancy,  and 
consequently  of  the  lien.  Atkin- 
son V.  James,  96  Ala.  214,  10  So. 
846.     But  he  may  by  his  acts  estop 


himself  from  denying  the  liabil- 
ity of  the  property  to  another  in 
preference  to  his  lien.  Brown  v. 
Hamil,  76  Ala.  506.  But  the  land- 
lord may  maintain  a  special  action 
against  one  who,  with  notice  of 
the  lien,  destroys,  removes  or  con- 
verts the  crop  or  so  changes  its 
character  that  the  landlord  can 
not  enforce  his  Hen.  Hussey  v. 
Peebles,  53  Ala.  432;  Lake  v. 
Gaines,  75  Ala.  143;  Hurst  v.  Bell, 
72  Ala.  2Z6;  Kennon  v.  Wright,  70 
Ala.  434;  Thompson  v.  Powell,  77 
Ala.  391.  Notice  to  a  purchaser 
from  the  tenant,  that  the  crop  was 
raised  on  rented  land  and  that  the 
rent  is  unpaid,  does  not  operate 
as  notice  that  the  landlord  had 
made  advances  to  the  tenant  and 
that  he  has  a  lien  therefor.  Wil- 
son v.  Stewart,  69  Ala.  302;  Wilkin- 
son V.  Ketler,  69  Ala.  435.  Actual 
knowledge  is  not  necessary  to 
charge  a  purchaser  with  notice  of 
the  lien,  but  anything  that  should 
put  him  upon  inquiry  is  sufficient. 
Lomax  v.  Le  Grand,  60  Ala.  537; 
Aderhold  v.  Bluthenthal,  95  Ala. 
66,  10  So.  230.  A  purchaser  in  good 
faith  from  the  tenant,  after  the 
latter  has  removed  the  crop  from 


6o3 


LIENS. 


570 


The  landlord  may  assign  his  claim,  and  the  assignee  takes 
his  rights  and  remedies.^® 


the  rented  premises,  is  protected 
as  a  purchaser  without  notice. 
Scaife  x.  Stovall,  67  Ala.  237.  The 
affidavit  need  not  specify  the  par- 
ticular articles  advanced,  or  set 
forth  an  itemized  account.  It  is 
sufficient  if  it  shows  that  the  rela- 
tion of  landlord  and  tenant  exist- 
ed, that  advances  for  the  purposes 
specified  were  made,  that  a  spe- 
cified balance  remains  unpaid, 
and  that  a  statutory  ground  for 
attachment  exists.  Cockburn  v. 
Watkins,  76  Ala.  486;  Bell  v.  Al- 
len, 76  Ala.  450.  If  the  claim  for 
advances  is  past  due,  the  affidavit 
should  aver  specially  that  a  de- 
mand for  payment  was  made  be- 
fore the  action  was  brought.  Bell 
V.  Allen,  76  Ala.  450.  The  affidavit 
is  to  be  construed  liberally,  and 
is  sufficient  if  it  sets  forth  with 
substantial  accuracy  the  general 
facts,  either  expressly,  or  by  nec- 
essary implication.  Gunter  v.  Du 
Bose,  n  Ala.  iK^;  Fitzsimmons  v. 
Howard,  69  Ala.  590.  As  to  suffi- 
ciency of  affidavit,  see  Robinson 
V.  Holt,  85  Ala.  596,  5  So.  350.  The 
landlord's  lien  is  not  divested  by 
the  death  of  the  tenant  and  by 
the  fact  that  an  administrator  ha.s 
possession  of  the  property.  Wil- 
cox V.  Alexander  (Tex.),  32  S.  W. 
561.  The  removal  of  the  property 
where  it  has  not  been  sold  to  a 
bona  fide  purchaser  for  value  who 
had  no  notice  of  the  landlord's 
lien  will  not  affect  such  lien.  An- 
drews Mfg.  Co.  V.  Porter,  112  Ala. 
381,  20  So.  475. 
oSSimmons    v.    Fielder,    46    Ala. 


304.  Otherwise  before  so  provid- 
ed. Foster  v.  Westmoreland,  52 
Ala.  223;  Hussey  v.  Peebles,  53 
Ala.  432;  Lavender  v.  Hall,  60  Ala. 
214;  Lomax  v.  Le  Grand,  60  Ala. 
537;  Hudson  v.  Vaughan,  57  Ala. 
609;  Warren  v.  Barnet,  83  Ala.  208, 
3  So.  609.  The  remedy  of  the 
landlord  against  a  purchaser  of 
the  crop  with  notice  of  the  lien, 
who  has  received  and  converted 
it  to  his  own  use,  is  by  special  ac- 
tion on  the  case.  He  can  not 
maintain  a  bill  in  equity  unless  he 
shov/s  that  his  remady  at  law  is 
inadequate.  Kennon  v.  Wright,  70 
Ala.  434.  Otherwise  where  the 
statutory  remedy  can  not  be  pur- 
sued. Abraham  v.  Hall,  59  Ala. 
386.  Until  he  has  sued  out  a  valid 
attachment,  and  had  it  levied  on 
the  crop,  he  can  not  recover  in  a 
statutory  suit  against  a  third  per- 
son to  try  the  right  of  property. 
Jackson  v.  Bain,  74  Ala.  328.  The 
landlord  can  not  maintain  trover 
for  the  conversion  of  the  crop  by 
a  wrongdoer.  His  lien  has  no  ele- 
ment of  property.  He  has  neither 
a  jus  in  re  nor  a  jus  ad  rem.  Cor- 
bitt  V.  Reynolds,  68  Ala.  378;  Fol- 
mar  v.  Copeland,  57  Ala.  588.  He 
has  merely  a  statutory  right  to 
charge  the  crop  with  the  payment 
of  the  rent  and  advances  in  prior- 
ity to  all  other  rights  or  liens.  The 
property  and  the  right  of  property 
remain  in  the  tenant.  The  latter 
may  therefore  make  a  bona  fide 
sale  to  a  purchaser  which  would 
prevail  over  the  landlord's  lien, 
Wilson    V.    Stewart,    69    Ala.    302; 


571  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  605 

The  lien  is  enforced  by  attachment  either  when  the  claim 
is  due  and  the  tenant  fails  or  refuses,  after  demand  made,  to 
pay  the  same,  or  before  it  is  due,  m  case  there  is  good  cause 
to  believe  that  the  tenant  is  about  to  remove  or  dispose  of 
any  part  of  the  crop  without  paying  such  rent  and  advances, 
or  without  the  consent  of  the  landlord  or  assignee,  or  has 
removed  it  without  paying  such  rent  and  advances,  and 
without  the  consent  of  the  landlord  or  assignee,  or  the  land- 
lord has  good  cause  to  believe  the  tenant  is  about  to  dispose 
of  the  articles  advanced  or  purchased.^''' 

§  604.  Alabama-^^  (continued).  Liens  of  tenants  in  com- 
mon.— Persons  who  farm  on  shares  or  who  raise  crops  by 
joint  contributions  in  such  manner  as  to  make  them  tenants 
in  common  in  such  crops,  or  their  assignees,  have  a  lien  upon 
the  interest  of  the  other  in  such  crops  for  any  balance  due  for 
provisions,  supplies,  teams,  materials,  labor,  services,  and 
money,  or  either,  furnished  to  aid  in  the  cultivating  and 
gathering  such  crops,  under  contract,  or  furnished  when  the 
interests  of  such  crops  require  it,  in  case  of  a  failure  of  either 
to  contribute  the  amount  and  means  as  agreed  upon  by  the 
parties. 

This  lien  may  be  enforced  in  the  same  manner  as  a  land- 
lord's lien  is  enforced ;  but  it  may  also  be  enforced  in  any 
other  appropriate  mode. 

§  605.  Arizona.^^ —  Every  landlord  shall  have  a  lien  on 
all  property  of  his  tenant  not  exempt  by  law,  placed  upon 

Stern  V.  Simpson,  62  Ala.  194;  Blum  part    only   of    the    tenant's    goods. 

V.    Jones,   51    Ala.    149;    Thompson  Couch   v.    Davidson,    109   Ala.   313, 

V.  Spinks,  12  Ala.  155.  19  So.  507. 

57As  to  affidavit  for  attachment  ssCiv.  Code  1907,  §§  4792,  4793. 
on  account  of  removal,  see  Bax-  59Rev.  Stats.  1901,  §  2695.  The 
ley  v.  Segrist,  85  Ala.  183,  4  So.  landlord's  lien  attaches  for  the 
865;  Nicrosi  v.  Roswald,  113  Ala.  w^hole  term  of  the  lease  on  all 
592,  21  So.  338.  The  landlord  may  property  of  the  tenant  not  ex- 
proceed    by   attachment   against    a  empt,    used    on    or    placed    on    the 


§    6o6  LIENS.  572 

or  used  on  the  leased  premises  until  his  rent  shall  be  paid, 
and  such  landlord,  his  agent  or  attorney,  may  seize,  for  rent, 
any  personal  property  of  his  tenant  that  may  be  found  on  the 
premises,  or  in  the  county  where  such  tenant  shall  reside,  but 
no  property  of  any  other  person,  although  the  same  may  be 
found  on  the  premises,  shall  be  liable  for  seizure  for  rent  due 
from  such  tenant,  and  in  case  of  failure  of  the  tenant  to  allow 
the  landlord,  his  agent,  or  attorney  to  take  possession  of  such 
property  for  the  payment  of  rent,  said  landlord  shall  have  the 
right  to  reduce  such  property  to  his  possession  by  action 
against  the  tenant  to  recover  the  possession  of  the  same, 
and  may  hold  or  sell  the  same  for  the  purpose  of  paying  said 
rent  unless  said  rent  shall  be  paid  before  sale,  and  every  land- 
lord shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  crops  grown  or  growing  upon 
the  homestead  premises  for  rent  thereof,  whether  the  same  is 
payable  wholly  or  in  part  in  money  or  specific  articles  of  prop- 
erty or  products  of  the  premises  or  labor,  and  also  for  the 
faithful  performance  of  the  terms  of  the  lease,  and  such  lien 
shall  continue  for  a  period  of  six  months  after  the  expiration 
of  the  term  for  which  the  premises  were  leased,  and  in  all 
cases  when  the  demised  premises  shall  be  let  or  lease  as- 
signed, th  landlord  shall  have  the  same  right  to  enforce  his 
lien  against  the  special  lessor  or  assignee  as  he  has  against 
the  tenant  to  whom  the  premises  were  leased. 

§  606.  Arkansas. '^^ — Every  landlord  shall  have  a  lien  upon 
the  crop  grown  upon  the  demised  premises  in  any  year  for 
rent  that  shall  accrue  for  such  year,  and  such  lien  shall  con- 
tinue for  six  months  after  such  rent  shall  become  due  and 
payable. ^^ 

real  estate,  and  the  lien  will  con-  his  lien,  but  can  enforce  the  same 

tinue  until  the  rent  is  paid.     Mur-  by  attachment.     Kirby's  Dig.  1904, 

phy    V.    Brown,    12    Ariz.    268,    100  §§  5040,  5041 ;  Ferniman  v.  Nowlin, 

Pac.  801.  91  Ark.  20,  120  S.  W.  378. 

60Kirby's     Dig.     of    Stats.     1904,  •^iJf   the    rent    contract    includes 

§§  5032-5043.    The  landlord  can  not  other  indebtedness  in  the  amount 

apply  the  crop  to  the  payment  of  expressed    as    rent,    the    landlord's 


573 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT, 


§    606 


Whenever  any  landlord  shall  indorse  upon  any  written 
agreement  made  by  and  between  his  tenant  and  the  em- 
ployees of  such  tenant,  his  written  consent  to  the  terms  of 
such  agreement,  then,  and  in  that  case  only,  shall  the  lien 
of  such  employees  have  precedence  over  that  of  the  landlord, 
and  that  only  for  the  compensation  specified  in  such  agree- 
ment, the  services  therein  specified  having  been  rendered 
toward  the  production  of  the  crop  against  which  the  land- 
lord's lien  attaches. 


lien  is  limited  to  the  amount  due 
for  rent  only;  and  in  a  contest  be- 
tween the  landlord  and  another 
incumbrancer,  the  latter  may 
show  the  true  amount  due  for 
rent.  Roth  v.  Williams,  45  Ark. 
447;  Varner  v.  Rice,  39  Ark.  344; 
Hammond  v.  Harper,  39  Ark.  248. 
But  a  creditor  who  has  no  lien  on 
the  property  can  not  complain 
that  the  landlord  has  applied  a 
part  of  the  crop  to  the  satisfac- 
tion of  a  debt  for  which  the  land- 
lord has  no  lien.  Hammond  v. 
Harper,  39  Ark.  248.  The  land- 
lord's lien  does  not  pass  to  an  as- 
signee of  the  rent  debt.  Varner 
V.  Rice,  39  Ark.  344;  Nolen  v. 
Royston,  36  Ark.  561;  Bernays  v. 
Feild,  29  Ark.  218;  Roberts  v. 
Jacks,  31  Ark.  597,  25  Am.  Rep.  584; 
Block  V.  Smith,  61  Ark.  266,  32  S. 
W.  1070.  But  if  the  debt  is  reas- 
signed to  the  landlord,  the  lien  re- 
vives. Varner  v.  Rice,  39  Ark. 
344.  And  though  the  note  for  rent 
be  executed  by  the  tenant  to  a 
creditor  of  the  landlord  with  his 
consent,  and  it  is  afterwards  re- 
delivered by  the  creditor  to  the 
landlord,  the  lien,  which  before 
was  dormant,  revives  and  unites 
in  the  landlord  the  debt  and  the 
right    to    enforce    satisfaction    out 


of  the  crop.  The  original  payee 
of  the  note  may  properly  be  made 
a  party  to  the  suit  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  tenant.  Varner  v.  Rice, 
39  Ark.  344.  Although  the  assign- 
ment of  the  rent  note  does  not 
carry  the  landlord's  lien,  yet,  if 
the  tenant  delivers  the  crop  to 
one  holding  the  rent  note  as  col- 
lateral security  for  a  debt  due 
from  the  landlord,  the  payment 
will  be  upheld  as  against  a  mort- 
gagee of  the  crop.  Watson  v. 
Johnson,  33  Ark.  737.  Though  the 
landlord's  lien  can  not  be  trans- 
ferred, it  can  be  released.  Buck- 
ner  v.  McHroy,  31  Ark.  631.  If 
the  landlord,  after  assigning  his 
rent  note,  redeems  it,  his  lien  is 
revived.  Dickinson  v.  Harris,  52 
Ark.  58,  11  S.  W.  965.  Where  a 
tenant  in  his  lease  has  contracted 
to  repair  fences  and  agrees  to  pay 
damages  upon  his  failure  to  do  so, 
the  cost  of  such  repairs  becomes 
a  part  of  the  rent  stipulated  and 
the  landlord  has  a  lien  on  the 
crops  for  such  costs.  Von  Berg  v. 
Goodman,  85  Ark.  605,  109  S.  W. 
1006.  A  landlord  is  entitled  to  a 
lien  on  crops  for  the  price  fur- 
nished the  tenant  to  raise  such 
crops.  Ferniman  v.  Nowlin,  91 
Ark.  20,  120  S.  W.  378. 


§  6o6  LIENS.  ,  574 

Any  person  subrenting  lands  or  tenements  shall  only  be 
held  responsible  for  the  rent  of  such  as  are  cultivated  or  oc- 
cupied by  him. 

Any  landlord  who  has  a  lien  on  the  crop  for  rent  shall  be 
entitled  to  bring  suit  before  a  justice  of  the  peace,  or  in  the 
circuit  court,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  have  a  writ  of  attach- 
ment for  the  recovery  of  the  same,  whether  the  rent  be  due 
or  not,  in  the  following  cases:  First.  When  the  tenant  is 
about  to  remove  the  crop  from  the  premises  without  paying 
the  rent.  Second.  When  he  has  removed  it,  or  any  portion 
thereof,  without  the  consent  of  the  landlord. ^^ 

Before  such  writ  of  attachment  shall  issue,  the  landlord, 
his  agent  or  attorney,  shall  make  and  file  an  affidavit  of  one 
of  the  above  facts,  that  the  amount  claimed,  which  shall  be 
therein  stated,  is,  or  will  be,  due  for  rent,  or  will  be  the  value 
of  the  portion  of  the  crop  agreed  to  be  received  as  rent,  stat- 
ing the  time  when  the  same  became  or  would  become  due, 
and  that  he  has  a  lien  on  the  crop  for  the  rent;^^  and  he  shall 
file  with  the  justice  or  clerk,  as  the  case  may  be,  a  bond  to 
the  defendant,  with  sufficient  security,  in  double  the  amount 
of  his  claim  as  sworn  to,  conditioned  that  he  will  prove  his 
debt  or  demand  and  his  lien  in  a  trial  at  law,  or  that  he  will 
pay  such  damages  as  shall  be  adjudged  against  him. 

62A  landlord's  lien  gives  him  no  Lemay  v.  Johnson,  35  Ark.  225,  233; 

right    of    possession    of   the    crop,  Hammond  v.  Harper,  39  Ark.  248; 

and    he    can    not    therefore    main-  Griggs  v.  Horton,  84  Ark.  623,  104 

tain   replevin.     He    must   proceed  S.  W.  930. 

by  attachment.     Bell  v.   Matheny,  esThe   affidavit   may  be   amend- 

36    Ark.    572.      While     a     landlord  ed.      Nolen    v.    Royston,    36    Ark. 

must    refrain    from    an    active    in-  561.     It  is  not  impaired  by  includ- 

jury  to  a  junior  incumbrancer,  he  ing    in    the    demand    a    claim    for 

is   under   no   obligation   to   collect  which    he    has   no    lien.      Kurtz    v. 

his  debt,   or  to  husband   the   crop  Dunn,    36    Ark.    648.      The    lien    is 

so  as  to  make  it  cover  both  debts.  primarily  for  rent  and   is  extend- 

If  the  tenant  virrongfully  disposes  ed     by     statute     to     advances     of 

of  a  part   of   the  crop  subject   to  money  and   supplies.     Kaufman  v. 

his  lien,  he  may   enforce  his  lien  Underwood,  83  Ark.  118,  102  S.  W. 

against   the    residue    of   the    crop.  718. 


575 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


607 


The  writ  may  be  levied  on  the  crop  in  the  possession  of 
the  tenant,  or  any  one  holding  it  in  his  right,  or  in  the  posses- 
sion of  a  purchaser  from  him  with  notice  of  the  lien  of  the 
landlord.*'* 

§  607.  Arkansas^^  (continued).  Lien  for  supplies  ad- 
vanced.— In  addition  to  the  lien  now  given  by  law  to  land- 
lords, if  any  landlord,  to  enable  his  tenant  or  employee  to 
make  and  gather  the  crop,  shall  advance  such  tenant  or  em- 
ployee any  necessary  supplies,  either  of  money,  provisions, 


64As  against  a  purchaser  of  the 
crop  with  notice  of  the  lien,  the 
landlord's  remedy  is  by  specific 
attachment,  while  the  crop  is  in 
the  purchaser's  hands,  or  by  bill 
in  equity  if  he  has  sold  it,  to  have 
the  proceeds  applied  to  the  pay- 
ment of  the  rent.  Reavis  v. 
Barnes,  36  Ark.  575.  An  action  by 
the  landlord  against  one  taking 
the  crop,  with  a  knowledge  of 
the  existence  of  the  lien,  will  be 
barred  in  six  months  after  the 
maturity  of  the  rent.  King  v. 
Blount,  37  Ark.  115;  Valentine  v. 
Hamlett,  35  Ark.  538.  The  land- 
lord may  by  an  action  in  equity 
force  one  to  account  to  him  who 
has  purchased  from  the  tenant 
the  crops  raised  by  him.  Murphy 
V.  Myar,  95  Ark.  32,  128  S.  W.  359, 
Ann.  Cas.  1912  A.  573.  Where 
mortgagees  pay  the  tenant's  rent 
for  a  previous  year,  it  is  a  suffi- 
cient circumstance  to  put  them 
on  inquiry  as  to  the  landlord's 
lien  and  as  to  the  nonpayment  of 
rent.  Judge  v.  Curtis,  72  Ark.  132, 
78  S.  W.  746. 

65Kirby's  Dig.  of  Stats.  1904, 
§§  5033-5036.  This  act,  concluding 
with  a  repeal  of  all  acts  incon- 
sistent therewith,  had  no  effect  to 


repeal  the  provision  of  Mansf. 
Dig.  Ark.  §  4452,  that  the  evidence 
of  the  waiver  of  the  landlord's 
lien  for  supplies  shall  be  in  writ- 
ing by  indorsement  upon  the  mort- 
gage or  other  instrument  by 
which  the  employe  transfers  his 
interest  in  the  crop.  The  land- 
lord has  a  lien  on  a  cropper's 
share  for  advances.  Tinsley  v. 
Craige,  54  Ark.  346,  IS  S.  W.  897,  16 
S.  W.  570.  For  supplies  furnished 
a  tenant  held  to  be  within  the 
statute  authorizing  a  lien  there- 
for, see  Earl  v.  Malone,  80  Ark. 
218,  96  S.  W.  1062.  An  oral 
waiver  by  the  landlord  is  suffi- 
cient under  Kirby's  Dig.  1904, 
§  5033,  to  permit  the  lien  of 
employes  to  have  preference 
over  his  lien.  Griggs  v.  Horton, 
84  Ark.  623,  104  S.  W.  930.  See 
also,  Neeley  v.  Phillips,  70  Ark. 
90,  66  S.  W.  349.  Where  a  land- 
lord becomes  surety  for  his  ten- 
ant to  buy  a  horse,  he  does  not 
have  a  lien  on  the  crop  therefor 
which  is  superior  to  a  mortgage 
lien.  Kaufman  v.  Underwood,  83 
Ark.  118,  102  S.  W.  718.  See  also. 
Neal  v.  Brandon,  70  Ark.  79,  66 
S.   W.  200. 


§    6o8  LIENS.  576 

clothing,  stock,  or  other  necessary  articles,  such  landlord 
shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  crop  raised  upon  the  premises  for 
the  value  of  such  advances,  which  lien  shall  have  preference 
over  any  mortgage  or  other  conveyance  of  such  crop  made 
by  such  tenant  or  employee.  Such  lien  may  be  enforced  by 
an  action  of  attachment  before  any  court  or  justice  of  the 
peace  having  jurisdiction,  and  the  lien  for  advances  and  for 
rent  may  be  joined  and  enforced  in  the  same  action. 

The  purchaser  or  assignee  of  the  receipt  of  any  ginner, 
w^arehouse  holder,  or  cotton  factor  or  other  bailee,  for  any 
cotton,  corn  or  other  farm  products  in  store  or  custody  of 
such  ginner,  warehouseman,  cotton  factor,  or  other  bailee 
shall  not  be  held  to  be  an  innocent  purchaser  of  any  such 
produce  against  the  lien  of  any  landlord  or  laborer. 

§  608.  Delaware.*'^ — A  distress  lies  for  any  rent  arrear 
either  of  money,  or  a  quantity  or  share  of  grain,  or  other 
produce,  or  of  anything  certain,  or  that  can  be  reduced  to 
certainty,  and  whether  the  same  be  a  rent  accruing  upon  a 
demise  for  life,  or  a  term  of  one  or  more  years,  or  a  less  time, 
or  at  will,  or  a  rent-charge,  rent-seek,  quit-rent,  or  otherwise, 
issuing  out  of,  or  charged  upon,  any  lands,  tenements,  or 
hereditaments. 

The  person  entitled  to  such  rent,  whether  the  original 
lessor,  or  an  assignee,  heir,  executor,  or  administrator,  may 
distrain  for  the  same,  either  personally  or  by  his  bailiff. 

A  distress  may  be  made  either  during  the  demise,  or  after- 
ward, while  the  tenant,  or  any  person  coming  into  possession 
by,  or  under  him,  shall  continue  to  hold  the  demised  prem- 
ises, and  the  title  to  said  premises  shall  remain  in  the  person 

66Rev.    Code,   as    amended,    1893,  by    it    is    delivered    at     the     land- 

ch.    120,    §§    19-66.     The    lien    of    a  lord's  premises.     Ford  v.   Clewell, 

landlord   is   superior   to   that   of   a  9  Houst.  (111.)  179,  31  Atl.  715.    See 

chattel  mortgage  executed  prior  to  also,  Lupton  v.  Hughes,  2  Pennew. 

the  beginning  of  the  tenancy  and  (Del.)   515,  47  Atl.  624. 
even  before  the  property  covered 


577  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  608 

to  whom  the  rent  accrued,  or  his  heirs,  devisees,  executors, 
or  administrators,  or  be  in  his  immediate  reversioner  or  re- 
mainderman. 

A  distress  may  be  as  well  of  the  grain,  grass  and  other  pro- 
duce found  upon  the  premises  out  of  which  the  rent  issues, 
or  upon  which  it  is  charged,  whether  growing,  or  severed,  in 
sheaves,  stacks,  or  otherwise,  as  the  horses,  cattle  and  other 
goods  and  chattels  being  upon  said  premises;  except  goods 
and  chattels  not  the  property  of  the  tenant,  but  being  in  his 
possession  in  the  way  of  his  trade,  or  upon  the  said  premises 
in  the  regular  course  of  any  occupation,  or  business,  there 
carried  on,^^  which  exception  shall  extend  to  horses  and 
carriages  at  a  livery  stable,  to  property  of  boarders  in  a 
boarding-house,  and  to  the  beasts  of  a  drover  depastured 
while  passing  through  the  county,  as  well  as  to  the  more 
obvious  cases  of  exemption  at  common  law;  also  except 
stoves  not  the  property  of  but  hired  by  the  tenant,  and 
beasts  not  the  property  of  the  tenant,  escaping  into  the  said 
premises  through  defect  of  fences,  which  the  tenant,  or  his 
landlord,  was  bound  to  repair. 

If  the  tenant,  either  during  his  term,  or  estate,  or  after  the 
end  thereof,  remove  his  goods  and  chattels,  or  any  of  them, 
from  the  said  premises  without  payment  of  the  rent  due,  or 
growing  due,  for  the  said  premises,  and  without  license  from 
the  landlord,  or  his  agent,  in  writing  under  his  hand,  the 
goods  and  chattels,  so  removed,  unless  sold  fairly  for  a  valu- 
able consideration  and  delivered  to  the  buyer,  shall  be  liable, 
wherever  found,  to  be  distrained  for  said  rent  for  forty  days 
after  the  removal,  or  if  the  rent  be  not  in  arrear  at  the  time 
of  the  removal,  for  forty  days  after  the  rent  shall  become  in 
arrear. 

The  person  on  whose  demand  a  distress  is  made,  has  a 

G'^The     goods     of     a     subtenant,  on    a   warrant    at    the    suit    of   the 

removed  from  the  demised  prem-  landlord  against  the  original  ten- 

ises    after    the    expiration    of    the  ant,   for  rent   in  arrears.     New  v. 

term,    are    not    liable    to    distress,  Pyle,  2  Houst.  (Del.)  9. 

37 


§    609  LIENS.  578 

special  property  in  the  things  distrained  until  replevin,  or 
sale  thereof,  so  that  he  may  take  the  same,  wherever  found, 
and  recover  damages  for  carrying  away,  or  injuring  them. 

If  the  property  distrained  be  not  replevied  within  five  days 
after  written  notice  to  the  tenant  of  the  property  distrained, 
and  the  cause  of  the  distress,  it  must  be  appraised  at  its  true 
value. 

After  the  expiration  of  six  days  from  the  day  of  appraising 
the  property,  it  may  be  sold  at  public  vendue  to  the  highest 
bidder,  first  giving  at  least  six  days'  notice  of  the  sale. 

If  the  goods  and  chattels  of  a  tenant,  being  upon  premises 
held  by  him  by  demise  under  a  rent  of  money  be  seized  upon 
execution  or  attachment,  they  are  liable  for  one  year's  rent  of 
the  premises,  in  arrear,  or  growing  due,  at  the  time  of  the 
seizure,  in  preference  to  such  process.  A  prior  distress  of 
such  goods  for  rent  in  arrear  does  not  preclude  the  landlord 
from  such  preference. ^^ 

§  609.  District  of  Columbia.*^^ — The  landlord  has  a  tacit 
lien  upon  such  of  the  tenant's  personal  chattels  on  the  prem- 

csAfter  execution  has  been  lev-  ceeds  of  it,  in  preference  to  the 
ied  on  the  tenant's  goods,  the  execution  creditor,  but  he  is  en- 
landlord  can  not  distrain  on  a  titled  to  the  rent  growing  due  up 
portion  of  them,  and  take  the  pro-  to  the  time  of  the  purchase  of  the 
ceeds  of  a  sale  of  them  on  a  claim  terin.  Cause  v.  Richardson,  4 
of  a  balance  due  him  for  the  pre-  Houst.  (Del.)  222. 
ceding  year,  and  then  claim  an  69Code  1901,  §§  1229-1231.  The 
entire  year's  rent  out  of  the  sale  first  section  of  the  statute  abol- 
of  the  residue  on  the  execution,  ishes  the  common-law  right  of 
for  the  current  year.  Hopkins  v.  the  landlord  to  distrain  for  rent. 
Simpson,  3  Houst.  (Del.)  90.  See  The  statute  is  a  substitute  for  the 
also,  State  v.  Vandever,  2  Har.  right  abolished.  Wallach  v.  Ches- 
(Del.).397;  Biddle  V.  Biddle,  3  Har.  ley,  2  Mackey  (D.  C.)  209.  See 
(Del.)  539.  If,  at  an  execution  also,  on  this  statute,  Fowler  v. 
sale  of  the  tenant's  goods,  the  Rapley,  IS  Wall.  (U.  S.)  328,  21 
landlord  buys  in  the  unexpired  L.  ed.  35;  Webb  x.  Sharp,  13  Wall. 
term,  he  is  not  entitled  to  a  year's  (U.  S.)  14,  20  L.  ed.  478;  Beall  v. 
rent  growing  due  at  the  time  of  White,  94  U.  S.  382,  24  L.  ed.  173. 
sale,   to   be   paid    out   of    the   pro- 


579 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


§    609 


ises  as  are  subject  to  execution  for  debt,  to  commence  with 
the  tenancy  and  continue  for  three  months  after  the  rent  is 
due/*'  and  until  the  termination  of  any  action  for  such  rent 
brought  within  the  said  three  months. 

This  hen  may  be  enforced, — First.  By  attachment,  to  be 
issued  upon  affidavit  that  the  rent  is  due  and  unpaid,  or,  if 
not  due,  that  the  defendant  is  about  to  remove  or  sell  all  or 
some  part  of  said  chattels;"^  or,  Second.  By  judgment 
against  the  tenant  and  execution,  to  be  levied  on  said  chattels 
or  any  of  them,  in  whosesoever  hands  they  may  be  found  ;'^^ 
or.  Third.  By  action  against  any  purchaser  of  any  of  said 
chattels  with  notice  of  the  lien,  in  which  action  the  plaintiff 


70Where  the  tenant's  chattels 
have  been  sold  by  virtue  of  an 
assignment  for  the  benefit  of  his 
creditors,  the  landlord's  claim 
upon  the  fund,  to  the  extent  of 
three  months'  rent,  has  priority 
over  the  claims  of  simple  contract 
creditors.  Fox  v.  Davidson,  1 
Mackey  (D.  C.)  102.  The  lien  is 
for  the  periodical  rent  accruing 
when  the  levy  is  made,  but  not 
for  succeeding  periods,  during 
M^hich  the  officer  keeps  the  goods 
upon  the  premises.  Harris  v.  Dam- 
mann,  3  Mackey  (D.  C.)  90. 

'i'llf  the  rent  is  payable  month- 
ly, the  landlord  may  issue  his  at- 
tachment for  rent  vi^hich  will  be 
due  and  payable  for  the  month 
during  a  part  of  which  the  tenant 
occupied  the  premises.  Joyce  v. 
Wilkenning,  1  MacArthur  (D.  C.) 
567. 

'2The  landlord  has  no  right  to 
an  attachment  against  the  ten- 
ant's chattels  which  have  been  re- 
moved from  the  premises  before 
the  rent  is  due.  His  remedy  is  by 
judgment  against  the  tenant  and 
execution,  to  be  levied  upon  such 


chattels  or  any  of  them,  in  whoso- 
ever hands  they  may  be  found. 
Wallach  v.  Chesley,  2  Mackey  (D. 
C.)  209.  The  statute  provides  for 
several  conditions  of  things: 
"First,  when  the  rent  is  due,  and, 
next,  when  the  rent  is  not  yet  ma- 
tured. When  the  rent  is  due,  the 
lien  may  be  enforced  by  an  at- 
tachment issued  upon  an  affidavit 
that  the  rent  is  due  and  unpaid. 
There  is  no  trouble  about  that. 
But  it  will  occur  to  anybody,  that 
the  tenant  may,  just  before  the 
maturity  of  his  rent,  and  in  order 
to  avoid  compulsory  payment  of 
it,  remove  his  chattels,  or  change 
the  property  in  them.  To  meet 
that  contingency,  it  is  further  pro- 
vided that,  even  before  the  rent 
is  due,  if  the  landlord  will  make 
affidavit  that  the  tenant  is  about 
to  remove  or  sell  all  or  some  part 
of  his  chattels,  the  attachment 
may  issue.  And  those  are  the  only 
two  cases  provided  for  in  the 
statute,  in  which  an  attachment  is 
the  remedy  intended."  Per  Cox, 
C.  J. 


§  6io 


LIENS. 


580 


may  have  judgment  for  the  value  of  the  chattels  purchased 
by  the  defendant,  but  not  exceeding  the  rent  in  arrear.'''^ 

§  610.  Florida.^^ — Every  person  to  w^hom  rent  may  be  due, 
his  heirs,  executors,  administrators  or  assigns  shall  have  a 
lien  upon  the  property  found  upon  or  off  the  premises  leased 
or  rented,  and  in  the  possession  of  any  person  as  follows: 
1.  Upon  agricultural  products  raised  on  the  land  leased  or 
rented  for  the  current  year.  This  lien  shall  be  superior  to  all 
other  liens,  though  of  older  date.  2.  Upon  all  other  property 
of  the  lessee,  or  his  sublessee  or  assigns,  usually  kept  on  the 
premises.  This  lien  shall  be  superior  to  any  lien  acquired 
subsequent  to  the  bringing  of  such  property  on  the  premises 
leased.  3.  Upon  all  other  property  of  the  defendant.  This 
lien  shall  date  from  the  levy  of  the  distress  w^arrant. 

Landlords  also  have  a  lien  on  the  crop  grown  on  rented 


''^li  the  goods  subject  to  a 
landlord's  lien  be  seized  and  sold 
upon  execution  by  another  credit- 
or, the  landlord  may  move  the 
court  out  of  which  the  execution 
issued  for  an  order  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  rent  out  of  the  pro- 
ceeds of  the  sale.  This  motion 
may  be  made  at  any  time  before 
the  money  is  paid  over,  the  offi- 
cer being  bound,  on  notice  from 
the  landlord,  to  retain  the  money. 
Gibson  v.  Gautier,  1  Mackey  (D. 
C.)  35.  A  lien  on  crops  and  other 
personal  property  may  be  secured 
by  an  instrument  executed  by  the 
tenant,  and  this  lien  is  not  lost  as 
against  the  tenant's  creditors  by 
a  failure  to  acknowledge  it  and 
have  it  recorded.  Hume  v.  Riggs, 
12  App.   D.   C.  355. 

'-iGen.  Stats.  1906,  §§  2237,  2239, 
2240-2246.  Formerly  there  was  no 
lien  for  rent  until  a  warrant  of 
distress  was  issued.     Patterson  v. 


Taylor,  15  Fla.  336.  The  statute 
is  not  restricted  to  rents  of  agri- 
cultural lands,  but  applies  to  all 
rental  of  real  property.  Jones  v. 
Fox,  23  Fla.  454,  2  So.  700;  Fox  v. 
Jones,  26  Fla.  276,  8  So.  449.  The 
lien  given  by  the  statute  is  a 
charge  upon  the  property  of  the 
tenant,  and  the  landlord  can  not 
be  deprived  of  his  lien  at  the  will 
of  the  tenant  by  assigning  the 
goods,  in  the  house  rented,  to  a 
third  party.  Campbell,  etc.,  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  Walker,  22  Fla.  412,  422,  1 
So.  59;  Fox  v.  Jones,  26  Fla.  276, 
8  So.  449.  The  landlord's  lien  for 
rent  and  also  his  lien  for  advances 
may  be  enforced  by  a  single  dis- 
tress warrant  covering  both 
claims.  Blanchard  v.  Raines,  20 
Fla.  467.  A  seizure  of  the  prop- 
erty.in  the  tenant's  possession  is 
a  sufficient  notice  of  the  proceed- 
ing. Blanchard  v.  Raines,  20  Fla. 
467. 


581  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  611 

land  for  advances  made  in  money,  or  other  things  of  value, 
whether  made  directly  by  them  or  at  their  instance  and  re- 
quest by  another  person,  or  for  which  they  have  assumed  the 
legal  responsibility,  at  or  before  the  time  at  which  such  ad- 
vances were  made,  for  the  sustenance  or  well-being  of  the 
tenant  or  his  family,  or  for  preparing  the  ground  for  cultiva- 
tion, or  for  cultivating,  gathering,  saving,  handling  or  prepar- 
ing the  crop  for  market;  and  they  shall  have  a  lien  also  upon 
each  and  every  article  advanced,  and  upon  all  property  pur- 
chased with  money  advanced,  or  obtained  by  barter  or  ex- 
change for  any  articles  advanced,  for  the  aggregate  value  or 
price  of  all  such  property  or  articles  so  advanced;  and  such 
liens  upon  the  crop  shall  be  of  equal  dignity  with  liens  for 
rent,  and,  upon  the  articles  advanced,  shall  be  paramount  to 
all  other  liehs. 

The  lien  is  enforced  by  a  distress  warrant  directed  to  the 
executive  officer  of  the  court.  This  is  issued  upon  an  affidavit 
stating  the  amount  or  quantity  and  value  of  the  rent  due, 
and  whether  it  is  payable  in  money,  cotton,  or  other  agricul- 
tural product  or  thing.  If  the  property  levied  upon  be  not 
replevied  and  the  defendant  has  not  appeared  within  ten  days, 
it  is  sold,  and  the  proceeds  applied  to  the  payment  of  the  lien 
claim  and  costs. '^^ 

§611.  Georgia.'^ — Landlords  have  a  special  lien  for  rent 
on  crops  made  on  land  rented  from  them,  superior  to  all  other 

■^^If  the  tenant  claims  that  cer-  Prior  to  this  statute  the  landlord 

tain  property  is  exempt  from  levy  had  no  lien  except  by  contract  on 

and    sale,   the   question    should   be  the   crop  until  the   levy  of  a  dis- 

settled   in  law^.     The  landlord  can  tress    warrant.      Lien    for    rent    is 

not   invoke   the  aid   of  a  court   of  superior    to    exemption    set    apart 

equity  to  enforce  his  lien.  Haynes  in  crops  under  the  code.     Shirling 

V.  McGeehee,  17  Fla.  159.     The  af-  v.   Kennon,  119  Ga.  501.     The  lien 

fidavit  is  equivalent  to  a  declara-  of  the  landlord  is  superior  to  the 

tion.      Smoot    v.    Strauss,    21    Fla.  lien   of   a    common-law   judgment. 

611.  Floyd  V.   Cook,   118  Ga.   528,  45   S. 

76  Code    1911,    §§    3340-3341,    3348.  E.  441,  63  L.  R.  A.  450. 


6ii 


LIENS. 


582 


liens  except  liens  for  taxes,'"  to  which  they  shall  be  inferior, 
and  shall  also  have  a  general  lien  on  the  property  of  the 
debtor,  liable  to  levy  and  sale,  and  such  general  lien  shall  date 
from  the  time  of  the  levy  of  a  distress  w^arrant  to  enforce  the 
sameJ^  Such  general  lien  of  landlords  shall  be  inferior  to 
liens  for  taxes  and  the  general  and  special  lien  of  laborers,  but 
shall  rank  with  other  liens,  and  with  each  other,  according  to 
date,  the  date  being  from  the  time  of  levying  a  distress  war- 
rant. The  special  liens  of  landlords  for  rent  shall  date  from 
the  maturity  of  the  crops  on  the  lands  rented,  unless  other- 


""Saulsbury  v.  McKellar,  59  Ga. 
301.  This  lien  is  superior  to  an 
agreement  between  the  tenant  and 
one  who  cultivated  the  premises 
with  him  on  shares,  whereby  the 
latter  was  to  have  all  the  cotton 
to  be  raised  thereon.  Alston  v. 
Wilson,  64  Ga.  482.  The  tenant  is 
not  entitled  to  any  exeption  out 
of  the  crop  till  the  rent  of  the 
land  upon  which  the  crop  was 
raised  is  paid.  Davis  v.  Meyers,  41 
Ga.  95.  This  special  lien  can  be  en- 
forced only  by  distress  warrant. 
The  title  to  the  crop  is  not  in  the 
landlord,  and  therefore  he  can  not 
sue  for  it  in  trover,  or  for  its 
value  in  assumpsit.  Worrill  v. 
Barnes,  57  Ga.  404;  Colclough  v. 
Mathis,  79  Ga.  394,  4  S.  E.  762. 
Landlord  must  foreclose  his  lien. 
He  can  not  take  possession  as 
against  a  purchaser.  Hall  v.  Mc- 
Gaughey,  114  Ga.  405,  40  S.  E.  246. 
A  bona  fide  purchaser  of  crop 
from  tenant  takes  it  free  from 
landlord's  lien.  Holmes  v.  Pye,  107 
Ga.  784.  33  S.  E.  816.  Before  the 
landlord  can  assert  his  lien  on  a 
crop,  he  must  prove  that  it  was 
raised    on    the    rented    land.      The 


burden  of  this  proof  is  upon  him. 
Saulsbury  v.  McKellar,  55  Ga.  322. 
"SWhen  the  hire  of  animals  or 
other  personalty  upon  a  farm  is 
included  in  the  rent  for  the  whole, 
the  entire  sum  is  rent,  and  may  be 
collected  by  distress.  Lathrop  v. 
Clewis,  63  Ga.  282.  An  affidavit  to 
enforce  the  special  Hen  should  al- 
lege a  demand  and  refuse  to  pay 
the  rent.  Hill  v.  Reeves,  57  Ga. 
31 ;  Lathrop  v.  Clewis,  63  Ga.  282. 
This  is  not  necessary  in  case  of  a 
general  lien.  Buffington  v.  Hilley, 
55  Ga.  655.  The  affidavit  to  fore- 
close the  landlord's  lien  for  sup- 
plies is  sufficient  if  it  sets  out 
fully  the  relation  of  landlord  and 
tenant,  states  that  the  landlord 
furnished  the  tenant  with  supplies 
to  make  a  crop  for  a  particular 
year,  states  the  amount  claimed, 
and  a  demand  and  refusal  to  pay 
after  the  debt  became  due.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  set  out  the  prop- 
erty on  which  the  lien  is  claimed. 
Ward  V.  Blalock,  72  Ga.  804; 
Scruggs  V.  Gibson,  40  Ga.  511; 
Sharp  V.  Morgan,  9  Ga.  App.  487, 
71  S.  E.  766;  Nash  v.  Orr,  9  Ga. 
App.  33,  70  S.  E.  194;  Smith  v. 
Smith,  105  Ga.  717,  31  S.  E.  754. 


58: 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


6ll 


wise  agreed  on,  but  shall  not  be  enforced  by  distress  warrants 
until  said  rent  is  due,  unless  the  tenant  is  removing  his  prop- 
erty, or  when  other  legal  process  is  being  enforced  against 
said  crops,  when  the  landlord  may  enforce  said  liens,  both 
general  and  special."^  This  special  lien  may  be  foreclosed 
by  the  transferee  in  his  own  name. 


^9 An  ordinary  distress  for  rent 
implies  that  the  plaintiff  is  the 
landlord.  An  assignee  can  suc- 
ceed to  a  landlord's  lien  only  by 
an  assignment  of  the  same  in 
writing.  Code  1911,  §  3343;  Driv- 
er V.  Maxwell,  56  Ga.  11.  With- 
out such  assignment,  the  right  to 
enforce  the  lien  remains  in  the 
landlord.  If  the  proceeding  be  by 
an  assignee,  both  the  contract  and 
the  assignment  must  be  set  out  or 
described  in  the  affidavit.  Lath- 
rop  V.  Clewis,  63  Ga.  282.  Inas- 
much as  the  landlord's  special  lien 
dates  from  the  maturity  of  the 
crop,  and  his  general  lien  from 
the  levy  of  a  distress  warrant,  a 
mere  transfer  of  a  note  given  for 
rent,  which  transfer  is  made  in 
writing  before  either  of  these 
events  happen,  is  not  an  assign- 
ment of  any  lien.  Lathrop  v. 
Clewis,  63  Ga.  282.  A  levy  is  not 
required  to  fix  the  landlord's  lien 
on  crops.  Cochran  v.  Waits,  127 
Ga.  93,  56  S.  E.  241.  Under  the 
Act  of  September  27,  1883  (Code 
1911,  §  3343),  a  special  lien  for 
rent  arises  in  favor  of  the  trans- 
feree of  a  rent  note  when  the 
crop  matures,  if  the  transfer  was 
made  in  writing  before  such  ma- 
turity. Andrew  v.  Stewart,  81  Ga. 
53,  7  S.  E.  169;  Garner  v.  Doug- 
lasville  Banking  Co.,  136  Ga.  310, 
71  S.  E.  478.  It  is  a  misdemeanor 
for   a   tenant   to   dispose   of  prop- 


erty on  which  the  landlord  has  a 
lien  without  the  consent  of  the 
landlord.  2  Code  1911,  §  729;  Mor- 
rison V.  State,  111  Ga.  642,  36  S.  E. 
902;  Reece  v.  State,  5  Ga.  App. 
663,  63  S.  E.  670.  If  the  tenant  is 
removing  his  property,  the  land- 
lord may  distrain  before  the  rent 
is  due.  Rosenstein  v.  Forester,  57 
Ga.  94.  When  a  landlord  is 
lulled  into  security  so  that  he 
permits  a  creditor  of  the  tenant 
to  take  possession  of  the  tenant's 
crop  a  promise  will  be  implied  on 
the  part  of  the  possessor  to  pay 
the  rent.  Shealey  v.  Clark,  117 
Ga.  794,  45  S.  E.  70.  A  laborer's 
lien  in  the  absence  of  equitable 
grounds  can  not  participate  in  a 
fund  in  court  under  other  process. 
Bryan  v.  Madison  Supply  Co.,  135 
Ga.  171;  68  S.  E.  1106.  The  lien  of 
the  landlord  for  rent  is  superior 
to  the  lien  for  supplies  furnished. 
Madison  Supply  &  Hardware  Co. 
V.  Richardson,  8  Ga.  App.  344,  69 
S.  E.  45.  For  holding  in  conflict 
between  lien  of  laborer  and  for 
furnishing  materials  where  the  la- 
borer has  a  special  contract  with 
the  tenant,  see  Rousey  v.  Mattox, 
111  Ga.  883,  36  S.  E.  925.  No  de- 
mand need  be  made  before  fore- 
closure, when  the  tenant  is  re- 
moving his  crops  from  the  prem- 
ises. Vaughn  v.  Strickland,  108 
Ga.  659,  34  S.  E.  192. 


§  6ii 


LIENS. 


584 


Landlords^*^  furnishing  supplies,  money,  horses,  mules, 
asses,  oxen,  farming  utensils  of  necessity,  to  make  crops,  have 
the  right  to  secure  themselves  from  the  crops  of  the  year  in 
which  such  things  are  clone  or  furnished,  upon  such  terms 
as  may  be  agreed  upon  by  the  parties  with  the  following 
conditions  :^^ 


^f*If  a  landlord  having  a  lien  for 
his  rent  and  a  lien  for  supplies  as- 
signs the  latter  lien  for  the  pur- 
pose of  enabling  the  tenant  to 
procure  supplies  of  the  assignee, 
and  the  supplies  are  furnished  by 
the  assignee  on  the  faith  of  this 
lien,  the  landlord  is  estopped  from 
attacking  the  validity  of  the  lien 
in  the  hands  of  the  assignee. 
Zachry  v.  Stewart,  67  Ga.  218.  In 
order  to  have  a  lien  for  supplies, 
the  landlord  himself  must  furnish 
them.  He  has  no  lien  by  reason 
of  having  become  his  tenant's 
surety  for  the  price  of  the  articles, 
when  these  are  furnished  by  some 
other  person  directly  to  the  ten- 
ant. The  landlord  may  furnish 
them  directly  from  his  own  stores, 
or  may  order  them  from  others 
on  his  credit.  He  has  a  lien  if  he 
is  the  real  purchaser  for  the  ten- 
ant, and  it  does  not  matter  that 
the  tenant  has  joined  him  in  a 
joint  and  several  note  for  the 
price.  If,  however,  the  tenant  is 
the  real  purchaser  in  the  first  in- 
stance, there  is  no  lien.  Scott  v. 
Pound,  61  Ga.  579;  Swann  v.  Mor- 
ris, 83  Ga.  143,  9  S.  E.  1G1.  An  as- 
signee of  a  note  by  a  tenant  to 
his  landlord  may  enforce  the  Hen. 
Mercer  v.  Cross,  79  Ga.  432,  5  S. 
E.  245.  A  landlord  is  entitled  to 
a  lien  for  supplies  furnished  to 
the  tenant  at  the  tenant's  request, 
but    furnished   by   a    third    person, 


where  the  landlord,  at  the  tenant's 
request,  assumes  entire  liability 
for  the  debt.  Henderson  v. 
Hughes,  4  Ga.  App.  52,  60  S.  E.  813; 
Garner  v.  Douglasville  Banking 
Co.,  136  Ga.  310,  71  S.  E.  478.  For 
a  description  of  property  held 
sufficient  in  a  contract  creating  a 
landlord's  lien  for  supplies  fur- 
nished, see  Strickland  v.  Stiles, 
107  Ga.  308,  ZZ  S.  E.  85.  Special 
liens  held  by  landlord  for  rent 
and  supplies  are  superior  to  com- 
mon-law judgment  liens.  Coch- 
ran V.  Waits,  127  Ga.  93,  56  S. 
E.  241.  Where  a  tenant  contracts 
with  a  trustee  as  landlord  the 
trustee  may  foreclose  a  lien 
in  his  own  name  for  supplies  fur- 
nished, even  though  the  land  and 
such  supplies  furnished  belonged 
to  the  trustee's  principal.  Farga- 
son  V.  Ford,  119  Ga.  343,  46  S.  E. 
431. 

siThe  lien  may  be  enforced  as 
provided  in  Code  1911,  §  3366, 
which  is  a  general  provision  for 
the  enforcement  of  liens  upon 
personal  property.  See  Ch.  xxii, 
infra.  A  landlord  who  has  agreed 
to  board  his  tenant  may  have  a 
lien  on  the  crop  for  such  board. 
Jones  V.  Eubanks,  86  Ga.  616, 
12  S.  E.  1065.  A  tenant  is  not 
estopped  to  deny  the  right  of  the 
landlord  to  foreclose  a  lien  for 
rent  of  a  former  year,  by  reason 
of    the    fact    that    he    has    agreed 


585 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


6ll 


1.  The  liens  shall  arise  by  operation  of  law  from  the  re- 
lation of  landlord  and  tenant,^-  as  well  as  by  special  con- 
tract in  writing,  whenever  the  landlord  shall  furnish  the 
articles  above  enumerated,  or  any  one  of  them,  to  the  ten- 
ant, for  the  purpose  therein  named. 

2.  Whenever  said  liens  may  be  created  by  special  con- 
tract in  writing,  as  now  provided  by  law,  the  same  shall  be 
assignable  by  the  landlord,  and  may  be  enforced  by  the  as- 
signees in  the  manner  provided  for  the  enforcement  of  such 
liens  by  landlords. 

3.  They  shall  only  exist  as  liens  on  the  crop  of  the  year 
in  which  they  are  made,^^  and  may  be  foreclosed  before  the 
debt  is  due  if  the  tenant  is  removing  or  seeking  to  remove 
his  crop  from  the  premises,  or  where  other  legal  process, 
not  in  favor  of  the  landlord  nor  controlled  by  him  nor  levied 
at  his  instance  or  procurement,  is  being  enforced  against 
said  crop. 

4.  Every  person  giving  a  lien  under  this  section,  having 
previously  given  a  lien  or  liens  under  it  or  any  other  lien, 
shall,  when  giving  a  new  lien  hereunder,  on  the  same  prop- 
erty to  another  person,  inform  such  person,  if  interrogated, 
as  to  the  facts  of  the  amount  of  such  lien  or  liens  and  to 
whom  given. ^"^ 


that  the  lien  shall  include  the 
debt  of  the  former  year.  Parks 
V.  Simpson,  124  Ga.  523,  52  S.  E. 
616.  See  also,  Fletcher  Guano  Co. 
V.  Vorus,  10  Ga.  App.  380,  IZ  S.  E. 
348.  A  landlord  has  a  lien  for  the 
price  of  his  horse  sold  to  the  ten- 
ant, in  accordance  with  a  contract 
to  that  efifect  where  such  horse 
was  necessary  to  the  making  of 
the  crop.  Boyce  v.  Day.  3  Ga. 
App.  275,  59  S.  E.  930.  The  land- 
lord must  foreclose  his  special 
lien  for  supplies  furnished  in  or- 
der to  defeat  a  judgment  creditor. 


Lightner  v.  Brannen,  99  Ga.  606, 
27  S.  E.  703. 

S-*There  is  no  lien  against  crop- 
per. Fields  V.  Argo,  103  Ga.  387, 
30  S.  E.  29. 

ssparks  v.  Simpson,  124  Ga.  523, 
52  S.  E.  616. 

84Such  person  giving  false  in- 
formation as  to  the  facts  afore- 
said shall  be  deemed  a  common 
cheat  and  swindler,  and,  on  con- 
viction thereof,  shall  be  punished 
as  prescribed  in  Penal  Code  1911, 
§  714.  These  liens  are  hereby 
declared  to  be  superior  in  rank  to 


§    6l2 


LIENS. 


586 


§612.     Georgia    (continued).     Distress   for   rent.^^ — The 

landlord  shall  have  power  to  distrain  for  rent  as  soon  as  the 
same  is  due,  or  before  due  if  the  tenant  is  seeking  to  re- 
move his  goods  from  the  premises. ^^ 

The  landlord's  lien  for  his  rent  shall  attach  from  the  time 
of  levying  his  distress  warrant,  but  it  shall  take  precedence 
of  no  lien  of  older  date  except  as  to  crop  raised  on  the  prem- 
ises. 

Landlords  may  have,  by  special  contract  in  writing,  a 
lien  upon  the  crops  of  their  tenants  for  such  stock,  farming 
utensils,  and  provisions  furnished  such  tenants  for  the  pur- 
pose of  making  their  crops. ^^ 

Any  person  who  may  have  rent  due  may,  by  himself,  his 
agent  or  attorney,  make  application  to  any  justice  of  the 
peace  within  the  county  where  his  debtor  may  reside,  or 
where  his  property  may  be  found,  and  obtain  from  such  jus- 
tice a  distress  warrant  for  the  sum  claimed  to  be  due,  on  the 
oath  of  the  principal  or  agent,  or  attorney,  in  writing,  for 
the  said  rent,  which  may  be  levied  by  any  constable,  duly 


other  liens,  except  liens  for  taxes, 
the  general  and  special  liens  of 
laborers  and  the  special  liens  of 
landlords,  to  which  they  shall 
be  inferio.r,  and  shall,  as  between 
themselves  and  other  liens  not 
herein  excepted,  rank  according 
to  date.     Code  1911,  §  3348. 

85  Code  1911,  §§  3700,  3701,  5390- 
5392.  To  justify  a  distress  war- 
rant, the  relation  of  landlord  and 
tenant  must  exist.  Cohen  v. 
Broughton,  54  Ga.  296;  Payne  v. 
Holt,  61  Ga.  355;  Ferguson  v. 
Hardy,  59  Ga.  758.  A  tenant  who 
sublets  to  another  stands  in  the 
relation  of  landlord  to  him,  and 
may  distrain.  Harrison  v.  Guill, 
46  Ga.  427.  A  proceeding  before 
a  justice  to  foreclose  a  landlord's 
lien  must  be  brought  in  the  mili- 


tia district  in  which  defendant  re- 
sides or  has  property.  Jones  v. 
Wylie,  82  Ga.  745,  9  S.  E.  614.  The 
affidavit  for  a  distress  warrant  is 
amendable.  Bryant  v.  Mercier, 
82  Ga.  409,  9  S.  E.  166;  Jones  v. 
Eubanks,  86  Ga.  616,  12  S.  E.  1065. 

8GA  tenant  seeking  to  remove 
from  the  premises  any  portion  of 
the  commercial  crops  before  the 
rent  is  due,  without  his  landlord's 
consent,  is  subject  to  distress  im- 
mediately, no  matter  what  may  be 
the  purpose  or  intent  of  such  re- 
moval. Daniel  v.  Harris,  84  Ga. 
479,  10  S.  E.  1013;  Jones  v.  Eu- 
banks, 86  Ga.  616,  12  S.  E.  1065; 
Vaughn  v.  Strickland,  108  Ga.  659, 
34  S.   E.  192. 

87Code  1911,  §3702. 


587  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  613 

qualified,  on  any  property  belonging  to  said  debtor,  whether 
found  on  the  premises  or  elsewhere,  who  shall  advertise  and 
sell  the  same,  as  in  case  of  levy  and  sale  under  execution; 
provided,  if  the  sum  claimed  to  be  due  exceeds  one  hundred 
dollars,  and  said  warrant  shall  be  levied  by  a  constable,  it 
shall  be  his  duty  to  deliver  the  warrant,  with  a  return  of  the 
property  levied  upon,  to  the  sheriff  of  said  county  or  his 
deputy,  who  shall  advertise  and  sell  as  now  provided  by 
law  for  sheriff's  sales. 

The  party  distrained  may  in  all  cases  replevy  the  property 
so  distrained,  by  making  oath  that  the  sum,  or  some  part 
thereof,  distrained  for  is  not  due,  and  give  security  for  the 
eventual  condemnation  money;  and  in  such  case  the  levy- 
ing officer  shall  return  the  same  to  the  court  having  cog- 
nizance thereof,  which  shall  be  tried  by  a  jury  as  provided 
for  in  the  trial  of  claims. 

When  property  distrained  may  be  claimed  by  a  third  per- 
son, the  same  shall  be  claimed  on  oath,  and  bond  given  as 
required  in  cases  of  other  claims,  which  shall  be  returned 
and  tried  as  provided  by  law  for  the  trial  of  the  right  of 
property  levied  upon  by  execution. 

§  613.  Illinois.^^ — In  all  cases  of  distress  for  rent,  the 
landlord,  by  himself,  his  agent  or  attorney,  may  seize  for 
rent  any  personal  property  of  his  tenant  that  may  be  found 
in  the  county  where  such  tenant  shall  reside  ;^^  and  in  no 

88  Hurd's    Rev.    Stats.    1913,    ch.  162  111.   158,  44  N.   E.  411,  affd.   59 

80,  §§   16-30.     The  statutes  of  this  111.  App.  89.    See  also.  Springer  v. 

state    in    regard    to    the    landlord's  Lipsis,   110  111.  App.    109,  affd.  209 

right    of    distress    do    not    create  111.  261,  70  N.   E.  641;   Downey  v. 

the  right,  but  recognize  and  regu-  Chicago  T.  &  T.  Co.,  86  111.  App. 

late    the    right    which    existed    by  664.     It  is   not  necessary  that   the 

common   law.     Penny  v.    Little,   4  lease    should    reserve     the      right. 

111.    301;    Johnson    v.    Trussing,    4  Penny  v.   Little,  4  111.  301. 

111.  App.  575.     Except  as  to  crops  SDUnder    this    statute    the    land- 

a  landlord  can  only  acquire  a  lien  lord  has  no  lien  upon  the  personal 

by  commencing  proceedings.   Kel-  property  of  the  tenant  prior  to  the 

log    Newspaper    Co.    v.    Peterson,  actual    levy    of    the    distress    war- 


6i3 


LIENS. 


588 


case  shall  the  property  of  any  other  person,  although  the 
same  may  be  found  on  the  premises,  be  liable  to  siezure  for 
rent  due  from  such  tenant. ®® 

The  person  making  the  distress  must  immediately  file 
with  a  justice  of  the  peace,  or  with  the  clerk  of  a  court  of  rec- 
ord of  competent  jurisdiction,  a  copy  of  the  distress  warrant, 
with  an  inventory  of  the  property  levied  upon.^^ 

Upon  the  filing  of  such  copy  the  justice  of  the  peace  or 
clerk  issues  a  summons  against  the  party  against  whom  the 
distress  warrant  is  issued,  returnable  as  other  summons. 

The  suit  thereupon  proceeds  as  in  case  of  an  attachment. 

The  defendant  may  avail  himself  of  any  set-ofT  or  other 
defence  which  would  have  been  proper  if  the  suit  had  been 
for  the  rent  in  any  form  of  action  and  with  like  effect. ^^ 


rant.  Leopold  v.  Godfrey,  50 
Fed.  145;  National  Cash  Register 
Co.  V.  Wait,  158  111.  App.  168.  The 
landlord  need  not  enforce  his  lien 
by  distress  where  the  tenant  de- 
livers the  crop  to  him  to  satisfy 
the  lien.  Colean  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Jones, 
122  111.  App.  172. 

90  The  landlord  cannot  distrain 
the  goods  of  a  stranger  or  a  sub- 
tenant, the  latter  being  liable  only 
to  his  immediate  lessor.  Gray  v. 
Rawson,  11  111.  527;  Emmert  v. 
Reinhardt,  67  111.  481.  The  dis- 
tress can  be  levied  only  upon 
property  of  the  tenant  found  in 
the  county.  Uhl  v.  Dighton,  25 
111.  154.  When  the  facts  are  such 
as  to  put  a  purchaser  on  guard 
and  he  buys  from  the  tenant  not- 
withstanding such  facts,  he  will  be 
liable  to  the  landlord  for  the  value 
of  such  property.  Carter  v.  An- 
drews, 56  111.  App.  646.  The  bur- 
den is  on  the  landlord  to  show 
that  the  purchaser  had  notice  of 
the    landlord's    lien.      Brownell    v. 


Twyman,  68  111.  App.  67.  See 
also,  Faith  v.  Taylor,  69  111.  App. 
419. 

91  As  to  requisites  of  allega- 
tion, proof,  and  practice,  see  Bart- 
lett  V.  Sullivan,  87  111.  21'9;  Rauh 
V.  Ritchie,  1  111.  App.  188;  Alwood 
V.  Mansfield,  33  111.  452;  Cox  v. 
Jordan,  86  111.  560,  561.  The  land- 
lord cannot  by  distress  warrant 
enforce  a  lien  under  the  Land- 
lord and  Tenant  Act  on  account  of 
the  tenant's  failure  to  faithfully 
perform  the  provisions  of  the 
lease.  Lord  v.  Johnson,  120  111. 
App.   55. 

92  See  Cox  v.  Jordan,  86  111.  560; 
Lindley  v.  Miller,  67  111.  244;  Al- 
wood V.  Mansfield,  33  111.  452.  In 
an  action  of  trespass  by  a  tenant 
against  his  landlord  for  an  illegal 
distress,  the  latter,  it  seems,  may 
recoup  to  the  extent  of  the  rent 
unpaid,  although  this  may  not  be 
due.  Cunnea  v.  Williams,  11  111. 
App.    72. 


589  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  613 

The  judgment  has  the  same  effect  as  in  suits  commenced 
by  summons, ^^  and  execution  may  issue  thereon,  not  only 
against  the  property  distrained,  l)ut  also  against  the  other 
property  of  the  defendant.  But  the  property  distrained,  if 
the  same  has  not  been  replevied  or  released  from  seizure, 
shall  be  first  sold. 

If  any  property  distrained  is  of  a  perishable  nature  and 
in  danger  of  immediate  waste  or  decay,  and  it  has  not  been 
replevied  or  bonded,  the  landlord  or  his  agent  or  attorney 
may,  upon  giving  notice  to  the  defendant  or  his  attorney, 
if  either  can  be  found  in  the  county,  or  if  neither  can  be 
found,  without  any  notice,  apply  to  the  judge  or  a  master 
in  chancery  of  the  court  in  which,  or  the  justice  of  the  peace 
before  whom,  the  suit  is  pending,  describing  the  property, 
and  showing  that  the  same  is  so  in  danger,  and  if  such 
judge,  master  or  justice  of  the  peace  is  satisfied  that  the 
property  is  of  a  perishable  nature  and  in  danger  of  imme- 
diate waste  or  decay,  and  if  the  defendant  or  his  attorney 
is  not  served  with  notice,  or  does  not  appear,  that  he  can 
not  be  found  in  the  county,  he  may  issue  an  order  to  the 
person  having  possession  of  the  property,  directing  the  sale 
thereof,  upon  such  time  and  such  notice,  terms,  and  condi- 
tions as  the  judge,  master,  or  justice  of  the  peace  shall  think 
for  the  best  interests  of  all  the  parties  concerned.  The  money 
arising  from  such  sale  must  be  deposited  with  the  clerk  of 
the  court  in  which,  or  the  justice  of  the  peace  before  whom 
the  suit  is  pending,  there  to  abide  the  event  of  the  suit. 

The  right  of  the  landlord  to  distrain  the  personal  goods 
of  the  tenant  shall  continue  for  the  period  of  six  months 
after  the  expiration  of  the  term  for  which  the  premises  were 
demised  or  the  tenancy  is  terminated. ^^ 

93  See  Clevenger  v.  Dunaway,  84  it.     Werner    v.    Ropiequet.   44   III. 

111.  367.  522.     The  landlord  has  no  lien,  ex- 

94A    warrant    issued    afterward  cept   on   crops  grown  or  growing, 

is  illegal  and  void,  and  affords  no  for   his    rent   until   the    seizure   of 

protection    to    the    officer    levying  said    other    property    by    distress 


6i4 


LIENS. 


590 


When  the  rent  is  payable  wholly  or  in  part  in  specific 
articles  of  property  or  products  of  the  premises,  or  labor, 
the  landlord  may  distrain  for  the  value  of  such  articles,  pro- 
ducts or  labor.^^ 

The  same  articles  of  personal  property  which  are,  by  law, 
exempt  from  execution,  except  the  crops  grown  or  growing 
upon  the  demised  premises,  shall  also  be  exempt  from  dis- 
tress for  rent.^*' 

§  614.  Illinois'^"  (continued).  Lien  upon  crops. — Every 
landlord  shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  crops  grown  or  growing 


or  in  some  other  proceedings.  A. 
N.  Kellogg  Newspaper  Co.  v. 
Peterson,  162  111.  158,  44  N.  E.  411, 
53  Am.   St.  300. 

95  A  warrant  under  this  section 
is  not  vitiated  by  the  use  of  the 
term  "damages"  instead  of  "rent." 
Craig  V.  Merime,  16  111.  App.  214. 

96  It  is  against  public  policy  to 
allow  a  tenant  to  waive  his  ex- 
emption in  a  lease.  Curtiss  v. 
Ellenwood,  59  111.  App.  110. 

97  Kurd's  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  p.  1540, 
§§  31-34.  If  a  landlord  is  not  en- 
dangered he  has  no  right  to  dis- 
train for  undue  rent.  Hill  v. 
Coats,  109  111.  App.  266.  This  stat- 
ute makes  a  distinction  between 
agricultural  products  and  the  gen- 
eral personal  property  of  the  ten- 
ant. A  lien  is  given  upon  the 
crops  grown  in  any  year  for  the 
rent  that  shall  accrue  during  such 
year,  but  no  specific  lien  is  given 
as  to  any  other  property  of  the 
tenant.  The  giving  of  a  lien  upon 
crops  by  implication  excludes  the 
idea  of  a  lien  on  any  other  prop- 
erty of  the  tenant.  Hadden  v. 
Knickerbocker,  70  111.  677,  22  Am. 
Rep.   80;    Herron   v.    Gill,    112   111. 


247.  The  distinction  was  doubt- 
less owing  to  the  fact  that  agricul- 
ture is  the  chief  industry  of  the 
state.  It  may  have  been  thought 
that  it  could  work  no  serious  in- 
jury to  trade  if  one  kind  of  prop- 
erty alone  were  subject  to  a  statu- 
tory lien,  but  that  to  extend  this 
lien  to  all  the  personal  property 
owned  by  a  tenant  in  the  county 
would  interfere  with  it  very  ma- 
terially. Morgan  v.  Campbell,  22 
Wall.  (U.  S.)  381,  390,  22  L.  ed. 
796,  per  Davis,  J.  The  levy  of 
a  distress  warrant  is  not  essential 
to  the  landlord's  right  of  posses- 
sion of  the  property  upon  which 
he  has  a  lien  for  rent.  Such  war- 
rant is  not  his  exclusive  remedy 
for  the  assertion  and  protection 
of  his  lien.  The  statute  gives  him 
a  lien  upon  the  crop.  The  lien 
does  not  grow  out  of  the  levy 
of  the  distress  warrant.  The 
landlord  may  take  possession  of 
the  crop,  and  he  may  hold  it  as 
against  a  purchaser  from  the 
tenant  or  an  attaching  creditor  to 
the  extent  of  the  rent  due  him. 
Hunter  v.  Whitfield,  89  111.  229; 
Wetsel  V.   Mayers,     91     111.     497; 


591 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


614 


Upon  the  demised  premises  for  the  rent  thereof  whether  the 
same  is  payable  wholly  or  in  part  in  money  or  specific  arti- 
cles of  property  or  products  of  the  premises,  or  labor,  and 
also  for  the  faithful  performance  of  the  terms  of  the  lease. 
Such  lien  shall  continue  for  the  period  of  six  months  after 
the  expiration  of  the  term  for  which  the  premises  were  de- 
mised. 

In  all  cases  where  the  demised  premises  shall  be  sublet, 
or  the  lease  is  assigned,  the  landlord  shall  have  the  same 
right  to  enforce  his  lien  against  the  sublessee  or  assignee 
that  he  has  against  the  tenant  to  whom  the  premises  were 
demised. 

When  a  tenant  abandons  or  removes  from  the  premises 
or  any  part  thereof,  the  landlord  or  his  agent  or  attorney 
may  seize  any  grain  or  other  crops  grown  or  growing  upon 
the  premises  or  part  thereof  so  abandoned,  whether  the  rent 


Thompson  v.  Mead,  61  111.  395; 
Mead  v.  Thompson,  78  111.  62; 
Miles  V.  James,  36  111.  399;  Pretty- 
man  V.  Unland,  11  111.  206.  Where 
the  landlord  has  not  attempted  to 
exercise  his  right  to  distrain  he 
has  no  lien  upon  the  after  ac- 
quired property  of  the  possession 
of  the  lessee's  assignee.  Downey 
V.  Chicago  Title  and  Trust  Co., 
86  111.  App.  664.  A  landlord, 
without  the  levy  of  a  distress  war- 
rant, cannot  maintain  trespass, 
trover  nor  replevin.  Chapin  v. 
Miles  &  Ricketts,  151  111.  App. 
164;  Bowers  v.  Davis,  79  111.  App. 
347.  A  lease  giving  a  landlord  a 
first  lien  on  his  tenant's  goods, 
whether  they  are  exempt  by  law 
or  not,  is  like  a  chattel  mortgage 
lien.  Gubbins  v.  Equitable  Trust 
Co.,  80  111.  App.  17.  The  land- 
lord's lien  is  not  defeated  by  a 
sale  of  the  crop  by  the  tenant  to 


one  having  notice  of  the  fact  of 
tenancy  and  that  such  crop  grew 
on  the  leased  land.  Harvey  v. 
Hampton,  1C8  111.  App.  501.  The 
landlord  is  not  entitled  to  pos- 
session as  against  the  tenant 
until  the  rent  is  due.  Watt  v.  Sco- 
field,  76  111.  261.  But  a  lien  at- 
taches before  rent  is  due.  Harvey 
V.  Hampton,  108  111.  App.  501.  The 
lien  can  only  be  lost  by  waiver, 
or  by  failing  to  enforce  it  within 
the  proper  time.  The  abandon- 
ment of  proceedings  by  distress  is 
not  a  waiver  of  the  lien.  Wetsel 
V.  Mayers,  91  111.  497.  This  lien 
does  not  render  a  purchaser  of 
the  crops  from  the  tenant  for 
value,  without  notice  of  the  lien, 
liable  to  the  landlord  for  their 
conversion.  Finney  v.  Harding, 
136  111.  573,  581,  27  N.  E.  289,  12 
L.  R.  A.  605,  reversing,  32  111.  App. 
98;  Craig,  J.,  dissenting. 


§    6l4  LIENS.  592 

is  due  or  not.*^^  If  such  grain  or  other  crops  or  any  part 
thereof  is  not  fully  grown  or  matured,  the  landlord  or  his 
agent  or  attorney  shall  cause  the  same  to  be  properly  cul- 
tivated and  harvested  or  gathered,  and  may  sell  and  dispose 
of  the  same,  and  apply  the  proceeds,  so  far  as  may  be  neces- 
sary, to  compensate  him  for  his  labor  and  expenses,  and  to 
pay  the  rent;  provided,  the  tenant  may  redeem  at  any  time 
before  sale  by  tendering  the  rent  due,  and  the  reasonable 
compensation  and  expenses  of  cultivation  and  harvesting 
or  gathering  the  same,  or  he  may  replevy  the  property 
seized. ^^ 

If  any  tenant  shall,  without  the  consent  of  his  landlord, 
sell  and  remove,  or  permit  to  be  removed,  or  be  about  to 
sell  and  remove,  or  permit  to  be  removed,  from  the  demised 
premises,  such  part  or  portion  of  the  crops  raised  thereon, 
as  shall  endanger  the  lien  of  the  landlord  upon  such  crops 
for  the  rent  agreed  to  be  paid,  it  shall  and  may  be  lawful 
for  the  landlord  to  institute  proceedings  by  distress  before 
the  rent  is  due,  as  is  now  provided  by  law,  in  case  of  the 
removal  of  the  tenant  from  the  demised  premises ;  lamd 
thereafter  the  proceedings  shall  be  conducted  in  the  same 
manner  as  is  now  provided  by  law  in  ordinary  cases  of  dis- 
tress, where  the  rent  is  due  and  unpaid.^ 

98  Except  as  so  provided,  prop-  1  See  Finney  v.  Harding,  136  111. 
erty  cannot  be  taken  under  a  dis-  573,  27  N.  E.  289,  291,  12  L.  R.  A. 
tress  warrant  until  the  rent  is  due.  605,  where  Shope,  J.,  quotes  and 
Asay  V.  Sparr,  26  111.  115;  Hare  discusses  this  provision  as  bear- 
V.  Stegall,  60  111.  380;  Harms  v.  ing  upon  the  landlord's  rights 
Solem,  79  111.  460;  Johnson  v.  against  a  bona  fide  purchaser.  If 
Trussing,  4  111.  App.  575;  First  the  tenant  feeds  the  crops  to  stock, 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Adam,  138  111.  483,  28  thereby  placing  them  beyond  the 
N.   E.  955.  reach    of    the    landlord's    lien    for 

99  The  landlord's  rights  are  not  rent,  the  tenant  is  guilty  of  re- 
affected  by  notice  from  the  tenant  moval  of  the  crops  within  the 
of  his  intention  to  leave.  Hare  v.  meaning  of  the  act  relating  to 
Stegall,  60  111.  380.  See  Hammond  landlord  and  tenant.  Hopkins  v. 
V.  Will,  60  111.  404.  Wood,  79  111.  App.  484. 


593 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


6i6 


§615.  Indiana.- — In  all  cases  where  a  tenant  agrees  to 
pay,  as  rent,  a  part  of  the  crop  raised  on  the  leased  prem- 
ises, or  rent  in  kind,  or  a  cash  rent,  the  landlord  shall  have 
a  lien  on  the  crop  raised  under  such  contract  for  the  pay- 
ment of  such  rent;  which  lien,  if  the  tenant  refuse  or  neglect 
to  pay  or  deliver  to  the  landlord  such  rent  when  due,  may 
be  enforced  by  sale  of  such  crop,  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
lien  of  a  chattel  mortgage  containing  a  power  to  sell:  pro- 
vided, that  nothing  herein  contained  shall  prohibit  the  ten- 
ant, after  notice  in  writing  to  the  landlord  or  his  agent,  from 
removing  from  such  leased  premises  his  own  part  of  said 
growing  crop,  and  no  more  than  such  part,  and  from  also 
disposing  of  the  same  whenever  the  rent  is  to  be  paid  in 
part  of  the  crop  raised;  but  in  other  cases,  he  may  remove 
not  more  than  one-half  of  the  crop  growing  or  matured. 

§  616.  lowa.^ — A  landlord  shall  have  a  lien  for  his  rent 
upon  all  crops  grown  upon  the  leased  premises,'*  and  upon 


2  Burns'  Ann.  Stats.  1914,  §  8070; 
Kennard  v.  Harvey,  80  Ind.  il ; 
Shaffer  v.  Stevens,  143  Ind.  295. 
If  rent  is  to  be  paid  partly  in 
money  and  partly  in  crops  until 
the  same  are  measured  and  the 
share  of  the  landlord  delivered 
and  the  cash  rent  paid,  the  tenant 
has  no  title  to  the  crops;  the  land- 
lord may  sue  a  purchaser  of  the 
crops  from  the  tenant  in  violation 
of  the  contract  for  conversion.  Gif- 
ford  V.  Meyers,  27  Ind.  App.  348, 
61  N.  E.  210.  Purchasers  of  crops 
from  tenants  are  bound  to  take 
notice  of  the  liens  given  landlords 
by  the  statute.  Shelby  v.  Moore, 
22  Ind.  App.  371,  53  N.  E.  842; 
Campbell  v.  Bowen,  22  Ind.  App. 
562,  54  N.  E.  409.  The  landlord 
has  a  lien  on  crops  of  his  tenant 
rented  for  cash  rent   even  though 

38 


the  crops  in  the  possession  of  the 
tenant  are  exempt  from  execution. 
Keim  v.  Myers,  44  Ind.  App.  299, 
89  N.  E.  ill. 

3  Code  Ann.  1897,  §§  2992,  2993. 

•1  The  lien  attaches  to  crops 
grow^n  upon  the  demised  premises 
by  a  sublessee  of  the  tenant. 
Houghton  v.  Bauer,  70  Iowa  314, 
30  N.  W.  577;  Beck  v.  Minnesota 
and  W.  Grain  Co.,  131  Iowa  62,  107 
N.  W.  1032,  7  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  930. 
The  lien  is  not  divested  by  a  sale 
of  the  crops  by  the  tenant,  but  the 
landlord  may  follow  them  into 
the  hands  of  the  purchaser;  and 
if  he  has  consumed  them,  he  is 
liable  to  the  landlord  in  damages.. 
Holden  v.  Cox,  60  Iowa  449,  15  N. 
W.  269.  Evans  v.  Collins,  94  Iowa 
432,  t2  N.  W.  810.  The  landlord's 
statutory  lien  is  not  waived  by  a 


6i6 


LIENS. 


594 


any   other    personal   property  of  the  tenant  which  has  been 
used^   or    kept   thereon    during   the    term    and    not    exempt 


lease  providing  that  he  shall  have 
a  lien  on  all  the  property   of  the 
lessee      used      on      the      premises 
though    exempt     from     execution. 
Smith  V.   Dayton,  94  Iowa   102,  62 
N.    W.    650.      See    also,    Blake    v. 
Counselman,  95  Iowa  219,  63  N.  W. 
679.     While  a  landlord  has   a  lien 
on    the    tenant's    property    he    has 
no  right  to  possession  until  after 
rent    accrues   and   cannot    replevin 
such   property.      Hilman    v.    Brig- 
ham,    117   Iowa   70,   90   N.   W.   491. 
The    landlord's    lien    attaches    to 
a     crop     raised     by     a     subtenant. 
Beck    v.    Minnesota    &    W.    Grain 
Co.,  131   Iowa  62,   107  N.   W.   Ii032, 
7   L.    R.    A.    (N.    S.)    930.     As   be- 
tween the  landlord  and  tenant  the 
lien  will  attach  whether  the  ten- 
ancy  is   at   will   or   for   a   definite 
term.     In  re  Hersey,  171  Fed.  1001. 
See     also,     German     State     Bank 
V.     Herron,     111     Iowa    25,    82    N. 
W.   430.      The    landlord's    lien    ex- 
tends to  property  and  may  be  fol- 
lowed   in    the    hands    of    the    pur- 
chaser  from  the    tenant.     Boyd  v. 
Stipp,  151   Iowa  276,  131  N.  W.  22. 
Property    of    one     member    of    a 
partnership  kept   on   leased  prem- 
ises   is    not    subject    to    the    land- 
lord's lien.      Ward  v.  Walker,  111 
Iowa    6i'l,    82    N.    W.    1028.       But 
see,    Becker    v.    Dalby    (Iowa),    86 
N.    W.    314.      In    attachment    by    a 
landlord    against    his    tenant    the 
lien    of    the    tenant's    employe    for 
wages   is   superior   to   that    of   the 
landlord.      Stuart   v.    Twining,    112 
Iowa    154,    83    N.    W.    891.       The 
right  of  the  landlord's  lien  termi- 
nates   with    the    tenancy.       Bacon 


v.    Carr,    112    Iowa    193,   83    N.    W. 
957.        The      lien      of      the      land- 
lord attaches  to  property  brought 
on  the    leased  premises     for     the 
rent    for    the    whole    term    of    the 
tenancy.     Des    Moines    Nat.    Bank 
V.    Council    Bluffs    Sav.    Bank,    150 
Fed.  301.     The  lien  of  a  landlord 
gives  him  no  right  to  the  posses- 
sion of  the  tenant's  property,  but 
he  may  enforce  such  lien  by  judi- 
cial       proceedings.  Remington 
Typewriter   Co.   v.   McArthur,   145 
Iowa  57,  123  N.  W.  760.     The  lien 
for  rent  is  superior  to  the  lien  of 
a    judgment    on   property   not    ex- 
empt    from     execution,     but     the 
judgment   lien   for  alimony   is  su- 
perior.      Stoaks     V.     Stoaks,     146 
Iowa  61,  124  N.  W.  757.    The  land- 
lord  is   not  compelled  to  proceed 
by  attachment  to  enforce    this   lien, 
but  he  may  resort   to   other  rem- 
edies.    Citizens'  Sav.  Bank  of  Olin 
V.  Woods,  134  Iowa  232,  111  N.  W. 
929.    "Not  exempt  from  execution" 
as    used    in    the    statute    giving    a 
lien  on  crops  and  other  property 
brought    on    the    leased    premises, 
applies  to  the  other  property  and 
not  to  crops  grown  on  the  prem- 
ises.    Hipsley  v.    Price,    104  Iowa 
282,    73    N.    W.    584.      Non-lienable 
items  must  not  be  joined  in  a  suit 
to  enforce  liens  for  rent.     Crill  v. 
Jeffrey,  95  Iowa  634,  64  N.  W.  625; 
Evans   v.   Collins,  94  Iowa  432,  62 
N.  W.  810.     Where  the  rent  claim 
is  blended  with  other  claims  in  a 
note    the    landlord's    lien    is    lost. 
Ladner   v.    Balsley,    103   Iowa   674, 
72  N.   W.   787. 
^  A    different     rule     applies     to 


595 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


§  6i6 


from   execution,   for  the  period   of  one  year  after  a  year's 
rent,  or  the  rent  of  a  shorter  period,  falls  due ;  but  such  lien 


sales  of  other  personal  property. 
Thus,  if  a  tenant  keeps  a  stock 
of  goods  upon  the  demised  prem- 
ises merely  for  sale,  he  may  make 
sales  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
business,  and  the  landlord  cannot 
follow  the  goods  sold.  Grant  v. 
Whitwell,  9  Iowa  152.  The  prop- 
erty must  be  actually  used  on  the 
premises  to  entitle  the  landlord  to 
a  lien  thereon  for  rent.  Grant  v. 
Whitwell,  9  Iowa  152.  Horses  and 
wagons  used  in  connection  with 
a  grocery  business  carried  on  up- 
on the  leased  premises,  but  kept 
in  another  place,  are  not  subject 
to  the  landlord's  lien.  Van  Patten 
V.  Leonard,  55  Iowa  520,  8  N.  W. 
334.  No  lien  is  given  by  the 
statute  upon  notes  and  accounts 
due  the  tenant  and  kept  on  the 
premises.  Van  Patten  v.  Leonard, 
55  Iowa  520,  8  N.  W.  334.  The 
landlord  has  a  lien  on  property 
kept  upon  the  premises  for  the 
purpose  of  sale,  although  not 
used  for  any  other  purpose. 
The  lien  is  given  only  upon 
the  property  of  the  tenant.  The 
landlord  has  no  lien  upon  the 
property  of  third  persons,  al- 
though it  be  used  by  the  tenant 
upon  the  demised  premises  dur- 
ing the  term  of  the  lease.  Perry 
V.  Waggoner,  68  Iowa  403,  27  N. 
W.  292.  The  lien  is  subject  to  the 
course  of  business  of  the  tenant, 
"so  as  to  not  interfere  with  sales 
of  property  contemplated  by  the 
character  of  the  business  prose- 
cuted by  the  tenant,  to  which  the 
landlord  is  presumed  to  have  as- 
sented   upon    the    leasing    of    the 


premises.  Thus,  a  retail  dealer 
may  sell  goods  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  business,  free  from  the 
lien  of  his  landlord  for  rent,  and 
the  tenant  of  a  farm  may  sell 
marketing  produce  and  livestock, 
which  are  usually  kept  for  sale  by 
farmers;  in  such  cases  the  land- 
lord's lien  does  not  follow  the 
property."  Richardson  v.  Peter- 
son, 58  Iowa  724,  13  N.  W.  63.  In 
Grant  v.  Whitwell,  9  Iowa  152,  the 
court  said,  in  efifect,  that  the  lien 
attached  when  the  property  was 
brought  upon  the  leased  premises, 
and  that  it  secured  the  payment 
of  rent  before  it  became  due.  The 
doctrine  of  that  case  was  ap- 
proved in  Garner  v.  Cutting,  32 
Iowa  547.  In  Martin  v.  Stearns, 
52  Iowa  345,  3  N.  W.  92,  it  was  held 
that  the  lien  given  by  the  statute 
attached  from  the  commencement 
of  the  lease  upon  all  property  of 
the  tenant  then  on  the  leased 
premises,  and  upon  all  other  prop- 
erty afterward  brought  thereon, 
for  the  rent  of  the  entire  term. 
That  rule  was  approved  in  Gil- 
bert V.  Grenebaum,  56  Iowa  211, 
9  N.  W.  182;  and  Milner  v.  Cooper, 
65  Iowa  190,  21  N.  W.  558.  In 
Garner  v.  Cutting,  32  Iowa  547, 
it  was  also  held  that  the  landlord 
might  have  an  injunction  to  pre- 
vent the  acts  of  his  tenant  which 
wofild  destroy  or  impair  the  secu- 
rity given  by  his  lien.  But  a  land- 
lord cannot  enjoin  an  electric  light 
company,  occupying  his  land  un- 
der a  lease  for  a  term  of  years, 
from  removing  before  the  end  of 
the  lease  to  other  premises  with- 


6i6 


LIENS. 


596 


shall  not  in  any  case  continue  more  than  six  months  after 
the  expiration  of  the  term.  In  the  event  that  a  stock  of 
goods  or  merchandise,  or  a  part  thereof,  subject  to  a  land- 
lord's lien,  shall  be  sold  under  judicial  process,  order  of 
court,  or  by  an  assignee  under  a  general  assignment  for 
benefit  of  creditors,  the  lien  of  the  landlord  shall  not  be 
enforcible  against  said  stock  or  portion  thereof,  except  for 
rent  due  for  the  term  already  expired,  and  for  rent  to  be 
paid  for  the  use  of  demised  premises  for  a  period  not  ex- 
ceeding six  months  after  date  of  sale,  any  agreement  of  the 
parties  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding. 

The  lien  may  be  effected  by  the  commencement  of  an 
action,  within  the  period  above  prescribed,  for  the  rent 
alone,  in  which  action  the  landlord  will  be  entitled  to  a  writ 
of  attachment,  upon  filing  w^ith  the  proper  clerk  or  the  jus- 
tice an  affidavit  that  the  action  is  commenced  to  recover 
rent  accrued  within  one  year  previous  thereto  upon  prem- 
ises described  in  the  affidavit.® 


in  the  city,  on  which  the  company- 
intends  to  continue  and  enlarge 
its  business,  the  company  not  be- 
ing in  arrears  for  rent,  and  its 
property  being  easily  identified. 
The  statute  was  not  designed  to 
enable  the  landlord  to  do  more 
than  to  protect  the  security  which 
the  law  gave  him.  Carson  v.  Elec- 
tric Light  &  Power  Co.,  85  Iowa 
44,  51  N.  W.  1144. 

(•It  seems  the  word  "effected," 
as  used  by  the  statute,  must  be 
regarded  the  same  as  "enforced," 
for  it  does  not  require  an  action 
to  effectuate  the  lien.  It  exists 
for  and  during  the  statutory  per- 
iod, although  no  action  is  brought 
to  enforce  it.  If,  however,  it  is 
desired  to  enforce  the  lien,  then 
an  action  is  required.  A  tenant 
sold    certain    wheat    on    which    his 


landlord  had  a  lien.  The  landlord 
sued  his  tenant  before  the  expira- 
tion of  the  six  months  prescribed, 
and  recovered  judgment,  and,  af- 
ter the  expiration  of  that  time, 
sued  the  purchaser  of  the  wheat 
for  the  amount  of  the  prior  judg- 
ment. It  was  held  that  the  lien 
was  not  affected  by  the  action 
against  the  tenant,  and  that  the 
action  against  the  purchaser  was 
barred.  Nickelson  v.  Negley,  71 
Iowa  546,  Z2  N.  W.  487.  This  rem- 
edy is  purely  statutory,  and  must 
be  strictly  construed.  Merrit  v. 
Fisher,  19  Iowa  354.  An  action 
for  rent,  commenced  by  ordinary 
attachment  before  rent  is  due, 
cannot  be  deemed  an  action  to 
effect  a  landlord's  lien,  and  the 
plaintiff  takes  thereby  only  such 
a   lien  as   an  ordinary  attachment 


597 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


§    617 


If  any  tenant  of  farm  lands  shall,  with  intent  to  defraud, 
sell,  conceal,  or  in  any  manner  dispose  of  any  of  the  grain, 
or  other  annual  products  thereof  upon  which  there  is  a  land- 
lord's lien  for  unpaid  rent,  without  the  written  consent  of 
the  landlord,  he  shall  be  guilty  of  larceny  and  punished  ac- 
cordingly.'^ 

§  617.  Kansas.^ — An}^  rent  due  for  farming  land  shall  be 
a  lien  on  the  crop  growing  or  made  on  the  premises.  Such 
lien  may  be  enforced  by  action  and  attachment  therein.^ 

When  any  such  rent  is  payable  in  a  share  or  certain  pro- 
portion of  the  crop,  the  lessor  shall  be  deemed  the  owner 


gives.  Clark  v.  Haynes,  57  Iowa 
96,  10  N.  W.  292.  The  action  under 
the  statute  to  effect  the  lien  can- 
not be  commenced  before  the  rent 
is  due;  and  if  the  landlord  needs 
to  aid  his  lien  by  preventing  a  dis- 
position of  the  property,  he  must 
do  so  by  an  application  in  equity 
for  an  injunction.  Garner  v.  Cut- 
ting, 32  lovi^a  547,  552.  An  attach- 
ment may  be  issued  against  the 
crop  of  a  sublessee  grown  upon 
the  lands  demised  to  the  tenant, 
in  an  action  by  the  landlord  on  a 
promissory  note  given  by  the  ten- 
ant to  secure  the  rent.  Houghton 
■  v.  Bauer,  70  Iowa  314,  30  N.  W. 
577.  A  mortgagee  of  chattels, 
after  being  garnished  by  a  credi- 
tor of  the  mortgagor,  may  pay 
over  to  the  landlord,  out  of  the 
surplus  in  his  hands,  after  satis- 
fying the  mortgage  debt,  the  rent 
accrued  upon  the  building  in 
which  the  goods  were  kept,  and 
which  was  in  arrear  when  the 
mortgagee  tok  possession.  Doane 
V.  Garretson,  24  Iowa  351,  354. 
'Supp.  1907,  §  4852a. 


8  Dassler's  Gen  Stats.  1909, 
§§  4713-4717. 

SNeifert  v.  Ames,  26  Kans.  515. 
The  lien  exists  without  process  or 
a  seizure  on  attachment.  Scully 
V.  Porter,  57  Kans.  322,  46  Pac.  313; 
Wester  v.  Long,  63  Kans.  876,  66 
Pac.  1032.  The  landlord  having 
a  lien  on  crops  is  entitled  to  pos- 
session until  the  rent  is  paid  and 
may  maintain  replevin  therefor 
against  an  execution  creditor  of 
the  tenant.  Dale  v.  Taylor,  63 
Kans.  674,  66  Pac.  993.  The  lien 
may  be  enforced  against  a  sub- 
lessee upon  the  landlord's  attach- 
ment. Berry  v.  Berry,  8  Kans. 
App.  584,  55  Pac.  348.  The  tenant 
is  not  a  necessary  party  where  a 
landlord  seeks  to  enforce  his  lien 
against  a  purchaser  from  the  ten- 
ant. Gill  V.  Buckingham,  7  Kans. 
App.  227,  52  Pac.  897.  The  land- 
lord's statutory  lien  for  rent  is 
superior  to  the  lien  of  a  chattel 
mortgage  given  by  the  tenant  to 
one  who  advances  money  to  har- 
vest the  crop.  Salina  State  Bank 
V.  Burr,  7  Kans.  App.  197,  52  Pac. 
704. 


6i7 


LIENS. 


598 


of  such  share  or  proportion,  and  may,  if  the  tenant  refuse  to 
deliver  him  such  share  or  proportion,  enter  upon  the  land 
and  take  possession  of  the  same,  or  obtain  possession  there- 
of by  action  of  replevin. 

The  person  entitled  to  the  rent  may  recover  from  the 
purchaser  of  the  crop,  or  any 'part  thereof,  with  notice  of  the 
lien,  the  value  of  the  crop  purchased,  to  the  extent  of  the 
rent  due  and  damages. ^*^ 

When  any  person  who  shall  be  liable  to  pay  rent  (whether 
the  same  be  due  or  not,  if  it  be  due  within  one  year  there- 
after, and  whether  the  same  be  payable  in  money  or  other 
thing)  intends  to  remove,  or  is  removing,  or  has  within 
thirty  days  removed  his  property,  or  the  crops,  or  any  part 
thereof,  from  the  leased  premises,  the  person  to  whom  the 
rent  is  owing  may  commence  an  action  in  the  court  having 
jurisdiction;  and  upon  making  an  affidavit  stating  the 
amount  of  rent  for  which  such  person  is  liable,  and  one  or 
more  of  the  above  facts,  and  executing  an  undertaking  as  in 
other  cases,  an  attachment  shall  issue  in  the  same  manner 
and  with  the  like  effect  as  is  provided  by  law  in  other  ac- 
tions.^^ 


lOSee  Neifert  v.  Ames,  26  Kans. 
515.  Knowledge  of  facts  by  a 
purchaser  from  a  tenant  as  to  the 
tenancy,  the  nonpayment  of  rent 
and  the  landlord's  lien  sufficient 
to  put  such  purchaser  on  inquiry 
amounts  to  notice  of  such  lien 
binding  upon  him.  Stadel  v.  Ai- 
kins,  65  Kans.  82,  68  Pac.  1088; 
Maelzer  v.  Swan,  75  Kans.  496,  89 
Pac.  1037.  As  to  what  facts  will 
charge  a  purchaser  of  crops  with 
notice,  see  Mangum  v.  Stadel,  1() 
Kans.  764,  92  Pac.  1093. 

iiLand  was  rented  to  be  culti- 
vated in  wheat,  the  rent  being  a 
share  of  the  crop.  When  the 
wheat    was    ripe    the    tenant    har- 


vested and  removed  the  entire 
crop  from  the  premises,  against 
the  protest  of  the  landlord,  who 
afterward  commenced  an  action 
against  the  tenant  for  the  value  of 
his  share  of  the  wheat,  and  at  the 
same  time  procured  an  order  of 
attachment  to  be  issued  and  levied 
upon  the  entire  crop.  It  was  held 
that  the  action  with  the  order  of 
attachment  was  rightly  brought, 
and  could  be  maintained.  The 
landlord  had  a  lien  upon  the 
whole  crop  for  the  payment  of  his 
share ;  and  was  not  confined  to 
the  remedy  of  replevin  under  §  25 
of  the  act,  but  could  proceed  by 
attachment   under   §   27.     Tarpy  v. 


599 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


§  6i8 


In  an  action  to  enforce  a  lien  on  crops  for  rent  of  farming 
lands,  the  affidavit  for  an  attachment  shall  state  that  there 
is  due  from  the  defendant  to  the  plaintiff  a  certain  sum, 
naming  it,  for  rent  of  farming  lands,  describing  the  same, 
and  that  the  plaintiff  claims  a  lien  on  the  crop  made  on  such 
land.  Upon  making  and  filing  such  affidavit  and  executing 
an  undertaking  as  prescribed  in  the  preceding  paragraph, 
an  order  of  attachment  shall  issue  as  in  other  cases,  and 
shall  be  levied  on  such  crop  or  so  much  thereof  as  may  be 
necessary ;  and  all  other  proceedings  in  such  attachment 
shall  be  the  same  as  in  other  actions. 

§  618.  Kentucky.^- — Rent  may  be  recovered  by  distress, 
attachment,  or  action,  and  shall  bear  six  per  cent,  interest 
per  annum  from  the  time  it  is  due.  When  rent  is  reserved 
in  money,^^  a  landlord  may,  before  a  justice  of  the  peace, 
police  judge,  or  a  judge  of  the  quarterly  court  where  th.e 
land  lies,  file  an  af^davit  showing  the  amount  of  rent  due 
him  and  in  arrear,  and  thereupon  such  officer  issues  a  dis- 
tress warrant  directed  to  the  sheriff,  marshal,  or  constable, 
authorizing  such  officer  to  distrain  for  the  amount  due,  with 
interest  and  costs. 


Persing,  27  Kans.  745.  And  see 
Neifert  v.  Ames,  26  Kans.  515; 
Dale  V.  Taylor,  63  Kans.  674,  66 
Pac.  993.  The  lien  attaches  to  ev- 
ery part  of  the  crop;  and  if  a 
tenant  removes  any  appreciable 
part  of  it,  an  attachment  may  is- 
sue. The  motive  of  the  tenant  is 
immaterial.  Knowles  v.  Sell,  41 
Kans.  171,  21   Pac.   102. 

12  Carroll's  Stat.  1909,  §§  2299, 
2301,  2306,  2316.  As  to  constitu- 
tionality of  the  act,  see  Burket  v. 
Boude,  3  Dana  (Ky.)  209;  Thom- 
son v.  Tilton,  22  Ky.  L.  1004,  59  S. 
W.  485.  The  delivery  by  the  ten- 
ant   to    the    landlord    of    the    ten- 


ant's portion  of  the  crop  before 
the  lien  expires  will  preserve 
it  just  as  well  as  the  insti- 
tution of  a  suit.  Marquess  v. 
Ladd,  30  Ky.  L.  1142,  100  S.  W.  305. 
i^Distress  is  available  only 
when  rent  is  payable  in  money. 
Myers  v.  Mayfield,  7  Bush  (Ky.) 
212,  213;  Poer  v.  Peebles,  1  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  1,  3.  The  lien  reserved 
in  a  lease  contract  does  not  attach 
to  property  thereafter  acquired  by 
the  tenant  as  against  the  tenant's 
creditors.  Wender  Blue  Gem 
Coal  Co.  v.  Louisville  Property 
Co.,   137  Ky.  339,   125  S.   W.  732. 


§    6l9  LIENS.  600 

A  distress  warrant  may  issue  although  the  lease  be  not 
ended,  but  only  for  rent  then  due,  and  not  after  the  lapse  of 
six  months  from  the  time  it  was  due. 

All  valid  liens  upon  the  personal  property  of  a  lessee,  as- 
signee, or  under-tenant,  created  before  the  property  was 
carried  upon  the  leased  premises,  prevail  against  a  distress 
warrant,  or  attachment  for  rent.  If  liens  be  afterwards 
created  while  the  property  is  on  the  leased  premises,  and 
on  property  upon  which  the  landlord  has  a  superior  lien  for 
his  rent,  then,  to  the  extent  of  one  year's  rent,  whether  the 
same  accrued  before  or  after  the  creation  of  the  lien,  a  dis- 
tress or  attachment  has  preference,  provided  the  same  is 
sued  out  in  one  hundred  and  twenty  days  from  the  time  the 
rent  was  due.^* 

§  619.  Kentucky  (continued).  Lien  for  rent. — A  land- 
lord shall  have  a  superior^^  lien  on  the  produce  of  the  farm 
or  premises  rented,  on  the  fixtures,  on  the  household  furni- 
ture, and  other  personal  property  of  the  tenant,  or  under- 
tenant, owned  by  him,  after  possession  is  taken  under  the 

14A   creditor   who   levies   execu-  against  the  tenant's  creditors,  but 

tion    upon    property    subject    to    a  not  as  against  bona  fide  purchas- 

landlord's  lien  must,  upon  notice,  ers  who  take  the  property  oflf  the 

tender  the   rent   in  arrear  not   ex-  premises.     Stone  v.   Bohm,  79  Ky. 

ceeding     one     year.     Craddock    v.  141.     The    landlord,    however,    has 

Riddlesbarger,  2   Dana    (Ky.)   205;  priority    over    the    tenant's    mort- 

Burket    v.    Boude,    3    Dana    (Ky.)  gagees,  whose  liens  have  been  ac- 

209;   Williams   v.   Woods,   2   Mete.  quired  after  the  property  has  been 

(Ky.)    41.     To   render  the   lien   ef-  taken    to    the   leased   premises,   to 

fectual  against  an  attaching  cred-  the    extent   of   one   year's   rent,    if 

itor,  if  the  rent  is  not  due  at  the  the     remedy     has     been     pursued 

time  of  such  attachment,  the  land-  within    the    time   allowed   by   law. 

lord  should  sue  out  an  attachment  English  v.  Duncan,  14  Bush  (Ky.) 

or  a  distress  warrant  and  have  it  ZIT ;  Fisher  v.  Kollerts,  16  B.  Mon. 

levied   on   the    attached    property  (Ky.)  398,  408;  Williams  v.  Wood, 

on  which  he  has  a  lien.     Williams  2    Mete.    (Ky.)     41.     The     lien     is 

v.   Wood,  2  Mete.    (Ky.)   41.  subject    to   the    exemption   statute 

isCarroll's    Stats.    1909,    §§    2309,  of  May  17,  1886,  Stats.  1909,  §§  1697- 

2310,  2317.     The  lien  is  superior  as  1701a.     Rudd   v.    Ford,  91    Ky.    183, 


6oi 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


§    620 


lease ;  but  such  lien  shall  not  be  for  more  than  one  year's 
rent  due  or  to  become  due,  nor  for  any  rent  which  has  been 
due  for  more  than  one  hundred  and  twenty  days.^**  And  if 
any  such  property  be  removed  openly  from  the  leased  prem- 
ises, and  without  fraudulent  intent,  and  not  returned,  the 
landlord  shall  have  a  superior  lien  on  the  property  so  re- 
moved for  fifteen  days  from  the  date  of  its  removal,  and 
may  enforce  his  lien  against  the  property  wherever  found. ^''' 

Property  distrained  for  rent,  or  so  much  as  is  sufificient  to 
make  satisfaction,  is  sold  by  the  ofificer,  unless  within  ten 
days  from  the  day  of  levy  the  demand  be  replevied,  or  by 
other  legal  procedure  a  sale  is  prevented. 

A  distress  for  rent,  at  any  time  before  sale,  may  be  re- 
plevied for  three  months  by  the  defendant's  giving  a  bond 
with  good  surety. 


§  620.    Louisiana. 


-The  lessor  has,  for  the  payment  of 


his  rent,  and  other  obligations  of  the  lease,  a  right  of  pledge 
on  the  movable  effects  of  the  lessee,  which  are  found  on  the 
property  leased. ^^ 


12  Ky.  L.  740,  15  S.  W.  179.  The 
liwillv^iu's  Hen  on  crops  is  superior 
to  the  lien  of  a  chattel  mortgage 
given  to  an  insurance  company. 
Bowles'  Exr.  v.  Jones,  29  Ky.  L. 
1022,  96  S.  W.   1121. 

icUnder  this  statute  the  land- 
lord, in  order  to  prevail  against 
other  liens,  must  assert  his  rent 
claim  in  ninety  days;  and  to  pre- 
vail against  all  other  rights  and 
equities  of  third  persons,  he  must 
assert  it  in  one  hundred  tv^^enty 
days.  A  distress  warrant  not 
issued  within  the  latter  time  can- 
not prevail  against  the  tenant's 
assignee  under  an  assignment  for 
the  benefit  of  his  creditors.  Petry 
V.  Randolph,  85  Ky.  351.  3  S.  W. 
420;   Loth   v.   Carty,  85   Ky.   591,  4 


S.  W.  314;  Stats.  1909,  ch.  75,  art. 
II.;  Porter  v.  Rice,  (Ky)  128  S.  W. 
70;  Jones  v.  Louisville  Tobacco 
Warehouse  Co.,  135  Ky.  824,  121 
S.    W.    633,    123   S.    W.    307. 

I'^'This  provision  is  a  material 
change  from  the  statutes  of  8 
Anne,  ch.  14,  and  2  George  II.  ch. 
19,  under  which,  in  order  to  pre- 
serve the  lien  after  removal  of  the 
property,  it  was  necessary  to  show 
that  the  removal  was  fraudulent. 
Under  the  statute  of  Kentucky  it 
is  immaterial  whether  the  remov- 
al be  with  a  fraudulent  intent  or 
not.  Stone  v.  Bohm,  79  Ky.  141, 
144,  2  Ky.  L.  40. 

iSMerrick's  Rev.  Civ.  Code,  arts. 
2705-2709. 

if*The  lease  need  not  be  record- 


620 


LIENS. 


602 


In  case  of  predial  estates,  this  right  embraces  everything 
that  serves  for  the  labors  of  the  farm,-°  the  furniture  of  the 
lessee's  house,  and  the  fruits  produced  during  the  lease  of 
the  land;  and  in  the  case  of  houses  and  other  edifices,  it  in- 
cludes the  furniture  of  the  lessee.-^  and  the  merchandise 
contained  in  the  house  or  apartment,  if  it  be  a  store  or  shop. 


ed.  Johnson  v.  Tacneau,  23  La. 
Ann.  453,  454.  Furniture  lodged  by 
the  lessee  upon  the  leased  prem- 
ises is  pledged  for  the  rent.  A 
seizure  by  the  landlord,  and  a  re- 
lease of  the  seizure  by  the  les- 
see's giving  bond,  does  not  de- 
stroy or  impair  the  privilege. 
Harrison  v.  Jenks,  23  La.  Ann. 
707.  The  landlord's  privilege 
springs  from  the  nature  of  the 
debt.  A  seizure  does  not  give  the 
privilege,  and  a  release  of  the 
seizure  does  not  take  it  away. 
The  bond  is  only  an  additional 
security.  The  privilege  still  ex- 
ists against  the  property.  Harri- 
son V.  Jenks,  23  La.  Ann.  707.  See 
Conrad  v.  Patzelt,  29  La.  Ann.  465 ; 
Schall  v.  Kinsella,  117  La.  687,  42 
So.  221.  The  landlord's  privilege, 
for  rent  due  and  for  rent  not  due, 
prevails  against  a  seizure  by  a 
judgment  creditor  of  the  lessee. 
Harmon  v.  Juge,  6  La.  Ann.  768; 
Robinson  v.  Staples,  5  La.  Ann. 
712;  Gleason  v.  Sheriff,  20  La. 
Ann.  266.  The  sheriff  may  be  or- 
dered to  retain  in  his  hands  the 
proceeds  of  the  property  sold, 
and  such  order  continues  the  land- 
lord's privilege  in  force.  New 
Orleans  v.  Vaught,  12  La.  Ann. 
339.  As  to  the  landlord's  reme- 
dies in  such  case,  see  Robb  v. 
Wagner,  5  La.  Ann.  111.  The  les- 
sor   is    not    bound    to    enforce    his 


privilege  before  pursuing  the 
lessee's  sureties.  Ledoux  v. 
Jones,  20  La.  Ann.  539.  Agree- 
ments in  the  lease  whereby  the 
lessee  is  to  repair  are  secured 
by  the  privilege.  Warfield  v. 
Oliver,  23  La.  Ann.  612.  But  on 
the  other  hand  the  covenant  of  a 
landlord  to  pay  for  improvements 
erected  by  a  tenant  does  not  con- 
stitute a  lien  on  the  premises. 
Confiscation  Cases,  1  Woods  (U. 
S.)  221.  The  lessor  has  no  priv- 
ilege on  a  debt  due  the  lessee. 
Edwards  v.  Fairbanks,  Louque's 
Dig.  583.  But  a  banker's  movable 
effects,  subject  to  the  privilege, 
embrace  notes,  certificates  of 
stock,  and  the  like,  on  the  prem- 
ises. Matthews  v.  Creditors,  10 
La.  Ann.  718.  The  right  of  pledge 
held  by  the  lessor  on  the  chattels 
of  his  sublessee  is  only  for  the 
amount  owing  by  the  sublessee 
at  the  time  of  the  seizure.  Tu- 
lane  Imp.  Co.  v.  W.  B.  Green 
Photo  Supply  Co.,  124  La.  619,  50 
So.  601.  In  case  the  lessor's  right 
of  pledge  is  lost  he  may  still  have 
his  preference.  O'Kelley  v.  Fer- 
guson, 49  La.  Ann.  1230,  22  So.  783. 

20The  lessor's  privilege  extends 
to  horses  and  carts  kept  by  the 
lessee  on  the  premises.  Bazin  v. 
Segura,  5   La.  Ann.  718. 

2iLalaurie  v.  Woods,  8  La.  Ann. 
366. 


6o3 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


620 


But  the  lessee  shall  be  entitled  to  retain,  out  of  the  prop- 
erty subjected  by  law  to  the  lessor's  privilege,  his  clothes 
and  linen,  and  those  of  his  wife  and  family;  his  bed,  bedding 
and  bedsteads,  and  those  of  his  wife  and  family;  his  arms, 
military  accoutrements,  and  tools  and  instruments  neces- 
sary for  the  exercise  of  the  trade  or  profession  by  which  he 
gains  his  living  and  that  of  his  family. -- 

This  right  of  pledge  includes,  not  only  the  effects  of  the 
principal  lessee  or  tenant,  but  those  of  the  under-tenant-^ 
so  far  as  the  latter  is  indebted  to  the  principal  lessee  at  the 
time  when  the  proprietor  chooses  to  exercise  his  right.-"* 

A  payment  made  in  anticipation,  by  the  under-tenant  to 
his  principal,  does  not  release  him  from  the  owner's  claim. 

This  right  of  pledge  affects,  not  only  the  movables  of  the 
lessee  and  under-lessee,  but  also  those  belonging  to  third  per- 


22The  lessor  cannot  seize  a 
piano,  organ,  or  other  musical 
instrument  hired  for  use,  and  not 
the  property  of  the  inmates  or 
sublessee.  Merrick's  Rev.  Civ. 
Code  1900,  p.  682;  Wolff's  Const. 
&  Rev.  Laws  1904,  p.  1337;  Act 
1874,  No.  63,  p.  112.  The  lessor 
does  not  lose  his  lien  by  a  sale 
made  by  his  tenant  to  a  purchaser 
wrho  becomes  his  tenant.  Villere 
V.  Succession  of  Shaw,  108  La.  71, 
32  So.  196.  The  lessor's  privilege 
extends  only  to  that  part  of  the 
lessee's  property  that  is  on  the 
leased  premises.  L.  Luderbach 
Plumbing  Co.  v.  Its  Creditors,  121 
La.  371,  46  So.  359.  A  steam  engine 
used  in  plowing  is  a  farming  uten- 
sil and  the  vendor's  privilege 
thereon  takes  precedence  over  that 
of  a  lessor.  Lahn  v.  Carr,  120  La. 
797,  45  So.  707.  See  also,  Weill  v. 
Kent,   107  La.  Z22,  31  So.  761. 


23Under-tenant  is  the  same  as 
under-lessee.  University  Pub. 
lishing  Co.  v.  Piffet,  34  La.  Ann. 
602. 

24Goods  of  a  sublessee  are  only 
liable  to  seizure  for  rent  that  is 
past  due.  Sanarens  v.  True,  22 
La.  Ann.  181.  If  the  sublessee 
does  not  disclose  the  title  under 
which  he  occupies  the  premises, 
the  lessor's  privilege  will  cover 
the  goods  for  the  whole  amount  of 
rent  due.  Simon  v.  Goldenberg, 
15  La.  Ann.  229.  If  the  sublessee 
owes  no  rent  to  the  lessee,  the 
landlord  cannot  seize  his  goods. 
Kittridge  v.  Ribas,  18  La.  Ann. 
718;  Simon  v.  Goldenberg,  15  La. 
Ann.  229;  Powers  v.  Florance,  7 
La.  Ann.  524;  Wallace  v.  Smith, 
8  La.  Ann.  374.  One  who  pays 
storage  on  his  goods  in  a  ware- 
house is  a  sublessee.  Vairin  v.^ 
Hunt,  18  La.  498. 


620 


LIENS. 


(304 


sons,  when  their  goods  are  contained  in  the  house  or  store, 
by  their  own  consent,  express  or  implied. ^^ 

Movables  are  not  subject  to  this  right,  when  they  are  only 
transiently  or  accidentally  in  the  house,  store,  or  shop,  such 
as  the  baggage  of  a  traveler  in  an  inn,  merchandise  sent  to 
a  workman  to  be  made  up  or  repaired,  and  effects  lodged  in 
the  store  of  an  auctioneer  to  be  sold.-^ 


2'JTherefore,  if  goods  of  a  third 
person  be  consigned  by  their  own- 
er to  the  lessee,  to  be  sold  by  the 
latter  at  a  price  fixed  by  the  own- 
er, with  the  agreement  that  the 
lessee  shall  keep,  as  his  compen- 
sation, all  that  he  should  obtain 
above  such  price,  and  that  no  rent 
should  be  charged,  the  goods  are 
affected  by  the  privilege.  Good- 
rich V.  Bodley,  35  La.  Ann.  525. 
The  goods  of  a  third  person  who 
is  allowed  to  occupy  a  portion  of 
the  leased  premises  without  rent, 
the  lessor's  motive  being  an  ex- 
pected benefit  to  his  own  business 
from  having  such  person  in  his 
house,  are  subject  to  the  land- 
lord's privilege.  University  Pub- 
lishing Co.  V.  Piffet,  34  La.  Ann. 
602.  As  to  the  consent  which 
makes  the  goods  of  a  third  per- 
son liable,  see  also,  Twitty  v. 
Clarke,  14  La.  Ann.  503.  When 
the  lessor's  privilege  has  attached 
before  a  sale  by  the  lessee,  the 
purchaser  cannot  defeat  a  seizure 
by  the  lessor.  Davis  v.  Thomas, 
23  La.  Ann.  340.  Otherwise  if 
sale  take  place  before  any  de- 
fault. Smith  V.  Blois,  8  La.  Ann. 
10.  Goods  on  the  leased  premises 
belonging  to  a  partnership  are 
subject  to  the  lessor's  privilege 
where  the  lessee  is  a  member  of 
the  partnership.  Hynson  v.  Cor- 
dukes,  21    La.   Ann.  553.     Property 


of  a  wife  carrying  on  a  separate 
trade  in  a  building  leased  to  hus- 
band is  liable  for  the  rent.  Des- 
lix  V.  Jonc,  6  Rob.  (La.)  292.  Un- 
der the  rule  that  privileges  are 
stricti  juris,  the  court  is  preclud- 
ed from  assuming  that  the  effects 
of  a  third  person  are  affected  by 
the  lessor's  privilege  after  their 
removal  from  his  house  or  store. 
The  privilege  must  be  restricted 
as  against  third  persons  to  the 
conditions  imposed  by  this  arti- 
cle. Merrick  v.  La  Hache,  27  La. 
Ann.  87;  Silliman  v.  Short,  26  La. 
Ann.  512;  Bailey  v.  Quick,  28  La. 
Ann.  432.  The  effects  of  a  third 
person  removed  from  the  prem- 
ises cannot  be  seized  by  the  les- 
sor, even  within  fifteen  days  of 
their  removal.  Merrick  v.  La 
Hache,  27  La.  Ann.  87.  If  a  lessee 
not  in  default  for  his  rent  trans- 
fers goods  back  to  a  vendor,  and 
obtains  credit  for  the  price,  and 
the  vendor  sells  to  another,  the 
lessor's  privilege  is  defeated, 
though  the  lessee  was  in  an  em- 
barassed  condition  at  the  time. 
Smith  V.  Blois,  8  La.  Ann.  10. 

-•'Sugar  and  molasses  manufac- 
tured for  third  persons  from  cane 
belonging  to  them,  and  grown  on 
another  plantation,  are  not  liable 
to  the  landlord's  privilege.  Les- 
seps  V.  Ritcher,  18  La.  Ann.  653; 
Coleman  v.  Fairbanks,  28  La.  Ann. 


6o5 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


620 


In  the  exercise  of  this  right,  the  lessor  may  seize  the 
objects,  which  are  subject  to  it,  before  the  lessee  takes  them 
away,  or  within  fifteen  days  after  they  are  taken  away,  if 
they  continue  to  be  the  property  of  the  lessee,  and  can  be 
identified.-" 

The  right  which  the  lessor  has  over  the  products  of  the 
estate,  and  on  the  movables  which  are  found  on  the  place 
leased,  for  his  rent,  is  of  a  higher  nature  than  a  mere  privi- 
lege.-^ The  latter  is  only  enforced  on  the  price  arising  from 
the  sale  of  movables  to  which  it  applies.  It  does  not  enable 
the  creditor  to  take  or  keep  the  effects  themselves  specially. 
The  lessor,  on  the  contrary,  may  take  the  effects  themselves 
and  retain  them  until  he  is  paid.-^ 


93.  Nor  on  goods  of  a  third  per- 
son transiently  stored.  Rea  v. 
Burt,  8  La.  Ann.  509,  511. 

-''A  lessor  who  makes  a  seizure 
before  the  rent  is  due  is  not 
liable  in  damages  although  the 
lessee  had  no  fraudulent  intent, 
provided  the  lessor  acts  without 
malice  and  in  the  honest  belief  or 
fear  that  the  lessee  will  remove 
his  property  from  the  leased 
premises.  Dillon  v.  Porier,  34 
La.  Ann.  ITOO.  The  attempt  of  a 
lessee  or  of  his  vendee,  to  forci- 
bly remove  from  the  leased  prem- 
ises, property  subject  to  the  les- 
sor's privilege  is  a  trespass,  sound- 
ing in  damages.  Cooper  v.  Cap- 
pel,  29  La.  Ann.  213.  The  privi- 
lege cannot  be  asserted  against 
goods  removed  except  within  the 
time  limited.  Langsdorf  v.  Le 
Gardeur,  27  La.  Ann.  363 ;  Haral- 
son V.  Boyle,  22  La.  Ann.  210; 
Farnet  v.  Creditors,  8  La.  Ann. 
372;  Carroll  v.  Bancker,  43  La. 
Ann.  1078,  1194,  10  So.  187. 

•-is  Merrick's  Rev.  Civ.  Code  1900, 
art.   3218;    Garretson   v.    Creditors, 


1   Rob.    (La.)   445;   Hoey  v.   Hews, 
3  La.  Ann.  704. 

-'-♦As  against  others  having  a 
legal  right  to  the  property,  the 
lessor  cannot  detain  the  lessee's 
property  continuously;  he  cannot 
prevent  a  sale  of  the  property  on 
the  pretence  that  it  would  not 
bring  the  amount  of  his  debt.  No 
right  of  his  is  violated  by  a  sale 
made  in  the  exercise  of  a  legal 
right  of  another  against  the  prop- 
erty. If  his  right  is  preserved 
and  his  debt  is  paid  in  whole  or 
in  part  by  the  appropriation  of 
the  entire  proceeds  of  the  prop- 
erty, he  has  no  just  ground  of 
complaint.  Case  v.  Kloppenburg, 
27  La.  Ann.  482.  And  see  Cooper 
V.  Cappel,  29  La.  Ann.  213.  The 
lessors  have  the  first  privilege 
on  movables  seized  upon  a  plan- 
tation, except  on  the  crops,  upon 
which  the  laborers  have  a  prefer- 
ence. Duplantier  v.  Wilkins,  19 
La.  Ann.  112.  A  steam  engine  used 
to  pump  water  for  irrigation,  to- 
gether with  a  thresher  and  ma- 
chinery   for    raising    a    rice    crop, 


620 


LIENS. 


606 


Privileges  on  crops  are  ranked  in  the  order  of  preference  :^*^ 

1.  Privilege  of  the  laborer.^^ 

2.  Privilege  of  the  lessor.^- 

3.  Privilege  of  the  overseer. 

4.  Pledges  for  advances. 

5.  Privilege  of  furnishers  of  supplies  and  of  money,  and 
of  the  physician. ^^ 

When  a  lessor  sues  for  rent,  whether  the  same  be  due  or 
not  due,  he  may  obtain  the  provisional  seizure  of  such  furni- 
ture or  property  as  may  be  found  in  the  house,  or  attached 
to  the  land  leased  by  him;^^  and  in  all  cases  it  shall  be  sufifici- 
ent  to  entitle  a  lessor  to  said  writ,  to  swear  to  the  amount 
which  he  claims,  whether  due  or  not  due,  and  that  he  has 
good  reasons  to  believe  that  such  lessee  will  remove  the 
furniture  or  property  on  which  he  has  a  lien  or  privilege  out 
of  the  premises,  and  that  he  may  be  thereby  deprived  of  his 
lien;  provided,  that  in  case  the  rent  be  paid  when  it  falls  due, 
the  costs  of  seizure  shall  be  paid  by  the  lessor,  unless  he 
prove  that  the  lessee  did  actually  remove,  or  attempt  or  in- 
tend to  remove,  the  property  out  of  the  premises;  provided, 


when  not  used  for  any  other  pur- 
pose is  a  farming  utensil.  Lahn 
V.   Carr,   120  La.  797,  45  So.  707. 

soWolff's  Const.  &  Rev.  Laws 
1904,  p.  1342;  Act  No.  89  of  1886. 

31  Wolff's  Const.  &  Rev.  Laws 
1904,  p.  1339;  under  Act  No.  66  of 
1874. 

32The  privilege  of  a  vendor  who 
has  delivered  personal  property  is 
inferior  to  that  of  a  lessor.  Gale's 
Succession,  21  La.  Ann.  487;  Har- 
rison v.  Jenks,  23  La.  Ann.  707. 

33Physicians  have  a  lien  and 
privilege  for  medical  services  ren- 
dered to  any  person,  on  the  crop 
of  said  person.  Such  lien  is  con- 
current in  rank  with  the  lien  and 
privilege  now  given  by  law  to  the 


furnisher  of  supplies;  if  the  debt- 
or is  a  laborer  such  privilege  may 
be  enforced  upon  his  wages  or  his 
interest  in  the  crop.  The  amount 
of  such  lien  shall  not  exceed  the 
sum  of  fifteen  dollars  for  any  one 
year.  Wolff's  Const.  &  Rev. 
Laws  1904,  p.  1330.  Threshermen 
have  a  lien  for  services  rendered, 
under  contract  or  otherwise,  on 
the  crop  threshed,  and  said  lien  is 
next  in  rank  with  the  lien  and 
privilege  of  the  lessor.  Laws 
1906,  Act  No.  53. 

34Garland's  Rev.  Code  of  Prac- 
tice, 1901,  arts.  287,  288.  As  to 
seizure,  when  demand  for  rent  be 
made  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a 
justice  of  the  peace,  see  art.  1125. 


6o7  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  621 

that  in  all  cases  of  provisional  seizure  of  furniture  or  other 
property  at  the  instance  of  lessors,  the  lessee  shall  be  per- 
mitted to  have  the  seizure  released  upon  executing  a  forth- 
coming bond  or  obligation,  with  a  good,  solvent  security  for 
the  value  of  the  property  to  be  left  in  his  possession,  or  for 
the  amount  of  the  claim,  with  interest  and  costs;  provided, 
further,  that  the  value  of  the  property  shall  be  fixed  by  the 
sheriff,  or  one  of  his  deputies,  with  the  assistance  of  two 
appraisers  selected  by  the  parties,  twenty-four  hours'  notice 
being  previously  given  to  the  lessor  or  his  counsel  to  select 
an  appraiser. 

The  lessor  may  seize,  even  in  the  hands  of  a  third  person, 
such  furniture  as  was  in  the  house  leased,^^  if  the  same  has 
been  removed  by  the  lessee,  provided  he  declare  on  oath 
that  the  same  has  been  removed  without  his  consent,  within 
fifteen  days  previous  to  his  suit  being  brought. 

§621.  Maine.^^ — When  a  lease  of  land,  with  a  rent  pay- 
able, is  made  for  the  purpose  of  erecting  a  mill  or  other  build- 
ings thereon,  such  buildings  and  all  the  interest  of  the  lessee 
are  subject  to  a  lien  and  liable  to  be  attached  for  the  rent 
due.  Such  attachment,  made  within  six  months  after  the 
rent  becomes  due,  is  effectual  against  any  transfer  of  the 
property  by  the  lessee. 

In  all  cases  where  land  rent  accrues  and  remains  unpaid, 
whether  under  a  lease,  or  otherwise,  all  buildings  upon  the 

s^Factors    and    agents      of      the  is    a    security    only,    the    same    as 

lessee  are  not  third  persons  in  the  a   mortgage.     Kelley  v.    Goodwin, 

sense    of    this    provision.     Tupery  95    Maine    538,    50    Atl.    711.     The 

V.   Edmondson,  32  La.  Ann.  1146.  lien  of  a  landlord  against  a  build- 

36Rev.   Stats.   1903,  ch.  93,   §§   44,  ing  erected  on  the  leased  premises 

45.     When    it    is    provided      in      a  is   enforceable   when   the   rent  be- 

farm    lease    that   the   crops    raised  comes    due    whether      the      tenant 

during    a    named    season    shall    be  owns  the  building  or  not.     Union 

and    remain   the    lessor's   property  Water-Power    Co.    v.    Chabot,    93 

until  the  rent  is  paid,  the  lessor's  Maine  339,  45  Atl.  30. 
title    is   not   an   absolute    one,    but 


§    622 


LIENS. 


608 


premises  while  the  rent  accrues,  are  subject  to  a  lien  and  to 
attachment  for  the  rent  due,  as  provided  in  the  preceding 
paragraph,  although  other  persons  than  the  lessee  may  own 
the  whole  or  a  part  thereof,  and  whether  or  not  the  land  was 
leased  for  the  purpose  of  erecting  such  buildings;  provided, 
however,  that  if  any  person  except  the  lessee  is  interested  in 
said  buildings,  the  proceedings  shall  be  substantially  in  the 
forms  directed  for  enforcing  liens  against  vessels,  with  such 
additional  notice  to  supposed  or  unknown  owners,  as  any  jus- 
tice of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  orders,  or  the  attachment 
and  levy  of  execution  shall  not  be  valid  except  against  the 
lessee. 

§  622.  Maryland.'^" — Distress  for  rent. — A  landlord,  or  his 
agent,-^^  before  levying  a  distress,  must  make  oath  that 
the  tenant  is  justly  and  bona  fide  indebted  to  him  in  the 
sum  named,  or  is  entitled  to  a  certain  quantity  or  proportion 
of  the  produce  claimed  by  the  landlord,  for  rent  in  arrear  and 
already  due,  and  that  no  part  of  it  has  been  received  except 
the  credits  given. ^^ 


37  Pub.  Gen.  Laws  1904,  art.  53,  §§ 
8-12,  18-21.  Certain  property,  spe- 
cifically named,  is  exempt  from 
distress.  Pub.  Gen.  Laws  1904, 
art.  53,  §  17.  The  property  of  a 
boarder  or  sojourner  in  a  board- 
ing-house is  exempt  by  the  stat- 
ute. But  it  must  be  such  property 
as  is  in  the  personal  use  of  the 
boarder  or  his  family,  and  not 
such  as  is  in  general  use  by  the 
household.  Leitch  v.  Owings,  34 
Md.  262.  And  see  Trieber  v. 
Knabe,  12  Md.  491,  71  Am.  Dec.  607. 

38  What  agency  sufficient:  Giles 
V.  Ebsworth,  10  Md.  ZZZ;  Jean  v. 
Spurrier,  35  Md.  110.  A  distress 
for  rent  is  a  remedy  by  the  act  of 
the  party,  and  a  landlord  may  con- 
stitute   any    person    as    his    bailiff 


to  make  it.  Myers  v.  Smith,  27 
Md.  91.  It  is  customary,  however, 
to  have  the  warrant  directed  to  a 
sheriff,  who  may  execute  it  by  his 
deputy.  Myers  v.  Smith,  27  Md. 
91. 

39If  by  mistake  a  larger  sum 
is  alleged  to  be  due  than  is  ac- 
tually due,  the  whole  distress  is 
not  rendered  void,  but  the  land- 
lord may  recover  what  is  actually 
due.  Jean  v.  Spurrier,  35  Md.  110. 
The  object  of  the  provision  was 
to  protect  the  tenant  from  oner- 
ous and  oppressive  proceedings 
and  from  an  excessive  distress, 
and  the  statute  is  to  receive  a 
reasonable  construction.  Cross  v. 
Tome,  14  Md.  247.  It  is  not  nec- 
essary  to   state    the   terms   of   the 


6o9 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


622 


When  the  distress  is  for  grain  or  produce,  the  bailiff  shall 
summon  two  appraisers  to  estimate  the  money  value  of  the 
same,  and  thereupon  the  distress  is  levied  as  in  ordinary- 
cases,  taking  the  estimated  value  to  be  the  money  rent.  At 
any  time  before  such  grain  or  produce  is  sold,  the  tenant  may 
deliver  the  grain  or  other  produce,  with  the  expenses  of  the 
distress,  whereupon  the  proceedings  shall  cease.^'^ 

Whenever  property  shall  be  removed  from  premises  which 
have  been  rented  within  sixty  days  prior  or  subsequent  to  the 
time  when  the  rent  has  or  will  become  due,  and  whether  such 
removal  be  by  night  or  day,  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  landlord 
to  follow,  seize  and  sell  such  property  under  distress  for  the 
rent  due  at  any  time  within  sixty  days  after  the  time  when 
the  rent  becomes  due ;  provided,  that  such  property  shall  not 
have  been  sold  to  a  bona  fide  purchaser  without  notice  or 
taken  in  execution.'*^ 

The  rents  of  real  estate  of  minors  or  of  leasehold  estates 
that  may  not  be  due  at  the  death  of  such  minor  shall  for  the 
year  in  which  such  minor  may  die  be  paid  to  the  guardian, 
who  may  maintain  distress  or  suit  to  recover  such  rent. 


renting,  or  the  items  of  the 
charges  and  credits.  But  the  ac- 
count must  state  when  the  rent 
became  due,  so  that  the  tenant 
may  be  protected  against  being 
called  on  a  second  time  for  the 
same  debt,  and  so  that  it  may  be 
known  that  the  rent  is  in  arrear 
and  may  be  collected  by  distress. 
Cross  V.  Tome,  14  Md.  247;  Butler 
V.  Gannon,  53  Md.  333,  346.  No  ac- 
tion lies  for  distraining  for  more 
rent  than  is  due  and  in  arrear. 
Hamilton  v.  Windolf,  36  Md.  301, 
11   Am.   Rep.  491. 

40N0  notice  or  demand  prelim- 
inary to  the  levy  of  the  distress 
is  necessary.  Offutt  v.  Trail,  4 
Har.    &    J.    (Md.)    20.      But    there 


must  be  notice  preliminary  to  the 
sale.  Keller  v.  Weber,  27  Md. 
660.  Before  sale  the  goods  must 
be  appraised  by  two  sworn  ap- 
praisers. These  must  be  reason- 
ably competent,  but  need  not  be 
professional  appraisers.  Cahill  v. 
Lee,  55   Md.  319. 

■11  Neale  v.  Clautice,  7  Har.  & 
J.  (Md.)  372.  Where  a  receiver 
has  taken  possession  of  the  ten- 
ant's goods  and  sold  them,  the 
landlord  is  not  entitled  to  a  lien 
on  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  for 
rent  becoming  due  after  the  sale 
and  removal  of  the  goods  by  the 
purchaser,  notwithstanding  this 
provision.Gaither  v.  Stockbridge, 
67  Md.  222,  9  Atl.  632,  10  Atl.  309. 


39 


§    623  LIENS.  610 

If  such  guardian  dies  before  the  recovery  of  said  rent  the 
executor  or  administrator  of  such  guardian  may  recover  the 
same  by  distress  or  suit. 

Whenever  any  landlord  shall  give  notice  of  rent  due  to  the 
sheriff  or  constable  who  may  be  about  to  sell  the  goods  and 
chattels  of  his  tenant  under  execution  there  shall  be  appended 
to  said  notice  an  affidavit  of  the  amount  of  his  rent  claimed 
to  be  due. 

§623.  Maryland.^-  (continued).  Lien  on  crops. — In  all 
cases  of  renting  lands  wherein  a  share  of  the  growing  crop  or 
crops  is  reserved  as  rent,  the  rent  reserved  is  a  lien  on  such 
crop  or  crops,  which  cannot  be  divested  by  any  sale  made  by 
the  tenant,  or  by  his  assignment  in  bankruptcy  or  insolvency, 
or  by  the  process  of  law  issued  against  the  tenant. ^^ 

In  all  cases  wherein  advances  by  the  landlord  have  been 
made  upon  the  faith  of  the  crops  to  be  grown,  the  rent  re- 
served and  such  advances  made  are  a  lien  on  such  crop  or 
crops,  which  shall  not  be  divested  by  any  sale  made  by  the 
tenant,  or  by  any  administrator  of  a  deceased  tenant,  or  by 
the  assignment  of  the  tenant  in  insolvency,  or  by  the  process 
of  law  issued  against  the  tenant;  provided,  that  at  the  time 
of  the  said  renting,  the  contract  under  and  by  which  the  said 
advances  are  to  be  made  shall  be  reduced  to  writing,  duly  at- 
tested and  executed  by  the  said  landlord  and  tenant.** 

42  Pub.    Gen.  Laws  1904,  art.  53,  the   chattels   of   the   tenant  as    se- 

§§  22,  23.  rurity     for     rent     is     invalid     as 

■*3If    the    landlord    receives    his  against    creditors    of    the     tenant 

share,    he    cannot,    as    against    the  whose   debts   were   created  before 

tenant's  mortgage  of  his  share,  set  the  tenant  entered  into  possession, 

up  a  parol  agreement  by  the  ten-  In   re    Potee    Brick   Co.    of    Balti- 

ant  to  let  him  have  the  entire  crop  more   City,  179  Fed.  525. 

for   arrearages     of     years   before.  44These    provisions    apply    only 

Hopper   V.    Haines,    71    Md.   64,    18  to      the      counties    of    St.    Mary's, 

Atl.    29,    20    Atl.    159.     An    agree-  Prince  George's,  Charles  and  Cal- 

ment  between  the  tenant  and  the  vert.     See    Hopper    v.    Haines,    71 

landlord  that  the  latter  shall  hold  Md.  64,  18  Atl.  29,  20  Atl.  159. 


6ii 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


625 


§  624.  Minnesota.^^ — The  landlord's  common-law  right  of 
distress  for  rent  in  arrear,  as  modified  by  the  statute  2  Wil- 
liam &  Mary,  ch.  5,^®  allowing  the  property  to  be  sold,  existed 
in  this  state  until  the  remedy  was  abolished  by  statute  in 
1877,  The  common  law  of  a  state  or  territory  which  had  no 
political  existence  before  the  Revolution  is  the  common  law 
as  modified  and  amended  by  English  statutes  passed  prior  to 
our  Revolution.^''' 


§  625.     Mississippi.^^ — Every  lessor  of  land  shall  have  a 
lien  on  all  the  agricultural  products  of  the  leased  premises, ^^ 


45  Gen.  Stats.  1913,  §  6806;  But- 
cher V.   Culver,  24  Minn.  584. 

46  Stats,    at    Large,    1688-1696,    p. 

n. 

47Coburn  v.  Harvey,  18  Wis.  148. 

48  Code  1906,  §§  2832,  2833.  Sec- 
tion 2832  is  an  addition  to  the  law^ 
of  landlord  and  tenant,  as  it  ex- 
isted before  the  Code  of  1880. 
Under  the  Codes  of  1871  and  1857, 
the  landlord's  common-lav\r  remedy 
for  rent  w^as  assumed  to  exist, 
and  was  regulated  and  modified 
by  those  codes.  Fitzgerald  v. 
Fowlkes,  60  Miss.  270.  The  com- 
mon-law process  of  distress  was 
abolished  by  the  statute,  which 
provides  for  a  summary  method 
of  attaching  the  tenant's  property, 
and  selling  the  same  to  pay  the 
rent  due  by  him.  Marye  v.  Dyche, 
42  Miss.  347.  An  advance  or  loan 
of  corn  in  a  preceding  year  is  not 
within  the  statute.  Lumbley  v. 
Gilruth,  65  Miss.  23,  3  So.  11.  The 
lien  may  be  enforced  against  such 
products  after  their  removal  from 
the  premises,  and  prevails  against 
a  bona  fide  purchaser  for  value. 
Newman  v.  Bank  of  Greenville, 
66  Miss.  323,  5  So.  753.  The  land- 
lord's lien  is  not  lost  by  the  sale 


of  the  tenant's  chattels,  and  where 
the  tenant  delivers  such  property 
to  a  merchant  who  is  his  creditor 
for  shipment  out  of  the  state  and 
sale,  the  proceeds  to  be  credited 
on  the  tenant's  account,  such  act 
will  amount  to  conversion  and  the 
merchant  becomes  liable  to  the 
landlord  to  the  extent  of  the  lien. 
Peets  &  Norman  Co.  v.  Baker,  95 
Miss.  576,  48  So.  898.  See  also, 
Eason  v.  Johnson,  69  Miss.  371,  12 
So.  446;  Powell  v.  Smith,  74  Miss. 
142,  20  So.  872.  A  lessee  of  a 
plantation  sublet  a  part  thereof, 
and  his  tenant,  after  making  a 
crop  of  cotton,  and  before  it  was 
gathered,  abandoned  the  premises, 
and  the  lessee  sold  the  cotton  to 
defendants.  The  lessor  of  the 
plantation  was  held  to  have  a  lien 
on  such  cotton  for  rent  due  him 
from  his  lessee.  Hollingsworth 
V.  Hill,  69  Miss.  IZ,  10  So.  450.  The 
lien  for  money  advanced  to  gath- 
er a  crop  of  a  tenant  is  inferior 
to  the  landlord's  lien  for  rent. 
Goodwin  v.  Mitchell  (Miss.),  38 
So.  657. 

4!»The  right  of  the  landlord  to 
enforce  this  lien  is  not  prejudiced 
or    in   any   manner    diminished    by 


§  625 


LIENS. 


6l2 


however  and  by  whomsoever  produced,  to  secure  the  pay- 
ment of  the  rent,  and  the  fair  market  value  of  all  advances 
made  by  him  to  his  tenant  for  supplies  for  tenant  and  others 
for  whom  he  may  contract,  and  for  his  business  carried  on 
upon  the  leased  premises,  and  this  lien  shall  be  paramount  to 
all  others  liens,  claims,  or  demands  upon  such  products  ;^° 
and  the  claim  of  the  lessor  for  supplies  furnished  may  be  en- 
forced in  the  same  manner,  and  under  the  same  circum- 
stances, as  his  claim  for  rent  may  be;  and  all  the  provisions 
of  law  as  to  attachment  for  rent  and  proceedings  under  it 
shall  be  applicable  to  a  claim  for  supplies  furnished,  and  such 
attachment  may  be  levied  on  any  goods  and  chatteb^^  liable 


the  termination  of  the  lease  and 
removal  of  the  tenant  from  the 
demised  premises,  nor  by  the  re- 
moval of  the  products  from  the 
premises.  The  lien  continues  un- 
til it  is  extinguished  by  lapse  of 
the  period  prescribed  for  its  en- 
forcement, just  as  if  there  had 
been  no  removal  of  the  tenant  or 
of  the  products.  Fitzgerald  v. 
Fowlkes,  60  Miss.  270;  Ball  v. 
Sledge,  82  Miss.  749,  35  So.  447. 

50A  third  person  can  assert  his 
lien  only  as  subject  to  the  land- 
lord's lien,  but  the  tenant  can  de- 
feat a  recovery  of  possession  by 
such  third  person  by  setting  up 
the  landlord's  lien.  McGill  v. 
Hovirard,  61  Miss.  411.  This  stat- 
ute (1873)  took  away  the  power 
of  the  tenant  to  incumber  the 
crop  so  as  to  impair  the  lien  of 
the  landlord.  Arbuckle  v.  Nelms, 
50  Miss.  556;  Storm  v.  Green,  51 
Miss.  103.  For  rule  in  case  ten- 
ant has  option  to  purchase,  see 
Bedford  v.  Gartrell,  88  Miss.  429, 
40  So.  801.  See  also,  Strauss  v. 
Baley,  58  Miss.  131.  A  guaranty 
of  supplies  gives  no  lien.     Ellis  v. 


Jones,  70  Miss.  60,  11  So.  566.  A 
lien  on  the  crop  exists  for  ginning 
and  baling  cotton.  Duncan  v. 
Jayne,  76  Miss   133,  23   So.  392. 

^iThere  is  a  distinction  between 
the  agricultural  products  of  the 
leased  premises  and  other  goods 
and  chattels  of  the  tenant.  The 
statute  creates  a  lien  on  the  for- 
mer, and  gives  the  attachment  to 
enforce  it,  while  only  a  right  to 
seize  the  latter  is  conferred. 
Goods  and  chattels  of  the  tenant, 
other  than  agricultural  products 
of  the  leased  premises,  are  not 
subject  to  a  lien  for  rent  or  ad- 
vances for  supplies,  and  they  can 
be  seized  only  on  the  premises,  or 
off  of  them,  within  the  time  pre- 
scribed by  statute;  but  this  limi- 
tation of  time  or  place  is  not  ap- 
plicable to  the  agricultural  prod- 
ucts of  the  leased  premises,  on 
which  the  landlord  has  a  lien, 
with  the  right  to  enforce  it  by 
seizure  under  attachment  wherev- 
er and  whenever  found.  Henry  v. 
Davis,  60  Miss.  212,  per  Campbell, 
C.  J.;  Fitzgerald  v.  Fowlkes,  60 
Miss.  270.     The  landlord's  lien  on 


6i3 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


§    625 


for  rent,  as  well  as  on  the  agricultural  products  aforesaid. 
A  landlord  shall  have  a  lien,  for  one  year,  for  the  reasonable 
value  of  all  livestock,  farming  tools,  implements,  and  vehicles 
furnished  by  him  to  his  tenant,  upon  the  property  so  fur- 
nished, and  upon  all  the  agricultural  products  raised  upon  the 
leased  premises;  and  the  property  so  furnished  shall  be  con- 
sidered as  supplies,  and  the  lien  therefor  may  be  enforced  ac- 
cordingly. Such  lien  shall  be  a  superior  and  first  lien,  and 
need  not  be  evidenced  by  writing,  or,  if  in  writing,  it  need  not 
be  recorded. 

The  remedy  is  by  attachment  in  the  nature  of  a  distraint, 
and  sale  of  the  property  after  three  months. ^^ 

Attachments  may  be  made  upon  apprehension  that  the 
tenant  will  remove  his  effects  from  the  leased  premises.     At- 


crops  is  effectual  to  secure  rent 
of  farm  house.  Scroggins  v.  Fos- 
ter, 76  Miss.  318,  24  So.  194.  See, 
further,  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
alien,  Westmoreland  v.  Wooten, 
51'  Miss.  825.  The  lien  passes  to 
an  assignee  of  the  landlord's 
claim  against  the  tenant  for  rent 
and  supplies.  Newman  v.  Bank 
of  Greenville,  66  Miss.  323,  5  So. 
753;  Taylor  v.  Nelson,  54  Miss. 
524;  Thomas  v.  Shell,  76  Miss.  556, 
24  So.  876.  But  an  assignee  is  not 
entitled  to  the  remedy  by  distress. 
Gross  V.  Bartley,  66  Miss.  116,  5 
So.  225.  A  ginner's  lien  is  super- 
ior to  that  of  a  landlord.  Duncan 
V.  Jayne,  76  Miss.  133,  23  So.  392. 
52 Code  1906,  §§  2838,  2845.  A 
distress  for  rent  is  not  the  com- 
mencement of  a  suit,  but  a  seiz- 
ure of  the  tenant's  goods  for  the 
satisfaction  of  the  rent,  just  as  if 
a  judgment  had  been  rendered 
therefor.  Towns  v.  Boarman,  23 
Miss.  186;   Canterberry  v.  Jordan, 


27  Miss.  96;  Smith  v.  Jones,  65 
Miss.  276,  3  So.  740.  And  under 
the  statute  an  attachment  is  not  a 
mesne  process  returnable  into  a 
court,  but  is  in  the  nature  of  a 
final  process.  Maxey  v.  White,  53 
Miss.  80,  83.  No  lien  for  rent, 
either  by  common  law  or  by  stat- 
ute, existed  in  this  state  prior  to 
the  Agricultural  Lien  Act  of  1873. 
Arbuckle  v.  Nelms,  50  Miss.  556. 
The  right  of  distress  by  attach- 
ment, under  the  statutes  of  this 
state  modifying  the  common  law 
of  distress,  exists  not  because  of 
any  lien,  but  because  of  rent  in 
arrear,  or  because  of  a  contem- 
plated removal.  Stamps  v.  Gil- 
man,  43  Miss.  456;  Marye  v.  Dyche, 
42  Miss.  347.  If  an  ofificer  making 
a  distress  for  rent  fails  to  give  a 
notice  to  the  tenant  or  his  repre- 
sentative, this  is  ground  for  quash- 
ing the  writ.  Wright  v.  Craig,  92 
Miss.  218,  45  So.  835. 


§  625 


LIENS. 


614 


tachment  may  also  be  made  after  such  removal  within  thirty- 
days  after  the  rent  becomes  diie.^^ 

If  a  tenant  removes  his  chattels  from  the  premises  leaving 
any  part  of  the  rent  unpaid,  the  landlord  may,  w^ithin  thirty 
days  afterwards  cause  them  to  be  seized  wherever  they  may 
be  found,  as  a  distress  for  the  arrears  of  rent;  but  no  goods 
so  carried  of¥  and  sold  in  good  faith,  before  such  seizure,  shall 
be  seized  for  rent.^'* 

Distress  may  be  made  after  the  termination  of  the  lease, 
provided  it  be  made  within  six  months  afterwards,  and  dur- 
ing the  continuance  of  the  landlord's  title,  and  during  the 
possession  of  the  tenant. ^^ 

The  distress  must  be  reasonable,  and  must  not  be  removed 
from  the  county.^^ 

No  goods  or  chattels  found  on  the  demised  premises,  and 
not  belonging  to  the  tenant,  or  to  some  person  liable  for  the 
rent,  shall  be  distrained  for  rent;  but  a  limited  interest  in 
such  goods  may  be  distrained.  No  person  claiming  title  to 
such  property  shall  avail  himself  of  this  provision,  unless  by 


53Code  1906,  §§  2848,  2849.  To 
authorize  a  distress  on  account  of 
apprehension  that  the  tenant  will 
remove  his  property  before  the 
rent  is  due,  the  landlord  must 
have  some  ground  for  this  appre- 
hension, and  must  show^  this  by 
evidence,  else  the  distress  will  be 
wrongful.  Briscoe  v.  McElween, 
43  Miss.  556.  The  removal,  more- 
over, must  be  such  as  would  en- 
danger or  defeat  a  distress  for 
rent.  Stamps  v.  Gilman,  43  Miss. 
456;  Dudley  v.  Harvey,  59  Miss. 
34. 

54  Code  1906,  §§  2849,  2850.  To 
authorize  a  seizure  of  goods 
and  chattels  of  the  tenant 
away  from  the  leased  premises, 
within  thirty  days  after  their  re- 


moval, it  is  not  necessary  that  the 
affidavit  for  attachment  shall  state 
that  the  goods  and  chattels  have 
been  removed  from  the  premises. 
Henry  v.  Davis,  60  Miss.  212.  One 
buying  property  for  value  from  a 
tenant  on  leased  premises,  ex- 
cept agricultural  products,  where 
he  buys  prior  to  distress  for  rent, 
gets  a  good  title  as  against  the 
landlord  even  if  such  purchaser 
knows  that  rent  is  due  and  that 
the  landlord  looked  to  the  goods 
for  the  collection  of  the  rent.  As 
to  agricultural  products  such  a 
purchaser  will  receive  no  title. 
Richardson  v.  McLaurin,  69  Miss. 
70,  12  So.  264. 

soCode  1906,  §  2852. 

56Code  1906,  §  2853. 


6i5 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


§    626 


making  and  filing  an  affidavit  that  the  goods  distrained  are 
his  property,  and  not  the  property  of  the  tenant,  nor  held  in 
trust  for  the  tenant,  and  giving  bond  and  security  in  the  man- 
ner directed  for  the  tenant. ^''^ 

§  626.  Missouri.^^ — Every  landlord  shall  have  a  lien  upon 
the  crops  growm  on  the  demised  premises  in  any  year,  for  the 
rent  that  shall  accrue  for  such  year,  and  such  lien  shall  con- 
tinue for  eight  months  after  such  rent  shall  become  due  and 
payable,  and  no  longer.  When  the  demised  premises,  or  any 
portion  thereof,  are  used  for  the  purpose  of  growing  nursery 
stock,  a  lien  shall  exist  and  continue  on  such  stock  until  the 


57 Code  1906,  §§  2867,  2868.  A 
person  claiming  the  goods  dis- 
trained is  precluded  from  main- 
taining an  action  for  them  if  he 
has  failed  to  interpose  a  claim  in 
pursuance  of  this  provision.  Paine 
V.  Hall's  Safe  &  Lock  Co.,  64  Miss. 
175,  1  So.  56. 

58Rev.  Stats.  1909,  §§  7888,  7896. 
The  right  of  distress  for  rent  has 
never  existed  in  this  state.  Crock- 
er V.  Mann,  3  Mo.  472.  The  lien 
given  by  statute  can  only  be  en- 
forced by  process  of  law.  The 
landlord  can  not  himself  seize  the 
crops.  Knox  v.  Hunt,  18  Mo.  243. 
By  express  stipulation  in  the 
lease,  the  landlord  may  be  author- 
ized to  take  possession  of  the  crop 
and  sell  it.  Sheble  v.  Curdt,  56 
Mo.  437.  Legal  process  to  collect 
the  landlord's  lien  is  only  neces- 
sary when  the  tenant  refuses  to 
allow  the  landlord  to  sell  it  for 
the  rent.  Auxvasse  Milling  Co. 
V.  Cornet,  85  Mo.  App.  251'.  The 
crop  during  the  continuance  of 
the  lien  is  not  subject  to  process 
of   law   at    the   suit   of  any   other 


creditor  of  the  tenant.  Knox  v. 
Hunt,  18  Mo.  243.  If  th-  tenant 
abandons  the  crop,  and  the  land- 
lord harvests  it,  it  is  not  subject 
to  seizure  by  a  creditor  of  thv 
tenant.  Sanders  v.  Ohlhausen,  51 
Mo.  163.  H  there  is  no  indebted- 
ness for  rent,  though  the  tenant 
may  be  otherwise  indebted  to  tnf 
landlord,  the  tenant  may  dispose 
of  the  crop.  Brown  v.  Turner,  60 
Mo.  21.  In  a  suit  by  the  landlord 
against  one  who  has  purchased 
the  crop,  a  prima  facie  case  is 
made  when  it  is  proven  that  he  is 
the  owner  of  the  land,  that  it  was 
rented  to  the  tenant,  and  that  the 
crop  raised  on  such  land  was 
raised  by  the  tenant  during  the 
year  named.  Mitchell  v.  Sanford, 
149  Mo.  App.  72,  130  S.  W.  99. 
See  also.  King  v.  Rowlett,  120  Mo. 
App.  120,  96  S.  W.  493.  A  pur- 
chaser having  paid  the  landlord 
the  rent  may  set  it  up  as  a  de- 
fense to  an  action  brought  against 
him  for  the  purchase  price.  Hardy 
v.  Mathews,  101  Mo.  App,  708, 
74  S.  W.  166. 


626 


LIENS. 


6l6 


same  shall  have  been  removed  from  the  premises  and  sold, 
and  such  lien  may  be  enforced  by  attachment  in  the  manner 
hereinafter  provided. 

Whether  the  rent  is  due  or  not,  if  it  will  be  due  within  one 
year,  and  the  person  liable  to  pay  it  intends  to  remove,  or  has 
within  thirty  days  removed,  his  property  from  the  leased 
premises,  or  attempts  to  dispose  of  it  so  as  to  endanger  or 
delay  the  collection  of  the  rent,  or  when  the  rent  is  due  and 
unpaid,  the  landlord  may,  upon  affidavit  of  the  fact,  obtain  an 
attachment  of  such  property,  including  the  crops  grown  on 
the  premises. ^^ 


59The  landlord  has  a  lien  under 
this  statute  on  the  whole  crop. 
The  tenant  is  not  prohibited  from 
removing  any  portion  of  it,  pro- 
vided he  does  not  endanger  the 
landlord's  collection  of  his  rent. 
This  is  a  question  for  the  jury, 
to  be  determined  with  reference 
to  the  property  remaining  on  the 
premises.  Haseltine  v.  Ausher- 
man,  87  Mo.  410;  Meier  v.  Thom- 
as, 5  Mo.  App.  584.  A  lien  for 
rent  due  and  unpaid  may  be  en- 
forced by  attachment,  accom- 
panied by  the  affidavit  required. 
Chamberlain  v.  Heard,  22  Mo.  App. 
416.  The  growing  crop  of  a  ten- 
ant may  be  attached  by  the  land- 
lord for  rent  due.  Crawford  v. 
Coil,  69  Mo.  588.  Though  the  pro- 
vision for  attachment  in  favor  of 
the  landlord  was  not  enacted  for 
the  purpose  of  enforcing  the  lien 
upon  the  crop  grown  upon  the 
premises,  yet  it  may  be  properly 
used  for  that  purpose.  Hubbard 
V.  Moss,  65  Mo.  647.  This  rem- 
edy   is   not    exclusive.      The    land- 


lord may  proceed  under  the  gen- 
eral attachment  law.  Sanders  v. 
Ohlhausen,  51  Mo.  163;  Price  v. 
Roetzell,  56  Mo.  500.  The  pro- 
ceeding may  be  maintained  by  the 
landlord,  not  only  against  his  im- 
mediate lessee,  but  also  against  a 
sublessee,  provided  the  rent  ac- 
crued during  the  term  of  such  les- 
see. Therefore,  where  an  under- 
tenant had  removed  a  wheat  cr  ip 
from  the  land  within  thirty  days 
next  before  the  commencement  of 
the  suit  for  an  attachment,  and 
while  the  rent  was  still  owing  by 
the  lessee  to  the  landlord,  it  was 
held  that  the  landlord  was  entitled 
to  an  attachment  against  the  un- 
der-tenant's wheat  for  the  rent 
due  by  the  lessee  to  the  landlord. 
Garroutte  v.  White,  92  Mo.  237,  4 
S.  W.  681.  The  landlord  can  only 
attach  the  tenant's  property  when 
he  is  removing  or  is  about  to  re- 
move the  crop  from  the  premises, 
etc.  Abington  v.  Steinberg,  86  Mo. 
App.  639. 


6iy  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  627 

§  627.  New  Jersey''*' — Distress  for  rent. — All  distresses 
shall  be  reasonable  and  not  too  great.  No  person  shall  take 
any  distress  wrongfully, ^^  or  cause  any  distress  to  be  driven 
or  conveyed  out  of  the  county.  No  person  shall  be  distrained 
for  any  cause  whatsoever  by  his  beasts  of  the  plough,  or 
sheep,  or  by  the  implements  of  his  trade,  while  other  distress 
or  chattels  whereof  the  debt  or  demand  may  be  levied,  or 
sufficient  for  the  same,  may  be  found. 

Where  any  goods  or  chattels  shall  be  distrained  for  any 
rent  reserved  and  due,  and  the  tenant  or  owner  of  the  goods 
so  distrained  shall  not  within  ten  days  next  after  such  dis- 
tress, and  notice  thereof,  with  the  cause  of  such  taking,  left 
at  the  chief  mansion-house  or  other  most  notorious  place  on 
the  premises  charged  with  the  rent  distrained  for,  replevy 
the  same,  with  sufficient  security  to  be  given  to  the  sheriff, 
according  to  law,  then  in  such  case,  after  such  distress  and 
notice  and  expiration  of  the  said  ten  days,  the  person  dis- 
training may,  on  two  days'  notice  to  the  tenant,  with  the 
sheriff  or  under-sheriff  of  the  county,  or  with  the  constable 
of  the  township,  precinct,  or  place  where  such  distress  shall 
be  taken,  cause  the  goods  and  chattels  so  distrained  to  be  in- 
ventoried and  appraised  by  three  sworn  appraisers,  and  after 
such  inventory  and  appraisement  may  lawfully  sell  at  public 
vendue  the  goods  and  chattels  so  distrained  (giving  five  days' 
public  notice  by  advertising  the  articles  to  be  sold,  and  the 
time  and  place  of  sale,  in  at  least  three  of  the  most  public 
places  in  the  township  where  such  distress  shall  be  made), 
for  the  best  price  that  can  be  gotten  for  the  same,  towards 
satisfaction  of  the  rent  for  which  the  said  goods  and  chattels 
shall  be  distrained,  and  of  the  charges  of  such  distress,  ap- 
praisement, and  sale,  leaving  the  overplus,  if  any,  in  the  hands 
of  such  sheriff,  under-sheriff,  or  constable,  for  the  owner's 
use. 

60Comp.  Stats.  1910,  pp.  1939-  for  rent  unless  he  can  maintain 
1943.  an  action  for  it.    Oliver  v.  Phelps, 

6IA    landlord    can    not    distrain       Spen.    (N.   J.)    180. 


§    ^2^]  LIENS.  6l8 

The  landlord  may  seize  in  distraint  sheaves,  cocks,  or 
stacks  of  grain  or  corn,  or  grain  or  corn  loose  or  in  the  straw, 
or  flax,  hemp,  or  hay  in  any  barn,  crib  or  granary,  or  upon 
any  hovel,  stack,  rick  or  barrack,  or  elsev^^here  upon  any  part 
of  the  land  charged  with  such  rent,  and  may  lock  up  the  same 
in  the  place  where  the  same  may  be  found. 

The  lessor  or  landlord,  lessors  or  landlords,  or  his,  her  or 
their  steward,  bailiff,  receiver  or  other  person  or  persons  em- 
powered by  him,  her  or  them  may  seize  as  a  distress  for 
arrears  of  rent  any  of  the  goods  and  chattels  of  his,  her  or 
their  tenant  or  tenants  and  not  of  any  other  person,^^  al- 
though in  possession  of  such  tenant  or  tenants,  which  may  be 
found  on  the  demised  premises,  except  such  goods  and  chat- 
tels as  are  by  law  privileged  from  distress;  and  also  any  hogs, 
horses,  cattle  or  stock  of  his,  her  or  their  respective  tenant  or 
tenants,  and  not  of  any  other  person,  although  in  possession 
of  such  tenant  or  tenants  feeding  or  depasturing  on  the  de- 
mised premises,  or  upon  any  common  appendant  or  appur- 
tenant, or  anyways  belonging  to  all  or  any  part  'of  the 
premises  demised;*'^  and  also  to  take  or  seize  all  or  any 
grain  or  produce  whatsoever,  growing  or  being  on  the  prem- 
ises, or  any  part  thereof,  so  demised  or  holden  as  a  dis- 
tress for  arrears  of  rent,'^'*  and  the  same  to  cut,   dig,   pull, 

C2The  right  of  distress  is  lim-  N.  J.  L.  110,  17  Am.  Dec.  455.  0th- 
ited  to  the  goods  of  the  tenant.  erwise  under  the  South  Carolina 
Woodside  v.  Adams,  40  N.  J.  L.  statute,  §  634.  There  is  no  lien  on 
417.  The  goods  of  one  of  several  the  goods  of  the  tenant  except 
joint  lessees  may  be  distrained.  from  the  time  of  actual  seizure 
Hoskins  v.  Paul,  9  N.  J.  L.  110,  17  under  the  distress  warrant.  Wood- 
Am.  Dec.  455.  Goods  of  which  side  v.  Adams,  40  N.  J.  L.  417. 
the  tenant  is  a  joint  owner  with  63By  the  ancient  rule  of  law,  the 
a  stranger  may  be  distrained;  but  cattle  of  the  tenant,  being  on  a 
only  his  interest  can  be  distrained  common  appendant  or  appurte- 
and  sold.  Allen  v.  Agnew,  24  N.  nant  to  the  demised  premises, 
J.  L.  443.  Goods  of  a  tenant  on  were  not  subject  to  the  landlord's 
the  premises  may  be  distrained  levy.  This  clause  extends  his 
although  the  tenant  has  made  an  remedy  to  such  property.  Guest 
assignment  of  them  under  the  in-  v.  Opdyke,  31  N.  J.  L.  552,  555. 
solvent    act.      Hoskins    v.    Paul,    9  f'^The    power    of    distress    as    to 


6ig  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  627 

gather,  make,  cure,  carry  and  lay  up  in  some  proper  and 
convenient  place  on  the  premises,  and  for  want  thereof  in 
some  other  place  to  be  procured  by  such  lessor  or  land- 
lord, lessors  or  landlords  (due  notice  of  such  place  being 
given  to  such  tenant  or  lessee,  or  left  at  his  or  her  place  of 
abode),  and  to  appraise,  sell  and  dispose  of  the  same  in  the 
time  and  manner  hereinbefore  directed ;  provided  always  that 
it  shall  not  be  lawful  for  any  lessor  or  landlord,  at  one  time  to 
distrain  for  more  than  one  year's  rent  in  arrear,  and  that  such 
distress  must  be  made  within  six  months  after  the  same  shall 
become  due,  or,  where  the  rent  is  payable  in  instalments, 
then  within  six  months  after  the  year's  rent  shall  have  be- 
come due. 

If  any  tenant  or  tenants,  or  lessee  or  lessees,  for  life  or 
lives,  term  of  year  or  years,  at  will,  sufferance,  or  otherwise 
of  any  messuage,  lands,  tenements,  or  hereditaments,  shall 
convey  away  or  carry  off  or  from  such  premises,  his,  her  or 
their  goods  or  chattels,  leaving  the  rent  or  any  part  thereof 
unpaid,  the  landlord  or  lessor,  landlords  or  lessors,  or  any 
person  or  persons  by  him,  her  or  them  for  that  purpose  law- 
fully empowered,  within  the  space  of  thirty  days  next  after 
such  conveying  away  or  carrying  off  such  goods  or  chattels, 
may  take  and  seize  such  goods  and  chattels  wherever  the 
same  shall  be  found  as  a  distress  for  the  said  arrears  of  rent, 
and  the  same  to  sell  or  otherwise  dispose  of,  in  such  manner 
as  if  the  said  goods  and  chattels  had  actually  been  distrained 
in  and  upon  such  premises ;  provided  always  that  no  landlord 
or  lessor  or  other  person  entitled  to  such  arrears  of  rent  shall 
take  or  seize  any  such  goods  or  chattels,  as  a  distress  for  the 
same,  which  shall  be  sold  bona  fide,  or  for  a  valuable  con- 
produce  "growing  or  being  on  the  sor's  right  to  distrain  growing 
premises"  is  not  limited  to  such  crops  is  not  affected  by  the  sale 
as  belongs  exclusively  to  the  ten-  of  such  crops  by  the  tenant.  Bird 
ant.  Guest  v.  Opdyke,  31  N.  J.  L.  v.  Anderson,  41  N.  J.  L.  392. 
552,  555.     It  follows  that  the  les- 


628 


LIENS. 


620 


sideration,  before  such  seizure  made  to  any  person  not  privy 
to  such  fraud.  This  paragraph  shall  extend  to  all  cases 
where  rent  shall  have  accrued  and  shall  be  unpaid,  upon  any 
demise  or  contract  hereafter  made,  although  by  the  terms 
thereof  the  rent  shall  not  be  payable.®^ 

§  628.  New  Jersey.^*^  (continued).  Liens  for  rent.  When 
tenant's  goods  seized  on  execution. — No  goods  or  chat- 
tels upon  any  messuage,  lands  or  tenements  leased  for  term 
of  life  or  years,  at  will  or  otherwise,  shall  be  liable  to  be  taken, 
by  virtue  of  any  execution,  attachment,  or  other  process, 
unless  the  party  at  whose  suit  the  said  execution  or  other 
process  is  sued  out,  shall,  before  the  removal  of  such  goods 
from  the  premises,  pay  to  the  landlord  all  rent  due  for  the 
premises  at  the  time  of  the  taking  such  goods  or  chattels, 
by  .virtue  of  such  process,  or  which  shall  have  accrued  up  to 


(>5This  provision  construed, 
Weiss  V.  Jahn,  Zl  N.  J.  L.  93. 

eeComp.  Stats.  1910,  pp.  3066- 
3068.  The  landlord  must  give  no- 
tice to  the  officer  of  the  rent  due 
him,  before  the  removal  of  the 
goods.  Ayers  v.  Johnson,  7  N.  J. 
L.  119.  If  the  sheriff  w^rongfully 
proceeds  to  sell  and  remove  the 
goods  after  such  notice,  he  is  lia- 
ble for  the  tort,  but  the  plaintiff 
in  execution  is  not.  Princeton 
Bank  v.  Gibson,  20  N.  J.  L.  138. 
As  to  distress  of  goods  vi^hich  have 
already  been  seized  upon  execu- 
tion, see  Nevi^ell  v.  Clark,  46  N. 
J.  L.  363.  A  levy  and  sale  of  the 
goods  amount  to  a  removal, 
whether  the  goods  are  actually 
taken  from  the  premises  or 
not,  for  a  sale  effects  the 
very  evil  which  the  statute  was 
designed  to  remedy.  Ryerson  v. 
Quackenbush,  26  N.  J.  L.  236.  It 
is  proper  practice   for  a  landlord. 


who  is  entitled  to  have  his  ar- 
rears of  rent  paid  before  the  re- 
moval or  sale  of  goods  levied  on. 
to  apply  to  the  court  for  a  rule 
that  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  un- 
der execution  be  applied  to  the 
payment  of  his  rent.  Fischel  v. 
Keer,  45  N.  J.  L.  507.  This  was 
done  as  early  as  1718,  under  the 
Act  8  Anne,  ch.  14,  passed  in  1710; 
Waring  v.  Dewberry,  1  Str.  97; 
and  the  practice  has  continued 
down  to  the  present  time.  Hen- 
chett  V.  Kimpson,  2  Wils.  140;  Cen- 
tral Bank  v.  Peterson,  24  N.  J.  L. 
668.  If  the  rent  be  not  due,  the 
landlord  has  no  right  to  demand 
payment  before  removal,  except 
by  force  of  the  statute.  Schenck 
v.  Vannest,  4  N.  J.  L.  329.  To  au- 
thorize a  payment  out  of  the  pro- 
ceeds of  an  execution  sale  of  rent 
to  the  landlord,  it  must  appear 
that  rent  was  due  him  upon  such 
a  lease  or  contract  as  would  give 


621  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  629 

the  day  of  the  removal  of  the  goods  from  the  premises, 
whether  by  the  terms  of  lease  the  day  of  payment  shall  have 
come  or  not,  making  a  rebate  of  interest  on  the  sum,  the  time 
of  payment  of  which,  by  the  terms  of  the  lease,  shall  not  have 
come ;  provided,  the  said  arrears  of  rent  do  not  amount  to 
more  than  one  year's  rent ;  and  in  case  the  said  arrears  shall 
exceed  one  year's  rent,  then  the  said  party  at  whose  suit  such 
process  is  sued  out,  paying  the  landlord  one  year's  rent,  may 
proceed  to  execute  his  process;  and  the  sheriff  or  other  officer 
is  empowered  and  required  to  levy  and  pay  to  the  plaintiff 
as  well  the  money  so  paid  for  rent  as  the  money  to  be  made 
by  virtue  of  such  process. 

If  the  goods  have  been  removed  from  the  leased  premises 
by  virtue  of  such  process,  the  same  shall  not  be  sold  until  ten 
days  after  such  removal,  and  then  not  unless  the  plaintiff 
shall,  before  the  sale,  pay  to  the  landlord  all  rent  due  as  above 
provided:  provided  the  landlord  shall,  before  the  expiration 
of  the  said  ten  days  from  the  time  of  such  removal,  give 
notice  to  the  officer  holding  the  execution  or  other  process 
of  the  amount  of  the  rent  in  arrear,  and  claim  the  same.*^'^ 

No  such  goods  shall  be  removed  from  the  premises  except 
openly  and  in  the  daytime,  and  then  not  unless  the  officer 
shall  at  the  time  of  such  removal  give  notice  thereof  to  the 
defendant,  or,  in  his  absence,  to  some  person  of  his  family  re- 
siding on  the  premises. 

§  629.  New  York.*'^ — Distress  for  rent  under  the  com- 
mon-law rules  as  modified  by  statute  prevailed  in  this  state 
down  to  1846,  when  it  was  abolished  by  statute. 

him   the    right   to   distrain.     Kirk-  goods   beyond   the   demised  prem- 

patrick  v.    Cason,  30  N.  J.   L.  331.  ises,   when  removed   by  an  officer 

The  fact  that  the  rent  is  reserved  by  virtue   of  an   execution.     Pea- 

to    be    applied    to    a    special    pur-  cock  v.  Hammitt,  15  N.  J.  L.  165. 

pose  does  not  affect  its  character  cswilliams    v.    Potter,    2    Barb. 

as  rent.     Ryerson  v.  Quackenbush,  (N.    Y.)    316;    Guild    v.    Rogers,   8 

26  N.  J.  L.  236.  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  502;  Van  Rensselaer 

c' Before      this      provision,      the  v.   Snyder,   13  N.   Y.  299. 
landlord     could     not     follow     the 


§    630  LIENS.  622 

§  630.  New  Mexico.*'" — Landlords  shall  have  a  lien  on  the 
property  of  their  tenants  which  remains  in  the  house  rented, 
for  the  rent  due,  and  said  property  may  not  be  removed  from 
said  house  without  the  consent  of  the  landlord,  until  the  rent 
is  paid  or  secured."** 

No  person  is  entitled  to  a  lien  who  has  taken  collateral 
security  for  the  payment  of  the  sum  due  him. 

To  enforce  the  lien  a  written  notice  may  be  served  on  the 
debtor,  setting  forth  the  amount  of  the  indebtedness  and  the 
nature  of  it,  and,  if  the  same  is  not  paid  within  ten  days  after 
the  service  of  such  notice,  the  property  may  be  advertised 
for  twenty  days  and  then  sold  at  auction.  The  lien  claimant 
may  bid  for  or  purchase  the  property  at  such  sale. 

The  lien  may  also  be  enforced  by  suit  in  the  ordinary  form, 
and  sale  of  the  property  upon  which  the  lien  has  attached 
upon  execution,  as  in  other  cases.  If  such  property  does  not 
satisfy  the  execution,  other  property  of  the  defendant  may 
be  levied  upon. 

Rentals  shall  constitute  a  first  lien  on  any  and  all  improve- 
ments and  crops  upon  the  land  leased,  prior  and  superior  to 
any  other  lien  or  encumbrance  whatsoever  whether  created 
with  or  without  notice  of  the  lien  for  rental  due  or  to  become 
due.  When  any  rental  is  due  and  unpaid  the  Commissioner 
may  forthwith  attach,  without  attachment  bond,  all  improve- 
ments and  crops  upon  the  land  leased,  or  so  much  thereof 
as  may  be  suf^cient  to  pay  such  rental  together  with  all  costs 
necessarily  incurred  in  the  enforcement  of  such  lien,  and  the 
enforcement  of  such  lien  shall  work  a  forfeiture  of  such  lease. 

fi^Comp.  Laws  1897,  §§  2234-2243.  the  landlord  consents  to  a  remov- 

'i'OWhere       there      are       several  al   of  a  tenant's  property   from   a 

rooms    in    one    building,    each    oc-  separate  room  so  occupied  to  an- 

cupied    by    a    separate    tenant,    a.s  other  room  in  the  building,  his  lien 

between  the  landlord  and  the  sev-  for   the   rent   of   the    first   room   is 

eral  tenants  each  apartment  so  oc-  lost.      Wolcott    v.    Ashenfelter,    5 

cupied    is    a    "house"     within     the  N.  Mex.  442,  23  Pac.  780,  8  L.   R. 

meaning  of  the  statute,  and,  when  A.  691. 


623 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


§    631 


The  failure  of  any  lessee  of  state  land  to  pay  the  rental  there- 
for when  due  or  to  furnish  additional  security  for  any  de- 
ferred payment,  when  required  by  the  Commissioner,  shall 
be  sufficient  cause  for  declaring  any  such  lease  forfeited. ^^* 

§631.  North  Carolina.'^^ — When  lands  shall  be  rented  or 
leased  by  agreement,  written  or  oral,  for  agricultural  pur- 
poses, or  shall  be  cultivated  by  a  cropper,  unless  otherwise 
agreed  between  the  parties  to  the  lease  or  agreement,  any 
and  all  crops  raised  on  said  lands  shall  be  deemed  and  held 
to  be  vested  in  possession  of  the  lessor  or  his  assigns  at  all 
times,  until  the  rents  for  said  lands  shall  be  paid,''^^  and  until 
all  the  stipulations  contained  in  the  lease  or  agreement  shall 
be  performed,  or  damages  in  lieu  thereof  shall  be  paid  to  the 
lessor  or  his  assigns,  and  until  said  party  or  his  assigns  shall 
be  paid  for  all  advancements  made  and  expenses  incurred  in 


■"•a  Laws  1912,  p.  179,  §  16. 

'iRevisal  1905,  §§  1993,  1995-1997, 
3664,  3665.  Distress  for  rent  is 
unknown  in  this  state.  Dalgleish 
V.  Grandy,  1  N.  Car.  249,  Cam.  & 
Nor.  Conf.  (N.  Car.)  22;  Deaver 
V.  Rice,  20  N.  Car.  567,  34  Am. 
Dec.  388.  Under  this  statute  the 
landlord  has  a  first  lien  upon  the 
crop  to  secure  his  rent  and  ad- 
vances, with  the  right  of  posses- 
sion. Ledbetter  v.  Quick,  90  N. 
Car.  276.  See  Sessoms  v.  Tay- 
loe,  148  N.  Car.  369,  62  S.  E.  424; 
Reynolds  v.  Taylor,  144  N.  Car. 
165.  56  S.  E.  871. 

"-The  landlord  has  such  a  prop- 
erty in  his  tenant's  crop  by  virtue 
of  his  lien  and  right  of  possession 
that  he  can  maintain  an  action  for 
the  recovery  of  the  same.  Mon- 
tague V.  Mial,  89  N.  Car.  137;  Liv- 
ingston V.  Parish,  89  N.  Car.  140; 
Ledbetter  v.  Quick,  90  N.  Car. 
276;  Rawlings  v.  Hunt,  90  N.  Car. 
270.     The   landlord   can   not   claim 


a  delivery  until  the  crop  is  gath- 
ered and  ready  for  division.  Jor- 
dan V.  Bryan,  103  N.  Car.  59,  9  S. 
E.  135.  The  only  statutory  pro- 
vision giving  the  landlord  a  lien 
where  rent  is  payable  in  kind,  un- 
til a  division  has  been  made  and 
his  share  set  apart  to  him  in  sev- 
eralty, is  in  the  case  of  leases  for 
agricultural  purposes,  under 
§  1754.  Rowland  v.  Forlaw,  108 
N.  Car.  567,  13  S.  E.  173.  When 
advancements  are  necessary  to 
the  cultivation  of  the  crop  they 
will  be  presumed  to  create  a  lien 
against  the  tenant's  property,  but 
when  they  are  inappropriate  and 
unnecessary  for  such  purpose  it 
must  be  shown  that  they  were 
made  to  aid  in  raising  the  crop. 
Windsor  Bargain  House  v.  Wat- 
son, 148  N.  Car.  295,  62  S.  E.  305. 
Advancements  made  to  the  tenant 
on  the  landlord's  credit  to  aid  in 
making  the  crop,  where  the  land- 


631 


LIENS. 


624 


making  and  saving  said  crops. '^     This  lien  shall  be  preferred 


lord  promises  to  be  responsible, 
are  within  the  statute  and  will 
give  the  landlord  a  lien.  Powell 
V.  Perry,  127  N.  Car.  22,  Zl  S.  E. 
71.  The  landlord's  title  is  not 
impaired  by  the  tenant's  convey- 
ing the  crop  to  a  third  person, 
who  purchases  without  notice  of 
the  landlord's  claim.  Belcher  v. 
Grimsley,  88  N.  Car.  88.  A  tenant 
who  retains  actual  possession  of 
the  crop  can  not  be  indicted  for 
larceny  for  secretly  taking  away 
part  of  the  crop.  State  v.  Cope- 
land,  86  N.  Car.  691.  Otherwise  if 
the  tenant's  actual  possession  has 
terminated  by  a  delivery  to  the 
landlord.  State  v.  Webb,  87  N. 
Car.  558. 

TSThe  advances,  whether  made 
in  money  or  merchandise,  must  be 
such  as  go  directly  or  indirectly 
to  make  or  save  the  crop,  and  the 
tenant  must  be  the  judge  of  what 
best  serves  his  purpose.  Womble 
V.  Leach,  83  N.  Car.  84.  At  the 
end  of  a  tenant's  first  year,  the 
landlord  leased  the  land  for  an- 
other year  to  the  same  tenant, 
and  agreed  that  he  should  retail? 
the  landlord's  share  of  the  former 
crop  to  enable  him  to  make  an- 
other crop.  It  was  held  that  this 
constituted  an  advancement  for 
the  second  year,  and  gave  the  land- 
lord a  lien  on  the  crop  thereof, 
though  his  share  of  the  first  year's 
crop  had  never  been  set  apart  or 
divided  from  the  bulk  belonging 
to  the  tenant,  and  though  such 
share  was  to  be  returned  in  kind 
or  paid  for  in  money.  Thigpen  v. 
Maget,  107  N.  Car.  39,  12  S.  E.  272. 
Where   the   lessor   furnishes   table 


board  to  the  lessee  and  his  fam- 
ily, in  order  that  the  latter  may 
make  and  save  his  crops,  such 
board  at  once  becomes  an  advance- 
ment, and  the  lessor  is  not  re- 
quired to  prove  an  express  agree- 
ment showing  that  it  was  to  be  so 
considered  between  the  parties. 
Brown  v.  Brown,  109  N.  Car.  124, 
13  S.  E.  797.  Supplies  necessary 
to  make  and  save  a  crop  are  such 
articles  as  are  in  good  faith  fui- 
nished  to  and  received  by  the  ten- 
ant for  that  purpose.  It  may  be 
properly  left  to  the  jury  to  find 
whether,  upon  the  evidence,  a  mule 
and  wagon  were  treated  as  ad- 
vancements. Ledbetter  v.  Quick, 
90  N.  Car.  276.  The  debt  for  ad- 
vances must  be  created  in  good 
faith.  It  must  not  be  made  col- 
lusively.  The  landlord  can  not 
be  allowed  to  supply  such  things 
as  advancements  as  are  manifest- 
ly not  such,  and  which  he  has  rea- 
son to  believe  are  not  so  intended. 
Ledbetter  v.  Quick,  90  N.  Car. 
276.  Advances  by  the  landlord  to 
a  sublessee,  made  without  the 
knowledge  and  privity  of  the  les- 
see, are  not  entitled  to  priority 
over  advances  procured  by  the  les- 
see for  the  sublessee  from  a  third 
person.  Moore  v.  Faison,  97  N. 
Car.  322,  2  S.  E.  169.  A  person 
having  an  agricultural  lien  on  a 
crop  for  advances  made  to  the 
landlord,  the  lien  having  been  ac- 
quired after  the  making  of  a  con- 
tract by  the  landlord  with  a  crop- 
per, under  which  the  latter  is  to 
receive  a  share  of  the  crop  for 
working  it,  holds  the  lien  subject 
to  the  right  of  the  cropper  to  his 


625  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  631 

to  all  other  liens/"*  and  the  lessor  or  his  assigns  shall  be 
entitled,  against  the  lessee  or  cropper  or  the  assigns  of  either, 
who  shall  remove  the  crop  or  any  part  thereof  from  the 
lands  without  the  consent  of  the  lessor  or  his  assigns,  or 
against  any  other  person  who  may  get  possession  of  said 
crop  or  any  part  thereof,  to  the  remedies  given  in  an  action 
upon  a  claim  for  the  delivery  of  personal  property.'^'^ 

In  case  there  is  any  controversy  between  the  parties,  this 
may  be  determined  in  court  forthwith ;  but  in  case  of  a  con- 
tinuance or  appeal,  the  lessee  must  give  an  undertaking  to 
pay  whatever  the  adverse  party  may  recover  in  the  action. 
If  the  lessee  fails  to  give  the  undertaking,  the  ofhcer  delivers 
the  property  to  the  lessor,  on  his  giving  an  undertaking  to 
return  it  in  case  judgment  be  against  him.  In  case  neither 
party  gives  such  undertaking,  the  clerk  of  court  issues  an 
order  to  the  officer,  directing  him  to  take  into  his  possession 
the  property,  or  so  much  as  is  necessary  to  satisfy  the  claim- 
ant's demand  and  costs,  and  to  sell  the  same  in  the  manner 
prescribed  for  the  sale  of  personal  property  under  execution, 
and  to  hold  the  proceeds  subject  to  the  decision  of  the  court. '^ 

Any  lessee  or  cropper,  or  the  assigns  of  either,  or  any  other 
person,  who  shall  remove  said  crop,  or  any  part  thereof,  from 
such  land,  without  the  consent  of  the  lessor  or  his  assigns,  and 
without  giving  him  or  his  agent  five  days'  notice  of  such 
intended  removal,  and  before  satisfying  all  the  liens  held  by 
the  lessor  or  his  assigns,  on  said  crop,  shall  be  guilty  of  a 
misdemeanor;  and  if  any  landlord  shall  unlawfully,  wilfully, 
knowingly,  and  without  process  of  law,  and  unjustly,  seize 

share.     Rouse   v.   Wooten,   104   N.  of  the  crop,  though  all  of   it  has 

Car.  229,   10  S.   E.   190.  been  delivered  to  a  third  person. 

''■*  See    Brewer   v.    Chappell,    101  Boone  v.   Darden,   109  N.  Car.  74, 

N.  Car.  251,  7  S.  E.  670;  Spruill  v.  13  S.  E.  728. 

Arrington,  109  N.  Car.  192,  13  S.  E.  -e  Revisal  1905,  §§  1995-1997.  The 

779.  lien    includes     costs     as     well     as 

"oThe     landlord     may    maintain  rents.      Slaughter    v.    Winfrey,    85 

the  action  for  a  certain  part  only  N.  Car.  159. 


40 


§    631a  LIENS.  626 

the  crop  of  his  tenant  when  there  is  nothing  due  him,  he 
shall  be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor.'^' 

§  631a.  North  Dakota."^^ — A  Hen  by  contract  upon  crops 
shall  attach  only  to  the  crop  next  maturing  after  the  delivery 
of  such  contract,  except  in  the  case  of  liens  by  contract  to 
secure  the  purchase-price,  or  rental,  of  the  land  upon  which 
such  crops  are  to  be  grown. 

§631b.  OklahomaJ^ — Any  rent  due  for  farming  land 
shall  be  a  lien  on  the  crop  growing  or  made  on  the  premises. 
Such  lien  may  be  enforced  by  action  and  attachment  therein, 
as  hereinafter  provided. 

When  any  such  rent  is  payable  in  a  share  or  certain  pro- 
portion of  the  crop,  the  lessor  shall  be  deemed  the  owner  of 
such  share  or  proportion,  and  may,  if  the  tenant  refuses  to 
deliver  him  such  share  or  proportion,  enter  upon  the  land 
and  take  possession  of  the  same,  or  obtain  possession  thereof 
by  action  of  replevin. 

The  person  entitled  to  rent  may  recover  from  the  pur- 
chaser of  the  crop,  or  any  part  thereof,  with  notice  of  the 
lien,  the  value  of  the  crop  purchased,  to  the  extent  of  the 
rent  due  and  damages. 

77As  to  indictments  under  this  S.  E.  203;  State  v.  Crook,  132  N. 
provision,  see  State  v.  Pender,  83  Car.  1053,  44  S.  E.  32. 
N.  Car.  651 ;  State  v.  Rose,  90  N.  "8  Rev.  Code  1905,  §  6131.  Where 
Car.  712;  Varner  v.  Spencer,  72  the  lease  provides  that  the  land- 
N.  Car.  381.  In  a  prosecution  for  lord  may  hold  the  grain  raised  on 
removing  crops  without  first  sat-  the  leased  land  for  advances  made 
isfying  lessor's  lien,  or  giving  five  to  the  tenant,  the  landlord  can 
days'  notice  thereof,  it  is  held  not,  by  purchasing  claims  against 
not  to  be  a  defense  that  the  les-  the  tenant  not  connected  with  the 
see  was  damaged  more  by  the  lease,  hold  the  crop  for  the  pay- 
failure  of  the  lessor  to  comply  ment  of  such  debts.  Aronson  v. 
with  his  contract  than  the  amount  Oppegard,  16  N.  Dak.  595,  114  N. 
of  rent  due.     State  v.  Bell,  136  N.  W.  111. 

Car.   674,   49   S.    E.    163.     But   see,  "» Comp.      Laws     1909,      §§4100- 

State  V.   Neal,  129  N.   Car.  692,  40  4102. 


62y  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  632 

When  any  person  who  shall  be  liable  to  pay  rent  (whether 
the  same  be  due  or  not,  if  it  be  due  within  one  year  there- 
after, and  whether  the  same  be  payable  in  money  or  other 
things)  intends  to  remove  or  is  removing,  or  has,  within 
thirty  days,  removed  his  property,  or  his  crops,  or  any  part 
thereof,  from  the  leased  premises,  the  person  to  whom  the 
rent  is  owing  may  commence  an  action  in  the  court  having 
jurisdiction;  and  upon  making  an  afifiidavit,  stating  the 
amount  of  rent  for  which  such  person  is  liable  and  one  or 
more  of  the  above  facts,  and  executing  an  undertaking  as  in 
other  cases,  an  attachment  shall  issue  in  the  same  manner 
and  with  the  like  efYect  as  is  provided  by  law  in  other  actions. 

In  action  to  enforce  a  lien  on  crops  for  rent  of  farming 
lands,  the  affidavit  for  attachment  shall  state  that  there  is 
due  from  the  defendant  to  the  plaintiff  a  certain  sum,  nam- 
ing it,  for  rent  of  farming  lands,  describing  the  same,  and 
that  the  plaintiff  claims  a  lien  on  the  crop  made  on  such 
land.  Upon  making  and  filing  such  affidavit  and  executing 
an  undertaking  as  prescribed  in  the  preceding  section,  an 
order  of  attachment  shall  issue  as  in  other  cases,  and  shall 
be  levied  on  such  crop,  or  so  much  thereof  as  may  be  neces- 
sary; and  all  other  proceedings  in  such  attachment  shall  be 
the  same  as  in  other  actions. 

§  631c.  Oregon. — The  lien  on  personal  property  not  a 
decree  or  judgment,  such  as  the  lien  of  a  landlord  on  his 
tenant's  furniture  when  reserved  in  the  lease  and  where  the 
lease  does  not  provide  a  mode  of  enforcement,  must  be  fore- 
closed in  a  suit  for  that  purpose.®^ 

§  632.  Pennsylvania.^^ — Any  person  having  any  rent  in 
arrear^-  or  due  upon  any  lease  for  life  or  lives,  or  for  one  or 

80  Bellinger     &     Cotton's     Ann.  8I  Purdon's    Dig.    (13th    ed.),   pp. 

Codes  &  Stats.  1902,  §  423;  Swank  2174-2184. 

V.    Elwert,    55    Ore.   487,    105    Pac,  82  A  landlord  issuing  a  distress 

901.  is   required   to   credit   on   the   rent 


§ 


632 


LIENS. 


628 


more  years,  or  at  will,  ended  or  determined,  may  distrain 
for  such  arrears,  after  the  determination  of  the  said  respec- 
tive leases,  in  the  same  manner  as  he  might  have  done  if  such 
lease  had  not  been  ended  or  determined;  provided,  that  such 
distress  be  made  during  the  continuance  of  such  lessor's  title 
or  interest. ^^ 

The  landlord  may  take  and  seize  as  a  distress  for  arrears 
of  rent  any  cattle  or  stock  of  his  tenant,  feeding  or  depastur- 
ing upon  all  or  any  part  of  the  premises  demised  or  holden; 
and  also  all  sorts  of  corn  and  grass,  hops,  roots,  fruit,  pulse, 
or  other  product  whatsoever,  which  shall  be  growing  on  any 
part  of  the  estate  so  demised  or  holden,  in  the  same  manner 
as  other  goods  and  chattels  may  be  seized,  distrained,  and 
disposed  of.®^     And  the  purchaser  of  any  such  product  shall 


all  actual  payments  of  rent,  and 
such  sums  as  the  parties  have 
agreed  to  treat  as  payment  on  ac- 
count of  rent.  But  he  is  under  no 
obligation  to  deduct  any  claim  for 
unliquidated  damages  which  the 
tenant  may  have  against  him. 
Therefore  the  fact  that  he  fails, 
in  issuing  the  w^arrant  of  distress, 
to  credit  on  the  rent  such  claim 
for  unliquidated  damages,  does 
not  entitle  the  tenant  to  recover 
damages  for  distraining  for  more 
rent  than  was  in  arrear.  Spencer 
V.  Clinefelter,  101  Pa.  St.  219.  As 
to  the  recovery  of  damages  for 
an  excessive  distress,  see  Fern- 
wood  Masonic  Hall  Assn.  v. 
Jones,  102  Pa.  St.  307;  Richards 
v.  McGrath,  100  Pa.  St.  389;  Mc- 
Elroy  v.  Dice,  17  Pa.  St.  163; 
McKinney  v.  Reader,  6  Watts. 
(Pa.)  34.  A  distress  can  not  be 
made  on  Sunday,  nor  by  breaking 
open  an  outer  door.  Mayfield  v. 
White,  1   Browne  (Pa.)  241. 

83  The  right  continues  after  the 


termination  of  the  term,  without 
limitation  as  to  time.  The  stat- 
ute gives  the  landlord  this  right 
whenever  the  rent  is  in  arrear, 
and  he  retains  the  title.  Moss's 
Appeal,  35  Pa.  St.  162;  Clififord  v. 
Beems,  3  Watts  (Pa.)  246;  Lewis's 
Appeal,  66  Pa.  St.  312;  Whiting  v. 
Lake,  91  Pa.  St.  349;  In  re  De 
Lancey  Stables  Co.,  170  Fed.  860. 
A  lessee  for  years  who  transfers 
all  his  interest  to  a  third  person, 
with  a  reservation  of  rent,  can 
not  distrain  unless  the  instrument 
of  transfer  reserves  an  express 
power  of  distress.  Manuel  v. 
Reath,  5  Phila.  (Pa.)  11.  After  the 
determination  of  the  landlord's  es- 
tate by  surrender  to  the  owner  of 
the  paramount  estate,  the  landlord 
has  no  right  to  distrain,  for  rent 
in  arrear,  on  the  goods  of  his 
former  tenant  remaining  on  the 
premises.  An  officer  acting  under 
such  a  warrant  is  a  trespasser. 
Walbridge  v.  Prudent,  102  Pa.  St.  1. 
84  Property    of    a    stranger     on 


629 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


632 


have  free  egress  and  regress  to  and  from  the  same  where 
growing,  to  repair  the  fences  from  time  to  time,  and,  when 
ripe,  to  cut,  gather,  make,  cure,  and  lay  up  and  thresh,  and 
after  to  carry  the  same  away,  in  the  same  manner  as  the  ten- 
ant might  legally  have  done  had  such  distress  never  been 
made. 

Property  to  the  value  of  three  hundred  dollars,  exclusive 
of  all  wearing  apparel  of  the  defendant  and  his  family,  and 
all  bibles  and  school-books  in  use  in  the  family  (which  shall 
remain  exempted  as  heretofore),  and  no  more,  owned  by  or 
in  possession  of  any  debtor,  shall  be  exempt  from  levy  and 
sale  on  execution,  or  by  distress  for  rent.^^  Leased  pianos,®^ 
musical  instruments,  sewing  machines  and  typewriters  are 
also  exempt. ^''^ 

In  case  any  lessee  shall  fraudulently  or  clandestinely  con- 
vey or  carry  off  or  from  such  demised  premises^^  his  goods 
and  chattels,  with  intent  to  prevent  the  landlord  or  lessor 
from  distraining  the  same  for  arrears  of  such  rent  so  re- 
served as  aforesaid,  it  shall  and  may  be  lawftil  to  and  for 
such  lessor,  within  the  space  of  thirty  days  next  ensuing  such 


the  demised  premises  is  generally 
liable  to  distress  for  rent.  Kleber 
V.   Ward,   88   Pa.   St.  93. 

85  Joint  owners  of  chattels 
levied  on,  under  distress  for  rent 
due  upon  their  joint  lease,  are  not 
entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  ex- 
emption law.  Bonsall  v.  Comly, 
44  Pa.  St.  42.  A  subtenant,  or 
assignee  of  the  tenant,  who  has 
not  been  recognized  as  such  by 
the  landlord,  can  not  claim  the 
benefit  of  the  exemption  law,  as 
against  a  distress  for  rent,  when 
the  goods  are  levied  on  as  those 
of  the  original  lessee.  Neither 
the  relation  of  landlord  and  ten- 
ant, nor  that  of  debtor  and  cred- 
itor,   exists    between   the    landlord 


and  such  subtenant  or  assignee. 
Rosenberger  v.  Hallowell,  35  Pa. 
St.  369.  A  privilege  from  distress 
may  be  waived.  McKinney  v. 
Reader,  6  Watts  (Pa.)  34;  Win- 
chester V.  Costello,  2  Pars.  Eq. 
Cas.  (Pa.)  279,  283;  Bowman  v. 
Smiley,  31  Pa.  St.  225,  72  Am.  Dec. 
738. 

86  Purdon's  Dig.  (13th  ed.),  p. 
2176. 

S7  Purdon's  Dig.  (13th  ed.),  p. 
2175. 

ss  A  removal  in  the  daytime, 
though  without  the  knowledge  of 
the  landlord,  is  not  fraudulent. 
Grant's  App.,  44  Pa.  St.  477;  Grace 
v.  Shively,  12  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  217; 
Hoops  V.   Crowley,   12  Serg.   &   R. 


§  632 


LIENS. 


630 


conveying  away  or  carrying  off  such  goods  or  chattels  as 
aforesaid,  to  take  and  seize  such  goods  and  chattels, ^^ 
wherever  the  same  may  be  found,  as  a  distress  for  the  said 
arrears  of  such  rent,  and  the  same  to  sell  or  otherwise  dis- 
pose of,  in  such  manner,  as  if  the  said  goods  and  chattels  had 
actually  been  distrained  by  such  lessor  or  landlord  in  and 
upon  such  demised  premises,  for  such  arrears  of  rent. 

When  any  goods  or  chattels  shall  be  distrained  for  any 
rent  reserved  and  due,  and  the  tenant  or  owner  shall  not, 
within  five  days  after  such  distress  and  notice  thereof,^"  with 
the  cause  of  such  taking  left  on  the  premises,  replevy  the 
same,^^  then  the  person  distraining  may  cause  the  goods  to 
be  appraised  by  two  reputable  freeholders  under  oath,  and 
after  such  appraisement  may,  after  six  days'  public  notice. 


(Pa.)  219n;  Purfel  v.  Sands,  1 
Ashm.  (Pa.)  120;  Morris  v.  Parker, 
1   Ashm.    (Pa.)    187. 

89  The  goods  of  a  stranger  can 
not  be  followed  and  distrained 
under  this  clause.  Sleeper  v.  Par- 
rish,  7  Phila.  (Pa.)  247;  Adams  v. 
La  Comb,  1  Dall.  (U.  S.)  440,  1  L. 
ed.  214.  But  goods  of  an  assignee 
after  term  may  be  followed. 
Jones  V.  Gundrin,  3  Watts  &  S. 
(Pa.)  531.  Nor  can  goods  fairly 
sold  to  an  innocent  purchaser  be 
distrained.  Clifford  v.  Beems,  3 
Watts  (Pa.)  246.  Such  goods  can 
not  be  distrained  for  rent  not  due 
at  the  time  of  removal.  Conway 
V.  Lowry,  7  W.  N.  C.  (Pa.)  64; 
Grace  v.  Shively,  12  Serg.  &  R. 
(Pa.)  217.  As  to  the  law  appli- 
cable to  Philadelphia,  see  Purdon's 
Dig.  (13th  ed.)  p.  2177.  The 
same  applied  to  Pittsburg  And 
Allegheny.  In  Pennsylvania,  out- 
side of  Philadelphia,  Pittsburg 
^nd   Allegheny,     a     landlord     has 


no  right  to  distrain  upon  goods 
fraudulently  removed  from  the 
demised  premises  with  intent 
to  defraud  the  landlord  of  his 
distress,  for  rent  that  is  not 
yet  due,  nor  has  a  court  of  equity 
jurisdiction  to  detain  the  goods 
upon  the  premises  until  the  land- 
lord is  in  a  condition  to  distrain. 
Jackson's  Appeal,  6  Sad.  (Pa.)  327, 
9  Atl.  306. 

90  The  day  of  making  the  dis- 
tress is  to  be  excluded  in  comput- 
ing the  time,  and  if  the  last  day 
fall  on  Sunday,  the  landlord  has 
until  the  next  day  to  remove  the 
goods.  McKinney  v.  Reader,  6 
Watts  (Pa.)  34,  Z7 ;  Brisben  v. 
Wilson,  60  Pa.  St.  452;  Davis  v. 
Davis,  128  Pa.  St.  100,  18  Atl.  514. 

s>i  Replevin  is  the  only  remedy 
for  an  unlawful  distress  where 
notice  has  been  given  and  the 
goods  appraised.  Sassman  v.  Bris- 
bane, 7  Phila.  (Pa.)   159. 


631 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


633 


sell  the  goods  distrained  for  the  satisfaction  of  the  rent  and 
charges. ^^ 

§  633.  Pennsylvania^^  (continued).  Tenant's  goods 
seized  on  execution. — The  goods  and  chattels  upon  any 
lands  or  tenements  which  are  demised  for  life  or  years,  or 
otherwise,  taken  by  virtue  of  an  execution,  and  liable  to  the 
distress  of  the  landlord,  are  liable  for  the  payment  of  any 
sums  of  money  due  for  rent  at  the  time  of  taking  such  goods 
in  execution:''^  provided,  that  such  rent  shall  not  exceed  one 
year's  rent.^^ 


92  The  landlord  ought  not  to 
sell  the  goods  after  a  tender  of 
the  rent  and  costs  made  at  any- 
time before  the  sale.  Richards  v. 
McGrath,  100  Pa.  St.  389.  And  see 
Johnson  v.  Upham,  2  El.  &  El. 
250.  A  sale  can  be  made  only  af- 
ter appraisement.  Davis  v.  Davis, 
128  Pa.  St.  100,  18  Atl.  514.  Even 
after  the  sale  has  commenced,  if 
the  tenant  tenders  the  difference 
between  the  amount  realized  by 
the  sale  and  the  full  amount  of 
the  rent  claimed,  with  costs,  and 
the  landlord  refuses  the  tender 
and  proceeds  with  the  sale,  he  is 
liable  in  an  action  of  trespass  for 
the  value  of  the  goods  afterwards 
sold.  Richards  v.  McGrath,  100 
Pa.    St.   389. 

93  Purdon's  Dig.  (13th  ed.),  pp. 
2184-2186. 

94  This  right  is  confined  to 
goods  which  were  upon  the  de- 
mised premises  at  the  time  of  the 
levy,  and  which  were  liable  to  dis- 
tress. When  the  tenant's  goods 
were  removed  from  the  premises, 
and  the  removal  was  neither  clan- 
destine nor  fraudulent,  and  the 
landlord  distrained  a  part  of  them 


at  the  place  of  removal,  he  can 
not,  as  against  an  execution  cred- 
itor whose  execution  was  levied 
the  day  after,  claim  any  portion 
of  the  proceeds  for  rent  due.  He 
should  have  returned  the  goods  to 
the  demised  premises,  so  that  if 
the  sheriff  levied  upon  them  they 
would  have  been  liable  for  the 
rent  within  the  terms  of  the  stat- 
ute. Grant's  Appeal,  44  Pa.  St. 
477. 

95  The  landlord's  preference  for 
one  year's  rent  is  not  confined  to 
the  rent  for  the  year  immediately 
preceding  the  execution.  Richie  v. 
McCauley,  4  Pa.  St.  471.  But  the 
landlord  is  entitled  only  to  the 
rent  due  at  the  time  of  the  levy, 
out  of  the  proceeds  of  the  prop- 
erty. Case  V.  Davis,  15  Pa.  St.  80. 
Only  the  immediate  landlord  of 
the  defendant,  either  by  a  direct 
lease  or  by  a  legal  assignment  of 
the  lease,  is  entitled  to  receive 
one  year's  rent  out  of  the  pro- 
ceeds of  the  sheriff's  sale.  Brom- 
ley V.  Hopewell,  2  Miles  (Pa.) 
414,  affd.  14  Pa.  St.  400.  The  land- 
lord's right  to  be  paid  out  of  the 
proceeds    of    a    sheriff's    sale    de- 


§  634 


LIENS. 


632 


After  sale  by  the  officer  of  such  goods,  he  must  first  pay 
out  of  the  proceeds  the  rent  so  due.'^*^ 

§  634.  South  Carolina.^' — No  goods  or  chattels,  lands  or 
tenements,  which  are  or  shall  be  leased  for  life  or  lives,  term 
of  years,  at  will,  or  otherwise,  shall  be  liable  to  be  taken  by 
virtue  of  any  execution  or  any  pretence  whatsoever,  unless 
the  party  at  whose  suit  the  said  execution  is  sued  out  shall, 
before  the  removal  of  such  goods  from  off  the  said  premises, 
by  virtue  of  such  execution  or  extent,  pay  to  the  landlord  of 
the  said  premises  or  his  bailiff  all  such  sum  or  sums  of  money 
as  are  or  shall  be  due  for  rent  for  the  said  premises  at  the 
time  of  the  taking  such  goods  or  chattels  by  virtue  of  such 


pends  on  his  power  to  distrain  the 
goods  sold.  Lewis'  Appeal,  66  Pa. 
St.  312.  After  a  levy  of  an  execu- 
tion upon  goods  liable  to  distress, 
the  plaintiff  can  not  stay  proceed- 
ings without  the  consent  of  the 
landlord  first  had  in  writing.  The 
rent  is  a  prior  charge  by  law,  and 
the  sale  under  execution  is  for  the 
benefit  of  the  landlord.  Barnes' 
Appeal,  76  Pa.  St.  50.  This  right 
continues  after  the  determination 
of  the  term.  Moss'  Appeal,  35  Pa. 
St.  162.  The  landlord  is  entitled 
to  claim  rent  payable  in  advance 
out  of  the  proceeds  of  a  sheriff's 
sale  of  the  tenant's  goods  upon 
the  demised  premises.  Collins' 
Appeal,  35  Pa.  St.  83.  The  tenant's 
waiver  of  the  benefit  of  the  ex- 
emption law  in  favor  of  the  exe- 
cution creditor  gives  the  latter  no 
preference  over  the  claim  of  the 
landlord,  in  whose  favor  there  is 
no  such  waiver.  Collins'  Appeal, 
35   Pa.   St.  83. 

96  Of  course   the   landlord  must 
give  notice  of  his   claim  for  rent 


before  the  return  of  the  execution. 
Mitchell's  Admr.  v.  Stewart,  13 
Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  295.  The  land- 
lord may  distrain  upon  goods  on 
the  demised  premises  which  have 
been  previously  taken  in  execu- 
tion and  released.  Gilliam  v.  To- 
bias, 11  Phila.  (Pa.)  313.  In  case 
the  landlord  had  previously  to  the 
levy  and  sale  distrained  the  prop- 
erty and  the  tenant  had  replevied 
it,  the  landlord  would  be  entitled 
to  have  out  of  the  proceeds  of  the 
sale  only  the  amount  of  rent  that 
had  accrued  subsequently  to  the 
distress.  Gray  v.  Wilson,  4  Watts 
(Pa.)   39. 

«'  Code  of  Laws  1912,  §§  3513- 
3517.  Distress  for  rent  was  abol- 
ished in  1868.  14  Stat.  105.  In  1878 
the  law  as  it  formerly  existed  was 
restored,  with  the  single  excep- 
tion that  no  property  could  be 
taken  except  such  as  belonged  to 
the  tenant  in  his  own  right.  Acts 
1876-88,  p.  511;  Mobley  v.*  Dent, 
10  S.  Car.  471,  472;  Sullivan  v.  Elli- 
son, 20  S.  Car.  481.     After  an  exe- 


633  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  634 

execution :  provided,  the  said  arrears  of  rent  do  not  amount 
to  more  than  one  year's  rent/''^ 

In  case  any  lessee  shall,  fraudulently  or  clandestinely,  con- 
vey or  carry  off  or  from  such  demised  premises  his  goods  or 
chattels,  it  shall  and  may  be  lawful  to  and  for  such  lessor  or 
landlord,  within  the  space  of  ten  days  next  ensuing  such 
conveying  away  or  carrying  off  such  goods  or  chattels  as 
aforesaid,  to  take  and  seize  such  goods  and  chattels,  wherever 
the  same  shall  be  found,  as  a  distress  for  the  said  arrears 
of  such  rent;  and  the  same  to  sell  or  otherwise  dispose  of,  in 
such  manner  as  if  the  said  goods  and  chattels  had  actually 
been  distrained  by  such  lessor  or  landlord,  in  and  upon  such 
demised  premises,  for  such  arrears  of  rent,  any  law,  usage 
or  custom  to  the  contrary  in  anywise  notwithstanding. 

Nothing  herein  contained  shall  extend,  or  be  construed  to 
extend,  to  empower  such  lessor  or  landlord  to  take  or  seize 
any  goods  or  chattels,  as  a  distress  for  arrears  of  rent,  which 
shall  be  sold  bona  fide  and  for  a  valuable  consideration  be- 
fore such  seizure  made;  and  no  property  shall  be  seized 
under  a  distress  warrant  for  such,  except  such  as  belongs  to 
the  tenant  in  his  own  right. ^^ 

cution  has  been  levied  upon  the  99  This  provision  includes  goods 
tenant's  personal  property  subject  on  the  premises  as  well  as  those 
to  distress,  the  landlord  may,  be-  removed  therefrom;  but  property 
fore  removal  of  the  property,  give  mortgaged  bona  fide  by  the  ten- 
notice  of  his  claim  for  rent,  and  ant  before  seizure  under  the  dis- 
have  judgment  against  the  officer  tress  vv^arrant,  though  still  on  the 
for  the  proceeds  of  the  sale,  or  premises,  does  not,  within  the 
for  so  much  of  the  proceeds  as  meaning  of  the  statute,  belong  to 
may  be  necessary  to  pay  his  claim  the  tenant,  and  is  therefore  not 
for  rent  for  that  year  before  sat-  liable  to  be  distrained  for  rent 
isfying  the  execution.  Sullivan  v.  due.  Ex  parte  Knobeloch,  26  S. 
Ellison,  20  S.  Car.  481.  Car.  331,  2  S.  E.  612.  Where  a 
98  An  agricultural  lienholder  can  tenant  makes  an  assignment  in  the 
not,  by  virtue  of  his  lien  for  ad-  usual  form  for  the  benefit  of  his 
vances,  take  crops  out  of  the  creditors,  the  assigned  property  is 
landlord's  possession  unless  he  no  longer  his  in  his  own  right, 
first  pay  arrears  of  rent  due.  Bischoff  v.  Trenholm,  36  S.  Car. 
Brewster  v.  McNab,  36  S.  Car.  75,  15  S.  E.  346.  Otherwise  under 
274,  15  S.  E.  233. 


§  635  LIENS.  634 

When  tenants  pur  autre  vie,  and  lessees  for  years  or  at 
will,  hold  over  the  tenements  to  them  devised  after  the  de- 
termination of  such  leases,  it  shall  and  may  be  .lawful  for  any 
person  or  persons,  to  whom  any  rent  is  in  arrear  or  due,  to 
distrain  for  such  arrears,  after  the  determination  of  the  said 
respective  leases,  in  the  same  manner  as  they  might  have 
done  if  such  lease  or  leases  had  not  been  ended  or  deter- 
mined: provided,  that  such  distress  be  made  within  the  space 
of  six  calendar  months  after  the  determination  of  such  lease, 
and  during  the  continuance  of  such  landlord's  title  or  inter- 
est, and  during  the  possession  of  the  tenant  from  whom  such 
arrears  became  due. 

§  635.  South  Carolina^  (continued).  Lien  for  rent  and 
advances  for  agricultural  purposes. — Each  landlord  leasing 
lands  for  agricultural  purposes-  shall  have  a  prior  and  pre- 
ferred lien  for  rent  to  the  extent  of  all  crops  raised  on  the 
lands  leased  by  him,  whether  the  same  be  raised  by  the 
tenant  or  other  persons,  and  enforcible  in  the  same  manner 
as  liens  for  advances,  which  said  lien  shall  be  valid  without 
recording  or  filing:  provided,  that,  subject  to  such  lien  and 
enforcible  in  the  same  way,  the  landlord  shall  have  a  lien  on 
all  the  crops  raised  by  the  tenant  for  all  advances  made  by 
the  landlord  during  the  year:  provided,  further,  every  lien 
for  advances  and  for  rent^  shall  be  indexed  in  the  office  of  the 

the  New  Jersey  statute.     See  ante,  from  asserting  it  as  against  a  sec- 

§627.  ond    lien    for    supplies    by    reason 

1  Code  of  Laws  1912,  §§  4162,  of  paying,  or  allowing  to  be  paid, 
4164,  4165.  As  to  proceedings  for  a  first  lien  for  supplies  in  prefer- 
foreclosure,  see  Code  of  Laws  ence  to  the  lien  for  rent.  Carter 
1912,  §4167.  V.   Du   Pre,  18  S.   Car.   179. 

2  The  lien  arises  from  the  con-  3  A  landlord,  to  secure  a  lien 
tract  of  renting  without  an  ex-  for  advances  made  to  his  tenant, 
press  agreement  that  there  shall  or  for  rent  exceeding  one-third  of 
be  a  lien.  Carter  v.  Du  Pre,  18  the  crop,  must  comply  with  the 
S.  Car.  179;  Kennedy  v.  Reames,  statute  relating  to  agricultural 
15  S.  Car.  548.  A  landlord  having  advances.  This  statute  was  not 
a  first  lien  for  rent  is  not  estopped  intended   to   do   more   than   to   se- 


635 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


635 


register  of  mense  conveyances  of  the  county  in  which  the 
Henor  resides  within  thirty  days  from  the  date  of  the  lien 
(and  the  indexing  of  the  said  lien  shall  constitute  notice 
thereof  to  all  third  persons,  and  entitle  the  same  to  the  bene- 
fit of  this  article) :  said  index  shall  show  the  names  of  the 
lienor  and  lienee,  the  date  and  amount  of  lien,  and  a  brief 
description  of  the  place  so  cultivated;  and  said  indexing  shall 
be  a  sufficient  record  of  the  same,  and  the  property  covered 
by  said  lien,  so  indexed  as  aforesaid,  if  found  in  the  hands  of 
subsequent  purchasers  or  creditors,  shall  be  deemed  liable 
to  said  lien. 

The  landlord  shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  crops  of  his  tenant 
for  his  rent  in  preference  to  all  other  liens. ^  Laborers  who 
assist  in  making  any  crop  shall  have  a  lien  thereon  to  the 
extent  of  the  amount  due  them  for  such  labor,  next  in  prior- 


cure  the  rent  proper  to  the  land- 
lord, and  then  leave  him  to  make 
agricultural  advances  to  his  ten- 
ants upon  the  same  terms  and 
conditions,  as  to  recording  and  the 
like,  as  are  imposed  upon  all 
others.  Therefore,  where  a  land- 
lord leased  land  to  a  tenant  for  a 
stipulated  rent,  and  also  agreed  to 
make  advances,  which  were  to  be 
repaid  out  of  the  crop,  but  the 
contract  was  not  recorded  nor 
filed,  it  was  held  that  the  landlord 
could  not  recover  for  such  ad- 
vances the  crop  made  by  the  ten- 
ant, which  had  been  seized  under 
a  warrant  issued  upon  a  mer- 
chant's recorded  lien  of  later  date. 
Whaley  v.  Jacobson,  21  S.  Car.  51. 
See  also,  Kennedy  v.  Reames,  15 
S.  Car.  548. 

4  A  complaint  alleged  that  cot- 
ton covered  by  plaintiffs'  lien  for 
rent  was  shipped  to  defendants,  to 
be   sold   by  them  as   factors ;   that 


defendants  knew  of  plaintiff's  lien, 
and  were  instructed  by  the  ship- 
per to  apply  the  proceeds  from 
the  sale  of  the  cotton  to  the  dis- 
charge of  the  lien;  and  that,  after 
the  sale  of  the  cotton,  defendants 
refused  to  pay  the  money  due 
plaintiffs  when  demanded.  It  was 
held  that  such  facts  were  suffi- 
cient to  constitute  a  cause  of  ac- 
tion for  the  amount  of  rent  due 
as  money  had  and  received,  and  it 
was  error  to  dismiss  the  com- 
plaint, on  the  ground  that  there 
was  no  privity  of  contract  be- 
tween plaintiffs  and  defendants. 
Drake  v.  Whaley,  35  S.  Car.  187, 
14  S.  E.  397.  The  lien  attaches  to 
all  the  crops  of  the  tenant  on  the 
premises,  though  the  tenant 
agreed  to  set  apart  for  the  rent  a 
specific  portion  of  the  crops. 
State  V.  Reader,  36  S.  Car.  497,  15 
S.  E.  544. 


636 


LIENS. 


636 


ity  to  the  landlord,  and  as  between  such  laborers  there  shall 
be  no  preference.  All  other  liens  for  agricultural  supplies 
shall  be  paid  paid  next  after  the  satisfaction  of  the  liens  of 
the  landlord  and  laborers,  and  shall  rank  in  other  respects 
as  they  do  now  under  existing  laws. 

No  writing  or  recording  shall  be  necessary  to  create  the 
liens  of  the  landlord,  but  such  lien  shall  exist  from  the  date 
of  the  contract,  whether  the  same  be  in  writing  or  verbal. 


§  636.  Tennessee.'^ — Any  debt  by  note,  account,  or  other- 
wise, created  for  the  rent  of  land,  is  a  lien  on  the  crop  grow- 
ing or  made  on  the  premises,  in  preference  to  all  other  debts, 
from  the  date  of  the  contract.^ 

The  lien  continues  for  three  months  after  the  debt  be- 
comes due,  and  until  the  termination  of  any  suit  commenced 
within  that  time  for  such  rent. 

This  lien  may  be  enforced:'^  1.  By  original  attachment  is- 
sued on  afSdavit  that  the  rent  is  due  and  unpaid,  or,  before 
due,  on  affidavit  that  the  defendant  is  about  to  remove  or 
sell  the  crop;^  2.  Or  by  judgment  at  law  against  the  tenant 
and  execution  to  be  levied  on  the  crop  in  whosesoever  hands 
it  may  be. 


5  Code  1896,  §§  5299-5304. 

6  The  lien  exists  when  the  farm- 
ing is  on  shares,  as  well  as  when 
the  rent  is  payable  in  money. 
Sharp  V.  Fields,  1  Heisk.  (Tenn.) 
571.  The  lien  attaches  to  the  crop 
whether  raised  by  the  lessee  or  a 
sublessee,  and  it  attaches  as 
against  a  sublessee,  although  he 
may  have  paid  the  tenant  the  rent 
due  from  him.  Rutledge  v.  Wal- 
ton, 4  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  458.  The  lien 
is  superior  to  the  laws  exempting 
property  from  execution.  Hill  v. 
George,  1  Head  (Tenn.)  394. 

"  A  court  of  equity  also  has 
jurisdiction    of    an    attachment    to 


enforce  a  landlord's  lien  for  rent. 
Sharp  V.  Fields,  1  Heisk.  (Tenn.) 
571.  Damages  for  the  tenant's 
failure  to  comply  with  an  implied 
contract  for  good  husbandry, 
where  the  renting  is  for  a  part 
of  the  crop,  can  not  be  enforced 
under  those  provisions  giving  at- 
tachment for  rent.  He  must  seek 
these  by  an  action  on  the  case. 
Patterson  v.  Hawkins,  3  Lea 
(Tenn.)  483. 

8  The  lien  begins  from  the  date 
of  the  contract.  The  landlord  may 
make  his  inchoate  lien  specific, 
before  the  rent  has  becorrfe  due, 
by    attaching    the    crop    upon    the 


(iZ7 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


636 


The  person  entitled  to  the  rent  may  recover  from  the  pur- 
chaser of  the  crop,  or  of  any  part  of  it,  the  vahie  of  the  prop- 
erty not  exceeding  the  amount  of  the  rent  and  damages.'' 

The  landlord,  in  addition  to  liens  already  given  him  by 
law,  shall  have  a  further  lien  on  the  growing  crop  for  neces- 
sary supplies  of  food  and  clothing  furnished  by  the  landlord 
or  his  agent  to  the  tenant,  for  himself  or  those  dependent  on 
him,  to  enable  the  tenant  to  make  the  crop:^"  provided  an 
account  of  such  necessary  supplies  is  kept  as  the  articles  are 
furnished,  and  is  sworn  to  before  some  justice  of  the  peace 
before  the  enforcement  of  the  lien.  This  lien  shall  be  sec- 
ondary to  that  of  the  landlord  for  his  rent,  and  may  be  en- 
forced in  the  same  manner.^  ^ 


premises.  The  lien  thus  fixed  re- 
lates back  to  the  date  of  the  con- 
tract, and  overreaches  any  title 
acquired  by  a  purchaser  of  the 
crop  from  the  tenant,  though 
without  notice  of  the  lien.  Phil- 
lips V.  Maxwell,  1  Baxt.  (Tenn.) 
25. 

9  The  landlord  may  maintain  a 
suit  against  a  purchaser  of  the 
crop  from  the  tenant,  before  he 
has  recovered  any  judgment 
against  the  tenant  for  the  rent 
due.  Richardson  v.  Blakemore,  11 
Lea  (Tenn.)  290;  Davis  v.  Wilson, 
86  Tenn.  519,  8  S.  W.  151;  Biggs 
V.  Piper,  86  Tenn.  589,  8  S.  W. 
851.  A  factor  who  sells  cotton 
for  a  tenant,  and  appropriates  the 
proceeds  to  a  debt  due  him  with 
the  tenant's  consent,  is  not  liable 
to  the  landlord.  The  factor  is  not 
a  purchaser,  but  a  seller;  and  the 
fact  that  the  tenant  paid  him  the 
proceeds  does  not  make  him  a  pur- 
chaser within  the  meaning  of  this 


provision.     Armstrong  v.   Walker, 
9  Lea  (Tenn.)   156. 

10  This  lien,  unlike  the  lien  for 
general  supplies,  may  be  created 
without  any  contract  in  writing. 
Lewis  V.  Mahon,  9  Baxt.  (Tenn.) 
374. 

11  The  landlord  may  join  in  one 
suit  demands  for  rent  and  for 
supplies  which  are  a  lien  on  the 
same  crop,  but  he  must  give  the 
amount  of  each  demand  constitut- 
ing the  aggregate  sum.  Dougher- 
ty V.  Kellum,  3  Lea  (Tenn.)  643. 
The  affidavit  need  not  state  the 
form  of  the  demand,  as,  whether 
it  is  a  note  or  account ;  but  it 
must  state  that  an  account  of  the 
supplies  was  kept  as  the  articles 
were  furnished,  and  the  account 
must  be  sworn  to  at  or  before  the 
time  of  suing  out  the  attachment. 
An  account  meets  the  require- 
ments of  the  act,  though  it  be  a 
mere  memorandum  upon  a  loose 
sheet  of  paper.  Dougherty  v.  Kel- 
lum,   3    Lea    (Tenn.)    643. 


§    637  LIENS.  638 

§  637.  Tennessee  (continued).  Furnishers'  liens.^^ — ^ny 
debt  by  note,  account,  or  otherwise,  contracted  for  sup- 
pHes,  implements  of  industry  [husbandry,  9  Baxt.  374]  or 
work  stock  furnished  by  the  owners  of  the  land  to  lessees  or 
by  lessees  to  subtenants,^^  and  used  in  the  cultivation  of  the 
crop,  shall  be  and  constitute  a  lien  upon  the  crop  growing  or 
made  during  the  year  upon  the  premises,  in  as  full  and  per- 
fect a  manner  as  provided  with  regard  to  rents:  provided, 
the  said  lien  is  expressly  contracted  for  on  the  face  of  the 
note  or  writing,  between  the  owner  of  the  land  or  lessees, 
or  between  the  lessees  and  subtenants.^'*  The  agreement  or 
contract  so  entered  into  shall  not  have  priority  of  the  lien  of 
the  owner  of  the  land  for  the  rent ;  but  no  recovery  for  the 
value  of  the  crop  can  be  had  as  against  the  purchaser  of  the 
crop  without  notice. 

The  landlord's  lien  for  rent,  supplies  and  for  labor  and 
moneys  furnished  tenants,  and  also  furnishors'  liens  on  crops 
for  supplies,  implements  of  industry,  or  work  stock  contract- 
ed as  required  by  existing  law,  shall  continue  for  six  months 
from  and  after  the  debt  becomes  due,  and  until  the  termina- 
tion of  any  suit  commenced  within  that  time  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  such  liens:  provided  nothing  in  this  bill  shall  be  con- 
strued to  apply  to  or  in  any  way  effect  [affect]  suits  already 
commenced. ^^ 

12  Code  1896,  §  5303.  charge  created  by  contract.  Whit- 
es This  section  was  intended  to  more  v.  Poindexter,  7  Baxt. 
give  the  owner  a  security  for  sup-  (Tenn.)  248.  A  landlord  has  no 
plies  furnished,  and  also  at  the  lien  for  supplies  furnished  upon 
same  time  to  give  security  to  a  a  parol  contract.  Hughes  v.  Whit- 
tenant  as  against  his  subtenant,  aker,  4  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  399. 
subordinate,  however,  to  the  lien  I'^An  agreement  in  writing  to 
of  the  landlord  for  rent.  This  "bind  and  trust  his  half  of  the 
lien  is  given  only  to  the  landlord  crop  to  the  said  [creditor]  for 
and  to  lessees.  It  has  all  the  inci-  any  debt  he  may  owe  or  contract 
dents  of  a  landlord's  lien,  and  is  to  him,"  creates  no  lien  for  ad- 
enforced  in  the  same  way.  It  is  vances.  Dunlap  v.  Aycock,  10 
not  a  right  of  property  in  the  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  561. 
crop,    but    a    right    to    enforce    a  ^^  Acts    1905,    p.    77.     As    to    un- 


639 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


638 


§  638.  Texas.^^ — All  persons  renting  or  leasing-  lands  or 
tenements,  at  will  or  for  a  term,  shall  have  a  preference 
lien^^  upon  the  property  of  the  tenant,  hereinafter  indicated, 
upon  such  premises, ^^  for  any  rent  that  may  become  due, 
and  for  all  money  and  the  value  of  all  animals,  tools,  provis- 
ions, and  supplies  furnished  by  the  landlord  to  the  tenant  to 
enable  the  tenant  to  make  a  crop  on  such  premises,  and  to 
gather,  secure,  house,  and  put  the  same  in  condition  for 
market,  the  money,  animals,  tools,  provisions,  and  supplies 
so  furnished  being  necessary  for  that  purpose,  v^hether  the 


lawful  disposal  of  goods  under 
rent  lien,  see  Supp.  1903,  §§5299- 
5330. 

16  Rev.  Civ.  Stats.  1911,  arts. 
5475-5485,  5490.  iThe  lien  of  a 
landlord  for  rent  and  for  advances 
is  superior  to  the  lien  of  a  laborer. 
Paine  v.  Dorough,  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  132  S.  W.  369.  The  lien 
may  be  assigned.  Hatchett  v. 
Miller,  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  53  S.  W. 
357. 

17  A  claim  for  rent  due  by  an  in- 
solvent lessee  is  a  lien  superior 
to  attachments  of  the  property 
subject  to  the  lien,  and  is  entitled 
to  be  first  satisfied  out  of  the 
moneys  arising  from  a  sale  of  the 
attached  property.  Sullivan  v. 
Cleveland,  62  Tex.  677. 

18  The  landlord's  lien  attaches 
upon  whatever  property  the  lessee 
has  on  the  rented  premises  when 
the  warrant  issues  and  is  levied, 
without  reference  to  the  time 
when  the  debt  for  the  rent  ac- 
crued. One  who  has  purchased 
property  from  the  lessee  upon 
leased  premises  not  in  the  ordi- 
nary course  of  business  stands  in 
this  respect  in  the  same  position 
as  the  lessee.     Block  v.  Latham,  63 


Tex.  414;  Meyer  v.  Oliver,  61  Tex. 
584;  Lehman  v.  Stone,  4  Wills.  Civ. 
Cas.  Ct.  App.  (Tex.),  §  121,  16  S. 
W.  784.  A  landlord's  lien  under 
art.  5475  of  Rev.  Civ.  Stats.  1911, 
and  the  remedy  by  distress  war- 
rant prescribed  by  the  statute,  are 
inconsistent  with  the  relationship 
of  tenant  in  common,  and  none  of 
the  consequences  resulting  from 
such  relationship  can  be  inferred 
in  such  a  case.  Texas  &  Pacific 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Bayliss,  62  Tex.  570. 
The  landlord  has  no  lien  on  the 
tenant's  property  as  against  other 
creditors  where  he  has  become 
surety  for  the  tenant  for  the  price 
of  articles  furnished  to  the  tenant 
and  used  in  raising  a  crop.  Kelley 
V.  King,  18  Tex.  Civ.  App.  360,  44 
S.  W.  915;  Ranger  Mercantile  Co. 
V.  Terrett  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
106  S.  W.  1145.  The  landlord  may 
waive  his  lien  and  thereby  make 
it  inferior  to  a  mortgage  lien. 
Orange  County  Irr.  Co.  v.  Orange 
Nat.  Bank  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
130  S.  W.  869.  As  to  landlord's 
waiver,  see  also  Melasky  v.  Jar- 
rell  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  131  S.  W. 
856. 


638 


LIENS. 


640 


same  are  to  be  paid  in  money,  agricultural  products,  or  other 
property;  and  this  lien  shall  apply  only  to  animals,  tools,  and 
other  property  furnished  by  the  landlord  to  the  tenant,  and 
to  the  crop  raised  on  such  rented  premises. 

All  persons  leasing  or  renting  any  residence  or  storehouse 
or  other  building  shall  have  a  preference  lien  upon  all  the 
property  of  the  tenant  in  said  residence  or  storehouse  or 
other  building^^  for  the  payment  of  the  rents  due  and  that 
may  become  due;  provided,  the  lien  for  rents  to  become  due 
shall  not  continue  or  be  enforced  for  a  longer  period  than  the 
current  contract  year,  and  such  lien  shall  continue  and  be  in 
force  so  long  as  the  tenant  shall  occupy  the  rented  premises, 
and  for  one  month  thereafter.-" 


!'■>  Where  a  married  woman  is 
the  lessee  of  a  hotel,  her  furniture 
in  the  hotel,  whether  it  be  her 
separate  property  or  community 
property,  is  subject  to  the  lien. 
Biesenbach  v.  Key,  63  Tex.  79.  An 
enclosed  square  in  a  city,  with  no 
improvements  save  a  pavilion,  was 
rented  for  a  pleasure  resort.  The 
tenants  erected  a  shooting  and 
skating  gallery  and  swings  and 
benches  on  the  grounds  for  the  ac- 
commodation of  visitors.  It  was 
held  that,  on  improvements  placed 
on  the  ground  outside  of  the  pa- 
vilion, the  landlord  had  no  Hen 
under  this  provision.  Rush  v. 
Hendley,  4  Wills  Civ.  Cas.  Ct. 
App.  (Tex.),  §  200,  15  S.  W.  201 
The  landlord's  lien  under  this  sec- 
tion does  not  attach  to  furniture 
and  fixtures  used  on  the  leased 
premises  but  belonging  to  third 
persons.  Davis  v.  Washington,  18 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  67,  43  S.  W.  585. 
The  lien  extends  for  the  entire 
term  of  the  lease.  Johnson  v.  Hu- 
lett,  56  Tex.  Civ.  App.  11,  120  S. 
W.  257. 


20  This  article.  Rev.  Civ.  Stats. 
1911,  §  5490,  was  enacted  in  1889. 
It  is  apparent,  taking  all  the  pro- 
visions together,  that  the  legisla- 
ture intended  to  limit  the  opera- 
tion of  the  landlord's  lien  to  year- 
ly renting.  The  provision  of  the 
statute,  that  the  lien  shall  con- 
tinue in  force  so  long  as  the  ten- 
ant shall  occupy  the  rented  prem- 
ises, prescribes  the  rule  only  when 
the  lien  has  attached  by  reason  of 
rents  due,  or  such  as  are  accruing 
and  will  certainly  become  due,  un- 
der the  particular  tenancy.  It  does 
not  impose  a  charge  in  advance 
upon  the  property  of  the  tenant 
for  any  rents  that  might  by  possi- 
bility become  due  for  another 
term  or  tenancy,  whether  such 
term  be  created  by  contract  or  by 
the  tenant's  holding  over.  There- 
fore, when  a  tenant  from  month 
to  month  mortgages  the  personal 
property  on  the  mortgaged  prem- 
ises to  another,  and  the  rent  for 
the  month  in  which  the  mortgage 
is  executed  has  been  paid,  and  the 
property  remains   upon   the  prem- 


641 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


638 


It  shall  not  be  lawful  for  the  tenant,  while  the  rent  and 
such  advances  remain  unpaid,  to  remove  or  permit  to  be  re- 
moved from  the  premises  so  leased  or  rented  any  of  the 
agricultural  products  produced  thereon,  or  any  of  the  ani- 
mals, tools,  or  property  furnished  as  aforesaid,  without  the 
consent  of  the  landlord.  Such  preference  lien  shall  continue 
as  to  such  agricultural  products,  and  as  to  the  animals,  tools, 
and  other  property  furnished  to  the  tenant  as  aforesaid,  so 
long  as  they  remain  on  such  rented  or  leased  premises,  and 
for  one  month  thereafter;  and  such  lien,  as  to  agricultural 
products,  and  as  to  animals  and  tools  furnished  as  aforesaid, 


ises  by  permission  of  the  mort- 
gagee from  month  to  month,  the 
lien  of  the  landlord  is  subordinate 
to  that  of  the  mortgage.  At  the 
time  the  mortgage  is  made  in  such 
case,  the  tenant  holds  the  proper- 
ty free  from  any  charge  and  unin- 
cumbered by  any  lien.  He  could 
then  remove  it  from  the  rented 
premises,  dispose  of  it  by  sale,  or 
incumber  it  at  will.  The  mort- 
gagee occupies  the  same  position 
with  respect  to  the  landlord's  lien 
as  if  the  mortgage  had  been  exe- 
cuted before  the  property  had 
been  brought  upon  the  rented 
premises.  Hempstead  Real  Estate 
&c.  Assn.  V.  Cochran,  60  Tex.  620. 
Rogers  v.  Grigg  (Tex.  Civ,  App.), 
29  S.  W.  654.  The  landlord  who 
leases  a  vacant  lot  has  no  lien  for 
rent  on  a  building  placed  on  the 
ground  by  the  tenant.  Allen  v. 
Houston  Ice  &  Brewing  Co.,  44 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  125,  97  S.  W. 
1063.  A  landlord  who  lets  a 
storehouse  for  one  year,  at  a 
rent  payable  at  the  end  of  the 
term,  has  a  lien  for  the  year's  rent 
on    the    proceeds    of    the    tenant's 


goods  seized  in  the  storehouse  on 
attachment,  and  sold  as  perishable 
a  few  months  after  the  year  com- 
menced. Ohio  V.  Shutt,  78  Tex. 
375,  14  S.  W.  860.  One  who  pur- 
chases property  of  a  tenant  with 
knowledge  of  the  landlord's  lien 
thereon  can  not  hold  such  prop- 
erty as  against  such  lien.  York  v. 
Carlisle,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  269,  46 
S.  W.  257.  But  see,  Newman  v. 
Ward  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  46  S.  W. 
868.  The  lien  for  furnishing  sup- 
plies extends  only  to  the  crop  pro- 
duced during  the  year  wherein 
such  supplies  were  furnished. 
Walker  v.  Patterson's  Estate,  33 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  650,  77  S.  W.  437. 
The  lien  of  a  landlord  attaches 
to  crops  raised  by  a  subtenant  or 
assignee.  Edwards  v.  Anderson,  36 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  611,  82  S.  W.  659. 
The  defense  of  innocent  purchaser 
from  a  tenant  of  crops  raised  on 
rented  land  is  not  good  where  the 
purchase  is  made  within  thirty 
days  after  the  removal  of  the 
crops  from  the  rented  premises. 
American  Cotton  Co.  v.  Phillips, 
31  Tex.  Civ.  App.  79,  71  S.  W.  320. 


41 


§  638 


LIENS. 


642 


shall  l)e  superior  to  all  laws  exempting  sncli  property  from 
forced  sales. 

Such  lien  shall  not  attach  to  tlie  goods,  wares,  and  mer- 
chandise of  a  merchant,  trader,  or  mechanic,  sold  and  de- 
livered in  good  faith  in  the  regular  course  of  business  to  the 
tenant.-^ 

The  removal  of  the  agricultural  products,  with  the  consent 
of  the  landlord,  for  the  purpose  of  being  prepared  for  market, 
shall  not  be  considered  a  waiver  of  such  lien,  but  such  lien 
shall  continue  and  attach  to  the  products  so  removed,  the 
same  as  if  they  had  remained  on  such  rented  or  leased  prem- 
ises. 

When  any  rent  or  advances  shall  become  due,  or  the  ten- 
ant shall  be  about  to  remove  from  such  leased  or  rented 
premises,  or  to  remove  his  property  from  such  premises,  it 
shall  be  lawful  for  the  person  to  whom  the  rents  or  advances 
are  payable,  his  agent,  attorney,  assigns,  heirs,  or  legal  rep- 
resentatives, to  apply  to  a  justice  of  the  peace  of  the  precinct 
wdiere  the  premises  are  situated,  or  in  which  the  property 
upon  which  a  lien  for  rents  or  advances  exists,  may  be  found, 
or  to  any  justice  having  jurisdiction  of  the  cause  of  action 
for  a  warrant  to  seize  the  property  of  such  tenant.-- 


21  A  sale  by  a  merchant  of  his 
entire  stock  in  forty-two  days  at 
wholesale  and  retail  is  not  made 
in  the  ordinary  course  of  business 
and  such  sales  do  not  free  the 
goods  from  the  landlord's  lien. 
Freeman  v.  Collier  Racket  Co., 
100  Tex.  475,   101   S.  W.  202. 

22  The  lien,  being  given  by  stat- 
ute, exists  independently  of  a  dis- 
tress warrant,  which  is  only  a 
means  of  securing  the  property 
and  making  the  lien  effective. 
Templeman  v.  Gresham,  61  Tex. 
50;  Pruitt  v.  Kelley,  4  Willson 
Civ.  Cas.  Ct.  App.  (Tex.),  §  175,  15 
S.   W.    119.     The   lien   is  therefore 


superior  to  an  assignment  to  se- 
cure creditors.  Rosenberg  v.  Sha- 
per,  51  Tex.  134.  The  lien  is  not 
lost  by  the  failure  of  the  landlord 
to  sue  out  a  distress  warrant  for 
rent,  nor  acquired  by  his  resort  to 
that  remedy;  but  the  lien  may  be 
preserved  by  suit  to  foreclosure, 
which  will  prevent  its  loss  by  the 
expiration  of  the  time  limited  in 
the  statute  for  its  continuance. 
Bourcier  v.  Edmondson,  58  Tex. 
675;  Rosenberg  v.  Shaper,  51  Tex. 
134.  In  a  trial  of  the  rights  of 
property  where  the  goods  of  the 
tenant  are  attached  by  a  creditor, 
and    the    landlord    claims    a    prior 


643 


LANDLORDS     LIENS    FOR    RENT. 


638 


The  plaintiff,  his  agent  or  attorney,  shall  make  oath  that 
the  amount  sued  for  is  for  rent  or  advances,  or  shall  produce 
a  writing  signed  by  such  tenant  to  that  effect,  and  shall  fur- 


lien  thereon,  the  landlord's  lien 
can  not  be  enforced.  Groesbeck 
V.  Evans,  40  Tex,  Civ.  App.  216, 
83  S.  W.  430,  88  S.  W.  889.  If  a 
purchaser  from  a  tenant  disposes 
of  the  goods  pending  the  land- 
lord's foreclosure  of  his  lien 
thereon,  such  purchaser  is  liable 
for  conversion.  Jackson  v.  Cor- 
ley,  30  Tex.  Civ.  App.  417,  70  S. 
W.  570.  See  also,  Zapp  v.  John- 
son, 87  Tex.  641,  30  S.  W.  861; 
Sparks  v.  Ponder,  42  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  431,  94  S.  W.  428;  Mensing 
v.  Cardw^ell,  23  Tex.  Civ.  App.  16, 
75  S.  W.  347.  As  to  the  rights  of 
a  landlord  to  foreclose  his  lien 
against  a  sublessee  after  assign- 
ment by  landlord's  consent,  see, 
Kennedy  v.  Groves,  50  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  266,  110  S.  W.  136.  The  land- 
lord is  not  restricted  to  the  use 
of  the  summary  remedy  by  dis- 
tress provided  by  the  statute.  It 
allows  him  this  remedy  in  case  he 
is  willing  to  subject  himself  to 
the  burden  prescribed  by  it.  But 
he  may  also  use  the  remedies  ap- 
propriate for  the  enforcement  of 
liens  upon  personal  property.  He 
may  foreclose  the  lien  by  suit, 
though  by  so  doing  he  takes  the 
chances  of  finding  the  property 
forthcoming  to  answer  his  judg- 
ment. Bourcier  v.  Edmondson,  58 
Tex.  675;  Randall  v.  Rosenthal 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  27  S.  W.  906. 
If  a  tenant's  goods  are  attached 
upon  the  rented  premises,  and 
there  remain  until  they  are  sold 
under  the  process,  he  is  liable  for 
rent    during   the    entire   period    of 


such  occupancy;  and  though  the 
goods  are  not  subject  to  seizure 
for  rent  under  a  distress  warrant 
while  they  are  in  the  custody  of 
the  law,  yet,  immediately  upon  a 
sale  being  made  under  the  attach- 
ment, the  landlord's  lien  can  be 
enforced  by  seizure  of  the  goods 
while  they  are  still  upon  the  prem- 
ises for  all  the  rent  due  up  to 
the  time  of  seizure.  Meyer  v. 
Oliver,  61  Tex.  584.  The  remedy 
by  distraint  under  the  statute  is 
not  dependent  upon  the  ownership 
of  the  premises  at  the  time  the 
writ  is  issued,  nor  is  it  in  any  way 
affected  by  the  fact  that  the  rela- 
tion of  landlard  and  tenant  has 
then  ceased.  If  rent  is  due  and 
the  lien  subsists,  a  distress  war- 
rant may  issue  to  enforce  the  lien. 
Meyer  v.  Oliver,  61  Tex.  584.  In 
a  proceeding  to  enforce  the  lien 
by  foreclosure,  if  the  landlorfl 
does  not  have  access  to  the  prem- 
ises so  as  to  enable  him  to  in- 
ventory the  articles  which  he 
wishes  to  subject  to  his  lien,  it 
is  sufficient  that  he  describes  them 
in  a  general  way,  as  by  referring 
to  the  property  as  a  quantity  of 
household  furniture  and  other  per- 
sonal property  owned  by  the  ten- 
ant, and  now  in  his  possession 
on  the  rented  premises.  A  gen- 
eral description,  with  the  exact  lo- 
cality of  the  house  containing  it, 
tjie  name  of  the  person  in  pos- 
session and  of  the  owner  is  suffi- 
cient. Bourcier  v.  Edmondson,  58 
Tex.  675. 


§    638  LIENS.  644 

ther  swear  that  such  warrant  is  not  sued  out  for  the  purpose 
of  vexing  and  harassing  the  defendant;-^  and  the  person 
applying  for  such  warrant  shall  execute  a  bond,  with  two  or 
more  good  and  sufficient  sureties,  to  be  approved  by  the  jus- 
tice of  the  peace,  payable  to  the  defendant,  conditioned  that 
the  plaintiff  will  pay  the  defendant  such  damages  as  he  may 
sustain  in  case  such  warrant  has  been  illegally  and  unjustly 
sued  out,  which  bond  shall  be  filed  among  the  papers  of  the 
cause;  and,  in  case  the  suit  shall  be  finally  decided  in  favor 
of  the  defendant,  he  may  bring  suit  against  the  plaintiff  and 
his  sureties  on  such  bond,  and  shall  recover  such  damages 
as  may  be  awarded  to  him  by  the  proper  tribunal. 

Upon  the  filing  of  such  oath  and  bond,  it  shall  be  the  duty 
of  such  justice  of  the  peace  to  issue  his  warrant  to  the  sheriff 
or  any  constable  of  the  county,  commanding  him  to  seize  the 
property  of  the  defendant,  or  so  much  thereof  as  will  satisfy 
the  demand. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  officer  to  whom  such  warrant  is 
directed  to  seize  the  property  of  such  tenant,  or  so  much 
thereof  as  shall  be  of  value  sufficient  to  satisfy  such  debt  and 
costs,  and  the  same  in  his  possession  safely  keep,  unless  the 
same  is  replevied  as  herein  provided,  and  make  due  return 
thereof  to  the  court  to  which  said  warrant  is  returnable,  at 
the  next  term  thereof. 

The  defendant  shall  have  the  right  at  any  time  within  ten 
days  from  the  date  of  said  levy  to  replevy  the  property  so 
seized.-* 

23  Affidavit  that  the  warrant  was  moval   of   the   property   from   the 

not  sued  out  for  "injuring  or  ha-  rented  premises,  the  lien  is  there- 

rassing"   is  sufficient.     Biesenbach  by    fixed   against    both    the   tenant 

V.    Key,  63  Tex.   79.     The   amount  and  his  vendee.     Ingraham  v.  Rich 

must     be     stated     definitely,     not  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  136  S.  W.  549. 

"about"    a    given    sum.      Jones    v.  24  Even  if  a  distress  warrant  is 

Walker,  44  Tex.  200.    Where  a  suit  released  in  such  replevin  suit  the 

for    foreclosure    of    lien    and    for  landlord    still    has    his     statutory 

rent  is  brought  in  a  justice  court  lien.      McEvoy    v.    Niece,    20   Tex, 

within    thirty    days    after    the    re-  Civ.  App.  686,  SO  S.  W.  424. 


645  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  638a 

If  the  property  is  of  a  perishable  or  wasting  kind,  and  the 
defendant  fails  to  replevy  as  herein  provided,  the  officer 
making  the  levy,  or  the  plaintiff  or  the  defendant,  may  apply 
to  the  court  or  judge  thereof  to  vsdiich  the  warrant  is  re- 
turnable, either  in  term  time  or  vacation,  for  an  order  to  sell 
such  property. 

§  638a.  Utah.^^ — Lessors,  except  as  hereinafter  pro- 
vided, shall  have  a  lien  for  rent  due  upon  all  the  property  of 
the  lessee  not  exempt  from  execution  as  long  as  the  lessee 
shall  occupy  the  leased  premises,  and  for  thirty  days  there- 
after. 

A  lien  for  rent  as  herein  provided  for  shall  have  priority 
over  all  other  liens,  excepting  taxes,  mortgages  for  purchase 
money,  and  liens  of  employes  for  services  for  one  year  prior 
to  sale. 

Where  any  rent  shall  become  due  or  the  lessee  shall  be 
about  to  remove  his  property  from  such  leased  premises,  it 
shall  be  lawful  for  the  lessor,  his  attorney,  agent,  or  assigns, 
to  apply  to  a  justice  of  the  peace  of  the  precinct,  or  if  the 
rent  is  not  less  than  the  sum  of  $300,  then  to  the  district  court 
of  the  district  wherein  the  premises  are  situated,  for  a  war- 
rant to  seize  the  property  of  such  lessee. 

The  lessor,  his  attorney,  agent,  or  assigns  shall,  before  the 
issue  of  such  writ  of  attachment,  file  in  the  court  aforesaid  an 
affidavit  duly  sworn  to,  setting  forth  the  amount  of  rent  sued 
for  over  and  above  all  offsets  and  counterclaims,  and  a  brief 
description  of  the  leased  premises,  and  shall  further  state, 
under  oath,  that  said  writ  of  attachment  is  not  sued  out  for 
the  purpose  of  vexing  or  harassing  the  lessee;  and  the  per- 
son applying  for  such  writ  of  attachment  shall  execute  a 
bond,  with  two  or  more  good  and  sufficient  sureties,  condi- 
tioned that  the  lessor  will  pay  the  lessee  such  damages  as  he 
may  sustain  in  case  such  wn-it  of  attachment  has  been  illegally 

25  Comp.  Laws  1907,  §§  1407-1414. 


§    639  LIENS.  646 

and  unjustly  sued  out,  which  bond  shall  be  approved  and 
filed  with  the  papers  in  the  case. 

Upon  the  filing  of  such  affidavit  and  bond,  it  shall  be  the 
duty  of  the  court  wherein  the  same  is  filed  to  issue  a  writ  of 
attachment  to  the  proper  person,  commanding  him  to  seize 
the  property  of  the  defendant  not  exempt  from  execution,  or 
so  much  thereof  as  shall  satisfy  the  demand. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  officer  to  whom  the  writ  of  at- 
tachment is  directed  to  seize  the  property  of  such  lessee  not 
exempt  from  execution,  or  as  much  thereof  as  shall  be  of 
value  sufficient  to  satisfy  such  debt,  costs,  and  reasonable 
attorney's  fees,  and  to  keep  the  same  until  the  determination 
of  the  action  pending  between  the  lessor  and  the  lessee,  un- 
less the  property  be  sooner  released  from  bond  or  the  at- 
tachment be  discharged. 

A  bond  for  the  release  of  the  attachment  may  be  made,  in 
the  manner  provided  by  law  for  the  release  of  the  property 
taken  under  attachment  or  for  the  discharge  of  a  writ  of  at- 
tachment. 

All  property,  including  growing  and  harvested  crops  and 
all  ore  mined  or  upon  the  premises,  or  so  much  of  said  prop- 
erty as  may  be  necessary  to  pay  the  amount  of  rent  due  and 
costs,  shall  be  liable  to  sale  to  enforce  the  payment  of  the 
lien  hereby  created. 

§  639.  Virginia.^*' — Rent  of  every  kind  may  be  recovered 
by  distress  or  action.  He  to  whom  rent  or  compensation  is 
due,  whether  he  have  the  reversion  or  not,  his  personal  repre- 
sentative or  assignee,  may  recover  it,  whatever  be  the  estate 

-'C  Pollard's    Code    1904,    §§    2787,  the  leased  premises  is  superior  to 

2788,   2790,  2791,  2792,  2795.     As    to  the    lien    of   a    mortgage    or    trust 

exemptions,  see  Code  1904,  §  3630.  deed    which    is    created    after    such 

As    to    lien    of    landlords    on    the  goods  are  placed  on  said  premises. 

crops  for  advances,  see  Code  1904,  In  re  Mclntire,  142  Fed.  593;  An- 

§  2496.     The    lien    of    the    landlord  derson   v.    Henry,    45    W.    Va.   319, 

on   his   tenant's   goods   carried   on  31  S.   E.  998. 


647  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  639 

of  the  person  owning  [owing]  it,  or  though  his  estate  or  in- 
terest in  the  land  be  ended. 

Rent  may  be  distrained  for  within  five  years  from  the  time 
it  becomes  due,  and  not  afterwards,  whether  the  lease  be 
ended  or  not.  The  distress  shall  be  made  by  a  constable, 
sheriff,  or  sergeant  of  the  county  or  corporation  wherein  the 
premises  yielding  the  rent,  or  some  part  thereof,  may  be,  or 
the  goods  liable  to  distress  may  be  found,  under  warrant 
from  a  justice  or  clerk  of  the  circuit  or  corporation  court, 
founded  upon  an  affidavit  of  the  person  claiming  the  rent,  or 
his  agent,  that  the  amount  of  money  or  other  thing  to  be  dis- 
trained for  (to  be  specified  in  the  affidavit),  as  he  verily  be- 
lieves, is  justly  due  to  the  claimant,  for  rent  reserved  upon 
contract,  from  the  person  of  whom  it  is  claimed. 

The  distress  may  be  levied  on  any  goods  of  the  lessee,  or 
his  assignee  or  under-tenant,  found  on  the  premises,  or  which 
may  have  been  removed  therefrom  not  more  than  thirty 
days.  If  the  goods  of  such  lessee,  assignee,  or  under-tenant, 
when  carried  on  the  premises,  are  subject  to  a  lien,  which  is 
valid  against  his  creditors,  his  interest  only  in  such  goods 
shall  be  liable  to  such  distress.  If  any  lien  be  created  thereon 
while  they  are  upon  the  leased  premises,  they  shall  be  liable 
to  distress,  but  for  not  more  than  one  year's  rent,  whether  it 
shall  have  accrued  before  or  after  the  creation  of  the  lien. 
No  other  goods  shall  be  liable  to  distress  than  such  as  are 
declared  to  be  so  liable.  If,  after  the  commencement  of  any 
tenancy,-^  a  lien  be  obtained   or  created  by  deed  of  trust, 

27  If,    after    the    commencement  mond      v.      Duesberry,    27      Grat. 

of  a  tenancy  for  a  year,  the  tenant  (Va.)  210.     Real  estate  was  leased 

mortgages     his    furniture    on    the  to    a   firm    for   the    term    of    three 

leased  premises,  and  the  rent  for  years,  to  commence  on  the  1st  of 

that  year   is   paid,   but   the   tenant  January,  1876.     On  the  19th  day  of 

holds  over  under  a  new  lease,  the  June,  1876,  before  the  rent  of  that 

lien     of     the     mortgage     is     valid  year  became  due,  one  of  the   les- 

against  the  lien  of  the  landlord  for  sees   executed  a  deed  of  trust  on 

rent,  the  former  being  a  lien  when  the    furniture.      The    rent    for   the 

the  latter  lease  commenced.  Rich-  year  1876  was  paid.     The  rent  for 


639 


LIENS. 


648 


mortgage,  or  .otherwise  upon  the  interest  or  property  in 
goods  on  premises  leased  or  rented,  of  any  person  liable  for 
the  rent,  the  party  having  such  lien  may  remove  said  goods 
from  the  premises  on  the  following  terms,  and  not  otherwise, 
that  is  to  say:  on  the  terms  of  paying  to  the  person  entitled 


1877  was  assigned  to  a  third  party, 
who  levied  a  distress  warrant 
upon  the  furniture  on  the  leased 
premises  for  that  year's  rent, 
which  was  in  arrear,  the  holder 
of  the  note  claiming,  among  other 
things,  that  the  trust  deed  consti- 
tuted a  prior  lien  on  the  property 
to  the  rent  for  the  year  1877,  and 
praying  an  injunction  to  stop  the 
sale  of  the  property  levied  on  un- 
til the  rights  of  the  parties  could 
be  determined,  and  for  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  receiver.  It  was 
held:  1.  That  the  deed  of  trust 
was  created  "after  the  commence- 
ment of  the  tenancy"  under  which 
the  distress  was  made, — that  the 
tenancy  of  the  two  years,  1876  and 
1877,  was  the  same;  2.  That  the 
payment  of  the  rent  for  the  year 
1876  was  no  discharge  of  the  prior 
right  of  the  lessors  or  their  as- 
signee to  "one  year's  rent,"  within 
the  meaning  of  the  statute; 
3.  That  goods  carried  on  the 
leased  premises  and  incumbered 
"after  the  commencement  of  the 
tenancy"  are  charged  with  a  defi- 
nite portion  of  the  rent  arising 
under  the  tenancy  during  the 
term,  and  not  with  the  specific 
rent  of  any  particular  year  or  pe- 
riod of  time.  "One  year's  rent" 
and  "a  year's  rent"  are  used  in  the 
statute  to  denote  the  amount  of 
rent  to  be  distrained  for  in  the 
one   case,   and   to   be   paid   or   se- 


cured in  the  other.  And  it  mat- 
ters not  for  what  year  it  accrued, 
or  whether  it  was  before  or  after 
the  creation  of  the  lien,  or 
whether  or  not  other  rents  may 
have  accrued  after  the  lien  was 
created  and  had  been  paid  by  the 
tenants.  As  long  as  any  rent  aris- 
ing under  the  tenancy  remains  un- 
paid by  the  persons  liable  therefor, 
as  soon  as  it  becomes  due  the  per- 
son entitled  to  it  may  distrain  the 
goods  for  an  amount  not  exceed- 
ing the  rent  for  a  year.  Wades 
v.  Figgatt,  75  Va.  575.  As  to  mar- 
shalling proceeds  of  sale  as  be- 
tween successive  mortgages  of 
property  subject  to  distress,  see 
Jones  v.  Phelan,  20  Gratt.  (Va.) 
229.  A  tenant  under  a  lease  for  a 
term  of  years,  which  contained  no 
covenant  or  stipulation  for  a  re- 
newal, executed  a  deed  of  trust 
which  conveyed  the  machinery 
and  other  personalty  on  the 
premises.  Thereafter,  but  before 
registration  of  the  deed  of  trust, 
an  agreement  for  renewal  of  the 
lease  was  entered  into.  It  was 
held  that  possession  under  the 
agreement  for  renewal  was  to  be 
treated  as  a  new  tenancy,  and 
that  the  lien  of  the  trust  deed 
took  priority  over  the  landlord's 
lien  for  rent  accruing  after  the 
expiration  of  the  original  term. 
Upper  Appomattox  Co.  v.  Hamil- 
ton, 83  Va.  319,  2  S.  E.   195. 


649  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  639 

to  the  rent  so  much  as  is  in  arrear,  and  securing  to  him  so 
much  as  is  to  become  due,  what  is  so  paid  or  secured  not 
being  more  altogether  than  a  year's  rent  in  any  case.  If  the 
goods  be  taken  under  legal  process,  the  officer  executing  it 
shall,  out  of  the  proceeds  of  the  goods,  make  such  payment 
of  what  is  in  arrear;  and  as  to  what  is  to  become  due,  he  shall 
sell  a  sufficient  portion  of  the  goods  on  a  credit  till  then, 
taking  from  the  purchasers  bonds  with  good  security,  paya- 
ble to  the  person  so  entitled,  and  delivering  such  bonds  to 
him.  If  the  goods  be  not  taken  under  legal  process,  such 
payment  and  security  shall  be  made  and  given  before  their 
removal.-^ 

It  shall  be  deemed  a  misdemeanor  for  any  person  renting 
lands  of  another,  either  for  a  share  of  the  crop  or  for  money 
consideration  to  remove  therefrom,  without  the  consent  of 
the  landlord,  any  part  of  such  crop  until  the  rents  and  ad- 
vances are  satisfied."*'^ 

Where  goods  are  distrained  or  attached  for  rent  reserved 
in  a  share  of  the  crop,  or  in  anything  other  than  money,  the 
claimant  of  the  rent,  having  given  the  tenant  ten  days'  no- 
tice, or,  if  he  be  out  of  the  county,  having  set  up  the  notice 
in  some  conspicuous  place  on  the  premises,  may  apply  to 
the  court,  to  which  the  attachment  is  returnable,  or  the  court 
of  the  county  or  corporation  in  which  the  distress  is  made. 
The  court  having  ascertained  the  value,  either  by  its  own 
judgment,  or,  if  either  party  require  it,  by  the  verdict  of  a 
jury  impaneled  without  the  formality  of  pleading,  shall 
order  the  goods  distrained  or  attached  to  be  sold  to  pay  the 
amount  so  ascertained. 

28  This  statute  creates  a  lien  in  warrant      or      attachment,      which 

favor  of  the   landlord,  and  a  lien  remedies,    in   case    of    a   bankrupt, 

of  a  high   and  peculiar   character.  are   superseded   by  the   effect   and 

The    lien    it   creates    must    be    re-  operation  of  the  bankrupt  act.    In 

spected  and   enforced.     The  land-  re  Wynne,  Chase  (U.  S.)  227,  Fed. 

lord's    lien    under    that    statute    is  Cas.  No.  1817. 

given  by  the  statute  independent-  2Say\cts   1906,  p.   104. 
ly     of     proceedings     by     distress 


§    639a  LIENS,  650 

§639a.  Washington.-^ — Every  landlord  shall  have  a  lien 
upon  the  crops  grown  or  growing  upon  the  demised  lands 
of  any  year  for  the  rents  accrued  or  acquiring  [accruing]  for 
such  year,  whether  the  same  is  paid  wholly  or  in  part  in 
money  or  specific  articles  of  property,  or  products  of  the 
premises,  or  labor,  and  also  for  the  faithful  performance  of 
the  lease;  and  the  lien  created  by  the  provisions  of  this  sec- 
tion shall  be  a  preferred  lien,  and  shall  be  prior  to  all  other 
liens. 

Any  person  claiming  the  benefit  of  this  statute  must,  with- 
in forty  days  after  the  close  of  said  work  and  labor,  or  after 
the  expiration  of  the  term,  or  after  the  expiration  of  each 
year  of  the  lease,  for  which  any  lands  were  demised,  file  for 
record  with  the  county  auditor  of  the  county  in  which  said 
work  and  labor  was  performed,  or  said  demised  lands  are  sit- 
uated, a  claim  which  shall  be  duly  verified,^*'  and  said  lien 
may  be  enforced  in  a  civil  action  :^^  provided  that  the  lien  so 
created  in  favor  of  landlords  shall  only  apply  when  the  lease 
has  been  recorded. 

§  639b.  West  Virginia.^- — Rent  of  every  kind  may  be  re- 
covered by  distress  or  action.  A  landlord  may  also,  by 
action,  recover  (where  the  agreement  is  not  by  deed)  a  rea- 
sonable satisfaction  for  the  use  and  occupation  of  lands;  on 
the  trial  of  which  action,  if  an}^  parol  demise,  or  any  agree- 
ment (not  being  by  deed)  whereon  a  certain  rent  was  re- 
served, shall  appear  in  evidence,  the  plaintiff  shall  not  there- 
fore be  nonsuited,  but  may  use  the  same  as  evidence  of  the 
amount  of  his  debt  or  damages.  In  any  action  for  rent,  or 
for  such  use  and  occupation  interest  shall  be  allowed  as  on 
other  contracts. 

Rent  may  be  distrained  for  within  one  year  after  the  time 

29  Remington  &  Ballinger's  Ann.  si  As   provided  in   Remington   & 

Codes  &  Stats.  1910,  §§   1188,  1190.  Ballinger's    Ann.    Codes    &    Stats., 

so  In    accordance    with    Reming-  1910,   §    1172. 

ton    &    Ballinger's    Ann.    Codes    &  32  Code   1906,  §§  3400,  3403-3405. 
Stats.     1910,  §  1168. 


651  landlords'  liens  for  rent.  §  639b 

it  becomes  due,  and  not  afterwards,  whether  the  lease  be 
ended  or  not.  The  distress  shall  be  made  by  any  sheriff 
or  constable  of  the  county  wherein  the  premises  yielding  the 
rent  or  some  part  thereof  may  be  or  the  goods  liable  to  dis- 
tress may  be  found,  under  a  warrant  from  a  justice  founded 
upon  the  affidavit  of  the  person  claiming  the  rent,  or  his 
agent,  that  the  amount  of  money  or  other  thing  to  be  dis- 
trained for  (to  be  specified  in  the  afifidavit),  as  he  verily  be- 
lieves is  justly  due  to  the  claimant  for  rent,  reserved  upon 
contract  from  the  person  of  whom  it  is  claimed. 

The  distress  may  be  levied  on  any  goods  of  the  lessee,  or 
his  assignee  or  under-tenant,  found  on  the  premises,  or  wdiich 
may  have  been  removed  therefrom  not  more  than  thirty 
days.  If  the  goods  of  such  lessee,  assignee,  or  under-tenant, 
when  carried  on  the  premises  are  subject  to  a  lien,  which  is 
valid  against  his  creditors,  his  interest  only  in  such  goods 
shall  be  liable  to  such  distress.  If  any  lien  shall  be  created 
thereon  while  they  are  upon  the  leased  premises,  they  shall 
be  liable  to  distress,  but  not  for  more  than  one  year's  rent, 
whether  it  shall  have  accrued  before  or  after  the  creation  of 
the  lien.  No  goods  shall  be  liable  to  distress  other  than 
such  as  are  declared  to  be  so  liable  in  this  section. 

If,  after  the  commencement  of  any  tenancy,  a  lien  be  ob- 
tained or  created  by  deed  of  trust,  mortgage,  or  otherwise, 
upon  the  interest  or  property  in  goods  or  premises  leased  or 
rented,  of  any  person  liable  for  the  rent,  the  party  having 
such  lien  may  remove  said  goods  from  the  premises  on  the 
following  terms,  and  not  otherwise,  that  is  to  say:  On  the 
terms  of  paying  to  the  person  entitled  to  the  rent,  so  much 
as  is  in  arrear,  and  securing  to  him  so  much  as  is  to  become 
due ;  what  is  so  paid  or  secured  not  being  more  altogether 
than  a  year's  rent  in  any  case.  If  the  goods  be  taken  under 
legal  process,  the  officer  executing  it  shall,  out  of  the  pro- 
ceeds of  the  goods,  make  such  payment  of  what  is  in  arrear; 
and  as  to  wdiat  is  to  become  due,  he  shall  sell  a  sufficient 


§    640  LIENS.  652 

portion  of  the  goods  on  a  credit  till  then,  taking  from  the 
purchasers,  bonds,  with  good  security,  payable  to  the  person 
so  entitled,  and  delivering  such  bonds  to  him.  If  the  goods 
be  not  taken  under  legal  process,  such  payment  and  secur- 
ity shall  be  made  and  given  before  their  removal. 

§  640.  Wisconsin.^'^ — The  common-law  right  of  distress, 
as  it  existed  in  England  prior  to  the  American  Revolution, 
existed  in  this  state  down  to  1866,  when  it  was  abolished  by 
statute.^'* 

33  Coburn  v.  Harvey,     18     Wis.  34  Laws  1866,  ch.  74. 

148. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


LIVERY  STABLE  KEEPERS'  AND  AGISTORS'  LIENS. 


Sec. 

Sec. 

641. 

Agistors     ; 

and 

livery    stable 

664. 

keepers 

have    no    lien 

at 

665. 

common 

law 

665a. 

642. 

Lien   can   not   be   created 

by 

666. 

usage. 

667. 

643. 

Rule  quest 

ione< 

d   in   Pennsyl- 

668. 

vania. 

669. 

644. 

Lien      on 

horse     kept 

for 

670. 

training. 

671. 

645. 

The  owner 

■  of 

a  stallion 

has 

672. 

a  lien  uf 

)on  a 

,  mare  for 

the 

673. 

charge 

for 

serving 

the 

673a. 

mare. 

674. 

646. 

Statutes 

of 

the      several 

674a. 

states. 

675. 

647. 

Alabama. 

Gie. 

647a. 

Alaska. 

676a. 

647b. 

Arizona. 

677. 

648. 

Arkansas. 

678. 

649. 

California. 

678a. 

650. 

Colorado. 

679. 

651. 

Connecticut. 

680. 

652. 

Delaware. 

680a. 

653. 

District    oi 

t    Co 

lumbia. 

680b. 

654. 

Florida. 

681. 

655. 

Georgia. 

682. 

655a, 

.  Hawaii. 

683. 

655b 

.  Idaho. 

656. 

Illinois. 

657. 

Indiana. 

684. 

658. 

Iowa. 

659. 

Kansas. 

685. 

660. 

Kentucky. 

661. 

Louisiana. 

686. 

662. 

Maine. 

(i^l. 

663. 

Massachusetts. 

Michigan. 

Minnesota. 

Mississippi. 

Missouri. 

Montana. 

Nebraska. 

Nevada. 

New  Hampshire. 

New    Jersey. 

New  Mexico. 

New  York. 

North   Dakota. 

Ohio. 

Oklahoma. 

Oregon. 

Pennsylvania. 

South   Dakota. 

Tennessee. 

Texas. 

Utah. 

Vermont. 

Virginia. 

Washington. 

West    Virginia. 

Wisconsin. 

Wyoming. 

A  statute  creating  the  lien 
attaches  from  its  enact- 
ment. 

Property  exempt  from  exe- 
cution subject  to  the  lien. 

Lien  of  stable  keeper  is 
purely   statutory. 

Joint  and  several  lien. 

Lien  does  not  include  iso- 
lated  cases   of   feeding. 


65; 


641 


LIENS. 


654 


Sec.  Sec. 

688.  No  lien  where   keeper  keeps       694. 

horse    for    own    benefit. 

689.  Servant  has  no  lien  on  mas- 

•  ter's  cattle.  695. 

690.  Lien  upon  notice  in  writing. 

690a.  Sheriff    holding  cattle    under       696. 
mortgage      may      contract 
for   their  keeping.  697. 

691.  Prior    chattel    mortgage    su- 

perior   to    stable    keeper's       698. 
lien. 
691a.  Consent    of    owner    may    be 

implied.  699. 

692.  Lien  of  stable  keeper  some- 

times held  superior  to  lien       700. 
of  mortgage. 
692a.  Lien  can  not  be  made  supe-       701. 
rior  to  prior  mortgage. 

693.  Lien  of  stallion  keeper  supe- 

rior   to    subsequent    mort- 
gage. 


Possession  of  keeper  is  con- 
structive notice  to  a  pur- 
chaser. 

Mortgage  by  owner  while  in 
temporary   possession. 

Lien  by  agreement  will  not 
hold   against   mortgage. 

Facts  held  to  be  waiver  of 
keeper's    lien. 

Lien  not  lost  by  delivery 
of  horse  temporarily  to 
owner. 

Loss  of  possession  will  de- 
prive keeper  of  lien. 

Acts  of  ownership  by  lien- 
holder. 

Waiver  by  including  in 
claim  that  for  which  keep- 
er has   no   lien. 


•^641.  Agistors  and  livery  stable  keepers  have  no  lien  at 
common  law. — Agistors  of  cattle  and  livery  stable  keepers 
have  no  lien  at  common  law  for  the  keeping  of  cattle  or 
horses.  Such  a  lien  can  arise  only  by  virtue  of  a  statute,  or 
of  a  special  agreement  in  the  nature  of  a  pledge.^     "By  the 


1  Chapman  v.  Allen,  Cro.  Car. 
271;  Bevan  v.  Waters,  3  Car.  &  P. 
520;  Wallace  v.  Woodgate,,  1  Car. 
&  P.  575;  Jackson  v.  Cummins,  5 
M.  &  W.  342;  Yorke  v.  Grenaugh, 
2  Ld.  Raym.  866;  Judson  v.  Ether- 
idge,  1  C.  &  M.  743;  Richards  v. 
Symons,  15  L.  J.  (N.  S.)  Q.  B.  35. 
Iowa:  Munson  v.  Porter,  63  Iowa 
453,  19  N.  W.  290;  McDonald  v. 
Bennett,  45  Iowa  456.  Massachu- 
setts :  Goodrich  v.  Willard,  7 
Gray  (Mass.)  183;  Vinal  v.  Spof- 
ford,  139  Mass.  126;  Goell  v. 
Morse,  126  Mass.  480.     New  York: 


Jackson  v.  Kasseall,  30  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  231;  Fox  v.  McGregor,  11 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  41;  Grinnell  v. 
Cook,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.)  485,  491,  38 
Am.  Dec.  663;  Bissell  v.  Pearce, 
28  N.  Y.  252.  Vermont:  Ingalls 
V.  Vance,  61  Vt.  582,  584,  18  Atl. 
452;  Wills  v.  Barrister,  36  Vt.  220; 
for  keeping  sheep,  Cummings  v. 
Harris,  3  Vt.  244,  23  Am.  Dec.  206. 
Other  States:  Miller  v.  Marston, 
35  Maine  153,  155,  56  Am.  Dec. 
694;  Kelsey  v.  Layne,  28  Kans. 
218,  42  Am.  Rep.  158;  Lewis  v. 
Tyler,     23     Cal.     364;   Hickman  v. 


655 


LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS     AND    AGISTORS     LIENS. 


642 


general  law,"  said  Baron  Parker,-  "in  the  absence  of  any- 
specific  agreement,  whenever  a  party  has  expended  labor 
and  skill  in  the  improvement  of  a  chattel  bailed  to  him,  he 
has  a  lien  upon  it.  Now  the  case  of  an  agistment  does  not 
fall  within  that  principle,  inasmuch  as  the  agistor  does  not 
confer  any  additional  value  on  the  article,  either  by  the  exer- 
tion of  any  skill  of  his  own,  or  indirectly  by  means  of  any  in- 
strument in  his  possession,  as  was  the  case  with  the  stallion 
in  Scarfe  v.  Morgan;^  he  simply  takes  the  animal  to  feed  it." 
The  statutes,  however,  create  rights  in  the  nature  of  com- 
mon-law liens,  for  they  are  rights  to  retain  the  property  as 
security,  and  are  lost  by  parting  with  possession.* 

The  livery  stable  keeper  does  not  come  within  the  reason 
of  the  rule  of  law  which  gives  a  lien  to  an  innkeeper,  namely, 
that  the  innkeeper  is  bound  to  entertain  and  provide  for  any 
one  who  presents  himself  in  the  character  of  a  guest;  for  the 
keeper  of  a  livery  stable  is  under  no  obligation  to  take  and 
feed  the  horse  of  a  customer.^  An  execution  cannot  be 
levied  on  the  lien  of  an  agistor.^ 

§  642.  Lien  cannot  be  created  by  usage. — Nor  can  such  a 
lien  be  created  by  the  force  of  any  usage  prevailing  in  a  par- 
ticular town  or  city;  but  to  acquire  the  force  of  law,  such 
usage  or  custom  must  have  been  established,  and  have  be- 
come general,  so  that  a  presumption  of  knowledge  by  the 
parties  can  be  said  to  arise. ^ 


Thomas,  16  Ala.  666;  Mauney  v. 
Ingram,  78  N.  Car.  96;  Jackson 
V.  Holland,  31  Ga.  339;  Millikin 
V.  Jones,  11  111.  372;  Saint  v.  Smith, 
1  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  51;  Fishell  v. 
Morris,  57  Conn.  547,  18  Atl.  717, 
6  L.  R.  A.  82;  Sharp  v.  Johnson,  38 
Ore.  246,  63  Pac.  485,  84  Am.  St. 
788. 

2  Jackson  v.  Cummins,  5  M.  & 
W.  342. 

34  M.  &  W.  270. 


4  Seebaum  v.  Handy,  46  Ohio  St. 
560,  22  N.    E.  869. 

5  Munson  v.  Porter,  63  Iowa  453, 
19  N.  W.  290,  per  Adams,  J.;  Mc- 
Ghee  v.  Edwards,  87  Tenn.  506,  11 
S.  W.  316,  3  L.  R.  A.  654,  per 
Folkes,   J. 

6  McNamara  v.  Godair,  161  111. 
228,  43  N.  E.  1071,  affg.  59  111.  App. 
184. 

7  Saint  V.  Smith,  1  Coldw. 
(Tenn.)   51. 


643 


LIENS. 


656 


The  lien  may  be  created  by  force  of  a  special  agreement, 
and  in  such  case,  if  the  owner  of  a  horse  remove  it  for  the 
purpose  of  defrauding  the  keeper  of  his  lien,  the  latter  may 
retake  the  horse,  and  his  lien  will  revive  with  the  restored 
possession.^ 


§  643.  Rule  questioned  in  Pennsylvania. — In  a  Pennsyl- 
vania case  the  doctrine  of  the  cases  which  deny  the  agistor 
of  cattle  a  lien  is  called  in  question.^  In  this  case  Chief  Jus- 
tice Gibson  dissents  from  the  view  that  liens  are  confined  to 
bailments  for  skilled  labor;  that  the  lien  results  from  the 
labor  and  care  of  any  bailee,  whether  skilled  or  not,  and  not 
from  the  improved  condition  of  the  thing  bailed.  "It  is,"  he 
says,  "difiicult  to  find  an  argument  for  the  position  that  a 
man  who  fits  an  ox  for  the  shambles,  by  fattening  it  with  his 


8  Wallace  v.  Woodgate,  Ry.  & 
M.  193. 

9  Steinman  v.  Wilkins,  7  Watts 
&  S.  (Pa.)  466,  42  Am.  Dec.  254. 
This  case  is  cited,  and  the  views 
of  Chief  Justice  Gibson  approved, 
in  Hoover  v.  Epler,  52  Pa.  St.  522, 
per  Thompson,  J.,  and  in  Kelsey 
v.  Layne,  28  Kans.  218,  224,  42  Am. 
Rep.  158.  In  the  latter  case  Brew- 
er, J.,  said:  "The  theory  of  the 
common  law  was,  that  if  the  labor 
and  skill  of  the  bailee  increased 
the  value  of  the  article  bailed,  he 
had  a  lien.  In  other  words,  it  was 
the  profit  of  the  bailor  and  not  the 
loss  of  the  bailee  which  deter- 
mined the  lien.  Now  it  would 
seem  far  more  just  that  when  the 
bailee  parted  with  anything,  either 
property  or  labor,  at  the  instance 
of  the  bailor,  he  should  be  pro- 
tected, irrespective  of  the  ques- 
tion whether  such  property  or  la- 
bor   increased    the    value    of    the 


thing  bailed,  or  simply  preserved 
it  in  existence.  Often  times  in- 
deed, as  suggested  by  Chief  Jus- 
tice Gibson  in  the  quotation  just 
made,  the  feeding  and  care  of  the 
agistor  actually  increase  the  in- 
trinsic value.  Further  it  may  be 
remarked  that  the  general  tenden- 
cy of  all  legislation  and  adjudica- 
tion is  to  afford  protection  to  him 
who  parts  with  labor  or  material 
for  the  benefit  of  another.  Wit- 
ness the  various  mechanics'  lien 
laws  for  the  protection  of  those 
who  bestow  labor  or  furnish  ma- 
terial for  the  improvement  of  real 
estate,  the  law  requiring  railroads 
to  give  a  bond  to  secure  the  pay- 
ment of  all  laborers,  and  the  stat- 
utes like  the  one  now  in  consid- 
eration before  us.  These  statutes, 
which  rest  upon  obvious  consid- 
erations of  justice,  are  to  be  rea- 
sonably construed  in  order  to  ac- 
complish the  ends   intended." 


657         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS.         §    644 

provender,  does  not  increase  its  intrinsic  value  by  means  ex- 
clusively within  his  control."  The  learned  Chief  Justice  re- 
fers to  the  argument  of  Baron  Parke  in  Jackson  v.  Cum- 
mins/°  that  the  lien  extends  only  to  cases  in  which  the  bailee 
has  directly  conferred  additional  value  by  labor  or  skill,  or 
indirectly  by  the  instrumentality  of  an  agent  under  his  con- 
trol, as  in  the  case  of  Scarfe  v.  Morgan, ^^  where  the  owner 
of  a  stallion  was  allowed  to  have  a  lien  for  a  single  service, 
which  resulted  in  the  mare's  being  with  foal.  In  the  latter 
case  the  lien,  of  course,  could  have  no  other  foundation  than 
the  improved  condition  and  increased  value  of  the  mare,  in- 
dependently of  the  consideration  of  skill.  "In  Jackson  v. 
Cummins,"  said  Gibson,  C.  J.,  in  conclusion,  "we  see  the  ex- 
piring embers  of  the  primitive  notion  that  the  basis  of  the 
lien  is  intrinsic  improvement  of  the  thing  by  mechanical 
means;  but  if  we  get  away  from  it  at  all,  what  matters  it 
how  the  additional  value  has  ben  imparted,  or  whether  it  has 
been  attended  with  an  alteration  in  the  condition  of  the 
thing?  It  may  be  said  that  the  condition  of  a  fat  ox  is  not  a 
permanent  one ;  but  neither  is  the  increased  value  of  a  mare 
in  foal  permanent ;  yet  in  Scarfe  v.  Morgan  the  owner  of  a 
stallion  was  allowed  to  have  a  lien  for  the  price  of  the  leap. 
The  truth  is,  the  modern  decisions  evince  a  struggle  of  the 
judicial  mind  to  escape  from  the  narrow  confines  of  the 
earlier  precedents,  but  without  having  as  yet  established 
principles  adapted  to  the  current  transactions  and  conven- 
ience of  the  world." 

§  644.  Lien  on  horse  kept  for  training. — But  a  livery 
stable  keeper  has  a  lien  at  common  law  on  a  horse  which  he 
keeps  for  the  purpose  of  exercising  and  training  to  run  at 
races, ^-  although  the  races  be  for  bets  and  wagers  which  are 

105  M.  &  W.  342.  Morgan,    4    M.     &    W.    270,    283; 

114  M.  &  W.  270.  Forth   v.    Simpson,    13   Q.    B.   680; 

12  Bevan  v.  Waters,  3  Car.  &  P.       Jacobs    v.    Latour,    5    Bing.    130,    2 

520,    Moo.    &    M.    235;    Scarfe  v.       Moo.   &  P.,  201;   Harris  v.  Wood- 

42 


§  645  LIENS.  658 

made  illegal  by  statute,  and  the  stable  keeper  knew  that  the 
horse  was  so  used  while  in  his  possession. ^^  Even  though 
the  parties  were  in  pari  delicto,  potior  est  conditio  possiden- 
tis, and  the  law  will  not  assist  the  owner  of  the  horse  to  ob- 
tain possession  without  paying  the  keeper  and  trainer. ^^ 

It  may  happen  that  a  trainer,  while  having  a  lien  at  com- 
mon law  for  his  labor  bestowed  upon  a  horse,  may  have  a 
statutory  lien  for  boarding  the  horse.  Whether  both  liens, 
in  such  case,  can  be  enforced  together,  depends  upon  the  law 
of  the  state  under  which  the  liens  arise. ^^ 

One  who  takes  a  horse  to  be  kept  and  cared  for  has  a  lien 
for  the  service, ^^  but  the  lien  arises  from  the  special  service 
in  caring  for  the  horse,  if  he  needs  medical  treatment.  A 
stable-keeper  has  no  lien  for  incidental  treatment  of  a  horse 
rendered  in  the  usual  course  of  keeping  it  without  a  special 
contract  for  a  lien.^''' 

§  645.  The  owner  of  a  stallion  has  a  lien  upon  a  mare  for 
the  charge  for  serving  the  mare.^^ — The  lien  is  specific,  and 
the  mare  cannot  be  retained  for  a  general  balance  of  account. 
This  lien  is  given  upon  the  general  principle  that,  where  a 
bailee  has  expended  his  labor  and  skill  in  the  improvement 

rufif,    124    Mass.    205,    26  Am.    Rep.  i"  Miller   v.    Marston,   35    Maine 

658;     Shields    v.     Dodge,     14    Lea  153,   56  Am.    Dec.  694. 

(Tenn.)    356;   Towle   v.    Raymond,  is  Scarfe     v.     Morgan,     4    M.    & 

58  N.   H.   64;    Scott  v.    Mercer,  98  W.  270,  283.    Parke,  B.,  said:  "The 

Iowa  258,  67  N.  W.  108,  60  Am.  St.  object    is    that    the    mare    may   be 

188;  Farney  v.  Kerr  (Tenn.),  48  S.  made    more    valuable    by    proving 

W.  103.  in    foal.      She    is   delivered   to   the 

13  Harris  v.  Woodruff,  124  Mass.  defendant,    that    she    may    by    his 
205,   26  Am.    Rep.   658.  skill  and  labor,  and  the  use  of  his 

14  Harris  v.  Woodruff,  124  Mass.  stallion    for   that  object,   be   made 
205,  26  Am.    Rep.    658.  so;   and  we  think,  therefore,   that 

15  Towle  V.   Raymond,  58  N.    H.  it  is  a  case  which  falls  within  the 
64.  principle    of   those    cited    in   argu- 

1*"'  Lord   V.   Jones,  24   Maine  439,       ment." 
41  Am.  Dec.  391. 


659 


LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS     AND    AGISTORS     LIENS, 


645 


of  a  chattel  delivered  to  him,  he  has  a  lien  for  his  charge  in 
that  respect. 

In  this  country  a  similar  lien  has  in  most  of  the  states  been 
conferred  by  statute. ^'^  The  lien  is  sometimes  extended  so 
as  to  attach  also  to  the  offspring,  and  sometimes  it  is  made 
to  attach  to  the  offspring  alone.  The  lien  is  also  generally 
enlarged  so  that  it  does  not  depend  upon  possession,  but 
without  possession  may  be  asserted  within  a  limited  time  by 


19  Alabama:  Civ.  Code  1907, 
§§  4810-4813.  Arizona:  Rev.  Stats. 
1901,  §  4508.  Arkansas:  Castle's 
Supp.  1911,  §§  5049-5052.  It  is  sub- 
sequent to  the  lien  of  a  prior  re- 
corded mortgage.  Easter  v. 
Goyne,  1  Ark.  222,  11  S.  W.  212. 
California:  Civ.  Code  1906,  I  3062. 
Colorado:  Mills'  Ann.  Stats.  1912. 
p.  2975,  §  7130.  Delaware:  Laws 
1893,  p.  827.  Florida:  Gen.  Stats. 
1906,  §  2207.  Georgia:  Code  1911, 
§  3361.  Idaho  :  Sess.  Laws  1913,  p. 
550,  §  4,  amending  Sess.  Laws  1909, 
p.  212,  §  4.  Illinois:  Hurd's  Rev. 
Stats.  1913,  ch.  8,  §§  68,  69.  Indi- 
ana: Burns'  Ann.  Stats.  1912, 
§§  3252-3255.  Iowa:  Laws  1909,  p. 
133.  Kansas  :  Dassler's  Gen.  Stats. 
1909,  §  4818.  Kentucky:  Carroll's 
Stats.  1909,  §§  2503,  2504.  Louisi- 
ana :  Wolff's  Const.  &  Rev.  Laws 
1904,  p.  1332.  Maine:  Rev.  Stats. 
1903,  ch.  93,  §  58.  As  to  time  with- 
in which  lien  on  the  get  may  be 
enforced,  see  Gile  v.  Atkins,  93 
Maine  223,  44  Atl.  896,  74  Am.  St. 
341.  Michigan:  Pub.  Acts  1907, 
ch.  145;  Howell's  Ann.  Stats.  1912, 
§  2918.  Minnesota:  Gen.  Stats. 
1913,  §  7080.  Mississippi:  Code 
1906,  §§  3076,  3077.  Missouri:  Rev. 
Stats.  1909,  §§  8240,  8241.  Mon- 
tana :  Laws  191'3,  ch.  45.  Nebraska : 
Laws    1913,    ch.    49.      New    Hamp- 


shire: Laws  1905,  ch.  33.  New 
Mexico:  Laws  1912,  ch.  23.  New 
York:  Birdseye's  C.  &  G.  Consol. 
Laws  1909,  p.  3227.  See  Supp.  1910, 
p.    665.      North    Carolina:    Revisal 

1905,  §  2024.  (See  amendment  ap- 
plicable to  Wilkes  county,  in  Pub. 
Local  Laws  1911,  ch.  743.)  North 
Dakota:  Laws  1909,  p.  199,  §  13. 
Ohio:  Gen.  Code  1910,  §§  8355-8357. 
Oklahoma:  Comp.  Laws  1909, 
§§  146,  147.  Oregon:  Bellinger  & 
Cotton's  Ann.  Codes  &  Stats.  1902, 
§§  4322,  4323,  as  amended  by  Gen. 
Laws  (special  session)  1903,  pp. 
14-16.  See  Gen.  Laws  1911,  p.  352. 
South  Carolina:  Code  1912,  §4172. 
South  Dakota:  Sess.  Laws  1913, 
ch.  264.  Tennessee:  Ann.  Code 
1896,  §§  3554,  3555.  As  to  superiori- 
ty of  subsequent  mortgage,  see 
Sims  V.  Bradford,  12  Lea  (Tenn.) 
434.  Texas:  Rev.  Civ.  Stats.  1911, 
arts.  5652,  5633.  Utah:  Laws  1911, 
p.  321,  §  15.     Vermont :  Pub.  Stats. 

1906,  §§  2659-2662,  as  amended  by 
Laws  1910,  p.  100.  Virginia:  Code 
Ann.  1904,  §  2490a.  Washington: 
Remington  &  Ballinger's  Ann. 
Codes  &  Stats.  1910,  §§  3161-3165, 
as  amended  by  Laws  1913,  p.  155. 
West  Virginia:  Code  1906,  §  3124. 
Wisconsin:  Stats.  1898,  art.  3347a. 
Wyoming:  Comp.  Stats.  1910, 
§§  3771,  3772. 


§    646  LIENS.  660 

attachment.  The  Hen  exists  from  the  time  of  service,  and 
one  who  purchases  the  mare  after  the  service,  but  before  the 
fibng  of  the  notice  of  lien,  and  before  the  time  for  fiHng  such 
notice  has  expired,  takes  her  subject  to  the  existing  lien.-*^ 

§  646.  Statutes  of  the  several  states. — The  statutes  of  the 
several  states  giving  liens  to  agistors,  stable  keepers,  and 
others,  differ  much  in  terms.  Generally  the  lien  attaches  only 
to  the  animals  taken  care  of;  and  it  does  not  attach  to 
v^agons,  carriages,  harnesses,  and  other  articles  left  with 
the  horses  and  cattle  which  are  to  be  kept.-^  But  in  a  few 
states  it  is  provided  that  the  lien  shall  attach  to  such  arti- 
cles.^- In  some  states  the  lien  is  given  only  to  livery  stable 
keepers;  in  others  it  is  also  given  to  agistors,  ranchmen,  and 
farmers.  In  some  the  statutes  apply  in  favor  of  those  whose 
business  it  is  to  board  horses,  or  to  pasture  or  feed  cattle; 
while  others  seem  to  be  broad  enough  to  cover  isolated  cases 
of  boarding  horses  or  keeping  cattle. 

The  statutes  of  several  states  expressly  provide  that  the 
lien  shall  not  attach  to  property  which  has  been  stolen,  or 
which  does  not  belong  to  the  person  who  intrusts  it  to  a 
stable  keeper  or  agistor.-^  The  reason  for  an  innkeeper's 
lien  attaching  to  such  property  does  not  hold  in  case  of 
stable  keepers  and  agistors,  and  therefore  the  lien  does  not 
attach  to  such  property  unless  it  is  expressly  made  to  attach. 
If  the  statute  is  silent  on  the  subject,  it  does  not  apply  to 
stolen  animals,  or  such  as  belong  to  other  persons.-^ 

20  Tuttle  V.  Dennis,  58  Hun  (N.  such  as  carriages  and  harness. 
Y.)  35,  11  N.  Y.  S.  600,  33  N.  Y.  St.  Hartshorne  v.  Seeds,  1  Chester 
445.      Statute    giving    lien    on    off-       Co.    Rep.    (Pa.)    460. 

spring  for  service  of  sire  held  un-  --  See  post,  Delaw^are,  §  652;  Mis- 
constitutional.  Weis  V.  Ashley,  souri,  §  666;  New  Jersey,  §  671;  Vir- 
59  Nebr.  494,  81  N.  W.  318,  80  Am.  ginia,  §  680;  and  Wisconsin,  §  681. 
St.  704.  23  See      post.      North      Dakota, 

21  Thus  a  lien  given  by  statute  §  673a;  South  Dakota,  §  676a;  Mon- 
upon  a  horse  for  his  keeping  does  tana,  §  667;  Wyoming,  §  682. 

not  extend  to  any  other  property  24  Gump  v.  Showalter,  43  Pa.  St. 

intrusted     to     the     stable     keeper,      507. 


66l         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS*    LIENS.      §    647b 

§  647.  Alabama.-^ — Keepers,  owners,  or  proprietors  of 
livery  stables,  or  other  places  for  feeding  and  caring  for 
stock  for  pay,  have  a  lien  on  all  stock  kept  and  fed  by  them 
for  the  payment  of  their  charges,  for  keeping  and  feeding 
such  stock,  and  have  right  to  retain  such  stock,  or  so  much 
thereof  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  payment  of  charges  for 
keeping  and  feeding  such  stock:  provided,  that  said  lien  on 
any  stock  so  kept,  fed,  and  cared  for  shall  continue  for  six 
months  in  possession  of  persons  with  notice  of  such  lien. 

If  the  charges  when  due  are  not  paid  within  ten  days  after 
demand  therefor,  the  keepers,  owners  or  proprietors  are 
authorized,  after  giving  thirty  days'  notice,  once  a  week  for 
three  successive  weeks,  in  a  newspaper  published  in  the 
county  in  which  such  stables  are  located,  or,  if  there  be  no 
such  paper,  by  posting  the  notice  for  thirty  days  in  three 
conspicuous  places  in  the  county,  to  sell  the  stock  for  the 
payment  of  the  charges  and  expenses  incident  thereto;  and 
the  balance,  if  any,  is  to  be  paid  over  to  the  owner. 

§  647a.  Alaska. — Any  person  who  shall  pasture  or  feed 
any  horses,  cattle,  hogs,  sheep  or  other  live  stock,  or  bestow 
any  labor,  care  or  attention  upon  the  same  at  the  request  of 
the  owner  or  lawful  possessor  thereof,  shall  have  a  lien  upon 
such  property  for  his  just  and  reasonable  charges  for  the 
labor,  care  and  attention  he  has  bestowed  and  the  food  he 
has  furnished,  and  he  may  retain  possession  of  such  prop- 
erty until  such  charges  be  paid.  If  not  paid  within  three 
months,  the  person  having  such  lien  may  sell  after  notice.-® 

§  647b.  Arizona.-" — Proprietors  of  livery  or  public  stables 
have  a  special  lien  on  all  animals  placed  with  them  for  feed, 
care  and  attention,  as  also  upon  such  carriages,  buggies,  vehi- 
cles, or  other  equipments  as  may  have  been  placed  in  their 
care,  for  the  amount  of  the  charges  against  the  same.     All 

25  Code  1907,  §§  4806,  4807.  27  Rev.  Stats.  1901,  §§  2922,  2931- 

26  Carter's  Code  1900,  p.  414,  2934.  As  to  enforcement,  see  post, 
§§  277-278.  §  1049a. 


§    648  LIENS.  662 

farmers,  ranchmen,  and  others  who  furnish  pasture,  hay,  or 
other  feed  for  any  cattle,  horses,  or  other  stock  to  be  fed  on 
the  premises  of  such  person  or  persons  furnishing  such  pas- 
ture, hay,  or  feed,  have  a  lien  on  such  stock  for  the  amount  of 
the  charges  due  and  unpaid  for  such  pasturage,  hay  or  other 
feed,  and  shall  have  the  right  to  take  possession  of  and  retaki 
such  stock  until  such  charges  are  paid  by  the  owner  or  own- 
ers thereof;  the  lien  may  be  enforced  by  taking  possession 
and  selling  after  notice. 

§  648.  Arkansas.^^ — Keepers  of  livery,  sale  or  feed  stables, 
or  wagon  yards,  have  a  lien  for  their  reasonable  charges  and 
costs  on  all  horses,  mules  or  other  stock  or  property  left  in 
their  charge  to  be  kept,  sheltered,  fed,  sold  or  otherwise 
cared  for.  Such  keepers  are  authorized  to  keep  possession 
of  such  property  until  such  charges  are  paid,  or  tendered  to 
them  by  the  owner  thereof. 

In  case  an}^  such  property  shall  be  left  with  such  keeper, 
and  not  be  called  for  by  the  owner,  and  the  charges  and 
costs  paid  thereon  before  they  shall  amount  to  the  value 
thereof,  and  the  cost  of  selling  the  same,  it  shall  be  lawful  for 
such  keeper  to  cause  the  same  to  be  sold. 

Such  sale  shall  be  at  public  outcry,  after  first  giving  the 
owner  thirty  days'  actual  notice,  or  constructive  notice,  to 
be  published  in  a  newspaper  authorized  to  publish  legal  no- 
tices, specifying  the  day,  hour  and  place  of  such  sale,  and 
out  of  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  shall  be  paid:  1st.  The 
costs  and  expenses  of  sale ;  2d.  The  amount  due  such  keeper 
for  his  charges :  and  the  balance,  if  any,  shall  be  held  by  such 
keeper  for  the  use  and  subject  to  the  order,  of  the  owner  of 
the  property  so  sold. 

§  649.  California.-^ — Livery  or  boarding  or  feed  stable 
proprietors,  and  persons 'pasturing  horses  or  stock,  have  a 

28  Dig.    of    Stats.     1904,  §§  5044-  29  Civ.  Code  1906,  §  3051'.     As  to 

5047.  former    statute    of    1870,    and    the 


663         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS.         §    65 1 

lien,  dependent  on  possession,  for  their  compensation  in  car- 
ing for,  boarding,  feeding  or  pasturing  such  horses  or  stock. 

§  650.  Colorado."'*^ — Any  ranchmann,  farmer,  agistor, 
herder  of  cattle,  tavern-keeper,  livery  stable  keeper,  or  any 
other  person  to  whom  any  horses,  mules,  asses,  cattle,  sheep 
or  hogs  shall  be  intrusted,  for  the  purpose  of  feeding,  herd- 
ing, pasturing,  keeping  or  ranching,  shall  have  a  lien  upon 
such  horses,  mules,  asses,  cattle,  sheep  or  hogs  for  the 
amount  that  may  be  due  for  such  feeding,  herding,  pasturing, 
keeping  or  ranching,  and  for  all  costs  incurred  in  enforcing 
such  lien. 

§651.  Connecticut.'^^ — When  a  special  agreement  shall 
have  been  made  between  the  owner  of  any  cattle,  horses, 
sheep,  or  swine,  and  by  any  person  wdio  shall  keep  and  feed 
such  animals,  regarding  the  price  of  such  keeping,  such  ani- 
mals shall  be  subject  to  a  lien,  for  the  price  of  such  keeping, 
in  favor  of  the  person  keeping  the  same;  and  such  person  so 
keeping  said  animals  may  detain  the  same  until  such  debt 
shall  be  paid;  and  if  it  be  not  paid  within  twenty-one  days 
after  it  is  due  he  may  sell  such  animals  or  so  many  thereof 
as  shall  be  necessary,  at  public  auction,  upon  giving  written 
notice  to  the  owner  of  the  time  and  place  of  said  sale  at 
least  six  days  before  said  sale,  and  apply  the  proceeds  to  the 
payment  of  such  debts,  returning  the  surplus,  if  any,  to  said 
owner. 

Code    before    it    was    amended    in  of  said   lien,  as   required   by  Ann. 

1878,  see  Johnson  v.  Perry,  53  Cal.  Stats.,   §   114.     Bailey  v.   O'Fallon, 

351.  30  Colo.  419,  70  Pac.  755.    See  Auld 

so  Mills'  Ann.   Stats.   1912,  I  4568.  v.  Travis,  5   Colo.  App.  535,  as  to 

For  mode   of   enforcing,   see   gen-  lien   of  an  agistor   on  partnership 

eral  provision,  ch.  22,  §  1050,  infra.  property. 

A  sale  of   an  animal   upon  w^hich  si  Gen.  Stats.  1902,  §  4167.    As  to 

a  lien   is  claimed   is   invalid   when  sale,  see  Gen.  Stats.  1902,  §  842. 
no   notice    is   given    to    the   owner 


§    652  LIENS.  664 

§  652.  Delaware.^- — Any  hotel  keeper,  innkeeper,  or 
other  person  who  keeps  a  livery  or  boarding  stable,  and  for 
price  or  reward  at  such  stable  furnishes  food  or  care  for  any 
horse,  or  has  the  custody  or  care  of  any  carriage,  cart,  wagon, 
sleigh  or  other  vehicle,  or  any  harness,  robes  or  other  equip- 
ments for  the  same,  shall  have  a  lien  upon  such  horse,  car- 
riage, cart,  wagon,  sleigh,  vehicle,  harness,  robes  or  equip- 
ments, and  the  right  to  detain  the  same  to  secure  the  pay- 
ment of  such  price  or  reward,  and  may,  after  the  expiration 
of  fifteen  days  from  the  time  the  same  or  any  part  thereof 
became  due  and  payable,  the  same  remaining  unpaid  in 
whole  or  in  part,  sell  the  property  upon  which  he  has  such 
lien  at  public  sale,  at  such  livery  or  boarding  stable,  to  the 
highest  and  best  bidder  or  bidders  therefor,  first  giving  at 
least  ten  days'  notice  of  such  sale  by  handbills  posted  in  five 
or  more  public  places  in  the  county  in  which  such  sale  is  to 
be  had  and  by  advertisement  in  a  newspaper  published  in 
said  county,  describing  the  property  to  be  sold  and  naming 
the  day,  hour  and  place  of  sale  thereof,  and  may  apply  the 
money  arising  from  said  sale  to  the  payment  of  the  amount 
then  remaining  due,  including  therein  compensation  at  the 
same  rate  as  such  stipulated  price  or  reward  for  food,  care 
or  custody  furnished  or  bestowed  as  aforesaid  up  to  the  time 
of  sale,  together  with  the  costs  and  expenses  of  sale. 

If  the  keeper  of  the  stable  has  parted  with  the  custody  of 
the  property  subject  to  such  lien,  he  may  at  any  time  within 
ten  days  from  the  parting  of  such  custody  make  an  affidavit 
describing  the  property  and  stating  the  amount  due,  and 
thereupon  a  warrant  may  issue  for  the  seizure  of  the  prop- 
erty and  the  delivery  thereof  to  the  keeper  of  the  stable. 

§  653.  District  of  Columbia.^-"^ — It  shall  be  lawful  for  all 
persons  keeping  or  boarding  any  animals  at  livery  within  the 
district,   under  any  agreement  with  the   owner  thereof,    to 

32  Code  1893,  p.  824.  33Code  1901,   §   1262. 


665         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS.         §    655 

detain  such  animals  until  all  charges  under  such  agreement 
for  the  care,  keep,  or  board  of  such  animals  shall  have  been 
paid:  provided,  however,  that  notice  in  writing  shall  first 
be  given  to  such  owner  in  person  or  at  his  last  known  place 
of  residence  of  the  amount  of  such  charges  and  the  intention 
to  detain  such  animal  or  animals  until  all  charges  shall  be 
paid. 

§  654.  Florida. ^^ — A  lien  prior  in  dignity  to  all  others 
exists  in  favor  of  all  keepers  of  livery,  sale  or  feed  stables  for 
feeding  or  taking  care  of  any  horse  or  other  animal  put  in 
their  charge,  upon  such  horse  or  other  animal, 

§  655.  Georgia."'^^ — Innkeepers  and  livery  stable  keepers 
have  a  lien  for  their  dues  on  the  stock  placed  in  their  care 
for  keeping,  which  shall  be  superior  to  other  liens,  except 
liens  for  taxes,  special  liens  of  landlords  for  rent,  liens  of 
laborers,  and  all  general  liens  of  which  they  had  actual 
notice  before  the  property  claimed  to  be  subject  to  lien  came 
into  their  control,  to  which  excepted  liens  they  shall  be  in- 
ferior. 

The  keeper  of  a  livery  stable  is  a  depositary  for  hire,  and 
is  bound  to  the  same  diligence  and  entitled  to  the  same  lien 
as  an  innkeeper.^*^ 

Every  livery  stable  keeper  may  also  assert  his  lien  by 
making  a  statement  in  writing  of  the  amount  due  him,  with  a 
description  of  the  stock  on  which  the  lien  is  claimed,  and 
making  affidavit  thereto,  and  recording  it  in  the  clerk's 
office  of  the  superior  court  of  the  county  where  the  service 
was  rendered,  and  when  so  recorded  the  lien  has  the  same 
effect  as  is  now  given  by  retaining  possession.  The  lien 
must  be  recorded  while  the  property  is  in  the  possession  of 

34Gen.    Stats.   1906,    §  2205.  to  priority,  see  Colquitt     v.     Kirk- 

35  Code  1911,  §  3360.     For  mode  man,  47  Ga.  555;   Elliott  v.   Hodg- 

of  enforcing  the  lien,  see  general  son,  133  Ga.  209,  65  S.  E.  405. 

provisions,  ch.  xxii.,  1053,  infra.    As  scCode   1911,    §   3515. 


§    655a  LIENS.  666 

the  livery  stable  keeper.     Such  lien  may  be   foreclosed   as 
mortgages  on  personalty  are  now  foreclosed. '^^ 

§  655a.  Hawaii.""'' — Whoever  pastures,  feeds,  or  shelters 
animals  by  virtue  of  a  contract  with  or  by  the  consent  of  the 
owner  of  such  animals  for  a  compensation  agreed  upon,  has 
a  lien  on  such  animals  for  such  pasturing,  feeding  or  shelter- 
ing to  secure  payment  thereof  wath  costs. 

If  the  owner  of  such  animal  or  animals  after  demand  and 
notice  in  writing  that  such  lien  will  be  enforced  served  upon 
him,  shall  fail  to  pay  the  amount  due  for  such  pasturing,  feed- 
ing or  sheltering  within  thirty  days,  the  holder  of  the  lien 
may  cause  such  animal  or  animals  to  be  sold  at  public  auc- 
tion, upon  notice  of  such  sale  being  given  for  fifteen  days  by 
publication  in  an  English  or  Hawaiian  newspaper,  or  by  post- 
ing such  notice  in  the  Hawaiian  and  English  languages  at  the 
court  house  of  the  district  where  no  newspaper  is  published. 

§  655b.  Idaho.''^ — Livery  or  boarding  or  feed  stable  pro- 
prietors, and  persons  pasturing  live  stock  of  any  kind,  have  a 
lien,  dependent  on  possession,  for  their  compensation  in 
caring  for,  boarding,  feeding  or  pasturing  such  live  stock. 
If  the  liens  as  herein  provided  are  not  paid  within  sixty  days 
after  the  work  is  done,  service  rendered,  or  feed  or  pasturing 
supplied,  the  person  in  whose  favor  such  special  lien  is 
created  may  proceed  to  sell  the  property  at  public  auction, 
after  giving  ten  days'  public  notice  of  the  sale  by  advertising 
in  some  newspaper  published  in  the  county  where  such  prop- 
erty is  situated,  or  if  there  be  no  newspaper  published  in  the 
county  then  by  posting  notices  of  the  sale  in  three  of  the 
most  public  places  in  the  county,  for  ten  days  previous  to 
such  sale.  The  proceeds  of  the  sale  must  be  paid  over  to  the 
owner. 

STCode   1911,   §  3370.  mon  v.   Franklin,  7   Idaho  316,   62 

STaRev.  Laws  1905,  §§  2179,  2180.       Pac.  1030. 
38Rev.   Code   1908,   §   3446;   Solo- 


66; 


LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS     AND    AGISTORS     LIENS. 


658 


§  656.  Illinois."^ — Stable  keepers  and  other  persons  have 
a  Hen  upon  the  horses,  carriages,  and  harness  kept  by  them, 
for  the  proper  charges  due  for  the  keeping  thereof  and  ex- 
penses bestowed  thereon  at  the  request  of  the  owner,  or 
the  person  having  the  possession  thereof. 

Agistors  and  other  persons  keeping,  yarding,  feeding  or 
pasturing  domestic  animals  have  a  lien  upon  the  animals 
agistered,  kept,  yarded  or  fed,  for  the  proper  charges  due 
for  the  agisting,  keeping,  yarding  or  feeding  thereof. 

§  657.  Indiana.^" — The  keepers  of  livery  stables  and  all 
others  engaged  in  feeding  horses,  cattle,  hogs,  and  other 
live  stock,  have  a  lien  upon  such  property  for  the  feed 
and  care  bestowed  by  them  upon  the  same,  and  shall  have 
the  same  rights  and  remedies  as  are  provided  for  tradesmen, 
mechanics  and  others.'*^ 

§  658.  lowa.^- — Keepers  of  livery  and  feed  stables,  herd- 
ers and  feeders  and  keepers  of  stock  for  hire,  have  a  lien  on 


39  Kurd's  Rev.  Stats.  1913,  ch.  82, 
§§  2,  3.  For  mode  of  enforcing 
liens,  see  ch.  xxii.,  §  1054,  post. 
One  only  selling  feed  to  another 
in  charge  of  an  animal  is  not  en- 
titled to  any  lien.  W.  H.  How- 
ard Com.  Co.  V.  National  Live- 
stock Bank,  93  111.  App.  473. 

40  Burns'  Ann.  Stats.  1914,  §  8294. 
The  statute  does  not  apply  to  iso- 
lated cases  of  feeding  cattle. 
Conklin  v.  Carver,  19  Ind.  226. 
The  lien  is  not  assignable.  Rear- 
don  v.  Higgins,  39  Ind.  App.  363, 
79  N.  E.  208.  Where  animals  are 
fed  and  boarded  by  the  consent  of 
the  mortgagee  the  agister  has  a 
lien  superior  to  the  lien  of  the 
mortgage.  Woodard  v.  Myers,  15 
Ind.  App.  42,  43  N.  E.  573.  The 
liveryman's    lien   is   not   assignable 


and  the  assignee  can  not  defend  a 
replevin  suit  for  a  horse  by  the 
owner  by  setting  up  such  assign- 
ment. Glascock  V.  Lemp,  26  Ind. 
App.  175,  59  N.  E.  342. 

41  See  post,   §   758. 

42Code  Ann.  1897,  §  3137.  Prior 
to  the  enactment  of  this  statute, 
March  10,  1880,  a  livery  stable 
keeper  in  this  state  had  no  lien. 
McDonald  v.  Bennett,  45  Iowa  456; 
Munson  v.  Porter,  63  Iowa  453, 
19  N.  W.  290.  The  statute  giving 
a  lien  upon  personal  property 
stored  or  left  with  a  warehouse- 
man or  other  depositary  did  not 
give  such  a  lien.  McDonald  v. 
Bennett,  45  Iowa  456.  A  profes- 
sional trainer  of  horses  for  speed 
has  no  lien.  Scott  v,  Mercer 
(Iowa),  63  N.  W.  325. 


§  659  LIENS.  668 

all  stock  and  property  coming  into  their  hands,  as  such,  for 
their  charges,  and  expense  of  keeping,  when  the  same  have 
been  received  from  the  owner  or  from  any  person:  pro- 
vided, however,  this  lien  shall  be  subject  to  all  prior  liens  of 
record. 

The  owner  or  claimant  of  the  property  may  release  the 
lien  and  shall  be  entitled  to  the  possession  of  the  property 
on  tendering  to  the  person  claiming  the  lien  a  bond  in  a 
penal  sum  of  three  times  the  amount  for  which  the  lien  is 
claimed,  signed  by  two  sureties,  residents  of  the  county, 
who  shall  justify  as  required  in  other  cases,  conditioned  to 
pay  any  judgment  the  person  claiming  the  lien  shall  obtain, 
for  which  the  property  was  liable  under  the  lien. 

If  such  charges  and  expenses  are  not  sooner  paid,  the  lien- 
holder  may  sell  said  property  at  public  auction,  after  giving 
to  the  owner  or  claimant  ten  days'  notice  in  writing  of  the 
time  and  place  of  such  sale,  if  found  within  the  county,  and 
also  by  posting  written  notices  thereof  in  three  public  places 
in  the  township  where  said  stock  was  kept  or  let.  Out  of  the 
proceeds  of  such  sale  he  shall  pay  all  of  said  charges  and  ex- 
penses of  keeping  said  stock  together  with  the  costs  and  ex- 
penses of  said  sale,  and  the  balance,  if  any,  shall  be  paid  to 
the  owner  or  claimant  of  said  property. 

§  659.  Kansas.*^ — The  keepers  of  livery  stables,  and  all 
others  engaged  in  feeding  horses,  cattle,  hogs,  or  other  live 
stock,  shall  have  a  lien  upon  such  property  for  the  feed  and 
care  bestowed  by  them  upon  the  same,  and  if  reasonable  or 
stipulated  charges  for  such  feed  and  care  be  not  paid  within 
sixty  days  after  the  same  becomes  due,  the  property,  or  so 

^--^Dassler's      Gen.      Stat.      1909,  1909,   §   4809)   have   been  followed. 

§§  4809,  4813-4816.  An  agistor's  lien  Central    Nat.    Bank   v.    Brecheisen, 

by  contract  with  a  mortgagor  will  65     Kans.    807,    70    Pac.  895.    See 

not  prevail  over  a  prior  mortgage  Jackson  v.   McCray,  63  Kans.  238, 

unless    the    statutes     (Gen.    Stats.  65  Pac.  227. 


669         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS.         §    660 

much  thereof  as  may  be  necessary  to  pay  such  charges  and 
the  expenses  of  publication  and  sale,  may  be  sold. 

§  660.  Kentucky. ^^ — All  owners  and  keepers  of  livery 
stables,  and  persons  feeding  or  grazing  cattle  for  compensa- 
tion, shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  cattle  placed  in  such  stable  or 
put  out  to  be  fed  or  grazed  by  the  owner  or  owners  thereof, 
for  their  reasonable  charges  for  keeping,  caring  for,  feeding 
and  grazing  the  same;  and  this  lien  shall  attach  whether  the 
cattle  are  merely  temporarily  lodged,  fed,  grazed  and  cared 
for,  or  are  placed  at  such  stable  or  other  place  or  pasture  for 
regular  board;  but  it  shall  be  subject  to  the  limitations  and 
restrictions  as  provided  in  case  of  a  landlord's  lien  for  rent. 

When  such  lien  exists  in  favor  of  any  person,  he  may, 
before  a  justice  of  the  peace,  or  a  judge  of  the  quarterly 
court  of  the  county  where  the  cattle  were  fed  or  grazed,  by 
himself  or  agent,  make  affidavit  to  the  amount  due  him  and 
in  arrear  for  keeping  and  caring  for  such  cattle,  and  de- 
scribing as  near  as  may  be  the  cattle  so  kept  by  him;  and 
thereupon  such  officer  shall  issue  a  warrant,  directed  to  the 
sheriff  or  any  constable  or  town  marshal  of  said  county,  au- 
thorizing him  to  levy  upon  and  seize  the  said  cattle  for  the 

44  Carroll's  Stats.  1909,  §§  2500-  penses  is  constitutional.  Griffith 
2502.  Speth  v.  Brangman,  27  Ky.  L.  v.  Speaks,  111  Ky.  149,  23  Ky.  L. 
295,  84  S.  W.  1149.  The  lien  of  a  561,  63  S.  W.  465.  A  lien  on  a 
prior  mortgage  is  superior  to  the  horse  reserved  in  a  note  for  pur- 
lien  of  a  stable  keeper,  not  em-  chase-money  is  superior  to  the  lien 
ployed  by  the  mortgagee.  Lee  v.  of  an  agister  wh  knows  of  such 
Vanmeter,  98  Ky.  1,  17  Ky.  L.  548,  lien.  Bean  v.  Johnson,  17  Ky.  L. 
32  S.  W.  137.  Where  some  of  the  585,  32  S.  W.  175.  The  existence 
animals  on  which  an  agistor  has  a  of  an  agistor's  lien  can  not  be  ad- 
lien  are  surrendered  to  the  owner  judged  as  against  an  attaching 
the  lienor  may  hold  the  rest  for  creditor  of  the  owner  where  the 
all  the  claim.  Griffith  v.  Speaks,  animal  upon  which  the  lien  is 
111  Ky.  149,  23  Ky.  561,  63  S.  W.  claimed  was  under  the  full  control 
465.  The  act  giving  persons  feed-  of  the  owner.  Feltman  v.  Chinn,  19 
ing  and  caring  for  animals  a  lien  Ky.  L.  1147,  43  S.  W.  192. 
on  them  for  such  services  and  ex- 


§    66 1  LIENS.  670 

amount  due,  with  interest  and  costs;  but  if  the  said  cattle 
have  been  removed  from  the  custody  of  the  livery  stable 
keeper,  or  person  feeding  or  grazing  them,  with  his  consent, 
the  lien  herein  provided  for  shall  not  continue  longer  than 
ten  days  from  and  after  such  removal;  nor  shall  such  lien,  in 
any  case  of  such  removal,  be  valid  against  any  bona  fide  pur- 
chaser without  notice  at  any  time  within  ten  days  after 
such  removal.  A  warrant,  as  herein  provided,  may  be  issued 
to  another  county  than  that  in  which  the  cattle  were  fed  or 
grazed;  the  lien  may  also  be  enforced  by  action  as  in  case 
of  other  liens. 

The  proceedings  under  a  warrant  shall,  in  all  respects,  be 
the  same  as  is  provided  in  cases  of  distress  w'arrants,  and 
none  of  the  cattle  so  fed  or  grazed  shall  be  exempt  from 
seizure  or  sale. 

§  661.  Louisiana. — Under  the  provision  of  the  code^^ 
which  entitles  a  party  to  the  expenses  incurred  in  the  pre- 
servation of  property,  and  to  the  right  to  retain  it,  it  is  held 
that  the  feeding  of  horses  may  be  classed  among  the  ex- 
penses incurred  in  their  preservation,  and  that  a  privilege 
exists  therefor.'*® 

But  a  keeper  of  public  stables  has  no  privilege  on  horses 
placed  with  him  on  livery  for  money  loaned  to  their  owner. ^^ 

§  662.  Maine. "^^ — Whoever  pastures,  feeds  or  shelters  ani- 
mals by  virtue  of  a  contract  with  or  by  consent  of  the  owner, 

45  Merrick's  Rev.  Civ.  Code  1900,  court    deemed    it    unnecessary    to 

§§  3224-3226.  decide. 

4<5Andrews    v.    Crandell,    16    La.  -^'Whiting  v.   Coons,  2  La.  Ann. 

Ann.  208.     In   Powers   v.   Hubbell.  961. 

12  La.   Ann.  413,   it  was   held   that  ^sRev.    Stats.    1903,    ch.   93,    §    59. 

the  keeper  of  a  livery  stable  has  A  proceeding  to   enforce  lien   for 

no    privilege    by    law    upon    car-  board  of  a  horse  is  purely  a  pro- 

riages  kept  in  his  stable.    Whether  ceeding   in   rem.      McGillicuddy    v. 

he  has  a  privilege  for  preserving  Edwards,    96    Maine    347,    52    Atl. 

the    horses    by    feeding    them,    the  785. 


6/1         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS. 


663 


has  a  lien  thereon  for  the  amount  due  for  such  pasturing, 
feeding  or  sheltering,  and  for  necessary  expenses  incurred  in 
the  proper  care  of  such  animals  in  payment  of  taxes  assessed 
thereon,  to  secure  payment  thereof  with  costs,  to  be  en- 
forced in  the  same  manner  as  liens  on  goods  in  possession 
and  choses  in  action.^'' 

§  663.  Massachusetts.'" — Persons  having  proper  charges 
due  them  for  pasturing,  boarding  or  keeping  horses  or  other 
domestic  animals,  brought  to  their  premises  or  placed  in 
their  care  by  or  with  the  consent  of  the  owners  thereof,  have 
a  lien  on  such  horses  or  other  domestic  animals  for  such 
charges. 

At  the  expiration  of  ten  days  after  a  demand  in  writing, 


4'J  See  ante,  §  531.  After  a  sale 
under  execution  issued  upon 
a  petition  to  enforce  the  lien, 
a  second  petition  to  enforce 
a  lien  for  keeping  the  animals 
during  the  time  intervening  be- 
tween the  dates  of  tlie  two  peti- 
tions can  not  be  maintained, 
though  commenced  while  the  ani- 
mals still  remain  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  lien-holder,  and  there 
is  a  surplus  arising  from  the  pro- 
ceeds of  the  sale.  After  the  sale, 
there  is  nothing  upon  which  the 
lien  can  attach.  It  can  not  attach 
to  the  surplus.  Lord  v.  Collins, 
76  Maine  443,  446,  per  Foster,  J. : 
"There  is  nothing  in  the  statute 
we  are  considering  which  by  ex- 
press words  or  by  necessary  im- 
plication contemplates  the  en- 
forcement of  a  lien  upon  anything 
other  than  the  animals  which  have 
been  furnished  food  or  shelter. 
The    petitioner    claims    to    sustain 


this  petition  as  against  said  ani- 
mals in  addition  to  the  judgment 
of  lien  in  his  behalf  before 
granted,  and  to  have  his  claim 
satisfied  'out  of  said  property  or 
the  proceeds  thereof.'  The  stat- 
ute does  not  go  to  that  extent, 
where,  by  the  petitioner's  own 
motion,  the  property  has  been 
sold  to  satisfy  a  lien  in  favor 
of  the  same  party,  and  originating 
from  one  and  the  same  bailment." 
50Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  198,  §  29. 
The  stable  keeper's  lien  is  not 
lost  by  his  useing  horses  kept 
by  him  for  the  owner.  Brintnall 
v.  Smith,  166  Mass.  253,  44  N.  E. 
221.  Where  one  boarding  a  horse 
for  another  allows  the  owner  to 
take  and  keep  possession  for  sev- 
eral weeks,  he  waives  his  lien 
on  such  horse.  Papineau  v.  Went- 
worth,  136  Mass.  543.  See  also, 
Hodgkins  v.  Bowser,  195  Mass. 
141,   80  N.   E.   796. 


§  664  '  ,         LIENS.  672 

petition  may  be  made  for  the  sale  of  the  property,  and  notice 
thereon  may  be  served  seven  days  before  the  hearing.^^ 

§  664.  Michigan.'^- — Whenever  any  person  shall  deliver 
to  another  any  horse,  mule,  neat  cattle,  sheep  or  swine  to  be 
kept  or  cared  for,  such  person  shall  have  a  lien  thereon  for 
the  keeping  and  care  of  such  animals,  and  may  retain  pos- 
session of  the  same  until  such  charges  are  paid. 

The  person  having  such  lien  may  commence  a  suit  for  the 
recovery  of  such  charges,  by  summons  in  the  usual  form, 
before  any  justic  of  the  peace  of  the  city  or  township  in  which 
he  resides,  or  in  any  court,  as  the  case  may  require,  against 
the  person  liable  for  the  payment  thereof.  If  such  summons 
be  returned  personally  served  upon  the  defendant,  the  same 
proceedings  shall  thereupon  be  had,  in  all  respects,  as  in 
other  suits  commenced  by  summons,  in  which  there  is  a  per- 
sonal service  of  process,  and  judgment  shall  be  rendered  in 
such  suit  in  like  manner.  If  the  officer  return  upon  such 
summons,  that  the  defendant  cannot  be  found  within  his 
county,  the  same  proceedings  shall  be  thereupon  had,  in  all 
respects,  as  near  as  may  be,  as  in  suits  commenced  by  at- 
tachment, in  which  there  is  not  a  personal  service  of  a  copy 
of  the  attachment  upon  the  defendant,  and  judgment  shall 
be  rendered  in  such  suit  in  like  manner.     If  the  plaintiff  re- 

oiln    other    respects    the    lien    is  Howell's        Stats.        Ann.        1912, 

enforced  under  the  general  provi-  §§     13804-13812.      One    boarding    a 

sions    stated    in    ch.    xxii.,    §    1056,  horse,  brought  to  him  by  one  not 

Massachusetts.     One    who    has    a  the  owner,  to  have  lien  must  show 

lien    on    a    horse    for    boarding    it  that    such    person    was   authorized 

who    in    good    faith    demands    an  to   act    for    the   owner.     Elliott   v. 

excessive    sum    for    the    delivery  Martin,    105    Mich.    506,    63    N.    W. 

of    possession    to    the    owner    will  525.     Where  a  tender   is   made  by 

not  lose  his  lien  where  no  tender  the    owner    for    the    keeping    and 

of    the    amount    due    is    made    to  feeding    his    horse    and    the    same 

him.  Folsom  v.  Barrett,   180  Mass.  is    accepted,    even    if    the    amount 

439,  62  N.   E.  723,  91   Am.   St.  320.  is  too   small,  the  keeper's   lien   is 

•52Comp.     Laws     1897,     ch.     297,  discharged.  Rosema  v.  Porter,   112 

§§      10746,      10749-10752,        10754;  Mich.   13,  70  N.   W.  316. 


dj}^         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS.  §    665 

cover  judgment  in  such  suit,  execution  shall  issue  thereon 
in  the  same  manner  and  with  the  like  effect,  as  upon  judg- 
ment rendered  in  suits  commenced  by  attachment;  and  the 
property  upon  which  the  plaintiff  holds  such  lien,  or  so  much 
thereof  as  shall  be  sufficient  to  satisfy  such  execution  may 
be  sold  thereon  in  the  same  manner  as  if  it  had  been  seized 
and  held  upon  an  attachment  in  such  suit. 

If  the  property  upon  which  any  such  lien  shall  be  enforced 
consist  of  horses,  cattle,  sheep,  swine  or  other  beasts,  and 
any  expenses  shall  have  been  incurred  by  the  person  having 
such  lien  after  the  same  accrued,  in  keeping  and  taking  care 
of  such  property,  the  amount  of  such  expenses  shall  be  an 
additional  lien  upon  the  property,  and  shall  be  computed  and 
ascertained  upon  the  trial  or  assessment  of  damages,  and  in- 
cluded in  the  judgment. 

§  665.  Minnesota.^^ — A  lien  and  right  of  detainer  shall 
exist  for  the  keeping,  feeding,  pasturing,  or  otherwise  caring 
for  domestic  animals  or  other  beasts,  including  medical  or 
surgical  treatment  thereof  and  shoeing  the  same;  such  liens 
shall  embrace  all  lawful  charges  against  such  property  paid 
to  any  other  person  by  the  person  claiming  such  lien  and  the 
price  or  value  of  such  care  and  all  reasonable  disbursements 
occasioned  by  the  detention  or  sale  of  the  property.  If  any 
sum  secured  by  such  lien  be  not  paid  within  ninety  days  after 
it  becomes  due  the  holder  may  sell  the  property  and  out  of 
the  proceeds  of  such  sale  there  shall  be  paid,  first,  the  dis- 
bursements aforesaid,   and  second,   all  charges  against  the 

53  Gen.  Stats.   1913,  §   7037.     The  472,  67  N.  W.  365.     The  lien  of  a 

lien  takes  precedence  of  a  chattel  livery    stable    keeper     applies     to 

mortgage    executed      before      such  exempt  property  such  as  a  horse, 

keeping.       Smith     v.     Stevens,     36  Flint  v.  Luhrs,  66  Minn.  57,  68  N. 

Minn.  303,  31  N.  W.  55.     The  lien  W.  514,  61  Am.  St.  391.     There  is 

is  inferior  to  that  of  a  previously  no   lien    in   favor   of  a  groom   for 

executed   and   recorded   mortgage.  care  of  horse.  Skinner  v.  Caughey, 

Petzenka   v.    Dallimore,   64    Minn.  64  Minn.  375,  67  N.  W.  203. 

43 


665  a 


LIENS. 


674 


property  paid  by  any  person  against  any  other  person,  and 
third,  the  total  indebtedness  then  secured  by  the  lien.  The 
remainder,  if  any,  shall  be  paid  on  demand  to  the  owner  or 
other  person  entitled  thereto. ^^ 

§  665a.  Mississippi.^'' — The  owner  of  every  livery  stable, 
sale  stable,  or  feed  stable  shall  have  a  lien  on  every  horse, 
mule,  cow,  or  other  animal  for  the  price  of  feeding,  groom- 
ing, training  or  keeping  the  same  at  the  instance  of  the 
owner  of  the  animal,  and  shall  have  the  right  to  retain  pos- 
session of  the  animal  until  such  price  be  paid.  The  lien  shall 
be  subordinate  to  any  prior  incumbrance  on  such  animal  of 
which  the  owner  of  the  stable  had  notice,  actual  or  construc- 
tive, unless  the  animal  were  fed,  groomed,  trained  or  kept 
bv  the  consent  of  the  incumbrancer. 

§  666.  Missouri."'''*' — Every  person  who  shall  keep,  board 
or  train  any  horse,  mule  or  other  animal  shall,  for  the  amount 


54As  to  provisions  for  sale  see 
Laws  1907,  ch.  114,  §  4.  As  to 
unlawful  disposal  of  animal,  see 
Annot.  Stats.  1906,  ch.  47,  §  4232. 

55Code  1906,  ch.  84,  §§  3082,  3084. 

56Rev.  Stats.  1909,  §§  8238,  8239. 
The  lien  is  inferior  to  that  of  a 
prior  mortgage.  Miller  v.  Crabbe. 
66  Mo.  App.  660,  2  Mo.  App.  Rep. 
1'371;  Pickett  v.  McCord,  62  Mo. 
App.  467.  The  stable  keeper  has 
no  lien  on  a  carriage  kept  at  the 
stable,  together  with  a  horse 
which  he  is  boarding.  Zartman- 
Thalman  Carriage  Co.  v.  Reid,  99 
Mo.  App.  415,  73  S.  W.  942.  The 
agistor  has  a  lien  only  for  the 
amount  which  is  due  at  the  time 
he  gives  up  possession.  Powers 
V.  Botts,  58  Mo.  App.  1.  Re- 
plevin will  lie  for  possession  of 
an  animal  obtained  by  one  having 


notice  that  there  was  an  agistor's 
lien  against  it.  Story  v.  Patten, 
61  Mo.  App.  12.  One  has  a  lien 
for  caring  for  and  doctoring  a 
horse.  Maryville  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Snyder,  85  Mo.  App.  82.  A  mort- 
gage recorded  in  a  county  other 
than  where  the  mortgagee  resides 
will  not  defeat  the  foreclosure  of 
an  agistor's  lien  on  the  horse  de- 
scribed in  the  mortgage.  Duke 
V.  Duke,  93  Mo.  App.  244.  A  lien 
for  pasturing  stock  must  be  based 
on  a  contract,  express  or  implied. 
Cunningham  v.  Hamill,  84  Mo. 
App.  389.  Where  a  horse  and 
buggy  are  kept  at  the  livery  stable 
the  stableman  has  no  lien  on  the 
buggy  as  against  a  mortgage. 
Varney  v.  Jackson,  66  Mo.  App. 
349. 


675         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS.         §    666 

due  therefor,  have  a  lien  on  such  animal,  and  on  any  vehicle, 
harness  or  equipment  coming  into  his  possession  therewith, 
and  no  ovv^ner  or  claimant  shall  have  the  right  to  take  any 
such  property  out  of  the  custody  of  the  person  having  such 
lien,  except  with  his  consent  or  on  the  payment  of  such  debt; 
and  such  lien  shall  be  valid  gaainst  said  property  in  the  pos- 
session of  any  person  receiving  or  purchasing  it  with  notice 
of  such  claim. 

The  lien  provided  for  in  the  preceding  paragraph  shall  be 
enforced  as  follows:  The  person  claiming  the  lien  shall  file 
with  a  justice  of  the  peace  of  the  w^ard,  district  or  township 
in  which  he  resides,  a  statement  duly  verified  by  himself, 
his  agent  or  attorney,  setting  forth  his  account  and  a  de- 
scription of  the  property  on  which  the  lien  is  claimed,  and 
thereupon  the  justice  shall  issue  a  summons,  as  in  ordinary 
civil  actions,  returnable  forthwith;  and  upon  the  return  of 
the  summons,  duly  served,  shall  set  the  cause  for  hearing  at 
any  time  after  the  lapse  of  one  day.  If  summons  be  returned 
"defendant  not  found,"  and  if  it  be  proved  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  justice  that  the  defendant  is  not  a  resident  of  the 
county,  the  justice  shall  order  a  notice  of  the  proceedings  to 
be  published  for  three  successive  days,  in  a  daily  newspaper, 
if  one  be  published  in  the  county,  and  if  there  be  none,  then 
once  in  a  weekly,  if  such  be  published  in  the  county;  and  if  no 
paper  be  published  in  the  county,  then  by  six  handbills  put  up 
in  six  public  places  in  the  county,  notifying  the  defendant  of 
the  filing  and  the  particulars  of  the  account,  the  description  of 
the  property  on  which  the  lien  is  claimed,  its  whereabouts, 
and  the  day  and  place  set  for  the  hearing  of  the  cause,  which 
shall  be  at  least  ten  days  from  the  day  of  the  last  publication 
of  the  notice ;  and  the  proof  of  such  publication  shall  be  filed 
in  the  justice's  office  on  or  before  the  day  of  trial.  When  the 
defendant  shall  have  been  summoned  or  notified  as  aforesaid, 
the  cause  shall,  on  the  day  fixed  for  trial,  be  tried  as  any 
ordinary  case  in  a  justice's  court.     If  the  judgment  be  for  the 


§    667  LIENS.  ^^jd 

plaintiff,  the  justice  shall  order  the  property  upon  which  the 
lien  shall  have  been  found  to  exist  to  be  sold  to  satisfy  the 
same.  If  the  lien  be  not  established,  and  the  defendant  shall 
not  have  been  summoned,  or  shall  not  have  voluntarily  ap- 
peared to  the  action,  the  cause  shall  be  dismissed  at  the  cost 
of  the  plaintiff.  If  the  defendant  shall  have  been  summoned, 
or  shall  have  appeared  to  the  action,  and  the  plaintiff  shall 
have  established  an  indebtedness  on  the  account  sued  on,  but 
shall  have  failed  to  establish  the  lien  claimed,  the  judgment 
shall  be  for  the  plaintiff  for  such  indebtedness,  but  the  costs 
of  suit,  or  any  part  thereof,  may  be  taxed  against  him. 

§  667.  Montana.^" — A  ranchman,  farmer,  agister,  herder, 
hotel-keeper,  livery,  boarding  or  feed  stable  keeper,  to  v^hom 
any  horses,  mules,  cattle,  sheep,  hogs  or  other  stock  shall  be 
intrusted,  and  there  is  a  contract,  express  or  implied,  for 
their  keeping,  feeding,  herding,  pasturing,  or  ranching,  has 
a  lien  upon  such  stock  for  the  amount  due  for  keeping,  feed- 
ing, herding,  pasturing  or  ranching  the  same,  and  is  author- 
ized to  retain  possession  thereof  until  the  sum  due  is  paid, 
and  may  enforce  his  lien  as  in  the  case  of  a  pledge. 

§  668.  Nebraska.^^ — When  any  person  shall  procure,  con- 
tract with,  or  hire  any  other  person  to  feed  and  take  care  of 
any  kind  of  live  stock,  the  latter  shall  have  a  lien  upon  such 

57  Code  (Civ.)  1895,  §  3935.  caution;  and  instead  of  adopting 
58Ann.  Stats.  1911,  §  3117.  See  the  language  of  the  statutes  of 
Gates  V.  Parrott,  31  Nebr.  581,  48  New  Hampshire  and  other  eastern 
N.  W.  387.  The  original  statute  states,  which  gave  a  lien  in  ex- 
was  enacted  February  18,  1867,  press  terms  to  the  agisters  of 
and  is  probably  the  earliest  stat-  cattle,  they  only  created  an  es- 
ute  passed  by  any  western  state  toppel  against  the  person  Con- 
or territory  for  the  protection  of  tracting,  hiring,  or  procuring  the 
feeders  and  herders  of  cattle.  feeding  and  caring  for  of  livestock 
State  Bank  v.  Lowe,  22  Nebr.  68,  to  gain  possession  of  such  stock, 
ZZ  N.  W.  482.  Cobb,  J.,  in  this  by  replevin  or  other  legal  means, 
case,  said:  "Our  legislature  seems  until  he  should  make  payment,  or 
to    have     proceeded     with     great  tender     the     same     therefor."      It 


d'jy         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS.         §    669 

property  for  the  feed  and  care  bestowed  by  him  upon  the 
same  for  the  contract  price  therefor,  and,  in  case  no  price 
has  been  agreed  upon,  then  for  the  reasonable  value  of  such 
feed  and  care.  The  person  entitled  to  such  lien  may  fore- 
close the  same  in  the  manner  provided  by  law  for  the  fore- 
closing of  chattel  mortgages:  provided,  that  at  least  thirty 
days  before  the  sale  of  the  property  for  the  satisfaction  of 
such  lien,  the  person  entitled  thereto  shall  file  in  the  office  of 
the  county  clerk,  in  the  county  in  which  said  live  stock  may 
be  fed  and  kept,  an  affidavit  describing  the  same,  and  setting 
forth  the  amount  justly  due  for  the  feeding  and  keeping  of 
the  same. 

§  669.  Nevada.^^ — Any  ranchman,  or  other  person  or  per- 
sons, keeping  corrals,  livery  or  feed  stables,  or  furnishing 
hay,  grain,  pasture  or  otherwise  boarding  any  horse  or 
horses,  mule  or  mules,  ox  or  oxen,  or  other  animal  or  ani- 
mals, shall  have  a  lien  upon  and  retain  possession  of  the 
same,  or  a  sufficient  number  thereof,  until  all  reasonable 
charges  are  paid,  or  suit  can  be  brought  and  judgment  ob- 
tained for  the  amount  of  such  charges,  and  execution  issued 
and  levied  on  said  property:  provided,  nothing  in  this  act 

was  accordingly  held  that  the  indicating  an  intent  by  the  agistor 
statute  did  not  create  a  lien  su-  to  waive  his  lien.  Becker  v. 
perior  to  that  of  a  chattel  mort-  Brown,  65  Nebr.  264,  91  N.  W. 
gage  previously  executed,  deliv-  178.  The  agistor  may  adopt  other 
ered,  and  recorded.  Where  one  means  than  a  statutory  fore- 
is  put  in  the  possession  of  sheep  closure  where  the  owner  consents 
under  an  agreement  giving  him  a  to  it.  Dale  v.  Council  Bluffs  Sav. 
share  of  the  wool  and  the  increase  Bank,  65  Nebr.  692,  91  N.  W.  526, 
of  the  sheep  for  his  care  and  94  N.  W.  983.  Even  where  a  pur- 
feed  is  entitled  to  a  lien  on  such  chaser  for  value  of  livestock  has 
sheep  for  the  contract  price.  no  notice  of  an  agistor's  lien  he 
Schrandt  v.  Young,  62  Nebr.  254,  still  takes  the  title,  subject  to  an 
86  N.  W.  1085.  As  between  the  agistor's  lien.  Weber  v.  Whet- 
parties  or  those  having  notice  of  stone,  53  Nebr.  371,  73  N.  W.  695. 
an  agistor's  lien,  such  lien  is  not  59 Rev.  Laws  1912,  §§  5499,  5500. 
lost  by  change  of  possession  not 


§  670 


LIENS. 


678 


shall  be  so  construed  as  to  include  any  debt  other  than  for 
the  boarding,  keeping,  or  pasture  of  such  animal  or  animals, 
together  with  costs  of  suit  and  sale.  Sales  of  such  animal  or 
animals  shall  be  made  as  other  sales  of  personal  property 
under  execution.  The  officer  making  such  sale  shall  be  en- 
titled to  such  fees  for  his  services  as  are  allowed  by  law  in 
cases  of  other  sales  of  personal  property. 

§  670.  New  Hampshire.*'*^ — A  person  to  whom  horses, 
cattle,  sheep  or  other  domestic  animals  shall  be  intrusted  to 
be  pastured  or  boarded,  shall  have  a  lien  thereon  for  all  pro- 
per charges  due  for  such  pasturing  or  board,  until  the  same 
shall  be  paid  or  tendered. 

§  671.  New  Jersey.*^^ — All  livery  stable,  boarding  and  ex- 
change stable  keepers,  shall  have  a  lien  on  all  horses  and 
other  animals  left  with  them  in  livery  for  board,  or  sale,  or 
exchange ;  and  also  upon  all  carriages,  wagons,  sleighs  and 
harness  left  with  them  for  storage,  sale  or  exchange,  for  the 
amount  of  the  bill  due  to  the  proprietor  of  any  such  stable 
for  the  board  and  keep  of  any  such  horse  or  other  animal, 


eopub.  Stats.  &  Sess.  Laws  1901, 
ch.  141,  §  2.  For  mode  of  enforc- 
ing, see  general  provision,  ch. 
xxii.,  §  1057,  infra.  Under  this 
statute  a  person  pasturing  a 
milch  cow  for  the  season,  in 
the  usual  manner,  under  an 
agreement  with  the  owner,  is  so 
far  intrusted  with  the  animal  as 
to  have  a  lien  upon  it  for  the 
charge  of  pasturing,  as  against 
the  owner,  and  third  persons 
having  no  title  or  right  of 
possession.  Smith  v.  Harden, 
60  N.  H.  509,  512,  per  Doe, 
C.  J. :  "The  statute  does  not 
expressly  exclude  a  lien  when  the 
contract  is  to  pasture  or  board 
an  animal  a  month,  a  week,  a  day. 


or  parts  of  successive  days,  or 
when  the  owner  is  to  have  the  use 
and  possession  of  it  a  part  of 
every  day;  and  there  is  not  satis- 
factory evidence  of  an  intent  to 
leave  the  creditor,  in  such  cases 
as  this,  without  equitable  secur- 
ity." It  is  also  declared  that  the 
right  of  the  owner  to  take  the 
cow  from  the  pasture  daily  to 
milk  is  as  consistent  with  a  lien 
as  the  right  of  a  boarder  to  carry 
various  articles  of  his  luggage 
from  his  boarding  house  without 
affecting  the  boarding  house  keep- 
er's lien. 

eiComp.  Stats.     1910,     p.     3135, 
§  50. 


6/9         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS.         §    673 

and,  also,  for  such  storage;  and  shall  have  the  right,  without 
the  process  of  law,  to  retain  the  same,  until  the  amount  of 
such  said  indebtedness  is  discharged. 

All  property  held  by  any  such  livery  stable,  boarding  and 
exchange  stable  keeper  shall,  after  the  expiration  of  thirty 
days  from  the  date  of  such  detention,  be  sold  at  public  auc- 
tion; upon  a  notice  of  said  sale  being  first  published  for  the 
space  of  two  weeks  in  some  newspaper  circulating  in  the  city 
or  township  in  which  said  livery  or  boarding  and  exchange 
stable  is  situate;  and  also,  after  five  days'  notice  of  said  sale, 
set  up  in  five  of  the  most  public  places  in  said  city  or  town- 
ship, and  the  proceeds  of  said  sale  shall  be  applied  to  the  pay- 
ment of  such  lien,  and  the  expenses  of  such  sale;  and  the 
balance,  if  any  remaining,  shall  be  paid  over  to  the  owner  of 
such  property,  or  his  representatives;  and  if  the  said  balance 
is  not  claimed  by  such  owner  within  sixty  days  after  such 
sale,  then  the  said  balance  to  be  paid  over  to  the  overseer 
of  the  poor  of  said  city  or  township,  for  the  support  of  the 
poor. 

§  672.  New  Mexico.*'- — Livery  stable  keepers,  and  those 
who  furnish  feed  or  shelter  for  the  stock  of  others,  have  a  lien 
on  the  stock  while  the  same  is  in  their  possession,  and  until 
the  same  is  paid  for.  After  ten  days'  notice  in  writing  stat- 
ing the  amount  of  the  indebtedness,  and  then  after  giving 
twenty  days'  notice  by  posting,  the  lien  may  be  enforced  by 
sale  at  auction. 

§  673.  New  York.®^ — A  person  keeping  a  livery  stable,  or 
boarding  stable  for  animals,  or  pasturing  or  boarding  one  or 

62  Comp.      Laws      1897,    §§    2239-  notice    to    the    owner    is    essential 

2242.  to  the  lien,  even  though  the  owner 

63Laws  1906,  ch.  687;    Birdseye's  obtains  the  possession  wrongfullj*. 

C.    &    G.    Consol.     Laws     1909,    p.  Kline   v.    Green,   83   Hun.    (N.   Y.) 

3234.   Mason   Stable   Co.  v.   Lewis.  190,  31   N.   Y.   S.   599.     Demanding 

16    Misc.    (N.    Y.)    359,    74    N.    Y.  more    than    the    lien    is    held    for 

St.     379,     38     N.     Y.     S.     82.       A  will  not  deprive  the  stable  keeper 


V\5 


LIENS. 


680 


more  animals,  or  who  in  connection  therewith  keeps  or  stores 
any  wagon,  truck,  cart,  carriage,  vehicle  or  harness,  has  a 
lien  dependent  upon  the  possession  upon  each  animal  kept, 
pastured  or  boarded  by  him,  and  upon  any  wagon,  truck, 
cart,  carriage,  vehicle  or  harness  of  any  kind  or  description, 
stored  or  kept  provided  an  express  or  implied  agreement  is 
made  with  the  owners  thereof,  whether  such  owner  be  a 
mortgagor  remaining  in  possession,  or  otherwise,  for  the 
sum  due  him  for  the  care,  keeping,  boarding  or  pasturing  of 
the  animal  or  for  the  keeping  or  storing  of  any  wagon, 
truck,  cart,  carriage,  vehicle  or  harness,  under  the  agreement 
and  may  detain  the  animal  or  wagon,  truck,  cart,  carriage, 
vehicle  and  harness  accordingly,  until  such  sum  is  paid.^^ 


of  his  lien.  Campbell  v.  Abbott, 
60  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  93,  111  N.  Y.  S. 
782.  See  also,  Seiner  v.  Lyons,  110 
N.  Y.  S.  1049.  A  liveryman  board- 
ing a  horse  and  occasionally  clean- 
ing a  buggy  for  the  owner  has 
a  lien  on  the  horse  but  none  on 
the  buggy.  Cotta  v.  Carr,  27 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)  545,  58  N.  Y.  S.  317; 
Robinson  v.  Kaplan,  21  Misc.  (N. 
Y.)  686,  47  N.  Y.  S.  1083. 

64When  the  owner  of  a  horse 
demands  it  from  a  livery-stable 
keeper  without  offering  to  pay 
him  his  charges  for  keeping  it,  the 
livery-stable  keeper  is  entitled  to 
a  reasonable  time  in  which  to 
make  up  the  account  of  what  is 
due,  and  serve  it,  with  notice  of 
the  lien,  in  the  manner  required 
by  the  statute.  "Otherwise,  it 
would  be  in  the  power  of  an  un- 
scrupulous debtor,  by  suddenly 
making  such  a  demand,  to  cut  off 
the  livery-stable  keeper  altogether 
from  his  lien,  unless  he  were  pre- 
pared at  the  moment  to  hand  the 
debtor  the  bill  of  charges  and  the 


notice  in  writing,  which  the  stat- 
ute requires.  Such  a  construction 
would  operate  rather  to  defeat 
the  statute  than  to  aid  the  en- 
forcement of  the  remedy,  which 
is  the  construction  required  in 
remedial  statutes.  Where  an  ac- 
count is  running  on  from  day 
to  day,  or  from  week  to  week, 
for  the  keeping  of  a  horse,  the 
livery-stable  keeper  would  have 
to  be  continually  serving  writ- 
ten notices  of  his  lien  and  his 
charges  under  such  a  construc- 
tion as  the  justice  has  given; 
and  it  is  a  much  more  rea- 
sonable one,  that  when  the 
owner  of  a  horse  demands  the  ani- 
mal, without  offering  to  pay 
what  is  due  for  keeping  it,  the 
livery-stable  keeper  should  have 
thereafter  a  reasonable  length  of 
time  to  make  up  the  account,  and 
serve  it  with  the  notice  in  the 
formal  manner  which  the  statute 
requires  for  his  protection;  and 
as  in  this  case,  an  account  running 
over  a  period  of  eight  months  has 


68 1         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS.         §    674 

§673a.  North  Dakota.^^ — Any  farmer,  ranchman,  or 
herder  of  cattle,  tavern-keeper  or  livery-stable  keeper,  to 
whom  any  horses,  mules,  cattle  or  sheep  shall  be  intrusted 
for  the  purpose  of  feeding,  herding,  pasturing,  or  ranching, 
shall  have  a  lien  upon  said  horses,  mules,  cattle,  or  sheep  for 
the  amount  that  may  be  due  for  such  feeding,  herding, 
pasturing  or  ranching,  and  shall  be  authorized  to  retain 
possession  of  such  horses,  mules,  cattle  or  sheep  until  the 
said  amount  is  paid;  provided,  that  these  provisions  shall 
not  be  construed  to  apply  to  stolen  stock. 

These  provisions  shall  not  be  construed  to  give  any 
farmer,  ranchman  or  herder  of  cattle,  tavern-keeper,  or 
livery  stable  keeper  any  lien  upon  horses,  mules,  cattle  or 
sheep  put  into  their  keeping  for  the  purposes  mentioned  in 
the  previous  paragraph,  when  said  property  was  not  owned 
by  the  person  intrusting  the  same  at  the  time  of  delivering 
them  into  the  possession  of  said  farmer,  ranchman,  herder, 
tavern-keeper  or  livery  stable  keeper. 

§  674.  Ohio.^^  A  person  who  feeds  or  furnishes  food  and 
care  for  any  horse,  mare,  foal,  filly,  gelding,  cattle,  sheep, 
swine,  mule  or  ass,  by  virtue  of  any  contract  or  agreement 
with  the  owner  or  person  having  lawful  possession  thereof, 

to  be  made  up  of  charges,  credits  and   serve   notice   on  him.     A   no- 

and     offsets,     four    or    five    hours  tice   directed  to   and   served   upon 

was    not    an    unreasonable    length  the    husband,    when     in    fact    the 

of    time    to    enable    the    defendant  horse   belonged    to   his   wife,    is    a 

to   do   so."     Eckhard   v.    Donohue,  nullity.     Armitage  v.   Mace,  48  N. 

9  Daly  (N.  Y.)  214,  216,  cited  with  Y.    Super.   Ct.    107,   affd.   96   N.   Y. 

approval     in     Lessells     v.     Farns-  538,  on  another  point, 

worth,  3  How.  Pr.  (N.  S.)   (N.  Y.)  esNorth  Dakota  Rev.  Code  1905, 

364.     If  a  stable  keeper  boards  a  ch.  82,  §§  6264-6266.     For  mode  of 

horse  which  is  already  subject  to  enforcing  liens,  see  ch.  xxii.,  infra, 

a  mortgage,  the  mortgagee  has  a  66Gen.   Code   1910,   §§  8353,  8354. 

superior    lien.      One    who    desires  The  lien  of  an  agistor  is  superior 

to  assert  his  right  to  the  posses-  to  that   of  a  mortgage.     Aylmore 

sion   of  a  horse   by  virtue    of  his  v.    Kahn,    5    Ohio    Cir.    D.    410,    11 

lien  must  ascertain  the  real  owner  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  392. 


§    674a  LIENS.  682 

shall  have  a  lien  therefor  to  secure  the  payment  of  the  same 
upon  such  animal. 

A  person  feeding  or  furnishing  food  and  care  for  any 
horse,  mare,  foal,  filly,  gelding,  cattle,  sheep,  swine,  mule  or 
ass  shall  retain  such  animal  for  the  period  of  ten  days,  at  the 
expiration  of  which  time,  if  the  owner  or  person  having  law- 
ful possession  of  it  does  not  satisfy  such  lien,  he  may  sell 
such  animal  at  public  auction,  after  giving  the  owner  ten 
days'  notice  of  the  time  and  place  of  sale  in  a  newspaper  of 
general  circulation  in  the  county  where  the  food  was  fur- 
nished or  the  care  bestowed;  and  after  satisfying  the  lien 
and  costs  that  may  accrue,  any  residue  remaining  shall  be 
paid  to  the  owner  or  person  legally  entitled  to  it. 

§  674a.  Oklahoma/'^ — Any  person  or  persons  employed  in 
feeding,  grazing  or  herding  any  domestic  animals,  whether  in 
pasture  or  otherwise,  shall,  for  the  amount  due  for  such  feed- 
ing, grazing  or  herding,  have  a  lien  on  said  animals. 

Any  person  or  persons,  partnership,  firm  or  corporation 
within  this  state,  or  in  any  border  county  of  the  adjacent 
states,  furnishing  or  providing  to  the  owners  of  such  domes- 
tic ^animals,  shall,  for  the  amount  due  for  such  corn,  forage, 
feed  and  hay,  have  a  lien  on  said  animals. 

All  liens,  not  to  excceed  in  the  aggregate  twenty-five  per 
cent,  of  the  value  of  such  animals,  against  any  domestic 
animal  or  animals  for  labor,  grazing,  herding  or  feeding,  or 
for  corn,  feed,  forage  or  hay,  furnished  the  owner  of  such 
domestic  animals  as  herein  provided,  and  actually  used  for 
such  purpose,  shall  be  prior  to  all  other  liens  thereon,  and 
no  recital  or  stipulation  in  any  mortgage  or  other  incum- 
brance on  any  cattle  so  fed  shall  be  held  to  supersede  or 
vitiate  the  lien  here  provided  for. 

67Comp.  Laws  1909,  §§  143-145;  Pac.  876;  Boston  &  K.  C.  Cattle 
Crismon  v.  Barse  Live  Stock  Loan  Co.  v.  Dickson,  11  Okla.  680, 
Commission    Co.,    17   Okla.    117,   87      69   Pac.  889. 


683         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS.         §    6/6 

§  675.  Oregon.'^'^ — Any  person  who  shall  depasture  or 
feed  any  horses,  cattle,  hogs,  sheep,  or  other  livestock,  or 
bestow  any  labor,  care,  or  attention  upon  the  same,  at  the 
request  of  the  owner  or  lawful  possessor  thereof,  shall  have 
a  lien  upon  such  property  for  his  just  and  reasonable  charges 
for  the  labor,  care,  and  attention  he  has  bestowed  and  the 
food  he  has  furnished,  and  he  may  retain  possession  of  such 
property  until  such  charges  be  paid.  Lien  is  enforced  by 
sale  after  notice. 

§  676.  Pennsylvania.''^ — All  livery  stable  keepers  and  inn- 
keepers have  a  lien  upon  any  and  every  horse  delivered  to 
them  to  be  kept  in  their  stables,  for  the  expense  of  the  keep- 
ing; and  in  case  the  owner  of  the  said  horse  or  horses,  or  the 
person  who  delivered  them  for  keeping  to  the  keeper  of  the 
livery-stable  or  innkeepers,  shall  not  pay  and  discharge  the 
said  expense,  provided  it  amount  to  thirty  dollars,  within 
fifteen  days  after  demand  made  of  him  personally,  or,  in  case 
of  his  removal  from  the  place  where  such  livery-stable  or  inn 
is  kept,  within  ten  days  after  notice  of  the  amount  due,  and 
demand  of  payment  in  writing  left  at  his  last  place  of  abode, 
the  livery-stable  keeper  or  innkeeper  may  cause  the  horse 
or  horses  aforesaid  to  be  sold  at  publicc  sale,  according  to 
law ;  and,  after  deducting  from  the  amount  of  sales  the  costs 

68 Bellinger      &      Cotton's     Ann.  the  board  of  their  drivers.  McMan- 

Codes  &  Stats.  1902,  §§  5674,  5675.  igle  v.  Grouse,  34  Leg.   Int.   (Pa.) 

One  is  not  entitled  to  a  lien  who  384.     Or   the   care   of   wagons   and 

does  not  feed  or  bestow   labor  or  the   like.     Hartshorne   v.    Seeds,    1 

care  on  the  live  stock  of  another,  Chest.  Co.  Rep.  460.    The  lien  does 

but   who   only  pays    for   the    feed.  not  attach  to  stolen  horses.    Gump 

Sharp  V.  Johnson,  38  Ore.  246,  63  v.     Showalter,     43     Pa.     St.     507; 

Pac.  485,  84  Am.  St.  788.  Hoopes    v.    Worrall,    1    Del.    Co. 

69Purdon's    Dig.    (13th    ed.),    p.  Rep.    (Pa.)    111.     The    liveryman's 

1890,   §    16.     This  lien  is  joint  and  lien    for    boarding   and    keeping   a 

several    on    all    the     horses    kept.  horse  does  not  extend  to  a  phae- 

Young  V.  Kimball,  23  Pa.  St.   193.  ton    and    harness    kept    with    the 

The  lien  is  restricted  to  the  board  horse  at  the   livery  stable.     Sides 

of  the  horses,  and  does   not  cover  v.  Cline,   19  Pa.   Co.  Ct.  481. 


§    676a  LIENS.  684 

of  sale  and  the  expense  of  keeping,  shall  deliver  the  residue 
upon  demand  to  the  person  or  agent  of  the  person  who  de- 
livered the  horse  or  horses  for  keeping. 

§  676a.  South  Dakota/^ — Any  farmer,  ranchman,  or 
herder  of  cattle,  tavern-keeper,  or  livery  stable  keeper,  to 
v\^hom  any  horses,  mules,  cattle,  or  sheep  shall  be  instrusted 
for  the  purpose  of  feeding,  herding,  pasturing  or  ranching, 
shall  have  a  lien  upon  said  horses,  mules,  cattle,  or  sheep  for 
the  amount  that  may  be  due  for  such  feeding,  herding,  pas- 
turing or  ranching,  and  shall  be  authorized  to  retain  pos- 
session of  such  horses,  mules,  cattle  or  sheep  until  the  said 
amount  is  paid  provided,  that  these  provisions  shall  not  be 
construed  to  apply  to  stolen  stock. 

These  provisions  shall  not  be  construed  to  give  any 
farmer,  ranchman  or  herder  of  cattle,  tavern-keeper  or 
livery-stable  keeper  any  lien  upon  horses,  mules,  cattle  or 
sheep  put  into  their  keeping  for  the  purposes  mentioned  in 
the  previous  paragraph,  v^^hen  said  property  was  not  owned 
by  the  person  intrusting  the  same  at  the  time  of  delivering 
them  into  the  possession  of  said  farmer,  ranchman,  herder, 
tavern  keeper,  or  livery  stable  keeper. 

§  677.  Tennessee.'''^ — Whenever  any  horse  or  other  ani- 
mal is  received  to  pasture  for  a  consideration,  the  farmer 
shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  animal  for  his  proper  charges,  the 
same  as  the  innkeeper's  lien  at  common  law. 

This  lien  shall  include  the  charges  for  the  service  of  any 
stallion,  jack,  bull  or  boar,  when  the  charge  for  the  service 
of  such  animal  to  the  female  shall  have  been  stipulated  and 
agreed  upon  between  the  parties. 

Livery  stable  keepers  are  entitled  to  the  same  lien  on  all 

■J^o  Rev.    Code    1903,    (Civ.    Proc.)  superior   to    that   of   a   mortgagee 

§§  722,  723.  virho  knows  that  the  horse  is  being 

7iAnn.   Code   1896,   §§  3552,  3553,  trained.      Farney    v.    Kerr    (Tenn. 

3556.      The    Hen    of    a    trainer    is  Ch.),  48  S.   W.   103. 


685  LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS.       §    678a 

Stock  received  by  them  for  board  and  feed,  until  all  reason- 
able charges  are  paid. 

§  678.  Texas.'- — Proprietors  of  livery  or  public  stables 
have  a  special  lien  on  all  animals  placed  with  them  for  feed, 
care,  and  attention,  as  also  upon  such  carriages,  buggies  or 
other  vehicles  as  may  have  been  placed  in  their  care,  for  the 
amount  of  the  charges  against  the  same,  and  this  article  shall 
apply  to  and  include  owners  or  lessees  of  pastures,  who  shall 
have  a  similar  lien  on  all  animals  placed  with  them  for 
pasturage. 

§  678a.  Utah.''^^ — Any  ranchman,  farmer,  agistor  or 
herder  of  cattle,  tavern  keeper,  or  livery  stable  keeper,  tQ 
whom  any  horses,  mules,  cattle,  sheep,  or  asses,  shall  be 
intrusted  for  the  purpose  of  feeding,  herding,  pasturing,  or 
ranching,  shall  have  a  lien  upon  such  animals  for  the  amount 
that  may  be  due  him  for  such  feeding,  herding,  pasturing, 
or  ranching,  and  shall  be  authorized  to  retain  possession  of 
such  animals  until  said  amount  is  paid. 

At  any  time  after  thirty  days  after  default  made  in  the 
payment  of  a  debt  secured  by  a  lien  upon  personal  property, 
such  lien  may  be  foreclosed  by  advertisement,  upon  the 
notice  and  in  the  manner  provided  for  the  foreclosure  of 
mortgages  on  personal  property;  provided,  that  a  copy  of  the 
notice  shall,  at  the  time  of  posting  or  pujDlication,  be  delivered 
to  the  owner  of  the  property,  or  if  he  does  not  reside  in  the 
county,  shall  be  transmitted  to  him  by  mail  at  his  usual  place 
of  abode,  if  known.  Any  residue  of  the  proceeds  of  the  sale 
over  expenses  and  claim,  shall  be  rendered  to  the  owner  of 
the  property. 

■^SRev.  Stats.  1911,  art.  5664.    For  to     that     of     a     prior     mortgage, 

manner  of  enforcing  the  lien,  see  Blackford     v.     Ryan     (Tex.     Civ. 

general  provision,  ch.  xxii.,  §  1060.  App.),  61    S.  W.   161. 
The    liveryman's    lien    is    inferior  73Comp.  Laws  1907,  §§  1401,  1405. 


§    679  LIENS.  686 

§  679.  Vermont.'^ — Persons  liaving  charges  due  them 
for  pasturing,  boarding  or  keeping  domestic  animals,  placed, 
with  the  consent  of  the  owners  thereof,  in  the  care  of  such 
persons,  may,  if  the  charges  become  due  while  such  animals 
remain  in  their  possession,  retain  the  possession  of  such  ani- 
mals until  such  charges  are  paid,  and,  after  thirty  days  from 
the  time  the  charges  become  due,  if  the  property  affected 
does  not  exceed  one  hundred  dollars  in  value,  may  sell  such 
animals  in  the  manner  provided  for  the  sale  of  property 
under  a  lien  for  repairs. 

§  680.  Virginia.' ■' — Every  keeper  of  a  livery  stable,  and 
every  person  pasturing  or  keeping  any  horses  or  other  ani- 
mals, vehicles  or  harness,  shall  have  a  lien  upon  such  horses 
and  other  animals,  vehicles,  and  harness,  for  the  amount 
which  may  be  due  him  for  the  keeping,  supporting,  and  care 
thereof,  until  such  amount  is  paid. 

§  680a.  Washington.'^ — Any  farmer,  ranchman,  herder 
of  cattle,  tavern  keeper,  livery  and  boarding  stable  keeper, 
or  any  other  person  to  whom  any  horses,  mules,  cattle,  or 
sheep  shall  be  intrusted  for  the  purpose  of  feeding,  herding, 
pasturing,  and  training,  caring  for  or  ranching,  shall  have  a 
lien  upon  said  horses,  mules,  cattle,  or  sheep  for  the  amount 
that  may  be  due  for  such  feeding,  herding,  pasturing,  train- 
ing, caring  for,  or  raxiching,  and  shall  be  authorized  to  retain 
possession  of  such  horses,  mules,  cattle,  or  sheep  until  the 
said  amount  is  paid.  This  lien  may  be  enforced  by  an  action 
in  any  court  of  competent  jurisdiction;  and  said  property 
may  be  sold  on  execution  for  the  purpose  of  satisfying  the 
amount  of  such  judgment  and  costs  of  sale,  together  with 

74  Pub.   Stat.   1906,    §  2658.  One     merely     hired     to     care     for 

75Pollard's    Code    1904,    §§    1197,  sheep,    the   legal   possession   being 

1198.  in  the  owner,  has  no  lien.     Hooker 

76  Remington  &  Ballinger's  Ann.  v.  McAllister,  12  Wash.  46,  40  Pac. 

Codes  and  Stats.  1910,  §§  1197,  1198.  617. 


68/         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS,         §    682 

the  proper  costs  of  keeping  the  same  up  to  the  time  of  said 
sale. 

§  680b.  West  Virginia. — Persons  keeping  live  stock  for 
hire  shall  have  the  same  rights  and  remedies  for  the  recovery 
of  their  charges  therefor  as  innkeepers  have.'^'^ 

When  the  Humane  Society  of  West  Virginia  shall  provide 
any  neglected  or  abandoned  animal  with  proper  food,  shelter 
and  care,  it  shall  have  a  lien  upon  such  animal  for  the  ex- 
pense thereof,  and  such  expense  shall  be  charged  against 
the  ov^^ner  of  said  animal  and  collectible  from  said  owner  in 
an  action  thereforJ^ 

§  681.  Wisconsin. "^^ — Every  keeper  of  a  livery  or  board- 
ing stable,  and  every  person  pasturing  or  keeping  any  horses, 
carriage,  harness,  mules,  cattle,  or  stock,  shall  have  a  lien 
upon  and  may  retain  the  possession  of  any  such  horses,  car- 
riage, harness,  mules,  cattle,  or  stock  for  the  amount  which 
may  be  due  him  for  the  keeping,  supporting,  and  care  thereof, 
until  such  amount  is  paid. 

§  682.  Wyoming.^^ — Any  ranchman,  farmer,  agistor,  or 
herder  of  cattle,  tavern-keeper,  or  livery-stable  keeper,  to 
whom  any  horses,  mules,  asses,  cattle,  or  sheep  shall  be  in- 
trusted for  the  purpose  of  feeding,  herding,  pasturing,  or 
ranching,  shall  have  a  lien  upon  said  horses,  mules,  asses, 
cattle,  or  sheep  for  the  amount  that  may  be  due  for  such  feed- 

'^Code  1906,  §  3471.  keeping    of     horses     can     not     be 

'^'sCode   1906,   §  501.     The  lien   is  changed     into    one    to    enforce    a 

not  lost  by  attaching  the  property  specific  lien  upon  such  horses.     A 

by    the    keeper    of    the    live    stock.  complaint  for  legal  relief  can  not 

Lambert    v.    Nicklass,    45    W.    Va.  be    changed    by    amendment    into 

527,  31   S.    E.  951,  44  L.   R.  A.   561,  one  for  equitable  relief.     Brothers 

72  Am.  St.  828.  v.  Williams,  65  Wis.  401,  27  N.  W. 

79Stats.  1898,  §  3344,  as  amended  157. 
in    Laws    1911,    ch.    394.      An    ac-         soComp.    Stats.    1910,    §    3754. 
tion    of    contract    for    the    care    of 


§    683  LIENS.  688 

ing,  herding,  pasturing,  or  ranching,  and  shall  be  authorized 
to  retain  possession  of  the  same  until  the  said  amount  is  paid. 
These  provisions  do  not  apply  to  stolen  stock. 

§  683.  A  statute  creating  the  lien  attaches  from  its  enact- 
ment. The  fact  that  the  keeping  of  a  horse  began  before  the 
enactment  of  the  statute  giving  a  lien  does  not  deprive  the 
keeper  of  a  lien  for  the  keeping  subsequent  to  such  enact- 
ment, especially  if  the  keeping  of  the  horse  subsequent  to 
the  enactment  w^as  not  in  pursuance  of  a  contract  made 
prior  thereto.  In  such  case  the  lien  does  not  attach  for  that 
part  of  the  account  w^hich  accrued  prior  to  the  taking  effect 
of  the  statute;  but  it  does  attach  for  that  part  of  the  account 
accruing  subsequently.^^ 

The  lien  attaches  as  soon  as  feed  and  care  are  bestow^ed, 
though  the  charges  therefor  are  not  then  due.^- 

§  684.  Property  exempt  from  execution  subject  to  the 
lien. — Though  the  horses,  cattle  or  other  stock  upon  which 
the  statute  gives  a  lien  be  exempt  from  execution  and  from 
distress  for  rent,  the  property  is  subject  to  the  lien  in  the 
same  manner  as  other  property  not  so  exempt.®^  The  lien  at- 
taches to  such  property,  although  the  lien  can  be  enforced 
only  by  execution.^* 

§  685.  Lien  of  stable  keeper  is  purely  statutory. — Inas- 
much as  the  lien  of  a  stable  keeper  is  purely  statutory,  it  is 
for  him  to  comply  u^ith  all  the  conditions  precedent  which 
the  statute  requires. ^^  Thus,  if  a  statute  requires  the  giving 
of  notice  to  the  owner  of  an  intention  to  claim  a  lien  and  of 
the  amount  of  the  charges,  the  person  claiming  the  lien  must 

8iMunson  v.  Porter,  63  Iowa  453,  Iowa  453,  19  N.  W.  290;  see  ante, 

19  N.  W.  290.  §  510. 

82Walls  V.  Long,  2  Ind.  App.  202,  84Munson    v.    Porter,    63    Iowa 

28  N.  E.  101.  453,  19  N.  W.  290. 

83Fitch     V.     Steagall,     14     Bush  ssjngalls    v.    Vance,    61    Vt.    582, 

(Ky.)    230;    Munson    v.    Porter,   63  18  Atl.  452. 


689         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS.         §    687 

ascertain  the  real  owner  of  the  property,  and  serve  notice 
of  his  lien  upon  that  person.  If  the  notice  be  directed  to  and 
served  upon  a  person  who  is  not  the  owner,  it  is  a  nullity  as 
against  the  person  who  is.^^ 

§  686.  Joint  and  several  lien. — A  statutory  lien  for  the 
keeping  of  several  horses  is  a  joint  and  several  lien  upon  all 
the  horses,  and  one  horse  may  be  detained  for  the  keeping 
of  all  of  them.^" 

§  687.  Lien  does  not  include  isolated  cases  of  feeding. — 
A  statute  giving  a  lien  to  a  livery  stable  keeper,  and  to  those 
engaged  in  feeding  horses  and  cattle,  does  not  include 
isolated  cases  of  feeding,  but  only  those  whose  business  it  is 
to  feed  horses  and  cattle. 

But  where  it  appears  that  for  three  or  four  years  a  farmer 
has  been  keeping,  feeding  and  caring  for  stock  belonging  to 
a  neighbor,  such  farmer  will  be  entitled  to  a  lien  upon  the 
stock  for  his  feed  and  care,  notwithstanding  it  may  appear 
that  he  fed  and  pastured  no  other  stock  for  third  parties,  and 
that  the  number  of  cattle  belonging  to  such  neighbor  so  kept 
and  cared  for  at  no  time  exceeded  twelve  in  number.^^ 
Brewer,  Justice,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  said: 
"This  is  not  a  case  where  a  farmer  has  only  for  a  single  sea- 
son pastured  a  single  head  of  stock  for  a  neighbor,  but  where 
for  year  after  year  the  party  has  pastured  and  fed  several 
head  of  stock.  It  is  true  that  she  only  did  this  for  one  per- 
son, but  still  she  did  it  to  such  an  extent  and  for  such  a 
length  of  time  that  it  seems  to  us  she  comes  fairly  within  the 
protection  of  the  statute.  She  was  engaged  in  feeding  his 
stock.     That,  pro  hac  vice,  may  be  considered  her  business. 

scArmitage    v.    Mace,    48    N.    Y.  ssConklin  v.  Carver,  19  Ind.  226; 

Super.   Ct.   107,   113,  afifd.  96   N.   Y.  Kelsey    v.    Layne,    28    Kans.    218, 

538.  225,  42  Am.  Rep.   158.     See  Alt  v. 

STYoung  V.  Kimball,  23  Pa.  St.  Weidenberg,  6  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  176. 
193. 

44 


§  688  LIENS.  690 

No  one  would  for  a  moment  seriously  contend  that  a  party 
must  engage  in  it  as  an  exclusive  business  before  becoming 
entitled  to  the  protection  of  the  statute.  Suppose,  as  in  the 
case  of  Brown  v.  Holmes,®^  that  92  cattle  were  wintered  for 
a  single  person ;  could  it  be  said  for  a  moment  that  the  agistor 
was  not  engaged  in  the  business  of  feeding  and  taking  care 
of  cattle,  simply  because  he  had  only  the  cattle  of  one  per- 
son? So  in  this  case,  while  the  number  of  cattle  is  not  so 
great,  yet  the  length  of  time  is  much  greater." 

§  688.     No  lien  where  keeper  keeps  horse  for  own  benefit. 

— No  lien  arises  under  a  statute  for  keeping  a  horse  under  a 
special  agreement  whereby  the  stable-keeper  is  to  use  the 
horse  for  the  joint  benefit  of  himself  and  the  owner;  as  where 
he  was  to  take  the  horse  around  the  country  and  enter  it  for 
races,  the  owner  to  pay  all  expenses,  and  to  divide  the  earn- 
ings with  the  stable-keeper.  For  expenses  which  the  stable- 
keeper  has  paid  for  the  care  and  board  of  the  horse  at  other 
stables  the  statute  gives  him  no  lien,  though  the  expenses 
are  for  board  which  would  give  other  persons  a  lien.^^ 

§  689.  Servant  has  no  lien  on  master's  cattle. — When  the 
relation  of  master  and  servant  exists,  the  servant  can  acquire 
no  lien  on  his  master's  cattle  for  depasturing  or  feeding 
them.^^  A  servant  hired  as  a  groom  to  a  horse  has  no  lien 
upon  the  horse  for  his  services,  but  he  has  a  lien  for  feed 
furnished  by  him  which  the  owner  ought  to  have  furnished. 
If  the  horse  is  in  the  groom's  custody  at  his  own  stable,  he 
is  a  bailee,  and  entitled  to  the  lien  of  a  bailee.  A  contract 
to  feed  and  keep  the  horse  is  not  necessary  in  order  to  create 
a  lien;  but  the  case  stands  as  if  the  horse  had  been  left  for 

8913   Kans.  482.  23   Pac.   881;    Skinner    v.    Caughey, 

soArmitage    v.    Mace,    96    N.    Y.  64  Minn.  375,  Gl  N.  W.  203;  Hook- 

538,  affirming  46  N.  Y.   Super.    Ct.  er  v.    McAllister,    12  Wash.  46,  40 

550.  Pac.  617. 
9iBailey    v.    Davis,    19    Ore.    217. 


691 


LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS     AND    AGISTORS     LIENS. 


690 


keep  and  care  without  more  being  said,  in  which  case  it  is 
clear  that  the  owner  could  not  have  demanded  the  horse 
without  paying  the  charges. ^- 

§  690.  Lien  upon  notice  in  writing. — Where  a  statute 
gives  a  lien  provided  notice  in  writing  shall  first  be  given  to 
the  owner  of  the  amount  of  the  charges  and  the  intention  to 
claim  a  lien,^^  an  inchoate  lien  attaches  when  a  horse  is  placed 
in  a  stable;  and  it  becomes  complete  from  the  time  of  giving 
such  notice.  It  then  relates  back,  and  covers  all  charges 
due  for  the  care  and  board  of  the  horse  from  the  beginning. 
Such  a  statute  is  a  remedial  one,  giving  a  lien  where  none 
existed  before,  and  should  be  liberally  construed  to  advance 
the  remedy.  The  lien  is  not  cut  off  by  a  sale  of  the  horse 
before  the  notice  is  given. ^^ 

Except  in  case  the  statute  gives  a  lien  after  notice  to  the 
owner  of  intention  to  claim  a  lien,  the  statutory  lien  of  a 
livery  stable  keeper  arises  only  when  the  animal  is  placed 


^^Hoover  v.  Epler,  52  Pa.  St. 
522,   1    Pearson   (Pa.)   255. 

93As  in  New  York,  see  ante, 
§  673. 

94Lessells  v.  Farnsworth,  3  How. 
Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N.  Y.)  11,  affd.  3  How. 
Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N.  Y.)  364;  Eckhard 
V.  Donohue,  9  Daly  (N.  Y.)  214. 
There  are  some  statements  incon- 
sistent with  the  foregoing  in  Jack- 
son V.  Kasseall,  30  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
231.  It  is  there  said  that  if  the 
notice  operates  retrospectively, 
it  would  be  immaterial,  for  the 
purposes  of  the  lien,  at  what 
stage  of  the  period  of  keeping  the 
notice  is  given;  one  given  on  the 
last  day  would  be  as  effectual  as 
one  given  on  the  first  day.  Such 
a    construction    would    defeat    the 


very  object  of  requiring  a  notice 
to  be  given,  which  evidently  is 
to  advise  the  owner  and  all  others 
interested  that  a  lien  is  claimed, 
and  to  enable  them  to  take  such 
action  as  they  may  deem  neces- 
sary in  view  of  such  claim.  Per 
Smith,  J.  It  is,  however,  express- 
ly declared  by  the  court  that  it 
was  not  intended  to  deal  with  the 
question  whether  a  lien  could  be 
created  as  against  the  owner  for 
past  charges;  and  the  court  only 
decided  that  no  such  lien  could 
be  created  as  against  a  mortgagee 
holding  a  mortgage  duly  filed. 
This  case  is  referred  to  and  ex- 
plained in  Lessells  v.  Farnsworth, 
3  How.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N.  Y.)  364, 
367. 


690a 


LIENS. 


092 


with  the  livery  stable  keeper  by  its  owner,  or  some  one  hav- 
ing authority  for  him.'^^ 

§  690a.  Sheriff  holding  cattle  under  mortgage  may  con- 
tract for  their  keeping. — A  sheriff  who  has  taken  possession 
of  cattle  under  a  mortgage  for  the  purpose  of  foreclosure 
and  sale  may  contract  for  their  keeping^^  pending  the  fore- 
closure, and  the  keeper  has  a  lien  therefor.  The  sheriff  was 
legally  authorized  to  make  the  foreclosure,  and  as  it  was 
necessary  for  the  proper  carrying  out  of  the  powers  vested 
in  him  by  statute  that  the  cattle  should  be  cared  for  and 
pastured  until  the  day  of  sale,  he  was  authorized  through  his 
deputy  to  make  a  contract  for  that  purpose,  and  the  lien  fol- 
lowed by  virtue  of  the  statute. 

§  691.  Prior  chattel  mortgage  superior  to  stable  keeper's 
lien. — A  chattel  mortgage  upon  a  horse  is  superior  to  a  sub- 
sequent lien  of  a  stable  keeper,  where  the  horse  is  placed  in 
the  stable  by  the  mortagor,  after  the  making  of  the  mort- 
gage, without  the  knowledge  or  consent  of  the  mortgagee. ^^ 


o^Domnau  v.  Green,  4  Wills. 
Civ.    Cas.    Ct.    App.    (Tex.)    §    322, 

19  S.  W.  909;  Stott  v.  Scott,  68 
Tex.  302,  305,  4  S.  W.  494. 

'JCVose  V.  Whitney,  7  Mont.  385, 
16  Pac.  846. 

97See  §§  744,  971;  Jackson  v. 
Kasseall,  30  Hun  (N.  Y.)  231; 
Bissell  V.  Pearce,  28  N.  Y.  252; 
Charles  v.  Neigelson,  15  111.  App. 
17;  Sargent  v.  Usher,  55  N.  H. 
287,  20  Am.  Rep.  208;  State  Bank 
V.  Lowe,  22  Nebr.  68,  33  N.  W. 
482;    Ingalls   v.   Green,  62   Vt.  436, 

20  Atl.  196;  Howes  v.  Newcomb, 
146  Mass.  76,  15  N.  E.  123;  Wall  v. 
Garrison,  11  Colo.  515,  517,  19  Pac. 
469;  McGhee  v.  Edwards,  87  Tenn. 
506,  510,  11  S.  W.  316,  quoting  text; 


Ingalls  V.  Vance,  61  Vt.  582,  18 
Atl.  452;  Reynolds  v.  Case,  60 
Mich,  le,  26  N.  W.  838;  W^right 
V.  Sherman,  3  S.  Dak.  290,  52  N. 
W.  1093;  Easter  v.  Goyne,  51  Ark. 
222,  11  S.  W.  212;  Hanch  v.  Ripley, 
127  Ind.  151,  26  N.  E.  70;  Miller  v. 
Crabbe,  66  Mo.  App.  660,  2  Mo. 
App.  Repr.  1371;  Pickett  v.  Mc- 
Cord,  62  Mo.  App.  467;  Blackford 
V.  Ryan  (Tex.),  61  S.  W.  161;  Beh 
V.  Moore,  124  Iowa  564,  100  N.  W. 
502;  Lee  v.  Van  Meter,  98  Ky.  1, 
17  Ky.  L.  548,  32  S.  W.  137;  Beck- 
er V.  Brown,  65  Nebr.  264,  91  N. 
W.  178;  Bowden  v.  Dugan,  91 
Maine  141,  39  Atl.  467;  Erickson  v. 
Lampi,  150  Mich.  92,  113  N.  W. 
778;      Petzenka     v.    DalHmore,    64 


693         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS*    LIENS.      §    691a 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  a  statute  giving  a  lien  for  the 
keeping  of  animals  was  intended  to  violate  fundamental 
rights  of  property  by  enabling  the  possessor  to  create  a  lien 
without  the  consent  of  the  mortgagee,  when  the  person  in 
possession  could  confer  no  rights  as  against  the  mortgagee 
by  a  sale  of  the  animals.  The  keeper  of  animals  intrusted 
to  him  by  the  mortgagor  undoubtedly  acquires  a  lien  as 
against  the  mortgagor,  but  it  is  a  lien  only  upon  such  interest 
in  them  as  the  mortgagor  had  at  the  time,  and  not  a  lien  as 
against  the  mortgagee,  between  whom  and  the  keeper  of 
the  animals  there  is  no  privity  of  contract."^  The  mort- 
gagor, though  in  possession,  is  in  no  sense  the  mortgagee's 
agent,  nor  does  he  sustain  to  the  mortgagee  any  relations 
which  authorize  him  to  contract  any  liability  on  his  behalf. 
The  statute  can  not  be  construed  to  authorize  the  mortgagor 
to  subject  the  mortgagee's  interest  to  a  lien  without  his 
knowledge  or  consent,  as  security  for  a  liability  of  the  mort- 
gagor, unless  such  a  construction  clearly  appears  from  the 
language  of  the  statute  to  be  unavoidable.^^ 

§  691a.  Consent  of  owner  may  be  implied. — It  is  true  that 
"the  consent  of  the  owner,"  required  by  some  statutes  for 
maintaining  the  lien,  is  satisfied  by  an  implied  consent.  A 
mortgagee,  and  not  the  mortgagor,  of  horses  is  the  owner 
whose  consent  is  necessary;  and  if,  at  the  time  of  taking  his 
mortgage  he  knew  that  the  mortgagor  kept  his  horses  at  a 
boarding  stable,  or  that  he  was  engaged  in  a  business  in 
which  men  generally  hire  their  horses  boarded,  and  he  should 
leave  them  with  the  mortgagor  without  directions  for  their 
keeping,  he  would  be  held  to  their  being  so  kept.     But  if  the 

Minn.  472,  67  N.  W.  365;  Sullivan  3  S.  Dak.  290,  52  N.  W.  1093,  1095. 

V.  Clifton,  55  N.  J.  L.  324,  26  Atl.  'J!»McGhee  v.   Edwards,  87  Tenn. 

964,   20  L.   R.   A.   719,   39  Am.   St.  506,  510,  11  S.  W.  316,  quoting  text; 

652.  Wright  v.  Sherman,  3  S.  Dak.  290, 

98  Ingalls   V.    Green,   62   Vt.   436,  52  N.  W.  1093;  Beh  v.  Moore,  124 

20   Atl.    196;    Wright   v.    Sherman,  Iowa  564,  100  N.  W.  502. 


§  691a 


LIENS. 


694 


mortgagee  has  given  no  consent  other  than  that  which  is 
implied  from  his  allowing  the  mortgagor  to  remain  in  pos- 
session of  the  horses,  the  mortgagor  in  possession  would 
have  power  to^ create  a  paramount  lien  upon  them;  or,  in 
other  words,  he  would  have  power  to  supersede  and  render 
worthless  the  lien  of  the  mortgage.  The  mortgagee  cannot 
be  deemed  impliedly  to  consent  to  an  arrangement  for  the 
destruction  of  his  security  unless  he  has  knowledge  that 
the  mortgagor,  in  the  usual  course  of  business,  will  subject 
the  property  to  a  lien.  A  mortgagor  of  horses  in  his  posses- 
sion for  use  in  his  business  cannot,  by  keeping  them  at  the 
barn  of  an  employee  who  furnishes  feed  for  them,  create  a 
lien  as  against  the  mortgagee.^ 


iHowes  V.  Newcomb,  146  Mass. 
76,  15  N.  E.  123.  The  court  said: 
"In  every  case  of  this  kind  the  in- 
quiry is  whether  such  consent  is 
found,"  and  that  this  "depends, 
where  animals  are  left  with  a 
mortgagor  by  a  mortgagee,  not 
only  upon  the  terms  of  the  ex- 
press contract  relating  to  them, 
but  also  upon  all  the  circumstances 
surrounding  the  transaction  indi- 
cating the  expectation  of  the  mort- 
gagee as  to  the  management  of 
them  by  the  mortgagor.  If  from 
these  the  mortgagee  may  be  pre- 
sumed to  have  understood  that  the 
mortgagor  would  take  them  to  a 
stable  keeper  to  be  boarded,  and 
no  objection  was  made,  such  con- 
sent should  be  implied;  otherwise, 
it  should  not."  See  also,  Storms 
V.  Smith,  137  Mass.  201 ;  Ingalls 
V.  Vance,  61  Vt.  582,  18  Atl.  452; 
Wright  V.  Sherman,  3  S.  Dak.  290, 
52  N.  W.  1093.  In  this  case  Kel- 
lum,  P.  J.,  referring  to  the  ques- 
tion of  the  mortgagee's  implied 
consent,  said  :    "Such  consent  may, 


of  course,  be  shown  by  circum- 
stances; but  to  show  it  requires 
something  more  than  the  simple 
fact  of  leaving  the  property  in  the 
mortgagor's  possession,  for  that 
is  the  general  and  almost  univer- 
sal custom,  while  for  the  mort- 
gagor in  possession  to  place  such 
property  out  to  be  boarded  or 
taken  care  of  is  unusual  and  ex- 
ceptional; and,  when  the  mort- 
gagee simply  does  what  is  usually 
done  in  such  cases,  he  ought  not 
to  be  taken  as  thereby  consent- 
ing in  advance  that  the  mortgagor 
may  do  what  is  usually  not  done 
in  such  cases."  In  Corning  v.  Ash- 
ley, 51  Hun  (N.  Y.)  483,  21  N.  Y. 
St.  703,  4  N.  Y.  S.  255,  aflfd.  121  N. 
Y.  700,  24  N.  E.  1100,  it  is  held  that 
the  "owner"  to  whom  notice  of 
intention  to  claim  lien  is  to  be 
given  is  the  mortgagor  and  not 
the  mortgagee,  even  after  default. 
If  a  mortgagee  agrees  that  the 
agistor  shall  have  a  lien,  where 
the  horse  boarded  was  placed  with 
the  agistor  by  the  mortgagor,  the 


695 


LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS     AND    AGISTORS     LIENS. 


692 


But  if  a  mortgagee  of  a  horse  believes,  or  has  reason  to 
believe,  that  the  owner  is  not  keeping  the  horse,  but  is  board- 
ing it  at  some  livery  stable,  and  the  mortgagee  makes  no  ob- 
jection, this  shows  his  consent,  though  he  does  not  know 
at  what  stable  the  horse  is.^ 

§  692.  Lien  of  stable  keeper  sometimes  held  superior  to 
lien  of  mortgage. — On  the  other  hand,  some  authorities  hold 
that  the  lien  of  an  agistor  or  livery  stable  keeper  is  para- 
mount to  a  previous  mortgage  of  the  animals.^  While  it  is 
conceded  that  no  contract  lien  could  be  placed  upon  the  prop- 
erty to  take  precedence  of  the  prior  chattel  mortgage,  a 
statutory  lien  which  arises  from  the  mere  fact  of  the  keeping 
of  the  cattle  has  such  precedence.  "The  possession  of  the 
agistor  was  rightful,  and  the  possession  being  rightful,  the 
keeping  gave  rise  to  the  lien;  and  such  keeping  was  as  much 
for  the  interest  of  the  mortgagee  as  the  mortgagor.  The 
cattle  were  kept  alive  thereby;  and  the  principle  seems  to  be, 


agistor's  lien  is  valid.  Bowden  v. 
Dugan,  91  Maine  141,  39  Atl.  467; 
Graham  v.  Winchell,  4  Ohio  C.  D. 
139,  3  Ohio  N.  P.  106. 

2Lynde  v.  Parker,  155  Mass.  481, 
30  N.  E.  74. 

3Case  V.  Allen,  21  Kans.  217,  220, 
30  Am.  Rep.  425;  Smith  v.  Stevens, 
36  Minn.  303,  31  N.  W.  55.  In  this 
case  Berry,  J.,  said:  "A  mortgagee, 
when  he  takes  a  mortgage,  takes 
it,  in  legal  contemplation,  with 
full  knotvledge  of  and  subject  to 
the  right  of  a  person  keeping  it  at 
the  request  of  the  mortgagor  or 
other  lawful  possessor  to  the 
statutory  lien,  as  he  would  do  to 
a  common-law  lien."  In  Meyer 
V.  Berlandi,  39  Minn.  438,  40  N.  W. 
513,  1  L.  R.  A.  m,  12  Am.  St.  663, 
the  court,  in  referring  to  Smith  v. 


Stevens,  Ze  Minn.  303,  31  N.  W. 
55,  says:  The  opinion  rests  "upon 
the  doctrine  of  agency, — authority, 
implied  from  the  circumstances, 
from  the  mortgagee  to  the  mort- 
gagor, to  create  a  lien  for  such  a 
purpose."  It  is  to  be  observed  that 
the  statute  of  Minnesota  express- 
ly provides  that  the  keeping  at 
the  request  of  the  legal  possessor 
shall  be  sufficient  to  create  the 
lien.  See  Colquitt  v.  Kirkman,  47 
Ga.  555.  A  ranchman  placed  in 
possession  of  mortgaged  cattle  by 
the  sheriff,  to  whom  they  were 
turned  over  for  sale  under  the 
terms  of  the  chattel  mortgage,  has 
a  lien  on  the  cattle.  Vose  v. 
Whitney,  7  Mont.  385,  16  Pac. 
846;  Willard  v.  Whinfield,  2  Kans. 
App.   53,  43   Pac.   314. 


§    692a  LIENS.  696 

that  where  the  mortgagee  does  not  take  the  possession,  but 
leaves  it  with  the  mortgagor,  he  thereby  assents  to  the  cre- 
ation of  a  statutory  lien  for  any  expenditure  reasonably 
necessary  for  the  preservation  or  ordinary  repair  of  the 
thing  mortgaged.  Such  indebtedness  really  inures  to  his 
benefit.  The  entire  value  of  his  mortgage  may  rest  upon 
the  creation  of  such  indebtedness  and  lien,  as  in  the  case 
at  bar,  where  the  thing  mortgaged  is  live  stock,  and  the  lien 
for  food.  And  while  it  seems  essential  that  this  should  be 
the  rule,  to  protect  the  mechanic  or  other  person  given  by 
statute  a  lien  upon  chattels  for  labor  or  material,  the  rule,  on 
the  other  hand,  will  seldom  work  any  substantial  wrong  to 
the  mortgagee.  The  amount  due  under  such  liens  is  generally 
small — a  mere  trifle  compared  with  the  value  of  the  thing 
upon  which  the  lien  is  claimed.  The  work  or  material  en- 
hances or  continues  the  value  of  that  upon  which  the  work  is 
done  or  to  which  the  material  is  furnished;  and  the  mort- 
gagee can  always  protect  himself  against  such  liens,  or,  at 
least,  any  accumulation  of  debt  thereon,  by  taking  possession 
of  the  chattel  mortgaged."^ 

§  692a.     Lien  cannot  be  made  superior  to  prior  mortgage. 

— It  is  clear  that  a  lien  cannot  by  statute  be  made  superior 
to  the  lien  of  a  mortgage  executed  before  the  statute  was 
enacted.''  Thus,  a  statute  which  attempted  to  make  a  lien 
for  seed-grain  superior  to  the  lien  of  a  mortgage  executed 
before  the  passage  of  the  statute  is  repugnant  to  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Federal  Constitution,  forbidding  the  impair- 
ment by  any  state  of  the  obligations  of  a  contract.^ 

4Case  V.  Allen,  21  Kans.  217,  per      Ark.  231;   McGhee  v.   Edwards,  87 
Brewer,  J.  Tenn.  506,  11  S.  W.  316;  Ingalls  v. 


^Toledo,  D.  &  B.  R.  Co 
Hamilton,  134  U.  S.  296,  33  L.  ed 
905,  10  Sup.  Ct.  546;  Easter  v 
Goyne,  51  Ark.  222,  11  S.  W.  212 
Brown  v.  Morrison,  5  Ark.  217; 
McCuUough   V.    Caldwell's    Exr.,   8 


Vance,  61  Vt.  582,  18  Atl.  452; 
Wright  V.  Sherman,  3  S.  Dak.  290, 
52  N.  W.  1093. 

^Yeatman  v.  King,  2  N.  Dak.  421, 
51  N.  W.  721,  33  Am.  St.  797. 


697         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS.         §    695 

§  693.  Lien  of  stallion  keeper  superior  to  subsequent 
mortgage. — A  lien  given  by  statute  to  the  keeper  of  a  stal- 
lion on  the  ojffspring  is  held  to  be  superior  to  the  right  of  a 
subsequent  mortgagee  to  whom  the  mare  is  conveyed  while 
in  foal,  though  the  mortgage  is  registered  before  the  foal  is 
dropped.  The  statute  is  regarded  as  giving  the  lien  from 
the  time  of  the  performance  of  the  service,  to  be  enforced  at 
any  time  after  the  birth  of  the  colt.'^  As  in  the  case  of  the 
analogous  liens  of  landlords  for  rent  and  mechanics  for  work 
and  materials,  all  persons  must  take  notice  of  the  lien  at 
their  peril. 

§  ,694.  Possession  of  keeper  is  constructive  notice  to  a 
purchaser. — The  possession  of  animals  by  a  stable  keeper 
or  agistor  entitled  to  a  lien  for  keeping  them  is  constructive 
notice  to  a  purchaser  of  the  right  to  the  lien.^  He  is  not 
estopped  from  claiming  a  lien  because  he  has  not  given 
notice  of  it  previous  to  the  purchase,  or  previous  to  payment 
by  the  purchaser,  unless  the  stable  keeper  or  agistor  has 
done  something  to  mislead  the  purchaser  into  making  the 
purchase,  or  has  done  something  to  lead  the  purchaser  to 
suppose  that  no  lien  is  claimed. 

§  695.     Mortgage  by  owner  while  in  temporary  possession. 

— A  subsequent  mortgage  made  by  the  owner  while  in  tem- 
porary possession  has  priority.  Where  a  livery  stable  keeper 
received  a  span  of  horses  to  feed  and  care  for,  but  the  owner 
was  allowed  to  retain  possession  of  the  horses  and  use  them 
daily,  and  while  in  possession  he  mortgaged  them  to  secure 
a  debt,   it  was  held  that   the   claim  of  the   mortgagee   was 

■^Sims     V.      Bradford,      12      Lea  of   stock   for  value   without  notice 

(Tenn.)    434;    Burr    v.    Graves,    4  of  an  agistor's  lien  takes  the  stock 

Lea    (Tenn.)   552,  557.  subject    to    such    lien.      Weber    v. 

sLessells  v.  Farnsworth,  3  How.  Whitestone,    53    Nebr.   371,    73    N. 

Pr.   (N.  S.)    (N.   Y.)   73,  364.     But  W.  695. 
it  is  held  in  Nebraska  a  purchaser 


§    696  LIENS.  698 

superior  to  that  of  tlie  livery  stable  keeper.^  Continuance 
of  possession  is  indispensable  to  the  existence  of  a  lien  at 
common  law,  and  the  abandonment  of  the  custody  of  the 
property,  over  which  the  right  extends,  divests  the  lien. 
The  lienholder  in  such  case  is  deemed  to  surrender  the 
security  he  has  upon  the  property,  and  to  rely  on  the  per- 
sonal responsibility  of  the  owner.  If,  however,  a  sale  of  the 
property  be  made  by  the  owner  while  it  is  in  the  possession 
of  the  person  holding  it  under  the  lien,  the  lien  will  not  divest 
it.  The  purchaser  in  that  case  takes  it  subject  to  the  in- 
cumbrance.^° 

§  696.     Lien  by  agreement  will  not  hold  against  mortgage. 

— A  lien  for  the  keeping  of  a  horse,  created  by  agreement, 
will  not  hold  against  a  mortgage  subsequently  executed  and 
recorded,  if  the  owner  is  afterwards  permitted  to  use  the 
horse  at  his  pleasure.  By  the  mortgage  a  good  title  to  the 
property  is  given  subject  to  the  lien  of  the  livery  stable 
keeper.  If  afterwards  the  horse  is  repeatedly,  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  livery  stable  keeper,  suffered  to  be  taken  by  the 
mortgagor  into  his  possession,  to  be  used  by  him  at  his 
pleasure  in  carrying  on  the  particular  business  in  which  he  is 
engaged,  this,  as  against  the  mortgagee,  is  such  a  relinquish- 
ment of  possession  as  extinguishes  and  discharges  the  pre- 
viously existing  lien.  The  mortgage  then  becomes  prior  in 
right,  and  the  incumbrance  created  by  it  continues  without 
interruption,  disturbance  or  discharge,  from  and  after  the 
time  when  this  lien  was  lost;  and  the  mortgagee  thereby  ac- 
quires a  paramount  right  and  title  to  the  property.^^ 

§  697.     Facts  held  to  be  waiver  of  keeper's  lien. — If  thte 
owner  of  a  horse  upon  which  there  is  a  lien  for  board  be 

^Marseilles    Manufacturing      Co.  v.   Morgan,   12  Nebr.  66,  10   N.  W. 

V.  Morgan,  12  Nebr.  66,  10  N.  W.  462,  per  Maxwell,  C.  J. 
462.  iiPerkins  v.   Boardman,  14  Gray 

10  Marseilles  Manufacturing  Co.  (Mass.)  481,  483. 


699         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS.  §    698 

allowed  to  use  it  in  his  business,  and  while  it  is  away  from 
the  stable  sells  it  without  the  knowledge  of  the  stable 
keeper,  the  lien  is  lost,  and  the  stable  keeper  cannot  regain 
it  by  taking  the  horse  from  the  possession  of  the  purchaser. ^- 
The  lien  is  created  by  statute.  "But  it  gives  no  intimation 
that  it  uses  the  word  'lien'  in  any  different  sense  from  that 
which  is  known  to  the  common  law.^^  On  the  contrary,  it 
in  terms  supposes  that  the  animals  in  question  have  been 
placed  in  the  care — that  is  to  say,  in  the  possession  of  the 
party  to  whom  the  lien  is  given.  The  provisions  for  sale 
would  seem  to  imply  the  same  thing.  To  admit  that  it  was 
intended  to  create  a  tacit  hypothecation  like  that  enforced 
from  necessity,  but  within  narrow  limits,  in  the  admiralty, 
would  be  to  go  in  the  face  of  the  whole  policy  of  our  statutes, 
which  always  strive  to  secure  public  registration  when  posses- 
sion is  not  given  and  retained,  and  which  expressly  provide 
for  such  registration  when  they  in  terms  create  a  lien  not 
depending  on  possession.  It  follows  from  what  we  have 
said  that,  even  if  the  defendant  had  had  a  lien  for  the  keep- 
ing of  the  horse  after  sale,  or  whatever  might  be  the  rule 
when  the  animal  was  voluntarily  restored  to  his  possession, 
he  lost  it  by  allowing  the  plaintiff  to  take  possession,  and 
could  not  revive  his  right  by  seizing  the  horse. "^* 

§  698.  Lien  not  lost  by  delivery  of  horse  temporarily  to 
owner. — A  livery  stable  keeper  does  not  necessarily  lose  his 
lien  by  delivering  a  horse  to  the  owner  for  use  by  him.^'' 

i-Vinal    V.    Spofiford,    139    Mass.  places    his    cattle    therein,   the    fact 

126,    130,  29   N.    E.   288;    Fishell    v.  that  the  owner  of  the  pasture  un- 

Morris,   57   Conn.   547,   18  Atl.  717,  der  an  arrangement  with  the  ten- 

6  L.  R.  A.  82.  ant    rendered    some    assistance    in 

i3Fishell    V.     Morris,    57    Conn.  caring  for  the  cattle  will  give  him 

547,   18  Atl.  717,  6  L.  R.   A.  82.  no   lien   thereon   for   his    rent,    for 

i4Vinal    V.    Spofiford,    139    Mass.  the   possession    both    of   the    land 

126,  29   N.   E.  288,  per  Holmes,  J.  and  cattle  is  in  the  tenant.     Cotton 

Where    a    tenant    rents    a    pasture  v.  Arnold,  118  Mo.  App.  596,  95  S. 

from    the    owner    and    thereunder  W.  280. 
has    control    and    possession    and  i^Walls    v.    Long,    2    Ind.    App. 


§  699 


LIENS. 


700 


Thus,  if  horses  belonging  to  a  mail  contractor  are  used  by 
him  regularly  in  his  business,  the  stable  keeper  does  not  lose 
his  right  to  a  lien  for  previous  charges  every  time  he  allows 
the  horses  to  be  taken  away  from  his  stable.  It  is  a  neces- 
sary part  of  the  contract  in  such  a  case  that  the  horses  should 
be  delivered  to  the  owner  as  they  are  needed,  and  this  course 
of  business  is  consistent  with  the  right  of  lien  that  belongs 
to  the  stable  keeper,  and  does  not  impair  that  lien.^*' 

A  livery  stable  keeper  does  not  lose  his  lien  upon  a  horse 
for  board  by  permitting  the  owner  to  ride  the  horse  oc- 
casionally; and  his  lien  is  superior  to  the  lien  of  an  execution 
levied  upon  the  horse  while  temporarily  in  the  owner's  pos- 
session. 


17 


§  699.     Loss  of  possession  will  deprive  keeper  of  lien. — 

The  lien  is  waived  or  lost  by  allowing  the  owner  to  take  and 
keep  possession  longer  than  for  a  temporary  daily  use.  If 
one  entitled  to  the  lien  voluntarily  parts  with  the  possession 
to  the  owner,  unless  for  a  temporary  purpose,  and  under  an 
agreement  to  return  the  property,  the  lien — the  right  of  de- 
tention— is  gone.^^     The  owner  of  a  horse  had  been  in  the 


202.  28  N.  E.  101.  For  owner  to 
take  horse  from  stable  with- 
out consent  constitutes  larcency. 
Tumalty  v.  Parker.  100  111.  App. 
382. 

i6Young  V.  Kimball,  23  Pa.  St. 
193.  Welsh  V.  Barnes,  5  N.  Dak. 
277,  65  N.  W.  675.  If  the  owner 
of  live  stock  takes  possession 
from  his  agistor  without  the  lat- 
ter's  consent,  the  lien  will  not  be 
lost.  Weber  v.  Whitstone,  53  Nebr. 
371,  1Z  N.  W.  695;  Willard  v.  Whin- 
f^eld,  2  Kans.  App.  53,  43  Pac.  314. 

1'?  Caldwell  v.  Tutt,  10  Lea 
(Tenn.)  258,  260,  43  Am.  Rep.  307. 
Per    Freeman,   J. :    "Neither    party- 


thought  of  terminating  the  con- 
tract, or  of  the  one  taking  and 
the  other  yielding  possession,  so 
as  to  give  an  individual  credit 
alone  for  the  board,  and  release 
thereby  the  lien  of  the  livery 
man."  The  agistor's  lien  for  keep- 
ing a  horse  is  not  waived  when 
he  refuses  to  surrender  possession 
to  an  officer  holding  an  execution 
against  the  owner,  where  the  offi- 
cer seizes  the  horse  anyway.  Shue 
V.    Ingle,   87   111.   App.   522. 

I'^Seebaum  v.  Handy,  46  Ohio 
St.  560,  22  N.  E.  869;  Ferriss  v. 
Schreiner,  43  Minn.  148,  44  N.  W. 
1083.      The    agistor's    lien    is    lost 


yOl         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS'    AND    AGISTORS'    LIENS.         §    699 

habit  of  taking  it  from  the  stable  where  it  was  boarded,  and 
using  it  each  day  in  his  business,  and  returning  it  to  the 
stable  at  night.  On  one  occasion  he  did  not  return  the  horse 
as  usual,  and  the  stable  keeper  some  three  weeks  afterwards, 
finding  it  in  the  owner's  possession,  took  possession  of  it 
under  a  claim  of  lien,  and  left  it  in  charge  of  an  agent  at  a 
stable  where  the  owner  kept  it.  The  agent  on  the  following 
day  left  the  horse,  and  went  with  the  owner  to  see  the  stable 
keeper  who  claimed  the  lien.  The  owner  then  made  an 
offer  of  settlement,  which  was  refused,  and  then  promised 
to  return  the  horse  next  day,  but  did  not.  It  was  held  that 
there  had  been  a  waiver  of  the  lien.^^ 

The  owner  of  a  horse,  who  lived  out  of  the  city,  was  in 
the  habit  of  leaving  it  with  a  stable  keeper  in  the  city,  to  be 
fed  and  cared  for  as  long  as  suited  the  owner's  convenience. 
When  called  for,  the  horse  would  be  delivered  to  the  owmer, 
and  not  returned,  except  at  such  intervals  as  suited  the  own- 
er's convenience  when  again  in  the  city.     The  last  time  the 


by  the  voluntary  delivery  of  the 
cattle  to  their  owner.  First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  George  R.  Barse  Com. 
Co.,  61  Mo.  App.  143.  As  to  loss 
of  lien  by  surrender  of  posses- 
sion, see  Gorman  v.  Williams,  26 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)  776,  56  N.  Y.  S. 
1031. 

19  Papineau  v.  Wentworth,  136 
Mass.  543.  And  see  Estey  v. 
Cooke,  12  Nev.  276;  Cardinal  v. 
Edwards,  5  Nev.  36.  The  owner 
of  a  horse  disputed  the  account 
of  a  livery-stable  keeper,  which 
was  mostly  a  claim  by  a  trainer 
for  services,  and  in  interview,  af- 
ter the  owner  had  taken  the  horse 
from  the  stable  in  the  absence  of 
the  livery-stable  keeper,  the  lat- 
ter said,  "Let  it  go  till  the  trainer 
gets  home,  and  we  will  fix  it  up." 


It  was  held  that  the  livery-stable 
keeper  waived  any  lien  he  had  by 
this  agreement.  He  could  not  re- 
voke this  agreement  by  after- 
wards going  to  the  stable  of  the 
plaintiff  and  obtaining  possession 
of  the  horse  by  the  untruthful 
representation  that  he  was  sent 
there  by  Shea  for  the  horse.  Bray 
v.  Wise,  82  Iowa  581,  48  N.  W.  994. 
Under  a  contract  to  pasture  cattle 
and  to  plow  a  field  and  sow  grain 
to  make  more  pasture  and  where 
it  is  agreed  that  the  cattle  are  to 
be  removed  after  the  first  pasture 
is  used  up  until  the  new  pasture 
is  ready,  the  lien  is  waived  dur- 
ing the  interval.  Bouvier  v.  Brass, 
12  Ariz.  310,  100  Pac.  799.  See 
also,  Powers  v.  Botts,  63  Mo.  App. 
285. 


§    7^0  LIENS.  702 

horse  was  called  for  and  delivered  to  the  owner,  the  charges 
for  feed  and  care  amounted  to  over  $100.  Shortly  after- 
wards the  owner  was  killed  by  being  thrown  from  his  car- 
riage, and  some  time  after  that  the  horse  was  driven  to  the 
city  by  a  brother  of  the  deceased,  and  left  at  another  feed 
stable,  from  which  it  was  taken  by  replevin  suit  by  the  first- 
mentioned  stable  keeper.  It  was  held  that  the  delivery  of 
the  horse  was  a  voluntary  one,  and  the  lien  waived."*^ 

§  700.  Acts  of  ownership  by  lienholder. — The  owner  of  a 
mare  placed  her  in  the  possession  of  a  stable  keeper  under  an 
agreement  that  the  latter  should  train  her  for  the  track,  and 
should  run  her  from  time  to  time,  and  should  divide  the 
track-money  and  premiums  with  the  owner.  The  mare  was 
placed  upon  the  track,  but  the  owner  received  no  share  of  the 
gains,  if  any  were  obtained.  Subsequently  the  owner  bor- 
rowed a  sum  of  money  of  a  third  person,  and  gave  a  bill  of 
sale  of  the  mare  as  security.  On  the  owner's  failure  to 
pay  the  loan  it  was  paid  by  the  stable  keeper,  and  the  bill  of 
sale  was  transferred  to  him.  Afterwards  the  stable  keeper, 
continuing  in  possession  of  the  mare,  caused  her  to  be  gotten 
with  foal,  and  later  again  placed  her  upon  the  track.  The 
owner  then  went  to  the  stable  and  took  the  mare  away. 
The  stable  keeper  brought  an  action  of  replevin  to  recover 
the  mare  on  the  ground  that  he  had  a  lien  upon  her  for  her 

-'^  Seebaum  v.  Handy,  46  Ohio  tion.  In  such  case  where  the 
St.  560,  22  N.  E.  869.  Minshall,  owner  is  allowed  to  use  it,  its 
J.,  delivering  the  judgment,  said  :  voluntary  delivery  to  him  for  such 
"What  should  be  the  rule  in  cases  purpose,  might  be  said  to  imply  a 
where  the  animal  is  placed  by  the  contract  to  return  the  animal,  and 
owner  with  a  person  to  be  fed  a  failure  to  do  so  would  be  such 
and  cared  for,  not  temporarily, —  a  fraud  as  to  estop  the  owner 
the  horse  being  ordinarily  kept  at  from  setting  up  that  the  lien  had 
home  or  somewhere  else  by  the  been  lost  by  such  voluntary  deliv- 
owner, — but  permanently,  for  ery.  But  this  is  not  the  case  be- 
some  time  either  definite  or  in-  fore  us,  and  we  express  no  defi- 
definite,  presents  a  different  ques-  nite  opinion  upon  it  at  this  time." 


703         LIVERY    STABLE    KEEPERS     AND    AGISTORS     LIENS.  §701 

keeping.  It  was  held  that  he  was  entitled  to  recover  inas- 
much as  he  had  such  a  lien,  as  well  as  a  lien  for  the  money 
advanced  upon  the  assignment  of  the  bill  of  sale.-^  The 
action  of  the  stable  keeper  in  apparently  assuming  absolute 
ownership  of  the  mare,  by  keeping  all  the  premiums  and 
causing  the  mare  to  be  gotten  with  foal,  was  held  not  to 
destroy  any  lien  which  he  had  for  keeping. 

§  701.  Waiver  by  including  in  claim  that  for  which  keeper 
has  no  lien. — If  one  having  a  lien  includes  a  claim  to  which 
the  lien  does  not  attach,  he  waives  his  lien.  Thus,  where  a 
stable  keeper,  who  had  boarded  a  horse  which  had  been 
mortgaged,  gave  notice  to  the  mortgagee  of  his  claim  of  a 
lien  upon  the  horse,  and  afterwards  rendered  a  bill  for  the 
board  of  the  horse  both  before  and  after  the  notice,  and 
demanded  payment  of  this  as  a  condition  of  surrendering 
possession  of  the  horse,  it  was  held  that  he  rendered  himself 
liable  for  a  conversion  of  the  horse,  and  that  the  mortgagee 
could  maintain  a  suit  for  the  conversion  without  a  tender 
of  the  amount  due  for  keeping  the  horse  after  notice  for 
which  a  valid  lien  might  have  existed.^-  "Had  he  claimed 
distinct  liens  for  distinct  debts  for  what  occurred  before  and 
what  occurred  after  the  notice  to  the  plaintiffs,  it  may  be 
that  he  would  not  thereby  have  waived  a  valid  lien  for  one 
of  the  debts  only,  without  the  refusal  of  a  tender  of  that 
alone ;  but  the  demand  for  the  whole  as  one  debt,  and  the 
refusal  to  deliver  the  property  unless  the  whole  was  paid,  was 
a  refusal  to  deliver  the  property  upon  the  payment  of  the 

-1  Hartman    v.    Keown,    101    Pa.  is  held  in  an  action  by  the  owner 

St.  338.  for     the     possession     of    a    horse 

22  Hamilton   v.    McLaughlin,   145  which    the    keeper    was    boarding, 

Mass.  20,   12   N.    E.  424.      But   see,  that    the    keeper's    claiming    more 

Campbell  v.  Abbott,  60  Misc.   (N.  than   the   amount   of  his   lien  will 

Y.)  93,   111   N.  Y.   S.  782,   where   it  not  vitiate  his  lien. 


§  yoi  LIENS.  704 

amount  which  had  accrued  after  the  notice,  or  to  accept  a 
tender  of  that,  and  rendered  a  tender  of  it  unnecessary."^'^ 

A  livery  stable  keeper  waives  his  lien  by  transferring  his 
stable  to  a  purchaser,  and  delivering  with  the  stable  a  cus- 
tomer's horse  upon  which  he  had  a  lien,  under  a  new  arrange- 
ment with  the  purchaser  by  which  the  further  expense  of 
keeping  the  horse  was  charged  to  the  customer.  The  pur- 
chaser became  the  owner's  agent,,  and  the  purchaser's  posses- 
sion the  owner's  possession;  and  this  voluntary  surrender 
was  a  relinquishment  of  the  former  stable  keeper's  lien, 
which  could  only  be  preserved  by  some  understanding  made 
at  the  time,  by  which  the  purchaser  w^as  to  hold  the  prop- 
erty for  the  benefit  of  the  lien  claimant,  and  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  his  lien.-^ 

23  Hamilton  v.  McLaughlin,  145  St.  531,  59  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  383, 
Mass.  20,  12  N.  E.  424,  per  W.  14  N.  Y.  S.  479.  See  Geneva.  I. 
Allen,  J.;  Viley  v.  Lockwood,  102  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Sage,  35  Hun  (N. 
Tenn.  426,  52  S.  W.  138.  Y.)     95;     Bigelow     v.     Heaton,    4 

24  Fitchett   V.    Canary,    38   N.    Y.  Denio    (N.  Y.)   496. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

LUMBERMEN'S   LIENS. 


Sec. 

702.  No    lien    at    common    law    for 

cutting  and   hauling   timber. 

703.  Lien    at    common    law    where 

possession  is   retained. 

704.  Statutory    liens    in    lumbering 

states. 
704a.  Alabama. 

705.  Alaska. 
70Sa.  Arizona. 
705b.  Arkansas. 

706.  California. 

707.  Florida. 

708.  Georgia. 

709.  Louisiana. 

710.  Maine. 

711.  Maine    (continued.)      Enforce- 

ment of  the  lien. 

712.  Michigan. 

713.  Minnesota. 
713a.  Mississippi. 
713b.   Missouri. 
713c.  Montana. 

714.  Nevada. 

715.  New   Hampshire. 
715a.  New   York. 
715b.  North  Carolina. 

716.  Oregon. 


Sec. 

717.  Vermont. 

718.  Washington. 

719.  Wisconsin. 
719a.  Wyoming. 

720.  Liens    for   services   or  manual 

labor  depend  on  statutes. 

721.  Rule     by     statutes     in     some 

states. 
122.  Contractor  not  agent  of  own- 
er to  employ  men. 

723.  Constitutionality   of   statutes. 

724.  The  term  "personal  services." 

725.  Contractor  has  no  lien  for  la- 

bor   of    servants. 

726.  What  are   logs   or  lumber. 

727.  Priority   of   lumberman's   lien. 

728.  Property  upon  which  lien   at- 

taches must  be  identified. 

729.  Lien  upon   logs  worked  upon 

by   laborer. 

730.  Enforcement  of  labor  lien. 
730a.  Lien    on    different    kinds    of 

timber    cut   under    one    con- 
tract. 
730b.  Continuous       service      under 
contract. 


§  702.  No  lien  at  common  law  for  cutting  and  hauling  tim- 
ber.— At  common  law,  laborers  engaged  in  cutting,  hauling, 
and  driving  timber  had  no  lien  thereon.^     It  is  indispensable 


lOakes  v.  Moore,  24  Maine  214, 
41  Am.  Dec.  379;  Oliver  v.  Wood- 
man, 66  Maine  54,  56,  per  Virgin, 
J.;  Arians  v.  Brickley,  65  Wis. 
26,  26  N.  W.  188,  56  Am.  Rep.  611, 


per  Orton,  J.;  Brackett  v.  Pier- 
son,  114  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  281, 
99  N.  Y.  S.  770.  See  also,  Rhodes 
V.  Hines,  79  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
379,  79  N.  Y.  S.  437. 


705 


45 


§    7^3  LIENS.  706 

to  the  continuance  of  such  a  lien  that  it  should  be  accom- 
panied by  possession.  The  moment  that  possesion  is  volun- 
tarily surrendered,  the  lien  is  gone.  A  laborer  cutting,  haul- 
ing and  driving  logs  could  retain  possession  only  by  placing 
them  upon  his  own  land,  or  upon  the  land  of  another  under 
agreement  that  such  other  should  hold  possession  of  him. 
Practically  the  laborer  cannot  retain  possession.  If  he  parts 
v^ith  the  possession  he  can  have  a  lien  only  by  statute  or  by 
special  contract.  If  it  be  agreed  between  the  parties  that 
the  laborer  or  contractor  shall  cut  timber  and  deliver  it 
upon  the  owner's  premises,  and  it  be  further  stipulated  that 
the  laborer  or  contractor  shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  logs  un- 
til he  is  paid,  he  may  resume  possession  and  assert  his  lien. 
The  owner,  having  made  such  an  agreement  and  having 
failed  to  make  payment,  is  not  allowed  to  come  into  court 
and  say  that  the  claimant  has  parted  with  possession  and 
thereby  relinquished  his  lien.- 

Moreover,  a  laborer  who  does  work  for  a  contractor  can 
have  no  lien  at  common  law,  even  if  the  contractor  has  such 
a  lien;  for  if  any  one  has  possession  it  is  the  contractor.  The 
possession  of  the  laborer  is  the  possession  of  the  contractor, 
with  whom  alone  the  owner  deals,  and  to  whom  alone  he 
gives  possession  of  the  property.^  A  lien  cannot  be  acquired 
through  a  possession  unlawfully  obtained ;  and  therefore  a 
contractor  cannot  give  his  laborers  a  lien  through  possession, 
for  he  alone  is  entitled  to  possession  as  against  the  owner.'* 

§  703.     Lien  at  common  law  where  possession  is  retained. 

— One  who  has  cut  and  hauled  to  his  mill  a  quantity  of  tim- 
ber from  the  land  of  another,  under  a  contract  with  him,  has 
a  lien  at  common  law  for  his  labor  upon  the  lumber  in  his 
possession   remaining   manufactured   from    the    timber,    and 

20akes  v.  Moore,  24  Maine  214,  ^Wright    v.    Terry,    23    Fla.    160, 

41   Am.   Dec.  379.  2  So.  6,  per  Raney,  J.;   Dresser  v. 

sWright  V.  Terry,  23  Fla.  160,  2  Lemma,    122  Wis.  387,    100  N.   W. 

So.  6.  844. 


707  lumbermen's  liens.  §  704a 

also  upon  the  logs  iinsawed.^  In  like  manner  one  who  saws 
the  logs  of  another  into  lumber  and  shingles  has  a  common 
law  lien  thereon  for  the  value  of  such  work.^ 

§  704.  Statutory  liens  in  lumbering  states. — In  states  in 
which  lumbering  is  an  important  industry,  liens  are  gener- 
ally given  by  statute  to  those  engaged  in  the  work.  In  some 
states  the  laborers  alone  are  protected,  and  in  others  con- 
tractors as  well  as  laborers  are  within  the  protection  of  the 
statute.  The  most  characteristic  feature  of  these  statutes  is 
that  they  generally  make  this  lien  paramount  to  all  other 
liens  or  claims  against  the  property,  on  the  ground,  doubt- 
less, that  the  labor  of  the  lumberman  in  cutting,  hauling,  or 
driving  logs  greatly  increases  their  value  for  the  benefit  of 
all  persons  who  may  have  an  interest  in  the  property,  whether 
such  persons  be  claimants  under  other  liens,  or  under  mort- 
gages executed  and  recorded  before  the  lumberman's  lien 
attaches. 

A  manufacturer  who  retains  possession  of  lumber  sawed 
by  him  has  a  common-law  lien  upon  such  lumber;  but  this 
fact  does  not  prevent  the  application  of  the  additional  statu- 
tory one.  The  manufacturer  does  not  waive  his  statutory 
lien  by  expressly  reserving  in  his  statement  the  lien  which 
he  has  by  virtue  of  his  possession  of  the  property.''' 

§  704a.  Alabama.^ — Owners  of  land,  or  their  assignees, 
shall  have  a  lien  upon  timber  sold  therefrom  for  purposes  of 
rafting,  shipping,  or  manufacture,  for  the  stipulated  price  or 
value  thereof,  commonly  known  as  stumpage. 

^Palmer    v.    Tucker,    45    Maine  254,  45   N.  W.  81,   following  Shaw 

316.  V.  Bradley,  59  Mich.-  199,  26  N.  W. 

^Arians  v.   Brickley,  65  Wis.  26,  331,    overruling    Kieldsen    v.    Wil- 

26   N.    W.    188,   56   Am.    Rep.   611;  son,  11  Mich.  45,  43  N.  W.   1054. 
Bierly  v.  Royse,  25  Ind.  App.  202,  8Civ.  Code  1907,  §  4814.     Austill 

57  N.    E.  939;   Walker  v.   Cassels,  v.  Hieronymus,  117  Ala.  620,  23  So. 

70  S.  Car.  271,  49  S.  E.  862.  660. 

^Phillips     V.     Freyer,    80    Mich. 


§    705  LIENS.  708 

For  the  enforcement  of  such  lien,  the  owners  of  such  land, 
or  their  assignees,  may  have  process  of  attachment  from  any 
court  having  jurisdiction  of  the  amount  claimed  levyable 
upon  the  timber  upon  which  the  lien  exists,  when  such  claim 
is  due,  and  the  defendant,  on  demand,  fails  or  refuses  to  pay 
the  same,  when  not  due,  when  the  defendant  has  removed 
or  is  about  to  remove  any  part  of  the  timber  without  pay- 
ing therefor,  or  without  the  consent  of  the  owner  or  assignee. 

§  705.  Alaska.^ — Every  person  performing  labor  upon,  or 
who  shall  assist  in  obtaining  or  securing  saw  logs,  spars, 
piles  or  other  timber  shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  same  for  the 
work  or  labor  done  or  in  obtaining  or  securing  the  same, 
whether  such  work  or  labor  was  done  at  the  instance  of  the 
owner  of  the  same  or  his  agent.  The  cook  in  a  logging  camp 
and  any  and  all  others  who  may  assist  in  or  about  a  logging 
camp  shall  be  regarded  as  a  person  who  assists  in  obtaining 
or  securing  the  saw-logs,  spars,  piles  or  other  timber  men- 
tioned herein. 

Every  person  performing  labor  upon  or  who  shall  assist  in 
manufacturing  saw  logs  or  other  timber  into  lumber,  has 
a  lien  upon  such  lumber  while  the  same  remains  at  the  yard 
wherein  manufactured,  whether  such  work  or  labor  was  done 
at  the  instance  of  the  owner  of  such  lumber  or  his  agent. 

§  705a.  Arizona.^*' — All  persons  who  cut  or  cord  wood, 
cut,  saw  or  skid  logs,  cut,  saw,  hew  or  pile  ties,  at  the  request 
of  the  owner  thereof  or  his  agent,  shall  have  a  lien  thereon 
for  the  amount  due  him  for  the  labor  performed. 

§  705b.  Arkansas.^^ — Rafting  and  booming  companies 
shall  have  a  lien  on  the  logs,  timber,  or  other  floatables 
driven,  boomed,  rafted  or  run,  and  such  corporation  shall  be 

9Carter's    Ann.    Code    1900,    pp.  n  Kirby's     Dig.    of    Stats.     1904, 

413-415,  §§  280,  281.  §  6524. 

lORev.   Stats.   1901,   §   2907. 


709  lumbermen's  liens.  §  707 

entitled  to  retain  the  possession  of  so  much  of  such  logs, 
timber,  lumber,  or  other  floatables  as  may  be  necessary  to 
satisfy  the  amount  of  such  boomage  and  reasonable  charges 
for  driving,  rafting  or  running  of  logs,  timber,  lumber  and 
other  fioatables, 

§  706.  California.^- — A  person  who  labors  at  cutting,  haul- 
ing, rafting  or  drawing  logs,  bolts,  or  other  timber,  has  a 
lien  thereon  for  the  amount  due  for  his  personal  services, 
which  takes  precedence  of  all  other  claims,  to  continue  for 
thirty  days  after  the  logs,  bolts  or  other  timber  arrive  at  the 
place  of  destination  for  sale  or  manufacture,  while  such 
logs,  bolts,  or  other  timber  are  in  the  county  in  which  such 
labor  was  performed. 

The  lien  hereby  created  ceases  and  determines  unless  the 
claimant  thereof,  within  twenty  days  from  the  time  such 
labor  is  completed,  brings  suit  to  foreclose  the  same.  The 
plaintiff  in  any  such  suit,  at  the  time  of  issuing  the  summons 
or  at  any  time  afterwards,  may  have  the  logs,  bolts,  or  other 
timber  upon  which  such  lien  subsists  attached,  as  provided 
in  this  code,  upon  delivering  to  the  clerk  an  affidavit  by  or 
on  behalf  of  the  plaintiff,  showing  that  defendant  is  in- 
debted to  the  plaintiff  upon  a  demand  for  labor  performed, 
either  in  the  cutting,  hauling,  rafting,  or  drawing  such  logs, 
bolts,  or  other  timber,  and  that  the  sum  for  which  the  at- 
tachment is  asked  is  an  actual  bona  fide  existing  debt,  due 
and  owing  from  the  defendant  to  the  plaintiff,  and  that  the 
attachment  is  not  sought,  and  the  action  is  not  brought,  to 
hinder,  delay,  or  defraud  any  creditor  or  creditors  of  the  de- 
fendant. 

§  707.  Florida.^^ — A  lien  prior  in  dignity  to  all  others  ex- 
ists in  favor  of  any  person  by  himself  or  others  cutting,  raft- 

i2Civ.   Code  1906,  §  3065.  owner     contracts     can     have     the 

iSGen.   Stats.   1906,   §§  2197,  2202.      benefit    of    this    Hen.      Wright    v. 
Only     laborers     with     whom     the      Terry,   23    Fla.    160,   2   So.   6. 


7o8 


LIENS. 


710 


ing,  running,  driving,  or  performing  other  labor  upon  logs 
or  timber  of  any  kind,  on  such  logs  and  timber,  and  any  ar- 
ticle manufactured  therefrom;  also  in  favor  of  any  person 
who  shall  furnish  any  logs,  lumber,  clay,  sand,  stone,  or 
other  material  whatsoever,  crude  or  partially  or  wholly  pre- 
pared for  use,  to  any  mill  or  other  manufactory  to  be  manu- 
factured into  any  article  of  value,  upon  all  such  articles  fur- 
nished, and  upon  all  articles  manufactured  therefrom. 

§  708.    Georgia.^'* — All   persons    furnishing   sawmills   with 
timber,  logs,  provisions,  or  any  other  thing  necessary  to  carry 


i4Code  1911,  §  3358.  As  to  the 
affidavit  to  forclose  the  lien,  and 
as  to  the  levy,  see  Bennett  v. 
Gray,  82  Ga.  592,  9  S.  E.  469.  Un- 
der this  statute  one  furnishing 
money  for  carrying  on  the  busi- 
ness has  no  lien.  The  lien  is 
derogatory  to  common  rights,  and 
gives  an  immediate  and  harsh 
remedy,  and  therefore  should  be 
strictly  construed.  While  money 
is  necessary  to  carry  on  the  w^ork 
of  a  sawmill,  by  buying  the  things 
necessary  for  that  work,  still  it 
is  not  primarily  the  thing  neces- 
sary. It  buys  from  others  what 
is  used  to  carry  it  on.  Those 
who  actually  furnish  the  timber, 
or  provisions,  or  other  things 
necessary,  have  the  lien;  the 
money-lender  does  not.  Dart  v. 
Mayhew,  60  Ga.  104;  and  see 
Saulsbury  v.  Eason,  47  Ga.  617.  A 
sale  made  on  the  foreclosure  of  a 
lien  for  logs  furnished  a  sawmill, 
where  there  was  a  prior  mortgage, 
conveyed  only  the  equity  of  re- 
demption subject  to  the  mortgage. 
Townsend  Savings  Bank  v.  Ep- 
ping.  3  Woods  (U.  S.)  390, 
Fed.  Gas.  No.  14120.  A  sale 
of  standing  timber  to  sawmill  man 


will  give  no  lien  because  standing 
timber  is  real  estate.  Balkcom  v. 
Empire  Lumber  Co.,  91  Ga.  651, 
17  S.  E.  1020,  44  Am.  St.  58.  Under 
Civ.  Code  1895,  §2816,  one's  lien 
on  lumber  only  extends  to  that 
manufactured  in  the  county  where 
the  mill  is  located,  Weichselbaum 
Co.  v.  Pope,  119  Ga.  182,  45  S.  E. 
991 ;  Weichselbaum  Co.  v.  Farmers' 
Supply  Co.,  119  Ga.  183,  45  S.  E. 
991.  When  logs  are  cut  and  de- 
livered to  a  saw  mill  by  one  not 
the  owner,  he  is  entitled  to  a 
laborer's  lien,  but  not  for  furnish- 
ing supplies.  Trapp  v.  Watters, 
6  Ga.  App.  480,  65  S.  E.  306.  One 
who  buys  materials  furnished  to 
a  sawmill  in  good  faith  and  with- 
out notice  prior  to  foreclosure 
takes  the  property  freed  from  such 
lien.  Consignees'  Favorite  Box 
Co.  V.  Speer,  5  Ga.  App.  156,  62  S. 
E.  1000.  A  superintendent  and 
general  manager  of  a  sawmill  can 
not  maintain  a  lien  as  a  laborer. 
Cox  V.  Fletcher,  5  Ga.  App.  297,  63 
S.  E.  61.  No  law  allows  a  saw- 
mill lien  for  standing  timber, 
money  or  family  supplies.  Slappey 
v.  Charles.  7  Ga.  App.  796,  68  S. 
E.  308.     The  statute  creates  a  lien 


711 


LUMBERMEN  S    LIENS. 


§    709 


on  the  work  of  sawmills,  shall  have  liens  on  said  mills  and 
their  products,  which  shall,  as  between  themselves,  rank  ac- 
cording to  date,  and  the  date  of  each  shall  be  from  the  time 
when  the  debt  was  created,  and  such  liens  shall  be  superior  to 
all  liens  but  liens  for  taxes,  liens  for  labor,  and  to  all  general 
liens  of  which  they  have  actual  notice  before  their  debt  was 
created,  to  which  excepted  liens  they  shall  be  inferior. 

§  709.  Louisiana.^^ — Any  person  advancing  money  or  fur- 
nishing supplies  to  enable  another  to  deaden,  cut,  haul,  float 
or  raft  any  logs  or  forest  timber,  shall  have  a  privilege  upon 
such  logs  or  timber. 

Any  person  or  persons  who  shall  perform  any  labor  or 
service  in  deadening,  felling,  cutting,  hauling,  banking,  driv- 
ing, running,  rafting  or  booming  any  logs,  timber,  or  staves 
in  this  state,  or  any  person  cooking  for  persons  engaged  in 
said  business,  shall  have  a  lien  or  privilege  thereon  for  the 
amount  due  for  such  labor  or  services,  which  lien  or  privi- 
lege shall  be  concurrent  with  that  of  the  furnisher  of  neces- 
sary supplies. 


in  favor  of  one  who  hauls  logs  or 
lumber  for  another  though  he  may 
have  employed  laborers  to  do  the 
work.  Bruton  v.  Beasley,  135  Ga. 
412,  69  S.  E.  561.  Where  it  is  de- 
nied by  the  pleading  that  the 
lienor  made  demand  for  payment 
before  foreclosure  of  his  lien,  such 
lienor  has  the  burden  to  show 
such  demand.  Shealey  v.  Living- 
ston, 8  Ga.  App.  642,  70  S.  E.  100. 
Where  one  who  would  have  a  lien 
at  the  completion  of  a  sawmill 
under  Code  1895,  §  2816,  is  pre- 
vented from  completing  such 
mill  by  the  other  party,  he  has 
a  lien  to  the  extent  of  his  own 
compliance  with  his  contract. 
Haralson  v.  Speer,  1  Ga.  App.  573, 
58  S.  E.  142.     One  merely  selling 


standing  trees  to  the  owners  of 
a  sawmill  has  no  lien  upon  the 
mill  or  its  products.  Loud  v. 
Pritchett,  104  Ga.  648,  30  S.  E.  870. 
Timber  and  logs  in  possession  of 
the  seller  while  in  transit  to  the 
buyer  are  not  subject  to  an  execu- 
tion to  foreclose  lien  for  original 
purchase-price  of  the  landowner, 
asserted  for  the  first  time  subse- 
quent to  the  sale,  where  the  buyer 
had  no  notice  of  any  such  lien. 
Ray  V.  Schmidt,  7  Ga.  App.  380, 
66  S.  E.  1035.  One  who  sells  tim- 
ber by  the  acre  has  no  lien  on 
a  sawmill  and  its  products.  Giles 
V.  Gano,  102  Ga.  593,  27  S.  E.  730. 

i^Wolflf's  Const.  &  Rev.  Laws 
1904,  p.  1331,  as  amended  by  Const. 
&  Rev.  Laws  1908,  p.  642. 


§  /lo 


LIENS. 


712 


All  managers,  mechanics  or  laborers  employed  or  work- 
ing in  saw-mills,  planing  mills,  shingle  mills  and  sash,  door 
and  blind  factories,  shall  have  a  privilege  on  all  lumber,  shin- 
gles, and  all  material  manufactured  in  the  mills  and  factories, 
where  the  managers,  mechanics  and  laborers  are  engaged, 
for  the  payment  of  their  salaries  or  wages;  provided  that  the 
privilege  herein  granted  shall  not  exist  for  a  longer  period 
of  time  than  thirty  days  after  the  maturity  of  the  debt,  and 
provided  further,  that  this  privilege  shall  have  no  effect 
against  bona  fide  purchasers. 

§  710.  Maine. ^*^ — Whoever  labors  at  cutting,  hauling,  raft- 
ing, or  driving  logs  or  lumber,  or  at  cooking  for  persons  en- 
gaged in  such  labor,  or  in  shoeing  horses  or  oxen,  or  repair- 
ing property  while  thus  employed,  has  a  lien  on  the  logs  and 
lumber  for  the  amount  due  for  his  personal  services,  and 
for  the  services  performed  by  his  team,^^  which  takes  prece- 
dence of  all  other  claims  except  liens  reserved  to  the  state. ^® 


i6Rev.  Stats.  1903,  ch.  93,  §§  46, 
47.  The  lien  is  only  for  those  who 
labor  for  wages.  Mott  v.  Mott, 
107  Maine  481,  78  Atl.  900.  No 
lien  is  given  for  cutting  and  haul- 
ing manufactured  lumber.  Mit- 
chell V.  Page,  107  Maine  388,  78 
Atl.  570,  partly  overruling  Hut- 
chins  V.  Blaisdell,  106  Maine  92, 
75  Atl.  291. 

i"A  lien  given  by  a  former  stat- 
ute for  "personal  services"  was 
held  not  to  include  services  ren- 
dered by  the  laborer's  team.  Co- 
burn  V.  Kerswell,  35  Maine  126. 
Under  the  present  statute,  giving 
a  lien  not  only  for  his  "personal 
services,"  but  for  "the  services 
performed  by  his  team,"  it  is  held 
that  the  laborer  is  entitled  to  the 
earnings  of  a  team  rightfully  in 
his  possession  and  control,  though 


he  may  not  own  it.  Kelley  v.  Kel- 
ley,  11  Maine  135.  But  where  one 
hires  his  team  to  perform  hauling, 
performing  no  service  himself  or 
by  servant,  he  has  no  lien.  Rich- 
ardson V.  Hoxie,  90  Maine  227,  38 
Atl.  142.  The  foreman  of  laborers 
who  does  not  perform  actual  labor 
is  not  entitled  to  a  lien.  Meands  v. 
Park,  95  Maine  527,  SO  Atl.  706. 
A  laborer  within  the  meaning  of 
the  statute  is  one  who  performs 
manual  labor  for  wages  under  di- 
rection of  an  employer.  Littlefield 
V.  Morrill,  97  Maine  505,  54  Atl. 
1109. 

iSThis  lien  takes  precedence  of 
a  prior  mortgage.  Oliver  v.  Wood- 
man, 66  Maine  54.  The  rule  is  the 
same  under  analogous  statutes, — 
statutes,  for  instance,  giving  liens 
upon    vessels.      Deering    v.    Lord, 


713 


LUMBERMEN  S    LIENS. 


710 


Whoever  both  shores  and  runs  logs  by  himself,  his  servants 
or  agents,  has  a  lien  thereon  for  the  price  of  such  shoring 
and  running;  such  liens  continue  for  sixty  days  after  the 
logs  or  lumber  arrive  at  the  place  of  destination  for  sale  or 
manufacture,^^  and  may  be  enforced  by  attachment. ^^ 

The  officer  making  such  attachment  may  pay  the  boomage 
thereon,  not  exceeding  the  rate  per  thousand  on  the  quantity 
actually  attached  by  him,  and  return  the  amount  paid  on  the 
writ,  w^hich  shall  be  included  in  the  damages  recovered.  The 
action  or  lien  is  not  defeated  by  taking  a  note,  unless  it  is 
taken  in  discharge  of  the  amount  due  and  of  the  lien.  Such 
notice  of  the  suit,  as  the  court  orders,  shall  be  given  to  the 
owner  of  the  logs  or  lumber,  and  he  may  be  admitted  to 
defend  it.^^ 


45  Maine  293;  Perkins  v.  Pike,  42 
Maine  141,  66  Am.  Dec.  267;  Don- 
nell  V.  The  Starlight,  103  Mass. 
227;  The  Granite  State,  1  Sprague 
(U.  S.)  277,  278,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
5687. 

i^The  sixty  days  within  which 
attachment  must  be  made  do  not 
commence  to  run,  as  to  any  of 
the  logs  upon  which  the  lien 
exists,  until  all  the  logs  subject 
to  the  same  lien  have  arrived  at 
their  destination,  within  the  boom  : 
provided  the  logs  have  been 
driven  together,  and  the  driving 
has  not  been  suspended  after  a 
portion  of  them  has  reached  the 
boom,  but  has  been  continuously 
kept  up  until  all  the  logs  have 
been  driven  in.  Sheridan  v.  Ire- 
land, 66  Maine  65.  A  lien  is  given 
for  services  on  spool  timber  and 
spool  bars  for  sixty  days  after 
their  arrival  at  place  for  sale. 
Chamberlain  v.  Wood,  100  Maine 
IZ,  60  Atl.   706. 

20For    provisions     for     enforce- 


ment of  liens  by  attachment,  see 
post,  ch.  xxii,  §  1055.  A  laborer 
may  enforce  his  lien  by  attach- 
ment against  a  nonresident  con- 
tractor of  a  nonresident  owner. 
Plurede  v.  Levasseur,  89  Maine 
172,  36  Atl.  110. 

21  Such  notice  of  the  suit  is  im- 
perative, and  can  not  be  disre- 
garded. It  can  not  be  dispensed 
with,  though  there  be  an  appear- 
ance upon  the  docket  of  parties 
claiming  to  own  the  logs  or  lum- 
ber; for  the  court  can  not  judicial- 
ly know  whether  such  claimants 
are  the  owners,  without  giving 
a  notice  that  shall  be  binding  upon 
the  owner,  whoever  he  may  be. 
The  notice  ordered  should  be  a 
public  notice  by  posting  or  publi- 
cation, as  well  as  a  specific  notice 
to  the  supposed  owners.  Sheridan 
V.  Ireland,  61  Maine  486;  Parks  v. 
Crockett,  61  Maine  489.  These 
cases  differ  from  Bean  v.  Soper, 
56  Maine  297,  inasmuch  as  it  ap- 
pears  in  that  case  that  the  notice 


lO 


LIENS. 


714 


It  is  also  provided--  that  whoever  labors  at  cutting,  peel- 
ing, or  hauling  hemlock  bark  or  cutting,  yarding  or  hauling 
cordwood  or  pulpwood  or  any  wood  used  in  the  manufac- 
ture of  pulp-wood,  or  at  cooking  for  persons  engaged  in 
such  labor,  has  a  lien  thereon  for  the  amount  due  for  his  per- 
sonal services,  and  the  services  performed  by  his  team,  which 
takes  precedence  of  all  other  claims  and  continues  for  thirty 
days  after  the  contract  is  completed,  and  may  be  enforced 
by  attachment.  Whoever  labors  at  cutting,  hauling  or  saw- 
ing of  shingle,  stave,  lath,  or  dowel  timber  or  in  the  manu- 
facture of  shingle,  stave,  lath,  or  dowel  timber  into  shin- 
gles, staves,  laths,  or  dowels  and  the  piling  of  such  staves 
or  laths  and  the  bunching  of  such  shingles  or  dowels,  or 
at  cooking  for  persons  engaged  in  such  labor,  has  a  lien 
thereon  for  the  amount  due  for  his  personal  services  and 
the  services  performed  by  his  team,  which  takes  prece- 
dence of  all  other  claims,  continues  for  sixty  days  after  such 


required  by  statute  was  given.  See 
also,  Redington  v.  Frye,  43  Maine 
578,  587,  per  Cutting,  J.  As  to  the 
form  of  proceeding  and  practice 
relative  thereto,  see  Parks  v. 
Crockett.  61  Maine  489.  The  ac- 
tion, as  it  comes  through  a  con- 
tract, though  not  a  part  of  it, 
should  be  against  the  employer, 
whether  he  be  the  owner  of  the 
logs  or  not.  It  should  not  be 
against  the  owner  where  there  is 
no  contract  with  him.  Oliver  v. 
Woodman,  66  Maine  54.  The  ac- 
tion does  not  inure  to  a  tres- 
passer. Spofford  V.  True,  33  Maine 
283,  54  Am.  Dec.  621 ;  Doe  v.  Mon- 
son,  33  Maine  430;  Hamilton  v. 
Buck,  36  Maine  536.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  allege  in  the  writ 
the  ownership  of  the  logs,  or  that 
the  owner  is  unknown.     Parker  v. 


Williams,  77  Maine  418,  1  Atl.  138. 
Where  several  owners  separately 
employ  the  same  person  to  drive 
their  logs,  the  laborer's  lien  is  not 
upon  the  whole  mass  collectively, 
but  is  to  be  apportioned  pro  rata 
to  each.  Oliver  v.  Woodman,  66 
Maine  54;  Hamilton  v.  Buck,  36 
Maine  536;  Doyle  v.  True,  36 
Maine  542.  But  where  different 
owners  severally  employ  sufficient 
laborers  to  drive  their  respective 
logs,  the  lien  of  each  laborer  is 
confined  to  the  logs  he  is  employed 
to  drive,  although  all  the  logs  be- 
come intermingled  in  driving,  and 
are  collectively  driven  by  all  the 
laborers.  Doe  v.  Monson,  33 
Maine  430. 

-2Rev.    Stats.    1903,    ch.   93,    §    50, 
as  amended  by  Laws  1907,  p.  20. 


715  LUMBERMEN  S    LIENS.  §    7II 

timber,  shingles,  staves,  laths  and  dowels  are  manufactured, 
provided  the  same  have  not  been  sold  and  shipped.-' 

Whoever  labors  in  making  shovel  handle  blocks,  or  cuts 
or  furnishes  w^ood  for  shovel  handle  blocks,  or  is  engaged  in 
cooking  for  such  persons  engaged  in  such  labor,  or  fur- 
nishes a  team  for  hauling  said  shovel  handle  blocks  or  the 
lumber  from  which  they  are  made  has  a  lien  on  said  shovel 
handle  blocks  for  the  amount  due  him  for  his  personal  labor 
thereon,  or  the  services  of  his  team,  and  for  the  amount  due 
for  the  wood  so  cut  or  furnished  which  takes  precedence  of 
all  other  claims  except  liens  reserved  to  the  state,  continues 
for  thirty  days  after  said  shovel  handle  blocks  arrive  at  their 
destination  either  for  shipment  or  to  be  turned,  and  may  be 
enforced  by  attachment.-* 

§  711.  Maine  (continued).  Enforcement  of  the  lien.-' — 
Under  this  statute,  one  who  contracts  with  the  owner  of  the 
logs  has  a  claim  against  him  in  personam,  and  a  claim  in 
rem  against  the  logs.  The  proceeding  by  attachment  oper- 
ates in  both  ways  so  far  as  the  contractor  is  concerned.  But 
a  sub-contractor,  or  a  laborer  employed  by  the  contractor, 
has  no  claim  against  the  owner  in  personam,  but  only  a 
claim  against  the  property,  and  his  proceedings  must  be 
strictly  in  rem.  No  other  property  of  the  owner  is  liable 
except  that  upon  which  the  lien  attaches.  Therefore  a  sub- 
contractor or  laborer  must  obtain  a  valid  judgment  in  rem 
against  the  identical  logs  with  reference  to  which  the  labor 
was  done.^^    The  identity  of  claim  and  of  property  must  co- 

23Laws    1907,   p.   23,   as   amertded  ent    times.      Ouelette    v.    Fluff,    93 

by  Laws  1909,  p.  107.  Maine  168,  44  Atl.  616.    As  to  iden- 

2-iLaws   1909,  p.    106.  tifying  logs  in  the  writ,  see  Brogan 

25For    provisions    for    enforcing  v.    McEachern.    103    Maine    198.   68 

liens,  see     ch.     xxii.,     §  1055.     One  Atl.      822.        For      sufficiency      of 

who     labors     cutting     cord     wood  declaration    to   foreclose   lien   see. 

and  lumber   may  enforce   his    lien  Copp    v.    Copp,    103    Maine    51,   68 

by  an  action  in  rem  against  both  Atl.  458. 

the  wood  and  lumber  even  though  -<^Bicknell  v.  Trickey,  34  Maine 

the  lien  attaches  to  each  at  differ-  273;  Redington  v.  Frye,  43  Maine 


§    712  LIEKS.  716 

exist,  and  must  be  traceable  till  the  fruits  of  the  judgment 
have  been  obtained  by  satisfaction  of  the  execution.  The 
identity  of  the  property  must  be  established,  else  the  lien 
cannot  attach;  and  the  labor  must  be  shown  to  have  been 
done  upon  the  specific  property  seized.  The  attachment 
must  be  of  the  thing  upon  v^hich  the  lien  is  claimed,  and  the 
lien  must  be  established  by  a  valid  judgment.^'''  The  record 
of  the  judgment  must  show  that  the  logs  upon  which  the 
labor  was  expended  are  the  same  which  the  writ  commands 
to  be  attached,  and  which  were  attached.  The  officer's  re- 
turn of  an  attachment  of  logs  having  similar  marks  with 
those  described  in  the  plaintiff's  writ  and  declaration  does 
not  sufficiently  establish  the  identity;-^  but  such  identity  is 
sufficiently  established  if,  in  addition,  it  appears  that  all  the 
parties  interested  were  summoned  and  appeared,  and  ad- 
mitted the  truth  of  the  facts  set  forth  in  the  declaration,  and 
that  the  logs  described  therein  were  attached. ^^  Moreover, 
a  laborer's  claim  of  lien,  when  the  person  with  whom  he 
contracted  is  other  than  the  owner,  must  not  be  joined  in 
the  same  suit  with  a  claim  for  which  he  has  no  lien.  If  a 
judgment  embracing  both  claims  be  rendered,  the  lien  claim 
is  regarded  as  waived  or  merged.  The  lien  claim  and  the 
personal  claim  should  in  such  case  be  enforced  by  separate 
suits,  in  each  of  which  the  plaintiff  may  recover  costs. ^° 

§  712.  Michigan.^^ — Any  person  or  persons  who  perform 
any  labor  or  services  in  manufacturing  lumber  or  shingles 
in  or  about  any  lumber  or  shingle  mill,  or  in  cutting,  skid- 

578,  587.     The  lien  can  be  enforced  ^ogean  v.  Soper,  56  Maine  297. 

without  personal   service  on  a  de-  sogicknell  v.  Trickey,  34  Maine 

fendant    who    is   a   nonresident    of  273. 

the   state.      Plurede   v.    Levasseur,  siHowell's      Stats.      Ann.      1912, 

89  Maine   172,  2>6  Atl.   110.  §    13843.     This   act   covers   a   claim 

2"Annis    v.    Gilmore,    47    Maine  for    shingle-bands    furnished    to    a 

152.  contractor.       Bourgette      v.      Wil- 

-SThompson      v.      Gilmore,      50  liams.       7i       Mich.       208,      41      N. 

Maine  428.  W.  229.     It  does  not  cover  a  claim 


717 


LUMBERMEN  S    LIENS. 


§    712 


ding,  falling,  hauling,  scaling,  banking,  driving,  running, 
rafting,  or  booming^-  any  logs,  timber,  cedar  posts,  telegraph 
poles,  railroad  ties,  bark,  shingle-bolts,  stave-bolts,  staves, 
cord-wood,  pulp-wood,  hop-poles,  hoop-poles,  veneering 
wood,  or  any  other  forest  products  in  this  state,  or  in  haul- 
ing any  manufactured  forest  products  above  enumerated 
from  place  of  manufacture  to  place  where  deposited  for  ship- 
ment by  railroad  or  by  water,  or  to  any  other  place  of  desti- 
nation, has  a  lien  thereon,  for  the  amount  due  for  such  labor 
or  services,  and  the  same  shall  take  precedence  of  all  other 
claims  or  liens  thereon. ^^    The  word  person  or  persons  shall 


for  the  use  of  a  team  sold  on 
condition  that  the  vendor  should 
retain  title  until  the  price  was 
paid,  and  that,  upon  default,  he 
should  be  paid  for  its  use.  Mabie 
V.  Sines,  92  Mich.  545,  52  N.  W. 
1007.  It  does  not  give  a  lien  for 
hauling  lumber  from  the  mills 
after  it  is  manufactured.  Villenuve 
V.  Sines,  92  Mich.  556,  52  N.  W. 
1007.  The  vendee  of  logs  is  bound 
by  what  the  vendor  has  done  in 
accepting  work  done  under  a  con- 
tract with  another  and  can  not 
as  against  the  workman's  lien  as- 
sert nonperformance  of  the  con- 
tract. Kangas  v.  Boulton,  127 
Mich.  539,  86  N.  W.  1043.  As  to 
where  action  to  foreclose  lien 
must  be  begun,  see  Harris  v. 
Doyle,  130  Mich.  470,  90  N.  W.  293. 
See  also,  Kangas  v.  Boulton,  127 
Mich.  539,  86  N.  W.  1043. 

32  A  boom  company's  lien  is  ac- 
quired if  the  work  is  done  by  its 
agent,  though  the  agent  is  paid 
a  gross  sum  for  the  job.  Hall  v. 
Tittabawassee  Boom  Co.,  51  Mich. 
Zn,  16  N.  W.  770.  These  provi- 
sions cover  labor  performed  "in 
cutting,    skidding,    hauling,    chop- 


ping, sawing,  swamping,  loading, 
and  falling."  These  services  are 
in  substance  the  services  men- 
tioned in  the  statute.  Grand 
Rapids  Chair  Co.  v.  Runnels,  11 
Mich.  104,  ^43  N.  W.  1006.  A  jus- 
tice of  the  peace  does  not  have 
jurisdiction  of  a  suit  to  establish 
a  suit  by  attachment  under  the  law 
giving  liens  for  logging,  unless  a 
statement  of  the  lien  is  first  filed. 
Eales  V.  Francis,  115  Mich.  636, 
n  N.  W.  894. 

33A  boom  company  has  a  lien 
for  its  services  in  breaking  jams 
and  driving  logs  whose  owners 
have  not  put  on  a  sufficient  force 
of  laborers  to  do  the  work.  Hall 
V.  Tittabawassee  Boom  Co.,  51 
Mich.  Zll,  16  N.  W.  770.  Where 
the  logs  of  an  individual  owner 
have  become  intermingled  with 
those  in  charge  of  a  boom  com- 
pany without  his  consent,  but 
without  the  fault  of  the  company, 
the  latter  acquires  a  lien  for  its 
services  in  driving  them,  which 
it  does  not  waive  by  refusing  to 
deliver  them  to  the  owner  unless 
he  shall  tender  not  only  a  reason- 
able compensation  in  driving  them, 


■12 


LIENS. 


718 


be  interpreted  to  include  cooks,  blacksmiths,  artisans  and 
all  others  usually  employed  in  performing  such  labor  and 
services. 

A  statement  in  writing  under  oath  must  be  filed  in  the  of- 
fice of  the  clerk  of  the  county  where  the  drive  terminates, 
setting  forth  the  amount  due  and  a  description  of  the  prop- 
erty, within  thirty  days  from  the  completion  of  the  labor  or 
services.     The  lien  is  enforced  by  attachment. ^^ 


but  also  for  separating  his  logs 
from  the  others.  Hall  v.  Titta- 
wabassee  Boom  Co.,  51  Mich.  377, 
16  N.  \V.  770.  One  buying  lumber 
in  the  possession  of  sawyer  has 
the  burden  to  show  that  the  saw- 
yer's lien  for  sawing  had  been 
discharged.  German  v.  Central 
Lumber  Co.,  116  Mich.  245,  74  N. 
W.  644.  The  owner  of  lumber 
must  be  made  a  defendant  in  an 
attachment  proceeding  by  a  labor- 
er against  a  contractor.  Brabant 
V.  Lillie,  117  Mich.  167,  75  N.  W. 
440;  Sheridan  v.  Colton,  113  Mich. 
112,  71  N.  W.  479;  Newbauer  v. 
Newbauer,  112  Mich.  562,  70  N.  W. 
1104.  Where  a  sawyer  has  waived 
his  lien  on  a  part  of  lumber  by 
giving  the  possession  to  the  own- 
er, he  may  retain  a  lien  on  the 
remainder  of  the  lumber  for  his 
whole  bill.  German  v.  Central 
Lumber  Co.,  116  Mich.  245,  78  N. 
E.  1007.  The  log  lien  statute  giv- 
ing full  costs  in  justice's  court 
is  not  unconstitutional.  Lagoo  v. 
Seaman,  136  Mich.  418,  99  N.  W. 
393. 

34The  proceedings  to  enforce 
the  lien  must  conform  strictly  to 
the  statute.  The  affidavit  for  the 
attachment  is  jurisdictional,  and 
if  it  omits  material  averments  the 
writ  affords   no  protection  to  the 


officer  executing  it.  Woodruff  v. 
Ives,  34  Mich.  320.  Filing  and 
dismissing  proceedings  does  not 
constitute  an  estoppel.  Dowd  v. 
Dowd,  126  Mich.  649,  86  N.  W. 
128.  The  owner  of  logs  legally 
attached,  who  takes  them  and  con- 
verts them  into  lumber,  is  liable 
in  an  action  on  the  case,  or  in 
trover,  for  the  amount  of  the  lien. 
Goodrow  v.  Buckley,  70  Mich.  513, 
38  N.  W.  454.  The  lien  is  lost  if 
the  conditions  in  regard  to  the 
filing  of  a  statement  of  the  lien, 
and  commencing  suit  to  enforce  it, 
within  limited  periods,  are  not 
complied  with.  Haifley  v.  Haynes, 
27  Mich.  535.  A  short  layoff  at 
employer's  request  will  not  pre- 
vent Hen  for  entire  period.  Ham- 
mond V.  Pullman,  129  Mich.  567, 
89  N.  W.  358.  Lien  may  be  de- 
feated by  intentionally  overstat- 
ing claim.  Golden  v.  McCabe,  121 
Mich.  666,  80  N.  W.  1133.  See  also, 
Eales  V.  Francis,  115  Mich.  636, 
72,  N.  W.  894.  As  to  lien  and 
affidavit  where  several  laborers 
join  their  claims  for  laborer  per- 
formed for  a  contractor  upon  logs 
belonging  to  several  owners,  see 
Pack  V.  Circuit  Judge  of  Iosco 
County,  70  Mich.  135,  38  N.  W.  6; 
Wiggins  V.  Houghton,  89  Mich. 
468,  50  N.  W.  1005.    In  proceedings 


719 


LUMBERMEN  S    LIENS. 


§    713 


§  713.  Minnesota.^^ — Any  person  who  performs  manual 
labor  or  other  personal  service  for  hire,  in  or  in  aid  of  the 
cutting,  hauling,  banking,  driving,  rafting,  tov^ing,  cribbing, 


to  enforce  a  lien  by  attachment 
it  is  not  necessary  that  the  lumber 
should  be  appraised.  Ruggles  v. 
Muskegon  Circuit  Judge,  124  Mich. 
472,  83  N.  W.  149.  A  statement 
is  not  invalid  because  an  attempt 
is  made  to  include  claims  of 
others.  VanSlyck  v.  Arseneau,  140 
Mich.  154,  103  N.  W.  571.  See 
Clark  V.  Adams,  33  Mich.  159,  as 
to  service  of  notice,  and  general 
interpretation  of  the  lien  law^  of 
1873.  See  Grand  Rapids  Chair 
Co.  V.  Runnels,  77  Mich.  104,  43 
N.  W.  1006,  as  to  the  affidavit  for 
attachment,  the  service  of  the  writ 
of  attachment,  the  sherifif's  return, 
the  procedure  before  the  justice, 
and  the  levy  of  the  excution.  Also 
White  V.  Prior,  88  Mich.  647,  SO 
N.  W.  655.  Where  a  contract  for 
the  manufacture  of  shingles  was 
a  continuing  one,  and  the  shingles 
were  mingled  and  sold  by  the 
owner  without  regard  to  the  fact 
of  their  being  the  first  or  last 
manufactured,  the  manufacturer 
would  be  entitled  to  a  Hen.  on 
shingles  manufactured  prior  to  the 
time  up  to  which  he  had  been 
paid,  for  work  and  labor  there- 
after performed  in  such  manufac- 
ture. The  thirty  days  within  which 
the  statement  of  lien  shall  be  filed 
did  not  commence  to  run  from  the 
time  each  statement  of  the  amount 
due  was  rendered,  as  there  was 
but  one  contract.  Craddock  v. 
Dwight,  85  Mich.  587,  48  N.  W. 
644.  Under  the  provision  that  a 
proceeding  to  enforce  a  lien  on 
logs    shall    be    commenced    in    the 


county  where  the  property  or  any 
part  of  it  is  situated,  the  petition 
is  defective  if  it  does  not  allege 
that  the  logs,  or  some  part  of 
them,  are  within  the  county  where 
the  suit  is  begun.  The  court  can 
not  take  judicial  notice  that  the 
boom  is  within  the  county  so  as 
to  cure  the  omission  of  this  aver- 
ment. The  appearance  and  plea 
of  a  claimant  is  no  waiver  of 
the  defect,  for,  the  judgment 
sought  being  one  against  the  logs, 
the  court  must  have  actual  juris- 
diction. Pine  Saw  Logs  v.  Sias, 
43  Mich.  356,  5  N.  W.  414. 

35  Gen.  Stats.  1913,  §§  6265-6267; 
7058-7076.  Gen.  Laws  1897,  ch.  347 
(repealed  by  Laws  1899,  ch.  342), 
was  held  to  give  liens  to  con- 
tractors or  sub-contractors  for 
services  in  cutting,  banking 
or  hauling  logs.  Carver  v. 
Bagley,  79  Minn.  114,  81  N. 
W.  757.  A  company  sorting,  hand- 
ling and  collecting  logs  has  a  lien 
on  such  logs.  International  Boom 
Co.  v.  Rainy  Lake  River  Boom 
Corp.,  97  Minn.  513,  107  N.  W. 
735.  One  who  labors  in  cutting 
and  hauling  logs  has  a  lien  also 
for  labor  performed  by  his  ser- 
vants and  teams  under  a  monthly 
contract  price  for  both.  Breault 
V.  Archamboult,  64  Minn.  420,  67 
N.  W.  348,  58  Am.  St.  545.  One 
who  labors  in  taking  timber  out 
of  the  water  and  sorting  and  piling 
it  for  market  is  entitled  to  a  lien 
therefor.  Itasca  Cedar  &  Tie  Co. 
v.  Brainerd  Lumber  &  Mer- 
cantile      Co.,       109       Minn.       120, 


§    713  LIENS.  720 

or  booming  any  logs,  cross-ties,  poles,  or  other  timber,  shall 
have  a  lien  thereon  for  the  price  or  value  of  such  labor  or 
service,  which  shall  be  preferred  to  all  other  claims  on  the 
same  except  those  of  the  state  of  Minnesota  and  of  the  ow^ner 
or  occupant  of  the  land  from  which  the  same  may  have  been 
unlawfully  removed,  and  no  agreement  to  waive  such  lien 
shall  be  valid. 

A  statement  under  oath  by  the  claimant^*^  must  be  filed  in 
the  ofHce  of  the  surveyor-general  of  the  district,  setting  forth 
his  postoffice  address,  the  rate  of  compensation  agreed  upon 
or  claim.ed,  the  sums,  if  any,  paid  thereon,  the  date  of  the 
commencement  and  termination  of  such  labor,  the  amount 
or  balance  due,  a  description  of  the  logs  on  which  the  lien 
is  claimed,  and  the  fact  of  such  claim. 

For  labor  performed  between  the  first  day  of  October  and 
first  day  of  April  the  statement  must  be  filed  before  the  first 
day  of  May  next  thereafter;  and  for  labor  performed  in  any 
other  part  of  the  year  the  statement  must  be  filed  within 
thirty  days  after  completion  of  same. 

The  lien  is  enforced  by  an  attachment  against  such  logs 
or  lumber.  Before  the  attachment  is  issued,  the  claimant 
must  make  afBdavit  as  to  the  amount  of  indebtedness  se- 
cured by  the  lien  and  then  unpaid  and  give  the  name  of  the 

123   N.   W.   58.     A  seizure  of  logs  Sojf  the  statement  be  not  made 

on      attachment     to      foreclose      a  by  the  claimant,  it  must  be  made 

laborer's    lien    is    valid      if      made  by  some  one  with  authority  from 

by  the  sheriff  of  the  county  where  him    to    make     it,    and    the    oath 

they  are  situated.     Foley  v.  Mark-  should  state  such  authority.     Grif- 

ham,   60   Minn.  216,   62   N.   W.   125.  fin  v.  Chadbourne,  32  Minn.  126,  19 

An    action    for    damages    may    be  N.  W.  647;  Scott  v.  Holston  Lum- 

maintained    by    one     from    whom  ber   Co.   v.   Sharvey,  62  Minn.  528, 

logs  have  been  wrongfully  taken,  64  N.   W.    1132.     As   to   what   is  a 

depriving  him  of  his  lien  thereon.  sufficient   description   in    statement 

Breault   v.    Merrill    &   Ring   Lum-  of    lien,    see    Carver    v.    Crookston 

ber    Co.,    12    Minn.    143,    75    N.    W.  Lumber  Co.,  84  Minn.  79,  86  N.  W. 

122.  871. 


721 


LUMBERMEN  S    LIENS. 


713a 


debtor.    A  copy  of  the  lien  statement  shall  be  attached  there- 
to as  an  exhibit. ^^ 

It  is  further  provided,  that  this  act  is  intended  only  for  the 
protection  of  laborers  for  hire,  and  shall  not  inure  to  the 
benefit  of  any  person  interested  in  contracting,  cutting,  haul- 
ing, banking,  or  driving  logs  by  the  thousand. ^^ 

§  713a.  Mississippi.^^ — Every  employe  or  laborer  of  a  per- 
son, partnership,  or  a  corporation  engaged  in  operating  a 
sawmill,  planing  mill,  or  in  cutting  and  shipping  (or  rafting) 
timber,  shall  have  a  lien  on  all  such  lumber  and  timber  of  his 
employer,  for  his  wages  due  by  such  employer,  in  preterence 
to  all  other  debts  due  and  owing  from  the  owner  thereof. 
But  such  lien  shall  take  effect  as  to  purchasers  or  incum- 
brances for  a  valuable  consideration,  without  notice  thereof, 
only  from  the  time  of  commencing  suit  to  enforce  the  lien. 
This  lien  may  be  enforced  and  trial  and  judgment  had  in  the 
same  manner  as  the  lien  for  purchase-money  of  goods  is 
enforced.  This  lien  shall  expire  three  months  after  the  claim 
is  due  unless  judicial  proceedings  have  commenced  to  as- 
sert it. 


3"The  lien  can  only  be  enforced 
by  attachment  as  provided.  Griffin 
V.  Chadbourne,  32  Minn.  126,  19  N. 
W.  647.  As  to  evidence  admissi- 
ble to  show  right  to  lien  see  Lind- 
say &  Phelps  Co.  V.  Mullen,  176 
U.  S.  126,  44  L.  ed.  400,  20  Sup.  Ct. 
325.  The  lien  of  a  person  for 
boom  charges  on  logs  in  his  pos- 
session is  superior  to  claims  of 
a  bona  fide  purchaser.  Akeley  v. 
Miss.  &  R.  R.  Boom  Co.,  64  Minn. 
108,  69  N.  W.  208.  An  extension 
of  the  time  of  payment  will  re- 
lease a  lien.  Clough  v.  Mississippi 
&  R.  R.  Boom  Co.,  64  Minn.  87, 
66  N.  W.  200. 


.38  It  was  held  that  the  provision 
of  the  law  of  1876  (repealed  Laws 
1899,  ch.  342)  was  intended  to 
distinguish  the  contractor  who 
employs  others  to  do  the 
work  from  a  laborer  who  does 
the  work  himself,  and  should  be 
interpreted  as  if  it  read  that  it 
"shall  not  inure  to  the  benefit  of 
any  person  interested  in  contract- 
ing for  cutting,  hauling,  banking," 
etc.  King  v.  Kelley,  25  Minn.  522. 
But  see  Carver  v.  Bagley,  79 
Minn.  114,  81  N.  W.  757. 

-oLaws  1908.  ch.  131. 


46 


§    7^3^  LIENS,  722 

§  713b.  Missouri.^*^ — Corporations  and  persons  are  given 
liens  on  timber,  logs  and  other  floatables,  driven,  boomed, 
rafted  or  run  and  are  entitled  to  retain  the  possession  there- 
of, or  so  much  thereof  as  may  be  necessary  to  satisfy  the 
amount  due  for  such  booming  and  reasonable  charges  for 
driving,  rafting  or  running  of  such  logs,  timber,  lumber  and 
other  floatables  and  all  expenses  for  caring  for  the  same. 

§  713c.  Montana.^^ — Every  person  performing  labor  upon, 
or  who  shall  assist  in  obtaining  or  securing  saw  logs,  piling, 
railroad  ties,  cord  wood  or  other  timber,  has  a  lien  upon  the 
same,  and  upon  all  other  saw  logs,  piling,  railroad  ties,  cord 
wood  or  other  timber  which,  at  the  time  of  the  filing  of  the 
claim  or  lien  hereinafter  provided,  belonged  to  the  person  or 
corporation  for  whom  the  labor  was  performed,  for  the  work 
or  labor  done  upon  or  in  obtaining  or  securing  the  particular 
saw  logs,  piling,  railroad  ties,  cord  wood  or  other  timber  in 
said  claim  or  lien  described,  whether  such  work  or  labor  was 
done  at  the  instance  of  the  owner  of  the  same  or  his  agent,  or 
a  contractor  or  subcontractor  or  any  person  in  behalf  of  such 
owner  or  his  agent,  or  a  contractor  or  subcontractor.  The 
cook  in  a  logging  camp  shall  be  regarded  as  a  person  who  as- 
sists in  obtaining  or  securing  the  timber  herein  mentioned. 

Every  person  performing  work  or  labor  or  assisting  in 
manufacturing  saw  logs  and  other  timber  into  lumber  and 
shingles,  has  a  lien  upon  such  lumber  while  the  same  remains 
at  the  mill  where  it  was  manufactured,  or  in  the  possession 
or  under  the  control  of  the  manufacturer,  wdiether  such  work 
or  labor  was  done  at  the  instance  of  the  owner  of  such  logs 
or  his  agent  or  any  contractor  or  subcontractor  of  such 
owner. 

Any  person  who  shall  permit  another  to  go  upon  his  tim- 

40Rev.  Stats.  1909,  §  3467.  107    Pac.   898.     As    to    enforcement 

4iLaws   1899,  p.   126,  as  amended  of  lien,  see  Logan  v.  Billings  &  N. 

by  Laws  1909,  p.  66;  Lane  v.  Lane  R.  Co.,  40  Mont.  467,  107  Pac.  415. 

Potter  Lumber   Co.,  40  Mont.  541, 


723  lumbermen's  liens.  §  714 

ber  land  and  cut  thereon  saw  logs,  piling,  railroad  ties,  cord 
wood  or  other  timber,  has  a  lien  upon  the  same  for  the  price 
agreed  to  be  paid  for  such  privilege,  or  for  the  price  such 
privilege  w^ould  be  reasonably  vv-orth  in  case  there  was  no 
express  agreement  fixing  the  price. 

The  liens  herein  provided  for  are  preferred  liens  and  prior 
to  any  other  liens,  and  no  sale  or  transfer  of  any  saw  logs, 
piling,  railroad  ties,  cord  wood  or  other  timber  or  manufac- 
tured lumber  or  shingles  shall  divest  the  lien  thereon  as  here- 
in provided,  and  as  between  liens  provided  for  in  this  act 
those  for  work  and  labor  shall  be  preferred;  provided,  that 
as  between  liens  for  work  and  labor  claimed  by  several  la- 
borers on  the  same  logs  or  lot  of  logs  the  claim  or  claims 
for  work  or  labor  done  or  performed  on  the  identical  logs 
proceeded  against  to  the  extent  that  said  logs  can  be  identi- 
fied, shall  be  preferred  as  against  the  general  claims  of  lien 
for  work  and  labor  provided  for  above. 

§  714.  Nevada.^- — All  persons  who  shall  perform  work  or 
labor  upon  any  tract  or  tracts  of  lands,  by  cutting  or  cording 
the  wood  or  timber  growing,  or  being  thereon,  shall  have 
and  may  each,  respectively,  claim  and  hold  a  lien  upon  the 
wood  or  timber  so  cut  or  corded,  for  the  amount  in  value 
of  the  work  or  labor  so  performed,  by  retaining  possession 
of  the  same  until  the  whole  amount  due  for  such  work  or 
labor  shall  have  been  paid;  provided,  that  any  lien  claimed 
and  held,  as  aforesaid,  shall  be  deemed  to  be  waived,  unless 
an  action  be  brought  in  some  court  of  competent  jurisdiction, 
for  the  recovery  of  the  amount  for  which  such  lien  is  claimed 
as  security,  within  sixty  days  after  such  wood  or  timber 
shall  have  been  taken  into  possession  by  the  claimant;  and 
the  fact  that  such  lien  is  claimed,  shall  be  set  out  in  the  com- 
plaint, together  with  a  description  of,  and  the  number  of 
cords  of  wood,  or  feet  of  timber,  retained  in  possession  by 

42  Rev.  Laws  1912,  art.  2230. 


§    7^5  LIENS.  724 

the  claimant.  If  the  judgment  be  for  the  plaintiff  in  such 
action,  the  execution  shall  direct  the  same,  with  costs,  to  be 
satisfied  out  of  the  wood  or  timber  so  retained,  if  the  same 
shall  be  sufficient ;  if  not,  then  the  balance  to  be  satisfied  out 
of  any  other  property  of  the  defendant  in  the  same  manner 
provided  by  law.  In  all  cases  where  two  or  more  persons  are 
jointly  engaged  under  a  contract  or  employment,  in  cutting 
or  cording  wood  or  timber,  on  any  tract  or  tracts  of  land  in 
this  state,  any  one  of  such  persons  may  claim,  have,  hold  and 
enforce  a  lien,  for  all  the  work  or  labor  performed,  as  in  this 
section  provided,  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  other  persons 
jointly  interested  with  him;  in  such  cases,  in  all  actions 
brought  under  the  provisions  of  this  section,  it  shall  be  the 
duty  of  the  court,  in  case  the  judgment  shall  be  for  the  plain- 
tiff, to  designate  in  such  judgment  the  amount  due  each  of 
the  persons  interested. 

Possession  of  wood  or  timber  within  the  meaning  of  this 
section  shall  be  deemed  to  be  in  the  person  or  persons  cut- 
ting or  cording  wood  or  timber,  for  the  purposes  of  this  act, 
from  the  time  of  cutting  or  cording  the  same ;  and  shall  not 
be  deemed  to  have  been  released  or  yielded  by  the  person  or 
persons  performing  the  work  or  labor  as  herein  provided, 
except  such  person  or  persons,  by  word  or  act  clearly  and 
distinctly  declare,  or  evidence  his  or  their  intention  to  so  re- 
lease or  yield  possession;  and  in  cases  of  a  joint  contract  or 
employment,  the  possession  of  any  part  of  the  wood  or  tim- 
ber, cut  or  corded,  shall  not  be  deemed  yielded  or  released 
without  the  assent  of  all  the  persons  cutting  or  cording  the 
same,  manifested  as  in  this  section  provided.  Justices  of  the 
peace  shall  have  jurisdiction  of  all  actions  under  the  provi- 
sions of  this  act,  when  the  amount  claimed  does  not  exceed 
three  hundred  dollars. 

§  715.  New  Hampshire.*" — Any  person  who,  by  himself  or 
others,  or  by  teams,  shall  perform  labor  or  furnish  supplies 

-JsPub.  Stats.  &  Sess.  Laws  1901,   pp.  452,  453,  §§  12,  13,  16,  17. 


725  lumbermen's  liens.  §  715a 

to  the  amount  of  fifteen  dollars  or  more  toward  rafting,  driv- 
ing, cutting,  hauling,  sawing  or  drawing  wood,  bark,  lumber, 
or  logs,  or  toward  cooking  or  hauling  supplies  in  aid  of  such 
labor,  by  virtue  of  a  contract  with  the  owner  of  the  wood, 
bark,  lumber,  or  logs,  shall  have  a  lien  thereon  for  such  labor 
or  supplies,  which  lien  shall  take  precedence  of  all  prior 
claims  except  liens  on  account  of  public  taxes,  to  continue 
ninety  days  after  the  services  are  performed  or  supplies  fur- 
nished, and  may  be  secured  by  attachment. 

The  officer  making  such  attachment  may  pay  the  boomage 
thereon,  if  any,  and  return  the  amount  so  paid  on  the  writ, 
which  shall  be  included  in  the  damages  recovered. 

Any  person  who  shall,  by  himself  or  others,  perform 
labor  or  furnish  materials  to  the  amount  of  fifteen  dollars 
or  more  for  rafting,  driving,  cutting,  hauling,  [sawing]  or 
drawing  wood,  bark,  lumber,  or  logs,  by  virtue  of  a  contract 
with  an  agent,  contractor,  or  sub-contractor  of  the  owner, 
shall  have  a  lien  thereon  for  such  labor  or  supplies,  provided 
he  gave  notice  in  writing  to  the  owner  or  to  the  person 
having  charge  of  the  property  that  he  should  claim  such 
lien  before  performing  the  labor  or  furnishing  the  materials 
for  which  it  is  claimed.^* 

§715a.  New  York.^^ — It  is  provided  by  statute  that  one 
who  makes,  alters,  repairs,  or  in  any  w^ay  by  his  labor  adds 
to  the  value  of  personal  property  with  the  consent  or  at  the 
request  of  the  owner  shall  have  a  lien  on  such  article,  while 
lawfully  in  possession  thereof  for  his  reasonable  charges  -for 
the  work  done  and  materials  furnished,  and  may  retain  pos- 

44This    last    section    was    added  kins  v.  Rays,  68  N.  H.  164,  44  Atl. 

after    the    decision    in    Jacobs    v.  102,  72i  Am.  St.  554. 

Knapp,  SO  N.   H.  71.    In  an  action  45Birdseye's     C.     &     G.     Consol. 

to   enforce   a   lien   on   logs   a   gen-  Laws   1909,  p.   3228,   §   180;   O'Clair 

eral  description  of  the  logs  hauled  v.   Hale,  25  Misc.   (N.  Y.)  31,  affd. 

is  sufficiently  definite,   it  only  be-  35  App.   Div.   (N.  Y.)   77,  54  N.  Y. 

ing  necessary  to  identify  the  logs  S.  388. 
as   being   the   same   hauled.     Hop- 


§    715b  LIENS.  726 

session  thereof  until  such  charges  are  paid.  It  is  hehl  under 
this  statute  that  it  applies  only  to  skilled  labor  and  does  not 
refer  to  common  labor. 

§  715b.  North  Carolina.'**' — Every  person  doing  the  work 
of  cutting  or  sawing  logs  into  lumber,  getting  out  wood 
pulp,  acid  wood  or  tan  bark,  shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  said 
lumber  for  the  amount  of  wages  due  them,  and  the  said 
lien  shall  have  priority  over  all  other  claims  or  liens  upon 
said  lumber,  except  as  against  a  purchaser  for  full  value 
and  without  notice  thereof:  provided,  any  such  laborer  whose 
wages  for  thirty  or  less  number  of  days  performed  are  due 
and  unpaid  shall  file  notice  of  such  claim  before  the  nearest 
justice  of  the  peace  in  the  county  in  which  said  work  has 
been  done,  stating  the  number  of  days  of  labor  performed, 
the  price  per  day,  and  the  place  where  the  lumber  is  situate, 
and  the  person  for  whom  said  labor  was  performed,  which 
said  statement  shall  be  signed  by  the  said  laborer  or  his  at- 
torney, and  the  said  laborer  shall  also  give  to  the  owner 
thereof,  within  five  days  after  the  lien  has  been  filed  with 
the  justice  of  the  peace,  as  aforesaid,  a  copy  of  said  notice 
as  filed  with  the  said  justice  of  the  peace:  provided,  that  if 
the  owner  can  not  be  located,  that  notice  shall  be  given 
by  attaching  said  notice  on  the  logs  or  lumber,  wood  pulp, 
acid  wood  or  tan  bark  upon  which  the  labor  sued  for  was 
performed,  and  any  person  buying  said  lumber  or  logs,  wood 
pulp,  acid  wood  or  tan  bark  after  such  notice  has  been  filed 
with  the  nearest  justice  of  the  peace,  shall  be  deemed  to  have 
bought  the  same  with  notice  thereof,  but  no  action  shall 
be  maintained  against  the  owner  of  said  logs  or  lumber, 
wood  pulp,  acid  wood  or  tan  bark  or  the  purchaser  thereof 
under  the  provisions  of  this  section  unless  same  is  com- 
menced within  thirty  days  after  notice  is  filed  with  the  jus- 
tice of  the  peace  by  such  laborer,  as  above  provided. 

46Pub.  Laws  1913,  p.  242.  §  2023a. 


727  lumbermen's  liens.  §  716 

§  716.  Oregon. — Every  person  performing  labor  upon  or 
who  shall  assist  in  obtaining  or  securing  saw  logs,  spars, 
piles,  or  other  timber,  has  a  lien  upon  the  same  for  the  work 
or  labor  done  upon  or  in  obtaining  or  securing  the  same, 
whether  such  work  or  labor  was  done  at  the  instance  of  the 
owner  of  the  same  or  his  agent.  The  cook  in  a  logging- 
camp,  and  any  and  all  others  who  may  assist  in  or  about 
a  logging-camp,  shall  be  regarded  as  a  person  who  assists 
in  obtaining  or  securing  the  saw  logs,  spars,  piles,  or  other 
timber  mentioned  herein.  Every  person  performing  labor 
upon,  or  who  shall  assist  in  manufacturing  saw  logs  or 
other  timber  into  lumber,  has  a  lien  upon  such  lumber  while 
the  same  remains  at  the  yard  wherein  manufactured,  whether 
such  work  or  labor  was  done  at  the  instance  of  the  owner 
of  such  lumber  or  his  agent.  Any  person  who  shall  permit 
another  to  go  upon  his  timber  land  and  cut  thereon  saw 
logs,  spars,  piles,  or  other  timber  has  a  lien  upon  such  logs, 
spars,  piles,  and  timber  for  the  price  agreed  to  be  paid  for 
such  privilege,  or  for  the  price  such  privilege  or  the  stump- 
age  thereon  would  be  reasonably  worth,  in  case  there  was 
no  express  agreement  fixing  the  price.  Persons  entitled 
to  such  liens  are  only  entitled  to  them  during  the  six  months 
next  preceding  the  filing  of  the  claims.*'^ 

4"Bellinger  &  Cotton's  Ann.  does  not  carry  the  lien.  Alderson 
Codes  &  Stats.,  §§  5677-5692.  As  to  v.  Lee,  52  Ore.  92,  96  Pac.  234.  As 
filing  of  claim  and  bringing  of  suit  to  the  right  of  the  owner  of  stand- 
and  sale  of  property,  see  §§  7-18  of  ing  timber  to  give  a  lien  by  agree- 
above  act.  One  who  renders  logs  ment  on  the  lumber  to  be  manu- 
impossible  of  identification  upon  factured  from  them,  for  advances 
which  another  has  a  lien  is  liable  to  aid  him  in  manufacturing  such 
to  the  lienholder  for  damages  for  lumber,  see  Goodnough  Mercan- 
an  amount  equal  to  the  sum  se-  tile  &  Stock  Co.  v.  Galloway,  156 
cured  by  the  lien.  Bellinger  &  Fed.  504.  Laborer  may  have  a  lien 
Cotton's  Ann.  Codes  and  Stats.,  for  a  specified  time  without  filing 
§  5692;  Willett  v.  Kinney,  54  his  claim.  The  assignment  of  the 
Ore.  594,  104  Pac.  719.  The  laborer's  claim  carries  also  the 
right  to  a  laborer's  lien  is  per-  lien.  Fischer  v.  G.  W.  Cone  Lum- 
sonal  and  an  assignment  thereof  ber  Co.,  49  Ore.  277,  89  Pac.  IZl. 
prior  to  the  recording  of  the  lien 


§    71?  LIENS. 


/-< 


§717.  Vermont.^^ — A  person  cutting  or  drawing  logs, 
acting  under  a  contract  with  the  owner  thereof,  shall  have 
a  lien  thereon  for  his  wages,  which  shall  have  precedence  of 
other  claims  except  public  taxes,  and  continue  sixty  days 
after  the  services  are  performed.  Such  lien  shall  not  at- 
tach until  the  person  claiming  it  files  in  the  town  clerk's 
ofifice  of  the  town  where  he  performed  the  services,  or,  if 
the  town  is  not  organized,  in  the  county  clerk's  office,  a 
brief  statement  of  the  contract  under  which  he  claims  a  lien, 
and  his  purpose  to  enforce  it  against  the  property  for  the 
amount  due  for  such  service. 

Such  lien  shall  have  no  validity  against  a  subsequent  pur- 
chaser unless  a  suit  is  brought  and  the  logs  attached  thereon 
within  thirty  days  from  the  time  the  plaintiff's  right  of  ac- 
tion accrues  against  the  person  for  whom  he  performed  the 
services,  and  shall  be  vacated  as  to  all  persons,  unless  a  suit 
is  brought  and  the  logs  attached  thereon  within  sixty  days 
from  such  time. 

Such  attachment  shall  be  made  by  leaving  a  copy  of  the 
process  in  the  town  clerk's  office  of  the  town  where  the 
services  were  performed  and  also  where  the  logs  are,  and, 
if  either  town  is  unorganized,  in  the  county  clerk's  office. 

§718.  Washington.^^ — Every  person  performing  labor 
upon  or  who  shall  assist  in  obtaining  or  securing  saw  logs, 

■isPub.  Stats.  1906,  §§  2654-2656.  Grimm  v.    Pacific   Creosoting   Co., 

49Remington  &  Ballinger's  Ann.  50  Wash.  415,  97  Pac.  297.    No  lien 

Codes   &  Stats.   1910,   §§    1162-1172.  on  logs  for  boom  chains  furnished 

Such  lien  is  a  primary  claim  on  the  for    use    in    logging.     Braeger    v. 

property.    Casey  v.  Ault,  4  Wash.  Bolster,    60    Wash.    579,    111     Pac. 

167,  29  Pac.  1048;  Cross  v.  Dore,  20  797.        Where      ties      are      cut      in 

Wash.     121,     54     Pac.   1003;     Blu-  the  woods  no  lien  thereon  is  se- 

mauer   v.    Clock,  24  Wash.  596,  64  cured    under   the   statute   giving  a 

Pac.  844,  85  Am.   St.  966.    Loss  of  lien  for  labor  upon  the  manufac- 

possession     and     dominion      over  ture  of  timber  at  a  mill.  Forsberg 

property  w^aives  a  lien.     Anderson  v.  Lundgren,  64  Wash.  427,  117  Pac. 

V.   Tingley,  24  Wash.  537,   64   Pac.  244.    One  employed   to  cut  timber 

747,    85    Am.    St.    959.      See    also,  into  logs  has  a  lien  for  his  v^rork. 


729 


LUMBERMEN  S    LIENS. 


7i8 


spars,  piles,  cordwood,  shingle  bolts,  or  other  timber,  and 
the  owner  or  owners  of  any  tugboat,  or  towboat,  which  shall 
tow  or  assist  in  towing,  from  one  place  to  another  within 
this  state,  any  saw  logs,  spars,  piles,  cordwood,  shingle 
bolts,  or  other  timber,  and  the  owner  or  owners  of  any  team 
or  any  logging  engine,  which  shall  haul  or  assist  in  hauling 
from  one  place  to  another  within  this  state,  any  saw  logs, 
spars,  piles,  cord  wood,  shingle  bolts,  or  other  timber,  and 
the  owner  or  owners  of  any  logging  or  other  railroad  over 
which  saw  logs,  spars,  piles,  cordwood,  shingle  bolts,  or 
other  timber  shall  be  transported  and  delivered,  shall  have 
a  lien  upon  the  same  for  the  work  or  labor  done  upon,  or  in 
obtaining  or  securing,  or  for  services  rendered  in  towing, 
transporting,  hauling,  or  driving,  the  particular  saw  logs, 
spars,  cordwood,  shingle  bolts,  or  other  timber  in  said  claim 


O'Connor  v.  Burnham,  49  Wash. 
443,  95  Pac.  1013;  O'Brien  v.  Per- 
fection Pile  Preserving  Co.,  49 
Wash.  395,  95  Pac.  489.  For  evi- 
dence held  sufificient  to  establish 
logging  lien,  see  Cascade  Boom 
Co.  V.  McNeeley  Logging  Co.,  Zl 
Wash.  203,  79  Pac.  793.  A  laborer 
who  cuts  and  delivers  logs  to  a 
saw^  mill  has  a  lien  on  the  logs 
that  can  be  enforced.  Remington 
&  Ballinger's  Ann.  Codes  &  Stat. 
1910,  §  1162;  Graham  v.  Gardner, 
45  Wash.  648,  89  Pac.  171.  No  lien 
can  be  enforced  against  logs  not 
belonging  to  an  employer  or  his 
vendee.  Duggan  v.  Smith,  27  Wash. 
702,  68  Pac.  356.  No  lien  can  be 
acquired  on  fence  posts  by  merely 
hauling  them  from  the  factory  to 
the  vendee.  Ryan  v.  Guilfoil,  13 
Wash.  373,  43  Pac.  351.  As  to  suffi- 
ciency of  a  lien  notice,  see  Mc- 
Pherson  v.  Smith,  14  Wash.  226,  44 
Pac.  255.  An  attorney  fee  may  be 
allowed   to   plaintiff's    attorney    in 


foreclosing  a  lien.  Ivall  v.  Willis, 
17  Wash.  645,  50  Pac.  467.  See  also, 
Marlette  v.  Crawford,  17  Wash. 
603,  50  Pac.  495.  A  partnership  in 
possession  of  shingles  can  enforce 
its  lien  for  manufacturing  them. 
Munroe  v.  Sedro  Lumber  &  Shin- 
gle Co.,  16  Wash.  694,  48  Pac.  405. 
See  also,  Hadlock  v.  Shumway,  11 
Wash.  690,  40  Pac.  346.  A  logger's 
lien  is  allowable  for  services  in 
blasting  rock  to  clear  a  passage 
for  logs.  Duggan  v.  Washougal 
Land  &  Logging  Co.,  10  Wash.  84, 
38  Pac.  856.  Lienholders  may  join 
in  an  action  for  damages  for  the 
destruction  of  logs  subject  to  their 
liens.  Peterson  v.  Sayward,  9 
Wash.  503,  Z1  Pac.  657.  As  to  what 
is  necessary  to  aver  in  a  complaint 
for  conversion  of  logs,  see  Liv- 
ingston V.  Lovgren,  27  Wash.  102, 
67  Pac.  599.  As  to  awarding  costs 
in  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  lien,  see 
Fraser  v.  Rutherford,  26  Wash.  658, 
67  Pac.  Z(£. 


§    7l8  LIENS.  .  730 

of  lien  described,  whether  such  work,  labor  or  services  was 
done,  rendered  or  performed  at  the  instance  of  the  owner  of 
the  same  or  his  agent.  The  cook  in  a  logging-camp  shall 
be  regarded  as  a  person  who  assists  in  obtaining  or  securing 
the  timber  herein  mentioned. 

Every  person  performing  work  or  labor  upon  or  assisting 
in  manufacturing  saw  logs  and  other  timber  into  lumber  and 
shingles,  has  a  lien  upon  such  lumber  while  the  same  remains 
at  the  mill  where  it  was  manufactured  or  in  the  possession  or 
under  the  control  of  the  manufacturer,  whether  such  work  or 
labor  was  done  at  the  instance  of  the  owner  of  such  logs  or 
his  agent  or  any  contractor  or  subcontractor  of  such  owner. 

Any  person  who  shall  permit  another  to  go  upon  his 
timber  land  and  cut  thereon  saw  logs,  spars,  piles  or  other 
timber,  has  a  lien  upon  the  same  for  the  price  agreed  to  be 
paid  for  such  privilege,  or  for  the  price  such  privilege  would 
be  reasonably  worth  in  case  there  was  no  e  xpress  agreement 
fixing  the  price. 

These  liens  are  preferred  liens,  and  are  prior  to  any  other 
liens,  and  no  sale  or  transfer  of  any  saw  logs,  spars,  piles  or 
other  timber  or  manufactured  lumber  or  shingles  shall  divest 
the  lien  thereon. 

The  person  rendering  the  service  of  [or]  doing  the  work  or 
labor  named  above  is  only  entitled  to  the  liens  as  provided 
herein  for  services,  work  or  labor  for  the  period  of  eight  cal- 
endar months,  or  any  part  thereof  next  preceding  the  filing  of 
the  claim. 

The  person  granting  the  privilege  to  another  to  cut  logs 
upon  his  land  is  only  entitled  to  the  lien  as  provided  herein 
for  saw  logs,  spars,  piles  and  other  timber  cut  during  the 
eight  months  next  preceding  the  filing  of  the  claim  as  here- 
inafter provided. 

Every  person  within  thirty  days  after  the  close  of  the 
rendition  of  the  services,  or  after  the  close  of  the  work  or 
labor  hereinbefore  mentioned,  claiming  the  benefit  hereof, 
must  file  for  record  with  the  county  auditor  of  the  county  in 


731  lumbermen's  liens.  §  719 

which  such  saw  logs,  spars,  piles  and  other  timber  were  cut,  or 
in  which  such  lumber  or  shingles  were  manufactured,  a  claim 
containing  a  statement  of  his  demand,  and  the  amount  there- 
of, after  deducting  as  nearly  as  possible  all  just  credits  and 
offsets,  with  the  name  of  the  person  by  whom  he  was  em- 
ployed, with  a  statement  of  the  terms  and  conditions  of  his 
contract,  if  any,  and  in  case  there  is  no  express  contract,  the 
claim  shall  state  what  such  service,  work  or  labor  is  reason- 
ably worth ;  and  it  shall  also  contain  a  description  of  the 
property  to  be  charged  with  the  lien  sufificient  for  identifica- 
tion with  reasonable  certainty,  which  claim  must  be  verified 
by  the  oath  of  himself  or  some  other  person  to  the  effect  that 
the  affiant  believes  the  same  to  be  true.^*^ 

Every  person  claiming  the  benefit  of  the  lien  for  the  pur- 
chase-price of  timber  must  file  for  record,  with  the  county 
auditor  of  the  county  in  which  such  saw  logs,  spars,  piles 
or  other  timber  were  cut,  a  claim  in  substance  the  same  as 
provided  in  the  preceding  paragraph,  and  verified  as  therein 
provided. 

No  lien  above  provided  for  binds  any  saw  logs,  spars,  piles 
or  other  timber,  or  lumber  and  shingles,  for  a  longer 
period  than  eight  calendar  months  after  the  claim  has  been 
filed,  unless  a  civil  action  be  commenced  in  a  proper  court 
within  that  time  to  enforce  the  same. 

§  719.  Wisconsin.^^ — Any  person  who  shall  do  or  perform 
any  labor  or  services  in  cutting,  hauling,  running,   felling, 

50  The  form  of  the  claim  is  given  ment    after    such    notice    is    filed, 

in  the  statute.    As  to  sufficiency  of  Casey  v.  Ault,  4  Wash.  167,  29  Pac. 

description    of    the    property,    see  1048.    Even  if  a  part  of  the  logs  on 

Casey  v.  Ault,  4  Wash.  167,  29  Pac.  vv^hich  there  is  a  lien  are  sawed  be- 

1048;  Dexter  v.  Sparkman,  2  Wash.  fore  the  commencement  of  the  suit 

165,  25  Pac.  1070;  Dexter  v.  Wiley,  to  foreclose  there  may  be  a  fore- 

2  Wash.    171,  25   Pac.   1071;    Doyle  closure    on    the    1  >gs    not    sawed. 

V.    McLeod,   4   Wash.    732,   31    Pac.  Gray's   Harbor  Boom  Co.  v.  Lytle 

96.    While  the  inchoate  right  of  a  Logging     &     Mercantile     Co.,     36 

laborer's  lien  before  the  filing  of  Wash.  151,  78  Pac.  795. 

the  notice  cannot  be  assigned,  the  siStat.     1898,     §§     3329-3342b,     as 

lien  becomes  the  subject  of  assign-  amended  by  Laws  1913,  p.  255.    As 


719 


LIENS. 


732 


piling,  driving,  rafting,  booming,  cribbing,  towing,   sawing, 
.peeling,  or  manufacturing  into  lumber  or  timber  any  logs. 


to  service  by  publication,  see  Cox 
V.  North  Wisconsin  Lumber  Co., 
81  Wis.  141,  51  X.  W.  1130.  As  to 
the  mode  of  enforcing  such  lien, 
see  Stat.  1898,  §  3331.  As  to  the  de- 
scription of  the  property  in  the 
judgment,  see  Paulsen  v.  Ingersoll, 
62  Wis.  312,  22  N.  W.  477.  The 
lien  attaches  when  the  labor  is 
performed  and  the  failure  to  file 
the  claim  in  the  lifetime  of  claim- 
ant will  not  defeat  the  lien.  Oiles 
V.  Green,  91  Wis.  217,  64  N.  W. 
856.  As  to  levy  by  officer  upon 
logs  not  within  his  county,  see 
Shafer  v.  Hogue,  70  Wis.  392,  35 
N.  W.  928.  The  petition  for  a  lien 
may  be  amended.  Stacy  v.  Bryant, 
7i  Wis.  14,  40  N.  W.  632;  Murphy 
v.  Adams,  71  Maine  113,  2)6  Am. 
Rep.  299.  A  lien  is  also  given  for 
labor  in  cutting,  peeling,  or  hauling 
bark.  Rev.  Stat.  1898,  §  3329.  As 
to  time  within  which  petition  must 
be  filed,  see  Cuer  v.  Ross,  49  Wis. 
652,  6  N.  W.  331.  As  to  evidence 
of  time  when  petition  was  filed, 
see  Minton  v.  Underwood  Lumber 
Co..  79  Wis.  646,  48  N.  W.  857.  The 
statutes  of  1898,  §  3329,  giving  liens 
to  laborers  for  services  in  manu- 
facturing lumber,  give  no  lien  for 
hauling  lumber  from  the  mill  after 
it  is  sawed.  McGeorge  v.  Stanton- 
DeLong  Lumber  Co.,  131  Wis.  7, 
110  N.  W.  788.  Where  one  hires 
his  team  to  another  to  be  used  in 
hauling  logs  but  does  not  accom- 
pany the  team  in  person  or  by 
servant  he  can  have  no  lien  on  the 
logs  for  the  hire  of  his  team.  Ed- 
ward V.  H.  B.  Waite  Lumber  Co., 
108  Wis.  164,  84  N.  W.  150,  81  Am. 


St.  884.  One  who  works  in  build- 
ing and  repairing  a  logging  rail- 
road is  not  entitled  to  a  lien  on 
lumber  manufactured  from  logs 
hauled  thereon.  Carpenter  v. 
Bayfield  Western  Ry.  Co.,  107 
W^is.  611,  83  X.  W.  764.  One 
may  have  a  lien  for  incident- 
ally repairing  machinery  used 
in  manufacturing  lumber  while 
engaged  in  the  work  of  man- 
ufacturing logs  into  lumber.  Engi 
V.  Harden,  123  Wis.  407,  100  N.  W. 
1046.  A  prior  statute  gave  a  lien 
on  logs  and  timber,  but  not  upon 
lumber.  "While  the  property  re- 
mains in  the  form  of  logs  or  tim- 
ber, it  can  easily  be  traced,  de- 
scribed, and  identified  by  reference 
to  location  and  marks;  but  after  it 
is  cut  or  sawed  into  lumber,  it  be- 
comes more  portable,  more  liable 
to  be  scattered,  and  more  difficult 
to  describe  or  identify.  It  also 
then  becomes  more  peculiarly  an 
article  of  commerce,  and  more  lia- 
ble to  pass  into  the  hands  of  inno- 
cent purchasers."  Babka  v.  Eldred, 
47  Wis.  189,  2  N.  W.  102,  559.  See 
also,  Arians  v.  Brickley,  65  Wis. 
26,  26  N.  W.  288,  56  Am.  Rep.  611. 
The  word  "timber,"  however,  in- 
cludes railroad  ties.  These  are 
usually  made  from  the  stems  of 
small  trees.  They  are  as  much 
timber  as  squared  sticks  of  tim- 
ber. Kollock  V.  Parcher,  52  Wis. 
393.  9  N.  W.  67.  If  the  jury  find 
that  part  of  the  labor  for  which  a 
lien  is  sought  was  done  on  logs 
other  than  defendant's,  then  they 
should  find  how  much  was  done  on 
other  logs,  and  charge  defendant's 


7Z2> 


LUMBERMEN  S    LIENS. 


§    719 


timber,  stave  bolts,  heading,  staves,  pulp  wood,  cord  wood, 
firewood,    railroad    ties,    piling,    telegraph   poles,    telephone 


logs  only  with  the  labor  done  on 
them.  The  lien  attaches  and  can 
be  enforced  only  on  the  logs  on 
which  it  was  performed,  whether 
it  be  for  cutting,  hauling,  running, 
driving,  or  rafting.  It  is  a  specific 
lien  on  the  identical  thing  upon 
which  the  labor  is  performed. 
Minton  v.  Underwood  Lumber 
Co.,  79  Wis.  646,  48  N.  W. 
857;  Losie  v.  Underwood  Lumber 
Co.,  79  Wis.  631,  48  N.  W.  858.  One 
holding  a  lien  on  logs  may  en- 
force his  lien  for  all  of  his  claim 
on  a  part  only  of  the  logs.  Blonde 
V.  Menominee  Bay  Shore  Lumber 
Co.,  106  Wis.  540,  82  N.  W.  552.  A 
creditor  of  a  laborer  has  no  lien 
on  the  property  of  the  laborer's 
employer.  Hyde  v.  German  Nat. 
Bank,  115  Wis.  170,  91  N.  W.  230. 
The  owner  of  property  against 
which  a  lien  is  enforced  is  not 
personally  liable  in  damages.  St. 
Croix  Timber  Co.  v.  Joseph,  142 
Wis.  55,  124  N.  W.  1049.  As  to  sup- 
plies, see  Stat.  1898,  §  3342;  Gar- 
land V.  Hickey,  75  Wis.  178,  43  N. 
W.  832.  Under  a  statute  giving  a 
lien  to  one  furnishing  any  supplies 
in  such  business,  one  who  cooks 
food  for  the  men  at  work  on  the 
logs  directly  is  entitled  to  a  lien 
thereon  for  his  wages.  Young  v. 
French,  35  Wis.  Ill;  Winslow  v. 
Urquhart,  39  Wis.  260.  The  word 
"supplies"  also  includes  the  board 
of  the  men,  even  when  furnished 
at  a  hotel  in  a  city  several  miles 
from  the  place  where  they  are  at 
work,  if  the  charges  for  such  board 
are  reasonable  for  men  so  en- 
gaged.   Kollock  V.  Parcher,  52  Wis. 


393,  9  N.  W.  67.  Neither  the  resi- 
dence of  the  person  furnishing  the 
supplies,  nor  the  place  where  they 
are  delivered  to  the  person  who 
uses  them,  is  material  under  this 
provision.  Patten  v.  Northwestern 
Lumber  Co.,  72,  Wis.  233,  41  N.  W. 
82.  A  vendor  of  supplies  for  a  log- 
ging-camp, which  were  actually 
used  by  the  purchasers  in  getting 
out  logs,  is  entitled  to  a  lien  on 
the  logs  for  the  amount  due,  al- 
though the  supplies,  before  being 
so  used,  were  placed  by  the  pur- 
chasers in  their  store  to  be  sold  to 
their  employes  and  others  at  a 
profit.  Stacy  v.  Bryant,  72)  Wis.  14, 
40  N.  W.  632.  Under  Stat.  1898, 
§  3342,  providing  that  no  lien  shall 
be  had  on  logs  for  "supplies,"  there 
can  be  no  lien  for  board  furnished 
men  employed  in  getting  out,  raft- 
ing, or  running  the  logs.  Section 
3341,  giving  a  lien  to  all  persons 
performing  services  by  cooking 
food  for  men  performing  labor  on 
logs,  does  not  give  a  lien  to  one 
who  contracts  to  board  the  men. 
Where  an  action  to  enforce  a  lien 
is  based  on  a  contract  for  furnish- 
ing board  to  the  men  at  a  stipu- 
lated price,  there  can  be  no  ap- 
portionment separating  the  value 
of  the  food  from  the  labor  in  pre- 
paring it,  and  giving  plaintiff  a 
lien  for  his  services  as  cook.  Brad- 
ford v.  Underwood  Lumber  Co., 
80  Wis.  50,  48  N.  W.  1105.  See 
Abraham  v.  Agnew,  83  Wis.  246, 
53  N.  W.  504,  as  to  liens  for  sup- 
plies under  the  above  statute  in 
Douglas  County.  No  lien  accrues 
under  the  logging  statute  in  favor 


§  719a  LiExs.  734 

poles,  fence  posts,  paving  timber,  tan  or  other  barks  or 
in  preparing  wood  for  or  manufacturing  charcoal,  shall  have 
a  lien  upon  such  material  for  the  amount  due  or  to  become 
due  for  any  such  labor  or  services,  which  lien  shall  take 
precedence  of  all  other  claims,  liens  or  incumbrances  there- 
on or  sales  thereof,  whether  such  claims,  liens,  incumbrances, 
or  sales  are  made,  created,  or  accrued  before  or  after  the 
time  of  doing  such  work,  labor,  and  services. 

§  719a.  Wyoming.^^ — All  lien  claims  for  labor  performed 
in  cutting  or  manufacturing  railroad  cross-ties,  wood,  poles, 
or  lumber,  or  for  doing  any  labor  in  reference  thereto,  shall 
be  concurrent  liens  upon  the  same,  and  shall  be  paid,  pro 
rata,  out  of  the  proceeds  arising  from  the  sale  thereof,  if 
the  same  be  sold. 

Persons  entitled  to  a  lien  for  labor  performed  in  cutting 
or  manufacturing  any  railroad  cross-ties,  wood,  poles,  or 
lumber  shall  not  be  required  to  identify  any  particular  tie 
or  ties,  or  sticks,  poles,  or  boards,  but  may  maintain  their 
lien  against  any  or  all  of  that  class  of  property  owned  and 
held  by  the  person  or  persons  from  whom  their  pay  for 
such  labor  is  due,  and  may  seize  and  sell  the  same. 

§  720.  Liens  for  services  or  manual  labor  depend  on 
statutes. — Whether  this  lien  be  merely  for  the  personal  serv- 
ices or  manual  labor  of  the  claimant,  as  is  the  case  under 

of  one  for  labor  in  constructing  a  logs  for  labor  in  their  cutting  may- 
mill  and  the  appurtenances  there-  enforce  collection  of  his  entire 
to.  Kendall  v.  Hynes  Lumber  Co..  claim  out  of  any  part  of  the  logs 
96  Wis.  659,  71  N.  W.  1039.  The  subject  to  such  lien.  De  Morris 
lien  appertains  to  wages  earned  v.  Wilbur  Lumber  Co.,  98  Wis. 
and  in  no  sense  to  damages  sus-  465.  74  N.  W.  105. 
tained  by  reason  of  breach  ot  con-  52Comp.  Stat.  1910,  §§  3767,  3768. 
tract  of  the  employer  to  employ  As  to  manner  of  enforcing  such 
labor.  Kennedy  v.  South  Shore  liens,  see  Turner  v.  Horton,  18 
Lumber  Co..  102  Wis.  284,  78  N.  Wyo.  281,  106  Pac.  688. 
W.  567.    One  entitled  to  a  lien  on 


735  lumbermen's  liens.  §  721 

the  statutes  of  Maine^^  and  Vermont, ^^  or  includes  services 
performed  by  his  servants  and  teams,  as  is  the  case  under 
the  statutes  of  New  Hampshire'"'^''*  and  of  Wisconsin, ^^  de- 
pends much  upon  the  terms  of  the  statutes,  though  statutes 
substantially  in  the  same  terms  have  received  diverse  inter- 
pretations in  different  states.  In  the  latter  state  the  Su- 
preme Court  has  declared  that  the  words  "labor  and  ser- 
vices" in  a  statute  giving  a  lien  should  be  construed  as 
broadh^  as  their  common  use  will  allow;  and  without  other 
restrictive  words  this  language  would  include  labor  and 
services  performed  by  servants  and  agents,  as  well  as  per- 
sonally, just  as,  in  the  common  coynt  in  assumpsit  for  work 
and  labor  done,  recovery  may  be  had  for  work  and  labor  not 
personally  and  manually  performed  by  the  plaintiff.^''' 

§  721.  Rule  by  statutes  in  some  states. — In  some  states 
it  is  held  that  a  laborer  has  a  lien  upon  the  logs  and  lumber 
benefited  by  his  work,  whether  such  work  was  performed 
under  a  contract  with  the  owner  or  not;  and  that,  where 
the  labor  in  such  case  is  not  employed  by  the  general  owner 
of  the  logs,  the  latter  is  not  required  to  be  made  a  party 
to  the  action  to  enforce  the  lien.  In  Wisconsin  it  was  de- 
clared that  the  owner  in  such  a  case  is  not  deprived  of  his 
day  in  court,  but  that  he  may  bring  an  action  against  the 
officer  who  has  seized  the  logs  at  the  suit  of  the  lien  claimant, 
and  is  entitled  to  show  in  such  action  that  there  was  collu- 
sion between  such  lien  claimant  and  his  employer,  or  that 
the  amount  adjudged  to  be  due  the  former,  in  his  action 
against  his  employer,  was  not  in  fact  due  him.^^    This  view 

^3The    present    statute    includes  ^^Hogan  v.  Gushing,  49  Wis.  169, 

the  amount   due   for  services  per-  5  N.  W.  490.     See  post,  §  724. 

formed  by  the  laborer's  team.    See  ^THogan  v.  Gushing,  49  Wis.  169, 

ante,  §  710.  5  N.  W.  490,  per  Orton,  J. 

siSee  ante,  §  717.  "^s Hunger  v.  Lenroot,  32  Wis.  541, 

^^•See    ante,    §    715,    expressly    so  Dixon,    C.    J.,    dissenting    and    ap- 

provided.  proving  of  Jacobs  v.  Knapp,  50  N. 

H.  71. 


§    721  LIENS.  736 

was  adhered  to  in  a  later  decision  which  affirmed  the  con- 
stitutionality of  the  statutes  declaring  such  lien.''^ 

On  the  other  hand,  the  authorities  generally  hold  that  the 
lien  is  limited  to  the  party  who  contracts  with  the  owner 
of  the  property  upon  which  the  labor  of  the  contractor  and 
all  his  subcontractors  or  servants  is  expended,  unless  the 
statute  expressly  or  impliedly  includes  the  latter.^*'  At  com- 
mon law,  the  lien  belongs  to  the  person  with  whom  the 
owner  contracts  for  the  work  or  service,  and  not  to  the 
servants  or  others  employed  by  him.  A  statute  should  not 
be  regarded  as  changing  this  principle  of  the  common  law, 
unless  its  terms  are  such  that  the  intention  of  the  legislature 
to  make  such  a  change  seems  too  apparent  to  be  mistaken; 
for  such  a  change  would  be  likely  to  work  much  confusion 
by  giving  to  various  persons,  having  no  connection  with 
each  other  and  none  with  the  owner  of  the  property,  liens 
upon  the  whole  property  for  labor  expended  upon  different 
parts  of  it  under  different  contracts.  To  give  all  the  various 
workmen  and  servants  each  an  independent  lien,  without 
preference,  upon  the  same  property,  would  be  inconvenient 
and  practically  unjust  to  the  owner.  Liens  are  sometimes 
given  to  subcontractors,  but  when  this  is  done  some  special 
provision  is  made  for  avoiding  the  embarrassment  that  would 
arise  from  giving  a  right  of  lien  upon  the  same  property  to 
several  persons  at  the  same  time;  and  this  is  usually  done 
by  providing  that,  when  the  work  is  done  under  a  contract 
with  the  owner,  no  person  shall  have  the  benefit  of  a  lien 
unless,  within  a  prescribed  time,  he  shall  give  notice  to  the 
owner  that  he  is  so  employed  and  will  claim  the  benefit  of 
the  lien.^^ 

59Winslow  V.  Urquhart.  39  Wis.  W.  9;  Hoffa  v.  Person,  1  Pa.  Super. 

260.      So    in    Michigan:      Reilly    v.  Ct.  367.    See  post,  §  IZl. 

Stephenson,  62  Mich.  509,  29  N.  W.  siAfter  the  decision  in  Jacobs  v. 

99.  Knapp,  50  N.  H.  71,  a  section  was 

60Jacobs  V.  Knapp,  50  N.  H.  71 ;  added  to  the  statute  of  New- 
Gross  V.  Eiden,  53  Wis.  543,  11  N.  Hampshire,  giving  the  lien  to  per- 


737  lumbermen's  liens.  §  ^22 

Only  laborers  with  whom  the  owner  of  logs  or  lumber 
contracts,  and  not  employes  of  a  person  contracting  with  the 
owner  who  are  not  employes  of  the  owner,  can  claim  the 
benefit  of  this  lien.^^ 

§  722.  Contractor  not  agent  of  owner  to  employ  men. — 
The  contractor  is  not  in  general  an  agent  of  the  owner  to 
employ  men,  and  bind  the  owner  or  his  property.  Where 
one  contracted  with  the  owner  of  logs  to  drive  them  to  a 
certain  place  at  a  stipulated  price,  and  the  owner  was  to 
supply  provisions  and  money  to  a  limited  amount  to  pay  off 
men  who  might  be  discharged,  "all  other  men  to  be  paid  by 
the  owner  at  the  end  of  the  drive,"  it  was  held  that  the  con- 
tract did  not  constitute  the  contractor  the  owner's  agent 
to  employ  men,  and  that  the  men  employed  by  the  contractor 
were  his  own  and  not  the  owner's  employes,  and  that  the 
contract  did  not  give  the  employes  a  lien  on  the  logs  for 
their  wages. ^^  The  purpose  and  legal  effect  of  the  provi- 
sion for  the  payment  of  the  men  "at  the  end  of  the  drive" 
was  to  authorize  the  owner  to  pay  them  and  charge  the 
amount  to  the  contractor,  and  thereby  protect  himself,  if 
he  so  desired,  from  any  annoyance  that  might  arise  from  the 
contractor's  not  paying  them,  but  it  did  not  render  the 
owner  liable  to  such  men  for  their  pay. 

sons  who  performed  labor  under  a  hired  help,  or  employes  of  the  con- 
contract  with  an  agent  or  con-  tractor,  are  not  contracting  parties 
tractor  of  the  owner.  Pub.  Stat.  with  the  owner;  they  are  not  his 
&  Sess.  Laws  1901,  p.  452,  §  13.  laborers."  Per  Raney,  J. 

62Wright  V.  Terry,  23  Fla.  160,  2  63Wright  v.  Terry,  23  Fla.  160,  2 

So.  6.    "The   lien   is   given   to  the  So.  6,  citing  Jacobs  v.  Knapp,  50  N. 

laborers  or  contractors  with  whom  H.  71;  Landry  v.  Blanchard,  16  La. 

the  owner  of  the  logs  contracts.   If  Ann.  173,  a  case  relating  to  an  ar- 

he  hires  laborers,  his  laborers  have  tisan's  lien;  and   Harlan  v.   Rand, 

a  lien;  if  his  agreement  for  raft-  27  Pa,  St.  511,  a  case  relating  to  a 

ing  is  with  a  contractor  who  is  to  mechanic's  lien.  Valley  Pine  Lum- 

raft  the  logs  and  employ  his  own  ber   Co.  v.   Hodgens,   80  Ark.   516, 

help,   the  'contracting  parties'  are  97  S.  W.  682. 
the  owner  and  the  contractor.   The 

47 


§    7^1  LIENS.  738 

§  723.  Constitutionality  of  statutes. — Whether  a  statute, 
which  allows  a  lien  in  favor  of  one  not  in  privity  of  contract 
with  the  owner  of  the  property,  is  unconstitutional,  is  a 
question  upon  which  the  cases  are  not  in  entire  harmony. 
A  statute  providing  for  the  enforcement  of  a  laborer's  lien, 
by  an  action  against  the  person  or  property  of  a  party  be- 
tween whom  and  the  plaintiff  no  privity  of  contract  ever 
existed,  without  making  the  owner  a  party,  is  unconstitu- 
tional.®^ No  person  can  be  deprived  of  his  property  except 
by  due  process  of  law,  or  by  the  law  of  the  land.  The  law 
of  the  land  was  defined  by  Mr.  Webster,  in  his  argument 
in  the  Dartmouth  College  case,  as  the  law  "which  hears 
before  it  condemns,  which  proceeds  upon  inquiry,  and  ren- 
ders judgment  only  after  trial."  The  person  whose  property 
is  to  be  affected  by  a  judgment  of  court  must  have  notice 
of  the  proceeding  and  an  opportunity  to  defend.  A  statute 
which  provided  for  enforcing  a  lien  against  property,  with- 
out giving  the  owner  an  opportunity  to  come  into  court 
and  be  heard,  is  unconstitutional.®^ 

§  724.  The  term  "personal  services." — The  term  "personal 
services"  in  these  statutes  has  been  judicially  considered  in 
several  cases.  Under  a  former  statute  in  Maine,  it  was 
held  that  the  lien  given  for  "personal  services"  did  not  in- 
clude the  services  rendered  by  the  laborer's  team,  though 
the  present  statute  expressly  includes  the  services  of  his 
team.®®  But  in  New  Hampshire,  under  the  present  statute, 
it  is  held  that  the  term  "personal  services"  includes  not 
only  services  accomplished  by  the  laborer's  own  hands,  but 
those  aided  by  the  use  of  such  appliances  of  his  own  as 
are  indispensable  to  the  performance  of  his  labor.  "We 
have    therefore"    say   the    court    in    a    recent    case,®"    "little 

64Jacobs  V.  Knapp,  50  N.  H.  71.  126;  McCrillis  v.  Wilson,  34  Maine 

esQuimby  v.  Hazen,  54  Vt.   132;  286,  56  Am.  Dec.  655. 

Redington  v.   Frye,  43  Maine   578,  67Hale  v.   Brown,   59  N.   H.  551, 

587.   See  contra,  §  721,  ante.  558,  47  Am.  Rep.  224,  per  Foster,  J. 
66Coburn  v.  Kerswell,  35  Maine 


739  lumbermen's  liens.  §  725 

hesitation  in  holding  that  the  personal  services  of  the  lum- 
bermen include  the  use  and  the  earnings  of  his  own  oxen, 
chain,  cant-hook,  and  his  own  team  and  sled,  if  these  are 
actually  used  by  him  and  are  essential  to  the  service  ren- 
dered. We  do  not,  in  this  case,  go  so  far  as  to  hold,  that 
if  the  claimant  did  not  labor  himself,  or  if  acting  as  a 
common  laborer,  he  loaned  the  use  of  his  team  on  the  same 
work,  he  could  successfully  claim  the  benefit  of  the  lien 
on  account  of  his  team."®^  Under  the  Minnesota  statute 
the  same  construction  is  given  to  the  term  "manual  labor," 
and  the  fact  that,  where  a  man  and  his  team  are  employed 
at  a  gross  price  for  both,  the  employer  puts  them  to  work 
separately  on  different  parts  of  the  work,  is  immaterial. ^^ 

Under  the  present  statute  of  Maine,  which  expressly  in- 
cludes services  performed  by  the  laborer's  team,  it  is  held 
that  the  latter  are  included,  although  he  may  not  own  the 
team,  provided  it  is  in  his  rightful  possession  and  control.'^*' 

§  725.     Contractor  has  no  lien  for  labor  of  servants. — 

Under  a  statute  giving  a  lumberman  a  lien  for  "personal 
services"  in  cutting  and  hauling  lumber,  a  contractor  has  no 
lien  for  labor  performed  by  his  servants. ''^^    The  object  of  the 

6SThe  court  suggests  that  possi-  in    its    objects,    and    calculated    to 

bly  this  was  the  real  question  de-  make  certain  the  payment  for  the 

cided  in  the  two  cases  cited  from  labor  which  has  actually  gone  to 

Maine.    Where  one  hires  his  team  increase  the  value  of  the  timber." 

to  work  in  hauling  logs,  but  does  Per  Foster,  J. 

not  accompany  the  team  in  person  "^iHale  v.  Brown,  59  N.  H.  551, 
or  by  servant  he  has  no  lien  on  the  47  Am.  Rep.  224,  per  Foster,  J. 
logs  for  the  sum  due  him  for  team  "Whether  a  person  in  the  plain- 
hire.  Edwards  v.  H.  B.  Waite  tiff's  position,  a  contractor,  one 
Lumber  Co.,  108  Wis.  164,  84  N.  W.  who  assumes  the  responsibility  of 
150,  81  Am.  St.  884.  performing  a  certain  piece  of  work, 

69Martin  v.  Wakefield,  42  Minn.  and     employs     and     superintends 

176,  43  N.  W.  966.  others   in   the   performance   of   it, 

TOKelley  v.  Kelley,  11  Maine  135,  'labors,'  within  the  meaning  of  the 

137.   "To  hold  otherwise  would  be  statute  granting  one  a  lien  for  his 

doing  violence  to  the  spirit,  if  not  'personal     services,'    might    be     a 

to  the  letter,  of  a  statute  remedial  question  of  no   little  difficulty   in 


§  725 


LIENS. 


740 


statute  was  to  protect  the  man  whose  subsistence  depends 
on  the  wages  earned  by  his  manual  labor,  and  not  the  con- 
tractor, who  does  no  manual  labor  himself,  but  draws  his 
compensation  from  the  profits  derived  from  the  employment 
of  others.  "Most  of  the  authorities  that  we  examined,"  say 
the  court,  "support  this  view  of  the  law,  except  in  cases 
where,  from  the  wording  of  the  statutes,  a  different  inten- 
tion clearly  appeared.  And  we  are  not  disposed  to  question 
the  wisdom  of  those  cases. "^^ 

Under  a  similar  statute  in  Vermont,  which  gives  a  lien 
to  "any  person  who  labors  at  cutting,  or  drawing  logs,"  it 
was  held  that  the  lien  must  be  enforced  by  the  person  who 
actually  cuts  and  hauls  the  logs ;  and  that  it  cannot  be  en- 
forced by  a  contractor  who  employs  others  to  perform  the 
labor.  The  statute  is  primarily  designed  to  protect  employes 
against  employers. ''^^ 


the  absence  of  any  judicial  con- 
struction of  this  or  similar  stat- 
utes. The  stock-broker,  the  clergy- 
man, the  student,  the  farmer,  and 
the  wood-chopper,  all  labor,  but  in 
different  ways,  requiring  the  exer- 
cise of  different  mental  and  physi- 
cal powers.  From  the  original  and 
comprehensive  meaning  of  the 
word  itself,  no  reason,  perhaps, 
could  be  suggested  why  a  person 
who  accomplishes  a  certain  amount 
of  work  by  the  exercise  of  his 
mental  powers,  in  connection  with 
the  physical  exertion  of  others, 
could  not  be  said  to  labor.  The 
two  classes  or  kinds  of  labor  are 
dependent,  the  one  on  the  other, 
and  without  both  nothing  would  be 
accomplished.  But  when  we  study 
the  legislative  intention  in  the  en- 
actment of  a  law  granting  those 
who  work  chiefly  through  physical 
means  certain  privileges,  it  is  pos- 


sible to  see  that  the  term  'labor'  is 
used  in  a  restricted  sense  and  not 
in  its  broad  and  comprehensive 
meaning."  See  also,  Wentroth's 
App.,  82  Pa.  St.  469;  Kieldsen  v. 
Wilson,  n  Mich.  45,  43  N.  W.  1054. 

72Hale  v.  Brown,  59  N.  H.  551,  47 
Am.  Rep.  224,  citing  Weymouth  v. 
Sanborn,  43  N.  H.  171,  80  Am.  Dec. 
144;  Balch  v.  N.  Y.  &  O.  M.  R.  Co., 
46  N.  Y.  521;  Parker  v.  Bell,  7 
Gray  (Mass.)  429;  Stryker  v.  Cas- 
sidy.  10  Hun  (N.  Y.)  18,  revd.  1(> 
N.  Y.  50,  32  Am.  Rep.  262;  Went- 
roth's Appeal,  82  Pa.  St.  469;  Jones 
V.  Shawhan,  4  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.) 
257;  Ericsson  v.  Brown,  38  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  390;  Aikin  v.  Wasson,  24 
N.  Y.  482;  Sullivan's  Appeal,  11  Pa. 
St  107;  Winder  v.  Caldwell,  14 
How.  (U.  S.)  434,  14  L.  ed.  487; 
Hoatz  V.  Patterson,  5  Watts  &  S. 
(Pa.)  537,  538. 

73Quimby  v.  Hazen,  54  Vt.  132. 


741  lumbermen's  liens.  §  727 

§  726.  What  are  logs  or  lumber. — Under  a  statute  giving 
a  lien  on  logs  or  lumber  for  cutting  and  hauling,  the  sawing 
of  logs  into  sticks  four  feet  long  for  shingle  rift  does  not 
destroy  the  lien/'*  Railroad  ties  have  been  considered  "logs 
and  timber"  under  such  a  statute. '^^  A  lien  upon  logs  and 
timber  does  not  include  the  lumber  into  which  timber  is 
manufactured.'^^  Such  a  lien  does  not  include  laths'^'^  or 
shingles. '^^ 

§  727.  Priority  of  lumberman's  lien. — A  lumberman's  lien 
has  priority  of  a  lien  by  contract  and  of  a  prior  mortgage, 
though  previously  executed  and  recorded. "^^  It  is  declared 
to  be  the  intention  of  the  statute  conferring  such  lien  to 
give  to  the  laborers  mentioned  an  absolute  lien,  where  they 
are  employed  to  do  the  work  by  any  one  having  competent 
authority,  as  against  everybody,  upon  the  principle  that 
their  labor  enhances  the  value  of  the  property  of  every  one 
who  has  any  interest  in  it.  "It  was  designed  to  make  it  like 
the  sailor's  lien  for  wages.  *  *  *  Xhe  labor  of  workmen 
in  running  and  rafting  logs,  etc.,  is  of  a  very  similar  nature, 
and  the  design  of  the  statute  was  to  give  them  a  like  lien. 
And  whosoever  makes  such  contract  as  the  plaintiff  made  in 
this  case,  which  contemplates  the  performance  of  this  kind  of 
labor  for  the  benefit  of  both  the  contracting  parties,  must 
be  held  to  intend  that  the  lien  of  the  laborers  shall  attach 
according  to  the  law,  and  that  his  own  shall  be  subject  to  it, 
precisely  as  one  taking  a  bottomry  bond  or  mortgage  upon 

74Sands  v.  Sands,  74  Maine  239.  ^sGross  v.  Eiden,  53  Wis.  543,  11 

■^sKolloch    V.    Parcher,    52    Wis.  N.  W.  9.   "It  is  an  absurdity  to  say 

393,  9  N.  W.  (H,  26  Alb.  L.  J.  402.  that  the  laborer  shall  have  a  lien 

76Gross  V.  Eiden,  53  Wis.  543,  11  upon    logs    and    timber    for    work 

N.  W.  9.  done  in  manufacturing  them   into 

■^■^Babka  v.   Eldred,  47  Wis.   189,  lumber."   Per  Cole,  C.  J. 

2  N.  W.  102,  559.  Slabs  are  not  lum-  79See   generally   §§    555,   691-697, 

ber  within  the  statute  which  gives  727,   744,  971.    The   statutes  gener- 

a  lien  on   lumber   for  services   in  ally  give  this  lien  precedence  over 

cutting  logs.     Engi  v.  Hardell,  123  all  other  liens  or  claims.     Oliver  v. 

Wis.  407,  100  N.  W.  1046.  Woodman,  (£  Maine  54. 


§    7^8  LIENS.  742 

a  vessel  must  be  held  to  contemplate  that  such  vessel  will 
continue  subject  to  the  lien  for  sailors'  wages  thereafter  per- 
formed, which  will  take  precedence  of  his  own."^° 

An  attachment  upon  logs  or  lumber  under  a  general  at- 
tachment act,  though  prior  in  time,  is  subordinate  to  an 
attachment  for  the  enforcement  of  this  lien.^^ 

§  728.  Property  upon  which  lien  attaches  must  be  identi- 
fied.— As  a  general  rule,  the  property  upon  which  the  lien 
is  claimed  must  be  identified  as  the  property  upon  which 
the  labor  was  done.  To  entitle  one  to  claim  a  lien,  it  must 
appear  that  his  services,  or  those  of  his  team,  have  been 
performed  upon  the  logs  upon  which  he  seeks  to  enforce  his 
lien.^-  But  these  statutes  should  be  liberally  construed 
in  the  interests  of  labor.  A  strict  construction  as  regards 
the  identity  of  the  property  would  in  many  instances  defeat 
the  lien.  Accordingly,  the  lien  of  a  teamster  who  has  worked 
with  several  others  in  hauling  and  banking  logs  which  are 
mixed  together  is  not  limited  to  the  identical  logs  which  he 
himself  hauled  and  banked,  but  may  be  enforced  against 
any  portion  of  the  lot  of  logs  upon  which  he  and  the  others 
worked. ^^ 

If  the  services  are  performed  under  one  contract  upon  a 
single  lot  of  logs,  which  are  marked  with  different  marks 
according  to  their  quality,  the  laborer  may  enforce  his  lien 
for  his  entire  services  upon  a  portion  of  the  logs  bearing 
one  of  these  marks. ^^ 

soPaine   v.   Woodworth,   15  Wis.  83jacubeck  v.  Hewitt,  61  Wis.  96, 

298,    304,    per    Paine,    J.     And    see  20   N.   W.   Zll.    See  also,   Kline  v. 

Paine  v.   Gill,   13  Wis.   561;   Kline  Comstock,  67  Wis.  473,  30   N.   W. 

V.  Comstock,  67  Wis.  473,  30  N.  W.  920. 

920;  Reilly  v.  Stephenson,  62  Mich.  s^Martin  v.  Wakefield.  42  Minn. 

509,  29  N.  W.  99.  176,  43  N.  W.  966,  6  L.  R.  A.  362. 

siHalpin  v.  Hall,  42  Wis.  176.  See  Holderman  v.  Manier,  104  Ind. 

82Kelley  v.  Kelley,  11  Maine  135;  118,  3  N.  E.  811. 
Annis   v.    Gilmore,   47    Maine    152. 
See  also,  §  711,  ante. 


743  lumbermen's  liens.  §  730 

If  the  owner  has  iiifermingled  the  logs  upon  which  there 
is  a  lien  with  other  logs  of  the  same  mark,  so  that  the  former 
cannot  be  distinguished,  an  attachment  of  the  whole  lot 
may  be  made  to  enforce  the  lien.^^ 

§  729.  Lien  upon  logs  worked  upon  by  laborer. — If  sev- 
eral owners  of  logs  employ  several  laborers  to  drive  their 
logs,  the  lien  of  each  of  the  laborers  is  solely  upon  the  logs 
he  was  employed  to  drive,  although  the  logs  of  the  several 
owners  become  intermixed  in  driving,  and  are  driven  col- 
lectively by  all  the  laborers  employed  by  all  the  owners. '^^ 
In  like  manner,  if  several  owners  contract  with  one  person 
who  employs  the  same  drivers,  and  in  the  drive  all  the  logs 
become  intermixed,  their  respective  liens  are  not  collectively 
upon  the  whole  mass  of  logs,  but  are  distributed  upon  the 
logs  of  each  owner  according  to  the  amount  of  the  labor  be- 
stowed thereon.®"  If,  however,  logs  belonging  to  the  same 
owner,  though  cut  under  different  contracts,  are,  with  his 
consent,  mingled  together,  the  liens  of  the  laborers  attach 
to  all  the  logs  thus  mingled  together.^^ 

§  730.  Enforcement  of  labor  lien. — A  person  who  per- 
forms services  on  the  same  logs  for  dif¥erent  persons  may 
enforce  the  entire  lien  by  one  action.  The  action  bears  some 
analogy  to  a  libel  in  rem,  and  proceedings  thereon  in  ad- 
miralty. It  is  the  performance  of  the  labor,  and  not  the 
contract  of  employment,  or  other  relation  that  the  employer 
bears  to  the  logs,  that  creates  the  lien.  It  saves  a  mul- 
tiplicity of  suits  to  treat  the  lien  as  an  entirety  capable  of 

85 Parker  v.  Williams,  11  Maine  536;  Oliver  v.  Woodman,  66  Maine 

418,  1  Atl.  138.  54;  Doyle  v.  True,  36  Maine  542; 

86Doe  V.  Monson,  ZZ  Maine  430;  Appleman  v.   Myre,   74  Mich.   359, 

Marsh  v.  Flint,  27  Maine  475,  478;  42  N.  W.  48.    See  Pack  v.  Simpson, 

East   Hoquiam   Boom   &    Logging  70  Mich.  135,  38  N.  W.  6. 

Co.    V.    Neeson,   20   Wash.    142,    54  ssSpofford  v.  True.  Zl  Maine  283, 

Pac.  1001.  54  Am.  Dec.  621. 

87Hamilton    v.    Buck,    Zd    Maine 


§  73^^  LIENS.  744 

being  enforced  in  one  action.  It  gives  each  employer  who 
may  have  the  same  interest  in  the  logs  an  opportunity  of 
contesting  the  amount  and  right  of  lien,  not  only  under  his 
employment,  but  also  as  to  the  others.  It  further  saves  the 
common  property  from  being  consumed  by  costs  in  several 
suits,  w^hich  seem  unnecessary  for  the  protection  of  any 
right. ^^ 

§  730a.  Lien  on  different  kinds  of  timber  cut  under  one 
contract. — Where  different  kinds  of  timber  are  cut  and 
hauled  under  one  contract  from  the  same  land  to  the  same 
mill,  in  the  same  season,  though  delivered  in  separate  piles, 
and  one  kind  is  delivered  several  weeks  before  the  rest  is 
delivered,  the  suit  to  enforce  the  lien  is  seasonably  com- 
menced when  brought  within  the  time  limited  after  all  the 
timber  is  delivered.  The  lienholder  is  not  obliged  to  divide 
his  claim  and  bring  suit  for  each  different  kind  of  timber 
delivered  by  itself.^^ 

§  730b.  Continuous  service  under  a  contract. — What  is 
continuous  service  under  a  contract  is  an  important  ques- 
tion as  regards  the  time  within  which  a  claim  for  lien  may 
be  filed.  A  log-driving  company  contracted  to  raft  all  the 
logs  which  a  certain  firm  owned  in  a  stream.  All  the  logs 
but  four  were  delivered,  and  the  log-driving  company  sent 
the  owners  a  bill  for  services  rendered.  Both  parties  treated 
the  contract  as  fully  performed.  Two  months  afterwards 
the  log-driving  company  delivered  the  four  remaining  logs. 
It  was  held  that  such  later  delivery  did  not  keep  alive  the 
right  to  a  lien  for  the  services  performed,  under  a  statute 
providing  that  the  claim  for  lien  should  be  filed  within 
thirty  days  after  the  last  day  of  performing  the  service. ^^ 

89Collins  V.  Cowan,  52  Wis.  634,  16  Atl.  463;  Sheridan  v.  Ireland,  66 
9  N.  W.  787;  Chevret  v.   Mechan-      Maine  65. 

ics'  Mill  and  Lumber  Co.,  4  Wash.  aipish  Creek  Boom  &  Log-Driv- 

721,  31  Pac.  24.  ing  Co.  v.   Weed,  80  Wis.  630,  50 

»ophillips  V.  Vose,  81  Maine  134,      N.  W.  585.    But  see  Cross  v.  Dore, 

20  Wash.  121,  54  Pac.  1003. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

MECHANICS',  ARTISANS',  AND  LABORERS'  LIENS  UPON  PERSONAL 

PROPERTY. 


Sec. 

731.  Lien  for  labor  at  common  law. 

732.  Common-law    lien    a    specific 

lien. 

733.  Necessity  that  work  be   done 

at  owner's  request. 

734.  Consent  of  owner  may  be  im- 

plied. 

735.  Consent  of  owner  may  be  in- 

ferred. 

736.  Lien  of  a  city  or  town. 

737.  The    lien   belongs    strictly    to 

the  person  who  has  contract- 
ed with  the  owner  to  do  the 
work. 

738.  Lien  for  work  of  agents. 

739.  Lien   for   all   goods   delivered 

under  one  contract. 

740.  Lien  on  part  of  the  property 

for  repair  of  all  the  prop- 
erty. 

741.  Time    of    delivery   of   articles 

to  a  workman. 

742.  Lien  at  common  law  only  be- 

cause of  added  value  of  arti- 
cle. 

743.  Printer    has    no    lien    at    com- 

mon  law. 
743a.  Workman   must   observe    the 
terms    of    his    contract. 

744.  Precedence  over  mortgage  de- 

pends on  circumstances. 

745.  Possession  is  essential  to  the 

existence  of  this  lien. 

746.  Possession     of    an     officer    is 

possession  of  his  corpora- 
tion. 


Sec. 

747.  Delivery    of   property   waives 

lien. 

748.  Mode  of  payment  may  be  in- 

consistent  with   a   lien. 

749.  Statutes    of    states    providing 

liens. 

750.  Alabama. 
750a.  Alaska. 

751.  Arizona. 
751a.  Arkansas. 

752.  California. 

753.  Colorado. 
753a.  Connecticut. 
753b.  Delaware. 

754.  District  of   Columbia. 

755.  Florida. 

756.  Georgia. 

757.  Idaho. 

758.  Indiana. 

759.  Kansas. 
759a.  Kentucky. 

760.  Louisiana. 

761.  Maine. 
761a.  Maryland. 

762.  Massachusetts. 

763.  Michigan. 

764.  Minnesota. 

765.  Mississippi. 
765a.  Nebraska. 
765b.  Nevada. 

765c.  New  Hampshire. 

766.  New  Jersey. 

767.  New  Mexico. 
767a.  New  York. 

768.  North    Carolina. 
768a.  North   Dakota. 


745 


§  731 


LIENS. 


746 


Sec. 

768b.  Oklahoma, 

769.  Oregon. 
769a.    Pennsylvania. 
769b.  Rhode  Island. 

770.  South   Carolina. 
770a.  South  Dakota. 

771.  Tennessee. 
172.  Texas. 
772a.  Utah. 
772b.  Vermont. 
Ili.  Virginia. 
773a.  Washington. 

774.  Wisconsin. 

775.  Wyoming. 

776.  No  lien   for  farm  laborers   in 

the  absence  of  statutes. 
in.  Alabama. 

778.  Arkansas. 

779.  Arkansas   (continued).     Speci- 

fic   liens    in    favor      of      em- 
ployers. 

§  731.  Lien  for  labor  at  common  law. — By  the  common 
law,  a  workman  who  by  his  skill  and  labor  has  enhanced 
the  value  of  a  chattel  has  a  lien  on  it  for  his  reasonable 
charges,  provided  the  employment  be  with  the  consent, 
either  express  or  implied,  of  the  owner. ^     And  it  is  imma- 


Sec. 

779a.  California. 

779b.  Colorado. 

780.  Florida. 

781.  Georgia. 
781a.  Idaho. 

782.  Louisiana. 
782a.  Michigan. 
782b.  Minnesota. 

783.  Mississippi. 

784.  North  Carolina. 
784a.  North  Dakota. 
784b.  Oregon. 

784c.  South  Carolina. 

785.  South  Dakota. 

786.  Tennessee. 
786a.  Texas. 
786b.  Washington. 
786c.  Wisconsin. 


iCowper  V.  Andrew^s,  Hobart  39, 
41;  Green  v.  Farmer,  4  Burr.  2214; 
Close  V.  Waterhouse,  6  East  523n; 
Scarfe  v.  Morgan,  4  M.  &  W.  270, 
per  Baron  Parke. 

Colorado:  Hillsburg  v.  Harri- 
son, 2  Colo.  App.  298,  30  Pac.  355. 

Connecticut:  Pinney  v.  Wells, 
10  Conn.  104,   105. 

Indiana:  Hanna  v.  Phelps,  7 
Ind.  21,  63  Am.  Dec.  410;  East  v. 
Ferguson,  59  Ind.  169. 

Iowa:  Nevan  v.  Roup,  8  Iowa 
207. 

Maine :  Oakes  v.  Moore,  24 
Maine  214,  41  Am.  Dec.  379;  Edge- 
comb    V.     Jenney,     108    Main    538, 


81  Atl.  1091. 

New  Hampshire :  Wilson  v. 
Martin,  40  N.  H.  88. 

New  Jersey:  White  v.  Smith, 
44  N.  J.  L.  105,  43  Am.  Rep.  347. 

New  York:  Morgan  v.  Cong- 
don,  4  N.  Y.  552,  553,  per  Jewett, 
J.;  McFarland  v.  Wheeler,  26 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  485,  491,  38  Am. 
Dec.  663;  White  v.  Hoyt,  7  Daly 
(N.  Y.)  2Z2;  Hazard  v.  Manning, 
8  Hun  (N.  Y.)  613;  Myers  v.  Upte- 
grove,  3  How.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N.  Y.) 
316. 

Pennsylvania:  Hansel  v.  Noble, 
95  Pa.  St.  345,  40  Am.  Rep.  659; 
Mathias  v.   Sellers,  86  Pa.   St.  486, 


747 


MECHANICS  ,  ARTISANS  ,  AND  LABORERS    LIENS. 


731 


terial  whether  there  be  an  agreement  to  pay  a  stipulated 
price  for  such  skill  and  labor,  or  there  be  only  an  implied 
agreement  to  pay  a  reasonable  price. ^ 

Except  as  declared  by  modern  statutes,  this  lien  rests  upon 
immemorial  recognition,  or,  in  other  words,  upon  the  com- 
mon law.  It  exists  in  favor  of  every  bailee  for  hire  who 
takes  property  in  the  way  of  his  trade  and  occupation,  and 
by  his  labor  and  skill  imparts  additional  value  to  it.'"  A 
tailor  who  has  made  a  coat  out  of  cloth  delivered  to  him  by 


27  Am.  Rep.  723;  Mclntyre  v.  Car- 
ver, 2  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  392,  37  Am. 
Dec.  519;  Pierce  v.  Sweet,  33  Pa. 
St.  151. 

Vermont :  Cummings  v.  Harris, 
3  Vt.  244,  23  Am.  Dec.  206;  Bur- 
diet  V.  Murray,  3  Vt.  302,  21  Am. 
Dec.  588. 

Wisconsin :  Chappell  v.  Cady, 
10  Wis.  Ill;  Arians  v.  Brickley, 
65  Wis.  26,  26  N.  W.  188,  56  Am. 
Rep.  611. 

2  Morgan  v.  Congdon,  4  N.  Y.  552; 
Hanna  v.  Phelps,  7  Ind.  21,  63  Am. 
Dec.  410;  Steinman  v.  Wilkins,  7 
Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  466,  42  Am.  Dec. 
254. 

SGreen  v.  Farmer,  4  Burr.  2214, 
2221;  Bevan  v.  Waters,  Moody  & 
M.  235;  Scarf e  v.  Morgan,  4  M.  & 
W.  270,  283;  Trust  v.  Pirsson.  1 
Hilton  (N.  Y.)  292;  Grinnell  v. 
Cook,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.)  485,  491,  38 
Am.  Dec.  663;  Crommelin  v.  N.  Y. 
&  Harlem  R.  Co.,  4  Keyes  (X.  Y.) 
90,  per  Hunt,  C.  J.;  White  v.  Smith, 
44  N.  J.  L.  105,  43  Am.  Rep.  347; 
Mathias  v.  Sellers,  86  Pa.  St.  486, 
27  Am.  Rep.  723;  Oakes  v.  Moore, 
24  Maine  214,  41  Am.  Dec.  379. 
A  specific  lien  for  work  done 
arises  in  favor  of  a  dyer  who  dyes 


clothes:  Green  v.  Farmer,  4  Burr. 
2214;  in  favor  of  a  carriage-maker 
who  repairs  carriages  :  Rushforth 
v.  Hadfield,  7  East  224;  Pin- 
nock  v.  Harrison,  3  M.  &  W.  532; 
in  favor  of  a  wagon-maker  who 
makes  a  wagon  out  of  materials 
furnished  by  another :  Gregory  v. 
Stryker,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.)  628;  in 
favor  of  a  carpenter  who  makes 
doors  out  of  lumber  furnished  by 
another:  Curtis  v.  Jones,  How. 
App.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  137;  Mclntyre  v. 
Carver,  2  Watts  &  S.  392,  Zl  Am. 
Dec.  519;  in  favor  of  one  to  whom 
logs  are  delivered  to  be  converted 
into  boards  or  into  shingles : 
Pierce  v.  Sweet,  33  Pa.  St.  151; 
Comstock  V.  McCracken,  53  Mich. 
123.  18  N.  W.  583;  Morgan  v.  Cong- 
don, 4  N.  Y.  552;  Arians  v.  Brick- 
ley,  65  Wis.  26,  26  N.  W.  188,  56 
Am.  Rep.  611;  in  favor  of  a  manu- 
facturer of  starch :  Ruggles  v. 
Walker,  34  Vt.  468;  in  favor  of  one 
who  manufactures  brick  in  a  brick- 
yard furnished  bj^  another:  Moore 
V.  Hitchcock,  4  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  292; 
King  V.  Indian  Orchard  Canal  Co., 
11  Cush.  (Mass.)  231;  in  fav- 
or of  a  person  engaged  in 
rendering      lard      and      barrelling 


§    73^  LIENS.  748 

the  owner,  is  not  bound  to  deliver  the  coat  until  he  is  paid 
for  his  labor.*  Neither  is  a  shoemaker  bound  to  restore  a 
shoe  which  he  has  mended;  nor  a  jeweler  a  gem  which  he 
has  set;  nor  a  wheelwright  a  wagon  which  he  has  repaired; 
nor  a  ship  carpenter  a  ship  which  he  has  made  seaworthy, 
until  his  services  are  paid  for.^ 

§  732.  Common-law  lien  a  specific  lien. — The  lien  which 
the  common  law  gives  to  every  one  who  bestows  labor  and 
expense  upon  a  chattel  in  the  way  of  his  trade  or  occupa- 
tion is  a  particular  or  specific  lien;  or,  in  other  words,  it 
secures  the  payment  of  his  services  in  respect  to  property 
upon  which  a  lien  is  claimed.^  It  does  not  secure  a  general 
balance  of  account,  or  any  debt  other  than  that  created  by 
labor  upon  the  specific  property  detained.  In  particular 
trades  there  may  perhaps  be  general  usages  which  entitle 
them  to  claim  a  general  balance  for  work  done  in  the  course 
of  their  trades;'^  or  tradesmen  in  particular  places  may,  by 
resolution  or  agreement  among  themselves,  acquire  a  gen- 
eral lien,  if  such  resolution  or  agreement  be  brought  to  the 
notice  of  their  customers  and  assented  to  by  them.^ 

the      same:      Hanna      v.      Phelps,  bonds;   Chappell  v.   Cady,   10  Wis. 

7  Ind.  21,  63  Am.  Dec.  410;  in  fa-  111. 

vor  of  a  raftsman  on  lumber  raft-  ^Cowper  v.  Andrews,  Hobart  39, 

ed:    Farrington    v.    Meek,    30    Mo.  42;  Blake  v.  Nicholson  3  M.  &  S. 

578,  n  Am.  Dec.  627;  in  favor  of  a  167,  per  Lord  Ellenborough,  C.  J. 

harnessmaker  for  oiling  a  harness:  ^Story's     Bailments     (9th     ed.), 

Wilson  V.  Martin,  40  N.  H.  88;  in  §  440. 

favor    of    a    farrier    for    shoeing  6Green  v.  Farmer,  4  Burr.  2214; 

horses:  Lane  v.  Cotton,  1  Salk.  17;  Rushforth  v.  Hadfield,  6  East  519, 

Cummings  v.  Harris,  3  Vt.  244,  23  522;  Mathias  v.  Sellers,  86  Pa.  St. 

Am.    Dec.   206;   Lord  v.   Jones,   24  486,  27  Am.  Rep.  12Z;  Moulton  v. 

Maine    439,    41    Am.    Dec.    391;    in  Greene,    10    R.    L    330;    Nevan    v. 

favor       of      one      who      threshes  Roup,  8  Iowa  207. 

grain:     Nevan    v.    Roup,    8   Iowa  TRose     v.   Hart,   8     Taunt.  499; 

207;     in  favor    of  one    who    kills  Rushforth  v.  Hadfield,  6  East  519, 

and  packs  hogs;  East  v.  Ferguson,  522. 

59  Ind.    169;   in   favor  of  one  who  SKirkman  v.  Shawcross,  6  T.  R. 

effects  an   exchange   of   stocks   for  14;  Weldon  v.  Gould,  3  Esp.  268. 


749  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  733 

But  it  would  seem  to  be  essential,  except  in  the  case  of  a 
general  usage  well  known,  that  knowledge  of  the  resolu- 
tion or  agreement  for  a  general  lien  should  be  brought 
home  to  the  customer  in  such  a  way  that  there  is  practically 
an  assent  on  his  part  that  a  general  lien  may  be  claimed 
and  asserted  against  him. 

It  is  also  said  that  the  lien  extends  to  a  general  balance 
of  account  in  the  case  of  such  bailees  as  factors,  calico- 
printers,  packers,  fullers,  and  others,  to  whom  property  is 
delivered,  against  the  several  parts  of  which  it  is  imprac- 
ticable to  keep  separate  and  distinct  charges.  In  analogy 
with  such  instances,  it  has  been  held  that,  where  a  mill- 
owner  contracts  to  saw  lumber  for  another  at  a  stipulated 
price  per  thousand  feet,  his  lien  is  not  limited  to  any  given 
lot  of  lumber  for  the  price  of  sawing  the  same,  but  extends 
to  the  quantity  in  his  possession  for  any  general  balance 
due  him.^ 

§  733.  Necessity  that  work  be  done  at  owner's  request. — 
To  entitle  one  to  a  lien  for  work  done  upon  a  chattel  the 
work  must  be  done  at  the  owner's  request,  or  with  his  con- 
sent. The  fact  that  one  has  purchased  a  chattel  in  good 
faith,  from  a  person  claiming  to  be  the  owner,  gives  him 
no  lien  upon  it  from  expenditures  made  in  repairs  before 
discovering  that  the  property  belonged  to  another.^" 

The  employment  must  be  by  the  owner  whose  property 
is  affected  by  the  lien,  or  by  his  consent,  express  or  implied. 
Thus  a  coach  maker,  to  whom  a  carriage  had  been  delivered 
for  repairs  by  the  owner's  servant,  was  denied  a  lien  because 
the  carriage  had  been  broken  by  the  negligence  of  the  serv- 
ant, without  the  knowledge  of  the  master,  and  had  been 
taken  by  the  servant  to  the  coach  maker  for  repairs  without 

9Holderman  v.   Manier,  104  Ind.  43   Am.    Rep.    347,   per    Depue,   J.; 

118,  3  N.  E.  811.  Hill  v.  Burgess,  27  S.  Car.  604,  15 

10 Clark    V.    Hale,    34    Hale    398,  S.  E.  963. 
White   V.   Smith,  44   N.   J.   L.    105, 


§  734  LIENS.  750 

the  master's  orders.^ ^  And  so  where  one  having  purchased 
a  machine  in  an  unfinished  state  contracted  with  the  seller 
to  finish  it  for  a  stipulated  price,  and  the  latter,  without  the 
purchaser's  knowledge,  employed  a  mechanic  to  do  the 
work,  it  was  held  that  the  latter  acquired  no  lien  in  his  own 
right  for  the  labor  done  on  the  machine,  as  against  the 
owner,  although,  while  the  work  was  in  progress,  the  owner 
knew  that  the  mechanic  was  performing  the  work.^^ 

§  734.  Consent  of  owner  may  be  implied. — But  the  con- 
sent of  the  owner  to  a'  bailment  of  a  chattel  for  repairs 
may  be  implied.  Such  consent  need  not  be  given  with  such 
formalities  or  in  such  manner  as  would  create  a  personal  lia- 
bility on  the  part  of  the  owner  to  pay  the  charges.  If  the 
property  is  improved  and  enhanced  in  value  by  the  work- 
man's labor,  the  authority  of  the  owner  to  have  it  done  on 
the  footing  of  a  workman's  lien  may  be  implied  from  the 
relation  of  the  parties,  or  from  the  circumstances  of  the 
case.^^  Accordingly,  where  a  wagon  owned  by  a  wife  was 
put  in  the  husband's  charge  for  use  in  a  business  which  was 
carried  on  for  the  support  of  the  family,  and  he  took  it  to 
a  wheelwright  to  be  repaired,  it  was  held  that  the  latter  had 
a  lien  upon  it  for  his  reasonable  charges  for  the  repairs, 
though  the  wheelwright,  thinking  that  it  belonged  to  the 
husband,  had  charged  the  bill  for  repairs  to  him.^^  "It  was 
in  the  contemplation  of  all  the  parties,"  said  Mr.  Justice 
Depue,  delivering  the  judgment  of  the  court,  "that  the 
wagon  could  be  made  useful  for  the  purpose  for  which  it 
was  designed  to  be  used  only  by  being  kept  in  repair.  The 
repairs  were  beneficial  to  the  interests  of  both  parties — to 

iiHiscox  V.    Greenwood,   4   Esp.  i3 White    v.    Smith,    44    N.    J.    L. 

174.  105,  110,  43  Am.  Rep.  347,  per  De- 

i2Hollingsworth      v.      Dow,      19  pue,  J. 

Pick.  (Mass.)  228.  See  Mclntyre  v.  i-iwhite  v.  Smith,  44  N.  J.  L.  105, 

Carver,   2   Watts    &   S.    (Pa.)    392,  43  Am.  Rep.  347. 
2)7  Am.   Dec.  519,  which  is  hardly- 
consistent. 


751  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  735 

the  husband  in  fitting  the  wagon  for  use;  to  the  wife  in  en- 
hancing the  value  of  the  property  by  the  repairs  put  upon  it. 
I  think  it  clear,  on  the  facts  certified  by  the  court  below, 
that  the  husband  had  authority  from  the  wife — implied  from 
the  manner  in  which  she  permitted  the  wagon  to  be  used 
— to  have  the  repairs  done;  and  if  so,  the  property  became 
by  law  subject  to  a  lien  for  the  workman's  charges." 

§  735.  Consent  of  owner  may  be  inferred. — Such  consent 
may  be  inferred  when  the  owner  of  property  by  his  neglect 
gives  some  one  else  the  right  to  incur  labor  and  expense 
upon  his  property.  A  canal-boat  loaded  with  stone  was  acci- 
dentally sunk  in  the  harbor  of  BufYalo,  and  then  deserted 
by  her  master  and  crew,  who  made  no  effort  to  raise  the 
boat,  and  the  wreck  formed  a  serious  objection  and  hin- 
drance to  commerce  and  navigation.  The  common  council 
of  the  city,  in  pursuance  of  the  powers  conferred  by  the 
charter,  ordered  the  boat  and  cargo  to  be  removed  without 
delay,  and  decided  that,  if  the  owner  did  not  do  this  in  three 
days,  the  harbor  master  should  remove  the  same  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  boat  and  cargo.  In  accordance  with  such  order 
the  harbor  master  caused  the  boat  to  be  raised  and  the  cargo 
saved,  at  a  large  expense.  It  was  held  that  the  city  ac- 
quired a  lien  at  common  law  upon  the  boat  and  cargo  for 
the  amount  of  such  expense,  and  that  this  lien  could  be 
enforced  in  equity.^^     The  very  act  of  the  owner  in  reclaim- 

i-^City  of  Buffalo  v.  Yattan,  Shel-  goods  intrusted  to  them,  in  the  one 
don  (N.  Y.)  483,  487,  per  Smith,  J.  case,  or  those  which  the  guest  car- 
"The  common  law  right  of  lien  in  ries  with  him  in  the  other,  for  the 
respect  to  personal  property,  in  particular  service  rendered  or  en- 
many  cases,  rests  upon  the  duty  tertainment  and  necessaries  sup- 
of  the  party  upon  whom  it  is  con-  plied.  Cross  on  Lien,  16.  Says  Jus- 
ferred  to  render  services  or  incur  tice  Bronson,  in  Grinnell  v.  Cook,  3 
expenses.  Thus,  the  legal  obliga-  Hill  (N.  Y.)  485,  491:  'The  right 
tioii  to  exercise  their  trade  when  of  lien  has  always  been  admitted 
re(|uested,  as  in  the  case  of  an  inn-  where  the  party  was  bound,  by 
keeper  to  receive  a  guest,  has  law,  to  receive  the  goods.'  So 
vested    in    them    a    lien    upon    the  where  goods  have  been  taken  un- 


§  7Z^ 


LIENS. 


752 


ing  the  property  in  its  improved  condition  was  regarded  as 
a  recognition  of  the  city's  right  to  indemnity,  and  conse- 
quently to  a  lien  for  its  expenses  in  saving  the  property. 

§  736.  Lien  of  a  city  or  town. — A  city  or  town  or  its 
agents  may  acquire  a  lien  at  common  law  for  expenses  in- 
curred upon  property  under  statutory  authority  in  the  re- 
moval of  nuisances,  or  in  the  preservation  of  the  public 
health.  Thus,  under  a  regulation  of  the  board  of  health 
of  the  city  of  Boston,  made  in  pursuance  of  statutory  au- 


der  a  legal  right,  and  expenses 
have  been  necessarily  incurred  in 
their  preservation,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  lord  of  a  manor  who  had 
seized  a  horse  as  an  estray.  Henly 
V.  Walsh,  2  Salk.  686.  The  right 
of  lien  has  always  been  favored 
by  courts,  as  consonant  with  every 
principle  of  equity  and  justice. 
Within  a  recent  period,  indeed, 
they  have  recognized  and  allowed, 
without  restriction,  the  right  of 
every  bailee,  whether  voluntary  or 
involuntary,  to  a  lien  on  the  goods 
bailed  to  hire,  when  he  has  con- 
ferred an  additional  value  on  the 
chattel,  either  directly  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  personal  labor  or  skill, 
or  indirectly,  by  the  performance 
of  any  duty  or  the  use  of  any 
means  within  his  control.  Upon 
these  principles,  I  think  it  safe  and 
just  to  establish  and  enforce  the 
lien  claimed  by  the  plaintiff  in 
this  case.  In  the  discharge  of  a 
duty  which  it  could  neither  evade 
nor  neglect,  it  has  become  the  in- 
voluntary bailee  of  the  boat,  and 
has  thus  incurred  large  expenses. 
The  plaintiff  performed  this  duty, 
as  it  was  bound  to,  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  to  preserve,  protect,  and 
save  the  boat,  rather  than  to  suffer 
it  to  be  destroyed  or  injured.     It 


is  now  of  more  than  sufficient 
value  to  yield  indemnity  for  these 
expenses.  The  plaintiff  waited 
ample  time  for  the  owner  of  the 
boat  to  remove  and  save  his  prop- 
erty, before  taking  any  action,  for 
that  purpose.  He  does  not,  even 
now,  claim  the  boat,  or  set  up  any 
right  to  have  her  restored  to  him. 
He  rests  simply  upon  a  denial  of 
the  plaintiff's  claim.  If  he  has, 
indeed,  abandoned  the  property, 
and  intends  never  to  reclaim  it, 
no  injury  can  result  by  him  by 
the  adjudication  which  equity  will 
give  the  plaintiff.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  asserts  a  right  to  have 
the  property  returned  to  him,  he 
ought  to  pay  the  necessary  ex- 
penses incurred  in  saving  and  pro- 
tecting his  property.  The  very  act 
of  reclaiming  the  property,  which 
he  once  abandoned  for,  at  least, 
so  long  as  to  require  the  plaintiff 
to  act,  and  receiving  it  in  its  im- 
proved and  more  valuable  condi- 
tion, would  be  an  implied  recogni- 
tion of  the  plaintiff's  right  to  in- 
demnity. If  this  be  not  so,  then 
the  defendants  have  not  only  the 
right  to  recover  the  property,  but 
to  demand,  of  the  plaintiff,  dam- 
ages for  its  detention.  The  law 
will  permit  no  such  injustice." 


/DO 


mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  736 


thority,  ordering  rags  imported  into  the  city  to  be  disin- 
fected at  the  expense  of  the  owner,  it  was  in  a  recent  case 
held  that  a  Hen  arises  for  such  expense;  and  that  the  work 
of  disinfection  may  be  delegated  by  the  board  of  health  to 
a  third  person,  who  is  entitled  to  claim  and  enforce  a  lien 
upon  the  rags  for  his  reasonable  charges  for  the  work 
done.^^  Mr.  Justice  Devens,  delivering  the  judgment  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Massachusetts  in  this  case,  said:  "It 
can  not  be  important  that,  in  this  Commonwealth,  the  cred- 
itor has  a  right  of  attachment  on  mesne  process.  Such  a 
remedy  is  very  imperfect,  as  compared  with  that  afforded 
by  a  lien,  which  is  a  usual  and  efficient  remedy  where  work 
is  done  upon  a  chattel  by  a  bailee,  to  whom  it  is  confided 
under  any  agreement,  either  express  or  implied,  with  the 
owner  thereof.  Nor  is  it  important  that,  while  expenditures 
may  be  made  upon  real  estate  under  the  orders  of  the  board 
of  health,  a  lien  can  exist  only  upon  personal  property,  and 
thus  that  this  remedy  is  partial.  There  is  no  reason  why  a 
well-recognized  remedy  as  to  personal  property  should  not 
be  enforced,  because  there  may  be  cases  coming  within  the 
statute  affecting  real  estate  to  which  it  would  not  be  appli- 
cable. Even  if  a  lien  might  exist  in  favor  of  the  city,  if  it 
had  done  the  work  through  its  officers,  agents,  or  servants, 
and  the  plaintiffs  contend  that  this  was  the  only  mode  in 
which  it  was  authorized  to  do  it,  they  further  argue  that  no 
lien  can  exist  in  the  case  at  bar;  that  there  can  be  none  in 
favor  of  the  city,  as  it  has  done  no  work,  and  none  in  favor 
of  the  defendant,  as  it  was  an  independent  contractor  with 
the  city,  and  there  was  no  debt  due  to  such  contractor  from 
the  plaintiffs  as  the  owners  of  the  goods.  The  board  of 
health  might  certainly  delegate  the  work  to  an  independent 
contractor;  it  was  not  necessarily  to  be  done  by  it  or  its 
'  immediate  servants,  and  under  its  personal  supervision ;  it 

iSTrain    v.    Boston    Disinfecting      929,  59  Am.   Rep.   113. 
Co.,   144   Mass.  523,  532,   11    N.   E. 

48 


8  7^7  LIENS.  754 

was  sufficient  if  it  prescribed  the  method,  and  this  was  com- 
plied with.  The  board,  in  the  language  of  the  statute,  was 
to  'cause'  the  goods  to  be  purified.  It  had  a  right  to  make 
a  reasonable  contract  for  the  disinfection  of  the  goods;  the 
duty  of  paying  for  the  expenses  thus  incurred  was  by  the 
statute  cast  upon  the  plaintiffs,  and  their  promise  to  pay 
therefor  is  one  implied  by  law.  Where  a  party  is  subjected 
to  such  a  duty,  this  obligation  is  to  be  performed,  and  the 
law  will,  of  its  own  force,  imply  a  promise,  even  against 
his  protestation  and  express  declaration.  Such  a  contract 
necessarily  implies  a  lien  in  favor  of  the  contractor  into 
whose  hands  the  goods  are  taken  for  disinfection,  to  secure 
him  for  the  expenses  properly  incurred  in  his  work." 

§  737.  The  lien  belongs  strictly  to  the  person  who  has 
contracted  with  the  owner  to  do  the  work. — A  servant  or 
journeyman  or  sub-contractor  of  such  person  has  no  lien.^'^ 

Where  a  physician  rendered  services  to  one  member  of  a 
firm  in  consideration  of  the  firm's  agreement  to  repair  his 
sleigh  and  charge  the  expense  to  that  partner,  the  firm's 
assignee  in  insolvency  has  no  possessory  lien  on  the  sleigh 
for  the  work  done  on  it  by  the  firm  before  the  assignment, 
nor  for  that  done  by  himself  afterwards  without  the  physi- 
cian's knowledge.  There  is  no  privity  of  contract  between 
the  assignee  and  the  physician. ^^ 

§  738.  Lien  for  work  of  agents. — A  lien  is  acquired  by 
virtue  of  the  work  done,  and  it  is  immaterial  whether  the 
work  be  done  by  the  claimant  or  his  agents.  Thus  the  statu- 
tory lien  of  a  boom  company  for  driving  logs  is  acquired 
by  virtue  of  the  work  done  under  the  contract  of  the  par- 
ties; and  it  is  immaterial  that  the  work  is  done  by  the  com- 

iTWhite  V.  Smith,  44  N.  J.  L.  105,  is  Morrill    v.    Merrill,   64    N.    H. 

43  Am.    Rep.   347,   per    Depue,   J.;      71,  6  Atl.  602.     See  ante,  §  721. 
Quillian  v.  Central  R.  &  Banking 
Co.,  52  Ga.  374. 


755  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  740 

pany's  agent  who  is  paid  a  gross  sum  for  the  work.  It  is 
as  competent  for  the  company  to  employ  an  agent  to  do 
the  whole  labor  for  a  specified  sum,  as  it  to  do  it  through 
laborers  employed  by  the  day  or  the  month. ^^ 

An  artisan  has  a  lien  for  work  done  in  the  way  of  his 
trade  by  another  than  himself  outside  his  shop.  Thus, 
where  a  chonometer  was  left  with  a  watchmaker  in  Nova 
Scotia  to  be  repaired,  and  the  watchmaker,  finding  that  he 
could  not  make  the  repairs,  sent  it  to  Boston  to  be  repaired, 
it  was  held  that  the  watchmaker  had  a  lien  for  the  charges 
paid  by  him  for  the  repairs  done  in  Boston.^^ 

§  739.     Lien  for  all  goods  delivered  under  one  contract. — 

The  lien  extends  to  every  portion  of  the  goods  delivered 
under  one  contract,  and  attaches  to  every  part  for  the  whole 
service.  Where  a  quantity  of  logs  were  delivered  on  dif- 
ferent days  to  the  owner  of  a  sawmill  to  be  sawed  into 
boards,  and  he  sawed  a  part  of  them  and  delivered  them  to 
the  bailor  without  receiving  payment  for  the  sawing,  it  was 
held  that  the  mill-owner  had  a  lien  upon  the  logs  remain- 
ing in  his  possession  for  his  account.  The  sawing  was  an 
entire  work,  and  the  lien  extended  to  every  portion  of  the 
logs.^^ 

A  delivery  of  a  part  of  the  articles  received  under  one 
contract  does  not  defeat  the  lien  upon  the  remainder  for  the 
entire  contract  price. ^^ 

§  740.  Lien  on  part  of  the  property  for  repair  of  all  the 
property. — Where  an  entire  contract  is  made  for  making  or 
repairing  several  articles  for  a  gross  sum,  the  mechanic  or 
tradesman  has  a  lien  on  any  one  or  more  of  the  articles  in 

i^Hall    V.    Tittabawassee    Boom  2iMorgan   v.    Congdon,   4   N.   Y. 

Co.,   51   Mich.  377,   16  N.  W.  770.      552. 
See   ante,   §§724,   725.  22Steinman  v.  Wilkins,  7  Watts 

20Webber  v.  Cogswell,  2  Canada      &  S.  466,  42  Am.  Dec.  254;  Myers 
Sup.  Ct.  15.  V.  Uptegrove,  3  How.   Pr.   (N.  S.) 

(N.  Y.)   316. 


§    741  LIENS.  756 

his  possession,  not  only  for  their  proportionate  part  of  the 
sum  agreed  upon  for  making  or  repairing  the  whole,  but 
for  such  amount  as  he  may  be  entitled  to  for  labor  bestowed 
upon  all  the  articles  embraced  in  the  contract.^''  Thus  a 
tailor  employed  to  make  a  suit  of  clothes  has  a  lien  for  the 
whole  and  upon  any  part  of  the  suit  in  his  possession.-^ 
Thus  also,  under  a  special  contract  between  the  owner  of 
a  wagon  and  a  blacksmith  that  the  latter  should  re-tire  two 
wheels  for  three  dollars,  the  former  left  one  wheel,  and, 
after  the  tire  was  set,  came  and  demanded  that  wheel  upon 
a  tender  of  half  that  sum,  saying  that  he  would  not  have  the 
other  wheel  repaired.  The  blacksmith,  however,  had  cut, 
bent,  and  welded  the  iron  for  the  other  wheel,  and  therefore 
refused  to  deliver  the  wheel  that  had  been  repaired.  It  was 
held  that  he  had  a  right  to  retain  that  wheel  for  the  work 
done  upon  both  wheels  under  the  contract.-^ 

§  741.     Time  of  delivery  of  articles  to  a  workman. — The 

fact  that  the  chattels  are  delivered  to  a  workman  in  different 
parcels,  and  at  different  times,  does  not  interfere  with  his 
right  to  detain  any  part  of  them  for  the  payment  of  the 
amount  due  upon  all  of  them,  provided  all  the  work  be  done 
under  one  bargain.^^  Where  a  lien  was  claimed  on  car- 
riages repaired,  not  only  for  the  work  done  on  those  car- 
riages but  also  upon  other  carriages,  it  was  held  that  the 
carriages  might  be  reclaimed  upon  payment  of  the  charges 
for  the  repairs  done  upon  the  specific  carriages,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  any  proof  that  the  other  carriages  were  a  part  of 
an  entire  lot  delivered  at  the  same  time,  or  at  different  times 
under  one  arrangement.^''^ 

23Partridge    v.    Dartmouth    Col-  ^oChase    v.    Westmore,    5    M.    & 

lege,  5  N.  H.  286;  McFarland  v.  S.  180;  Myers  v.  Uptegrove,  3 
Wheeler,  26  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  467.  How.  Pr.  (N.  S.)   (N.  Y.)  316. 

24Blake  v.  Nicholson,  3  M.  &  S.  27Moulton    v.    Greene,    10    R.    I. 

167,  per  Lord   Ellenborough,  C.  J.       330. 

2''HenseI  v.  Noble.  95  Pa.  St.  345, 
40  Am.  Rep.  659. 


757  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  743 

If  wheat  be  sent  to  a  miller  at  different  times  to  be  ground, 
but  it  is  all  sent  under  one  contract,  he  may  detain  the  whole 
until  he  has  received  the  price  for  grinding  it.^^ 

§  742.  Lien  at  common  law  only  because  o£  added  value 
of  article. — It  is  an  essential  element  of  an  artisan's  lien  at 
common  law  that  he  has  conferred  additional  value  upon  the 
chattel,  either  directly  or  by  his  own  labor  or  skill,  or  in- 
directly by  the  use  of  some  instrument  or  means  within  his 
control.^^  If  additional  value  has  not  been  conferred  upon 
the  chattel  there  is  no  lien,  though  labor  and  skill  may  have 
been  expended  upon  it.  An  agistor,  or  one  who  takes  charge 
of  horses  or  cattle,  has  no  lien  for  keeping  and  feeding  them, 
because  he  does  not  confer  any  additional  value  on  the  ani- 
mal by  taking  charge  of  it  and  feeding  it.^^  But  on  the 
other  hand  one  has  a  lien  on  a  mare  covered  by  his  stallion, 
because  the  mare  is  made  more  valuable  by  being  in  foal.^^ 

One  who  takes  window  sashes  to  get  panes  of  glass  put  in 
them  has  a  lien  on  the  finished  windows  upon  common-law 
principles.^^ 

§  743.  Printer  has  no  lien  at  common  law. — A  printer 
has  no  lien  upon  type  set  up  by  him  and  used  for  printing, 
for  no  additional  value  is  imparted  to  the  type  by  the  use 
of  it.  On  the  contrary,  the  inference  might  well  be  that,  by 
setting  the  type  and  printing  from  it,  its  value  would  be 
diminished. ^^  Neither  has  a  printer  any  lien  upon  stereotype 
plates  which  have  been  furnished  him  to  print  from.^^     But 

28Chase    v.    Westmore,    5    M.    &  -^iScarfe   v.   Morgan,  4  M.  &  W. 

S.  180.  270. 

29Chapman    v.    Allen,    Cro.    Car.  32McMeekin     v.     Worcester,     99 

271 ;  Wallace  v.  Woodgate,  1  Car.  Iowa  243,  68  N.  W.  680. 

&   P.   575;   White   v.   Smith,   44   N.  33De  Vinne  v.  Rianhard,  9  Daly 

J.    L.    105,    43    Am.    Rep.    347,    per  (N.  Y.)  406,  11  Weekly  Dig.  268. 

Depue,  J.  34BIeaden  v.   Hancock,  Mood.  & 

30Jackson   v.    Cummins,   5   M.    &  M.  465,  4  Car.    &   P.   152.     A  pub- 

W.  342.    See  ante,  §  641.  lisher    may,    it    is    said,    under    an 


§  743  LIENS.  758 

the  printer  has  a  lien  upon  a  book  printed  from  the  type  or 
plate,  for  the  book  is  the  thing  produced  by  his  labor  and 
skill.  In  the  case  of  the  book,  the  paper  and  other  materials 
used  in  its  manufacture  are  enhanced  in  value  by  the  print- 
er's labor  and  skill.^^  An  engraver  has  a  lien  on  the  plates, 
impressions,  and  prints  in  his  possession  for  the  work  done 
upon  them.^^ 

By  virtue  of  a  contract  a  printer's  lien  may  attached  to 
paper  delivered  to  him  for  use  in  printing  an  entire  book, 
though  he  has  actually  used  but  a  little  of  it.  A  firm  of  paper 
makers  contracted  with  a  publisher  to  furnish  paper  for  a 
certain  book.  The  publisher  contracted  with  printers  for 
printing  the  book;  but  the  latter  had  refused  to  make  any 
contract  until  assured  by  the  paper  makers  that  they  would 
furnish  the  paper.  The  paper  makers  delivered  to  the  print- 
ers one  hundred  and  fifty  reams  of  paper  for  the  book,  the 
bill  for  which  was  made  out  and  delivered  to  the  publisher. 
On  account  of  a  forged  note  given  by  the  publisher  to  the 
paper  makers,  the  latter  commenced  an  action  to  recover 
the  paper.  The  printers  claimed  a  lien  upon  the  paper, 
though  they  had  actually  used  only  four  reams  of  it.  It 
was  held  that  they  had  a  lien  upon  all  the  paper  for  the  work 
done.  The  court  said  that  the  lien  "attached  the  moment 
the  paper  came  into  their  possession  for  the  purpose  of  hav- 
ing work  done  upon  it,  and  remains  good  until  discharged 
by  payment,  not  only  for  labor  literally  expended  upon  the 
paper  itself  (as  by  printing),  but  for  any  act  done,  or  labor 
performed,  or  money  expended  in  the  preparation  of  instru- 

agreement   with  an  author   to   re-  s^Blake  v.  Nicholson,  3  M.  &  S. 

ceive  a  share  of  the  profits  on  a  167;  De  Vinne  v.  Rianhard,  9  Daly 

book  to  be  published,  have  a  lien  (N.  Y.)  406,  per  Daly,  J.;  Conrow 

on  the  copyright  for  his  disburse-  v.   Little,   115   N.  Y.  387,  22  N.   E. 

ments.      Brook    v.    Wentworth,    3  346,  5  L.  R.  A.  693,  affd.  23  N.   E. 

Anst.  881.     But  how  can  the  pub-  1144. 

lisher  have  a  lien  upon  a  copyright  seMarks  v.  Lahee,  3  Bing.  N.  Cas. 

unless    it   has    been    taken    in    his  408. 
name   or   assigned   to   him? 


759  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  744 

mentalities  by  which  that  labor  was  to  be  performed,  as 
types,  cuts,  illustrations,  electrotypes,  and  other  things  of 
like  nature  and  object. "^^ 

§  743a.  Workman  must  observe  the  terms  of  his  con- 
tract.— It  is  an  essential  condition  of  an  artisan's  lien  that 
he  shall  observe  the  terms  of  the  contract,  and  perform  the 
work  within  the  time  and  in  the  manner  agreed  upon.  If 
he  has  failed  to  perform  his  contract  in  either  respect,  he  is 
not  entitled  to  retain  the  property,  but  the  owner  may  re- 
plevy it  without  making  any  tender  or  payment.  The  work- 
man can  not  refuse  to  perform  his  contract  and  insist  on 
retaining  possession  as  against  the  owner  of  the  goods.^^ 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  workman  has  fulfilled  his 
contract  within  the  time  prescribed,  or,  if  there  was  no 
limitation  of  time,  then  within  a  reasonable  time,  the  owner 
can  not  recover  the  goods  upon  which  the  work  was  per- 
formed without  making  payment  or  tender  of  the  amount 
due   the  workman.^^ 

§  744.  Precedence  over  mortgage  depends  on  circum- 
stances.— Whether  this  lien  takes  precedence  of  a  chattel 
mortgage  previously  recorded  or  filed  depends  upon  the  cir- 
cumstances attending  the  creation  of  the  lien.  It  is  certain 
that  the  mortgagor  can  not  by  contract  create  any  lien  which 

STConrow  v.  Little,  115  N.  Y.  387,  39HilIsburg  v.  Harrison,  2  Colo. 

22  N.   E.  346,  5  L.  R.  A.  693,  affd.  App.  298,  30  Pac.  355.     In  this  case 

23  N.  E.  1144.  it  was  held  that  coats  made  by  a 
ssHillsburg  v.  Harrison,  2  Colo.  tailor    out    of    cloth    furnished    by 

App.  298,  30  Pac.  355,  citing  Hodg-  a   merchant    for   that   purpose   can 

don  V.  Waldron,  9  N.  H.  66;  Hilger  not    be    replevied    before    comple- 

V.  Edwards,  5  Nev.  84;  Munson  v.  tion,   where   the   evidence   fails  to 

Porter,  63  Iowa  453,  19  N.  W.  290;  show  that  defendant  violated  any 

Bloom  V.    McGehee,  38  Ark.   329;  contract,    express    or    implied,    or 

Scarfe  v.    Morgan,  4   Mees.   &  W.  that      plaintiff      paid      defendant's 

270;  Hall  v.  Tittabawassee   Boom  wages  or  made  a  tender. 
Co.,  51  Mich.  Zn,  16  N.  W.  770. 


§  744 


LIENS. 


760 


shall  have  priority  over  such  mortgage.'**^*  But  the  mort- 
gagee's authority  for  the  creation  of  such  a  Hen  may  be  im- 
plied, and  the  implication  arises  from  the  mortgagor's  being 
allowed  to  remain  in  possession  of  the  chattel,  and  to  use  it 
for  profit.'*^  Thus,  w^here  the  subject  of  a  mortgage  was  a 
hack  let  for  hire,  and  it  was  described  as  "now  in  use"  at 
certain  stables,  and  it  was  stipulated  that  the  mortgagor 
might  retain  the  possession  and  use  of  it,  it  was  regarded 
as  the  manifest  intention  of  the  parties  that  the  hack  should 
continue  to  be  driven  for  hire,  and  should  be  kept  in  a  proper 
state  of  repair  for  that  purpose,  not  merely  for  the  benefit  of 
the  mortgagor,  but  for  that  of  the  mortgagee  also,  by  pre- 
serving the  value  of  the  security  and  affording  a  means  of 
earning  wherewithal  to  pay  ofT  the  mortgage  debt."*- 

"Where  property  is  to  be  retained  and  used  by  the  mort- 
gagor for  a  long  period  of  time,  it  will  be  presumed  to  have 
been  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  the  mortgage,  where  it 
is  property  liable  to  such  repairs,  that  it  is  to  be  kept  in 
repair;  and  when  the  property  is  machinery,  or  property  of 
a  character  which   renders   it   necessary   to   intrust   it   to   a 


■*"Jones  on  Chattel  Mortgages, 
§  472;  Bissell  v.  Pearce.  28  N.  Y. 
252;  McGhee  v.  Edwards.  87  Tenn. 
506,  11  S.  W.  316;  see  ante,  §§691- 
697,  727,  971. 

4iHammond  v.  Danielson,  126 
Mass.  294;  Loss  v.  Fry,  1  City 
Ct.  R.  (N.  Y.)  7. 

42Hammond  v.  Danielson.  126 
Mass.  294.  "The  case  is  analog- 
ous," says  Gray,  C.  J.,  "to  those  in 
which  courts  of  common  law,  as 
well  as  of  admiralty,  have  held, 
upon  general  principles,  independ- 
ently of  any  provision  of  statute, 
that  liens  for  repairs  made  by  me- 
chanics upon  vessels  in  their  pos- 
session take  precedence  of  prior 
mortgages."     Williams    v.    Allsup, 


10  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  417;  The  Scio,  L.  R. 
1  Adm.  &  Eccl.  353,  355;  The 
Granite  State,  1  Sprague  (U.  S.) 
m.  Fed  Cas.  No.  5687;  Donnell  v. 
The  Starlight,  103  Mass.  227,  22>Z; 
The  St.  Joseph,  1  Brown  Adm.  202; 
Watts  V.  Sweeney,  127  Ind.  116, 
26  N.  E.  680,  22  Am.  St.  615.  It 
may  be  stated  as  a  rule  that  a 
mortgagor  of  a  vessel  who  is  al- 
lowed to  remain  m  possession  has 
an  implied  authority  to  create 
liens  for  repairs  which  will  take 
priority  of  the  mortgage.  Jones 
on  Chattel  Mortgages,  §  535; 
Beall  V.  White,  94  U.  S.  382,  24  L. 
ed.  173;  Scott  v.  Delahunt,  5  Lans. 
(N.  Y.)  Z12,  affirmed  65  N.  Y.   128. 


761  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  744 

mechanic  or  machinist  to  make  such  reairs,  the  mortgagor 
in  possession  will  be  constituted  the  agent  of  the  mortgagee 
to  procure  the  repairs  to  be  made,  and  as  such  necessary 
repairs  are  for  the  betterment  of  the  property,  and  add  to 
its  value  to  the  gain  of  the  mortgagee,  the  common-law  lien 
in  favor  of  the  mechanic  for  the  value  of  the  repairs  is  para- 
mount and  superior  to  the  lien  of  the  mortgagee.  The  mort- 
gagee is  presumed  in  such  a  case  to  have  contracted  with  a 
knowledge  of  the  law  giving  to  a  mechanic  a  lien."^^ 

Thus  a  railroad  company  which  has  mortgaged  a  locomo- 
tive, the  only  one  on  the  road,  retaining  possession  under 
the  terms  of  the  mortgage,  and  also  after  forfeiture,  will  be 
presumed  to  be  the  mortgagee's  agent  to  keep  it  in  repair, 
and  has  the  right  to  create  a  lien  thereon  for  repairs  made 
after  the  forfeiture,  which  is  paramount  to  the  mortgage.^* 

The  court  say:  "The  fair  presumption  is,  that  the  engine 
thus  mortgaged,  but  retained  by  the  mortgagor,  to  be  used 
by  him  in  earning  money  to  pay  the  mortgage  debt,  was  to 
be  kept  in  repair;  and  the  further  presumption  follows  that 
it  being  machinery  requiring  skilled  mechanics  and  machin- 
ists to  repair,  it  would  be  intrusted  to  machinists  to  make 
necessary  repairs,  and  such  being  the  understanding  of  the 
parties  to  the  mortgage,  as  fairly  inferred  from  the  nature 
of  the  machinery  and  use  to  be  made  of  it,  and  by  permitting 
it  to  be  retained  and  used  by  the  mortgagor  long  after  the 
mortgage  debt  matured  and  the  conditions  of  the  mortgage 
forfeited,  the  mortgagee  was  bound  to  know  that  such  me- 
chanic or  machinist  would  have  a  lien  for  the  amount  of  the 
repairs." 

But  the  authority  of  the  mortgagor  to  create  lien  was 
held  not  to  be  implied  where  one  manufacturing  engines  for 
certain  boats  under  a  contract  mortgaged  them  when  they 

43Watts  V.  Sweeney,  127  Ind.  116,  Co.  v.  Mills,  54  Nebr.  417,  74  N.  W. 
26  N.  E.  680,  22  Am.  St.  615,  per  966,  40  L.  R.  A.  761,  69  Am  St.  719. 
Olds,    C.    J.  ;Drummond    Carriage  44Watts  v.  Sweeney,  127  Ind.  116, 

26  N.  E.  680,  22  Am.  St.  615. 


§  745  LIENS.  762 

were  only  partly  built,  and  afterwards  proceeded  with  their 
construction  under  a  verbal  agreement  with  the  mortgagee 
that  he  might  go  on  with  the  work  and  finish  the  engines. 
This  agreement  did  not  give  the  mortgagor  himself  a  lien 
against  the  mortgagee  for  the  work  afterwards  done  upon 
the  engines,  nor  did  it  authorize  him  to  employ  any  one 
else  to  work  upon  them  in  such  a  manner  as  to  create  a  lien 
for  such  work.'*^ 

§  745.     Possession  is  essential  to  the  existence  of  this  lien. 

If  the  mechanic  deliver  the  chattel  on  which  he  has  worked 
to  the  owner  his  lien  is  gone,  and  he  has  only  a  right  of  ac- 
tion against  him  for  the  value  of  the  work  done.^^  A  black- 
smith ironed  a  sled  and  claimed  a  lien  for  his  services,  where- 
upon the  owner  agreed  with  him  that  the  sled  should  be  his 
till  the  charge  should  be  paid.  The  owner  took  and  kept 
possession  of  the  sled,  always  recognizing  the  blacksmith's 
ownership.  A  creditor  of  the  owner  afterwards  attached  the 
sled  and  sold  it  upon  execution.  It  was  held  that  the  black- 
smith lost  his  lien  by  his  agreement  with  the  owner  for  a 
conditional  sale,  and  by  delivering  the  sled  to  him,  and  that 
the  sale  was  invalid  as  against  the  creditors  of  the  latter.^''' 

4oGlobe  Works  v.  Wright,  106  62.  A  salt  manufacturer  contract- 
Mass.  207.  One  not  in  possession  ed  with  a  salt  company  to  manu- 
can  not  have  a  lien  on  personalty  facture  salt  at  its  salt-blocks,  the 
as  against  the  rights  of  a  mort-  manufacturer  to  deliver  the  salt 
gagee.  Lighthouse  v.  Third  Nat.  piled  on  the  dock,  and  the  com- 
Bank,  162  N.  Y.  336,  56  N.  E.  738.  pany  to  pay  him  thirty-five  cents 

4CStickney    v.     Allen,     10     Gray  per    barrel    each    month    for    the 

(Mass.)    352;    King  v.    Indian    Or-  amount  delivered  during  the  pre- 

chard  Canal  Co.,  11   Cush   (Mass.)  ceding  month,  the  manufacturer  to 

231 ;  Morse  v.  Androscoggin  R.  Co.,  "be  responsible   for  the  salt  until 

39   Maine   285;    Nevan    v.    Roup,   8  it  shall  be  delivered  to  the  boats 

Iowa  207;   Bailey  v.  Quint,  22  Vt.  or    vessels    from    the    said    dock," 

474;   McDougall  v.   Crapon,  95   N.  and  "that   he  will   count   the   said 

Car.    292;    Tucker    v.    Taylor,    53  salt,  and  deliver  it  only  upon  the 

Ind.  93;  Holderman  v.  Manier,  104  written    order"    of    the    company. 

Ind.  118,  3  N.  E.  811.  Some    time    thereafter    the    com- 

47Kitteridge  v.  Freeman,  48  Vt.  pany  gave  a  chattel   mortgage  on 


763 


MECHANICS  ,  ARTISANS  ,  AND  LABORERS    LIENS. 


745 


Moreover,  if,  after  having'  parted  v;^ith  the  possession  of  the 
chattel,  the  mechanic  again  come  into  possession  of  it  with- 
out the  consent  or  agreement  of  the  owner,  his  lien  is  not 
reinstated. ^^  He  can  not  recover  his  lien  by  stopping  the 
goods  in  transitu,  after  he  has  shipped  them  to  the  owner 
at  the  owner's  risk  and  on  his  account. ^^ 

A  mill-owner  waives  his  lien  for  sawing  logs  if,  knowing 
that  the  lumber  to  be  sawed  has  been  sold,  he  saws  them 
according  to  the  purchaser's  directions,  piles  the  lumber 
separately,  marks  it  with  the  purchaser's  initials,  and  accepts 
a  seller's  note  for  the  price  of  the  sawing.^^ 

A  tailor  does  not  lose  his  lien  by  allowing  his  customer  to 
try  on  the  clothes  made  for  him,  if  this  be  done  in  the  tailor's 
presence. ^^ 


all  their  personalty,  including  the 
salt  in  the  salt-blocks,  on  the  plat- 
form, and  on  the  docks ;  and  a 
few  days  later  a  receiver  was  ap- 
pointed, who  took  possession  of 
the  salt,  there  being  at  that  time 
several  thousand  barrels  on  the 
platform,  in  the  blocks,  and  on 
the  docks,  on  account  of  which 
the  manufacturer  had  received  as 
part  payment  drafts  of  the  com- 
pany, which  were  protested.  It 
was  held  that  the  manufacturer, 
not  having  surrendered  possession 
of  the  salt,  was  entitled  to  a  lien 
thereon  for  his  account  less  the 
amount  of  drafts  received.  In  re 
Merrick,  91  Mich.  342,  51  N.  W. 
890.  "Appellants  contend  that  peti- 
tioner is  not  entitled  to  the  relief 
prayed,  (1)  because  under  his  con- 
tract he  was  bound  to  deliver  the 
salt  to  the  company  before  pay- 
ment, and  (2)  because  he  had  part- 
ed with  possession.  Docks  were 
erected  and  used  exclusively  in 
connection  with  these  salt-blocks. 


Petitioner  had  charge  of  the 
blocks  and  these  docks.  While  he 
was  to  deliver  the  salt  upon  the 
docks,  the  contract  contemplated 
that  it  should  remain  there  for 
some  time  afterwards;  and,  by  the 
terms  of  the  contract  petitioner 
was  responsible  for  its  custody 
and  control,  and  it  was  not  to  be 
delivered  to  any  one  except  upon 
the  written  order  of  the  company. 
Petitioner  simply  delivered  the 
salt  from  his  own  possession  in 
the  salt-block  to  his  own  custody 
upon  the  docks."  Per  McGrath, 
J. 

48Hartley  v.  Hitchcock,  1  Stark, 
408;  Howes  v.  Ball,  B.  &  C.  481,  1 
M.  &  Ry.  288;  Nevan  v.  Roup,  8 
Iowa  207. 

49Sweet  V.  Pym,  1  East  4,  per 
Lord  Kenyon. 

soTyler  v.  Blodgett  &  Davis 
Lumber  Co.,  78  Mich.  81,  43  N.  W. 
1034. 

51  Hughes  V.  Lenny,  5  M.  &  W. 
183,   187,  per   Parke,   B. 


§  746  LIENS.  764 

§  746.  Possession  of  an  officer  is  possession  of  his  cor- 
poration.— The  possession  of  an  officer  of  a  corporation  act- 
ing in  its  behalf  is  the  possession  of  the  corporation,  and  he 
can  not  by  means  of  such  possession  acquire  a  lien  as  against 
the  corporation.  Thus,  where  the  secretary  of  a  railroad 
corporation  bought  a  set  of  books  with  his  own  money  and 
entered  in  them  the  minutes  of  the  proceedings  of  the  cor- 
poration, it  was  held  that  upon  going  out  of  office  he  had 
no  lien  on  the  books  either  for  the  purchase-money,  or  for 
his  services  as  secretary,  for  his  possession  of  the  books 
was  the  possession  of  the  company  as  soon  as  he  began  to 
enter  in  them  the  minutes  and  accounts  of  the  company. 
By  entering  the  records  and  accounts  of  the  company  in 
these  books,  he  so  mixed  his  own  property  with  the  prop- 
erty of  the  company  that  they  could  not  be  separated,  and 
according  to  the  well-established  principle  of  law,  the  whole 
property  thereby  became  the  property  of  the  company.^- 

§  747.  Delivery  of  property  waives  lien. — One  who  is  by 
contract  bound  to  deliver  property  upon  which  he  has  ex- 
pended labor,  before  the  stipulated  time  of  payment,  has 
no  lien.  One  who  contracts  to  haul  and  deliver  lumber  on 
board  cars,  at  an  agreed  price  to  be  paid  when  the  lumber 
is  sold  in  the  market  and  the  proceeds  are  received  by 
the  owner,  has  no  lien  thereon  for  his  lumber.  The  obliga- 
tion to  deliver  the  lumber  before  payment  negatives  the 
right  to  detain  until  payment. °^  He  has  waived  the  lien  by 
his  contract,  and  can  not  set  it  up  in  violation  of  his  contract. 
A  lien  is  waived  by  an  unconditional  refusal  to  deliver  the 
property.^^  A  tanner  who  contracts  to  tan  hides  furnished 
him  by  the  owner,  and  to  return  the  leather  made  from  them 
in  a  reasonable  time,   at   a   price  agreed   upon   for  tanning 

52State  V.   Goll,  Z2  N.  J.   L.  285.  s^Alabama    Cotton     Oil     Co.    v. 

53Stillings    V.    Gibson,   63    N.    H.       Meeden,  150  Ala.  587. 
1. 


765  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  749 

and  transportation,  payable  after  delivery,  has  no  right  to 
detain  the  leather  after  it  is  finished  and  ready  for  delivery.^'' 
A  mechanic  repaired  a  wagon  under  an  agreement  that 
he  should  receive  payment  in  the  use  of  the  w^agon  and  the 
owner's  horse  for  a  journey.  When  the  wagon  was  repaired, 
the  mechanic,  not  being  ready  for  his  journey,  allow^ed  the 
owner  to  take  it  away.  After  some  three  weeks  he  was 
ready  for  his  journey,  and  the  owner  delivered  to  him  the 
wagon  and  a  horse,  which  directly  kicked  the  dash-board  off 
the  wagon  and  broke  the  shafts.  The  mechanic  gave  up  his 
journey  and  asserted  a  lien  on  the  wagon.  It  was  held 
that  he  had  no  lien.  If  any  lien  ever  existed,  he  lost  it  In- 
parting  with  the  possession;  and,  moreover,  the  agreement 
of  the  parties  seems  to  have  contemplated  payment  at  a 
future  day,  so  that  the  lien  was  waived  from  the  beginning. 
Detention  of  the  wagon  by  the  mechanic  until  he  should  find 
it  convenient  to  take  his  journey  would  seem  to  have  been 
inconsistent  with  the  understanding  of  the  parties. ^^ 

§  748.  Mode  of  payment  may  be  inconsistent  with  a  lien. 
— The  mode  of  payment  agreed  upon  may  be  inconsistent 
with  a  lien,  as  where  a  carriage  maker  agrees  to  repair  a 
physician's  carriages,  and  to  take  payment  in  medical  ser- 
vices.^''^ 

§  749.  Statutes  of  states  providing  liens. — In  most  of  the 
states  there  are  statutes  giving  to  mechanics,  artisans  and 
others  who  bestow  labor  on  personal  property,  a  lien  there- 
for. The  purpose  of  these  statutes  is  in  general  to  extend 
the  common-law  lien  in  respect  of  the  persons  who  can  ac- 
quire such  lien,  and  to  give  an  efifectual  remedy  for  its  en-, 
forcement,  either  by  sale  after  notice,  or  by  attachment  and 
sale  under  execution.    In  a  few  states  the  lien  is  extended  so 

55Lee  V.  Gould,  47  Pa.  St.  398.  sTMorriU  v.  Merrill,  64  N.  H.  71. 

56Tucker  v.  Taylor,  53  Ind.  93.  6  Atl.  602. 


§    75^  LIENS.  766 

that  it  may  be  availed  of  within  a  limited  time  after  the 
property  has  been  delivered  to  the  owner.^^  But  generally 
these  statutes  in  most  respects  are  merely  declaratory  of  the 
common  lavvr,  and  must  be  interpreted  in  accordance  with 
its  principles.  Especially  is  this  so  as  regards  the  necessity 
of  retaining  possession  of  the  property  in  order  to  retain  a 
lien  upon  it.^^  "The  lien  under  the  statute  is  of  the  same 
nature  that  it  formerly  was,  and  the  same  circumstances 
must  combine  to  create  it.  There  must  be  a  possession  of 
the  thing,  otherwise  there  can  not,  without  a  special  agree- 
ment to  that  effect,  be  any  lien.  The  term  lien  as  used  in 
the  statute  means  th*e  same  it  ever  did :  the  right  to  hold 
the  thing  until  the  payment  of  the  reasonable  charges  for 
making,  altering,  repairing,  or  bestowing  labor  upon  it.  Pos- 
session of  the  article  is  a  requisite  essential."^*' 

§  750.  Alabama.*'^ — Blacksmiths,  wood-workmen,  and  all 
other  mechanics  who  contribute  their  labor  and  material,  or 
either,  to  the  production,  manufacture,  or  repair  of  any  ve- 
hicle, implement,  machine,  or  article  of  any  kind,  have  a 
lien  thereon  in  the  hands  of  the  party  for  whom  such  vehicle 
or  implement,  machine  or  article,  was  made,  or  repaired,  or 
to  whom  sold,  and  in  the  hands  of  a  purchaser  with  notice  of 
such  lien,  for  the  agreed  price,  or  the  value  if  no  price  was 
agreed  upon,  of  the  labor  and  material,  or  either,  contrib- 

58As  in  Alabama,  §  750;  Louisi-  Co.,   188   Fed.  761.     A  plea  to  the 

ana,  §  760.  merits    of   an   attachment    suit    to 

59McDearmid  v.  Foster,  14  Ore.  enforce    a    lien    of    a    blacksmith 

417,    12    Pac.    813;    McDougall    v.  amounts  to  a  waiver  of  a  defense 

Crapon,  95  N.  Car.  292.  that  the  property  attached  is  not 

60McDearmid  v.  Foster,  14  Ore.  burdened  with  the  lien.  The  proper 

417,   12  Pac.  813,  per  Thayer,   J.  mode  to  test  whether  the  property 

eiCiv.  Code  1907,  §§  4788-4789.    A  is  subject  to  such  lien  is  to  move 

lien  on  personal  property  may  be  to  dissolve  the  attachment.     Mann 

transferred  to  the  proceeds  of  its  Lumber  Co.  v.  Bailey  Iron  Works 

sale  only  by  an  order  of  the  court.  Co.,   156  Ala.  598,  47  So.  325. 
In  re  Varley  &  Bauman  Clothing 


'j(i']  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.    §  750a 

uted  to  the  production,  manufacture,  or  repair  of  the  same. 
Parties  shall  be  entitled  to  process  of  attachment  to  en- 
force their  rights,  to  be  issued  by  the  same  of^cers  and  un- 
der the  same  conditions  as  required  by  law  in  other  cases 
of  attachments;  and  the  affidavit  shall  set  forth  all  the  facts 
necessary  to  the  creation  of  such  lien  under  the  section  above 
quoted,  and  in  addition  thereto,  one  or  the  other  of  the  fol- 
low^ing  causes:  1.  That  the  party  for  w^hom  such  article 
was  made,  sold,  or  repaired  is  the  owner  thereof,  and  that 
the  price  of  the  article,  or  for  the  repair  thereof,  or  some 
part  of  either,  is  due  and  unpaid;  2.  That  the  party  for 
whom  such  article  was  made,  sold,  or  repaired  has  trans- 
ferred the  article  to  a  purchaser  with  notice  of  such  lien, 
and  that  the  price  of  the  article,  or  for  the  repair  thereof, 
or  some  part  of  either,  is  due  and  unpaid.  Such  lien  shall 
be  enforced  only  within  six  months  from  the  time  when  the 
account  or  claim  becomes  due. 

§  750a.  Alaska. — Any  person  who  shall  make,  alter,  or 
bestow  labor  on  any  article  of  personal  property  at  the  re- 
quest of  the  owner  or  lawful  possessor  thereof  shall  have  a 
lien  upon  such  property  so  made,  altered,  or  repaired,  or 
upon  which  labor  had  been  bestowed,  for  his  just  and  rea- 
sonable charges  for  the  labor  he  has  performed  and  the  ma- 
terial he  has  furnished,  and  such  person  may  hold  and  retain 
possession  of  the  same  until  such  just  and  reasonable 
charges  shall  be  paid.^^ 

If  such  just  and  reasonable  charges  be  not  paid  within 
three  months  after  the  care,  attention  and  labor  shall  have 
been  performed  or  bestowed,  or  the  materials  or  food  shall 
have  been  furnished,  the  person  having  such  lien  may  sell 
at  public  auction  after  giving  notice  of  such  sale,  all  of  such 
property  or  any  part  sufScient  to  pay  such  just  and  reason- 
able charges. 

.   62  Carter's  Ann.   Code   1900,  p.  413,    §§  276,   278. 


§  751 


LIENS. 


768 


§751.  Arizona. — Whenever  any  article,  implement,  uten- 
sil, or  vehicle  shall  be  repaired  w^ith  labor  and  material,  or 
with  labor  and  without  furnishing  material  by  any  carpen- 
ter, mechanic,  artisan,  or  other  workman,  such  person  is 
authorized  to  retain  possession  of  the  same  until  the  amount 
due  on  the  same  for  repairing  shall  be  fully  paid.^^ 

§  751a.  Arkansas.*^^ — Laborers  who  perform  work  and 
labor  on  any  object,  thing,  material  or  property,  shall  have 


63  Rev.  Stat.  1901,  §  2923.  As  to 
enforcement,  see  post,  §  1049a.  A 
laborer  may  follow  a  crop  which 
he  has  labored  to  raise  and  attach 
the  same  in  a  suit  at  law.  Barrett 
V.  Nichols,  85  Ark.  58.  107  S.  W. 
171. 

6-iDig.  of  Stats.  1904.  §§  5011. 
5012,  5014.  For  mode  of  enforce- 
ment see  Dig-,  of  Stats.  1904. 
§§  4983-4994.  The  remedy  is  sum- 
mary, and  the  statute  should  be 
strictly  construed.  Dano  v.  Mis- 
sissippi, O.  &  R.  R.  Co.,  27  Ark. 
564;  Flournoy  v.  Shelton,  43  Ark. 
168.  Hay  is  the  production  of  the 
laborer  who  cuts  and  rakes  the 
grass,  and  he  has  a  lien  on  it  for 
the  price  or  value  of  his  labor. 
Emerson  v.  Hedrick,  42  Ark.  263. 
One  who  raises  a  crop  on  the  land 
of  another  for  an  agreed  share  is 
a  laborer  and  is  entitled  to  a  lien. 
Burgie  v.  Davis,  34  Ark.  179.  The 
lien  of  the  laborer  is  confined  to 
the  specific  property  on  which  his 
labor  was  bestowed;  Russell  v. 
Painter,  50  Ark.  244,  7  S.  W.  35; 
and  can  not  be  extended  to  wages 
earned  after  the  completion  and 
delivery  of  the  property  in  ques- 
tion. Ferguson  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Low  (Ark.),  17  S.  W.  879.  All  per- 
sons  engaged    in   the   manufacture 


of  shingles,  whose  labor  contrib- 
utes directly  to  the  value  of  the 
shingles  by  aiding  in  putting  them 
in  a  marketable  condition,  are  en- 
titled to  a  lien  under  this  statute. 
Sawyers  who  run  the  saws,  the 
engineer  who  runs  the  engine,  per- 
sons who  pile  blocks  into  position 
to  be  made  into  shingles,  one  who 
runs  a  machine  for  trimming  the 
shingles,  and  another  for  splitting 
the  blocks  to  be  made  into  shingles, 
are  entitled  to  a  lien.  But  the 
superintendent  of  the  mill,  who 
files  the  saws  and  occasionally 
does  other  work  at  the  mill,  and  a 
watchman  who  watches  the  mill 
at  night  and  cleans  the  machinery, 
and  laborers  who  remove  the  saw- 
dust and  waste  from  the  mill,  are 
not  entitled  to  a  lien  on  the  shin- 
gles, because  their  work  is  not 
upon  the  shingles,  and  does  not 
contribute  directly  to  the  making 
of  the  shingles.  Van  Etten  v. 
Cook,  54  Ark.  522,  16  S.  W.  477. 
One  holding  a  lien  on  property 
purchased  and  converted  by  an- 
other who  knows  of  the  lien  may 
have  his  Hen  fastened  to  the  pro- 
ceeds of  such  sale.  Beebe  Stave 
Co.  V.  Austin,  92  Ark.  248,  122  S. 
W.  482,   135   Am.  St.   172. 


769  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  752 

an  absolute  lien  on  such  object,  thing,  material  or  property 
for  such  labor  done  and  performed,  subject  to  prior  liens 
and  landlord's  liens  for  rent  and  supplies,  and  such  liens  may 
be  enforced  within  the  same  time,  and  in  the  same  manner 
now  provided  for  by  law,  in  enforcing  laborer's  liens  on  the 
production  of  labor  done  and  performed. 

A  purchaser  with  notice  is  liable  for  such  a  lien  as  de- 
scribed above.  Every  person  who  has  such  lien,  and  wishes 
to  avail  himself  of  the  same,  shall  file  with  the  clerk  of  the 
circuit  court  of  the  county  in  which  the  debtor  resides,  a 
just  and  true  account  of  the  demand  due,  or  becoming  due 
after  allowing  all  credits,  and  containing  a  description  of  the 
property  to  be  charged  with  said  lien,  verified  by  afifidavit. 

Blacksmiths,  wheelwrights  and  horseshoers  have  an  abso- 
lute lien  on  the  product  of  their  labor  and  upon  all  wagons, 
carriages,  implements  and  other  articles  repaired  or  horses 
or  other  animals  shod,  for  money  due  for  labor  and  ma- 
terials.*^^ 

§  752.  California.^*"' — Every  person  who,  while  lawfully  in 
possession  of  an  article  of  personal  property,  renders  any 
service  to  the  owner  thereof,  by  labor  skill,  employed  for 
the  protection,  improvement,  safe-keeping,  or  carriage 
thereof,  has  a  special  lien  thereon,  dependent  on  possession, 
for  the  compensation,  if  any,  which  is  due  to  him  from  the 
owner  for  such  service ;  a  person  who  makers,  alters,  or  re- 
pairs any  article  of  personal  property,  at  the  request  of  the 
•owner,  or  legal  possessor  of  the  property,  has  a  lien  on  the 
same  for  his  reasonable  charges  for  the  balance  due  for  such 
work  done  and  materials  furnished,  and  may  retain  posses- 
sion of  the  same  until  the  charges  are  paid,*^^  and  livery  or 

63Castle's  Supp.  1911,  §  5013.  cording  to  common  law  principles. 

66Civ.    Code    1906,    §§   3051,   3052,  Quist  v.  Sandman,  154  Cal.  748,  99 

as  amended  by  Stats,  and  Amends.  Pac.  204. 

to   Codes    1911,   p.  887.     The    right  *^~Under  this  provision,  a  person 

to  a  lien  must  be  interpreted  ac-  who  under  contract  manufactures 
49 


§  753  LIENS.  770 

boarding  or  feed  stable  proprietors,  and  persons  pasturing 
horses  or  stock,  have  a  Hen,  dependent  on  possession,  for 
their  compensation  in  caring  for,  boarding,  feeding  or  pas- 
turing such  horses  or  stock;  and  laundry  proprietors  and 
persons  conducting  a  laundry  business  have  a  general  lien, 
dependent  on  possession,  upon  all  personal  property,  in  their 
hands  belonging  to  a  customer,  for  the  balance  due  them 
from  such  customer  for  laundry  work;  and  veterinary  pro- 
prietors and  veterinary  surgeons  shall  have  a  lien,  depend- 
ent on  possession,  for  their  compensation  in  caring  for, 
boarding,  feeding,  and  medical  treatment  of  animals,  and 
keepers  of  garages  for  automobiles  shall  have  a  lien,  de- 
pendent on  possession,  for  their  compensation  in  caring  for 
and  safe-keeping  such  automobiles. 

§  753.  Colorado.*'^ — Any  mechanic  or  other  person  who 
shall  make,  alter,  or  bestow  labor  upon  any  article  of  per- 
sonal property,  at  the  request  of  the  owner  of  such  personal 
property,  shall  have  a  lien  upon  such  property  for  the 
amount  due  for  such  labor  done  or  materials  furnished,  and 
for  all   costs  incurred   in  enforcing   such   lien. 

§  753a.  Connecticut.^^ — All  persons  and  corporations  en- 
gaged in  the  business  of  manufacturing,  spinning,  or  throw- 
ing cotton,  wool,  or  silk,  into  yard  or  other  goods,  shall  be 
entitled  to  a  lien  upon  the  goods  and  property  of  others 
that  may  come  into  their  possession  for  the  purpose  of  being 
so  manufactured,  spun,  or  thrown  into  yarn  or  other  goods 
for  the  amount  of  any  debt  that  may  be  due  them,  or  of 
any  note  or  notes  taken  on  account  of  such  debt,  from  the 
owners  of  such  cotton,  wool,  or  silk,  by  reason  of  any  work 

railroad  ties  for  the  owner  on  the  owner.      Douglass    v.    McFarland, 

latter's    land    has    a    lien    thereon,  92  Cal.  656,  28  Pac.  687. 

and    can    recover    the    ties    or   the  68 Mills'  Ann.  Stats.  1912,  §  4570; 

amount  of  his  lien  from  a  consta-  Hillsburg  v.  Harrison,  2  Col.  App. 

ble  who,  without  his  consent,  takes  298,   30   Pac.   355. 

the  ties  on   execution  against  the  coQen.    Stats.    1902,   §   4168. 


771  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  754 

and  labor  performed  and  materials  furnished  in  or  about  the 
manufacturing,  spinning  or  throwing  of  the  same,  or  other 
goods,  of  such  owner  or  owners.  Such  lien  shall  not  be 
waived  or  impaired  by  the  taking  of  any  note  or  notes,  or 
recovery  of  any  judgment  for  the  moneys  so  due,  or  for 
the  work  and  labor  performed  and  materials  furnished;  and 
such  lien  may  be  enforced  by  levy  and  sale  under  execution 
upon  such  judgment.  Such  lien  may  also  be  enforced  by  a 
public  sale  of  the  goods  or  property  on  which  the  lien  rests, 
upon  such  notice  to  all  parties  in  interest,  as  to  the  time 
and  place  of  the  sale,  as  may  be  ordered  by  any  judge  of  the 
superior  court,  or  of  any  court  of  common  pleas,  upon  ap- 
plication of  the  party  holding  the  lien. 

§  753b.  Delaware.'^^ — All  debts  or  claims  that  may  be- 
come due  or  growing  due  for  labor  or  services  rendered  by 
any  mechanic,  laborer,  clerk  or  other  employe  of  any  per- 
son or  persons,  chartered  company  or  association  employing 
laborers,  clerks  or  mechanics  in  any  manner  whatsoever, 
shall  be  a  first  lien  on  all  the  real  and  personal  property  of 
such  employer  or  employers,  and  shall  be  the  first  to  be 
satisfied  out  of  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  such  property. 

§754.  District  of  Columbia.'^ ^ — Any  mechanic  or  artisan 
who  shall  make,  alter,  or  repair  any  article  of  personal  prop- 
erty, at  the  request  of  the  owner,  shall  have  a  lien  thereon 
for  his  just  and  reasonable  charges  for  his  work  done  and 
materials  furnished,  and  may  retain  the  same  in  his  posses- 
sion until  such  charges  are  paid;  but  if  possession  is  parted 
with  by  his  consent  such  lien  shall  cease,  and  if  not  paid  at 
the  end  of  a  month  after  the  amount  is  due,  and  the  property 
bound  by  such  lien  does  not  exceed  the  sum  of  fifty  dollars, 
the  party  entitled  to  such  lien,  after  demand  upon  the  debtor, 
if  he  be  within  the  district,  may  proceed  to  sell  the  property 

TORev.  Code  1893,  p.  817.  7iCode  1901,  §§   1260,  1263. 


§  755  LIENS.  772 

at  public  auction,  by  giving  notice  once  a  week  for  three 
consecutive  weeks  in  some  daily  newspaper  published  in  the 
District  of  Columbia;  and  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  shall  be 
applied  first  in  the  discharge  of  such  lien,  and  the  remainder, 
if  any,  shall  be  paid  over  to  the  owner  thereof. 

§  755.  Florida.'- — A  lien  prior  in  dignity  to  all  others  ac- 
cruing thereafter  exists  in  favor  of  any  person  by  himself 
others  performing  any  labor  upon  or  with  any  engine,  ma- 
chine, apparatus,  fixture,  implement,  newspaper  or  printing 
material  or  other  property,  or  doing  work  in  any  hotel,  upon 
such  engine,  machine,  apparatus,  fixture,  implement,  news- 
paper or  printing  material,  or  other  property,  and  upon  the 
furniture,  furnishings  and  belongings  of  said  hotel.  Also 
in  favor  of  any  person  who  shall  manufacture,  alter,  or  repair 
any  article  or  thing  of  value,  upon  such  article  or  thing  of 
value.  Also  in  favor  of  any  person  who  shall  furnish  any 
locomotive  or  stationary  engine,  water  engine,  windmill,  car 
or  other  machine  or  parts  of  a  machine  or  instrument  for 
any  railroad,  telegraph  or  telephone  line,  mill,  distillery  or 
other  manufactory,  upon  the  articles  so  furnished.  Also  in 
favor  of  bookkeepers,  clerks,  agents,  porters,  and  other  em- 
ployes of  merchants  and  transportation  companies  and 
other  corporations,  upon  the  stock,  fixtures,  and  other  prop- 
erty of  such  merchants,  companies,  or  corporations. 

There  shall  be  no  lien  upon  personal  property,  as  against 
purchasers  and  creditors  without  notice,  unless  the  person 
claiming  the  lien  be  in  possession  of  the  property  upon  which 
the  lien  is  claimed,  in  which  case  the  lien  as  against  cred- 
itors and  purchasers  without  notice  shall  continue  as  long 

72Gen.  Stats.   1906,   §§  2196,  2198,  is   held  that  a  clerk,   time  keeper, 

2201,   2203.    A  bookkeeper  in  a  saw  and    a    teamster    driving   his    own 

mill   can   not   have   a   lien   on    the  team   have   a   lien   against   lumber 

mill  belonging  to  his  employer  for  produced    by    an    employing    cor- 

his       services.         Warburton       v.  poration.    First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kirk- 

Coumbe,  34  Fla.  212,  15  So.  769.     It  by,  43  Fla.  276,  32  So.  881. 


773 


MECHANICS  ,  ARTISANS  ,  AND  LABQRERS    LIENS. 


756 


as  the  possession  continues,  but  not  for  a  period  longer 
than  three  months  after  the  performance  of  the  labor  or  the 
furnishing  of  the  material."^ 

§  756.  Georgia^'* — All  mechanics  of  every  sort,  for  work 
done  and  material  furnished  in  manufacturing  or  repairing 
personal  property,  shall  have  a  special  lien  on  the  same, 
which  must  be  asserted  by  retention  of  such  property,  or 
the  mechanic  may  'surrender  such  personal  property  and 
give  credit,  when  the  same  shall  be  enforced  as  other  liens 
on  personal  property,  and  shall  be  superior  to  all  liens  but 
liens  for  taxes  and  such  other  liens  as  the  mechanic  may 
have  had  actual  notice  of  before  the  work  was  done  or  ma- 
terial furnished.  When  they  surrender  possession  of  the 
property  to  the  debtor,  such  mechanics  shall  record  their 
claim  of  lien,  within  ten  days  after  such  work  is  done  and 
material  furnished,  in  the  office  of  the  clerk  of  the  superior 
court  of  the  county  where  the  owner  resides,  which  claim 
shall  be  in  substance  as  follows:     "A.  B.,  mechanic,  claims 

a  lien  on  (here  describe  the  property)   of   C.  D.,  for 

work  done  and  materials  furnished  in  manufacturing  or  re- 
pairing (as  the  case  may  be),  the  same." 


73Gen.  Stats.   1906,  §  2210,  2b. 

"4Code  1911.  §  3354,  as  to  general 
laborer's  liens,  see  post,  §  781.  As 
to  privity  of  lien  see  Houser  v. 
Cooper,  102  Ga.  823,  30  S.  E.  539. 
For  enforcement,  see  post,  ch. 
xxii.,  Georgia,  §  1053.  The  failure 
to  record  a  claim  of  lien  for 
services  rendered  or  mater- 
ials furnished  in  repairing  or 
manufacturing  personal  property 
within  the  time  required  by  the 
statute  after  the  labor  is  complet- 
ed will  prevent  recovery  upon 
such  lien  where  the  possession  of 
the  property  is  surrendered. 
Mulkey  v.  Thompson,  3  Ga.  App. 


522,  60  S.  E.  223.  Lien  must  be 
filed  within  ten  days  after  work 
is  done.  No  lien  for  open  running 
account  is  allowed.  Palim  v. 
Cooke,  125  Ga.  442,  54  S.  E.  90. 
A  bartender  may  have  lien  though 
he  also  keeps  the  books.  Lowen- 
stein  v.  Myer,  114  Ga.  709,  40  S.  E. 
726.  A  job  printer  is  entitled  to 
a  lien.  Georgia  Loan  Saving  Co. 
V.  Dunlop,  108  Ga.  218.  The  pro- 
prietor of  a  saw  mill  can  not 
have  a  lien  on  lumber  sawed  at 
the  mill,  as  a  mechanic.  Evans 
V.  Beddingfield,  106  Ga.  755,  Z2  S. 
E.  664. 


§  757  .  LIENS.  774 

§  757.  Idaho.'^ — A  person  who  makes,  alters,  or  repairs 
any  article  of  personal  property,  at  the  request  of  the  owner, 
has  a  lien  on  the  same  for  his  reasonable  charges  for  his 
work  done  and  material  furnished,  and  may  retain  posses- 
sion of  the  same  until  the  charges  are  paid.  If  not  paid 
within  two  months  after  the  work  is  done,  the  person  may 
proceed  to  sell  the  property  at  public  auction,  by  giving  ten 
days'  public  notice  of  the  sale  by  advertising  in  some  news- 
paper published  in  the  county  in  which  the  work  was  done, 
or,  if  there  is  no  such  newspaper,  then  by  posting  up  notices 
of  such  sale  in  three  of  the  most  public  places  in  the  town 
where  such  work  was  done,  for  ten  days  previous  to  the  sale; 
and  the  proceeds  of  said  sale  shall  be  applied  to  the  discharge 
of  the  lien  and  the  cost  of  keeping  and  selling  the  property, 
and  the  remainder,  if  any,  shall  be  paid  over  to  the  owner 
thereof. 

§  758.  Indiana."*^ — Whenever  any  person  shall  intrust  to 
any  mechanic  or  tradesman  materials  to  construct,  alter,  or 

75Rev.  Code  (Civ.)  1908,  §  3447.  same  subject  to  such  lien  and  to 
The  right  to  a  special  lien  does  the  right  of  the  ofificer  to  levy- 
not  apply  to  property  in  custodia  thereon,  though  he  made  the  re- 
legis.  Beck  v.  Lavin,  IS  Idaho  363,  pairs  without  knowledge  of  the 
97  Pac.  1028.  execution.       McCrisaken     v.     Os- 

"SBurns'  Rev.  Stats.  1914,  weiler,  70  Ind.  131.  Burns'  Rev. 
§§  8308-8313.  Under  a  statute  Stat.  1914,  §§  8288,  8289,  gives 
whereby  an  execution  operates  as  the  employes  of  corporations  do- 
a  lien  from  the  time  it  comes  to  ing  business  in  the  state  a  first 
the  officer's  hands  on  the  property  lien  for  unpaid  wages  on  all  of 
of  the  judgment  debtor  liable  to  the  corporate  property,  and  pro- 
be seized  on  it,  which  can  only  vide  that  any  employe  wishing  to 
be  divested  in  favor  of  some  other  acquire  the  lien  shall  file  in  the 
writ  in  the  hands  of  another  offi-  recorder's  office  a  notice  of  his  in- 
cer  which  shall  be  first  levied  upon  tention  to  do  so,  and,  when  re- 
the  property,  it  is  held  that,  if  a  corded,  the  lien  shall  date  from 
wagon  which  is  subject  to  the  lien  the  time  of  his  employment.  Un- 
of  an  execution  on  a  judgment  der  this  provision  a  purchaser 
against  the  owner  be  left  by  the  from  a  corporation  takes  subject 
execution  debtor  with  a  mechanic  to  this  lien,  even  when  the  prop- 
for    repairs,    the    latter    takes    the  erty    is    sold    to    him    before    the 


775 


MECHANICS  ,  ARTISANS  ,  AND  LABORERS    LIENS. 


758 


repair  any  article  of  value,'^  such  mechanic  or  tradesman, 
if  the  same  be  completed  and  not  taken  away,  and  his  fair 
and  reasonable  charges  not  paid,  may,  after  six  months  from 
the  time  such  charges  become  due,  sell  the  same;  or,  if  the 
same  be  susceptible  of  division  without  injury,  he  may  sell 
so  much  thereof  as  is  necessary  to  pay  such  charges,  and 
such  sale  shall  be  at  public  auction,  for  cash  or  on  reasonable 
credit,  taking  sufficient  sureties  in  case  of  a  sale  on  time. 

Public  notice  of  the  time  and  place  of  sale  must  be  given 
by  advertisements  set  up  for  ten  days  in  three  public  places 
in  the  city  or  township  where  he  resides,  one  of  which  shall 
be  in  some  conspicuous  part  of  his  shop,  or  place  of  business ; 
or,  if  the  value  of  the  article  be  ten  dollars  or  more,  by 
publishing  the  same  three  weeks  successively  in  a  news- 
paper in  the  county,  if  any."^ 


notice  required  in  the  statute  has 
been  filed.  Aurora  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Black,  129  Ind.  595,  29  N.  E.  396. 
Where  several  parcels  of  prop- 
erty of  a  corporation  are  incum- 
bered by  its  employes'  lien  for  un- 
paid wages  and  are  sold  by  the 
corporation  at  different  times, 
they  must  be  exhausted  to  satisfy 
this  lien  in  the  inverse  order  of 
the  sales.  There  is  no  contribu- 
tion in  such  case.  Savings  Bank 
V.  Creswell,  100  U.  S.  630;  Aurora 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Black,  129  Ind.  595,  29 
N.  E.  396;  Jones  on  Mortgages, 
§  1092.  The  lien  provided  by 
§  6  of  the  act  of  March  9,  1889, 
to  persons  working  on  the  con- 
struction of  a  railroad  is  to  be 
measured  by  the  reasonable  value 
of  the  services  rendered  and  not 
by  the  contract  between  employer 
and  employed.  Chapman  v.  Elgin, 
J.  &  E.  R.  Co.,  11  Ind.  App.  632, 
39  N.  E.  289. 


"'i'This  provision  applies  to  a 
case  where  an  engine  was  intrust- 
ed to  a  mechanic  to  alter  or  re- 
pair. Watts  V.  Sweeney,  127  Ind. 
116,  26  N.  E.  680,  22  Am.  St.  615. 
As  to  preferred  claims  of  laborers 
after  assignment  of  employer  see, 
Raynes  v.  Kokomo  Ladder  &  Fur- 
niture Co.,  153  Ind.  315,  54  N.  E. 
1061;  Pendergast  v.  Yandes,  124 
Ind.  159,  24  N.  E.  724,  8  L.  R.  A. 
849. 

"^Notice  of  the  sale  of  prop- 
erty by  a  liverystable  keeper  to 
satisfy  his  lien,  if  the  value  is  ten 
dollars  or  more,  is  sufficient  if 
given  by  publishing  the  same 
three  weeks  successively  in  a 
newspaper  in  the  county.  Shap- 
pendocia  v.  Spencer,  TZ  Ind.  128. 
A  notice  of  a  sale  to  be  made  "on 

the day  of ,  1877,"  is  not  a 

notice  of  the  time  and  place  of 
sale.  Shappendocia  v.  Spencer,  IZ 
Ind.  128. 


§    758  LIENS.  •j'j6 

The  proceeds  of  such  sale,  after  payment  of  charges  for 
construction  or  repair,  and  for  pnbhcation  and  notice  afore- 
said, shall,  if  the  owner  be  absent,  be  deposited  with  the 
treasurer  of  the  proper  county  by  the  person  making  such 
sale,  he  taking  the  treasurer's  receipt  therefor,  and  shall 
be  subject  to  the  order  of  the  person  legally  entitled  thereto. 

These  provisions  shall  apply  to  all  cases  of  personal  prop- 
erty on  which  the  bailee  or  keeper  has  by  law  a  lien  for  any 
feed  or  care  by  him  bestowed  on  such  property:  provided 
that,  in  cases  where  the  person  liable  shall  die  before  the 
expiration  of  six  months  from  the  time  such  charges  had  ac- 
crued, such  sale  shall  not  be  made  until  the  expiration  of 
six  months  from  the  time  of  his  decease. 

In  cases  embraced  in  the  preceding  paragraph,  if  the  prop- 
erty bailed  or  kept  be  horses,  cattle,  hogs,  or  other  live  stock, 
and  in  all  cases  embraced  in  this  act  where  the  property 
is  of  a  perishable  nature  ^nd  will  be  greatly  injured  by  de- 
lay, the  person  to  whom  such  charges  may  be  due  may,  after 
the  expiration  of  thirty  days  from  the  time  when  such 
charges  shall  have  become  due,  proceed  to  dispose  of  so 
much  of  such  property  as  may  be  necessary,  as  hereinbefore 
provided. 

Additional  compensation  for  expenses  in  keeping  and  tak- 
ing care  of  such  property,  necessarily  incurred,  may  be 
taken  from  the  proceeds  of  sale,  as  part  of  the  charges. 

Every  person,'^'^  firm  or  corporation,  or  others  engaged  in 
storing,  or  furnishing  supplies  for  or  repairing  an  automobile 
or  motor  truck,  or  every  person,  firm  or  corporation  or 
others  maintaining  automobile  garages,  shall  have  a  lien 
upon  any  such  automobile  or  motor  truck  stored,  for  storage 
charges  for  keeping  any  such  automobile  or  motor  truck, 
or  for  furnishing  supplies  for  or  repairs  done  on  such  auto- 
mobile or  motor  truck. 

Said  lien  may  be   foreclosed   as  equitable   liens   are   now 

<  9 Burns'  Rev.  Stat.  1914,  §§  8294a,    8294b. 


'j'j'j  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  759 

foreclosed  in  the  circuit  court  of  the  county  where  said  auto- 
mobile or  motor  truck  is  located  by  the  filing  of  a  complaint 
at  any  time  within  one  year  from  the  failure  or  refusal  of 
the  owner  of  said  automobile  or  motor  truck  to  pay  the  stor- 
age charges  or  the  charges  done  on  or  supplies  furnished  for 
any  such  automobile  or  motor  truck  as  specified  in  the  above 
paragraph. 

§  759.  Kansas.^^ — Whenever  any  person  shall  intrust  to 
any  mechanic,  artisan  or  tradesman  materials  to  construct, 
alter  or  repair  any  article  of  value,  or  any  article  of  value  to 
be  altered  or  repaired,  such  mechanic,  artisan  or  tradesman 
shall  have  a  lien  on  such  article,  and,  if  the  same  be  complet- 
ed and  not  taken  away,  and  his  fair  and  reasonable  or  stipu- 
lated charges  be  not  paid,  may,  after  six  months  from  the 
time  such  charges  become  due,  sell  the  same ;  or,  if  the 
same  be  susceptible  of  division  without  injury,  he  may  sell 
so  much  thereof  as  is  necessary  to  pay  such  charges,  and 
the  expenses  of  publication  and  sale,  as  provided  by  statute: 
provided,  that  on  the  completion  of  said  repairs  or  alteration, 
at  the  request  of  the  owner  of  said  property  so  intrusted,  or 
of  his  duly  authorized  agent,  the  said  mechanic,  artisan  or 
tradesman  may  permit  the  same  to  be  taken  away  without 
having  been  paid  for,  and  shall  be  entitled  to  retain  his  lien 
on  said  property  as  aforesaid  by  filing  in  the  office  of  the 
register  of  deeds  of  the  county  where  said  property  was  so 
altered  or  repaired,  within  three  days  after  the  said  property 
is  so  taken  aw^ay,  a  statement  in  w^riting,  signed  by  the  said 
mechanic,  artisan,  or  tradesman,  showing  the  name  of  the 
owner  of  the  property,  the  name  of  the  mechanic,  artisan,  or 
tradesman,  the  name  of  the  article,  the  date  of  the  charge 
for  same,  the  amount  due,  and  the  said  statement  shall  con- 
stitute a  lien  on  property  from  the  time  of  filing  the  same 
until  the  amount  of  the  charges  for  so  altering  or  repairing 

soDassler's  Gen.  Stats.  1909,  Briesen,  1  Kans.  App.  758,  41  Pac. 
§4808.     Amazon   Irrigating   Co.   v.       1116. 


§  759^  LIENS.  778 

the  property  shall  be  paid;  and  if  the  same  be  not  paid  within 
six  months  from  the  time  of  filing  said  statement,  the  me- 
chanic, artisan  or  tradesman  shall  be  entitled  to  the  posses- 
sion of  the  property,  and  after  obtaining  such  possession 
may  proceed  to  sell  the  same  as  hereinbefore  mentioned. 

A  first  and  prior  lien  is  created  in  favor  of  any  blacksmith, 
horseshoer  or  wagon  maker  upon  any  goods,  chattels,  horses, 
mules,  wagons,  buggies  or  other  vehicles  or  automobiles  and 
any  farm  implements  of  whatsoever  kinds,  which  shall  have 
come  into  the  possession  of  such  blacksmith,  horseshoer  or 
wagon  maker  for  the  purpose  of  having  work  on  said  prop- 
erty, or  repairs,  or  improvements  in  anywise  appertaining 
thereto,  and  said  lien  shall  amount  to  the  full  amount  and 
reasonable  value  of  the  services  performed.  It  shall  extend 
to,  and  include  the  reasonable  value  of  all  materials  used  in 
the  performance  of  such  services.^"  , 

§  759a.  Kentucky.^" — When  the  effects  of  the  estate  of  a 
manufacturing  company  are  to  be  distributed,  laborers  have 
a  first  lien  and  their  lien  is  superior  to  that  of  a  mortgage. 

§  760.  Louisiana.*^^ — The  debts  of  a  workman  or  artisan 
for  the  price  of  his  labor  are  privileges  on  the  movables 
which  he  has  repaired  or  made,  if  the  thing  continues  still 
in  his  possession. 

§  761.  Maine.^^ — Whoever  digs,  hauls,  or  furnishes  rock 
for  the  manufacture  of  lime,  has  a  lien  thereon  for  his  per- 

82 Laws   1913,   p.   392.  whom   he   has    employed    to   work 

ssCarroll's      Stats.    1909,    §  24S7;  under   him.      Landy   v.    Blanchard, 

Graham  v.  Magann  Fawke  Lumber  16    La.    Ann.    173.      Privileges    are 

Co.,   118   Ky.   192,  26  Ky.   L.  70,  80  stricti  juris,  and  the  party  claim- 

S.  W.  799.  ing  a  privilege  must  point  to  the 

s^Merrick's  Rev.  Civ.  Code  1900,  express  law  which  gives  him  such 

art.    3217.      This    privilege    exists  right  of  preference  on  account  of 

only  in  favor  of  him  who  has  con-  the  nature  of  the  debt.     Landry  v. 

tracted  to  do  the  work,  and  not  to  Blanchard,  16  La.  Ann.  173. 

journeymen   and    other    mechanics  ssRev.  Stat.  1903,  ch.  93,  §§  27,  28. 


779  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  761 

sonal  service,  and  on  the  rock  so  furnished,  for  thirty  days 
after  such  rock  is  manufactured  into  lime,  or  until  such  lime 
is  sold  or  shipped  on  board  a  vessel;  whoever  labors  in  quar- 
rying or  cutting  and  dressing  granite  in  any  quarry,  has  a  lien 
for  his  wages  on  all  the  granite  quarried  or  cut  and  dressed 
in  the  quarry  by  him,  or  his  colaborers,  for  thirty  days  after 
such  granite  is  cut  and  dressed,  or  until  such  granite  is  sold 
or  shipped  on  board  a  vessel;  and  whoever  labors  in  mining, 
quarrying  or  manufacturing  slate  in  any  quarry, ^"^  has  a 
lien  for  the  wages  of  his  labor  on  all  slate  mined,  quarried, 
or  manufactured  in  the  quarry  by  him  or  his  colaborers  for 
thirty  days  after  the  slate  arrives  at  the  port  of  shipment, 
and  until  it  has  been  shipped  on  board  a  vessel  or  laden  in 
a  car;  such  liens  have  precedence  of  all  other  claims,  and  may 
be  enforced  by  attachment  within  the  times  aforesaid.*^ 

Whoever  performs  labor,  or  furnishes  labor  or  wood  for 
manufacturing  and  burning  bricks  has  a  lien  on  such  bricks 
for  such  labor  and  wood,  for  thirty  days  after  the  same  are 
burned,  suitable  for  use,  provided  that  said  bricks  remain  in 
the  yard  where  burnt ;  such  lien  shall  have  precedence  of  all 
other  claims  and  of  all  attachments  and  encumbrances  not 
made  to  secure  a  similar  lien  and  may  be  enforced  by  attach- 
ment within  the  time  aforesaid.  Suits  to  enforce  liens  shall 
have  precedence  of  all  attachments  and  encumbrances  made 
after  the  lien  attached  and  not  made  to  enforce  a  lien;  and 
such  suit  may  be  maintained  although  the  employer  or  debtor 
is  dead  and  his  estate  has  been  represented  insolvent,  and  in 

86The   statute  giving  a   lien  for  within    the    time    named,    it    will 

wages  on  slate  quarried  and  manu-  have    precedence    of    sales    within 

factured  "in  the  quarry"  does  not  that  time;  and  that  after  that  time 

give  a  lien  to  one  who  labors   in  the  lien  may  be  enforced  so  long 

manufacturing     slate     at    a     place  as  the  granite  remains  unsold  and 

other  than  "  in  the  quarry."    Union  not    shipped    on    board    a    vessel. 

Slate  Co.  V.  Tilton,  Th  Maine  207.  Collins    Granite    Co.   v.    Devereux, 

8"This    statute    is    construed    to  72  Maine  422. 
mean  that,  if  tht.  lien  is  enforced 


§  y6iz  LIENS.  780 

that  case  his  executor  or  administrator  may  be  summoned  to 
answer  thereto. 

Whoever  furnishes  corn  or  other  grain  or  fruit,  for  can- 
ning or  preservation  otherwise,  has  a  lien  on  such  preserved 
article,  and  all  with  which  it  may  have  been  mingled,  for 
its  value  when  delivered,  including  the  cans  and  other  ves- 
sels containing  the  same,  and  the  cases,  for  thirty  days  after 
the  same  has  been  delivered,  and  until  it  has  been  shipped  on 
board  a  vessel  or  laden  in  a  car,  which  lien  may  be  enforced 
by  attachment  w-ithin  that  time.^^ 

Whoever  performs  labor  by  himself,  or  his  employes  in 
manufacturing,  or  repairing  the  ironwork  or  woodwork  of 
wagons,  carts,  sleighs  and  other  vehicles  by  direction  or 
consent  of  the  owner  thereof,  shall  have  a  lien  on  such  ve- 
hicle for  his  reasonable  charges  for  said  labor  and  materials 
used.*^^ 

§  761a.  Maryland.*'^'' — Upon  all  articles  left  or  given  to 
jewelers  or  silversmiths  for  repairs  or  work  on,  the  jewelers 
or  silversmith  shall  have  a  lien  on  said  article  or  articles  for 
cost  of  repairs,  work  on  and  material  put  on  or  in  such  ar- 
ticles. And  two  years  after  the  completion  of  repairs,  work 
on  or  material  put  on  or  in  such  article,  and  the  indebted- 
ness remains  unpaid  and  owing,  such  jewelers  or  silversmiths 
may  after  one  month's  notice  in  writing  to  the  owner  of  such 
article  notifying  such  owner  of  the  amount  due,  by  mailing 
such  notice  directed  to  the  owner's  last  known  address,  or  if 
the  owner  be  unknown,  by  written  or  printed  notice  set  up 
at  the  court  house  door  of  the  county  or  city  of  Baltimore 
and  the  bill  remains  unpaid,  sell  such  article  at  public  or  pri- 
vate sale  to  satisfy  such  claim,  and  the  proceeds  after  paying 
expenses  of  such  sale,  be  applied  in  liquidation  of  such  in- 
debtedness, and  the  balance,  if  any,  be  paid  over  to  such 
debtor. 

88  Rev.  Stat.  1903,  ch.  93,  §  56,  61.         soa  Laws  1912,  p.  957. 
89 Laws  1905,  p.  56. 


781  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  763 

§  762.  Massachusetts.^" — Whoever  has  a  Hen  for  money 
due  to  him  on  account  of  work  and  labor,  care  and  diUgence, 
or  money  expended  on  or  about  personal  property,  by  rea- 
son of  any  contract,  express  or  implied,  if  such  money  is  not 
paid  within  sixty  days  after  a  demand  in  writing  delivered 
to  the  debtor,  or  left  at  his  usual  place  of  abode,  if  within 
this  commonwealth,  or  made  by  letter  addressed  to  him 
at  his  usual  place  of  abode  without  the  commonwealth,  and 
deposited,  postpaid,  in  the  postofhce,  may  file  a  petition  in 
the  superior  court,  a  police,  district,  or  municipal  court,  or 
with  a  trial  justice  in  the  county  where  the  petitioner  resides, 
or  has  his  usual  place  of  business,  for  an  order  for  the  sale 
of  the  property  in  satisfaction  of  the  debt. 

Persons  maintaining  public  garages  for  the  storage  and 
care  of  automobiles  and  other  motor  vehicles  which  are 
brought  to  their  premises  or  placed  in  their  care  by  or  with 
the  consent  of  the  ovv'ners  thereof  shall  have  a  lien  upon 
such  automobiles  or  motor  vehicles  for  proper  care  due 
them  for  the  storage  and  care  of  the  same.^^ 

§  763.  Michigan.^- — Whenever  any  person  shall  deliver 
to  any  mechanic,  artisan,  or  tradesman  any  materials  or 
articles  for  the  purpose  of  constructing,  in  whole  or  in  part, 
or  completing  any  furniture,  jewelry,  implement,  untensil, 
clothing,  or  other  article  of  value,  or  shall  deliver  to  any 
person  any  horse,  mule,  neat  cattle,  sheep,  or  swine,  to  be 
kept  or  cared  for,  such  mechanic,  artisan,  tradesman,  or 
other  person  shall  have  a  lien  thereon  for  the  just  value 
of  the  labor  and  skill  applied  thereto  by  him,  and  for  any 
materials  which  he  may  have  furnished  in  the  construction 
or  completion  thereof,  and  for  the  keeping  and  care  of  such 
animals,  and  may  retain  possession  of  the  same  until  such 
charges  are  paid. 

90  Rev.  Laws  1902,  p.  1711,  §  23.  ^2  Howeirs  Stats.  1912,  §§  13804, 

91  Acts  and  Resolves  1913,  p.  230.      13805. 


764 


LIENS. 


782 


When  any  person  shall  deliver  to  any  mechanic,  artisan, 
or  tradesman  any  watch,  clock,  article  of  furniture  or  jewelry, 
implement,  clothing,  or  other  article  of  value,  to  be  altered, 
fitted,  or  repaired,  such  mechanic,  artisan,  or  tradesman  shall 
have  a  lien  thereof  for  the  just  value  of  the  labor  and  skill 
applied  thereto  by  him,  and  may  retain  possession  of  the 
same  until  such  charges  are  paid.^^ 

§  764.  Minnesota."' — Whoever  performs  or  contributes 
any  labor  or  skill,  or  furnishes  or  contributes  any  machinery, 
supplies,  materials  or  storage  in  making,  altering,  repairing, 
storing  or  otherwise  caring  for  any  motor  vehicle,  or  at  the 
instance  or  request  of  any  agent  of  such  owner,  shall  have 
a  lien  upon  such  motor  vehicle  for  the  price,  or  value,  of  the 
labor  or  skill  performed,  or  machinery,  supplies,  material 
or  storage  furnished  or  contributed.  If  the  labor  is  per- 
formed, or  machinery,  supplies,  materials  or  storage  is  fur- 
nished pursuant  to  a  contract,  for  an  agreed  price,  the  lien 


93This  lien  is  enforced  by  sum- 
mons and  sale  of  the  property 
upon  judgment  in  the  manner  pre- 
sented in  the  statute  given  under 
the  title  Livery  Stable  Keepers, 
§  664. 

94  Gen.  Stats.  1913,  §§  7053-7057. 
The  right  to  sell  ceases  when 
enough  property  has  been  sold 
to  satisfy  the  charges  that 
have  been  unpaid  for  three 
months.  The  provision  as  to 
satisfying  the  lien  by  sale 
applies  also  to  the  enforcement  of 
a  warehouseman's  lien.  A  large 
number  of  articles  were  deposited 
by  plaintiff  witn  defendant  iof 
storage,  the  charge  for  storage  to 
be  two  dollars  per  month.  After 
the  storage  for  the  first  month 
had    been    due    more    than    three 


months,  the  defendant  advertised 
and  sold,  article  by  article,  all  the 
goods.  Enough  was  realized  to 
more  than  pay  the  charges  over- 
due for  three  months  and  expenses 
of  sale.  The  actfon  being  for  con- 
version, held,  that  the  right  to  sell 
ceased  as  soon  as  the  sale  had 
produced  enough  to  satisfy  the 
charges  overdue  three  months  and 
expenses  of  sale,  and  all  articles 
sold  after  that  were  illegally  sold; 
that  it  was  for  defendant  to  show 
what  articles  were  sold  before  the 
right  to  sell  ceased,  •  and,  there 
being  no  evidence  to  show  that, 
plaintiff  was  entitled  to  recover 
the  value  of  all  the  articles.  Jesu- 
run  V.  Kent,  45  Minn.  222,  47  N. 
\Y.  784. 


y8^  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  764 

shall  be  for  the  sum  so  agreed  upon;  otherwise,  it  shall  be 
for  the  reasonable  value  thereof. 

The  lien  shall  cease  at  the  end  of  sixty  days  after  the 
furnishing  of  the  last  item  of  such  labor,  machinery,  sup- 
plies, materials,  and  sixty  (60)  days  after  the  termination  of 
such  storage,  unless  within  such  period  a  statement  of  the 
claim  thereof  be  filed  for  record  with  the  township  clerk,  city 
clerk  or  village  recorder,  as  the  case  may  be,  in  the  township, 
village  or  city  in  which  the  owner  of  such  motor  vehicle 
resides.  Such  statement  shall,  by  or  at  the  instance  of  the 
lien  claimant,  be  verified  by  the  oath  of  some  person,  shown 
by  such  verification  to  have  knowledge  of  the  facts  stated, 
and  shall  set  forth: 

1.  The  name  of  the  person  claiming  the  lien,  and  notice 
of  intention  to  claim  and  hold  a  lien; 

2.  The  name  of  the  owner,  or  reputed  owner,  of  such 
motor  vehicle; 

3.  The  license  number  of  such  motor  vehicle,  if  licensed 
under  the  laws  of  the  state  of  Minnesota; 

4.  The  amount  claimed  to  be  due,  and  that  such  amount 
is  due  for  labor  performed,  or  machinery,  materials,  sup- 
plies, or  storage  furnished  to  the  owner  of  the  motor  vehicle, 
or  at  the  instance  of  an  agent  of  such  owner; 

5.  The  dates  when  the  first  and  last  items  of  the  labor, 
or  other  contributions  were  made. 

Such  lien  may  be  foreclosed  by  action  within  six  (6) 
months  after  the  statement  is  filed.  The  summons  shall 
state  that  the  complaint  has  been  filed  with  the  clerk  of  the 
court  in  which  the  action  is  commenced,  and  shall  contain 
a  notice  that  the  action  is  brought  to  foreclose  a  lien,  giving 
the  amount  thereof,  and  the  license  number  of  the  motor 
vehicle  affected.  If  the  lien  claimant  recover  judgment,  the 
court  shall  order  the  sheriff  or  officer,  to  seize  such  motor 
vehicle  forthwith,  and  sell  the  same  at  public  vendue,  in 
the  manner  provided  by  law  for  the  sale  of  personal  prop- 


§    765  LIENS.  784 

erty  on  execution.  Out  of  the  proceeds  of  such  sale,  there 
shall  be  paid,  first,  the  expenses  thereof;  the  fees  of  the 
officers,  and  the  court  costs;  second,  to  the  claimant,  the 
amount  of  his  lien,  with  interest  to  date ;  the  remainder  shall 
be  paid  to  the  owner  of  the  motor  vehicle  sold,  or  other 
person  entitled  thereto. 

At  or  before  posting  the  notice  of  sale,  the  sheriff  shall 
serve  a  copy  of  said  notice  of  sale  on  the  judgment  debtor. 

The  term  "motor  vehicle,"  used  herein,  includes  all  vehi- 
cles of  locomotion,  except  those  propelled  by  muscular 
power,  and  except  those  which  run  on  rails  or  tracks.  The 
term  "owner"  shall  include  the  conditional  vendee  or  mort- 
gagor in  possession. 

§  765.  Mississippi.^' — All  carriages,  buggies,  wagons, 
plows,  or  any  other  article  constructed,  manufactured  or  re- 
paired, shall  be  liable  for  the  price  of  the  labor  and  material 
employed  in  constructing,  manufacturing  the  same;  and  the 
mechanic  to  whom  the  price  of  said  labor  and  material  may 
be  due  shall  have  the  right  to  retain  possession  of  such  things 
so  constructed,  manufactured,  or  repaired,  until  the  price  be 
paid ;  and  if  the  same  shall  not  be  paid  within  thirty  days, 
he  may  commence  his  suit  in  any  court  of  competent  juris- 
diction, and,  upon  proof  of  the  value  of  the  labor  and  mate- 
rials employed  in  such  repairs,  or  manufacture  or  construc- 
tion, he  shall  be  entitled  to  judgment  against  the  party  for 
whom  such  labor  was  done  or  materials  furnished,  with 
costs,  as  in  other  cases,  and  to  a  special  order  for  the  sale 
of  the  property  retained  in  his  possession  for  the  payment 
thereof,  with  costs,  and  to  an  execution,  as  in  other  cases, 
for  the  residue  of  what  remains  unpaid  after  sale  of  the 
property.  If  the  mechanic  parts  with  possession  he  shall 
retain  his  lien  as  is  provided  in  cases  of  lien  for  purchase 

Si-Code  1906,  §  3075.  A  ginner  a  mortgagee  to  show  the  cotton 
has  a  lien  on  a  part  of  the  cotton  was  turned  over.  Irwin  v.  Miller, 
ginned  for  his  services  as  against       12   Miss.    174,    16  So.  678. 


785  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.    §  765c 

money   of   goods,    and    the   same    may   be    enforced    in   like 
manner. 

§  765a.  Nebraska.'^*' — Any  person  who  makes,  alters,  re- 
pairs or  in  any  way  enhances  the  value  of  any  vehicle,  auto- 
mobile, machinery,  farm  implement  or  tool,  or  shoes  a 
horse  or  horses,  or  mule  or  mules,  at  the  request  of  or  with 
the  consent  of  the  owner,  or  owners  thereof,  shall  have  a 
lien  on  such  vehicle,  automobile,  machinery,  farm  imple- 
ment or  tool,  or  horse  or  horses,  mule  or  mules,  while  in 
his  possession  for  his  reasonable  or  agreed  charges  for  the 
work  done  or  material  furnished,  and  shall  have  the  right 
to  retain  said  property  until  said  charges  are  paid.  Such 
lienholder  must  file  in  the  office  of  the  clerk  of  the  county  in 
which  said  work  was  done  or  material  furnished,  or  in  which 
said  property  is  kept  within  sixty  days  after  performing 
such  work  or  furnishing  said  material,  a  verified  statement 
and  description  of  the  work  done  or  material  furnished  and 
a  description  of  the  article  so  repaired,  altered  or  enhanced 
in  value,  or  for  which  material  was  furnished  or  upon  which 
said  work  was  performed. 

§  765b.  Nevada.^^ — All  foundrymen  and  boilermakers, 
and  all  other  persons  performing  labor,  or  furnishing  ma- 
chinery, or  boilers,  or  castings,  or  other  materials  for  the 
construction,  or  repairing,  or  carrying  on  of  any  mill,  manu- 
factory, or  hoisting  works,  shall  have  a  lien  on  such  mill, 
manufactory,  or  hoisting  works,  for  such  work  or  labor  done 
on  such  machinery,  or  boiler,  or  castings,  or  ther  material 
furnished  by  each  respectively. 

§  765c.  New  Hampshire.^^ — If  a  person  shall-  perform 
labor  or  furnish  materials  or  fuel  to  the  amount  of  fifteen 

96 Laws  1913,  p.  310.  sspub.  Stat,  and  Sess.  Laws  1901, 

97 Rev.  Laws  1912,  §  2231.  pp.  452,  453,  §§11,  17,  as  amended 

by  Laws  1905,  p.  468. 

50 


§    "jGd  LIENS.  786 

dollars  or  more  for  the  making  of  brick,  by  virtue  of  a  con- 
tract with  the  owner  thereof,  he  shall  have  a  lien  upon  said 
materials  and  fuel  and  upon  the  brick  with  the  kiln  contain- 
ing said  brick,  for  such  labor,  materials  or  fuel.  Said  lien 
shall  continue  for  ninety  days  after  said  brick  are  burned,  and 
may  be  secured  by  attachment  at  any  time  while  the  lien 
continues, — the  writ  and  return  thereon  distinctly  express- 
ing that  purpose;  and  such  attachment  shall  have  precedence 
of  all  other  attachments  made  after  such  lien  accrued,  un- 
less founded  on  a  prior  lien. 

§  766,  New  Jersey /^^^ — If  the  lien  which  any  person  may 
have  upon  any  goods  or  chattels  in  his  possession  for  labor 
or  materials  bestowed  or  employed  in  the  repair  or  construc- 
tion thereof,  and  the  amount  due  thereon,  either  in  whole 
or  in  part,  shall  remain  unpaid  for  the  space  of  three  months 
after  the  same  became  due  and  payable,  it  shall  be  lawful  for 
the  person  having  said  lien  to  expose  the  same  at  public 
auction,  upon  a  notice  of  said  sale  being  first  published  for 
the  space  of  two  weeks  preceding  the  day  of  sale  in  some 
newspaper  published  in  the  county  in  which  said  goods 
or  chattels  are  located,  and  also  five  days'  notice  of  said 
sale  set  up  in  five  of  the  most  public  places  in  said  city  or 
township,  and  if  the  residence  can  be  ascertained  of  the 
owner  or  owners  of  said  goods  or  chattels,  a  copy  of  the 
printed  notice  be  mailed  to  said  owner  or  owners,  at  least  five 
days  before  the  day  of  sale ;  and  the  proceeds  of  said  sale  shall 
be  applied  to  the  payment  of  such  lien  and  the  expenses  of 
such  sale ;  and  no  more  of  such  goods  or  chattels  shall  be  sold, 
if  they  are  of  such  nature  as  to  be  easily  separated  or  divided, 
than  shall  shall  be  necessary,  as  near  as  may  be,  to  pay  such 
lien  and  expenses,  and  the  balance,  if  any,  shall  be  paid  to  the 
owner  of  such  goods  or  chattels  when  they  shall  be  taken 
away  or  settled  for  in  full.     Persons  or  corporations  engaged 

99Comp.     Laws    1910,    pp.    3138-3140,  §§  61-63,  66,  68. 


787  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.    §  767a 

in  the  business  of  dyeing  any  cotton,  woolen,  or  silk  yarns  or 
goods ;  or  in  manufacturing,  spinning,  or  throwing  cotton, 
wool,  or  silk  into  yarn  or  other  goods;  or  in  finishing  silk,  or 
other  goods  of  which  silk  is  a  component  part,  have  a  lien 
on  the  same  for  the  work  and  labor  performed  thereon.  The 
lien  may  be  enforced  by  levy  and  sale  under  execution.  The 
lien  which  any  person  may  have  upon  any  chattel  in  his  pos- 
session, for  labor  or  materials  bestowed  or  employed  in  the 
repair  or  construction  thereof,  shall  be  in  no  wise  waived, 
merged,  or  impaired  by  the  recovery  of  any  judgment  for 
the  moneys  due  for  such  labor  or  materials;  and  such  lien 
may  be  enforced  by  levy  and  sale  under  execution  upon  such 
judgment. 

§  767.  New  Mexico.^ — All  artisans  and  mechanics  shall 
have  a  lien  on  things  made  or  repaired  by  them,  for  the 
amount  due  for  their  work,  and  may  retain  possession  there- 
of until  said  amount  is  paid;  and  a  voluntary  parting  with 
the  possession  of  the  thing  shall  be  deemed  a  waiver  of  the 
lien. 

§  767a.  New  York.- — A  person  who  makes,  alters,  repairs 
or  in  any  way  enhances  the  value  of  an  article  of  personal 
property,  at  the  request  or  with  the  consent  of  the  owner,  has 
a  lien  on  such  articles,  while  lawfully  in  possession  thereof, 
for  his  reasonable  charges  for  the  work  done  and  materials 
furnished,  and  may  retain  possession  thereof  until  such 
charges  are  paid. 

iComp.  Laws  1897,  §  2233.  Rep.  479.  Where  one  receives  a 
2Birdseye's  C.  &  G.  Consol.  piano  from  the  owner  to  have  it 
Laws  1909,  p.  3228,  §  180.  For  evi-  repaired  and  there  is  no  proof  to 
dence  failing  to  show  that  a  Hen  deliver  it  to  a  third  person,  the 
for  repairs  is  superior  to  a  stor-  latter  can  not  enforce  a  lien  there- 
age  lien,  see  Gage  v.  Callanan,  113  on  against  the  owner.  Ludwick 
N.  Y.  S.  227,  128  App.  Div.  752,  re-  v.  Davenport-Treasy  Piano  Co., 
versing  109  N.  Y.  S.  844,  57  Misc.  112  N.  Y.  S.  1023. 


§  768 


LIENS. 


788 


§  768.  North  Carolina.^ — Any  mechanic  or  artisan  who 
shall  make,  alter  or  repair  any  article  of  personal  property, 
at  the  request  of  the  owner  or  legal  possessor  of  such  prop- 
erty, shall  have  a  lien  on  such  property  so  made,  or  repaired 
for  his  just  and  reasonable  charge  for  his  work  done  and  ma- 
terial furnished,  and  may  hold  and  retain  possession  of  the 
same  until  such  just  and  reasonable  charge  shall  be  paid;  and 
if  not  paid  for  within  the  space  of  thirty  days,  provided 
it  does  not  exceed  fifty  dollars,  if  over  fifty  dollars,  ninety 
days,  after  the  work  shall  have  been  done,  such  mechanic 
or  artisan  may  proceed  to  sell  the  property  so  made,  altered, 
or  repaired  at  public  auction,  by  giving  two  weeks'  public 
notice  of  such  sale  by  advertising  in  some  newspaper  in 
the  county  in  which  the  work  may  have  been  done,  or,  if 
there  be  no  such  newspaper,  then  by  posting  up  notice  of 
such  sale  in  three  of  the  most  public  places  in  the  county, 
town,  or  city  in  which  the  work  may  have  been  done;  and  the 
proceeds  of  the  said  sale  shall  be  applied  first  to  the  dis- 
charge of  the  said  lien,  and  the  expenses  and  costs  of  keep- 
ing and  selling  such  property,  and  the  remainder,  if  any, 
shall  be  paid  over  to  the  owner  thereof. 


SRevisal  1905,  §  2017.  This  is  a 
self-executing  enactment,  confer- 
ring upon  the  mechanic  or  artisan 
the  means  of  making  his  claim  out 
of  the  property  by  his  own  act, 
by  sale  without  any  judicial  pro- 
ceeding. But  possession  is  essen- 
tial to  give  him  the  right  to  en- 
force his  claim  by  sale.  If  he  has 
never  had  possession  and  can  not 
get  possession,  he  has  no  lien.  If 
he  repairs  a  wagon  and  surren- 
ders it  to  the  owner,  he  loses  his 
lien.  McDougall  v.  Crapon,  95  N. 
Car.  292.  The  lien  a  workman  has 
on  a  chattel  repaired  by  him  is 
lost  by  delivery  of  such  chattel  to 
the    owner   after    the    repairs    are 


completed.  Block  v.  David,  120 
N.  Car.  402,  27  S.  E.  129.  One  cut- 
ting timber  for  a  company  before 
it  gets  into  the  hands  of  a  receiv- 
er, can  not  be  forced  to  give  up 
the  possession  of  the  timber  be- 
fore he  is  paid.  Huntsman  v.  l^in- 
ville  River  Lumber  Co.,  122  N. 
Car.  583,  29  S.  E.  838.  For  a  suffi- 
cient labor  claim  to  be  filed  see 
Cameron  v.  Consolidated  Lumber 
Co.,  118  N.  Car.  266,  24  S.  E.  7. 
A  teamster  hauling  ties  to  a  rail- 
road has  no  lien  thereon  tor  his 
labor.  Tedder  v.  Wilmington  & 
W.  R.  Co.,  124  N.  Car.  342,  32  S.  E. 
714. 


789         mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.    §  768b 

§  768a.  North  Dakota.^ — A  person  who  makes,  ahers  or 
repairs  any  article  of  personal  property,  at  the  request  of 
the  owner  or  legal  possessor  of  the  property,  has  a  lien  on 
the  same  for  his  reasonable  charges  for  work  done  and  mate- 
rials furnished,  and  may  retain  possession  of  the  same  until 
the  charges  are  paid. 

Any  blacksmith  or  machinist  having  an  established  place 
of  business  within  the  state,  who  majces,  alters  or  repairs 
any  engine,  threshing  machine  or  well  machine  at  the  re- 
quest of  the  owner  or  legal  possessor  of  the  property,  shall 
have  a  lien  upon  the  same  for  his  reasonable  charges  for 
work  done  and  materials  furnished,  until  the  charges  are 
paid,  and  said  lien  shall  have  priority  over  all  other  liens, 
chattel  mortgages  or  incumbrances  against  said  personal 
property. 

§  768b.  Oklahoma.^ — A  person  who  makes,  alters  or  re- 
pairs any  article  of  personal  property,  at  the  request  of  the 
owner  or  legal  possessor  of  the  property,  has  a  lien  on  the 
same  for  his  reasonable  charge  for  work  done  and  materials 
furnished,  and  may  retain  possession  of  the  same  until  the 
charges  are  paid.  If  not  paid  within  two  months  after  the 
work  is  done,  the  person  may  proceed  to  sell  the  property  at 
public  auction,  by  giving  ten  days'  notice  of  the  sale  by 
advertising  in  some  newspaper  published  in  the  county  in 
which  the  work  was  done ;  or,  if  there  be  no  newspaper  pub- 
lished in  the  county,  then  by  posting  up  notices  of  the  sale 
in  three  of  the  most  public  places  in  the  town  where  the 
work  was  done,  for  ten  days  previous  to  the  sale.  The 
proceeds  of  the  sale  must  be  applied  to  the  discharge  of  the 
lien,  and  the  cost  of  keeping  and  selling  the  property;  the 
remainder,  if  any,  must  be  paid  over  to  the  owner  thereof. 

4Rev.     Code     1905,     §     6295,     as      Code   1905,   §  6245,  as  amended  by 
amended  by  Laws  1907,  p.  268.  For       Laws  1913,  p.  327. 
enforcement  of  this  lien,  see  Rev.  ^Comp.  Laws  1909,  p.  977,  §  4151. 


§    769  LIENS.  790 

A  later  statute"  creates  a  lien  in  behalf  of  laborers  who 
perform  work  and  labor  for  any  person  under  verbal  or 
written  contract,  if  unpaid  for  the  same,  on  the  production 
of  their  labor,  provided  that  such  lien  shall  attach  only 
while  the  tifle  to  the  property  remains  in  the  original  owner. 

Blacksmiths,"  wdieelrights  and  horseshoers  who  perform 
work  and  labor  for  any  person,  if  unpaid  for  same,  shall  have 
an  absolute  lien,  subject  to  all  prior  liens,  on  the  product  of 
their  labor  and  upon  all  wagons,  carriages,  automobiles,  im- 
plements and  other  articles  repaired  or  horses,  or  other 
other  animals  shod  by  them,  for  all  sums  of  money  due 
for  such  work  or  labor  and  for  any  material  furnished  by 
them  and  used  in  such  product,  repairs  or  shoeing. 

Any  person  having  a  lien  under  this  act  and  desiring  to 
avail  himself  of  its  provisions  shall  within  sixty  days  after 
such  work  or  labor  is  done  or  performed,  or  materials  fur- 
nished, file  with  the  clerk  of  the  district  court  of  the  county  in 
which  the  debtor  resides,  a  just  and  true  account  of  the  de- 
mand due,  or  becoming  due,  allowing  all  credits,  and  con- 
taining a  description  of  the  property  to  be  charged  with 
said  lien,  verified  by  affidavit ;  provided  that  said  lien  must  in 
either  event,  be  so  filed  with  the  clerk  of  the  district  court 
of  the  county  in  which  the  debtor  resides,  before  the  title  to 
the  property  described  therein,  has  passed  from  the  original 
owner. 

§  769.  Oregon.^ — Any  person  who  shall  make,  alter,  re- 
pair, or  bestow  labor  on  any  article  of  personal  property,  at 

<5Sess.  Laws  1910-1911,  p.  254.  port  a  lien  at  common  law.     A  la- 

■J^Sess.  Laws  1913,  p.  132.  borer    can    not    have   a   lien    on    a 

SBellinger      &      Cotton's      Ann.  crop  of  wheat  for  harvesting  and 

Codes   &  Stat.   1902,   §§   5673,   5675.  stacking  it   on   the    farmer's    land. 

Possession  of  the  thing  claimed  is  McDearmid  v.  Foster,  14  Ore.  417, 

essential   to   support  a   lien  under  12     Pac.    813.       See    general     pro- 

this  statute.    This  possession  must  visions    for   enforcement   of   liens, 

be  actual  and  exclusive.     It  must  ch.  xxii.,  infra. 
be  such  a  possession  as  would  sup- 


791  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.    §  769a 

the  request  of  the  owner  or  lawful  possessor  thereof,  shall 
have  a  lien  on  such  property  so  made,  altered,  or  repaired, 
or  upon  which  labor  has  been  bestowed,  for  his  just  and  rea- 
sonable charges  for  the  labor  he  has  performed  and  the  mate- 
rial he  has  furnished,  and  such  person  may  hold  and  retain 
possession  of  the  same  until  such  just  and  reasonable  charges 
shall  be  paid. 

The  lien  is  enforced  by  sale  or  after  notice.  Every  black- 
smith, wagon  maker,  automobile  repairer,  and  machinist 
who  has  expended  labor,  skill,  and  materials  on  any  chattel 
at  the  request  of  its  owner,  reputed  owner,  or  authorized 
agent  of  the  owner,  shall  have  a  lien  upon  said  chattel 
for  the  contract  price  for  such  expenditure,  or  in  the  absence 
of  such  contract  price,  for  the  reasonable  worth  of  such 
expenditure  for  the  period  of  one  year  from  and  after  such 
expenditure,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  possession  of 
such  chattel  has  been  surrendered  to  the  owner  thereof. 
Notice  must  be  filed  according  to  statute.^ 

§  769a.  Pennsylvania. — A  lien  on  ships  and  vessels  for 
work  done  and  materials  and  supplies  furnished  exists  in 
in  favor  of  all  ship-builders,  merchants,  dealers,  tradesmen 
and  mechanics  for  all  work  done  or  materials  and  supplies 
furnished  or  provided  in  the  building,  repairing,  fitting,  fur- 
nishing, supplying  or  equipping  of  such  ships  or  vessels. ^*^ 

All  persons  or  corporations,  engaged  in  the  business  of 
manufacturing,  spinning,  or  throwing  cotton,  wool,  or  silk 
into  yarn  or  other  goods,  shall  be  entitled  to  a  lien  upon  the 
goods  and  property  of  others,  that  may  come  into  their 
possession  for  the  purpose  of  being  so  manufactured,  spun 
or  thrown  into  yarn  or  other  goods,  for  the  amount  of  any 
account  that  may  be  due  them,  or  any  note  or  notes  taken  on 
account  of  such  account,  from  the  owners  of  such  cotton, 

oLaws   1909,  p.  223,   as   amended  lopurdon's   Dig.   (13th   ed.)   1905, 

by  Laws  1911,  p.  213.  p.  366,  §  3. 


§    769b  LIENS.  792 

wool,  or  silk,  by  reason  of  any  work  and  labor  performed 
and  the  materials  furnished  in  or  about  the  manufacturing, 
spinning,  or  throwing  of  the  same  or  other  goods  of  such 
owner  or  owners.  Such  lien  may  be  enforced  by  levy  and 
sale  under  execution.^  ^ 

§  769b.  Rhode  Island.^- — Whoever  has  a  lien  at  common 
law  for  money  due  him  on  account  of  work  and  labor,  care 
and  diligence,  or  money  expended  on  or  about  personal 
property  or  for  storage  of  personal  property  or  has  a  lien 
therefore  on  such  account  by  reason  of  any  contract,  expense 
or  implied,  if  such  money  is  not  paid  within  thirty  days 
after  a  demand  in  writing,  delivered  to  the  owner  or  some 
one  of  the  owners,  or  left  at  his  usual  place  of  abode,  if 
within  state,  with  some  person  living  there,  or  made  by  letter 
mailed  to  him  at  his  usual  postoffice  address  without  the 
state,  may  apply,  by  petition  in  equity  to  the  superior  court 
for  the  county  where  the  petitioner  or  some  one  of  the  peti- 
tioners resides,  for  an  order  for  the  sale  of  the  property  in 
satisfaction  of  the  debt. 

§  770.  South  Carolina.^^ — It  shall  be  lawful  for  any  me- 
chanic, in  this  state,  when  property  may  be  left  at  his  shop 
for  repair,  to  sell  the  same  at  public  outcry,  to  the  highest 
bidder,  after  the  expiration  of  one  year  from  the  time 
such  property  shall  have  been  repaired,  and  the  same  shall 
be  sold  by  any  magistrate  of  the  county  in  which  the  work 
was  done:  provided,  that  the  said  magistrate  shall,  before 
selling  such  property,  advertise  the  same,  for  at  least  ten 
days,  by  posting  a  notice  in  three  of  the  most  conspicuous 
places  in  his  township.  And  he  shall,  after  deducting  all 
proper  costs  and  commissions,  pay  to  the  claimant  the  money 
due  to  him,  taking  his  receipt  for  the  same,  after  which  he 

iiPurdon's       Dig.       (13th      ed.),  i3Code     of     Laws     (Civ.)     1912, 

Supp.  1909,  p.  5638,  §§  1,  2.  §  2614. 

12 Gen.  Laws  1909,  p.  896,  §  24. 


793  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  771 

shall  deposit  the  said  receipt,  as  well  as  the  items  of  costs 
and  commissions,  with  the  remainder  of  money  or  proceeds 
of  the  sale,  in  the  office  of  the  clerk  of  the  court,  subject 
to  the  order  of  the  owner  thereof,  or  his  legal  representa- 
tives. I 

§  770a.  South  Dakota. ^^ — A  person  who  makes,  alters  or 
repairs  any  article  of  personal  property  at  the  request  of 
the  owner  or  legal  possessor  of  the  property,  has  a  lien  on 
the  same  for  his  reasonable  charges  for  work  done  and  mate- 
rials furnished,  and  may  retain  possession  of  the  same  until 
the  charges  are  paid.  If  not  paid  within  two  months  after 
the  work  is  done,  the  person  may  proceed  to  sell  the  property 
at  public  auction  by  giving  ten  days'  public  notice  of  the 
sale  by  advertising  in  some  newspaper  published  in  the  coun- 
ty in  which  the  work  was  done ;  or,  if  there  be  no  newspaper 
published  in  the  county,  then  by  posting  up  notices  of  the 
sale  in  three  of  the  most  public  places  in  the  town  where 
the  work  w^as  done,  for  ten  days  previous  to  the  sale.  The 
proceeds  of  the  sale  must  be  applied  to  the  discharge  of  the 
lien  and  the  cost  of  keeping  and  selling  the  property.  The 
remainder,  if  any,  must  be  paid  over  to  the  owner  thereof. 

§  771.  Tennessee.^^ — Silversmiths,  lock  and  gunsmiths, 
blacksmiths,  and  artisans  generally  who  do  work  for  the 
public,  shall  have  the  power  and  right,  at  the  expiration  of 
one  year  from  the  time  of  the  contract  and  leaving  the  mate- 
rial with  them,  or  the  article  to  be  repaired,  if  not  claimed 
or  called  for  by  the  owner  or  owners,  to  sell  the  same  at 
public  outcry,  after  giving  thirty  days'  notice,  to  be  con- 
spicuously posted  in  three  public  places  in  the  county  wherein 
the  sale  is  to  be  made,  one  notice  to  be  posted  at  the  court 
house  door,  if  the  value  of  the  article  or  thing  shall  be  of 

i4Rev.   Code   (Civ.)   1903,  §  2162.       filing   of   a   lien    is    not    the    corn- 
See    Brown    v.    Smith,   24    S.    Dak.       mencement   of  an   action. 
231,  123  N.  W.  689,  holding  that  the  i^Ann.  Code  1896,  §  3559. 


§    ^^2  LIENS.  794 

the  value  of  five  dollars  or  more,  but  articles  of  a  less  value 
than  five  dollars  may  be  sold  at  the  expiration  of  ninety 
days  from  the  date  of  the  contract,  or  leaving  of  the  article 
or  articles. 

There  shall  be  a  lien^'^'  upon  any  vehicle,  whether  propelled 
by  horse,  steam,  water,  motor,  electric,  or  muscular  power, 
or  otherwise,  for  any  repair  or  improvements  made  or  fix- 
tures or  machinery  furnished  at  the  request  of  the  owner 
or  his  agent  in  favor  of  the  mechanic,  contractor,  founder, 
or  machinist  who  undertakes  the  work  or  makes  on  any 
vehicle  of  the  class  or  classes  herein  mentioned  any  repairs 
or  puts  therein  any  improvements,  fixtures,  machinery,  or 
material,  either  wood,  rubber,  composition,  or  metal;  pro- 
vided, the  lien  herein  created  shall  not  extend  to,  nor  shall 
the  provisions  of  this  act  be  so  construed  as  in  any  wav 
affecting  the  rights  and  title  acquired  by  purchasers  without 
notice. 

The  lien  shall  be  upon  and  include  the  vehicle  and  im- 
provements thereon,  and  continue  for  six  months  after  the 
work  is  finished  or  repairs  made  or  material  furnished,  and 
until  the  decision  of  any  suit  that  may  be  brought  within 
that  time  for  the  debt  due  said  contractor  or  undertaker  or 
furnisher,  and  binds  said  vehicle  and  the  improvements 
thereon,  provided  the  said  vehicle  and  improvements  thereon 
have  not  been  transferred  in  good  faith  to  purchasers  with- 
out notice. 

Such  lien  for  repairs,  materials,  furnishings,  improvements, 
machinery  and  work  upon  any  vehicle  of  the  class  or  classes 
heretofore  mentioned  shall  be  enforced  by  attachment  at 
law  or  in  equity  or  by  judgment  at  law  and  levy  of  the  exe- 
cution upon  the  property  subject  to  the  lien. 

§  772.  Texas.^''' — Whenever  any  article,  implement,  uten- 
sil, or  vehicle  shall  be  repaired  with  labor  and  material,  or 

icActs  1909,  p.  532.  I'Rev.  Civ.  Stat.  1911.  art.  5665 


795  MECHANICS  ,  ARTISANS  ,  AND  LABORERS'  LIENS.         §    772 

with  labor  and  without  furnishing  material,  by  any  carpenter, 
mechanic,  artisan,  or  other  workman  in  this  state,  such  car- 
penter, mechanic,  artisan,  or  other  workman  is  authorized 
to  retain  possession  of  said  article,  implement,  utensil,  or 
vehicle  until  the  amount  dile  on  the  same  for  repairing  by 
contract  shall  be  fully  paid  off  and  discharged. 

In  case  no  amount  is  agreed  upon  by  contract,  then  said 
carpenter,  mechanic,  artisan,  or  other  workman  shall  retain 
possession  of  such  article,  implement,  utensil,  or  vehicle  until 
all  reasonable,  customary,  and  usual  compensation  shall  be 
paid  in  full. 

When  possession  of  any  of  the  property  has  continued  for 
sixty  days  after  the  charges  accrued,  and  the  charges  so  due 
have  not  been  paid,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  persons  so 
holding  said  property  to  notify  the  owner,  if  in  the  state  and 
his  residence  be  known,  to  come  forward  and  pay  the  charges 
due ;  and  on  his  failure  within  ten  days  after  such  notice  has 
been  given  him  to  pay  said  charges,  the  persons  so  holding 
said  property,  after  twenty  days'  notice,  are  authorized  to 
sell  said  property  at  public  sale,  and  apply  the  proceeds  to 
the  payment  of  said  charges,  and  shall  pay  over  the  balance 
to  the  person  entitled  to  the  same. 

If  the  owner's  residence  is  beyond  the  state  or  is  unknown, 
the  person  holding  said  property  shall  not  be  required  to 
give  the  ten  days'  notice  before  proceeding  to  sell. 

If  the  person  who  is  legally  entitled  to  receive  the  balance 
is  not  known,  or  has  removed  from  the  state  or  from  the 
county  in  which  such  repairing  was  done  or  such  property 
was  so  held,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  person  so  holding  said 
property  to  pay  the  balance  to  the  county  treasurer  of  the 
county  in  which  said  property  is  held,  and  take  his  receipt 
therefor. 

5671.     The  death  of  the  owner  of  estate  and  its  allowance  does  not 

personal   property   left   for   repair  destroy  the  lien  of  the  mechanic, 

and   the   filing  of   a   claim   by   the  Lithgow   v.   Sweedberg,    (Tex.)    78 

mechanic    of   a    claim   against   the  S.  W.  246. 


§    ']']22l  liens.  796 

Whenever  any  balance  shall  remain  in  the  possession  of 
the  county  treasurer  for  the  period  of  two  years  unclaimed 
by  the  party  legally  entitled  to  the  same,  such  balance  shall 
become  a  part  of  the  county  fund  of  the  county  in  which  the 
property  was  so  sold,  and  shall  be  applied  as  any  other  county 
fund  or  money  of  such  county  is  applied  or  used. 

Nothing  in  this  title  shall  be  construed  or  considered  as 
in  any  manner  impairing  or  affecting  the  right  of  parties  to 
create  liens  by  special  contract  or  agreement,  nor  shall  it  in 
any  manner  affect  or  impair  other  liens  arising  at  common 
law  or  in  equity,  or  by  any  statute  of  this  state,  or  in  any 
other  lien  not  treated  under  this  title. 

§  772a.  Utah.^^ — Any  mechanic  or  other  person  who  shall 
make,  alter,  repair,  or  bestow  labor  upon  any  article  of 
personal  property,  at  the  request  of  the  owner  of  such  prop- 
erty, shall  in  like  manner  have  a  lien  upon  such  articles 
for  his  seasonable  charges  for  the  labor  performed,  and  for 
any  material  furnished  and  used  in  making  such  alteration, 
repair,  or  improvement. 

It  is  also  provided  that  all  foundrymen  and  boilermakers, 
and  all  persons  performing  labor  or  furnishing  machinery, 
or  boilers  or  castings,  or  other  material  for  the  construction 
or  repairing  or  carrying  on  of  any  mill,  manufactory,  or  hoist- 
ing mill,  manufactory,  or  hoisting  works  for  such  work  or 
labor  done  on  such  machinery,  or  boiler,  or  castings  or  other 
material  furnished  by  such  respectively.^^ 

§  772b.  Vermont."*^ — A  person  who  makes,  alters  or  re- 
pairs an  article  of  personal  property,  at  the  request  of  the 
owner,  shall  have  a  lien  thereon  for  his  reasonable  charges, 
and  may  retain  possession  of  the  property  until  the  same 
are  paid.  A  person  having  such  lien  may,  if  the  debt  secured 
thereby  remains  unpaid  for  three  months  and  the  value  of 
the  property  affected  does  not  exceed  one  hundred  dollars. 

isComp.  Laws  1907,  §  1404.  20Pub.   Stats.  1906,   §§  2651-2653. 

i9Comp.  Laws  1907,   §   1397. 


797  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  774 

sell  such  property  at  public  auction  in  the  town  where  he 
resides;  notice  of  the  time,  place  and  purpose  of  such  sale 
shall  be  posted  in  two  or  more  public  places  in  such  town,  at 
least  ten  days  prior  thereto,  and  he  may  apply  the  proceeds 
of  such  sale  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  debt  due  him  and  the 
expenses  of  such  sale ;  and  the  surplus  remaining  shall  be 
paid  to  the  proper  owner  thereof,  within  ten  days  thereafter, 
or  deposited  for  his  benefit  in  the  treasury  of  the  town  where 
the  sale  occurs. 

§  733.  Virginia.-^ — Every  mechanic  who  shall  alter  or 
repair  any  article  of  personal  property  at  the  request  of  the 
owner  of  such  property,  shall  have  a  lien  thereon  for  his 
just  and  reasonable  charges  therefor,  and  may  retain  posses- 
sion of  such  property  until  such  charges  are  paid. 

§  773a.  Washington.-- — Every  person,  firm  or  corpora- 
tion who  has  expended  labor,  skill  or  material  on  any  chattel, 
at  the  request  of  its  owner,  or  authorized  agent  of  its  owner, 
shall  have  a  lien  upon  such  chattels  for  the  contract  price 
for  such  expenditure,  or  in  the  absence  of  such  contract  price, 
for  the  reasonable  worth  of  such  expenditure,  for  a  period  of 
one  year  from  and  after  such  expenditure,  notwithstanding 
the  fact  that  such  chattel  be  surrendered  to  the  owner 
thereof:  provided,  however,  that  no  such  lien  shall  continue 
after  the  delivery  of  such  chattel  to  its  owner  as  against  the 
rights  of  third  persons  who  may  have  acquired  an  interest  in, 
or  the  title  to,  such  chattel  in  good  faith,  for  value,  and  with- 
out actual  knowledge  of  the  lien. 

§  774.  Wisconsin.^^ — Every  mechanic  who  shall  make, 
alter,  or  repair  any  article  of  personal  property,  at  the  request 

2iCode  Ann.  1904,  §  2488.  A  lien  22Laws  1909,  p.  626. 
claim  may  be  filed  at  any  time  23 Stat.  1898,  §  3343.  As  to  en- 
within  the  term  of  credit  extended,  forcement,  see  §  373.  Where  a 
for  supplies  furnished.  In  re  part  of  a  labor  claim  filed  is  lien- 
West  Norfolk  Lumber  Co.,  112  able  and  a  part  is  not  and  the 
Fed.  759.  proof  does  not  show  that  the  one 


§  775  LIENS.  798 

of  the  owner  or  legal  possessor  of  such  property,  shall  have  a 
lien  thereon  for  his  just  and  reasonable  charges  therefor,  and 
may  retain  possession  of  such  property  until  such  charges 
are  paid. 

§  775.  Wyoming.-'* — Any  mechanic,  artisan,  civil  engi- 
neer or  laborer  who  shall  make,  alter,  repair,  or  bestow  labor 
upon  any  article  of  personal  property,  or  upon  the  construc- 
tion of  any  ditch,  canal  or  reservoir  or  appurtenances  thereto, 
or  who  shall  furnish  materials  from  which  the  same  is  made 
or  repaired  at  the  request  of  the  owner  or  his  agent,  shall 
have  a  lien  upon  such  articles  of  personal  property,  ditch, 
canal  or  reservoir  or  appurtenances  thereto  for  his  reasonable 
charges  for  labor  performed  or  materials  furnished  and  used 
in  such  making,  repair  or  improvement. 

§  776.  No  lien  for  farm  laborers  in  the  absence  of  statutes. 
— Laborers  upon  a  farm  have  no  lien  for  their  wages  upon 
the  crops  produced  unless  given  by  statute,-^  or  by  special 
contract.  They  have  no  possession  of  the  crops  so  long  as 
they  are  growing;  and  even  after  they  are  harvested  they 
have  no  possession  if  they  are  gathered  and  stored  on  the 
farmer's  land.  Thus,  a  laborer  employed  to  cut  and  stack 
wheat  on  the  premises  has  no  such  possession  of  it  as  en- 
titles him  to  a  lien  upon  it  at  common  law.^*^  The  laborer 
has  only  a  qualified  possession  of  the  crops  while  he  is  labor- 
ing in  gathering  them.    \\'hile  they  remain  upon  the  farmer's 

can  be  separated  from  the  other,  livering  judgment,  said:  "There 
the  claim  for  a  lien  must  be  divid-  could,  to  my  mind,  be  no  greater 
ed.  McGeorge  v.  Stanton-De  Long  absurdity  than  to  hold  that  an  em- 
Lumber  Co.,  131  Wis.  7,  110  N.  W.  ploye  of  a  farmer,  to  perform  la- 
788.  bor  upon  the   farm,  would  be  en- 

24Comp.    Stats.    1910,    §    3753,    as  titled  to  a  lien   for  the  work  be- 

amended    by    Sess.    Laws    1913,    p.  stowed  in  cultivating  the   land,  or 

109.  harvesting  the  crop,  in  the  absence 

25Hunt      V.      Wing,      10      Heisk.  of   a   special   contract   creating   it, 

(Tenn.)  139.  to   be   followed   by  an   actual   and 

2CMcDearmid  v.  Foster,  14  Ore.  physical    change    of   possession    in 

417,    12   Pac.   813.     Thayer,   J.,   de-  the  nature  of  a  pledge." 


799 


MECHANICS  ,  ARTISANS  ,  AND  LABORERS    LIENS. 


711 


premises,  and  are  subject  to  his  control,  as  they  must  neces- 
sarily be,  unless  he  has  by  contract  surrendered  the  control, 
he  is  in  actual  possession,  and  no  one  can  have  a  lien  at  com- 
mon law  upon  them.  These  acts,  providing  as  they  general- 
ly do  for  a  remedy  summary  in  its  character  and  contrary  to 
the  course  of  the  common  law,  must  receive  a  strict  construc- 
tion. Claimants  under  them  must  bring  themselves  strictly 
within  the  terms  of  the  acts.-^ 

§  777.  Alabama.-'^ — A  lien  is  created  in  favor  of  agricul- 
tural laborers  and  superintendents  of  plantations  upon  the 
crops  grown  during  the  current  year  in  and  about  which 
they  are  employed,  for  the  hire  and  wages  due  them  for 
labor  and  services  rendered  by  them  in  and  about  the  cultiva- 
tion of  the  crops  under  any  contract  for  such  labor  and  serv- 
ices; which  lien  is  subordinate  to  the  landlord's  lien  for  rent, 
and  advances,  and  to  any  other  lien  for  supplies  furnished 
to  make  the  crops.^^ 

The  lien  is  held  to  be  waived  or  abandoned  at  the  expira- 
tion of  six  months  after  the  work  shall  have  been  completed, 


STplournoy  v.  Shehon,  43  Ark. 
168. 

28 Civ.  Code  1907,  §§  4795-4797, 
4800.  The  statute  does  not  require 
that  the  contract  shall  be  express. 
Its  words,  "any  contract,"  are 
comprehensive  enough  to  include 
implied  as  well  as  express  con- 
tracts. Giving  to  the  words  of  the 
statute  their  fair  and  plain  im- 
port and  scope,  any  contract  is  suf- 
ficient to  originate  the  lien,  which 
if  the  labor  is  rendered,  is  suffi- 
cient to  create  a  debt  or  liability. 
The  lien  may  be  based  on  an  im- 
plied contract.  Wilson  v.  Taylor, 
89  Ala.  368,  8  So.  149,  citing  Neil- 
son  V.  Iowa  East.  R.  Co.,  51  Iowa 
184,   1   N.   W.  434;  2  Jones   Liens, 


§  1236.     See  also,  Farrow  v.  Wool- 
ey,  149  Ala.  Zli,  43  So.  144. 

-'■^This  lien  prevails  against  any 
purchaser  with  notice,  actual  or 
constructive.  In  the  case  of  a  su- 
perintendent, if  a  purchaser  has 
knowledge  of  his  employment  or 
relation  to  the  owner,  and  of  the 
fact  that  the  crops  were  raised  un- 
der his  supervision  during  the 
year,  he  is  chargeable  with  con- 
structive notice  of  the  lien.  Town- 
send  V.  Brooks,  76  Ala.  308;  Lo- 
max  V.  Le Grand,  60  Ala.  537.  A 
laborer  for  a  tenant  to  enforce  his 
Hen  must  show  how  much  is  due 
him  under  his  contract  with  the 
tenant.  Hodson  v.  Wright,  1  Ala. 
App.  433,  56  So.  258.  See  also, 
Amos  V.  Garvin,  (Ala.)  39  So.  990. 


J-Jl 


LIENS. 


800 


unless  proceedings  are  within  that  time  commenced  to  en- 
force the  lien.  The  lien  is  enforced  by  attachment.  No 
greater  portion  of  the  crop  than  is  sufficient  to  satisfy  the 
claim,  with  costs  of  the  suit,  shall  be  attached. 

§  778.     Arkansas.-^" — Laborers    who    perform    work    and 
labor  on  any  object,  thing,  material   or  property,   have  an 


soDig.  of  Stat.  1904,  §§  5011, 
5014.  It  is  provided  by  §  4978, 
Dig.  of  Stat.  1904,  that  the  owner 
of  any  land,  houses,  boats  or  ves- 
sel, shall  have  the  right  to  vvrith- 
hold  from  the  amount  due  any 
contractor  the  amount  of  money 
for  w^hich  a  lien  is  filed.  A  labor- 
er's lien  under  a  verbal  contract 
for  a  period  not  more  than  one 
year,  upon  a  crop  of  cotton  raised 
by  his  labor  is  superior  to  the  lien 
of  a  mortgage  on  the  crop  exe- 
cuted by  the  owner.  Watson  v. 
May,  62  Ark.  435,  35  S.  W.  1108. 
The  statute  has  reference  solely 
to  movable  property,  and  the  la- 
bor performed  tnereon.  "Thus, 
ordinary  farm  hands,  employed  in 
the  cultivation  of  a  crop,  would 
have  a  lien  on  the  crop  produced 
by  their  labor.  But  it  may  well  be 
doubted  whether  the  laborer,  who 
built  fires  whilst  a  man  of  gen- 
ius wrote  a  poem,  would  have  a 
lien  either  upon  the  rhythm  or  the 
manuscript,  although  he  may  have 
contributed  to  the  comfort  and 
convenience  of  the  poet.  This 
word  'all,'  as  it  is  used  in  this  act, 
is  not  to  be  construed  literally  as 
giving  to  every  laborer  a  lien  for 
his  labor.  The  clerk  of  a  mer- 
chant or  banker,  in  one  sense  of 
the  word,  is  a  laborer,  and  so  are 
ordinary  house-servants;  but  they 
do  not  come  within  the  purview  of 


this  act,  because  they  produce 
nothing  to  which  a  lien  could  at- 
tach." Dano  V.  Miss.,  O.  &  R.  R. 
Co.,  27  Ark.  564,  567.  A  farm  over- 
seer is  not  a  laborer  within  the 
meaning  of  this  act.  Flournoy  v. 
Shelton.  43  Ark.  168;  Isbell  v.  Dun- 
lap.  17  S.  Car.  581,  583;  Whitaker 
V.  Smith,  81  N.  Car.  340,  31  Am. 
Rep.  503.  The  lien  of  a  laborer 
on  a  crop  he  has  helped  to  raise  is 
superior  to  the  lien  of  one  who 
has  advanced  money  to  make  the 
crop.  Sheeks-Stephens  Store  Co. 
V.  Richardson,  76  Ark.  282,  88  S. 
W.  983.  For  penalty  for  remov- 
ing property  subject  to  such  lien, 
see  Dig.  of  Stat.  1904,  §  2011.  One 
who  raises  a  crop  upon  the  land 
of  another  for  an  agreed  share  is 
a  laborer  and  not  a  tenant,  and  is 
entitled  to  a  lien.  Burgie  v.  Davis, 
34  Ark.  179.  The  laborer's  lien 
given  by  this  act  is  personal  and 
not  assignable;  it  must  arise  out 
of  contract ;  and  the  laborer  must 
bring  himself  strictly  within  the 
statute.  The  first  nine  sections 
apply  only  to  movable  property. 
The  remedy  is  summary,  and 
should  be  strictly  construed.  Dano 
V.  Miss.,  O.  &  R.  R.  Co.,  TJ  Ark. 
564;  Taylor  v.  Hathaway,  29  Ark. 
597.  Hay  is  the  production  of  the 
laborer  who  cuts  and  rakes  the 
grass,  and  he  has  a  lien  on  it  for 
the    price    or    value    of   his    labor. 


8oi  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  779 

absolute  lien  on  such  object,  thing,  material  or  property  for 
such  labor  done  and  performed,  subject  to  prior  liens  and 
landlord's  liens  for  rent  and  supplies,  and  such  liens  may  be 
enforced  within  the  same  time,  and  in  the  same  manner  now 
provided  for  by  law,  in  enforcing  laborers'  liens  on  the  pro- 
duction of  labor  done  and  performed. 

Any  person  having  a  lien  under  this  act  and  desiring  to 
avail  himself  of  its  provisions,  shall  within  thirty  days  after 
such  work  or  labor  is  done  or  performed,  or  materials  fur- 
nished, file  with  the  clerk  of  the  circuit  court  of  the  county  in 
which  the  debtor  resides,  a  just  and  true  account  of  the 
demand  due,  or  becoming  due  after  allowing  all  credits,  and 
containing  a  description  of  the  property  to  be  charged  with 
said  lien,  verified  by  affidavit. 

Such  liens  may  be  enforced  at  any  time  within  four  months 
after  such  accounts  are  filed  by  suits. 

Proceedings  to  enforce  this  lien  must  be  commenced  with- 
in eight  months  after  the  work  is  done.^^  The  employer, 
however,  may  bring  the  laborer  to  settlement  before  a  proper 
officer  any  time  after  the  labor  is  performed,  by  giving  the 
laborer  or  his  agent  ten  days'  notice. 

§  779.  Arkansas^^  (continued).  Specific  liens  in  favor  of 
employers. — Specific  liens  are  reserved  upon  so  much  of  the 
produce  raised,  and  articles  constructed  or  manufactured, 
by  laborers  during  their  contract  as  will  secure  all  moneys 
and  the  value  of  all  supplies  furnished  them  by  the  employers, 
and  all  wages  or  shares  due  the  laborer. 

Where  no  written  contract  is  made,   the   employer  shall 

Emerson  v.   Hedrick,  42  Ark.  263.  digging  a  well.     Guise   v.   Oliver, 

A  laborer  who  cultivates  land,  or  51  Ark.  356,  11   S.   W.  515. 

clears   and   prepares   the    same    for  si  Dig.  of  Stats.  1904,  §  5009. 

cultivation,    is    not    entitled    to    a  s2Dig.    of    Stats.    1904,    §§    5024, 

lien   thereon   for  his   wages.     The  5031.  Contracts  for  a  longer  per.'od 

statute  only  gives  a  lien  upon  the  than   one    month   must    be    signed, 

production  of  his  labor.    Taylor  v.  witnessed    by    two    witnesses,    or 

Hathaway,  29  Ark.  597.     There   is  acknowledged.     The  contract  does 

no    lien    for     labor    performed    in  not   affect   third  persons   unless   a 

51 


§  779^  LIENS.  802 

have  a  lien  upon  the  portion  of  the  crop  going  to  the  em- 
ploye for  any  debt  incident  to  making  and  gathering  the 
crop  owing  to  such  employer  by  such  employe,  without 
any  necessity  for  recording  any  contract  of  writing  giving 
such  lien;  and  in  such  case  no  mortgage  or  conveyance  of 
any  part  of  the  crop  made  by  the  person  cultivating  the  land 
of  another  shall  have  a  validity,  unless  made  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  employer  or  owner  of  the  land  or  crop,  which 
consent  must  be  indorsed  upon  such  mortgage  or  convey- 
ance; provided,  no  such  indorsement  shall  bind  the  party 
making  it  to  pay  the  debt  unless  expressly  so  stipulated. 

§  779a.  California.^^ — It  is  provided  by  statute  that  every 
person  working  in  or  about  a  threshing  machine,  while  en- 
gaged in  threshing  grain,  shall  have  a  lien  on  such  machine. 

§  779b.  Colorado.^^ — All  persons  who  shall  do  work  or 
shall  furnish  materials  or  mining,  milling  or  other  machinery 
or  other  fixtures,  for  the  working,  preservation,  prospecting 
or  development  of  any  mine,  lode  or  mining  claim,  deposit 
yielding  metals  or  minerals  of  any  kind  or  for  the  working, 
preservation  or  development  of  any  such  mine,  lode  or 
deposit,  in  search  of  any  such  metals  or  minerals  shall  have 
a  lien  upon  the  property  upon  which  they  have  rendered 
service  or  bestowed  labor  or  for  which  they  have  furnished 
materials  or  mining  or  milling  machinery  or  other  fixtures  for 

copy  of  it  is  filed  in  the  recorder's  s^Mills  Ann.   Stat.    1912,  §§  4583, 

office.  4612.      This   statute     would     come 

33Civ.    Code    1906,    §    3061.      The  more  appropriately  in  Vol.  II,  Ch. 

lien  is  valid  where  one  person  so  30.  post.    A  workman,  either  under 

works    under    the    employment    of  the  common  law  or  sec.  4570  of  the 

one  lawfully  in  possession  and  us-  statutes,    can    not    refuse    to    per- 

ing    a    threshing    machine    under  form  his   contract  and   still   insist 

contract    with    the    owner.      Lam-  on  retaining  possession  in  the  en- 

bert  V.  Davis,  116  Cal.  292,  48  Pac.  forcement   of  his   claimed   lien  as 

123.      An    action    to    foreclose     a  against    the    right    of    the    owner, 

thresher's   lien   will   not   bind   any  Hillsburg     v.     Harrison,     2     Colo, 

one  not  a  party  to  it.     Holt  Mfg.  App.  298,  30  Pac.  355. 
Co.  V.  Collins,  154  Cal.  265,  97  Pac. 
516. 


8o3  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  781 

the  value  of  such  services  rendered  or  labor  done  or  material 
furnished,  whether  at  the  instance  of  the  owner,  or  of  any 
other  person  acting  by  his  authority  or  under  him,  as  agent, 
contractor  or  otherwise. 

Any  person  or  persons,  company  or  corporation,  who  per- 
form labor  or  furnish  material  or  supplies  for  constructing, 
altering  or  repairing,  or  for  the  digging,  drilling  or  boring, 
operating,  completing  or  repairing  of  any  gas  well,  oil  well 
or  any  other  well,  by  virtue  of  a  contract  with  the  owner  or 
his  authorized  agent,  shall  have  a  lien  to  secure  the  payment 
of  the  same  upon  such  gas  well,  oil  well,  or  such  other 
well,  and  upon  the  materials  and  machinery  and  equipment 
and  supplies  so  furnished. 

§  780.  Florida.^^ — A  lien  prior  in  dignity  to  all  others 
accruing  thereafter  exists  in  favor  of  any  person  performing 
any  labor  in,  or  managing  or  overseeing  the  cultivation  or 
harvesting  of  crops,  upon  the  crops  cultivated  or  harvested. 

§  781.  Georgia.'^*^ — Laborers  shall  have  a  general  lien 
upon  the  property  of  their  employers,  liable  to  levy  and 
sale,  for  their  labor,  which  is  hereby  declared  to  be  superior 
to  all  other  liens,  except  liens  for  taxes,  the  special  liens  of 
landlords  on  yearly  crops,  and  such  other  liens  as  are  declared 
by  law  to  be  superior  to  them.^^ 

35Gen.  Stat.  1906,  §  2199.  chanic,  who  performs  actual  man- 

seCode   1911,   §§   3334,   3335,   3339.  ual  labor  for  his  employer,  is  en- 

The  word  laborer  as  used   in  the  titled  to  a   laborer's    lien    on    the 

statute  means  one  engaged  in  man-  property  of  the  latter.  But  though 

ual  labor,  and  not  one  whose  em-  a  contractor  may  be  a  mechanic,  if 

ployment  is  associated  with  men-  he  does  not  perform  manual  labor, 

tal  labor  and  skill,  as  a  clerk  for  he    is   not    entitled    to    a    laborer's 

instance.     Hinton  v.  Goode,  IZ  Ga.  lien  under  this  statute.     Adams  v. 

233;  Ricks  v.  Redwine,  IZ  Ga.  273;  Goodrich,  55  Ga.  233;  Savannah  & 

Richardson    v.    Langston,    68    Ga.  Charleston  R.   Co.  v.   Callahan,  49 

658.     Whether  a  clerk  is  a  laborer  Ga.  506. 

depends  on  the  nature  of  his  du-  ^''General    laborers'    lien    under 

ties.     Oliver  v.   Macon   Hardware  this  statute  take  precedence  over 

Co.,  98  Ga.  249,  25  S.  E.  403,  58  Am.  ordinary  mortgages,  although  the 

St.  300.     A  laborer,  though  a  me-  mortgages  were  made  prior  to  the 


78i 


LIENS, 


804 


Laborers  shall  also  have  a  special  lien  on  the  products  of 
their  abor,  superior  to  all  other  liens,  except  for  taxes  and 
special  liens  of  landlords  on  yearly  crops,  to  which  they  shall 
be  inferiors.'^^ 

Liens  of  laborers  shall  arise  upon  the  completion  of  their 
contract  of  labor,  but  shall  not  exist  against  bona  fide  pur- 
chasers without  notice,  until  the  same  are  reduced  to  execu- 
tion and  levied  by  an  officer;  and  such  liens  in  conflict  with 


contracts  for  labor.  Allred  v.  Hale, 
84  Ga.  570,  10  S.  E.  1095.  A  laborer 
may  make  claim  for  lien  at  any- 
time within  one  year  after  he  is 
entitled  to  payment  and  he  must 
make  demand  for  payment.  Fair- 
cloth  V.  Webb,  125  Ga.  230,  53  S.  E. 
592.  In  the  relation  of  landlord 
and  cropper  after  the  payment  of 
rent  and  advances  the  cropper 
may  foreclose  his  special  laborer's 
lien  for  a  balance  due  him.  Gar- 
rick  V.  Jones,  2  Ga.  App.  382,  58 
S.  E.  543.  Where  a  cropper  has 
not  completed  his  work  under  a 
contract  with  the  landlord  be- 
cause prevented  by  the  act  of  the 
landlord,  he  may  enforce  his  lien. 
Lewis  V.  Owens,  124  Ga.  228,  52  S. 
E.  333. 

38A  laborer  has  a  special  lien  on 
particular  property,  and  also  a 
general  lien  on  all  the  property  of 
his  employer,  for  work  done,  and, 
if  properly  asserted,  it  will  date 
from  the  completion  of  the  work. 
But  in  order  to  receive  the  advan- 
tage of  this  lien,  it  must  be  fore- 
closed as  provided  by  law,  and, 
as  to  realty,  recorded.  Where  a  la- 
borer neither  recorded  nor  fore- 
closed his  lien  as  such,  but 
brought  complaint  on  an  open  ac- 
count for  the  amount  due  him,  and 
recovered     judgment,     his     claim 


was  postponed  to  judgments  jun- 
ior to  the  performance  of  the 
work,  but  senior  to  the  date  of  his 
judgment.  That  a  laborer  desires 
to  claim  a  general  lien  on  all  the 
property  of  his  employer,  and  is 
unable  to  describe  such  property 
specifically,  does  not  relieve  him 
from  asserting  his  lien  and.  enforc- 
ing it  as  such.  It  does  not  matter 
that  he  might  be  compelled  to  en- 
force his  lien  on  the  personalty  of 
his  employer  in  one  action  and  on 
the  realty  in  another.  Love  v. 
Cox,  68  Ga.  269.  The  lien  must  be 
established  by  judgment,  and  pro- 
cess must  issue  upon  the  judgment, 
before  he  can  claim  money  arising 
from  the  sale  of  property  under 
an  execution  in  favor  of  another 
party.  Gumming  v.  Wright,  72  Ga. 
767.  One  who  furnishes  labor  for 
raising  a  crop  on  shares  may  re- 
cover his  share  by  foreclosure  of 
his  lien  as  a  laborer.  His  part  of 
the  crop  is  in  the  nature  of  wages. 
McElmurray  v.  Turner,  86  Ga. 
215,  12  S.  E.  359.  A  labor  lien  does 
not  attach  to  property  set  apart 
as  exempt.  Watson  v.  Williams, 
110  Ga.  321,  35  S.  E.  344.  As  to 
what  constitutes  completion  of 
contract  for  cutting  timber,  see 
Hawkins  v.  Chambliss,  120  Ga.  614, 
48  S.  E.  169. 


8o5 


mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.    §  781a 


each  other  shall  rank  according  to  date,  dating  each  from  the 
completion  of  the  contract  of  labor.^^ 

§  781a.  Idaho.^*^ — A  farm  laborer  is  given  a  lien  for  his 
labor  in  producing  crops.  This  is  a  preferred  and  prior  lien 
to  any  crop  or  chattel  mortgage  placed  thereon,  and  any 
person  taking  a  mortgage  on  such  crops  takes  it  subject  to 
the  farm  laborer's  lien  as  to  a  reasonable  compensation  for 
his  labor,  provided  the  interest  in  any  crop  of  any  lessor 
or  lessors  of  land  where  the  premises  are  leased  in  considera- 
tion of  a  share  in  the  crop  raised  thereon  is  not  subject  to 


39While  these  liens  by  the  terms 
of  the  statute  yield  to  bona  fide 
purchasers  without  notice,  yet  it 
is  held  that  they  take  precedence 
of  mortgages,  though  the  holders 
took  them  in  good  faith  and  with- 
out notice.  Langston  v.  Anderson, 
69  Ga.  65.  A  laborer's  lien  is  held 
superior  to  the  lien  of  a  purchase- 
money  mortgage.  Bradley  v.  Cas- 
sels,  117  Ga.  517,  43  S.  E.  857.  A 
distress  warrant,  levied  before  the 
work  for  which  the  lien  was 
claimed  is  completed,  takes  prece- 
dence. Hight  V.  Fleming,  74  Ga. 
592.  Upon  a  summary  process  to 
enforce  a  laborer's  lien  for  wages, 
the  defendant  can  not  set  up  by 
way  of  set-off  a  negotiable  note 
of  the  laborer,  brought  up  by  the 
employer  after  the  contract  of  hir- 
ing, in  the  absence  of  any  request 
or  encouragement  on  the  part  of 
the  laborer  to  make  the  purchase, 
or  of  any  promise  to  allow  the 
note  as  payment  or  as  set-off. 
Where  the  claim  in  set-off  arises 
out  of  transactions  wholly  discon- 
nected with  the  labor  or  the 
wages,    it   is   thought   to   be   a   de- 


fense not  contemplated  by  the  pro- 
visions of  the  code  relating  to  the 
enforcement  of  liens.  Fuller  v. 
Kitchens,  57  Ga.  265.  If  a  labor- 
er be  employed  by  his  creditor 
the  amount  due  him  for  his  wages 
will  be  applied  in  payment  of  his 
debt,  in  the  absence  of  any  ex- 
press agreement  that  they  shall 
not  be  so  applied.  If  after  the  hir- 
ing the  employer  makes  advances 
in  money  or  property  to  the  labor- 
er, in  the  absence  of  a  stipulation 
to  the  contrary,  such  advances  are 
applied  to  the  payment  of  the 
claim  for  wages.  Fuller  v.  Kitch- 
ens, 57  Ga.  265,  per  Bleckley,  J.  As 
to  validity  of  affidavit  of  fore- 
closure, see  Weischselbaum  v. 
Pope,  119  Ga.  182,  45  S.  E.  991. 

40Rev.  Code  1908,  §  5141;  Beck- 
stead  V.  Griffith,  11  Idaho  738,  83 
Pac.  764.  Where  a  debtor's  infant 
son  plows  the  land  of  his  father's 
creditor  to  cultivate  a  crop  there- 
on he  is  entitled  to  a  lien  for  his 
own  services,  but  he  can  have  no 
lien  for  the  services  of  the  team 
used  by  him.  Tuckey  v.  Lovell,  8 
Idaho  731,  71  Pac.  122. 


§  782 


LIENS. 


806 


such  lien.      It   is   held   that   this   Hen   extends   to  the   entire 
crop. 

§  782.  Louisiana.^ ^ — The  following  debts  to  agricultural 
laborers  are  privileged: — 

The  appointments  or  salaries  of  the  overseer  for  the  cur- 
rent year,  on  the  crops  of  the  year  and  the  proceeds  thereof; 
the  wages  of  laborers  employed  in  working  the  same,  on  th6 
crops  of  the  year,  and  on  everything  which  serves  to  the 
working  of  the  farm.^^ 

The  privileges  granted  to  the  overseer,  the  laborers,  the 
furnishes  of  supplies,  and  the  party  advancing  money  neces- 
sary to  carry  on  any  farm  or  plantation,  are  concurrent,  and 
shall  not  be  divested  by  any  prior  mortgage,  whether  con- 
ventional, legal,  or  judicial,  or  by  and  seizure  or  sale  of  the 
land  while  the  crop  is  on  it.  The  privilege  in  favor  of  the 
laborer  shall  be  ranked  as  the  first  privilege  on  the  crop.^^ 

§  782a.  Michigan.^^ — An  owner  of  a  threshing  machine 
shall,  upon  filing  a  proper  statement,  have  a  lien  for  the  value 
of  his  services  in  threshing  grains  or  vegetable  products  for 
another.     Such  lien  shall  not  attach  where  the  grain  shall 


•iiMerrick's  Rev.  Code  1900,  art. 
3217. 

42The  privilege,  "on  everything 
which  serves  to  the  working  of 
the  farm,"  is  construed  to  apply 
only  to  such  things  as  serve  to  the 
working  of  the  farm  but  do  not 
constitute  a  part  of  the  farm  it- 
self; that  is,  to  movables  by  na- 
ture and  destination, — movables 
serving  to  the  working  of  the 
farm,  but  not  belonging  to  the 
owner.  Rogers  v.  Walker,  24  Fed. 
344.  Independent  contractors  are 
not  laborers  on  a  plantation,  and 
are  not  entitled  to  a  special  privi- 


lege. Fortier  v.  Delgado,  59  C.  C. 
A.   180,   122  Fed.  604. 

^^In  the  distribution  of  the  pro- 
ceeds of  a  plantation  sold  to  sat- 
isfy a  mortgage,  upon  the  inter- 
vention of  laborers  claiming  a 
lien,  there  may  be  two  funds,  a 
crop  fund  and  a  plantation  fund. 
On  the  crop  fund  there  is,  first, 
the  laborer's  lien;  and,  second,  the 
factor's  lien.  On  the  plantation 
fund,  to  the  extent  of  the  mules, 
etc.,  the  maxim,  qui  prior  est  tem- 
pore, potior  est  jure,  is  applica- 
ble. Rogers  v.  Walker,  24  Fed. 
344. 

4i  Howell's  Stats.  1912,  §  13817. 


8o7 


mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.      §  y^T) 


have    passed    into    the    hands    of   an   innocent    purchaser   or 
dealer  in  the  usual  course  of  trades. 

§  782b.  Minnesota."*'' — The  statute  gives  the  owner  or 
operator  of  a  threshing  machine  a  lien  on  grain  threshed  for 
the  price  or  value  of  such  service,  w^hich  shall  be  preferred  to 
all  other  liens  or  incumbrances  except  those  given  for  the 
seed  from  which  said  grain  was  grown. 

§  783.  Mississippi.^^ — Every  employer  shall  have  a  lien  on 
the  share  or  interest  of  his  employe  in  any  crop  made  under 


45  Gen.  Stats.  1913,  §§  7082,  7083. 
For  a  sufficient  averment  in  a 
complaint  to  enforce  a  thresher's 
lien,  see  Phelan  v.  Terry,  101 
Minn.  454,  112  N.  W.  872.  Where 
a  thresher  retains  possession  of  a 
part  of  the  grain  threshed  he  may 
have  a  lien  upon  it  w^ithout  pro- 
ceeding as  provided  by  Rev. 
Laws  1905,  §§  3546,  3547.  Gordon 
v.  Freeman,  112  Minn.  482,  128  N. 
VV.  834.  Such  lien  is  not  lost  by 
the  thresher  placing  such  grain  in 
an  elevator  to  be  held  for  him. 
Gordon  v.  Freeman,  112  Minn. 
482,  128  N.  W.  834. 

4GRev.  Code  1906,  §§  3042,  3043. 
The  statutes  are  intended  only  to 
give  liens  upon  the  crops,  and  to 
provide  means  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  same  between  the 
classes  enumerated,  namely,  the 
employer  and  employe,  the  land- 
lord and  his  tenant,  or  the  crop- 
per on  shares  and  the  supply-man 
and  the  party  supplied.  An  over- 
seer is  not  within  either  of  these 
classes,  and  is  not  entitled  to  a 
lien.  Hester  v.  Allen,  52  Miss. 
162.  An  overseer  has  a  lien  for 
wages  under  a  contract  of  em- 
ployment.     Langford      v.    Leggitt, 


99  Miss.  266,  54  So.  856.  As  re- 
gards the  nature  of  the  indebted- 
ness for  which  the  lien  may  be 
created,  it  is  clear  that  there  can 
be  no  lien  for  a  debt  which  has  no 
relation  to  agriculture  or  to  sup- 
plies for  the  family.  But  where 
a  farmer  has  in  good  faith  taken 
up  the  goods  on  the  faith  of  the 
lien,  and  it  is  questioned  whether 
this  article  or  that  falls  within  the 
law,  there  ought  to  be  evidence 
that  the  things  were  not  needed 
for  farm  purposes,  or  that  they 
are  of  such  nature  of  themselves 
as  to  be  unfit  for  that  use,  in  or- 
der to  defeat  the  lien.  Where  a 
planter  pays  his  laborers  for 
wages  in  goods  obtained  from  a 
merchant,  the  latter  would  have 
a  lien  for  them,  whether  they  were 
of  the  class  embraced  in  the  pro- 
visions of  the  statute  or  not;  for 
it  would  be  the  same  as  advancing 
money  to  pay  the  wages  of  the 
laborers,  and  the  statute  gives  a 
lien  for  this.  Herman  v.  Perkins, 
52  Miss.  813.  A  person  employed 
to  do  general  work  on  a  planta- 
tion, who  assists  in  gathering  a 
crop,  is  entitled  to  this  Hen. 
Lumbley  v.   Thomas,  65   Miss.  97, 


§  783 


LIENS. 


808 


such  employment,  for  all  advances  of  money,  and  for  the 
fair  market  value  of  other  things  advanced  by  [to]  him,  or 
any  one  at  his  request,  for  supplies  for  himself,  his  family 
and  business,  during  the  existence  of  such  employment, 
which  lien  such  employer  may  offset,  recoup,  or  otherwise 
assert  and  maintain,  and  every  employe,  laborer,  cropper, 
part  owner,  overseer  or  manager,  or  other  person  who  may 
aid  by  his  labor  to  make,  gather,  or  prepare  for  sale  or  market 
any  crop,  shall  have  a  lien  on  the  interest  of  the  person  who 
contracts  with  him  for  such  labor,  for  his  wages,  or  share 
or  interest  in  such  crop,  whatever  may  be  the  kind  of  wages 
or  the  nature  of  such  interest,  which  lien  such  employe, 
laborer,  cropper,  part  owner,  overseer  or  manager,  or  other 
person  may  offset,  recoup  or  otherwise  assert  and  maintain. 
And  such  liens  shall  be  paramount  to  all  liens  or  incum- 
brances or  rights  of  any  kind  created  by  or  against  the  per- 
son so  contracting  for  such  assistance,  except  the  lien  of  the 
lessor  of  the  land  on  which  the  crop  is  made,  for  rent,  and 
supplies  furnished.*^ 


5  So.  823.  When  a  manager  of  a 
plantation  has  shipped  a  crop  to 
market,  where  it  is  sold  and  the 
plantation  is  credited  with  the 
price  received,  he  can  not  assert 
a  lien  for  his  services  on  such 
crop.  McCormick  v.  Blum,  75 
Miss.  81,  21  So.  707. 

47Such  lien  is  superior  to  a 
mortgage  of  the  crop  executed 
after  the  passage  of  this  act.  The 
mortgagor  in  such  case  has  the 
right  to  employ  laborers,  and 
thereby,  by  operation  of  law,  to 
create  the  lien  in  their  behalf,  al- 
though such  employment  be  sub- 
sequent to  the  execution  of  the 
mortgage.  Buck  v.  Paine,  50 
Miss.  648.  The  lien  is  also  para- 
mount to  a  mortgage  of  the  crop 
made  for  supplies  furnished  to  en- 


able the  farmer  to  make  the  crop, 
though  the  mortgage  was  made  be- 
fore the  laborer  was  employed 
and  was  duly  recorded,  and  the 
contract  with  the  laborer  was  ver- 
bal only.  The  lien  is  implied  by 
law.  It  requires  no  writing,  and 
rests  upon  no  record  to  uphold  it. 
Buck  v.  Payne,  52  Miss.  271;  Leak 
v.  Cooke,  52  Miss.  799;  Herman  v. 
Perkins,  52  Miss.  813.  The  labor- 
er may  waive  his  implied  lien  in 
favor  of  the  mortgagee,  and  thus 
make  the  mortgage  paramount  to 
the  lien.  Whether  he  has  done  so 
verbally  or  by  his  act,  is  a  ques- 
tion for  the  jury.  After  such 
waiver,  a  sale  by  the  laborer  of 
his  interest  in  the  crop  passes 
only  such  interest  as  the  laborer 
had  after  his  waiver,  and  his  ven- 


8o9 


mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.    §  784a 


Said  liens  shall  exist  by  virtue  of  the  relation  of  the  parties 
as  employer  and  employe,  and  without  any  writing  or  record- 
ing. 

§  784.  North  Carolina.^^ — Personal  property  is  subject 
to  a  lien  for  the  payment  of  all  debts  contracted  for  work 
done  on  the  same.  The  lien  for  work  on  crops  is  preferred 
to  every  other  lien  or  incumbrance  which  attached  upon  the 
property  subsequent  to  the  time  at  which  the  work  was  com- 
menced.^^ 

Whenever  servants  and  laborers  in  agriculture  shall  by 
their  contracts,  orally  or  in  writing,  be  entitled  for  wages  to 
a  part  of  the  crops  cultivated  by  them,  such  part  shall  not  be 
subject  to  sale  under  executions  against  their  employers,  or 
the  owners  of  the  land  cultivated. 

§  784a.  North  Dakota.^" — Any  person  who  performs 
services  for  another  in  the  capacity  of  farm  laborer  between 
the  first  day  of  April  and  the  first  day  of  December  in  any 


dee  can  not  protect  himself  from 
the  waiver  on  the  ground  that  he 
did  not  know  of  it.  The  purchas- 
er is  bound  to  inform  himself  of 
the  facts,  and  can  claim  no  better 
right  than  the  laborer  himself. 
Buck  V.  Paine,  50  Miss.  648.  A 
mortgage  of  the  crop,  made  before 
the  passage  of  the  act  creating 
liens  in  favor  of  laborers,  is  a  vest- 
ed right,  by  contract,  which  is  par- 
amount to  any  liens  under  such 
statute.  Leak  v.  Cooke,  52  Miss. 
799.  Where  a  laborer  is  working 
for  an  agreed  amount  per  month, 
he  need  not  particularize  the 
items  of  claim  in  his  claim  filed 
for  lien.  Baldwin  v.  Morgan,  Ti 
Miss.  276,  18  So.  919. 

48Revisal  of  1905,  §§   1998,  2017, 
2034. 


49See  Warren  v.  Woodard,  70  N. 
Car.  382.  Thus  it  is  preferred  to 
a  subsequent  agricultural  lien. 
Rouse  V.  Wooten,  104  N.  Car.  229, 
10  S.  E.  190;  see  ante,  §  457.  An 
overseer  is  not  entitled  to  a  la- 
borer's lien  for  his  wages  upon  the 
crop  or  land  of  his  employer  over 
which  he  has  superintendence. 
Whitaker  v.  Smith,  81  N.  Car. 
340,  31  Am.  Rep.  503.  The  claim 
must  be  in  detail,  specifying  the 
labor,  the  time  thereof,  and  the 
farm  on  which  it  was  performed. 
Cook  v.  Cobb,  101  N.  Car.  68,  7  S. 
E.  700. 

50  Rev.  Code  1905,  §§  6274,  6277. 
As  to  sufficient  description  of  the 
land  where  the  grain  was  threshed, 
see  Mitchell  v.  Monarch  Elevator 
Co.,  15  N.  Dak.  495,  107  N.  W.  1085. 


§    784b  LIENS.  810 

year,  shall  have  a  lien  on  all  crops  of  every  kind  grown,  raised 
or  harvested  by  the  person  for  whom  the  services  were  per- 
formed during  said  time  as  security  for  the  payment  of  any 
wages  due  or  owing  to  such  persons  for  services  so  per- 
formed, and  said  lien  shall  have  priority  over  all  other  liens, 
chattel  mortgages  or  incumbrances,  excepting,  however,  seed 
grain  and  threshers'  liens;  provided,  that  the  wages  for  which 
a  lien  may  be  obtained  must  be  reasonable  and  not  in  excess 
of  that  which  is  usually  charged  for  the  same  kind  of  work 
in  the  locality  where  the  labor  is  performed;  provided, 
further,  that  in  case  any  such  person  without  cause  quits  his 
employment  before  the  expiration  of  the  time  for  which  he  is 
employed,  or  if  he  shall  be  discharged  for  cause,  then  he  shall 
not  be  entitled  to  a  lien  as  herein  provided. 

Any  owner  or  lessee  of  a  threshing  machine  who  threshes 
grain  for  another  therewith,  shall  upon  filing  the  statement 
provided  for  in  the  statute,  have  a  lien  upon  such  grain 
for  the  value  of  his  services  in  threshing  the  same  from 
the  date  of  the  commencement  of  the  threshing. 

§  784b.  Oregon.^ ^ — Any  person  who  shall  by  his  own 
labor,  or  that  of  his  live  stock,  or  by  using  his  machinery, 
do  or  perform  any  labor  or  service  upon  any  farm  or  land 
in  tilling  the  same  or  sowing  or  harvesting  or  heading  or 

The  lien  is  on  all  the  grain  Dak.  185,  112  N.  W.  78.  The  fail- 
threshed  for  threshing  any  par-  ure  of  the  lienor  to  state  in  his 
ticular  kind  of  grain  where  all  the  statement  filed  the  quantity  of 
grain  is  threshed  under  one  con-  grain  threshed  is  fatal  to  his  lien, 
tract.  Mitchell  v.  Monarch  Ele-  Moher  v.  Rasmusson,  12  N.  Dak. 
vator  Co.,  15  N.  Dak.  495,  107  N.  71,  95  N.  W.  152.  The  lienor  seiz- 
W.  1085;  Gorthy  v.  Jarvis,  15  N.  ing  grain  under  his  lien  must  show 
Dak.  509,  108  N.  W.  39.  Where  two  that  the  grain  was  grown  on  the 
kinds  of  grain  are  described  in  the  land  he  describes  in  his  filed  state- 
statement,  stating  the  quantity  of  ment.  Martin  v.  Hawthorne,  5  N. 
each  and  the  price  for  each,  the  Dak.  66,  63  N.  W.  895.  See  also, 
contract  being  divisable,  there  are  Parker  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Lis- 
two  liens,  one  on  each  kind  of  bon,  3  N.  Dak.  87. 
grain.     Schlosser  v.  Moores,  16  N.  -'iGen.  Laws  1907,  pp.  275,  277. 


8ll  mechanics',  artisans',  AND  laborers'  LIENS.      §    784C 

threshing  any  grain,  or  in  securing  or  assisting  in  securing  or 
housing  any  crop  or  crops,  sown,  raised,  headed,  harvested  or 
threshed  thereon  during  the  year  in  which  said  work  or 
labor  was  done  shall  have  a  lien  upon  all  such  crop  as  shall 
have  been  raised  upon  all  or  any  of  such  land  for  the  con- 
tract price,  or  reasonable  value  if  there  be  no  contract  for 
such  work  or  labor,  and  said  lien  shall  attach  from  the  date 
of  the  commencement  of  such  work  or  labor,  and  such  lien 
shall  be  a  preferred  lien,  and  shall  be  prior  to  all  other  liens 
or  incumbrances. 

The  statute  also  gives  a  lien  upon  grain  or  other  crops  for 
the  contract  price  or  reasonable  value  of  threshing  or  harvest- 
ing any  grain,  or  other  crop,  and  declares  such  a  lien  to  be 
prior  over  all  others  except  those  of  laborers. 

§  784c.  South  Carolina.^^ — Laborers  who  assist  in  mak- 
ing any  crop  on  shares  or  for  wages  in  money  or  other  valu- 
able consideration,  shall  have  a  lien  thereon  to  the  extent 
of  the  amount  due  them  for  such  labor  next  in  priority  to 
the  lien  of  the  landlord  for  rent;  and  as  between  such  laborers 
there  shall  be  no  preference.  Such  portion  of  the  crop  to 
them  belonging,  or  such  amount  of  money  or  other  valuable 
consideration  as  may  be  due  them,  shall  be  recoverable  by  an 
action  in  any  court  of  competent  jurisdiction.  The  lien  of 
the  laborer  shall  rank  next  in  priority  to  that  of  the  landlord 
for  rent. 

52Code  of  Laws  1912,  §§  4163,  not  be  in  writing  to  create  a  lien 
4164.  An  overseer  is  not  an  agri-  under  §  3058  of  said  statutes  where 
cultural  laborer.  Isbell  v.  Dunlap,  the  contract  is  witnessed  by  dis- 
17  S.  Car.  581.  Even  where  a  interested  witnesses.  State  v, 
plaintifif  acts  in  good  faith  he  is"  Banier,  78  S.  Car.  103,  60  S.  E.  225. 
liable  for  acts  of  a  constable  in  A  lien  may  be  allowed  on  a  crop 
levying  on  crops  under  a  void  for  the  hire  of  a  mule  where  such 
warrant.  Forrest  v.  McBee,  78  S.  hire  is  provided  in  a  written  con- 
Car.  105,  58  S.  E.  955.  A  contract  tract.  McCasltn  v.  Nance,  46  S. 
under  §  2715  Civ.  Code  1902  need  Car.  568,  24  S.  E.  812. 


§    7^5  LIENS.  8l2 

§  785.  South  Dakota.^^ — Every  person  or  persons  own- 
ing and  operating  a  threshing  machine  shall  have  a  lien  from 
the  date  of  threshing  upon  all  grain  threshed  by  him  with 
such  machine  for  the  value  of  the  services  so  rendered  in 
doing  such  threshing;  provided,  that  the  provisions  of  this 
section  shall  not  apply  to  the  innocent  purchasers  of  grain 
after  the  threshing  unless  the  said  lien  be  filed  within  ten 
days.  Said  liens  shall  have  priority  over  all  other  liens  and 
incumbrances  upon  said  grain  if  filed  within  twenty  days 
from  the  day  on  which  said  threshing  was  completed. 

§  786.  Tennessee.^^ — Whenever  any  person  shall  perform 
any  labor,  or  render  service  to  another  in  accordance  with  a 
contract,  written  or  verbal,  for  cultivating  soil,  and  shall 
produce  a  crop,  he  shall  have  a  lien  upon  the  crop  produced, 
which  shall  be  the  results  of  his  labor,  for  the  payment  of 
such  wages  as  were  agreed  upon  in  the  contract. ^^ 

This  lien  shall  exist  three  months  from  the  fifteenth  day 
of  November  of  the  year  in  which  the  labor  is  performed, 
and  shall  be  enforced  by  execution  or  attachment,  as  land- 
lords' liens  are  enforced;  provided,  that  an  account  of  such 
labor  rendered  be  kept  and  sworn  to  before  some  justice 
of  the  peace,  or  clerk  of  the  court  issuing  the  writ  of  dis- 
traint of  attachment.    This  lien  shall  in  nowise  abridge  or  in- 

53Rev.    Code    (Civ.    Proc.)    1903,  in     lieu     of    wages,     can     not,     as 

§§   in,  738.     Hahn  v.   Sleepy   Eye  against  third  persons  who  have  a 

Milling  Co.,  21  S.  Dak.  324,  112  N.  fixed  lien,  as  by  mortgage,  upon  a 

W.  843.     A  judgment  for  plaintiff  portion  of  the  crop,  subject  such 

is  erroneous  in  a  suit  to  enforce  a  portion    to    the    payment    of    their 

thresher's     lien    when     the    proof  claims    against     the     entire    crop, 

fails   to   show   that   the   plaintiff's  They  must  show  that  the  portion 

assignor  owned  and   operated  the  attempted   to   be   subjected   is   the 

threshing  machine  used  in  thresh-  product    of   their    labor,   and   then 

ing  the  grain.    Anderson  v.  Alseth,  can   only   subject    their   stipulated 

6  S.  Dak.  566,  62  N.  W.  435.  part  of  such  portion  to  their  lien. 

'-■^Code  1896,  §§  3567-3569.  Hunt  v  .Wing,   10  Heisk.    (Tenn.) 

•'•> Laborers    upon    a    farm,    who  139. 
stipulate  for  a  share  of  the  crop 


8i3  mechanics',  artisans',  and  laborers'  liens.    §  786b 

terfere  with  the  landlords'  lien  for  rent  or  supplies,  as  estab- 
lished by  law,  but  the  same  shall  be  second  to  the  landlord's 
lien,  and  none  other. 

§  786a.  Texas.^*^ — The  statute  provides  that  a  farm  hand 
is  entitled  to  have  a  first  lien,  subject  to  the  landlords'  lien,  on 
all  the  products  of  the  farm  that  his  labor  helps  to  produce, 
but  to  secure  his  lien  he  must  make  duplicate  accounts, 
one  to  be  presented  to  his  employer  within  30  days  after  the 
debt  accrues  and  the  other  within  the  same  time  he  is  re- 
quired to  file  with  the  county  clerk. 

§  786b.  Washington.^^ — Any  person  who  shall  do  labor 
upon  any  farm  or  land,  in  tilling  the  same  or  in  sowing  or 
harvesting  or  threshing  any  grain,  as  laborer,  contractor, 
or  otherwise,  or  laboring  upon,  or  securing  or  assisting  in 
securing  or  housing  any  crop  or  crops  sown,  raised,  or 
threshed  thereon  during  the  year  in  which  said  work  or 
labor  was  done,  such  person  shall  have  a  lien  upon  all  such 

56Rev.  Civ.  Stats.  1911,  art.  5644,  Wash.  375,  38  Pac.  1130.  A  lien 
5645.  As  to  time  for  filing  such  for  services  of  several  farm  hands 
account,  see  Cash  v.  First  Nat.  is  good,  even  if  not  signed  by  all 
Bank,  26  Tex.  Civ.  App.  109,  61  S.  the  claimants,  where  the  body  of 
W.  723.  The  account  and  notice  the  claim  shows  wno  such  claim- 
required  by  the  statute  need  not  ants  are  and  a  landlord  is  not  a 
state  the  crops  raised.  Allen  v.  necessary  party  defendant  in  a 
Glover,  27  Tex.  Civ.  App.  483,  65  suit  on  such  claims  to  enforce  a 
S.  W.  379.  lien    on    the    crops    grown    on    his 

f>'Remington      and       Ballinger's  land  on  the  shares.    Pain  v.  Isaacs, 

Ann.  Codes,  Stat.  1910,  §  1188.    For  10  Wash.  173,  38  Pac.  1038.     There 

enforcement,      see      ante,      §  639a.  is    no    authority    for    amending    a 

Hogue  v.   Sheriff,  1  Wash.  T.  195.  lien  on  farm  products.     Dexter  v. 

An  employer  can  not  claim  a  lien  Olsen,  40  Wash.    199,  82  Pac.   286. 

covering  the    labor   of   other   per-  A  laborer's  lien  under  Remington 

sons  than  himself.     Mohr  v.  Clark,  and    Ballinger's    Ann.    Codes    and 

3  Wash.  T.  440,  19  Pac.  28.    There  Stats.,   §    1188,    is    superior   to   the 

is    no    lien    from    the    labor    of    a  Hen  of  a  chattel  mortgage  execut- 

team  in  tending  crops  when  there  ed     even     before     the     crop     was 

is   no  contract   for  the  labor  of  a  raised.    Sitton  v.  Dubois,  14  Wash, 

person.      Essency    v.    Essency,    10  624,  45  Pac.  303. 


§  786c  LIENS.  814 

crops  as  shall  have  been  raised  upon  all  or  any  of  such  land, 
for  such  work  or  labor. 

§  786c.  Wisconsin.^^ — Every  person,  w^ho,  as  owner  or 
lessee  of  a  threshing  machine  or  corn  sheller,  threshes  grain 
or  shells  corn  for  another  therewith,  shall  have  a  lien  upon 
the  grain  so  threshed  and  corn  so  shelled  for  the  value  of  his 
services  in  threshing  and  shelling  the  same,  to  the  extent  the 
person  contracting  such  services  has  an  interest  therein,  from 
the  date  of  the  commencement  of  such  services;  and  in  case 
the  value  of  such  services  remains  unpaid  may  seize  and  take 
possession  of  so  much  of  such  grain  or  corn  as  shall  be  neces- 
sary to  pay  for  such  services  and  the  expenses  of  enforcing 
such  lien,  for  the  purpose  of  foreclosing  said  lien  at  any  time 
within  six  months  from  the  last  charge  for  such  threshing 
grain  or  shelling  corn,  and  sell  the  same  at  public  auction, 
upon  notice  of  not  less  than  ten,  nor  more  than  fifteen  days 
from  the  date  of  such  seizure,  provided  the  same  be  not  re- 
deemed before  such  sale,  or  be  taken  by  proceedings  at  law. 
Notice  of  such  sale  to  be  given  personally  and  by  posting 
in  at  least  three  public  places  in  the  town  where  the  owner 
of  such  grain  or  corn  resides  and  also  in  the  town  where 
such  sale  is  to  be  made,  if  in  another  town;  and  if  such  own- 
er is  a  nonresident  of  the  state,  in  the  town  where  such  grain 
or  corn,  or  some  part  thereof,  was  threshed  or  shelled,  and 
apply  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  to  the  payment  of  the  amount 
due  for  such  service,  together  with  the  expense  of  such  seiz- 
ure and  sale,  returning  the  residue,  if  any,  to  the  party  en- 
titled thereto. 

ssLaws   1899,  p.  370. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 


PARTNERSHIP  LIENS. 


Sec. 

787.  Member    of    partnership    has 

lien. 

788.  Creditor    of    partnership    has 

no   lien. 

789.  Quasi  lien  of  joint  creditors. 

790.  No    equity    of   joint    creditors 

in  absence  of  joint  property. 

791.  Conveyance   by     one     partner 

to  the  other. 

792.  Transfer   of  one   partner's   in- 

terest to  creditor. 

793.  Partners  may  pay  debts  of  in- 

dividual member. 


Sec. 

794.  Dissolution   of  partnership  by 

death  of  a  partner. 

795.  Levy  of  execution  by  creditor 

of  member. 

796.  Legal  title  of  real  estate  con- 

veyed  to   partners, 

797.  Effect  of  notice  on  one  deal- 

ing with   individual  member 
of  firm, 

798.  Character        of        partnership 

property      impressed      upon 
real  estate, 

799.  Sale  of  real  estate  by  surviv- 

ing  partner. 


§  787.  Member  of  partnership  has  lien. — Each  member  of 
a  partnership  has  an  equitable  hen  on  the  partnership  prop- 
erty for  the  balance  of  account  between  himself  and  his  co- 
partners, which  he  may  enforce  as  against  them,  and  all  per- 
sons claiming  under  them,  in  their  individual  capacity.^  The 
partnership  property  belongs  to  the  partnership,  and  not  to 


iGarbett  v.  Veale,  5  Q.  B.  408; 
Fitzpatrick  v.  Flannagan,  106  U.  S. 
648,  27  L.  ed.  211,  1  Sup.  Ct.  369; 
Case  v.  Beauregard,  99  U.  S.  119, 
25  L.  ed.  370,  per  Strong,  J. ;  Kirby 
V.  Schoonmaker,  3  Barb.  Ch,  (N. 
Y.)  46,  49  Am.  Dec.  160;  Saunders 
V.  Reilly,  6  N.  Y.  St.  452,  59  Am. 
Rep.  472;  Evans  v.  Bryan,  95  N. 
Car.  174,  59  Am.  Rep.  233;  Free- 
man V.  Stewart,  41  Miss.  138 
Pierce  v.  Jackson,  6  Mass.  242 
Gibson   v.    Stevens,   7   N.    H.   352 


Christian  v.  Ellis,  1  Grat.  (Va.) 
396;  Miller  v.  Price,  20  Wis.  117; 
Roop  V,  Herron,  15  Nebr.  73,  17  N. 
W.  353;  Matlock  v.  Matlock,  5 
Ind.  403;  Dunham  v.  Hanna,  18 
Ind.  270;  Pilcher's  Succession,  39 
La.  Ann.  362,  1  So.  929;  Duryea  v. 
Burt,  28  Cal,  569;  Hodges  v.  Hole- 
man,  1  Dana  (Ky.)  50;  Harris  v. 
Tuttle,  114  Ky.  882,  24  Ky.  L.  1668, 
12  S.  W.  16.  California,  North  Da- 
kota and  South  Dakota:  Each 
member  of  a  partnership  may  re- 


815 


788 


LIENS. 


8i6 


the  individuals  of  whom  the  partnership  is  composed.  It  is 
the  right  of  each  individual  member  of  the  partnership  to  re- 
quire that  the  partnership  property  shall  be  applied  to  the 
payment  of  the  partnership  debts.  The  share  of  each  mem- 
ber is  his  share  of  the  surplus  remaining  after  the  settlement 
of  all  the  firm's  debts  and  accounts.  The  lien  covers  a  part- 
ner's account  as  made  up  in  the  partnership  dealings;  but  it 
does  not  cover  an  individual  debt  due  from  one  partner  to 
the  other.^ 


§  788.  Creditor  of  partnership  has  no  lien. — A  creditor 
of  a  partnership  has  no  equitable  lien  upon  its  effects  in  the 
first  instance  to  compel  their  application  to  the  payment 
of  partnership  debts.  Each  member  of  a  partnership  has  a 
right  to  require  the  application  of  the  joint  property  to  the 
payment  of  the  joint  debts,  before  any  portion  can  be  divert- 
ed to  the  individual  debts  of  the  separate  partners.^  But  a 
partnership  creditor  has  no  specific  lien,  legal  or  equitable, 


quire  its  property  to  be  applied  to 
the  discharge  of  its  debts,  and  has 
a  lien  upon  the  shares  of  the  other 
partners  for  this  purpose,  and  for 
the  payment  of  the  general  bal- 
ance, if  any,  due  to  him.  Property, 
whether  real  or  personal,  acquired 
with  partnership  funds,  is  pre- 
sumed to  be  partnership  property. 
California  :  Civ.  Code  1906,  §§  2405, 
2406.  Montana :  Codes  Ann.  (Civ.) 
1895,  §  3194.  North  Dakota:  Rev. 
Code  1905,  §§  5825,  5826.  South  Da- 
kota:  Rev.  Code  (Civ.)  1903. 
§§  1734,  1735.  Each  member  of  a 
mining  partnership  has  a  lien  on 
the  partnership  property  for  the 
debts  due  the  creditors  thereof, 
and  for  money  advanced  by  him 
for  its  use.  This  lien  exists  not- 
withstanding there  is  an  agree- 
ment  among   the   partners   that    it 


must  not.  California:  Civ.  Code 
1906,  §  2514.  Idaho:  Rev.  Codes 
1908,  §  3364.  Montana :  Codes  Ann. 
(Civ.)  1895,  §  3353.  This  lien  may 
exist  in  favor  of  one  partner,  al- 
though the  partnership  property 
is  in  the  actual  possession  of  the 
other.  Morganstern  v.  Thrift,  66 
Cal.  577,  6  Pac.  689.  In  Nevada  the 
amount  of  money  expended  or  in- 
debtedness assumed  by  a  partner 
for  the  necessary  and  actual  work- 
ing and  development  of  a  mining 
claim  shall  be  a  lien  on  the  inter- 
est of  said  copartner.  Rev.  Laws 
1912,  §  2481. 

2 Evans  v.  Bryan,  95  N.  Car.  174, 
59  Am.  Rep.  233. 

3Ex  parte  Ruffin,  6  Ves.  119; 
Taylor  v.  Fields,  4  Ves.  396;  Ex 
parte  King,  17  Ves.  115;  Campbell 
V.  Mullett,  2  Swanst.  551;  Fitzpat- 


8i7 


PARTNERSHIP    LIENS. 


788 


upon  the  joint  funds,  any  more  than  any  individual  creditor 
has  upon  the  private  estate  of  his  debtor.  This  has  been 
the  settled  doctrine  on  this  subject  since  Lord  Eldon's  deci- 
sion in  1801  of  the  case  of  Ex  parte  Ruffin.*  A  creditor  of  a 
partnership  has,  as  a  general  rule,  no  direct  lien  upon  the 
partnership  property  until  he  acquires  it  by  legal  process, 
that  is,  by  the  levy  of  an  attachment  or  of  an  execution.  His 
indirect  or  quasi  lien  is  derived  from  the  lien  or  equity  of  the 
individual  partners.  It  is  practically  a  subrogation  to  the  lien 
of  the  individual  partners.  If  the  partners  are  not  themselves 
in  a  condition  to  enforce  an  equitable  lien  upon  the  partner- 
ship property,  the  creditors  of  the  partnership  can  not  enforce 
a  lien  derived  from  them,  or  from  one  of  them.^  The  equity 
of  the  partnership  creditor  continues  so  long  as  the  equity 
of  the  individual  partner  continues,  and  no  longer. 


rick  V.  Flannagan,  106  U.  S.  648,  27 
L.  ed.  211,  1  Sup.  Ct.  369,  per  Mat- 
thews, J.  Connecticut :  Allen  v. 
Center  Valley  Co.,  21  Conn.  130, 
54  Am.  Dec.  333.  Indiana:  McDon- 
ald V.  Beach,  2  Blackf.  (Ind.)  55. 
The  equitable  lien  of  creditors 
upon  the  assets  of  a  partnership 
depends  upon  the  liens  of  the 
partners,  and  such  lien  may  be 
waived  by  the  partners,  and  a  sale 
by  a  partner  of  his  interest  in  the 
partnership  property  in  the  ab- 
sence of  fraud  is  a  waiver  of  his 
lien  on  the  partnership  assets,  and 
where  a  partnership  is  dissolved 
and  one  member  assigned  his  in- 
terest therein  to  the  other  mem- 
bers who  composed  another  firm, 
an  agreement  on  the  part  of  such 
members  to  pay  the  debts  of  the 
dissolved  firm  and  to  cancel  an  in- 
debtedness due  from  such  retiring 
member    constituted    a    sufficient 


consideration  to  support  the  as- 
signment. Selz  V.  Mayer,  151  Ind. 
422,  51'  N.  E.  485.  Mississippi: 
Freeman  v.  Stewart,  41  Miss.  138. 
Nebraska:  Brown  v.  Sloan,  55 
Nebr.  28,  75  N.  W.  54;  Murphy  v. 
Warren,  55  Nebr.  215,  75  N.  W.  573. 
New  York:  Saunders  v.  Reilly,  6 
N.  Y.  St.  452,  25  Cent.  L.  J. 
201 ;  Nicoll  v.  Mumford,  4  Johns. 
Ch.  (N.  Y.)  522,  reversed  20  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  611.  North  Carolina:  Phil- 
lips v.  Trezevant,  67  N.  Car.  370. 
Ohio :  Gwin  v.  Selby,  5  Ohio  St. 
96;  Sigler  v.  Knox  County  Bank,  8 
Ohio  St.  511;  Wilcox  v.  Kellogg, 
11  Ohio  394. 

^6  Ves.  119. 

^Fitzpatrick  v.  Flannagan,  106 
U.  S.  648,  27  L.  ed.  211,  1  Sup.  Ct. 
369;  Case  v.  Beauregard,  99  U.  S. 
119.  25  L.  ed.  370;  Bank  of  Ken- 
tucky V.  Herndon,  1  Bush  (Ky.) 
359,  89  Am.  Dec.  630. 


52 


§    789  LIENS.  818 

§  789.  Quasi  lien  of  joint  creditors. — It  is  only  through 
the  operation  of  administering  the  equities  between  the  part- 
ners themselves  that  the  joint  creditors  have  the  benefit  of 
a  quasi  Hen  upon  the  partnership  property.*^  These  equities 
can  be  asserted  only  through  the  action  of  the  partners,  or 
of  one  of  them,  or  through  the  insolvency  of  the  firm,  which 
puts  the  property  into  the  custody  of  the  law,  or  through 
the  death  of  one  partner,  which  devolves  the  settlement  of 
the  partnership  affairs  upon  the  survivor.  Simple  contract 
creditors  of  the  partnership  have  no  lien  upon  its  property 
until  it  is  acquired  by  process  of  law,  or  the  property  has 
passed  in  custodia  legis.  The  partnership  creditors  have 
what  is  termed  a  quasi  lien  upon  the  partnership  property, 
but  this  does  not  exist  independently  of  the  partners.  "The 
partners  have  the  lien,  and  especially  the  salvent  ones,  and 
have  a  right  to  insist  that  the  joint  funds  shall  pay  the  joint 
debts,  and  in  this  way,  and  by  enforcing  the  equities  or  lien 
of  the  partners,  the  creditors  of  the  partnership  come  to  their 
rights,  whatever  they  are,  and  thus  these  rights  are  worked 
out,  as  the  authorities  say."''^ 

6  Story    Part.    (7th    ed.),    §    360;  54;    Wilcox    v.    Kellogg,    11    Ohio 

Case  V.   Beauregard,  99  U.  S.   119,  394;     Day    v.    Wetherby,   29  Wis. 

101    U.    S.    688,    25    L.    ed.     1004;  363;  Schmidlapp  v.  Currie,  55  Miss. 

Fitzpatrick  V.  Flannagan,  106  U.  S.  597,   30  Am.     Rep.    530;     White   v. 

648,  27  L.   ed.  211,   1   Sup.   Ct.  369;  Parish,  20  Tex.   688,   IZ  Am.    Dec. 

In   re    Lloyd,   22   Fed.   90;   Wood-  204;  Hawk  Eye  Woollen  Mills  v. 

mansie  v.  Holcomb,  34  Kans.  35,  7  Conklin,  26  Iowa  422;  Poole  v.  Se- 

Pac.  603;  Allen  v.  Grissom,  90  N.  ney,    66    Iowa   502,    24    N.    W.   27; 

Car.  90;  Phillips  v.  Trezevant,  67  Jones  v.  Lusk,  2  Mete.   (Ky.)  356; 

N.    Car.   370;    Burns   v.    Harris,   67  Whitehead    v.    Chadwell,    2    Duv. 

N.    Car.    140;    Gallagher's    Appeal.  (Ky.)    432;    Bank    of    Kentucky    v. 

114  Pa.  St.  353,  4  Sad.   (Pa.)  297,  7  Herndon,  1  Bush  (Ky.)  359,  89  Am. 

Atl.  237,  60  Am.  Rep.  350;  Coover's  Dec.  630;  Freeman  v.  Stewart,  41 

Appeal,  29  Pa.  St.  9,  70  Am.  Dec.  Miss.  138.     See,  however,  Menagh 

149;  York  County  Bank's  Appeal,  v.  Whitwell,  52  N.  Y.  146,  11  Am. 

32  Pa.  St.  446;   Baker's  Appeal,  21  Rep.  683. 

Pa.  St.  76,  59  Am.  Dec.  752;  McNutt  'Allen  v.   Center  Valley  Co.,  21 

V.  Strayhorn,  39  Pa.  St.  269;  Rice  v.  Conn.  130,  135,  54  Am.  Dec.  ZZZ,  per 

Barnard,  20  Vt.  479,  50  Am.   Dec.  Church,  C.  J. 


8l9  PARTNERSHIP    LIENS.  §    780 

A  simple  contract  creditor  of  a  partnership  can  enforce 
his  equity  only  when  the  partnership  property  is  within  the 
control  of  the  court,  and,  in  the  course  of  administration, 
brought  there  by  proceedings  in  bankruptcy  or  insolvency, 
or  by  an  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  creditors,  or  by  the 
creation  of  a  trust  in  some  other  way.  Neither  the  partners 
nor  the  creditors  of  the  partnership  have  any  specific  lien, 
nor  is  there  any  trust  that  can  be  enforced  until  the  property 
has  passed  in  custodiam  legis.® 

§  790.  No  equity  of  joint  creditors  in  absence  of  joint 
property. — If  there  be  no  joint  property  there  can  be  no 
equity  in  favor  of  joint  creditors.^  Thus,  where  two  persons 
entered  into  partnership  under  an  agreement  that  one  should 
have  the  exclusive  ownership  of  the  property  until  the  other 
should  contribute  a  certain  sum  of  money,  and  before  he  did 
this  a  seperate  creditor  of  the  other  partner  levied  an  execu- 
tion upon  the  property,  and  afterwards  a  joint  creditor  levied 
upon  the  same  goods,  it  was  held  that  the  separate  execution 
creditor  was  entitled  to  the  preference  acquired  by  priority 
of  seizure.  The  property  was  individual  property.  The  part- 
ner who  had  not  become  entitled  to  an  interest  in  the  prop- 
erty had  no  lien  upon  it,  and  the  joint  creditors  could  work 
out  no  equity  through  him.^^ 

If  the  contract  of  partnership  be  of  such  a  nature  that  the 
partners  can  not,  as  between  themselves,  enforce  a  lien  upon 
the  partnership  funds  for  the  payment  of  partnership  liabili- 
ties, as  where  there  is  a  community  of  goods  between  them, 
and  they  and  their  families  are  supported  from  the  joint  prop- 

SFitzpatrick  v.  Flannagan,  106  U.  ^Case    v.    Beauregard,   Sf)   U.    S. 

S.  648,  27  L.  ed.  211,  1  Sup.  Ct.  369;  119,  25  L.  ed.  370;  Scull's  Appeal, 

Case  V.   Beauregard,  99  U.   S.   119,  115  Pa.  St.  141,  7  Atl.  588. 

25  L.  ed.  370,  per  Strong,  J.;  Saun-  lOYork    County    Bank's    Appeal, 

ders  V.  Reilly,  6  N.  Y.  St.  52;  Aus-  2>2  Pa.  St.  446;   Baker's  Appeal,  21 

tin  V.   Seligman,    18    Fed.    519,  21  Pa.  St.  Id,  59  Am.  Dec.  752. 
Blatch.  (U.  S.)  506,  66  How.  Prac. 
(N.  Y.)  87. 


§    791  LIENS.  820 

erty  without  any  account  being  kept  by  one  as  against  the 
other,  the  partnership  creditors  can  not  enforce  any  such  pre- 
ference.^^ 

And  so,  if  property  which  has  once  been  property  of  the 
partnership  has  been  in  good  faith  transferred  by  the  partner- 
ship to  an  individual  member  of  the  firm  or  to  a  third  person, 
the  equities  of  the  partners  are  extinguished,  and  consequent- 
ly the  equities  of  the  creditors  of  the  partnership  are  at  the 
same  time  extinguished. ^- 

§  791.     Conveyance  by  one  partner  to  the  other. — One  of 

two  partners  may  extinguish  all  partnership  equities  by 
transferring  his  interest  to  the  other,  provided  the  property 
has  not  previously  passed  in  custodia  legis,  and  provided  the 
transfer  be  made  in  good  faith. ^"  This  has  been  the  recog- 
nized rule  ever  since  it  was  declared  by  Lord  Eldon  at  the 
beginning  of  this  century.^'* 

Where  one  partner  transfers  all  his  interest  in  the  partner- 
ship property  to  the  other,  and  is  content  with  his  personal 
undertaking  to  pay  the  partnership  debts,  the  retiring  part- 
ner has  no  longer  any  lien  in  equity  upon  the  effects  of  the 
partnership,  but  the  continuing  partner  may  dispose  of  them 
as  he  chooses,  and  may  transfer  them  in  trust  for  the  pay- 
ment of  his  own  debts;  and  the  partnership  creditors  can 
not  follow  these  effects,  to  subject  them  to  the  payment  of 
partnership  debts. ^^ 

iiRice  V.  Barnard,  20  Vt.  479,  50  Cornwell,  48  111.   64,  95   Am.   Dec. 

Am.  Dec.  54.    And  see  York  Coun-  516;    Robb      v.    Mudge,    14      Gray 

ty   Bank's  Appeal,  32  Pa.   St.  446;  (Mass.)    534;    Kimball    v.    Thomp- 

Case  V.   Beauregard,  99  U.  S.   119,  son,    13    Mete.    (Mass.)    283.      See 

25  L.  ed.  370.  cases  collected  by  Mr.  Corliss,  34 

i2McDonald  v.  Beach,  2  Blackf.  Alb.   L.  J.  346. 

(Ind.)  55.  UEx  parte  Ruffin,  6  Ves.  119. 

iSFitzpatrick    v.    Flannagan,    106  i^Rankin  v.  Jones,  2  Jones'   Eq. 

U.  S.  648,  27  L.  ed.  211,  1  Sup.  Ct.  (N.  Car.)   169;  Potts  v.  Blackwell, 

369;  Case  v.  Beauregard,  99  U.  S.  4  Jones'  Eq.   (N.   Car.)   58;  White 

119,   25   L.   ed.   370.   affd.   101   U.   S.  v.    Griffin,   2   Jones'    L.    (N.    Car.) 

688.    25    L.    ed.    1004;    Hapgood   v.  3;    Allen    v.    Grissom,    90    N.    Car. 


821  PARTNERSHIP    LIENS.  §    792 

Of  a  firm  consisting  of  five  members  two  withdrew,  as- 
signing their  interests  to  the  remaining  three,  who  agreed 
to  pay  the  debts  of  the  firm.  Some  time  afterwards  one 
of  the  remaining  three  sold  his  interest  to  the  remaining 
two  partners.  The  latter,  after  contracting  debts,  made  an 
assignment  of  their  partnership  property  to  pay  the  debts 
of  the  last  partnership.  It  was  held  that  the  creditors  of 
the  first  and  second  partnerships  had  no  right  to  claim  any 
portion  of  the  property  assigned  for  the  benefit  of  the  credi- 
tors of  the  last  partnership.^^ 

§  792.     Transfer  of  one  partner's  interest  to  creditor. — 

One  member  of  a  partnership  may,  with  the  concurrence 
of  his  copartner,  transfer  in  good  faith  his  interest  in  the 
firm  to  any  individual  creditor,  and  a  simple  contract  creditor 
of  the  firm  can  not  mantain  a  bill  to  subject  the  property  to 
the  payment  of  his  debt,  although  both  the  firm  and  the 
individual  members  of  it  were  insolvent  at  the  time  of  such 
transfer.^^  The  transfer  converts  the  partnership  property 
into  property  held  in  severalty,  or  at  least  operates  to  termi- 
nate the  equity  of  any  partner  to  require  the  application  of 
the  partnership  property  to  the  payment  of  the  joint  debts. 

90;  Flack  v.  Charron,  29  Md.  311;  attached.      Conroy    v.    Woods,    13 

Griffith  V.  Buck,  13  Md.  102;  Jones  Cal.  626,  72,  Am.  Dec.  605;  Sedara  v. 

V.     Fletcher,     42     Ark.     422,     451;  Williams,    4    McLean    (U.    S.)    51, 

Goembel  v.  Arnett,  100  111.  34;  An-  Fed.    Cas.    No.    12609;    Bowman   v. 

drews     v.     Mann,     31     Miss.     322;  Spalding,  8  Ky.  L.   (abstract)   691, 

White   V.    Parish,   20   Tex.   688,   7Z  2  S.   W.  911. 

Am.  Dec.  204.  In  a  few  cases,  how-  i^Baker's  Appeal,  21  Pa.  St.  76. 

ever,  it  has  been  held  that  if  one  ^''^Case   v.   Beauregard,  99   U.   S. 

partner    buys    out    his    copartners,  119,  25  L.  ed.  370,  afifd.   101   U.  S. 

agreeing  to  pay  the  debts  of  the  688,  25   L.  ed.   1004;   Fitzpatrick  v. 

firm,  the  partnership  property  re-  Flannagan,  106  U.  S.  648,  27  L.  ed. 

mains   bound   for   the   firm    debts;  211,  1  Sup.  Ct.  369;  Woodmansie  v. 

and  the  lien  of  the  firm  creditors  Holcomb,  34  Kans.  35,  7  Pac.  603; 

upon    such   property    is    preferred  Schmidlapp  v.  Currie,  55  Miss.  597, 

to  the  Hen  of  an  individual  cred-  30  Am.  Rep.  530.    Some  authorities 

itor   of   such    remaining    partner,  hold,  however,  that  if  the  firm  is 

though  the  lien  of  the  latter  first  insolvent  at  the  time  of  such  pay- 


§  793  LIENS.  822 

The  partnership  creditor  can  sustain  such  bill  only  upon 
proof  that  the  transfer  was  fraudulent.  He  has  no  specific 
claim  upon  the  property,  and  there  is  no  trust  in  his  behalf 
which  a  court  of  equity  can  enforce. 

But  a  sale  and  transfer  by  one  partner,  without  the  asset 
and  concurrence  of  his  copartner,  of  all  his  interest  in  the 
partnership  property  to  a  trustee,  to  pay  all  his  individual 
and  partnership  debts,  does  not  divest  or  defeat  the  implied 
lien  of  the  other  partner  upon  the  partnership  property; 
but  such  implied  lien  continues  till  the  partnership  debts  have 
been  paid,  and  upon  the  insolvency  of  the  partnership  may 
be  enforced  by  the  partnership  creditor. ^^ 

§  793.     Partners  may  pay  debts  of  individual  member. — 

The  partnership  may  pay  the  debts  of  individual  members 
although  it  has  not  in  fact  sufficient  assets  to  pay  its  liabili- 
ties in  full,  provided  it  remains  in  the  exclusive  possession 
and  control  of  its  assets,  and  acts  in  good  faith.  The  mere 
inability  of  a  partnership  to  pay  its  debts  does  not  deprive  the 
partners  of  their  legal  control  of  their  property,  and  their 
right  to  sell  and  dispose  of  it  as  may  seem  just  and  proper.^^ 
If  proceedings  in  bankruptcy  or  insolvency  are  afterwards 
instituted  by  or  against  the  firm,  the  validity  of  the  appro- 
priation must  be  tested  by  statutes  and  rules  regulating  such 
proceedings.^*^ 

ment  or  transfer,  it  is  fraudulent  Patterson  v.  Seaton,  70  Iowa  689, 

and   void   as   to   existing  creditors  28   N.   W.   598;    Keith   v.   Fink,   47 

of  the  firm,  and  will  be  set  aside  III.  272. 

tinder    insolvency   proceedings,    or  isBank  of  Kentucky  v.  Herndon, 

at  the  suit  of  a  creditor  who  has  1  Bush  (Ky.)  359,  89  Am.  Dec.  630. 

obtained    a    judgment    against    the  i^Case    v.    Beauregard,  99  U.    S. 

firm.      Goodbar   v.    Gary,     16    Fed.  119,  25  L.  ed.  370;  Sigler  v.  Knox 

316,  4  Woods  (U.  S.)  663;  Wilson  Gounty  Bank,  8  Ohio  St.  511.   And 

V.  Robertson,  21  N.  Y.  587,  589,  19  see  Wilcox  v.  Kellogg,  11  Ohio  394. 

How.   Prac.   (N.  Y.)   350;   Menagh  20Nat.    Bank    of    Metropolis    v. 

V.  Whitwell,  52  N.  Y.  146,  11  Am.  Sprague,  20  N.  J.   Eq.  13,  revd.  21 

Rep.  683;   Ransom  v.  Van  Deven-  N.  J.  Eq.  530;  Schaeffer  v.  Fithian, 

ter,    41    Barb.    (N.    Y.)    307.      See  17  Ind.  463;  Jones  v.  Lusk,  2  Mete. 

Saunders    v.    Reilly,   6   N.   Y.  452;  (Ky.)  356. 


823  PARTNERSHIP   LIENS.  §    794 

If,  upon  a  dissolution  of  a  partnership  by  mutual  agree- 
ment, the  members,  honestly  believing  that  the  outstanding 
accounts  and  notes  due  the  firm  are  sufficient  to  pay  all  its 
debts,  divide  the  merchandise  betw^een  them,  the  title  to 
this  vests  in  the  individual  members,  and  one  partner  can  not 
afterwards  rescind  such  division,  and  compel  a  restoration  of 
the  goods,  or  the  proceeds  thereof,  from  another  partner  or 
from  his  assignee  in  insolvency,  except  for  fraud.^^ 

§  794.     Dissolution  of  partnership  by  death  of  a  partner. — 

Upon  the  dissolution  of  a  partnership  by  the  death  of  one 
of  its  members,  the  survivor  may  pay  his  individual  debts  out 
of  the  assets,  unless  the  intervention  of  the  court  is  sought 
to  v^ind  up  its  afTairs.  If  no  bill  is  filed  by  the  representa- 
tives of  the  deceased  partner,  or  by  the  firm  creditors,  asking 
a  court  of  equity  to  wind  up  the  business,  marshal  its  assets, 
and  apply  them  to  the  firm  debts,  the  surviving  partner  may, 
in  the  absence  of  an  actual  intent  to  defraud,  pay  his  individ- 
ual indebtedness  with  such  assets.-^  If,  in  good  faith,  with 
the  acquiescence  of  the  personal  representatives  of  the  de- 
ceased partner,  he  uses  the  firm  proprty  to  continue  the 
business  on  his  own  account  and  in  his  name,  he  does  it  with- 
out other  liability  than  to  be  held  accountable  to  the  estate 
of  the  deceased  partner  for  a  share  of  the  profits. ^^ 

If  the  surviving  partner  continues  the  business  under  a 
new  firm,  no  lien  attaches  upon  the  property  of  the  new 
firm  in  favor  of  the  creditors  of  the  old  firm,  although  the 
representatives  of  the  deceased  partner  do  not  sanction  the 
continuance  of  the  business.  The  creditors  of  the  new  firm 
have  priority  of  payment  out  of  the  property  of  the  new  firm, 
if  the  equities  are  administered  in  court.     To  prevent  the 

2iWhitworth  v.  Benbow,  56  Ind.  v.  Lewis,  124  Mass.  1,  26  Am.  Rep. 

194.  631. 

22Fitzpatrick    v.    Flannagan,    106  23Fitzpatrick    v.    Flannagan,  106 

U.  S.  648,  27  L.  ed.  211,  1  Sup.  Ct.  U.  S.  648,  27  L.  ed.  211,  1  Sup.  Ct. 

369;     Schmidlapp     v.     Currie,     55  369. 
Miss.  597,  30  Am.  Rep.  530;  Locke 


§  795  LIENS.  824 

attaching  of  such  new  equities,  the  representatives  of  the  de- 
ceased partner  or  the  creditors  of  the  old  firm  must  stop 
the  carrying  on  of  the  business,  and  obtain  a  winding  up  of 
the  old  firm.24 

§  795.     Levy  of  execution  by  creditor  of  member. — If  the 

creditor  of  an  individual  partner  levies  an  execution  upon 
the  partnership  property,  he  acquires  no  interest  thereby 
in  the  property  itself  as  against  the  partnership,  but  only  a 
lien  upon  the  interest  of  the  judgment  debtor  in  the  surplus 
remaining  after  all  partnership  debts  and  liens  should  be 
paid.^^  The  corpus  of  the  partnership  property  can  not  be 
taken  and  held  upon  a  levy  of  such  execution.  And  so  in  a 
sale  by  one  member  of  a  firm,  to  a  person  not  a  member,  of 
his  interest  in  the  firm  property,  the  purchaser  takes  no  part 
of  the  corpus  of  the  firm  property,  but  only  such  interest  as 
remains  after  the  equities  between  the  partners  have  been  ad- 
justed and  the  firm  debts  paid.^®  Even  if  all  the  members  of 
a  firm  severally  convey  to  different  persons  each  his  interest 
in  the  firm  property,  the  purchasers  do  not  take  any  of  the 
corpus  of  the  firm  property,  but  only  the  interest  of  each  part- 
ner after  the  firm  debts  are  paid,  and  the  equities  between  the 
partners  adjusted.^' 

§  796.     Legal  title  of  real  estate  conveyed  to  partners. — 

When  real  property  is  conveyed  to  partners  for  the  benefit 
of  the  firm,  the  legal  title,  which  at  common  law  would  vest 
in  the  grantees  as  joint  tenants,  under  the  statutes  in  this 
country  relative  to  joint  tenancies,  vests  in  them  as  tenants 

24Payne    v.     Hornby,    25    Beav.  100;  Coover's  Appeal,  29  Pa.  St.  9, 

280;  Hoyt  v.  Sprague,  103  U.  S.  613,  70  Am.  Dec.  149. 

26  L.  ed.  585.  26 Saunders  v.  Reilly,  6  N.  Y.  St. 

25Donellan  v.  Hardy,  57  Ind.  393;  452,  25  Cent.  L.  J.  201. 

Conroy  v.   Woods,  13  Cal.  626,  IZ  27AIenagh  v.  Whitwell,  52  N.  Y. 

Am.    Dec.   605;    Chase   v.    Steel,   9  146,   11  Am.   Rep.  683.     See  exam- 

Cal.  64;  Jones  v.   Parsons,  25  Cal.  ination  of  this  case  by  Mr.  Corliss, 

34  Alb.  L.  J.  364. 


825  PARTNERSHIP   LIENS.  §    797 

in  common.  A  purchaser  or  mortgagee  who  obtains  the 
legal  title  to  an  undivided  portion  of  partnership  lands,  with- 
out notice  of  the  equitable  rights  of  other  partners  in  the 
property  as  a  part  of  the  funds  of  the  partnership,  is  entitled 
to  protection  in  courts  of  equity  as  well  as  in  courts  of  law. 
But  as  between  the  partners  themselves,  such  real  estate  is 
to  be  treated  as  the  property  of  the  firm,  and  subject  to  the 
equitable  rights  of  the  partners.  It  is  chargeable  with  the 
debts  of  the  partnership,  and  with  any  balance  that  may  be 
due  from  one  copartner  to  another  upon  the  winding  up  of 
the  affairs  of  the  firm.^^ 

It  is  immaterial  whether  the  title  to  real  property  be 
taken  in  the  name  of  one  partner  or  in  the  names  of  all  the 
partners;  if  the  property  be  purchased  with  partnership  funds 
for  partnership  uses,  it  is  in  equity  treated  as  partnership 
property,  so  far  as  it  is  necessary  for  the  payment  of  the 
debts  of  partnership  and  the  adjustment  of  the  equities  of  the 
partners. ^^ 

§  797.  Effect  of  notice  on  one  dealing  with  individual 
member  of  firm. — But  a  purchaser  or  mortgagee  dealing 
with  an  individual  partner  may  be  affected  with  notice  of 
the  partnership  equities,  so  that  any  title  he  acquires  to  such 
property  will  be  subject  to  such  equities. ^"^  He  has  such 
notice  if  he  is  apprised  of  facts  sufficient  to  put  him  on  in- 
quiry, and  to  lead  him  by  such  inquiry  to  a  discovery  of  the 
truth.  Thus,  if,  while  a  mining  partnership  is  engaged  in 
working  its  mining  grounds,  one  partner  sells  his  interest 
in  the  mine,  the  purchaser  will  be  deemed  to  buy  with  notice 

28Shanks  v.  Klein,  104  U.  S.  18,  29Shanks  v.   Klein,  104  U.  S.  18, 

26  L.  ed.  635;  Dyer  v.  Clark,  5  Met.  26  L.   ed.  635;   Smith  v.  Jones,   18 

(Mass.)     562,    39    Am.     Dec.    697;  Nebr.  481,  25  N.  W.  624. 

Buchan  v.  Sumner,  2  Barb.  Ch.  (N.  soDuryea   v.    Burt,   28   Cal.   569; 

Y.)   165,  47  Am.  Dec.  305;  Duryea  Whitmore  v.  Shiverick,  3  Nev.  288. 
V.    Burt,    28    Cal.    569;    Smith      v. 
Evans,  1>]  Ind.  526. 


§  ygS  LIENS.  826 

of  any  lien  from  the  relation  of  the  partners  to  each  other, 
and  to  the  creditors  of  the  partnership.^^ 

§  798.  Character  of  partnership  property  impressed  upon 
real  estate. — The  character  of  partnership  property  may  be 
impressed  upon  real  estate  which  has  not  been  purchased 
with  partnership  funds,  but  which  has  been  purchased  and 
paid  for  by  individual  members  of  the  partnership;  as  where 
such  property  has  been  purchased  with  a  view  to  the  forma- 
tion of  the  partnership,  and  has  been,  by  agreement  of  the 
partners  or  by  their  acts,  brought  into  the  firm  and  used 
for  its  purposes.^^ 

Land  transferred  to  two  attorneys  at  law  who  are  part- 
ners, to  secure  a  debt  due  to  the  firm  for  professional  services, 
is  partnership  property,  and  can  not  be  subjected  to  the  claims 
of  the  individual  creditors  of  one  of  the  firm  until  the  part- 
nership debts  are  paid.^^  It  was  urged  that  the  land  could 
not  be  used  in  or  appropriated  to  the  firm  business,  and 
hence  could  not  be  treated  as  partnership  property.  The 
authorities  are  conflicting  as  to  what  is  requisite  to  convert 
real  estate  into  personalty  for  the  purpose  of  a  partnership. 
It  is  really  a  question  of  intention  to  be  gathered  from  all 
the  attending  circumstances;  but  unless  a  contrary  intention 
appears,  it  is  presumed  that  partnership  real  estate  is  to  be 
be  treated  as  partnership  assets.  "It  is  unnecessary  to  review 
the  numerous  cases.  To  do  so  we  would  have  to  begin 
with  the  opinions  of  Lord  Thurlow  upon  one  side  and  those 
of  Lord  Eldon  upon  the  other;  and  we  shall  content  our- 
selves with  saying,  that  we  think  the  true  principle,  deducible 
from  all  of  them,  is,  that  if  real  property  has  been  purchased 
with  the  firm  means,  and  is  held  in  the  joint  names  of  the 
partners   as   partnership   property,   then,    in   the   absence  of 

3iDuryea  v.  Burt,  28  Cal.  569.  ^spianagan  v.  Shuck,  82  Ky.  617, 

32Roberts  v.  McCarty,  9  Ind.  16,      6  Ky.  L.  699. 
68  Am.   Dec.  604;  Duryea  v.  Burt, 
28  Cal.  569. 


827  PARTNERSHIP    LIENS.  §    799 

any  agreement  between  them  to  the  contrary,  it  should  be 
regarded  at  law  as  held  and  owned  by  them  as  tenants  in 
common;  but  that  in  equity  it  should  be  treated  as  held  by 
them  in  trust  for  the  firm,  subject  to  the  rules  applicable  to 
partnership  personal  property,  and  liable  to  the  debts  of 
the  firm,  and  the  claims  of  each  partner  upon  the  others;  and 
after  these  claims  are  satisfied,  the  residue  of  it,  if  any  be 
left,  will  belong  both  at  law  and  in  equity  to  the  partners  as 
tenants  in  common,  unless  they  have,  by  an  agreement,  either 
express  or  implied,  impressed  upon  it  the  character  of  per- 
sonal property  for  all  purposes. "^^ 

§  799.  Sale  of  real  estate  by  surviving  partner. — Upon 
the  dissolution  of  a  firm  by  the  death  of  one  partner,  the 
survivor  can  sell  the  partnership  real  estate ;  and,  though 
he  can  not  transfer  the  legal  title  which  passed  to  the  heirs 
or  devisees  of  the  deceased  partner,  the  sale  vests  the  equi- 
table ownership  in  the  purchaser,  who  can  in  a  court  of 
equity  compel  the  holders  of  the  legal  title  to  convey  it  to 
himself.^^  The  surviving  partner  has  something  more  than 
an  equitable  lien,  such  as  belongs  to  the  representatives  of 
the  deceased  partner,  to  require  the  application  of  such  real 
estate  to  the  payment  of  the  debts  of  the  firm  and  the  settle- 
ment of  the  partnership  accounts.  "It  is,"  in  the  language 
of  Mr.  Justice  Miller,^^  an  equitable  right  accompanied  by 
an  equitable  title.  It  is  an  interest  in  th^  property  which 
courts  of  chancery  will  recognize  and  support.  What  is 
that  right?  Not  only  that  the  court  will,  when  necessary, 
see  that  the  real  estate  so  situated  is  appropriated  to  the 

34Flanagan  v.  Shuck,  82  Ky.  617,  Sandf.  Ch.   (N.  Y.)  366;   Dupuy  v. 

6  Ky.  L.  699,  per  Holt,  J.  Leavenworth,     17     Cal.  262;     An- 

35Shanks  v.  Klein,  104  U.  S.   18,  drews'  Heirs  v.  Brown's  Admr.,  21 

22,  26  L.  ed.  635;  Dyer  v.  Clark,  5  Ala.  437,  56  Am.   Dec.  252. 

Mete.    (Mass.)    562,    39    Am.    Dec.  seshanks  v.   Klein,  104  U.  S.  18, 

697;    Delmonico     v.    Guillaume,   2  22,  26  L.  ed.  635. 


§    799  LIENS.  828 

satisfaction  of  the  partnership  debts,  but  that  for  that  pur- 
pose, and  to  that  extent,  it  shall  be  treated  as  personal  prop- 
erty of  the  partnership,  and,  like  other  personal  property  pass 
under  the  control  of  the  surviving  partner.  This  control  ex- 
tends to  the  right  to  sell  it,  or  so  much  of  it  as  may  be  neces- 
sary to  pay  the  partnership  debts,  or  to  satisfy  the  just 
claims  of  the  surviving  partner." 


CHAPTER  XVII. 


SELLER'S  LIEN  FOR  PURCHASE-MONEY. 


Sec.  Sec. 

800.  Lien  of  seller  on  goods  sold.      816. 

801.  Part  payment  will  not  divest 

seller  of  his  lien.  817. 

802.  Lien  amounts  to  a  special  in- 

terest. 818. 

803.  Seller    not    bomid    to    deliver      819. 

on    receiving    notes    of    a 
third  person.  820. 

804.  Seller's     lien    only     for     the 

and  for  charges.  821. 

805.  Exercising  right  of  lien  does 

not  rescind  the  contract.         822. 

806.  Seller's   lien   depends   on   his 

retaining  possession.  823. 

807.  Constructive     delivery     will 

not  divest  seller's  right  to      824. 
a  lien. 

808.  Marking    and    setting    aside      825. 

goods  is  not  a  delivery. 

809.  Qualified    delivery    will    not      826. 

divest   lien. 

810.  Only  actual  delivery  will  di-      827. 

vest  the  seller's  lien. 

811.  No  lien  after  fair  delivery.        828. 

812.  When   ownership   passes    the 

lien    is   not   reserved   by   a 
mere  agreement.  829. 

813.  Sale     contract     divests     lien 

when  possession  is  already 

in  purchaser.  830. 

814.  Condition  of   sale   is   waived 

by  delivery.  831. 

815.  Not  every  delivery  of  goods 

without   insisting  upon  the 
performance    of    such    con-      832. 
dition    is   absolute. 

829 


Retaining  lien  by  special  con- 
tract. 

Lien  by  contract  is  good  only 
between    the    parties. 

No  lien  except  by  mortgage. 

Contract  to  mortgage  is 
equitable   lien. 

Property  will  not  pass  under 
conditional  sale. 

Difficulty  to  determine  what 
is  change  of  possession. 

Where  character  of  property 
is  changed  by  purchaser. 

Delivery  by  warehouse  re- 
ceipt. 

Delivery  order  differs  from 
bill  of  lading. 

Warehouse  receipt  differs 
from  a  delivery  order. 

Wharfinger's  certificate  not  a 
title   document. 

Vendor  estopped  from  set- 
ting up  his  lien. 

Rule  where  warehouseman 
enters  goods  in  purchaser's 
name. 

Seller  not  deprived  of  lien 
by  notice  of  sale  to  ware- 
houseman. 

Possession  by  purchaser  by 
fraud  will  not  divest  lien. 

Vendor  not  bound  by  order 
to  warehouseman  given  by 
vendee. 

Warehouseman's  charge  will 
not  affect  vendor's  lien. 


§  8oo 


LIENS. 


830 


Sec.  Sec. 

833.  Seller   loses    lien   by   holding      845. 

goods    as    bailee    for    pur- 
chaser. 

834.  Delivery    of    part    of    goods      846. 

sold     is     not     delivery     of 
whole. 

835.  Goods   sold  must     be     sepa-      847. 

rated. 

836.  Rule   sometimes   stated. 

837.  Intention   to   separate   goods      848. 

from  other  goods.  849. 

838.  Delivery     of     part     only     of 

goods  sold  w^ill   not  divest 
seller's    lien.  850. 

839.  Lien  of  seller  not  affected  by 

the   puchaser   pledging   the      851. 
goods  to  a  third  person.  852. 

840.  Vendor  may   retain   the  part 

of  the  goods  not  delivered 

for  whole   bill.  853. 

841.  Sale  by  purchaser  out  of  pos- 

session will  not  affect  sell- 
er's lien.  854. 

842.  Estoppel   of   seller   to   assert 

a  lien. 

843.  Estoppel    of    seller   to    assert      855. 

lien — Illustrations. 

844.  Estoppel   of  seller.  856. 


Seller's  estoppel  by  represen- 
tations to  the  sub-purchas- 
er. 

Seller  estopped  by  permitting 
vendee  to  assume  to  be 
owner. 

Seller  retains  lien  in  case  of 
sale  by  vendee  when  he  has 
not  assented  to  the  sale. 

Waiver  of  seller's  lien. 

Seller  waives  lien  by  attach- 
ing the  goods  as  the  prop- 
erty of  the  purchaser. 

Giving  of  credit  by  seller 
generally  waives  his  lien. 

Admissibility  of  evidence. 

Allowing  credit  not  a  waiver 
when  seller  retains  posses- 
sion. 

Taking  note  no  waiver  of 
lien  where  seller  keeps  pos- 
session of  goods. 

Taking  negotiable  note  from 
buyer  no  waiver  of  seller's 
lien. 

Lien  waived  by  delivery  of 
goods  sold  at  auction. 

Parol  evidence  admissible  to 
show  that  goods  were  sold 
on  credit. 


§  800.  Lien  of  seller  on  goods  sold. — A  seller  of  goods  has 
a  lien  upon  them  for  the  price,  so  long  as  they  remain  in  his 
possession  and  the  purchaser  neglects  to  pay  the  price  ac- 
cording to  the  terms  of  sale.^     "A  lien  for  the  price  is  inci- 


iParks  v.  Hall,  2  Pick.  (Mass.) 
206;  Morse  v.  Sherman,  106 
Mass.  430,  per  Colt,  J.;  Ras- 
kins V.  Warren,  115  Mass. 
514,  per  Wells,  J.;  Ware  Riv- 
er R.  Co.  V.  Vibbard,  114  Mass. 
447;  Clark  v.  Draper,  19  N.  H.  419; 
Milliken  v.  Warren,  57  Maine  46; 
White    V.    Welsh,   38   Pa.    St.    396; 


Wanamaker  v.  Yerkes,  70  Pa.  St. 
443;  Barr  v.  Logan,  5  Harr.  (Del.) 
52;  Tuthill  v.  Skidmore,  124  N.  Y. 
148,  26  N.  E.  348;  Carlisle  v.  Kin- 
ney, 66  Barb  (N.  Y.)  363;  Corn- 
wall V.  Haight,  8  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  327, 
revd.  21  N.  Y.  462;  Southwestern 
Freight  &  Cotton  Press  Co.  v. 
Stanard,  44   Mo.  71,   100  Am.   Dec. 


«3i 


SELLERS   LIEN    FOR    PURCHASE-MONEY. 


800 


dent  to  the  contract  of  sale,  when  there   is  no  stipulation 
therein  to  the  contrary;  because  a  man  is  not  required  to 


255, -Bradley  v.  Michael,  1  Ind.  551; 
Owens  V.  Weedman,  82  111.  409; 
Welsh  V.  Bell,  32  Pa.  St.  12;  Bohn 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  Haynes  83  Wis.  388, 
53  N.  W.  684;  Cragin  v.  O'Connell, 
169  N.  Y.  573,  61  N.  E.  1128;  Meyers 
V.  McAllister,  94  Minn.  510,  103  N. 
W.  564. 

In  a  few  states  there  are  stat- 
utes declaring  the  seller's  lien. 
Thus,  in  California,  Idaho,  North 
and  South  Dakota,  and  Oklahoma, 
it  is  provided  that  one  who  sells 
personal  property  has  a  special 
lien  thereon,  dependent  on  posses- 
sion, for  its  price,  if  it  is  in  his 
possession  when  the  price  becomes 
payable,  and  may  enforce  his  lien 
in  like  manner  as  if  the  property 
was  pledged  to  him  for  the  price. 
California:  Civ.  Code  1906,  §3049; 
Idaho:  Rev.  Codes  1908,  §  3444; 
Montana:  Codes  Ann.  (Civ.)  1895, 
§  3933;  North  Dakota:  Rev.  Code 
1905,  §  6284;  Oklahoma:  Comp. 
Laws  1909,  §  4140;  South  Dakota: 
Rev.   Code   (Civ.)    1903,   §2151. 

In  Louisiana,  the  seller  of  mov- 
ables has  a  preference  over  the 
other  creditors  of  the  purchaser, 
whether  the  sale  was  made  on 
credit  or  without,  if  the  property 
still  remains  in  the  possession  of 
the  purchaser.  The  seller  of  agri- 
cultural products  of  the  United 
States  in  New  Orleans  has  a  lien 
for  five  days  only  after  the  day 
of  delivery,  and  may  seize  the  same 
in  whatsoever  hands  or  place  they 
may  be  found.  This  lien  may  be 
waived  by  a  written  order  for 
delivery      without      the      vendor's 


privilege.  Rev.  Civ.  Code  19(X), 
arts.  3227-3231.  See  Gumbel  v.  Beer, 
36  La.  Ann.  484;  Scannell  v.  Beau- 
vais,  38  La.  Ann.  217;  State  Trust 
Co.  V.  De  La  Vergne  Refriger- 
ating Mach.  Co.,  105  Fed.  468,  44 
C.  C.  A.  556;  Monroe  Building  & 
Loan  Asso.  v.  Johnston,  51  La. 
Ann.  470,  25  So.  383;  Payne  v.  Bu- 
ford,  106  La.  83,  30  So.  263. 
Under  this  statute  the  lien  of  a 
vendor  of  cotton,  when  enforced 
in  five  days,  is  superior  to  that  of 
the  holder  for  value  of  a  bill  of 
lading  of  the  cotton.  Harris  v. 
Nicolopulo,  38  La.  Ann.  12;  Allen 
V.  Jones,  24  Fed.  11.  The  pref- 
erence given  a  seller  over  other 
creditors  cannot  be  enforced 
against  a  receiver  in  another  state. 
New  Orleans  Terminal  Co.  v.  Han- 
son 188  Fed.  638,  110  C.  C.  A.  452. 
See  also,  Carroll  v.  Swift,  129  La. 
43,  55  So.  703. 

In  Mississippi,  the  vendor  of 
personal  property  has  a  lien 
thereon  for  the  purchase-money 
while  it  remains  in  his  hands  or 
in  the  hands  of  one  deriving  titl* 
or  possession  through  him  with 
notice  that  the  purchase-money 
was  unpaid.     Code  1906,  §  3079. 

In  New  Jersey,  notwithstanding 
that  the  property  in  the  goods  may 
have  passed  to  the  buyer,  the  un- 
paid seller  has  a  lien  on  the  goods 
and  a  right  to  retain  them.  Comp. 
Stats.  1910,  p.  4659,  §  53. 

Tennessee:  When  merchants, 
factors,  or  cotton-brokers  sell  cot- 
ton, a  special  lien  in  behalf  of  the 
vendors    for    the    purchase-money 


§    80I  LIENS.  832 

part  with  his  goods  until  he  is  paid  for  him."^  In  a  leading 
case  before  the  King's  Bench,  Bayley,  J.,  upon  this  point 
said:^  "Where  goods  are  sold  and  nothing  is  said  as  to  the 
time  of  the  delivery,  or  the  time  of  payment,  and  everything 
the  seller  has  to  do  with  them  is  complete,  the  property  vests 
in  the  buyer,  so  as  to  subject  him  to  the  risk  of  any  accident 
which  may  happen  to  the  goods,  and  the  seller  is  liable  to  de- 
liver them  whenever  they  are  demanded  upon  payment  of 
the  price;  but  the  buyer  has  no  right  to  have  possession 
of  the  goods  till  he  pays  the  price.  *  *  *  jf  ^j-^^  seller 
has  dispatched  the  goods  to  the  buyer,  and  insolvency  oc- 
curs, he  has  a  right  in  virtue  of  his  original  ownership  to 
stop  them  in  transitu.  Why?  Because  the  property  is 
vested  in  the  buyer,  so  as  to  subject  him. to  the  risk  of 
any  accident ;  but  he  has  not  an  indefeasible  right  to  the 
possession,  and  his  insolvency,  without  payment  of  the  price, 
defeats  that  right.  And  if  this  be  the  case  after  he  has  dis- 
patched the  goods,  and  whilst  they  are  in  transitu,  a  fortiori, 
is  it  when  he  has  never  parted  with  the  goods,  and  when  no 
transitus  has  begun.  The  buyer,  or  those  who  stand  in  his 
place,  may  still  obtain  the  right  of  possession  if  they  will  pay 
or  tender  the  price,  or  they  may  still  act  upon  their  right  of 
property  if  anything  unwarrantable  is  done  to  that  right." 

§  801.    Part  pa5nTient  will  not  divest  seller  of  his  lien. — 

Part  payment  of  the  purchase-money,  for  goods  sold  for  cash 
or  on  credit,  does  not  divest  the  seller  of  his  lien  so  long  as 
he  retains  possession.*     But  payment  in  full  for  a  severed 

exists  for  five  days  from  and  after  255;  Milliken  v.  Warren,  57  Maine 

the  day  of  sale  or  delivery  thereof,  46;  Clark  v.  Draper,  19  N.  H.  419. 

unless     the     purchase-money     be  sBloxam  v.   Sanders,  4   B.   &   C. 

sooner  paid.     Code  1896,  §  3557.  941.     To   like   effect,   see   Leonard 

2  Arnold     v.     Delano,     4     Cush  v.   Davis,   1    Black   (U.  S.)   476,   17 

^Mass.)    33,    39,   50   Am.    Dec.    754,  L.    ed.    222;    Burke    v.    Dunn,    117 

per    Shaw,     C.    J.;     Southwestern  Mich.  430,  75  N.  W.  931. 

Freight    &    Cotton    Press    Co.    v.  <Hodgson   v.    Loy,   7   T.   R.   440; 

Stanard,  44   Mo.   71,   100  Am.   Dec.  Craven    v.    Ryder.    6    Taunt.    433; 


833  seller's  lien  for  purchase-money.  §  802 

portion  of  the  goods  divests  the  seller  of  his  lien  in  respect  of 
that  portion  of  the  goods  which  has  been  actually  paid  for. 
The  sale  may  be  apportionable,  although  in  one  sense  the 
contract  is  an  entire  contract.  Thus,  if  a  certain  quantity  of 
steel  rails  be  sold  at  an  entire  price,  to  be  delivered  at  inter- 
vals, and  each  portion  to  be  settled  for  separately,  and  the 
contract  is  carried  out  in  substance  though  not  at  the  exact 
times,  nor  in  the  exact  amounts,  which  had  been  arranged, 
but  payment  is  made  for  a  portion  of  the  goods  substantially 
as  agreed,  the  vendor  can  have  no  lien  on  that  portion  of  the 
goods  which  has  been  fully  paid  for.^ 

§  802.  Lien  amounts  to  a  special  interest. — This  right  has 
sometimes  been  said  to  be  not  a  mere  lien,  but  a  special  in- 
terest in  the  goods  sold  growing  out  of  the  vendor's  original 
ownership.  Thus,  in  a  case  before  the  Court  of  the  King's 
Bench  in  1825,  Bayley,  J.,  said:*"'  "The  buyer's  right  in  re- 
spect of  the  price  is  not  a  mere  lien  which  he  will  forfeit  if 
he  parts  with  the  possession,  but  grows  out  of  his  original 
ownership  and  dominion,  and  payment  or  a  tender  of  the 
price  is  a  condition  precedent  on  the  buyer's  part,  and  until 
he  makes  such  payment  or  tender  he  has  no  right  of  posses- 
sion." And  again,  in  1840,  in  a  case  before  the  Queen's 
Bench,  where  goods  were  sold  and  removed  to  a  warehouse 
used  by  the  purchaser,  but  belonging  to  a  third  person,  the 
course  of  dealing  was  that  the  goods  should  remain  there  till 
paid  for,  and  it  was  held  that,  although  there  was  a  sufficient 
delivery  and  acceptance  to  enable  the  seller  to  maintain  an 
action  for  goods  sold  and  delivered,  "consistently  with  this, 

Bunney  v.  Poyntz,  4  B.  &  Ad.  568;  Phoenix  Bessemer  Steel  Co.  5  Ch. 

Feise  V.  Wray,  3  East,  93;  Welsh  Div.    205. 

V.   Bell,  32  Pa.   St.   12;    Buckley  v.  6Bloxam   v.    Sanders,  4   B.   &  C. 

Furniss,    17    Wend.    (N.    Y.),    504;  941;  Milgate  v.   Kebble,  3  Man.  & 

^V^illiams   v.    Moore,  S   N.   H.  235;  G.    100.     And     see,   Audenried     v. 

Hamburger  v.  Rodman,  9  Daly  (N.  Randall,    3    Cliff.    (U.    S.)    99,    106, 

Y.),  93.  Fed.  Cas.  No.  644,  per  Clifford,  J. 
5  Merchants'      Banking      Co.      v. 

53 


§    802  LIENS.  834 

however,  the  plaintiff  had,  not  what  is  commonly  called  a 
lien,  determinable  on  the  loss  of  possession,  but  a  special 
interest,  sometimes  but  improperly,  called  a  lien,  growing 
out  of  his  original  ownership,  independent  of  the  actual  pos- 
session, and  consistent  with  the  property  being  in  the  de- 
fendant. This  he  retained  in  respect  of  the  term  agreed  on, 
that  the  goods  should  not  be  removed  to  their  ultimate  place 
of  destination  before  payment.  But  this  lien  is  consistent, 
as  we  have  stated,  with  the  possession  having  passed  to  the 
l;uyer,  so  that  there  may  have  been  a  delivery  to  and  actual 
receipt  by  him."" 

This  view  is  confirmed  by  a  recent  decision  in  New  York, 
in  which  the  vendor's  right  to  the  property  in  his  possession, 
wdien  the  price  is  due  and  unpaid  and  the  vendee  is  insolv- 
ent, is  greater  than  a  lien.  Chief  Justice  Follett,  delivering 
the  judgment,  said:^  "In  the  absence  of  an  express  power 
the  lienor  usually  cannot  transfer  the  title  to  the  property 
on  which  the  lien  exists  by  a  sale  of  it  to  one  having  notice 
of  the  extent  of  his  right,  but  he  must  proceed  by  foreclosure. 
When  a  vendor  rightfully  stops  goods  in  transitu,  or  retains 
them  before  transitus  has  begun,  he  can,  by  sale  made,  on 
notice  to  the  vendee,  vest  a  purchaser  with  a  good  title.^ 
His  right  is  very  nearly  that  of  a  pledgee,  with  power  to  sell 
at  private  sale  in  case  of  default.^"  The  vendee  having  be- 
come insolvent  and  refused  payment  of  the  notes  given  for 
the  purchase-price  of  the  property  which  remained  in  the 
vendor's  possession,  his  right  to  retain  it  as  security  for  the 
price  was  revived  as  against  the  vendee  and  his  attaching 
creditor. "^^ 

"Dodsley  v.  Varley,  12  Ad.  &  El.  4  B.  &  C.  951;  Milgate  v.  Kebble, 

632,  634.  3    Man.    &    G.    100;    Audenried    v. 

STuthill  V.   Skidmore,   124  N.   Y.  Randall.   3    Clifif.     (U.     S.)    99,    106 

148,  26  N.   E.  348.  Fed.    Cas.   No.   644;    Blackb.   Sales 

^Citing-  Dustan  v.  McAndrew,  44  (2d  ed.),  445,  454,  459;  Benj.  Sales 

N.  Y.  72.  (Corbin's   ed.),   §  1280. 

loCiting    Bloxam    v.    Sanders.    4  ^Citing    Arnold     v.     Delano,    4 

B.    &    C.   941;    Bloxam   v.    Morley,  Cush.  (Mass.)  33;  Haskell  v.  Rice, 


835 


seller's  lien  for  purchase-money. 


§  804 


§  803.  Seller  not  bound  to  deliver  on  receiving  notes  of  a 
third  person. — Even  where  goods  have  been  sold  to  be  paid 
for  in  the  notes  of  a  third  person,  and  he  becomes  insolvent 
before  the  time  fixed  for  delivery,  the  seller  is  not  bound  to 
deliver  upon  a  tenJer  oi  such  notes,  though  they  be  not  en- 
tirely worthless. ^^ 

§  804.  Seller's  lien  only  for  the  price  and  for  charges. — • 
A  seller's  lien  is  only  for  the  price,  and  for  any  charges  or 
expenses  incurred  in  keeping  the  goods. ^^  In  a  case  before 
the  House  of  Lords,  upon  the  question  whether  a  person  who 
has  a  lien  upon  a  chattel  can  make  a  claim  against  the  owner 


11  Gray  (Mass.)  240;  Milliken  v. 
Warren,  57  Maine  46;  Clark  v. 
Draper,  19  N.  H.  419;  Bloxam  v. 
Sanders,  4  B.  &  C.  941 ;  Bloxam  v. 
Morley,  4  B.  &  C.  951 ;  Hamburger 
V.  Rodman,  9  Daly  (N.  Y.)  93; 
Benj.  Sales  (Bennett's  ed.),  §825; 
2  Benj.  Sales  (Corbin's  ed.), 
§  1227;  Story  Sales  (4th  ed.),  §285; 
Blackb.  Sales   (2d  ed.),  454. 

i2Benedict  v.  Field,  16  N.  Y. 
595;  Roget  v.  Merritt,  2  Caines, 
(N.  Y.)  117;  Southwestern  Freight 
&  Cotton  Press  Co.  v.  Stanard,  44 
Mo.  71,  100  Am.  Dec.  255,  per 
Wagner,  J.  In  Roget  v.  Merritt,  2 
Caines  (N.  Y.),  117,  Judge  Spencer 
said:  "In  this  case  I  hold  that  there 
was  a  valid  contract,  executory  in 
its  nature;  but  before  the  period 
of  its  execution  arrived,  the  con- 
sideration agreed  to  be  given  by 
the  plaintiff  (the  buyer)  whollj'' 
failed,  by  the  insolvency  of  Lyon 
(the  maker  of  the  note  which 
was  to  be  given  in  payment).  The 
ofifer  by  the  plaintiff  to  pay  in  the 
note    of    a    bankrupt,    was    not    an 


offer  of  payment."  In  Benedict  v. 
Field,  16  N.  Y.  595,  the  court,  ap- 
proving the  foregoing  decision  and 
the  language  of  Judge  Spencer, 
said:  "The  agreement  was  execu- 
tory, as  we  have  said,  in  respect  to 
title :  it  certainly  was  in  respect 
to  the  delivery;  and  before  the 
time  for  performance  arrived  the 
essential  consideration  on  which  it 
was  based  had  failed.  It  is  true 
that  the  sale,  looking  only  at  the 
precise  letter  of  the  contract,  was 
not  defeasible  in  the  event  which 
occurred.  But  when  the  parties 
contracted,  the  firm  (whose  note 
was  to  be  received  in  payment) 
was  in  good  credit  and  was  sup- 
posed to  be  solvent.  Their  notes 
were  to  be  accepted  as  payment, 
but  the  ability  of  that  firm  to  give 
good  notes  was  assumed,  and  was 
really  the  consideration  of  the  de- 
fendant's engagement  to  sell  and 
deliver  the  goods."  Per  Com- 
stock,   J. 

13  British    Empire    Shipping   Co. 
V.   Somes,  El.  &  Bl.  353,  367. 


§   805  LIENS.  836 

for  keeping  it,  Lord  Wensleydale  said:^^  "No  authority  can 
be  found  affirming  such  a  proposition,  and  I  am  clearly  of 
opinion  that  no  person  has,  by  law,  a  right  to  add  to  his  lien 
upon  a  chattel  a  charge  for  keeping  it  till  the  debt  is  paid; 
that  is,  in  truth,  a  charge  for  keeping  it  for  his  own  benefit, 
not  for  the  benefit  of  the  person  whose  chattel  is  in  his  pos- 
session." 

§  805.  Exercising  right  of  lien  does  not  rescind  the  con- 
tract.— The  efTect  of  the  seller's  exercising  his  right  of  lien  is 
not  to  rescind  the  contract  of  sale;^^  and  therefore  the  seller 
continues  to  hold  possession  by  virtue  of  his  lien  until  that  is 
foreclosed,  or  the  purchaser  waives  the  contract  of  sale. 

But  if  a  seller  of  merchandise,  in  order  to  maintain  his  lien 
for  its  price,  refuses  to  permit  the  purchaser  to  take  posses- 
sion of  it,  he  may  thereby  prevent  an  acceptance  of  it  by  the 
purchaser  within  the  statute  of  frauds;  and  if  there  be  no 
memorandum  in  writing  of  the  contract,  and  no  part  pay- 
ment to  bind  the  bargain,  the  seller  cannot  maintain  an  ac- 
tion for  the  price  of  the  goods.  If,  in  such  case,  the  goods 
are  destroyed  by  fire,  the  loss  will  fall  upon  the  seller.^'' 

§  806.    Seller's  lien  depends  on  his  retaining  possession. — 

It  is  a  well-settled  rule  that  the  seller's  right  of  lien  depends 
upon  his  possession. ^^  He  can  never  maintain  it  without 
having  the  actual  or  constructive  possession  of  the  goods. 

1-1  Somes  V.  British  Empire  Ship-  562;     Gay   v.    Hardeman,    31    Tex. 

ping  Co.,  8  H.  L.  Cas.  338,  445.  245;  McNail  v.  Ziegler,  68  111.  224; 

15  Martindale  v.   Smith,   1   Q.   B.  Thompson  v.  Wedge,  50  Wis.  642, 

389.  7   N.    W.   560;   Matter   v.   Wathen, 

isSafford    V.     McDonough,,     120  99  Ark.   329,    138   S.   W.  455.     The 

Mass.  290.  seller  has  no  right  to  a  lien  after 

17  Parks  V.  Hall,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  he  has  delivered  the  goods.    A.  F. 

206;   Pickett  v.   Bullock,  52  N.   H.  Englehardt  Co.  v.  Kaufman,  5  App. 

354;  Welsh  v.  Bell,  32  Pa.  St.  12;  Div.   (N.   Y.)   475,  39  N.   Y.  S.  31; 

Bowen    v.    Burk,    13    Pa.    St.    146;  Slack   v.   Collins,    145   Ind.   569,   42 

Boyd  V.  Mosely,  2  Swan.   (Tenn.)  N.   E.  910;   Meyers  v.   McAllister, 

661;    Obermier    v.    Core,    25    Ark.  94  Minn.  510,  103  N.  W.  564. 


837  seller's  lien  for  purchase-money.  §  807 

He  can  never  maintain  it  after  the  goods  have  come  into  the 
possession  of  the  purchaser.  It  is  generally  immaterial 
whether  the  delivery  be  actual  or  constructive.  It  is  true 
that  it  has  sometimes  been  doubted  whether  a  constructive 
deliver}^  is  sufficient  to  take  away  the  seller's  right  of  lien; 
and  while  it  would  perhaps  be  going  too  far  to  say  that  in 
every  possible  case  a  constructive  delivery  would  have  this 
operation,  the  general  rule  is  that  such  a  delivery,  as  well  as 
an  actual  delivery,  defeats  the  lien.^^  Thus,  if  the  goods  be 
stored  in  the  seller's  warehouse,  his  delivery  of  the  key  of 
the  warehouse  to  the  purchaser,  with  the  view  of  giving  him 
possession,  amounts  to  a  constructive  delivery  of  the  goods, 
and  defeats  the  seller's  lien.^^ 

Upon  a  sale  of  lumber  to  be  delivered  by  the  seller  at  a 
railroad  station,  and  to  be  paid  for  by  the  buyer  as  shipped 
by  him  from  the  station,  there  is  a  complete  delivery,  which 
will  defeat  the  seller's  lien,  when  he  has  delivered  the  lumber 
to  the  buyer  at  the  station,  and  the  latter  has  with  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  seller  measured  and  piled  it,  marked  it  with  his 
initials,  and  left  it  in  charge  of  the  station  master  with  direc- 
tions to  ship  it.  The  lien  having  been  lost,  it  cannot  be  re- 
established in  such  case  by  proof  that  the  vendee,  upon  being 
requested  to  pay  for  the  lumber  lying  at  the  station,  said  to 
the  vendor,  "You  are  right  any  way,  you  have  the  lumber 
there  at  Bronte  Station."-^ 

§  807.  Constructive  delivery  will  not  divest  seller's  right 
to  a  lien. — There  may  be  a  constructive  delivery  of  the  goods 
sold  which  will  pass  the  title,  but  which  will  not  destroy  the 
seller's  lien.^^     If  the  goods  be  sold  and  counted  out  and  set 

IS  Parks  V.  Hall,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  21  Lickbarrow  v.  Mason,  5  T.  R; 

206.  per  Wilde,  J.  367,  1  Smith's  Lead.  Cas.  (8th  Eng. 

19  Ellis  V.  Hunt,  3  T.  R.  464,  468,  ed.)    789;   Owens   v.   Weedman,  82 
per   Lord  Kenyon.  111.  409;   Sigerson  v.   Kahmann,   39 

20  Mason  v.  Hatton,  41  U.  C.  Q.  Mo.  206;  Southwestern  Freight  & 
B.  610,  612.  Cotton    Press    Co.    v.    Stanard,   44 


8o7 


LIENS. 


838 


apart  for  the  purchaser,  there  is  such  a  constructive  delivery 
that  the  title  v^ill  vest  in  the  purchaser  and  the  property  w^ill 
be  at  his  risk,  and  yet  the  seller  has  the  indisputable  right  to 
refuse  to  deliver  without  payment.^^  Thus,  two  persons 
agreed  with  the  managers  of  a  lottery  to  take  a  large  number 
of  tickets,  and  to  give  approved  security  on  the  delivery  of 
the  tickets.  Part  of  the  tickets  were  delivered  and  paid  for, 
and  the  remainder  were  selected,  and  the  package  marked  by 
the  managers  with  the  name  of  the  purchasers.  The  drawing 
of  the  lottery  thereupon  began,  and  on  the  second  day  one  of 
the  tickets  in  this  package  drew  a  large  prize,  and  the  man- 
agers, upon  a  subsequent  tender  of  the  price  of  this  package 
of  tickets,  refused  to  deliver  them.  It  was  held  that  the 
property  in  the  tickets,  subject  to  a  lien  for  the  purchase- 
money,  had  passed  to  the  purchasers.^^ 


Mo.  71,  100  Am.  Dec.  255;  Wheless 
V.  Meyer  &  Schmid  Grocery  Co., 
140  Mo.  App.  572,  120  S.  W.  708. 

22  Southwestern  Freight  &  Cot- 
ton Press  Co.  v.  Plant,  45  Mo.  517; 
Owens  V.  Weedman,  82  111.  409. 

23  Thompson  v.  Gray.  1  Wheat. 
(U.  S.)  75,  83,  4  L.  ed.  40.  Chief 
Justice  Marshall  said  the  pur- 
chasers were  absolutely  bound  to 
take  the  designated  tickets.  "A 
refusal  to  do  so,  would  have  been 
a  breach  of  contract,  for  which 
they  would  have  been  responsible 
in  damages.  When  the  parties 
proceed  one  step  further;  when 
the  vendee,  in  execution  of  this 
contract,  selects  the  number  of 
tickets  he  has  agreed  to  purchase, 
and  the  vendor  assents  to  that  se- 
lection; when  they  are  separated 
from  the  mass  of  tickets,  and 
those  not  actually  delivered,  are 
set  apart  and  marked  as  the  prop- 
erty of  the  vendee ;  what,  then,  is 


the  state  of  the  contract?  It  cer- 
tainly stands  as  if  the  selection 
had  been  previously  made  and  in- 
serted in  the  contract  itself.  An 
article  purchased,  in  general  terms, 
from  many  of  the  same  descrip- 
tion, if  afterwards  selected  and  set 
apart  with  the  assent  of  the  par- 
ties, as  the  thing  purchased,  is  as 
completely  identified,  and  as  com- 
pletely sold,  as  if  it  had  been  se- 
lected previous  to  the  sale,  and 
specified  in  the  contract.  *  *  *  The 
stipulation  respecting  security 
could  not,  in  such  a  case,  be  con- 
sidered as  a  condition  precedent, 
on  the  performance  of  which 
the  sale  depended.  Certain- 
ly the  managers  could  have  re- 
quired, and  have  insisted  on  this 
security;  but  they  might  waive  it, 
without  dissolving  the  contract." 
And  see  United  States  v.  Lutz,  2 
Blatch.  (U.  S.)  383,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
15644. 


839 


SELLER  S   LIEN    FOR    PURCHASE-MONEY. 


809 


§  808.  Marking  and  setting  aside  goods  is  not  a  delivery. — 
Marking  and  setting  aside  the  goods  sold  do  not  amount  to 
a  delivery  sufficient  to  divest  the  vendor  of  his  lien,^^  though 
they  may  be  sufficient  to  pass  the  title  to  the  vendee.  "There 
is  manifestly  a  marked  distinction  between  those  acts,  which, 
as  between  vendor  and  vendee,  upon  a  contract  of  sale,  go 
to  make  a  constructive  delivery  and  to  vest  the  property  in 
the  vendee,  and  that  actual  delivery  by  the  vendor  to  the 
vendee  which  puts  an  end  to  the  right  of  the  vendor  to  hold 
goods  as  security  for  the  price. "^^  Marking,  measuring, 
weighing,  and  setting  aside  goods  which  are  the  subject  of 
sale,  serve  only  to  identify  the  goods;  for  if  they  are  capable 
of  being  identified  without  these  acts,  the  title  passes  by  the 
contract  of  sale.  Thus,  if  the  whole  of  a  quantity  of  iron 
lying  in  a  pile  be  sold  and  pointed  out  to  the  purchaser,  there 
is  no  need  of  any  further  act  of  delivery  to  pass  the  property. 
But  so  long  as  the  iron  remains  upon  the  premises  of  the 
vendor,  and  thus  in  his  possession,  he  has  the  right  to  detain 
it  until  the  price  is  paid.^^ 

§  809.  Qualified  delivery  will  not  divest  lien. — There  may 
even  be  a  qualified  delivery  of  goods  to  the  buyer,  which  will 


24  Dixon  V.  Yates,  5  B.  &  Ad. 
313;  Goodall  v.  Skelton,  2  H.  Bl. 
316;  Proctor  v.  Jones,  2  Car.  &  P. 
532,  per  Blest,  C.  J.  Where  a  dis- 
tiller under  contract  with  a  dealer 
manufactured  whiskey  for  the 
dealer,  and  brands  the  barrels  with 
the  dealer's  name  and  placed  them 
in  a  warehouse  for  the  dealer  who 
gave  his  notes  for  the  purchase- 
price,  the  distiller  was  to  charge 
storage  and  care  for  the  property. 
It  was  held  that  the  possession 
was  jointly  in  the  distiller  and  the 
storekeeper,  and  not  in  the  dealer 
and  that  the  distiller  had  a  right 
to    a    lien    on    the    whiskey    when 


the  dealer  became  solvent.  Vogel- 
sang V.  Fisher,  128  Mo.  386,  31  S. 
W.  13.  See  also,  Wheless  v.  Mey- 
er &  Schmid  Grocer  Co..  140 
Mo.  App.  572,   120  S.  W.  708. 

25  Arnold  v.  Delano,  4  Cush. 
(Mass.)   33,  38,  50  Am.  Dec.  754. 

26  Thompson  v.  Baltimore  & 
Ohio  R.  Co.,  28  Md.  396,  407,  per 
Miller,  J.  "So  long  as  the  vendor 
does  not  surrender  actual  posses- 
sion, his  lien  remains,  although  he 
may  have  performed  acts  which 
amount  to  a  constructive  delivery, 
so  as  to  pass  the  title  or  avoid 
the  statute.  In  all  cases  of  sym- 
bolical delivery,  which  is  the  only 


§    8lO  LIENS.  840 

not  destroy  the  seller's  lien  for  the  price.  Thus,  if  it  be  shown 
that  by  the  intention  of  the  parties  the  delivery  was  for  the 
purpose  of  allowing  the  buyer  an  opportunity  to  examine  the 
goods,  and  not  for  the  purpose  of  giving  absolute  possession 
to  the  buyer,  the  lien  is  not  lost;  and  a  usage  of  trade  in  con- 
formity with  such  intention  may  be  shown.^''^  But  if  it  ap- 
pear that  the  goods  were  delivered  for  the  purpose  of  com- 
pleting the  sale,  evidence  of  a  usage  that  the  sale  is  not 
completed  is  inadmissible,  and  a  usage  that  no  title  passes 
upon  an  ordinary  sale  and  delivery  without  payment  is  un- 
reasonable and  invalid.^^ 

A  delivery  of  goods  to  the  buyer  to  hold  as  bailee  of  the 
vendor  does  not  divest  the  latter  of  his  lien.  But  if  the 
buyer,  after  the  completion  of  the  contract  of  sale,  delivers 
the  property  to  the  seller  to  hold  as  his  bailee,  the  latter  can- 
not by  virtue  of  such  possession  have  a  lien  for  the  price,^^ 
unless  the  express  terms  of  the  sale  be  for  ready  money,  or 
such  as  to  imply  that  the  property  is  not  to  be  taken  away 
until  it  is  paid  for.^^ 

§  810.    Only  actual  delivery  will  divest  the  seller's  lien. — 

A  seller  has  the  right  to  insist  upon  his  lien  for  the  price  un- 
til he  has  made  actual  and  absolute  delivery  to  the  buyer. 
In  all  cases  of  inchoate  delivery,  until  the  delivery  is  com- 
plete, he  may  suspend  it  and  insist  upon  his  lien.  Thus,  if 
the  seller  has  given  to  the  buyer  an  order  on  a  warehouse- 
man for  the  goods,  and,  before  the  buyer  has  presented  the 

species    of    constructive    delivery  sufficient  to  annul  the  lien  of  the 

sufficient  to  give  a  final  possession  vendor." 

to   the  vendee,   it   is  only  because  -~  Haskins  v.  Warren,  115  Mass. 

of   the   manifest    intention    of   the  514. 

vendor     utterly     to     abandon     all  28  Haskins  v.  Warren,  115  Mass. 

claim     and     right     of     possession,  514. 

taken  in  connection  with  the  diffi-  29  Marvin  v.  Wallis,  6  El.  &  Bl. 

culty    or    impossibility   of   making  726. 

an  actual  and  manual  transfer,  that  so  Tempest  v.  Fitzgerald,  3  B.  & 

such   a   delivery   is   considered   as  Aid.   680. 


841 


SELLER  S   LIEN    FOR    PURCHASE-MONEY. 


8ll 


order  to  the  warehouseman  and  taken  the  goods,  and  had 
them  transferred  by  the  warehouseman  to  the  buyer,  or  to 
some  other  person,  and  the  buyer  becomes  insolvent,  the 
seller  may  reclaim  the  goods  under  his  lien;  and  he  may  do 
this  although  the  buyer  has  indorsed  and  delivered  the  order 
for  value  to  another  who  did  not  know  that  the  buyer  had  not 
paid  for  the  goods. ^^ 

§  811.  No  lien  after  fair  delivery. — But  a  seller  of  personal 
property  has  no  lien  upon  it  after  a  fair  and  absolute  delivery 
of  it  to  the  purchaser.^^  The  rule  in  relation  to  real  estate, 
that  a  vendor  has  a  lien  for  the  purchase-money  although  he 
has  conveyed  the  land  to  the  purchaser  absolutely  and  has 
delivered  possession  to  him,  has  no  application  to  personal 
property.  Even  as  regards  the  rule  as  to  real  property,  it  is 
one  that  does  not  exist  at  common  law;  but  it  is  a  doctrine 
of  equity,  and  was  transplanted  into  equity  from  the  civil 
law.^^ 

There  is  no  lien  for  the  purchase-money  after  the  goods 
are  delivered,  although  the  purchaser  was  insolvent  at  the 


31  Keeler  v.  Goodwin,  111  Mass. 
490;  Vogelsang  v.  Fisher,  128 
Mo.  386,  31  S.  W.  13.  A  sym- 
bolical delivery  will  not  destroy 
the  seller's  right  to  a  lien.  Whe- 
less  V.  Meyer  &  Schmid  Grocer 
Co.,  140  Mo.  App.  572,  120  S.  W. 
708. 

32  Lupin  V.  Marie,  6  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  n,  21  Am.  Dec.  256;  Freeman 
V.  Nichols,  116  Mass.  309;  Black- 
shear  V.  Burke,  74  Ala.  239;  Beam 
V.  Blanton,  3  Ired.  Eq.  (N.  Car.) 
59;  James  v.  Bird's  Admr.,  8  Leigh 
(Va.)  510,  31  Am.  Dec.  668; 
Thompson  v.  Wedge,  50  Wis.  642, 
7  N.  W.  560;  Obermier  v.  Core, 
25  Ark.  562;  Gay  v.  Hardeman,  31 
Tex.  245;  Baker  v.  Dewey,  15 
Grant  Ch.  (U.  C.)  668.  One  who  has 


parted  with  the  possession  of  his 
property  not  through  any  fraud, 
accident  or  mistake  or  bad  faith 
can  not  assert  a  lien  on  such  prop- 
erty or  on  the  proceeds  of  its 
sale.  Haggard  v.  Scott,  142  Iowa 
682,  121  N.  W.  375.  The  loss  of 
possession  terminates  the  right  to 
a  lien.  Norfolk  Hardwood  Co.  v. 
New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
202  Mass.   160,  88  N.  E.  664. 

33  By  the  Roman  law  the  vendor 
of  personal  property  could  resort 
to  the  property  in  the  hands  of 
the  purchaser  for  the  payment  of 
the  price.  The  sale,  though  posi- 
tive in  terms,  was  regarded  as 
made  upon  the  condition  that  the 
price  be  paid. 


§    8l2  LIENS.  842 

time,  and  he  knew  that  he  was  unable  to  pay  for  them.  The 
seller  may  have  a  right  in  equity  for  that  reason  to  rescind 
the  sale ;  but  he  has  no  right  of  lien  which  he  can  enforce  for 
this  reason.'^"* 

In  Louisiana,  however,  the  vendor's  privilege  on  movables 
continues  so  long  as  the  vendee's  possession  continues,  but 
is  lost  by  a  sale  and  delivery  of  them  by  the  vendee  to  a  third 
person.  But  a  sale  without  delivery  does  not  defeat  the  ven- 
dor's lien;  and  a  delivery,  in  order  to  defeat  it,  must  be  actual 
and  undoubted,  and  the  change  of  possession  must  be  con- 
tinued.^^ 

A  vendor  is,  however,  estopped  by  taking  security  for  the 
purchase-money  from  claiming  his  lien,  especially  as  against 
a  subsequent  bona  fide  purchaser  or  pledgee.^^ 

§  812.  When  ownership  passes  the  lien  is  not  reserved 
by  a  mere  agreement. — Whenever  the  ownership  of  property 
is  transferred,  as  shown  from  the  whole  transaction,  and  the 
seller  only  reserves  a  security  for  the  price,  it  matters  not 
what  designation  the  parties  may  give  to  the  transaction,  the 
contract  is  ineffectual  to  create  a  valid  lien  in  favor  of  the 
seller,  unless  it  be  a  chattel  mortgage,  and  the  formalities  re- 
quired to  make  such  a  mortgage  valid  are  observed.  Thus, 
where  printing  materials  were  delivered  by  the  owner  to  an- 
other under  a  contract  whereby  the  latter  in  terms  borrowed 
the  property,  but  it  was  to  become  his  on  payment  of  the 
price,  and  he  promised  absolutely  to  pay  the  price,  and  it  was 
provided  that,  if  the  borrower  failed  to  pay  the  price,  the 

34  Johnson  v.  Farnum,  56  Ga.  Assn.  v.  Johnston,  51  La.  Ann.  470, 
144;  Echols  v.  Head,  68  Ga.  152.'  25  So.  383;  New  Orleans  Terminal 

35  Rev.  Civ.  Code  1900,  §3227;  Co.  v.  Hanson,  188  Fed.  638,  110 
Flint  V.  Rawlings,  20  La.  Ann.  C.  C.  A.  452;  State  Trust  Co.  v. 
557;  Musson  v.  Elliott,  30  La.  De  La  Vergne  Refrigerating 
Ann.  47;  Fetter  v.  Field,  1  La.  Mach.  Co.,  105  Fed.  468.  44  C.  C. 
Ann.  80;   Elkin  v.    Harvey,  20   La.  A.  556.     See  ante,   §800. 

Ann.  545;  Carroll  v.  Swift,  129  La.  3G  Musson  v.  Elliott,  30  La.  Ann. 

4:.,   55   So.   7003;    Monroe    B.    &    L.      147. 


843  seller's  lien  for  purchase-money.  §  813 

lender  might  take  them  and  dispose  of  them,  rendering  to 
the  borrower  all  surplus,  if  any,  after  paying  the  price  agreed 
upon,  it  was  held  that  the  ownership  of  the  property  was 
transferred,  and  that  the  contract  was  invalid  as  against  a 
mortgagee  of  the  purchaser. ^'^  "Where  it  is  clear  from  the 
whole  transaction,"  says  the  court,  "that  for  all  practical  pur- 
poses the  ownership  of  property  was  intended  to  be  trans- 
ferred, and  that  the  seller  only  intended  to  reserve  a  security 
for  the  price,  any  characterization  of  the  transaction  by  the 
parties,  or  any  mere  denial  of  its  legal  effect,  will  not  be  re- 
garded. The  question,  it  is  true,  is  one  of  intention;  but  the 
intention  must  be  collected  from  the  whole  transaction,  and 
not  from  any  particular  feature  of  it.  In  the  present  case  it 
seems  to  us  that  the  intention  must  be  taken  to  have  been 
to  transfer  the  ownership  of  the  property,  reserving  a  secur- 
ity for  the  price,  and  nothing  more.  The  possession  was  de- 
livered.   The  promise  to  pay  was  absolute." 

§  813.  Sale  contract  divests  lien  when  possession  is  already 
in  purchaser. — Upon  a  sale  of  goods  already  in  the  possession 
of  the  purchaser  as  agent  of  the  seller,  no  delivery  is  neces- 
sary, beyond  the  completion  of  the  contract  of  sale,  to  de- 
stroy the  seller's  lien.^^ 

If  goods  stored  in  a  warehouse  in  the  name  of  the  owner's 
broker  be  sold  by  the  owner  to  such  broker,  the  seller's  lien 
for  the  purchase-money  is  lost  without  any  further  delivery 
of  the  goods.^'^  But  if  in  such  case  the  owner  does  not  sell 
the  goods  to  such  broker  in  whose  name  the  goods  are 
stored,  but  to  a  third  person  who  gives  notice  lof  his  pur- 
chase to  the  broker,  but  not  to  the  warehouseman,  the  pos- 

37  Palmer    v.     Howard,    72    Cal.      Martin   v.   Adams,    104   Mass.   262; 
293,   13  Pac.  858,  1  Am.  St.  60.  Linton   v.    Butz,    7    Pa.    St.   89.    47 

38  Edan  v.  Dudfield,  1'  Q.  B.  302;      Am.    Dec.    501. 

In      re       Batchelder,      2      Lowell  39  In    re     Batchelder.    2    Lowell 

245,     Fed.     Cas.     No.     1099;     War-      245,   Fed.   Cas.   1099. 
den    V.    Marshall,    99    Mass.    305; 


§    8l4  LIENS.  844 

session  is  not  changed,  and  the  lien  of  the  seller  will  revive 
on  the  insolvency  of  the  purchaser 


40 


§  814.  Condition  of  sale  is  waived  by  delivery. — A  condi- 
tion of  sale,  that  notes  or  bills  shall  be  given  for  the  price  of 
the  goods,  is  waived  by  an  absolute  delivery  without  demand- 
ing the  notes. ^^  Such  delivery,  when  not  procured  by  fraud, 
vests  the  absolute  property  in  the  purchaser.  The  rule  does 
not  differ  from  that  which  applies  where  goods  are  sold  to 
be  paid  for  in  cash,  and  delivery  is  made  without  demanding 
the  mone}^;  the  title  vests  in  the  purchaser.  But  a  delivery 
of  part  of  the  goods  is  no  waiver  of  the  condition  as  regards 
the  part  not  delivered.  Because  the  seller  has  dispensed  with 
the  condition  of  being  paid  in  the  manner  provided  in  deliv- 
ering part  of  the  goods,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  property  in 
the  whole  of  the  goods  vested  in  the  purchaser,  so  that  the 
seller  is  bound  to  deliver  the  remainder.  The  waiver  is  only 
pro  tanto,  and  the  seller  is  entitled  at  any  time  to  stand  on 
his  rights  as  established  by  the  contract. ^^ 

§  815.  Not  every  delivery  of  goods  without  insisting  upon 
the  performance  of  such  condition  is  absolute. — Undoubtedly 
a  delivery  without  any  demand  of  performance  of  the  condi- 
tion is  presumtive  evidence  of  a  waiver  of  the  condition  of 
present  payment,  and  of  a  lien  upon  the  property.  This  pre- 
sumption may,  however,  be  rebutted  by  the  acts  and  declara- 
tions of  the  parties,  or  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  The 
intention  of  the  parties  in  this  respect  is  a  question  of  fact  for 
the  jury.  If  the  jury  find  that  the  delivery  was  not  absolute, 
but  that  the  condition  of  payment  in  money  or  by  note  at- 

40  In    re    Batchelder,    2    Lowell  Am.    Dec.   368;    Freeman   v.   Nich- 
245,    Fed.    Cas.    No.    1099.  ols,   116   Mass.  309.     And  see   Mc- 

41  Lupin  V.   Marie,  6  Wend.   (N.  Craw  v.   Gilmer,  83  N.   Car.   162. 
Y.)  n,  21  Am.  Dec.  256;  Furniss  v.         42  Payne    v.    Shadbolt,    1    Camp. 
Hone,  8  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  247;  Smith  427. 

V.   Dennie,  6  Pick.   (Mass.)  262,  17 


845  seller's  lien  for  purchase-money.  §  817 

taclied  to  it,  the  seller  may  reclaim  the  goods  upon  the  ven- 
dee's refusal  to  comply  with  the  condition. ^^ 

§  816.  Retaining  lien  by  special  contract. — The  seller  may 
by  special  contract  retain  a  lien  upon  goods  sold,  which,  as 
between  the  parties,  will  not  be  dependent  upon  his  con- 
tinued possession.  When  the  common  law  itself  raises  a  lien, 
its  continuance  depends  upon  the  vendor's  possession.  But 
the  lien  may  be  created  and  continued  by  contract  irrespec- 
tive of  possession.  The  contract  may  stipulate  the  mode  in 
which  the  lien  may  be  retained;  and  if  it  provides  that  the 
vendor  shall  retain  a  lien  upon  the  property  in  the  hands  of 
the  vendee  until  the  purchase-money  shall  be  paid,  there  is 
no  rule  of  law  to  defeat  the  stipulation.^* 

§  817.  Lien  by  contract  is  good  only  between  the  parties. — 

But  a  lien  by  contract  is  in  general  good  only  between  the 
parties  themselves,  after  delivery  of  the  goods,  and  is  inef- 
fectual as  against  those  who  had  acquired  any  interest  under 
the  vendor.  Such  a  lien  would  usually  be  regarded  as  a 
mortgage. ^^  Thus,  where  it  was  agreed  between  the  vendor 
and  vendee  of  a  large  number  of  cattle  that  the  former  should 
retain  a  lien  upon  them  until  the  purchase-money  should  be 
paid,  and  that  for  the  purpose  of  preserving  the  lien  an  agent 
of  the  vendor  should  accompany  the  cattle,  and  accordingly 
an  agent  did  accompany  them,  and,  the  purchase-money  not 
being  paid  at  maturity,  took  forcible  possession  of  the  cattle, 
it  was  held  that  the  lien,  which  depended  upon  a  contract  and 
not  upon  possession,  might  be  enforced  as  between  the  par- 

43  0sborn  v.  Gantz,  60  N.  Y.  28;  Cory  v.  Barnes,  63  Vt.  456,  21 
540;  Smith  v.  Lynes,  5  N.  Y.  41.  Atl.  384;  Gregory  v.  Morris,  96  U. 
And  see  Hammett  v.  Linneman,  S.  619,  24  L.  ed.  740;  Woodland 
48  N.  Y.  399;  Leven  v.  Smith,  I  Co.  v.  Mendenhall,  82  Minn.  483, 
Denio  (N.  Y.)  571;  Marston  v.  85  N.  W.  164,  83  Am.  St.  445; 
Baldwin,  17  Mass.  606;  Lamb  v.  Fletcher  v.  Lazier,  58  Minn.  326, 
Utley,  146  Mich.  654,  110  N.  W.  50.  59   N.   W.   1040. 

44  Sawyer    v.    Fisher,    32    Maine  45  Dunning    v.    Stearns,    9    Barb. 

(N.  Y.)  630. 


§  8i8 


LIENS. 


846 


ties,  no  rights  of  third  parties  having  intervened,  according 
to  the  terms  of  the  contract.  But  the  court  spoke  of  the 
charge  upon  the  property  as  being  in  the  nature  of  a  mort- 
gage.'^ 

If  standing  timber  be  sold,  the  seller  reserving  a  lien  upon 
"said  timber  and  saw-logs  cut  therefrom"  until  the  conditions 
of  sale  shall  be  performed,  and  the  buyer  cuts  the  logs,  re- 
moves them  from  the  seller's  land,  and  sells  them  to  an  in- 
nocent purchaser,  who  has  no  knowledge  of  the  lien  re- 
served, the  lien  cannot  be  enforced  against  such  purchaser.'^ 

Where  the  instrument  evidencing  the  title  shows  upon  its 
face  that  the  transfer  is  made  subject  to  a  lien  for  the  pur- 
chase-money, the  purchaser  or  assignee  takes  the  property 
subject  to  such  lien.'^ 

§  818.  No  lien  except  by  mortgage. — No  lien  or  charge 
upon  goods  valid  as  against  purchasers  and  creditors  can  be 
created  in  favor  of  a  seller  not  in  possession,  except  by  mort- 


is Gregory  v.  Morris,  96  U.  S. 
619,  24  L.  ed.  740.  The  vendor's 
lien  can  not  be  enforced  as  against 
one  who  buys  the  property  for 
value  prior  thereto.  McComb  v. 
Judsonia  State  Bank,  91  Ark.  218, 
120  S.   W.  844. 

.    47  Bunn   V.    Valley    Lumber    Co., 
51  Wis.  376,  8  N.  W.  232. 

48  In  Kentucky  a  statute  act  of 
March  6,  1869,  requires  a  ware- 
house receipt  to  show  that  the 
purchase-money  is  unpaid,  in  or- 
der that  the  warehouseman  may 
assert  a  lien  therefor  as  against 
the  holder  of  the  receipt.  A  re- 
ceipt issued  from  a  bonded  ware- 
house recited  that  the  whiskey  for 
which  it  was  given  was  held  for 
account,  and  subject  to  the  order, 


of  a  person  named,  deliverable  on 
the  return  of  the  receipt  properly 
indorsed,  and  on  payment  of  gov- 
ernment tax  and  storage,  and 
upon  "the  payment  of  all  moneys 
due  hereon."  The  whiskey  de- 
scribed therein  was  of  the  identi- 
cal brand  which  the  warehouse- 
man was  described  as  the  owner 
and  controller  of  at  the  top  of 
the  receipt.  It  was  held  that  the 
receipt  sufficiently  showed  that 
the  moneys  referred  to  were  pur- 
chase-moneys, and  was  a  suffi- 
cient compliance  with  the  statute. 
Pike  V.  Greenbaum,  12  Ky.  L.  423, 
14  S.  W.  500;  Western  Bank  v. 
Marion  County  Distilling  Co.,  89 
Ky.  91,  9  Ky.  L.  500,  5  S.  W.  458. 


847  seller's  lien  for  purchase-money.  §  819 

gage.'*''  When  the  seller  delivers  the  goods,  the  right  of 
property  becomes  absolute  in  the  buyer,  and  the  seller  can 
have  no  claim  upon  them  except  by  force  of  an  instrument 
wdiich  can  operate  as  a  mortgage,  and  be  made  effectual  by 
recording  it  as  such.^^ 

If  a  lien  be  expressly  reserved  in  the  contract  of  sale,  while 
it  may  continue  to  exist  as  against  the  vendee  after  a  deliv- 
ery of  the  property  to  him,^^  it  does  not  exist  as  against  one 
who  has  purchased  from  him  for  value  and  without  notice 
after  such  delivery,  unless  the  lien  be  in  the  form  of  a  chat- 
tel mortgage,  and  this  be  duly  recorded.^^ 

§  819.  Contract  to  mortgage  is  equitable  lien. — An  agree- 
ment that  the  purchaser  of  chattels  shall  give  a  mortgage 
upon  them  for  the  purchase-money  constitutes  an  equitable 
lien  as  between  the  parties,  which  is  not  defeated  by  the 
omission  of  the  seller  to  demand  the  mortgage  at  the  time  of 
the  delivery  of  the  property,  or  to  make  the  delivery  condi- 
tional upon  the  execution  of  the  mortgage ;  but  the  agree- 
ment creating  the  equitable  lien  is  one  which  can  be  specifi- 
cally enforced  in  equity  as  against  the  purchaser  and  all  per- 
sons claiming  under  him,  except  bona  fide  purchasers  having 
no  notice  of  the  lien.^^  If,  in  pursuance  of  such  agreement, 
a  mortgage  be  executed  which  is  not  in  itself  sufficient  to 
create  a  legal  lien,  as,  for  instance,  if  the  purchasers  be  a 
mercantile  firm,  and  the  mortgage  be  executed  by  one  mem- 
ber of  the  firm  in  his  own  name,  yet  if  it  appears,  from  the 
recitals  in  the  mortgage  or  otherwise,  that  this  was  given 
with  the  intention  of  performing  the  agreement,  the  equi- 
table lien  will  not  be  lost,  but  will  be  protected  in  equity. 
If  a  receiver  of  the  partnership  property  be  afterwards  ap- 
pointed for  the  purpose  of  winding  up  its  affairs,  the  seller 

49  Obermier  v.  Core,  25  Ark.  562.  Bradeen  v.    Brooks,  22  Maine  463. 

50  Gay  V.  Hardeman,  31  Tex.  52  Barnett  v.  Mason,  7  Ark.  253. 
245.  53  Husted  v.  Ingraham,  75  N.  Y. 

51  Barnett  v.  Mason,  7  Ark.  253;  251. 


§    820 


LIENS, 


848 


may  apply  to  the  court  to  restrain  a  sale  of  the  property  by 
him;  or  may  apply  to  have  the  property  made  expressly  sub- 
ject to  the  lien;  or  may  apply  to  have  the  proceeds  of  any 
sale  of  it  made  by  the  receiver  first  applied  to  the  payment  of 
the  lien.  But  no  relief  could  be  obtained  in  such  case  by  a 
suit  at  law.^^ 


§  820.  Property  will  not  pass  under  conditional  sale. — Un- 
der a  conditional  sale,  or  an  executory  contract  of  sale,  the 
property  does  not  pass  though  possession  be  delivered.  The 
seller  in  such  case  has  no  lien,  but  instead  the  title  to  the 
property. ^^     The  seller  can  have  a  lien  only  w^hen  the  title 


5^  Husted  V.  Ingraham,  75  N.  Y. 
251;  Hale  v.  Omaha  Nat.  Bank,  64 
N.  Y.  550,  49  N.  Y.  626. 

*''j  Harkness  v.  Russell,  118  U.  S. 
663,  30  L.  ed.  285,  7  Sup.  Ct.  51; 
Frick  V.  Hilliard,  95  N.  Car.  117. 
Conditional  sales,  in  the  absence 
of  fraud,  are  generally  valid  as 
well  against  third  persons  as  be- 
tween the  parties  to  the  transac- 
tion. England :  Barrow  v.  Coles, 
3  Camp.  92;  Swain  v.  Shepherd,  1 
Moody  &  R.  223;  Brandt  v.  Bowl- 
by,  2  B.  &  Ad.  932;  Bishop  v. 
Shillito,  2  B.  &  Aid.  329,  note  a; 
Ex  parte  Crawcour,  9  Ch.  Div.  419; 
Crawcour  v.  Salter,  18  Ch.  Div.  30. 
Otherwise  under  the  English 
bankrupt  laws:  Horn  v.  Baker,  9 
East  215;  Holroyd  v.  Gwynne,  2 
Taunt.  176.  United  States :  Cop- 
land V.  Bosquet,  4  Wash.  588,  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  3212;  Harkness  v.  Rus- 
sell, 118  U.  S.  663,  30  L.  ed.  285,  7 
Sup.  Ct.  51.  Alabama:  Fairbanks 
v.  Eureka,  67  Ala.  109;  Sumner  v. 
Woods,  67  Ala.  139,  42  Am.  Rep. 
104;  Civ.  Code  1907,  §3394.  Alaska: 
Sess.  Laws  1913,  p.  236,  §§54-56. 
Arizona:     Rev.    Stat.    1901,     §2702. 


Colorado:  It  must  be  recorded  as 
chattel  mortgages.  Mills'  Ann. 
Stat.  1912,  §§620,  3067;  George  v. 
Tufts,  5  Colo.  162.  Connecticut: 
Forbes  v.  Marsh,  15  Conn.  384; 
Hart  V.  Carpenter,  24  Conn.  427. 
Georgia:  Must  be  recorded  as 
chattel  mortgages.  Code  1911, 
§§3318,  3319.  Idaho:  Barton  v. 
Groseclose,  11  Idaho  227,  81  Pac. 
623.  Indiana:  Hodson  v.  Warner, 
60  Ind.  214;  McGirr  v.  Sell,  60  Ind. 
249;  Bradshaw  v.  Warner,  54  Ind. 
58;  Dunbar  v.  Rawles,  28  Ind.  225, 
92  Am.  Dec.  311 ;  Shireman  v.  Jack- 
son, 14  Ind.  459.  Iowa:  Must  be 
recorded  as  chattel  mortgages. 
Code  1897,  §2905.  See,  on  this 
subject,  National  Cash  Register 
Co.  V.  Brocksmit,  103  Iowa  271,  72 
N.  W.  526;  Union  Bank  v.  Cream- 
ery Package  Mfg.  Co.,  105  Iowa 
136.  74  N.  W.  921;  National  Cash 
Register  Co.  v.  Schwab,  111  Iowa 
605,  82  N.  W.  1011;  Gaar  v.  Nich- 
ols, 115  Iowa  223,  88  N.  W.  382; 
Davis  Gasoline  Engine  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Hugh,  115  Iowa  415,  88  N.  W.  948; 
Thomson  v.  Smith,  111  Iowa  718, 
83  N.  W.  789,  50  L.  R.  A.  780,  82 


849  seller's  lien  for  purchase-money.  §  820 

passes  to  the  purchaser.     If  the  title  does  not  pass,  the  per- 


Am.  St.  541.  Maine:  George  v. 
Stubbs,  26  Maine  243;  Boynton  v. 
Libby,  62  Maine  253;  Rogers  v. 
Whitehouse,  71  Maine  222.  Now 
not  valid  unless  made  and  signed 
in  a  note,  or  recorded.  Rev.  Stat. 
1903,  ch.  113,  §5.  Massachusetts: 
Hussey  v.  Thornton,  4  Mass.  405 
3  Am.  Dec.  224;  Marston  v.  Bald- 
w^in,  17  Mass.  606;  Bartlett  v. 
Pritchard,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  512,  13 
Am.  Dec.  449;  Coggill  v.  Hartford 
&  N.  H.  R.  Co.,  3  Gray  (Mass.) 
545;  Deshon  v.  Bigelow^,  8  Gray 
(Mass.)  159;  Hirschorn  v.  Canney, 
98  Mass.  149;  Chase  v.  Ingalls,  122 
Mass.  381.  Now  conditional  sales 
of  furniture  or  household  effects 
must  be  in  writing,  and  copy  fur- 
nished vendee,  on  which  all  pay- 
ments must  be  endorsed.  Rev. 
Laws  1902,  ch.  198,  §  12.  Michigan: 
Whitney  v.  McConnell,  29  Mich. 
12;  Smith  v.  Lozo,  42  Mich.  6,  3 
N.  W.  227;  Marquette  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Jeffery,  49  Mich.  283,  13  N.  W. 
592.  Minnesota:  Must  be  filed  in 
town  where  vendee  resides.  Rec- 
ord ceases  to  be  notice  after  six 
years  from  date  of  filing  thereof. 
Gen.  Stats.  1913,  §§  6967,  6982.  Mis- 
sissippi :  The  vendor  of  personal 
property  shall  have  a  lien  upon 
the  goods  for  the  purchase-money 
while  it  remains  in  the  possession 
of  the  first  purchaser,  or  of 
one  deriving  title  or  possession 
through  him,  with  notice  that  the 
purchase-price  was  unpaid.  Code 
1906,  §§3079-3081.  Missouri:  Ridge- 
way  V.  Kennedy,  52  Mo.  24;  Wang- 
ler  V.  Franklin,  70  Mo.  659;  Sum- 
ner V.  Cottey,  71  Mo.  121.  Now  it 
must    be    recorded    in    same    man- 

54 


ner  as  chattel  mortgages.  Rev. 
Stat.  1909,  §  2889.  Nebraska  :  Must 
be  filed  in  county  where  vendee 
resides.  Ceases  to  be  valid  after 
five  years,  unless  filing  renewed. 
Ann.  Stat.  1911,  §  6045.  New  Hamp- 
shire: Sargent  v.  Gile,  8  N.  H. 
325;  McFarland  v.  Farmer,  42  N. 
H.  386;  King  v:  Bates,  57  N.  H. 
446.  Now  not  valid  unless  vendor 
takes  a  written  memorandum, 
signed  by  the  purchaser,  witness- 
ing the  sum  due,  and  causes  it 
to  be  recorded  in  the  town  clerk's 
office  where  the  purchaser  resides, 
if  in  the  state,  otherwise  where 
the  vendor  resides,  within  ten 
days  after  delivery.  An  affidavit 
of  good  faith,  signed  by  both  par- 
ties, must  be  appended  and  re- 
corded. Pub.  Stat.  &  Sess.  L. 
1901,  ch.  140,  §§23-26.  New  Jer- 
sey: The  contract  of  conditional 
sale  must  be  recorded.  All  con- 
ditions and  reservations  which 
provide  that  the  ownership  of 
such  goods  and  chattels  is  to  re- 
main in  the  person  so  contracting 
to  sell  them,  or  other  person  than 
the  one  contracting  to  buy  them, 
until  said  goods  and  chattels  are 
paid  for,  or  until  the  occurring  of 
any  future  event  or  contingency, 
shall  be  absolutely  void  as  against 
the  judgment  creditors  not  having 
notice  thereof,  and  subsequent  pur- 
chasers and  mortgagees  of,  in 
good  faith,  not  having  notice 
thereof,  whose  deeds  or  mortgages 
shall  have  been  first  duly  recorded, 
from  the  person  so  contracting  to 
buy  the  same,  and  as  to  them  the 
sale  shall  be  deemed  absolute,  un- 
less   such    contract    for    sale    with 


§    820 


LIENS. 


850 


son  to  whom  the  possession  is  delivered  can  confer  no  valid 
claim  to  the  property  to  another,  even  a  bona  fide  purchaser 


such  conditions  and  reservations 
therein  be  recorded  as  directed  in 
the  succeeding  section  of  this  act. 
Gen.  Laws  1895,  p.  891.  Comp. 
Stats.  1910,  p.  1561,  §71.  Cole  v. 
Berry,  42  N.  J.  L.  308,  36  Am.  Rep. 
511.  New  York:  Haggerty  v.  Pal- 
mer, 6  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  437; 
Strong  V.  Taylor,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
326;  Herring  v.  Hoppock,  15  N.  Y. 
409;  Ballard  v.  Burgett,  40  N.  Y. 
314.  And  see  Dows  v.  Kidder,  84  N. 
Y.  121 ;  Parker  v.  Baxter,  86  N.  Y. 
586;  Bean  v.  Edge,  84  N.  Y.  510. 
Void  unless  contract  or  a  copy  be 
filed  in  the  town  where  purchaser 
resides,  if  in  the  state,  otherwise 
in  town  where  property  is.  Rec- 
ord ceases  to  be  notice  after  one 
year,  unless  refiled  within  thirty 
days.  Birdseye's  C.  &  G.  Consol. 
Laws  1909,  pp.  4218-4222.  North 
Carolina :  Vasser  v.  Buxton,  86  N. 
Car.  335,  14  Rep.  121.  North  Da- 
kota: Effect  of  failure  to  file  con- 
tract of  conditional  sale.  Thomp- 
son V.  Armstrong,  11  N.  Dak.  198. 
Contract  void  unless  filed  as  a 
mortgage  of  personal  property. 
Rev.  Code  1905,  §6181.  Ohio:  Call 
V.  Seymour,  40  Ohio  St.  670;  San- 
ders V.  Keber,  28  Ohio  St.  630. 
Contract  void  unless  made  under 
oath  and  signed  by  purchaser,  and 
filed  in  city  where  he  resides,  or 
where  property  is.  Gen.  Code 
1910,  §  6045.  Oklahoma:  In- 
struments evidencing  conditional 
sales  must  be  recorded.  Comp. 
Laws  1909,  §  7911.  South  Carolina  : 
Must  be  recorded  in  same  man- 
ner as  chattel  mortgages.  Code 
1912,   §  3542.     Texas:  Must  be   re- 


corded as  chattel  mortgages.  Rev. 
Civ.  Stat.  1911,  art.  5655.  Vermont: 
Hefflin  v.  Bell,  30  Vt.  134;  Fales 
v.  Roberts,  38  Vt.  503;  Duncans 
V.  Stone,  45  Vt.  118,  123;  Page  v. 
Edwards,  64  Vt.  124,  23  Atl.  917. 
Not  valid  unless  memorandum 
signed  by  the  purchaser  be  record- 
ed in  town  clerk's  office  where 
purchaser  resides,  if  in  the  state, 
otherwise  where  seller  resides, 
within  thirty  days.  Pub.  Stat. 
1906,  §  2663.  One  who  purchases 
such  property  after  the  lien  is  re- 
corded acquires  no  title,  for  the 
seller  has  none  to  give.  Church 
V.  McLeod,  58  Vt.  541,  3  Atl.  490. 
Virginia:  The  reservation  of  title 
to  and  liens  on  goods  and  chat- 
tels sold  is  void  as  to  creditors 
and  purchasers  unless  in  writing 
and  recorded.  Code  1904,  §2462. 
Washington :  Conditional  sales, 
where  property  is  placed  in  the 
vendee's  possession,  are  absolute 
as  to  purchasers,  encumbrances 
and  subsequent  creditors  in  good 
faith,  unless  within  ten  days  a 
proper  memorandum,  signed  by 
vendor  and  vendee,  be  filed  in  the 
auditor's  office  of  the  county 
where  the  vendee  resided  at  the 
time  possession  was  taken.  Rem- 
ington &L  Ballinger's  Ann.  Codes 
and  Stat.  1910,  §3670.  West  Vir- 
ginia: Condition  or  reservation 
must  be  recorded  in  county  where 
property  is.  Code  Ann.  1906,  §  3101. 
Wagon  Co.  v.  Hutton,  53  W.  Va. 
154;  Hyer  v.  Smith,  48  W.  Va.  550; 
Hatfield  v.  Haubert,  51  W.  Va.  190. 
Wisconsin:  Not  valid  unless  filed 
in  town  where  vendee  resides,  or 


851 


SELLER  S   LIEN    FOR    PURCHASE-MONEY. 


821 


for  value. ^^  If  the  title  does  not  pass,  and  a  lien  is  in  some 
form  reserved,  though  this  may  be  a  valid  contract  between 
the  parties,  it  does  not  protect  the  property  from  seizure  by 
creditors  of  the  purchaser,  or  from  passing  by  a  sale  made 
by  him.^'^ 

If  the  contract  of  sale  provides  that  the  seller  may  at  his 
option  resume  possession  of  the  property,  he  should  give  no- 
tice of  his  option  before  taking  the  property  by  replevin,  es- 
pecially if  considerable  time  has  elapsed  since  default.^® 

§  821.  Difficulty  to  determine  what  is  change  of  posses- 
sion.— There  is  often  difficulty  in  determining  v^^hat  consti- 
tutes such  a  change  of  possession  from  the  seller  to  the  buyer 
as  will  put  an  end  to  the  seller's  lien.  If  the  goods  are  de- 
livered to  the  buyer's  own  servant,  agent,  or  carrier,  they 
are  in  legal  eiTect  delivered  to  the  buyer  himself.^^  But  a 
common  carrier  is  not  the  servant  of  the  buyer,  and  there- 
fore, although  the  goods  have  left  the  actual  possession  of 
the  seller,  he  retains  his  lien  while  they  are  in  the  hands  of 


where  property  is.  Rev.  Stat.  1898, 
§2317.  Wyoming:  Conditional 
sales  are  not  valid  against  any 
purchaser  or  judgment  creditor  of 
the  vendee  or  lessees  in  posses- 
sion, without  notice,  unless  they 
are  in  writing,  signed  by  the  ven- 
dee or  lessee,  and  the  original  or 
a  copy  thereof  filed  in  the  office 
of  the  county  clerk  of  the  county 
where  the  property  is.  Comp. 
Stat.  1910,  §3745.  In  a  few  states 
conditional  sales,  or  secret  liens 
which  treat  the  vendor  of  per- 
sonal property,  who  has  delivered 
possession  of  it  to  the  purchaser, 
as  owner  until  payment  of  the 
purchase-money,  can  not  be  main- 
tained; being  regarded  as  con- 
structively fraudulent.  Illinois: 
Murch  v.  Wright,  46  111.  487,  95 
Am.  Dec.  455;  McCormick  v.  Mad- 
den, Zl  111.  370;  Ketchum  v.  Wat- 


son, 24  111.  591;  Van  Duzor  v.  Al- 
len, 90  111.  499;  Hervey  v.  R.  I. 
Locomotive  Works,  93  U.  S.  664, 
23  L.  ed.  1003.  Kentucky:  Hart 
V.  Barney  &  Smith  Mfg.  Co.,  7 
Fed.  543;  Vaughn  v.  Hopson,  10 
Bush  (Ky.)  Zyi ;  Greer  v.  Church, 
13   Bush  (Ky.)  430. 

5ti  Kohler  v.  Hayes,  41  Cal.  455; 
Hegler  v.  Eddy,  SI  Cal.  597,  598; 
Palmer  v.  Howard,  12  Cal.  293,  13 
Pac.  858,   1  Am.   St.  60. 

57  Heryford  v.  Davis,  102  U.  S. 
235,  26  L.  ed.  160,  2  Ky.  L.  95. 

5S  Wheeler  v.  Teetzlafif,  53  Wis. 
211,  10  N.  W.   155. 

Sf*  Arnold  v.  Delano,  4  Cush, 
(Mass.)  ZZ,  39,  50  Am.  Dec.  754, 
per  Shaw,  C.  J.;  Muskegon 
Booming  Co.  v.  Underhill,  43 
Mich.  629,  5  N.  W.  1073;  Bohn 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  Hynes,  83  Wis.  388, 
53   N.   W.  684. 


§    822  LIENS.  852 

the  carrier,  until  the}^  have  reached  their  destination,  or  the 
actual  custody  of  the  seller,  and  may  be  stopped  by  him  in 
transitu. •'^  Even  after  the  goods  have  reached  their  destina- 
tion, the  seller  has  the  right  to  stop  them,  so  long  as  they 
have  not  passed  into  the  actual  custod}^  of  the  buyer,  and  he 
has  exercised  no  act  of  ownership  over  them.  But  so  far  as 
the  seller's  right  of  lien  is  concerned,  this  right  is  at  an  end 
and  the  delivery  is  complete  when  the  seller  has  placed  the 
goods  in  possession  of  a  carrier  to  be  transported  to  the 
buyer.  The  seller's  only  right  in  respect  to  the  goods  after 
such  delivery  is  his  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu, — which  is 
an  equitable  right  in  the  nature  of  a  lien,  but  well  distin- 
guished from  it, — to  repossess  himself  of  the  goods  while  in 
the  carrier's  hands,  and  before  they  have  come  in  the  actual 
possession  of  the  buyer,  upon  the  buyer's  insolvency.®^ 

§  822.  Where  character  of  property  is  changed  by  pur- 
chaser.— A  seller  is  deemed  to  have  parted  with  the  posses- 
sion of  chattels  sold  where  the  buyer  has  changed  the  char- 
acter of  the  property  by  expending  labor  or  money  upon  it, 
in  pursuance  of  the  contract  of  sale.  Thus,  if  the  owner  of 
land  sells  wood  standing  upon  it,  giving  authority  to  the 
purchaser  to  cut  it  within  a  certain  time,  the  seller  has  no 
lien  on  the  wood  for  the  price  in  case  of  the  purchaser's  in- 
solvency after  the  wood  is  cut,  and  before  it  is  removed. 
The  purchaser  having  expended  labor  and  money  in  felling 
the  trees  and  preparing  the  wood  for  the  market,  he  must 
be  regarded  as  having  taken  it  into  his  actual  possession. 
His  acts  have  wrought  such  a  change  of  possession  as  to  de- 
feat any  right  of  lien  in  the  seller.®^ 

§  823.  Delivery  by  warehouse  receipt. — A  delivery  order 
upon  a  warehouseman  does  not,  without  some  positive  act 

60  Arnold     v.     Delano,     4     Cush.  Boyd   v.    Mosely,   2   Swan    (Tenn.) 

(Mass.)  33,  50  Am.  Dec.  754.  661. 

Gi  Bullock    V.    Tschergi,    4    Mc-  G2  Douglas  v.  Shumway,  13  Graiy 

Crary    (U.    S.)    184,    13    Fed.    345;  (Mass.)  498. 


853 


SELLER  S   LIEN    FOR    PURCHASE-MONEY. 


823 


done  under  it.  operate  as  a  constructive  delivery,  nor  deprive 
the  seller  of  his  right  of  lien  for  the  price,  even  as  against  a 
third  person  who  has  in  good  faith  purchased  the  goods  of 
the  buyer  holding  such  order.^-^  The  indorsee  of  a  bill  of 
lading  may  have  a  better  title  to  the  goods  which  it  repre- 
sents than  the  indorser  had;  but  the  indorsee  of  a  delivery 
order  has  no  better  title  through  the  indorsement  than  the 
indorser  had.^'*  Even  the  fact  that  the  sub-vendee  was  in- 
duced by  the  original  vendee  to  purchase  and  pay  for  the 
goods,  by  receiving  the  delivery  orders  given  by  the  original 
vendor,  does  not  estop  the  latter  from  setting  up  his  right, 
as  an  unpaid  vendor,  to  withhold  the  goods.^^     In  a  case 


63  McEwan  v.  Smith,  2  H.  L.  Cas. 
309;  Townley  v.  Crump,  5  Nev.  & 
M.  606,  4  Ad.  &  El.  58;  Imperial 
Bank  v.  London  &  St.  Katharine 
Docks  Co.,  5  Ch.  Div.  195.  200; 
Griffiths  V.  Perry,  1  El.  &  El.  680; 
Winks  V.  Hassall,  9  B.  &  C.  ZU; 
Keeler  v.  Goodwin,  111  Mass.  490; 
Anderson  v.  Read,  106  N.  Y.  Z2>Z, 
13  N.  E.  292. 

64  Lord  Chancellor  Cottenham, 
delivering  judgment  in  McEwan  v. 
Smith.  2  H.  L.  Cas.  309,  said:  "It 
is  said,  that  though  the  delivery 
note  does  not  pass  the  property 
as  a  bill  of  lading  would  have 
passed  it,  by  being  indorsed  over 
from  one  party  to  another,  still 
it  operates  as  an  estoppel  upon 
the  party  giving  it,  so  far,  at  all 
events,  as  a  third  party  is  con- 
cerned; and  it  is  argued  that  it 
is  a  kind  of  fraud  for  a  person 
to  give  a  delivery  note  which  the 
person  receiving  it  may  use  so  as 
to  impose  upon  a  third  person, 
and  then  to  deprive  that  third  per- 
son of  its  benefit.  But  that  argu- 
ment  is  merely  putting  the  argu- 


ment as  to  the  effect  of  a  delivery 
note  in  another  form,  and  it  as- 
sumes that  such  a  document  has 
all  the  effect  of  a  bill  of  lading. 
But,  as  the  nature  and  effects  of 
these  two  documents  are  quite 
different  from  each  other,  it  seems 
to  me  that  such  an  argument  has 
no  foundation  at  all,  and  can  not 
be  adopted  without  converting  a 
delivery  note  into  a  bill  of  lad- 
ing." 

*j"  Farmiloe  v.  Bain,  1  C.  P.  D. 
445.  The  delivery  order  in  this 
case  was  as  follows  :  "We  hereby 
undertake  to  deliver  to  your  or- 
der indorsed  herein  twenty-five 
tons  merchantable  sheet  zinc  off 
your  contract  of  this  date."  Lind- 
ley,  J.,  said :  "The  document 
amounts  to  no  more  than  this, — 
'You  have  a  contract  with  me  for 
the  sale  of  certain  zinc;  and  I  am 
willing  to  deliver  twenty-five  tons 
off  that  contract,  on  the  terms  of 
that  contract.'  That  clearly  does 
not  amount  to  a  representation 
that  Burrs  &  Co.  [the  vendee] 
were    at    liberty    to      transfer      to 


§    824  LIENS.  854 

before  the  Common  Pleas  Division,  where  a  sub-vendee 
claimed  that  the  vendor  was  estopped  from  setting  up  his 
right,  all  the  judges  said  the  order  obviously  contained  no 
representation  of  any  fact,  and  the  sub-vendee  had  no  right 
to  rely  upon  it  as  a  representation,  and  consequently  he  did 
not  bring  himself  within  the  conditions  of  an  estoppel. 

§  824.  Delivery  order  differs  from  bill  of  lading. — A  deliv- 
ery order  differs  materially  in  its  eft'ects  from  a  bill  of  lad- 
jj-^g.Gc  fQj.^  while  a  delivery  order  does  not  divest  the  seller  of 
possession  until  the  order  is  accepted  or  actual  possession  is 
taken  under  it,  the  transfer  of  a  bill  of  lading  immediately 
divests  the  seller  of  possession,  and  consequently  of  his  right 
of  lien.  But  in  England,  by  the  recent  Factors'  Act,  the 
transfer  of  a  delivery  order  by  a  vendor  to  his  vendee  seems 
to  have  the  same  effect  as  the  transfer  of  a  bill  of  lading  in 
defeating  any  vendor's  lien,  or  right  of  stoppage  in  tran- 
situ.^^ 

A  bill  of  lading  is  an  instrument  of  title  representing  the 
property,  and  the  delivery  of  it  by  the  vendor  to  the  vendee 
passes  the  title  and  the  right  of  possession.  It  of  course  im- 
plies that  the  actual  possession  of  the  goods  represented  has 
passed  from  the  vendor  to  the  carrier  who  has  issued  the  bill 
of  lading.  Moreover,  the  delivery  of  the  instrument  of  title 
is  a  complete  legal  delivery  of  the  goods  themselves.  The 
vendor  is  consequently  divested  of  his  lien  by  the  delivery  of 
the  bill  of  lading;  but,  as  will  hereafter  be  noticed,  the  ven- 
dor may,  until  the  goods  have  come  to  the  actual  possession 
of  the  vendee,  or  he  has  transferred  the  bill  of  lading  to  a 
third  person  for  value,  intercept  the  goods  in  case  the  buyer 
becomes  insolvent  before  paying  the  price. 

their  vendees  a  property  in  the  ^'  Factors'  Act  1877,  40  &  41 
zinc  which  he  himself  did  not  pos-  Vict.  ch.  39,  §4;  Benjamin  on 
sess."  Sales   (4th  ed.),  §  1207. 

66  Keeler  v.  Goodwin,  111  Mass. 
490. 


855  seller's  lien  for  purchase-money.  §  826 

§  825.  Warehouse  receipt  differs  from  a  delivery  order. — 
A  warehouse  receipt  or  dock-warrant  also  differs  materially 
from  a  delivery  order.  It  is  so  far  a  document  of  title  that 
the  indorsement  or  transfer  of  it  for  value  amounts  to  a  de- 
livery of  the  goods  represented,  and  divests  the  vendor  of 
his  lien.^^  In  the  case  of  Spear  v.  Travers,^^  decided  in  1815, 
the  gentlemen  of  the  special  jury  observed  that  in  practice 
the  indorsed  dock-warrants  and  certificates  are  handed  from 
seller  to  buyer  as  a  complete  transfer  of  the  goods. 

A  warehouseman  who  has  issued  his  own  receipt  to  a  pur- 
chaser is  himself  estopped  from  denying  his  liability  for  the 
goods  to  the  holder  of  the  receipt;  and  he  is  estopped  al- 
though the  goods  have  not  been  separated  from  others  of 
the  same  kind.'^° 

§  826.    Wharfinger's  certificate  not  a  title  document. — A 

wdiarfinger's  certificate,  that  certain  goods  are  at  the  ven- 
dor's works  ready  for  shipment,  is  not  a  document  of  title, 
and  therefore  the  delivery  of  it  does  not  pass  the  goods  and 
divest  the  vendor  of  his  right  of  lien  as  against  either  the 
vendee  or  a  purchaser  from  him.'^^  In  a  case  before  the 
Court  of  Appeal  in  Chancery,  it  appeared  that  an  iron  manu- 
facturer had  contracted  to  sell  a  large  quantity  of  iron  rails 
for  shipment  to  Russia,  and  that  in  pursuance  of  the  contract 
he  delivered  to  the  purchaser  wharfinger's  certificates  to  the 
effect  that  a  certain  number  of  tons  of  such  rails  were  lying 

68  Whitlock  V.  Hay,  58  N.  Y.  484;  pass     the     property    in    the    goods 

Second    Nat.    Bank    v.    Walbridge,  therein  mentioned,  was  left  an  un- 

19   Ohio    St.   419,  424,  2  Am.    Rep.  decided  question  in  Lucas  v.  Dor- 

408;  Burton  v.  Curyea,  40  111.  320,  rien.  7  Taunt.  278;  though  Dallas, 

89     Am.      Dec.     350;      Merchants'  J.,   said   that  he   felt   no   doubt   on 

Bank  v.  Hibbard,  48  Mich.  118,   11  the  question. 
N.    W.    834;    Cochran    v.    Ripy,    13  69  4  Camp.  251. 

Bush   (Ky.)  495;  Davis  v.  Russell,  70  Adams   v.   Gorham,  6  Cal.  68; 

52  Cal.  611,  28  Am.  Rep.  647;  Allen  Goodwin  v.  Scannell,  6  Cal.  541. 
V.  Maury,  66  Ala.  10.     Whether  an  7i  Gunn    v.    Bolckow,    L.    R.    10, 

indorsement    of    the    warrants    of  ch.  491. 
the  West  India  Docks  Co.  would 


§    826  LIENS.  856 

at  the  works  of  the  manufacturer  ready  for  shipment  under 
the  contract.  The  purchaser  obtained  advances  on  the  se- 
curity of  such  certificates,  and  became  insolvent  before  his 
acceptances  for  the  price  became  due.  The  person  who  ad- 
vanced the  money  claimed  the  rails,  on  the  grounds  that 
the  wharfinger's  certificates  were  equivalent  to  warrants  or 
documents  of  title,  and  passed  both  the  right  of  property  and 
the  right  of  possession.  But  this  claim  was  repudiated  by  the 
court.  "A  document  of  title,"  said  Mellish,  L.  J.,  "is  some- 
thing which  represents  the  goods,  and  from  which,  either 
immediately  or  at  some  future  time,  the  possession  of  the 
goods  may  be  obtained.  In  this  way  a  bill  of  lading  repre- 
sents the  goods  while  they  are  at  sea,  and  by  which,  when 
the  goods  arrive  at  the  port  of  destination,  the  possession  of 
the  goods  may  be  obtained.  So,  also,  a  delivery  order  is  an 
order  for  a  delivery  of  the  goods  either  immediately  or  at 
some  future  time;  generally,  immediately  on  the  presentation 
of  the  delivery  order,  the  party  is  entitled  to  the  goods. 
Therefore  it  represents  the  goods.  *  *  *  Then  it  is  said 
that  there  is  a  custom  of  the  trade  to  treat  these  certificates 
as  warrants.  Now,  in  the  first  place,  there  is  no  evidence  of 
such  a  custom.  That  these  certificates  are  often  pledged,  and 
that,  as  between  the  party  who  pledges  them  and  the  party 
who  advances  money,  they  would  be  evidence  of  an  equitable 
charge,  is.  I  think,  very  probable.  The  iron  trade,  we  know, 
is  a  very  speculative  trade.  I  dare  say  those  who  are  en- 
gaged in  it  raise  money  in  that  way.  But  if  the  custom  were 
proved,  I  cannot  understand  how  any  practice  of  raising 
money  in  that  w^ay  can  affect  the  vendor's  rights.  The  ven- 
dor, having  agreed  by  his  contract  that  he  would  give  the 
wharfinger's  certificate  in  order  that  the  purchaser  may  have 
evidence  that  the  goods  have  been  actually  made,  and  now 
are  actually  ready  to  be  shipped,  can  not  help  giving  the  cer- 
tificate ;  and  how  the  fact  of  his  giving  that  certificate,  which 
does  not  profess  to  be  negotiable,  and  does  not  profess  to 


857 


SELLERS   LIEN    FOR    PURCHASE-MONEY. 


827 


require  the  delivery  of  the  goods  to  order  or  to  bearer,  or 
anything  of  the  kind,  can  affect  his  lien  as  vendor,  merely 
because  the  purchaser  chooses  to  borrow  money  on  the  faith 
of  it,  I  am  at  a  loss  to  conceive." 

§  827.  Vendor  estopped  from  setting  up  his  lien. — But,  by 
usage  of  a  particular  trade,  a  delivery  warrant,  without  any- 
thing more,  may  be  sufficient  to  estop  the  vendor  from  set- 
ting up  his  lien  as  against  an  assignee  for  value  of  such  war- 
rant. Thus,  where  it  was  proved  to  be  the  custom  of  the 
iron  trade  in  England  to  treat  such  a  warrant  as  giving  to 
the  holder  thereof  title  to  the  iron  described,  free  from  any 
claim  by  the  vendor  who  gave  the  warrant  for  the  purchase- 
money,  it  was  held  that  the  vendor  could  not  set  up  his  lien 
as  against  a  pledgee  of  such  warrant. ^- 


"i^  Merchants'  Banking  Co.  v. 
Phoenix  Bessemer  Steel  Co.,  5  Ch. 
Div.  205.  The  warrant  in  this 
case  was  as  follows :  "The  under- 
mentioned rails  will  not  be  deliv- 
ered to  any  party  but  the  holder 
of  this  warrant.  Stacked  at  the 
works,  etc.  Warrant  for  these 
rails  deliverable  (f.  o.  b.)  to  (pur- 
chasers), or  to  their  assigns,  by 
indorsement  hereon."  The  vendor 
had  already  given  to  the  purchaser 
an  invoice  of  the  goods  with  a 
similar  warrant  attached.  Jessell, 
M.  R.,  referring  to  the  terms  of 
the  warrant,  and  to  the  fact  that 
an  invoice  and  warrant  had  al- 
ready been  delivered,  said  :  "The 
very  form  of  the  warrant  shews 
the  purpose.  In  my  opinion,  con- 
sidering that  they  had  already 
given  a  document  of  title  which 
was  quite  clear  and  independent 
and  satisfactory  to  the  purchaser, 
this  was  something  they  were  is- 
suing for  a  dififerent  purpose.  *  *  * 


On  these  two  grounds  I  am  in  the 
plaintiff's  favour,  first,  on  account 
of  the  general  custom  of  the  trade, 
and,  secondly,  because  I  think  you 
must  impute  to  the  Defendant 
company  special  notice  and  spe- 
cial knowledge  that  the  warrant 
was  intended  to  be  used  for  some 
such  purpose,  and,  having  that 
knowledge  they  issued  the  docu- 
ment in  this  particular  form,  for 
it  is  inconceivable  for  what  pur- 
pose it  could  have  been  used  ex- 
cept that  for  which  it  was  actu- 
ally used,  including,  of  course,  the 
selling  as  well  as  pledging  the 
goods.  I  have  in  this  case  the 
distinction,  that  the  company  pur- 
posely issued  a  second  document 
of  title  with  a  view  of  its  being 
used  for  a  special  purpose.  On 
those  grounds  I  think  the  company 
are  not  entitled  to  set  up  in  this 
case  the  vendor's  lien  at  all 
against  the  plaintiffs." 


§    828  LIENS.  858 

§  828.  Rule  where  warehouseman  enters  goods  in  purchas- 
er's name. — There  is  an  actual  change  of  possession  under  a 
delivery  order  where  the  warehouseman  has  entered  the 
goods  in  the  name  of  the  purchaser,  though  the  goods  them- 
selves are  not  moved  from  their  place.  When  a  delivery  or- 
der has  been  lodged  with  the  warehouse  keeper  in  w^hose 
warehouse  the  goods  lie,  whether  this  be  the  vendor's  ware- 
house or  belongs  to  another,  and  the  warehouseman  has 
transferred  the  goods  in  his  books  into  the  name  of  the  pur- 
chaser, the  vendor's  lien  is  gone.  From  that  moment  the 
warehouseman  becomes  the  bailee  of  the  purchaser,  and  the 
delivery  is  as  complete  as  if  the  goods  had  been  delivered 
into  his  hands. ^^  And  so,  if  the  warehouseman,  on  receiving 
an  order  from  the  vendor  to  hold  the  goods  on  account  of 
the  purchaser,  gives  a  written  acknowledgment  that  he  so 
holds  them,  he  cannot  set  up,  as  a  defense  for  not  delivering 
them  to  the  purchaser,  that  by  the  usage  of  that  particular 
trade  the  property  in  them  is  not  transferred  till  it  is  remeas- 
ured,  and  that,  before  they  were  remeasured,  the  purchaser 
became  insolvent.  By  the  acknowledgment  the  warehouse- 
man attorned  to  the  purchaser.'^ 

Even  the  verbal  assent  of  the  warehouseman  to  the  order, 
upon  the  purchaser's  communicating  it  to  him,  will  effect  a 
change  of  possession  without  an  actual  transfer  of  the  goods 
in  his  books  to  the  name  of  the  purchaser.^^ 

§  829.  Seller  not  deprived  of  lien  by  notice  of  sale  to  ware- 
houseman.— But  a  mere  notice  of  a  sale  given  to  a  ware- 
houseman, or  other  bailee  in  possession  of  the  goods,  does 
not  generally  deprive  the  seller  of  his  lien;  but  the  bailee 
must  enter  into  some  obligation  with  the  vendee,  or  recog- 

73  Harman  V.  Anderson,  2  Camp.  "*  Stonard    v.    Dunkin,    2    Camp. 

242;    Arnold    v.    Delano,    4    Cush.  344;   Hawes  v.  Watson,  2  B.  &  C. 

(Mass.)    33,    39,    SO    Am.    Dec.    754,  540;  Gosling  v.  Birnie,  7  Bing.  339; 

per  Shaw,  C.  J.;  Parker  v.  Byrnes,  Holl   v.    Griffen,    10   Bing.   246. 

1   Lowell  539,  Fed.   Cas.   10728.  "5  Lucas  v.  Dorrien,  7  Taunt.  278. 


859  seller's  lien  for  purchase-money.  §  830 

nize  him  in  some  way,  so  that  he  shall  become  his  bailee  in- 
stead of  the  vendor's  baileeJ*^  "Notice  may  be  enough  to 
pnt  him  on  his  guard,  and  to  render  him  liable  to  an  action 
if* he  does  anything  inconsistent  with  the  notice;  and  a  notice 
silently  received  may  be  evidence  of  acquiescence,  and  it  may 
even  be  conclusive  evidence  thereof,  by  way  of  estoppel,  if 
third  persons  have  been  misled;  but,  as  between  the  vendor 
and  vendee,  I  understand  that  the  possession  is  not  changed 
until  the  warehouseman  has  in  some  way  acknowledged  the 
change,  and  has  become  the  agent  of  the  vendee.  In  the 
analogous  law  of  stoppage  in  transitu,  the  carrier  who  re- 
ceives goods  very  often  has  notice  that  the  consignee  has 
bought  them,  and  is  in  fact  their  owner,  and  he  is  notified 
and  directed  to  deliver  to  the  vendee ;  but  until  he  has  either 
delivered  them,  or  changed  his  relation  in  some  way  so  as  to 
become  the  exclusive  agent  of  the  vendee,  they  may  be 
stopped,  if  the  occasion  arises.  In  short,  such  an  order  is 
revocable  in  the  case  of  the  failure  of  the  vendee,  unless  it 
has  been  acted  on."'^''' 

§  830.    Possession  by  purchaser  by  fraud  will  not  divest 

lien.— Possession  under  a  delivery  order  obtained  by  artifice 
or  mistake  does  not  divest  the  seller  of  his  lien.  Thus  a 
seller  of  certain  casks  of  oil  directed  the  wharfinger  to  trans- 
fer them  to  the  purchaser's  name,  and  he  accordingly  did  so, 
and  gave  to  the  seller  a  transfer  order  addressed  to  the  pur- 
chaser, acknowledging  that  he  held  the  goods  for  him.  The 
seller  thereupon,  through  his  clerk,  offered  the  transfer  order 
to  the  buyer,  and  demanded  payment,  which  he  was  entitled 
to  upon  delivery.  The  buyer  refusd  to  make  payment,  but 
retained  the  transfer  order.  The  seller  immediately  gave  no- 
tice to  the  wharfinger  not  to  deliver  the  oil.  but  the  latter,  in 
defiance  of  the  order,  afterward  delivered  it  to  the  buyer.    In 

"6  In    re    Batchelder,    2    Lowell  "'  In    re    Batchelder,    2    Lowell 

(U.  S.)  245,  247,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  (U.  S.)  245,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  1099.  per 
1099.  Lowell,  J. 


§    831  LIENS.  860 

trover  by  the  seller  for  the  oil,  it  was  held  that  neither  the 
property  nor  the  right  of  possession  passed  to  the  buyer.'^^ 
"There  is  no  doubt  upon  the  authorities,"  said  Williams,  J., 
"that,  if  that  transfer  order  had  been  delivered  to  the  buyer, 
and  he  had  carrier  it  to  the  wharfinger,  and  the  latter  had 
consented  to  hold  the  oil  therein  specified  for  him,  or  if,  after 
the  order  had  been  left  with  the  wharfinger  by  the  seller's 
clerk,  the  wharfinger  had  communicated  it  to  the  buyer,  and 
the  latter  had  assented  to  it  either  tacitly  or  explicitly,  that 
would  have  constituted  a  complete  transfer,  inasmuch  as  the 
transaction  would  amount  to  an  arrangement  between  the 
three — the  vendor,  the  wharfinger,  and  the  vendee, — that  the 
oil  should  remain  in  the  wdiarfinger's  hands  as  the  agent  of 
the  vendee.  It  is  impossible  to  say  that  the  facts  here  show 
that  any  arrangement  of  that  kind  was  come  to.  The  per- 
son who  took  the  order  from  the  wharfinger  to  the  vendee 
was  induced  to  part  with  it  by  a  species  of  force.  I  am  clearly 
of  opinion  that  the  property  in  the  oil,  notwithstanding  what 
took  place,  remains  in  the  plaintiff." 

§  831.  Vendor  not  bound  by  order  to  warehouseman  given 
by  vendee. — Of  course  a  delivery  order  upon  a  warehouse- 
man, given,  not  by  the  owner  in  whose  name  the  goods  are 
stored,  but  by  his  vendee,  does  not  make  a  constructive  de- 
livery as  between  such  vendee  and  a  subvendee,  so  as  to  put 
an  end  to  the  first  vendee's  lien  for  the  price.'^^ 

§  832.  Warehouseman's  charge  will  not  affect  vendor's 
lien. — A  charge  of  warehouse  rent  by  the  seller  upon  the 
goods  left  in  his  possession,  and  stored  in  his  own  ware- 
house, does  not  affect  his  right  of  lien  for  the  unpaid  pur- 
chase-money ;^^  though  a  payment  of  such  rent  by  a  sub- 
's Godts  V.  Rose,  17  C.  B.  229.  C.  941 ;  Grice  v.  Richardson,  3  App. 

79  Lackington  v.  Atherton,  7  M.       Gas.  319;  Winks  v.  Hassall,  9  B.  & 
&   G.   360.  C.   2)12\   Hammond  v.  Anderson,  1 

80  Miles   V.    Gorton,  2   Cr.   &   M.       B.    &   P.    (N.   R.)    69. 
504;    Bloxam    v.    Sanders,    4   B.    & 


86 1  seller's  lien  for  purchase-money.  §  833 

vendee  for  the  whole  of  the  goods,  and  acceptance  of  the 
same  by  the  seller,  would  rightly  be  regarded  as  a  delivery 
of  the  whole. ^^  But  if  the  warehouse  rent  is  not  actually 
paid,  but  only  charged,  such  charge  amounts  to  a  notification 
by  the  seller  to  the  purchaser  that  he  is  not  to  have  the  goods 
until  he  has  paid,  not  only  the  price  of  the  goods,  but  also 
the  rent.^'*^  And  so,  if  a  subvendee  pays  the  worehouse  rent 
upon  part  of  the  goods  upon  receiving  such  part,  upon  an 
order  from  the  original  vendee,  the  vendor's  lien  upon  the 
remainder  of  the  goods  is  not  affected.  His  control  and  lien 
remain  entire  over  the  whole  until  the  delivery  of  the  part. 
It  is,  however,  divisible,  and,  when  part  is  taken  away,  the 
lien  remains  on  the  goods  which  were  not  delivered,  and  for 
which  the  warehouse  rent  has  never  been  paid.^^ 

§  833.  Seller  loses  lien  by  holding  goods  as  bailee  for  pur- 
chaser,— A  seller  loses  his  lien  by  giving  an  acknowledgment 
that  he  holds  the  goods  as  bailee  for  the  purchaser.  In  a  case 
where  a  negotiable  note  was  taken  for  the  price  of  goods 
sold,  the  seller  at  the  time  gave  the  buyer  a  certificate  that 
he  held  them  for  the  seller  upon  storage.  Afterwards  the 
buyer  verbally  offered  to  cancel  the  sale  if  the  seller  would 
surrender  the  note.  He  agreed  to  this,  but  the  note  having 
been  discounted  at  a  bank,  he  did  not  tender  the  note  till  sev- 
eral days  afterward.  In  the  meantime  the  buyer  had  as- 
signed the  goods  to  certain  of  his  creditors,  informing  them, 
however,  of  the  conversation  in  regard  to  cancelling  the  sale. 
These  assignees  brought  an  action  of  trover  against  the  seller 
for  the  goods,  whereupon  it  w^as  held  that  the  property 
vested  in  the  buyer,  and  that  the  seller  had  no  lien  for  the 
price  of  the  goods. ^^     The  contract  to  cancel  the  sale  was 

81  Hurry    v.    Mangles,    1    Camp.  S3  Miles  v.   Gorton,  2  Cr.   &   M. 
452.  504.  513,  per   Bayley,   B. 

82  Miles   V.   Gorton,  2  Cr.   &   M.  84  Chapman    v.    Searle,    3    Pick. 
504,  514,  per  Bayley,  B.  (Mass.)  38. 


§    834  LIENS.  862 

conditional;  and,  as  a  resale  of  the  goods,  it  was  void  by  the 
statute  of  frauds,  the  value  of  the  goods  being  more  than 
fifty  dollars. 

^  834.  Delivery  of  part  of  goods  sold  is  not  delivery  of 
whole. — A  delivery  of  a  part  of  the  goods  sold  does  not  oper- 
ate as  a  delivery  of  the  whole,  so  as  to  destroy  the  vendor's 
lien,  or  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu,  unless  there  be  some- 
thing to  show  that  the  parties  intended  that  such  delivery 
of  a  part  should  be  equivalent  to  a  delivery  of  the  whole.®^ 
Upon  this  point  Willis,  J.,  has  well  stated  the  modern  doc- 
trine: "There  have  been  different  expressions  of  opinion 
at  various  times  as  to  whether  the  delivery  of  a  portion  of 
the  goods,  the  subject  of  an  entire  contract,  operates  as  a  con- 
structive delivery  of  the  whole,  so  as  to  put  an  end  to  the 
right  of  stopping  in  transitu.  It  was  supposed  to  have  been 
thrown  out  by  Taunton,  J.,  that  a  delivery  of  part  operated 
as  a  constructive  delivery  of  the  whole;  but  that  doctrine  has 
since  been  called  in  question  and  dissented  from;  and  it  is 
now  held  that  the  delivery  of  part  operates  as  a  constructive 
delivery  of  the  whole  only  where  the  delivery  of  part  takes 
place  in  the  course  of  the  delivery  of  the  whole,  and  the  tak- 
ing possession  by  the  buyer  of  that  part  is  the  acceptance 
of  constructive  possession  of  the  whole. "^^ 

§  835.  Goods  sold  must  be  separated. — When  part  of  a 
quantity  of  goods  is  sold,  there  can  be  no  delivery  until  the 
part  sold  is  separate  or  set  apart  for  the  purchaser.  Thus,  if 
a  thousand  bushels  of  corn,  part  of  a  larger  quantity  lying  in 
bulk,  be  sold,  no  title  passes  until  separation  of  this  part  is 

85  Ex  parte  Cooper,  11   Ch.  Div.  Daly  (N.  Y.)  93;  McElwee  v.  Met- 

68,   citing  Bolton  v.   Lancashire   &  ropolitan  Lumber  Co.,  69  Fed.  302, 

Yorkshire   R.   Co.,   (L.   R.   1    C.   P.  16   C   C.   A.   232. 

431)  ;  Bunney  v.  Poyntz.  4  B.  &  Ad.  ««  Bolton  v.  Lancashire  &  York- 

568;  Payne  v.  Shadbolt,  1  Camp.  shire  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  431,  440. 
427;     Hamburger     v.     Rodman,     9 


863 


SELLERS    LIEN    FOR    PURCHASE-MONEY. 


836 


made  in  some  form.^'  But  if  in  such  case  the  grain  be  stored 
in  an  elevator,  and  the  seller  delivers  to  the  buyer  an  order 
on  the  proprietor  of  the  elevator  or  upon  the  v^arehouseman, 
and  the  buyer  presents  the  order  to  the  proprietor  or  w^are- 
houseman,  and  the  latter  agrees  thenceforw^ard  to  hold  that 
quantity  for  the  buyer,  a  valid  title  with  constructive  posses- 
sion is  acquired  by  the  buyer,  and  the  seller's  lien  is  de- 
feated.^^ 

Trees  lying  on  the  land  of  a  third  person  were  sold,  the 
purchaser  having  the  privilege  of  removing  them  when  he 
pleased.  He  marked  the  trees,  ascertained  their  cubical  con- 
tents, and  removed  some  of  them.  It  was  held  that  the 
tiansfer  of  the  whole  was  complete,  and  that,  upon  the  bank- 
ruptcy of  the  purchaser,  the  vendor  could  not  enforce  any 
lien  upon  the  portion  not  removed.^^ 

§  836.  Rule  sometimes  stated. — The  rule  has  sometimes 
been  stated  to  be  that  the  delivery  of  part  of  the  goods  sold 
on  an  entire  contract  is  a  virtual  delivery  of  the  whole,  and 
vests  in  the  purchaser  the  entire  property;^*'  so  stated,  sub- 


s' Keeler  v.  Goodwin,  111  Mass. 
490. 

88  Keeler  v.  Goodwin,  111  Mass. 
490,  per  Wells,  J.;  Gushing  v. 
Breed,  14  Allen  (Mass.)  Zn,  92 
Am.   Dec.  111. 

89  Tansley  v.  Turner,  2  Bing. 
N.  Gas.  151 ;  and  see  Ex  parte 
Gwynne,  12  Ves.  379;  Gooper  v. 
Bill,  3  H.  &  C.  722. 

90  Slubey  v.  Heyward,  2  H.  Bl. 
504;  Hammond  v.  Anderson,  1  B. 
&  P.  (N.  R.)  69.  Pollock,  G.  B., 
referring  to  these  two  cases  in 
Tanner  v.  Scovell,  14  M.  &  W.  28, 
Zl,  says  they  are  the  only  ones, 
so  far  as  he  has  observed,  which 
bear  the  semblance  of  an  authori- 
ty that  a  mere  part  delivery  is 
sullicient  to  put  an  end  to  the  ven- 


dor's lien,  or  his  rights  to  stop- 
page in  transitu.  In  Ex  parte 
Gooper,  11  Gh.  Div.  68,  Brett,  L. 
J.,  said,  with  reference  to  these 
two  cases :  "It  seems  to  me  that 
in  the  former  case  the  ground  of 
decision  was  that  the  captain  of 
the  ship  had  altered  his  position 
from  that  of  a  mere  carrier,  and 
had  undertaken,  with  the  consent 
of  the  assignees  of  the  bill  of  lad- 
ing, to  hold  the  whole  of  the  car- 
go for  them;  and,  in  the  latter 
case  the  wharfinger,  who  for  a 
time  had  held  for  the  persons  who 
had  put  the  goods  into  his  hands, 
had  altered  his  position,  and,  with 
the  consent  of  the  person  to 
whom  the  goods  were  transferred, 
had  agreed  to  hold  them  no  longer 


837 


LIENS. 


864 


ject,  however,  to  qualifications,  depending  upon  the  terms  of 
the  particular  contracts  and  the  intention  of  the  parties.  "As. 
for  instance,"  says  Judge  Wilde,^^  "if  goods  are  sold  by 
weight  or  measure,  and  a  part  is  weighed  or  measured  and 
delivered,  and  a  part  not,  the  property  in  the  goods  not 
weighed  or  measured  still  remains  in  the  vendor  ;^^  or  if  any- 
thing remains  to  be  done  by  the  vendor  before  delivery  as  to 
the  part  not  delivered;'^"  or  if  a  part  is  retained  by  the  vendor 
until  the  price  shall  be  paid;  or  if  the  goods  are  to  be  paid 
for  on  delivery,  and  a  part  only  is  paid  for  and  delivered.  In 
all  these  cases  the  property  in  the  part  not  delivered  will  not 
vest  in  the  vendee." 

§  837.    Intention  to  separate  goods  from  other  goods. — 

The  rule  as  above  stated  applies  only  where  there  was  no  in- 
tention to  separate  the  particular  part  delivered  from  the  re- 
mainder. In  that  case  the  incipient  or  inchoate  delivery  will 
amount  to  a  determination  of  the  vendor's  lien.  Chief  Baron 
Pollock,  reviewing  the  early  cases  upon  this  point,  says  of 
the  leading  case  of  Slubey  v.  Heyward,^"*  that  the  part  de- 
livery of  the  cargo  was  in  truth  a  delivery  of  the  whole  cargo, 
for  each  part  was  taken  away  with  the  intention  to  take  pos- 
session of  the  whole,  and  not  to  separate  the  part  that  was 


for  the  person  who  had  put  them 
into  his  hands,  but  for  the  vendee. 
In  both  cases  there  was  an  attorn- 
ment by  the  person  who  held  the 
goods,  and  unless  something- 
equivalent  to  an  attornment  is 
shown  on  the  part  of  the  carrier, 
so  that  he  has  altered  his  position 
from  that  of  carrier,  and  holds 
them  in  another  capacity,  it  seems 
to  me  the  transitus  can  not  be  at 
an  end."  Parks  v.  Hall,  2  Pick. 
(Mass.)  206;  Ex  parte  Gwynne,  12 
Ves.  379. 


01  Parks  V.  Hall,  2  Pick. 
(Mass.)  206. 

^•2  Citing  Hanson  v.  Meyer,  6 
East  614. 

93  Citing  Dixon  v.  Yates,  5  B.  & 
Ad.  313;  Simmons  v.  Swift,  5  B. 
&  C.  857;  Young  v.  Austin,  6  Pick. 
(Mass.)  280;  Merrill  v.  Hunnewell, 
13  Pick.  (Mass.)  213;  Riddler  v. 
\'arnum,  20   Pick.    (Mass.)   280. 

94  2H.  Bl.  504.  Lord  Tenterden, 
referring  to  this  case  in  Bunney 
V.  Poyntz,  4  B.  &  Ad.  568,  571.  says 
that  that  was  "the  delivery  of  part 


865 


SELLER  S   LIEN    FOR    PURCHASE-MONEY. 


837 


delivered  from  the  remainder.  In  Jones  v.  Jones,^^  also,  the 
vendee,  who  was  an  assignee  under  a  trust  deed,  took  pos- 
session of  part  of  a  cargo,  with  the  intention  of  obtaining 
possession  of  the  whole,  for  the  purposes  of  the  trust,  and 
therefore  such  taking  possession  of  a  part  put  an  end  to  the 
transaction. 

In  illustration  of  this  rule  may  be  mentioned  a  case  which 
turned  upon  the  legal  effect  of  a  partial  delivery  of  a  cargo  of 
wheat.  Bills  of  lading  of  the  wheat  were  transmitted  by  the 
seller  to  the  purchaser,  whose  assignee,  upon  the  arrival  of 
the  ship,  received  delivery  of  part  of  the  cargo,  when  the 
vendor  ordered  the  master  not  to  deliver  the  residue.  The 
court  held  that  the  vendor  had  no  authority  to  countermand 
his  order  of  delivery,  for  a  delivery  of  a  part  was  the  delivery 
of  the  whole,  there  appearing  to  be  no  intention,  either  previ- 
ous to  or  at  the  time  of  the  delivery,  to  separate  part  of  the 
cargo  from  the  rest.^^ 


of  the  cargo,  made  in  the  prog- 
ress of,  and  with  a  view  to,  the 
delivery  of   the  whole." 

95  8  M.  &  W.  431;  in  Ex  parte 
Cooper,  11  Ch.  Div.  68,  11, 
Lord  Justice  Cotton,  referring 
to  this  case,  said:  "It  looks 
at  first  a  little  more  like  one 
which  supports  the  general 
proposition  which  is  put  forward. 
But  when  it  is  examined  it 
amounts  only  to  this,  that  the 
court  came  to  the  conclusion  as  a 
matter  of  fact  that  there  was  an 
intention  to  take  the  whole  when 
part  only  was  actually  taken;  and, 
that  being  so,  it  is  only  an  au- 
thority that  where  a  purchaser 
taking  part  shows  an  intention,  ac- 
quiesced in  by  the  carrier,  to  re- 
ceive and  take  possession  of  the 
whole,  that  is  a  constructive  pos- 
session of  the  whole  by  the  acqui- 

55 


escence  of  both  parties.  It  does 
not  in  any  way  support  the  propo- 
sition that  the  mere  delivery  of  a 
part  of  the  cargo,  as  in  the  pres- 
ent case,  can  be  looked  upon  as  a 
constructive  delivery  of  the  whole 
or  as  putting  the  consignee  in  con- 
structive possession  of  the  whole 
so  as  to  defeat  the  vendor's  right 
to  stop  in  transitu,  or  the  right  of 
the  consignee,  if  he  so  desires  un- 
der the  circumstances,  to  put  an 
end  to  the  contract." 

96  Slubey  v.  Heyward,  2  H.  Bl. 
504.  In  Betts  v.  Gibbins,  2  Ad.  & 
El.  57,  IZ,  Taunton,  J.,  in  reply 
to  counsel,  who  asserted  that  a 
delivery  of  a  part  amounted  to  a 
delivery  of  the  whole  only  when 
the  circumstances  showed  that  it 
was  meant  as  such,  said  :  "No ;  on 
the  contrary,  a  partial  delivery  is 
a    delivery    of    the    whole,    unless 


§    838  LIENS.  866 

§  838.  Delivery  of  part  only  of  goods  sold  will  not  divest 
seller's  lien.— A\'herever  an  intention  appears  to  separate  a 
part  of  the  goods  from  the  residue,  delivery  of  a  part  only 
will  not  divest  the  seller's  lien  upon  such  residue.^^  If,  for 
instance,  goods  be  sold  to  be  paid  for  on  delivery,  and  the 
seller,  as  a  favor,  allows  the  purchaser  to  carry  away  part  of 
them  without  payment,  there  is  no  waiver  of  the  condition, 
but  the  seller  is  entitled  at  any  time  to  assert  his  rights,  and 
detained  the  remainder  of  the  goods  until  payment  is  made 
according  to  the  terms  of  the  sale.  Such  a  delivery  of  a  part 
is  a  separation  of  that  part  from  the  whole  bulk,  and  not  an 
inchoate  delivery  of  the  whole.®® 

A  vendee  taking  possession  of  a  part  of  the  goods  sold,  not 
meaning  thereby  to  take  possession  of  the  whole,  but  to 
separate  that  part,  and  to  take  possession  of  that  part  only, 
puts  an  end  to  the  vendor's  lien  only  with  respect  to  that 
part  and  no  more;  and  the  right  of  lien  and  the  right  of  stop- 
page in  transitu  on  the  remainder  still  continue.®^ 

§  839.  Lien  of  seller  not  affected  by  the  purchaser  pledg- 
ing the  goods  to  a  third  person. — If  during  the  delivery  of 
goods  sold,  and  before  it  is  completed,  the  purchaser  sells  or 
pledges  them  to  a  third  person,  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
original  vendor,  the  lien  of  the  latter  is  not  afifected.  Thus, 
where  a  raft  of  lumber  upon  the  Hudson  River  was  sold  to 
be  paid  for  on  delivery  upon  the  dock  of  a  lumber  dealer  at 

circumstances  show  that  it  is  not  Hams  v.  Moore,  5  N.  H.  235;  Buck- 
so  meant."  This  dictum  is  ques-  ley  v.  Furniss,  17  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
tioned  by  Pollock,  C.   B.,  in  Tan-      504;     Haskell     v.     Rice,     11     Gray 


ner  v.  Scovell,  14  M.  &  W.  28,  Zl. 
97  Valpy  V.  Oakley,  16  Q.  B.  941 
Griffiths  V.  Perry,  1  El.  &  El.  680 
Miles  V.  Gorton,  2  Cr.  &  M.  504: 
Leonard  v.  Sheard,  1  El.  &  El 
667,  per  Crompton,  J. ;  Hanson  v 
Meyer,  6  East  614;  Bunney  v 
Poyntz,  4  B.  &  Ad.  568,  571;  Wil- 


(Mass.)       240;       Wanamaker       v. 
Yerkes,   70  Pa.   St.  443. 

98  Dixon  V.  Yates,  5  B.  &  Ad. 
313,  per  Parke,  J. ;  Townley  v. 
Crump,  5  Nev.  &  M.  606. 

99  Tanner  v.  Scovell,  14  M.  & 
W.  28,   38,   per   Pollock,   C.   B. 


867  seller's  lien  for  purchase-money.  §  841 

Albany,  after  nearly  all  the  lumber  had  been  taken  from  the 
water  and  piled  upon  the  dock,  the  seller,  having  learned  that 
the  buyer  had  absconded,  forbade  the  piling  of  any  more  of 
it  upon  the  dock.  When  part  of  the  lumber  had  been  piled 
upon  the  dock,  the  buyer  obtained  an  advance  upon  it  from 
the  owner  of  the  dock,  and  the  latter  claimed  title  to  the 
lumber.  But  it  was  held  that  the  vendor  was  entitled  to  the 
lumber  by  virtue  of  his  lien.  The  court  said  that  the  sale 
was  of  the  whole  raft  to  be  delivered  upon  the  dock,  that  the 
vendor  had  no  right  to  demand  payment  of  any  part  until 
the  whole  was  delivered,  and  that,  being  present  to  demand 
payment  as  soon  as  the  whole  should  be  placed  upon  the 
dock,  he  had  not  lost  his  lien.^ 

§  840.  Vendor  may  retain  the  part  of  the  goods  not  deliv- 
ered for  whole  bill. — The  vendor  may  retain  the  goods  still 
in  his  hands,  not  only  for  the  price  of  such  goods,  but  also 
for  the  price  of  any  part  of  the  goods  already  delivered.^  The 
insolvency  of  the  purchaser  does  not  put  an  end  to  the  con- 
tract of  sale,  but,  if  the  insolvent  has  any  beneficial  inter- 
est under  it,  it  is  the  right  of  his  assignee,  in  behalf  of  his 
creditors,  to  complete  the  contract  by  paying  the  remainder 
of  the  unpaid  purchase-money.  The  assignee  cannot,  how- 
ever, claim  damages  for  the  nondelivery  of  an  instalment  of 
the  goods  sold,  without  tendering  payment  not  only  of  the 
price  of  that,  but  also  of  the  unpaid  price  of  a  prior  instal- 
ment already  delivered. 

§  841.  Sale  by  purchaser  out  of  possession  will  not  affect 
seller's  lien. — A  purchaser  who  has  not  obtained  possession 
cannot  defeat  the  seller's  lien  by  making  a  sale  to  another 
person.*^  The  purchaser  without  possession  can  confer  no 
better  title  than  he  has  himself.     An  invoice  of  the  goods 

1  Palmer  v.  Hand,  13  Johns.   (N.      289. 

Y.)  434,  7  Am.  Dec.  392.  3  Dixon  v.  Yates,  5  B.  &  Ad.  313. 

2  Ex  parte  Chalmers,  L.  R.  8  Ch. 


§    842  LIENS.  868 

without  actual  possession,  or  a  delivery  order  which  shows 
his  right  of  possession,  does  not  enable  the  purchaser  to  con- 
fer a  title  upon  another  as  against  the  seller's  lien.^ 

A  resale  of  the  goods  to  a  third  person  by  the  first  pur- 
chaser does  not  affect  the  rights  of  the  unpaid  vendor,  unless 
he  has  in  some  way  estopped  himself  from  asserting  them, 
as  against  the  subpurchaser,^ 

A  bill  of  lading  in  the  hands  of  the  purchaser  enables  him 
to  sell  and  confer  a  title  upon  a  purchaser  from  him.  But  a 
vendor  may  preserve  his  lien  by  consigning  goods  to  an 
agent  or  bailee  instead  of  the  purchaser,  and  taking  a  bill  of 
lading  to  the  vendor's  own  order.  Then,  upon  the  arrival  of 
the  goods  at  their  destination,  the  bailee  may  take  possession 
of  them  and  hold  them  until  payment  is  made.  If,  in  such 
case,  the  vendor  draws  against  the  goods  and  obtains  a  dis- 
count of  his  draft  upon  a  pledge  of  the  bill  of  lading,  and, 
the  purchaser  having  become  insolvent,  the  pledgee  attaches 
the  goods,  upon  their  arrival  at  their  destination,  as  the  pur- 
chaser's goods,  such  attachment  will  have  no  effect  upon  the 
lien  of  the  vendor,  but  he  may  pay  the  draft,  and  by  virtue 
of  his  lien  replevy  the  goods  from  the  attaching  officer.^ 

§  842.  Estoppel  of  seller  to  assert  a  lien. — The  unpaid 
seller  may  by  his  acts  or  declarations  estop  himself  from 
claiming  his  lien  as  against  a  subpurchaser.'^  Thus,  timber 
lying  at  the  owner's  wharf  was  sold  and  marked  with  the 
initials  of  the  buyer,  who  gave  his  acceptances  on  time  for 
the  price.     Before  the  acceptances  became  due,  the  buyer 

4  Dixon  V.  Yates,  5  B.  &  Ad.  313;  58;  Haskell  v.  Rice,  11  Gray 
Ware  River  R.  Co.  v.  Vibbard,  114  (Mass.)  240;  Hamburger  v.  Rod- 
Mass.  447;  Hamburger  v.  Rodman,      man,  9  Daly  (N.  Y.)  93. 

9  Daly   (N.   Y.)   93;   Vogelsang  v 
Fisher,  128  Mo.  386,  28  S.  W.  873 

5  Craven  v.  Ryder,  6  Taunt.  433 
Miles  v.  Gorton,  2  Cr.  &  M.  504: 
Farmeloe  v.  Bain,  1  C.  P.  Div.  445 
Townley  v.   Crump,   4  Ad.   &   El 


c  Seymour  v.  Newton,  105  Mass. 
272. 

7  Stoveld  v.  Hughes,  14  East  308; 
Parker  v.  Crittenden,  2)7  Conn.  148; 
McElmee  v.  Metropolitan  Lumber 
Co.,  69  Fed.  302,  16  C.  C.  A.  232. 


869  seller's  lien  for  purchase-money.  §  843 

sold  all  the  timber  except  a  small  part  which  had  been  deliv- 
ered to  him.  The  last  purchaser  notified  the  original  vendor 
of  his  purchase,  who  answered,  "Very  well;"  and  the  pur- 
chaser went  with  him  to  the  wharf,  and  there  marked  the 
timber  with  his  own  initials,  and  directed  the  vendor  to  send 
no  more  of  the  timber  to  the  original  vendee.  Upon  the  in- 
solvency of  the  latter,  it  was  held  that  the  vendor  could 
not  retain  the  lumber  against  the  last  purchaser.^  Lord  El- 
lenborough,  referring  to  the  assent  of  the  vendor  to  the  last 
purchase  in  saying  "Very  well,"  and  in  making  no  objection 
to  the  marking  of  the  timber  in  the  name  of  the  last  pur- 
chaser, said:  "If  that  be  not  an  executed  delivery,  I  know 
not  what  is  so."  The  other  judges  also  declared  that  there 
was  an  express  assent  to  such  transfer  of  the  lumber,  and 
that  the  seller  could  not  retain  it. 

§  843.    Estoppel  of  seller  to  assert  lien — Illustrations. — A 

purchaser  of  barley,  which  was  in  the  seller's  warehouse,  re- 
sold a  part  of  it,  and  gave  to  the  purchaser  a  delivery  order 
addressed  to  the  station-master.  The  second  purchaser  sent 
this  order  to  the  station-master,  saying,  "Please  confirm  this 
transfer."  The  station-master  showed  the  delivery  order  to 
the  seller,  who  still  had  possession  of  the  barley,  and  he  said, 
"All  right.  When  you  get  the  forwarding  note  I  will  put  the 
barley  on  the  line."  The  first  purchaser  became  bankrupt, 
and  the  seller  refused  to  deliver  the  grain.  The  Court  of 
Queen's  Bench  held  that  the  seller  was  estopped  by  his  state- 
ment to  the  station-master  from  denying  that  the  property 
had  passed  to  the  second  purchaser;  for,  by  making  such 
statement,  he  induced  the  plaintiff  to  rest  satisfied  under  the 
belief  that  the  property  had  passed,  and  so  to  alter  his  posi- 
tion by  abstaining  from  demanding  back  the  money  which 
he  had  paid  to  his  vendor.^ 

8  Stoveld  V.  Hughes,  14  East  308.  »  Knights  v.  Wiffen,  L.  R.  5  Q. 
For  a  similar  case,  see  Chapman  B.  660.  For  similar  cases,  see 
V.    Shepard,   39   Conn.   413.  Woodley  v.   Coventry,  2  H.   &   C. 


§    844  LIENS.  870 

A  case  not  distinguishable  from  the  foregoing  was  decided 
upon  the  same  grounds  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New 
York.  A  purchaser  of  a  quantity  of  cotton  in  store  pledged 
the  invoice,  and  gave  to  the  pledgee  an  order  upon  the  ware- 
houseman. The  pledgee  presented  the  order  to  the  ware- 
houseman, who,  with  the  consent  of  the  vendor,  gave  to  the 
pledgee  the  ordinary  warehouse  receipt  for  the  cotton.  Three 
days  afterward  the  purchaser  of  the  cotton  failed,  without 
having  paid  for  it.  It  was  held  that  the  seller  was  estopped 
from  claiming  the  cotton  as  against  the  pledgee,  because  the 
latter  had  a  right  to  rely  upon  the  warehouse  receipt.  Had 
the  pledgee  not  obtained  the  warehouse  receipt,  he  might 
have  resorted  to  some  process  to  recover  the  loan,  or  to  se- 
cure some  indemnity  against  loss.^^ 

§  844.  Estoppel  of  seller. — A  seller  is  estopped  from  set- 
ting up  his  lien,  as  against  a  purchaser  from  his  vendee,  by 
recognizing  such  purchaser's  delivery  order,  and  delivering 
several  parcels  to  him  without  objection.  Thus,  sugar  lying 
in  the  seller's  warehouse  was  sold,  and  the  buyer's  accept- 
ances taken  in  payment.  The  buyer  resold  the  sugar,  and 
gave  a  delivery  order  to  the  purchaser,  who  handed  it  to  the 
original  vendor,  and  received  from  him  a  part  of  the  sugar. 
Afterward  this  purchaser,  on  several  occasions,  gave  his  own 
delivery  orders  on  the  vendor  for  portions  of  the  goods.  Be- 
fore the  acceptances  became  due,  the  first  purchaser  became 
insolvent,  and  the  vendor  refused  to  deliver  the  remainder 
of  the  goods  to  the  last  purchaser.  It  was  held  that  he  could 
not  detain  the  goods;  that,  by  accepting  his  buyer's  delivery 
order  without  making  claim  to  any  lien  upon  the  goods,  he 
had  recognized  the  second  purchaser  as  having  the  right  of 
property  and  of  possession  of  the  goods,  and  that  he  could 
not   set  up  any  lien  upon  the   goods  as  against  such  pur- 

164';    Pooley  v.    Great    Eastern   R.      113,  citing  and  approving  Knights 
Co.,  34  L.  T.  (N.  S.)  537.  v.  Wiffen,  L.  R.  5  Q.   B.  660. 

lOVoorhis  v.  Olmstead,  66  N.  Y. 


871  seller's  lien  for  purchase-money.  §  845 

chaser.^ ^  Lord  Campbell,  C.  J.,  said:  "The  title  of  the  pur- 
chaser being  once  acknowledged  by  the  warehouseman,  the 
purchaser  has  a  right  to  treat  the  warehouseman  as  his 
agent ;  and  the  latter  cannot  afterward  set  up  a  right  in  re- 
spect of  a  third  party.  The  right  claimed  by  the  vendor  is 
analogous  to  a  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu;  and,  as  to  that, 
there  are  many  cases  in  which  it  has  been  decided  that,  after 
the  first  vendor  has  parted  with  the  possession  of  the  goods 
to  the  second  vendee,  and  acknowledged  his  title,  he  cannot 
afterward  stop  them  in  transitu  on  account  of  any  claim 
against  the  first  vendee." 

§  845.  Seller's  estoppel  by  representations  to  the  subpur- 
chaser.— In  such  cases  the  result  is  the  same,  whether  the 
jdbvendee  has  paid  his  purchase-money  before  or  after  the 
acts  or  representations  of  the  vendor  which  estop  him,  as 
against  such  subvendee,  from  setting  up  his  lien.  If  at  the 
time  of  such  acts  or  representations  the  subvendee  has  not 
paid  the  price  of  the  goods,  but  in  consequence  of  such  acts 
or  representations  he  alters  his  position  by  paying  the  price 
either  wholly  or  in  part,  the  vendor  is  held  to  be  bound  by 
his  acts  or  declarations.^^  If  at  the  time  of  such  acts  or 
declarations  the  subvendee  has  already  paid  the  price  of  the 
goods,  nevertheless  his  position  may  be  altered  thereby;  for 
he  may  be  induced  to  rest  satisfied  that  the  property  had 
passed  to  him,  and  would  take  no  steps  to  demand  back  the 
money  he  had  paid  to  the  first  purchaser  before  he  became 
bankrupt.  If  once  the  fact  is  established  that  the  subvendee's 
position  is  altered  by  relying  upon  the  acts  or  declarations  of 
the  vendor,  and  taking  no  further  steps,  the  latter  is  es- 
topped, just  as  he  is  in  the  case  first  stated. ^^ 

11  Pearson  v.  Dawson,  EL,  Bl.  &  i3  Knights  v.  Wiffen,  L.  R.  5  Q. 
El.  448.  B.    660.      See    Stonard    v.    Dunkin, 

12  Woodley  v.  Coventry,  2  H.  &  2  Camp.  344;  Hawes  v.  Watson,  2 
C.  164.  B.  &  C.  540. 


§    846  LIENS.  872 

§  846.  Seller  estopped  by  permitting  vendee  to  assume  to 
be  owner. — If  the  owner  of  goods  in  any  way  allows  them  to 
be  so  situated  that  a  stranger  has  a  right  to  assume  that  the 
title  is  in  another,  and  on  the  faith  of  such  indicia  of  owner- 
ship deals  with  the  apparent  owner,  the  true  owner  is  es- 
topped from  asserting  his  title. ^'^  But  in  such  case  it  is  an 
essential  part  of  the  estoppel  that  the  third  party  dealt  with 
the  apparent  owner  on  the  faith  of  the  indicia  of  ownership 
with  which  the  owner  has  invested  him.  The  owner  is  not 
estopped  if  he  has  not  invested  another  with  any  indicia  of 
ownership,  and  no  third  party  has  in  consequence  parted 
with  his  money  or  assumed  any  liability.  Thus,  where  one 
sold  wheat  to  be  paid  for  on  delivery  on  a  car  at  a  railroad 
station,  and  the  buyer,  before  any  wheat  had  been  placed  on 
board  the  car,  by  false  representations  obtained  from  the 
railroad  company  a  bill  of  lading  of  the  wheat,  and  afterward 
the  seller  of  the  wheat,  without  any  knowledge  of  the  fraudu- 
lent act  of  the  buyer,  put  the  wheat  into  the  car,  it  was  held 
that  he  had  not  delivered  the  wheat,  but  that  he  had  the 
right  to  move  it  if  the  price  were  not  paid,  both  as  against 
the  railroad  company  and  as  against  the  buyer.^^ 

If  a  seller  remaining  in  possession  of  the  goods  shows  them 
to  a  third  person  as  the  goods  of  the  vendee  without  claiming 
any  lien  upon  them,  and  such  third  person  thereupon  buys 
the  goods  of  the  vendee  and  pays  for  them,  the  seller  may  be 

14  Marsh  v.  Titus,  3  Hun  (N.  Y.)  his  contract   from  record  and  can 

550,    6   Thomp.    &    C.    (N.    Y.)    29.  not    enforce    his    reserved    lien    as 

Where  a  contract  providing  for  the  against     creditors     who     extended 

sale  of  growing  timber  and  reserv-  the      purchaser      credit      on      the 

ing    a    lien    thereon    for    purchase-  strength  of  his  ownership  of  such 

money  is  withheld  from  record  so  timber.      Clark  v.    B.    B.    Richards 

as  to  give  the  purchaser  credit  and  Lumber    Co.,   68    Minn.    282,    71    N. 

such  purchaser  thereafter  becomes  W.  389. 

indebted    and   insolvent,    the    seller  ^^  Toledo,    Wabash    &    Western 

acts    fraudulently    in    withholding  R.   Co.  v.   Gilvin,  81   111.  511. 


873  seller's  lien  for  purchase-money.  §  848 

estopped  as  against  him  from  asserting  his  lien  upon  the  sub- 
sequent insolvency  of  the  vendee.^'' 

§  847.  Seller  retains  lien  in  case  of  sale  by  vendee  when 
he  has  not  assented  to  the  sale. — But  the  seller  retains  his 
lien  as  against  a  subpurchaser  if  he  has  in  no  way  assented  to 
or  induced  the  resale.  Logs  were  sold  on  credit,  with  an 
agreement  that  they  should  remain  in  the  seller's  yard  for  a 
certain  time,  free  of  storage,  the  purchaser  being  free  to  send 
for  them  whenever  he  pleased.  At  the  request  of  the  pur- 
chaser, and  to  enable  him  to  resell,  an  invoice  containing  an 
enumeration  of  the  measurement  of  the  logs  was  delivered  to 
him  by  the  seller.  Subsequently  the  purchaser  resold  the 
logs  to  one  who  paid  him  the  price  in  cash,  without  having 
seen  the  bill  given  by  the  original  vendor,  or  having  com- 
municated with  the  latter  in  any  way  respecting  the  owner- 
ship of  the  logs;  although  before  such  resale  he  was  seen  by 
one  of  the  original  vendors  in  the  yard,  engaged  in  an  exami- 
nation of  the  logs,  in  company  with  the  original  purchaser. 
Part  of  the  logs  were  delivered  on  a  verbal  order  of  the  origi- 
nal purchaser,  who  shortly  afterward  failed.  It  was  held  that 
the  lien  of  the  vendor  attached  to  the  logs  remaining  in  his 
possession;  and  as  the  resale  did  not  appear  to  have  been 
made  with  his  knowledge  or  approval,  nor  in  any  way  induced 
by  him,  the  case  did  not  come  within  the  application  of  the 
rule  that,  where  one  of  two  innocent  persons  must  sufTer  by 
the  act  of  a  third,  he  who  has  enabled  such  third  person  to 
occasion  the  loss  must  himself  bear  it.^" 

§  848.  Waiver  of  seller's  lien. — A  vendor's  lien  is  waived 
when  the  parties  make  any  agreement  inconsistent  with  the 

i'5  Hunt!  V.  Bowne,  2  Caines  (N.  giving  such  privilege,   if  the  ven- 

Y.)    38.  dor  permits  it  to  be  sold  in  a  con- 

1'^  Hamburger  v.  Rodman,  9  Daly  fused     mass     with     other     things. 

(N.   Y.)   93,   9   Rep.   417.     But   the  Payne    v.    Buford,    106    La.    83,    30 

vendor  will   lose   his  privilege  on  So.  263. 
machinery    sold    under    a    statute 


§    849  LIENS.  874 

existence  of  such  lien,  or  from  which  a  waiver  may  be  fairly 
inferred. ^^  There  may  be  an  actual  waiver  of  the  lien,  and 
yet  the  court  may  not  be  justified  in  finding  a  waiver  as  a 
matter  of  law.  In  ordinary  cases,  where  the  contract  of  sale 
and  the  agreement  of  the  parties  made  in  connection  with  it 
are  merely  verbal,  the  question  should  be  submitted  to  the 
jury  whether  the  lien  was  intended  and  understood  by  the 
parties  to  be  waived  or  not.  And  so,  if  any  agreement  not 
in  writing  is  made  after  the  sale  afifecting  the  lien,  the  jury 
should  find,  from  this  and  all  the  attendant  circumstances, 
what  the  understanding  of  the  parties  was  concerning  it.^^ 

§  849.  Seller  waives  lien  by  attaching  the  goods  as  the 
property  of  the  purchaser. — A  seller  of  goods  waives  his  lien 
by  attaching  them  as  the  property  of  the  purchaser,  in  a  suit 
against  him.  The  attachment  is  an  affirmance  of  the  sale  and 
delivery  under  it.^^  But  a  suit  by  the  seller  against  the  pur- 
chaser for  the  price  of  the  goods,  where  these  have  remained 
in  the  seller's  possession,  is  no  waiver  of  the  lien.^^  An  ad- 
mission or  averment  in  the  petition  that  the  goods  had  been 
delivered  is  not  conclusive  against  the  seller  when  in  fact  he 
had  retained  possession,  but  was  ready  to  deliver  possession 
upon  payment  of  the  price.^^ 

§  850.  Giving  of  credit  by  seller  generally  waives  his  lien. — 

The  giving  of  credit  by  the  seller  generally  defeats  his  right 
of  lien;  for,  on  a  promise  to  pay  at  a  future  time,  the  buyer, 
in  the  absence  of  any  special  agreement  to  the  contrary,  is 
entitled  to  the  immediate  possession  of  the  goods,  and  he 
may  enforce  this  right  by  action. ^^     Accordingly,  the  taking 

18  Pickett  V.  Bullock,  52  N.  H.  21  Rhodes  v.  Mooney,  43  Ohio. 
354.  St.  421,  4  N.  E.  233. 

19  Pickett  V.  Bullock,  52  N.  H.  22  Rhodes  v.  Mooney,  43  Ohio 
354,  per  Sargent,  C.  J.  St.  421,  4  N.  E.  233. 

20  Heller  v.  Elliott,  45  N.  J.  L.  23  Spartali  v.  Benecke,  10  C.  B. 
564;  Leavy  v.  Kinsella,  39  Conn.  212;  Chase  v.  Westmore,  5  M.  & 
50.  S.    180;    Crawshay    v.    Homfray,    4 


8/5  seller's  lien  for  purchase-money.  §  851 

of  a  promissory  note  or  bill  of  exchange  payable  at  a  future 
day,  for  the  price  of  the  goods  sold,  operates  as  a  bar  to  the 
vendor's  right  of  lien.  The  giving  of  a  credit  of  any  kind  for 
the  price  of  the  goods  sold  implies  the  right  of  the  buyer  to 
take  them  away  into  his  own  actual  possession;  and  when 
he  exercises  this  right,  the  vendor's  right  of  lien  is  gone,  this 
being  a  right  incident  to  the  possession.  "If  goods  are  sold 
upon  credit,  and  nothing  is  agreed  upon  as  to  the  time  of  de- 
livering the  goods,  the  vendee  is  immediately  entitled  to  the 
possession,  and  the  right  of  possession  and  the  right  of  prop- 
erty vest  at  once  in  him;  but  his  right  of  possession  is  not 
absolute,  it  is  liable  to  be  defeated  if  he  becomes  insolvent 
before  he  obtains  possession."^* 

§  851.  Admissibility  of  evidence. — Whether  evidence  is  ad- 
missible of  a  usage  in  a  particular  trade,  that  the  seller  is  not 
bound  to  deliver  goods  without  payment,  in  case  a  term  of 
credit  is  given  by  a  written  contract  of  sale  not  ambiguous 
in  its  language,  is  a  question  upon  which  there  has  been 
some  diversity  of  opinion.  Thus,  where  thirty  bales  of  goats' 
wool  were  sold,  "to  be  paid  for  by  cash  in  one  month,  less 
five  per  cent,  discount,"  it  was  held  that  the  vendee  was  en- 
titled to  have  the  goods  delivered  to  him  immediately,  or 
within  a  reasonable  time,  but  was  not  bound  to  pay  for  them 

B.  &  Aid.  SO;  Houlditch  v.  Desan-  W.  560;  Baker  v.  Dewey,  IS  Grant 

ges,  2  Stark.  ZZ7 ;   Feise  v.  Wray,  Ch.   (U.   C.)  668.     The   seller  does 

3  East  93;   Edwards  v.   Brewer,  2  not  waive  his  lien  or  his  right  to 

M.  &  W.  375;  Cowell  v.  Simpson,  possession  of  goods  by  extending 

16   Ves.   275;   Jones   v.   Thurloe,   8  right  to  the  property  is  to  remain 

Mod.    172;    Hewison   v.    Guthrie,    2  in   the   purchaser   during  such    ex- 

Bing.    N.    Gas.   755,   759;    Dempsey  tension.     Badham   v.   Brabham,   54 

V.    Carson,    11    U.    C.    C.    P.    462;  S.   Car.   400,   Z2   S.    E.  444.     As   to 

Leonard  v.  Davis,  1  Black  (U.  S.)  loss    of    lien    by   a    sale    on    time, 

476,  17  L.   ed.  222;  Arnold  v.   De-  see  Redenbaugh  v.  Kelton,  130  Mo. 

lano,    4    Gush.    (Mass.)    33,    39,    SO  558,  32  S.  W.  67. 

Am.  Dec.  754,  per  Shaw,  G.  J.;  Mc-  24  Bloxam    v.    Sanders,    4    B.    & 

Nail  V.  Ziegler,  68  111.  224;  Thomp-  G.  941,  per   Bayley,  J. 
son   V.   Wedge,   50  Wis.   642,   7   N. 


§    852  LIENS.  876 

until  the  end  of  the  month,  and  that  evidence  of  a  usage  to 
the  contrary  was  inadmissible.^^  "The  objection  to  the  ad- 
missibility of  the  evidence,  is,  that  the  incident  sought  to  be 
annexed  by  such  evidence  is  inconsistent  with,  and  contra- 
dictory to,  the  express  terms  of  the  contract,  and  is  by  those 
terms,  if  not  expressly,  certainly  by  implication  excluded."^*' 
But  this  decision  was  overruled  by  the  Exchequer  Cham- 
ber in  Field  v.  Lelean.^"  There  a  sale  was  made  by  one 
broker  to  another  of  shares  in  a  mine,  "payment  half  in  two 
months,  and  a  half  in  four  months."  It  was  held  that  evi- 
dence was  admissible  of  a  custom  among  brokers  in  mining 
shares,  that,  in  contracts  relating  to  the  sale  and  purchase  of 
such  shares,  the  delivery  takes  place  at  the  time  appointed 
for  payment.  The  usage  was  regarded  as  not  varying  the 
time  of  payment  as  fixed  by  the  contract  of  sale,  but  as  de- 
termining the  time  of  delivery. 

§  852.  Allowing  credit  not  a  waiver  when  seller  retains 
possession. — But  if  the  buyer  allows  the  goods  to  remain  in 
the  seller's  possession  until  the  period  of  credit  has  elapsed 
and  then  fails  to  make  payment,  the  seller's  lien  revives,  and 
may  be  asserted  in  the  same  manner  as  it  might  have  been 
had  no  credit  been  given,  and  he  may  hold  the  goods  as  se- 
curity for  the  price.  Though  the  vendor  waives  his  lien  for 
the  price  by  giving  credit  for  it,  this  waiver  is  upon  the  im- 
plied condition  that  the  vendee  does  not  become  bankrupt 

25  Spartali  v.  Benecke,  10  C.  B.  against  the  admissibility  of  evi- 
212.  See  also,  Ford  v.  Yates,  2  dence  of  usage  in  this  case ;  but 
M.  &  G.  549.  that  decision  proceeds  on  what  ap- 

26  Spartali  v.  Benecke,  10  B.  C.  pears  to  me  to  be  the  mistaken 
212,  per  Wilde,  C.  J.  ground,   that  the   eflfect  of  the   in- 

2'?  6  H.  &  N.  617.     Wightman,  J.,  troduction   of  a  custom  as  to  the 

delivering    the    judgment    of    the  time  of  delivery  of  the  thing  sold 

court     of     common     pleas     in     the  v/ould  be  to  alter  or  vary  the  time 

case  of  Spartali  v.  Benecke,  10  C.  fixed   for  payment  by  the  written 

B.  212,  in  which  the  circumstances  contract,     whereas     the     time     for 

were   hardly   distinguishable    from  payment  would  not  be  altered,  and 

the   present,   is   no   doubt    directly  the  custom  would   only  affect  the 


8/7  seller's  lien  for  purchase-money.  §  853 

or  insolvent.^^  Thus,  if  the  owner  of  a  large  quantity  of 
wood,  lying  in  a  pile  upon  his  own  land,  sell  it  on  a  credit  of 
six  months,  with  an  agreement  that  the  purchaser  may  re- 
move it  within  a  year,  and  before  the  purchaser  removes  the 
wood  he  becomes  insolvent,  the  vendor  may  retain  the  wood 
against  the  assignee  in  insolvency  of  the  purchaser.^^ 

Where  a  sale  was  made  of  a  number  of  bales  of  drillings, 
which  were  to  be  delivered  to  the  purchaser  as  fast  as  he 
needed  them,  for  manufacturing  into  bags,  and  it  was  agreed 
that  the  purchaser  should  store  the  manufactured  bags  and 
deliver  the  warehouse  receipts  to  the  seller  in  pledge,  it  was 
held  that,  upon  the  delivery  of  the  goods  to  the  purchaser 
the  title  vested  in  him,  and  that  the  seller  had  no  lien  there- 
on, and  no  lien  on  the  manufactured  bags,  until  the  ware- 
house receipts  were  delivered  to  him.  The  agreement 
showed  that  the.seller  was  willing  to  trust  the  purchaser  for 
a  portion  of  the  goods,  and  that,  upon  his  pledging  the  bags 
manufactured  from  that  portion,  he  was  willing  to  trust  him 
for  another  portion.  If  the  seller  delivered  a  second  portion 
to  the  purchaser  without  requiring  a  delivery  in  pledge  of 
the  manufactured  bags,  this  was  a  waiver  of  the  condition, 
and  the  title  to  both  vested  absolutely  in  the  purchaser.^*^ 

853.  Taking  note  no  waiver  of  lien  where  seller  keeps 
possession  of  goods. — The  fact  that  the  vendor  has  taken  a 

time  for  delivery,  with  respect  to  Arnold  v.  Delano,  4  Cush.  (Mass.) 

which    the    written    contract    is    si-  33,  50  Am.  Dec.  754,  per  Shaw,  C. 

lent."  J.;    Milliken   v.    Warren,   57    Maine 

28  Grice    v.    Richardson,    3    App.  46;  Hamburger  v.  Rodman,  9  Daly 

Cas.  319;  Gunn  v.   Bolckow,  L.   R.  (N.   Y.)   93;   In     re     Batchelder,  2 

10    Ch.   491;    McEwan   v.    Smith,   2  Lowell    (U.   S.)   245,   Fed.   Cas.   No. 

H.     L.     Cas.     309;     Martindale     v.  1099;    Owens   v.    Weedman,  82    111. 

Smith,   1   Q.   B.  389,  395;   Dixon  v.  409;    Bohn   Mfg.   Co.  v.   Hynes,  83 

Yates,  5   B.   &  Ad.   313;   Castle   v.  Wis.  388,  53  N.  W.  684. 

Sworder,    5    H,    &    N.    281;    Miles  29  Arnold     v.     Delano,    4     Cush. 

V.    Gorton,   2    Cr.    &    M.    504;    Ex  (Mass.)  33;  Miles  v.  Gorton,  2  Cr. 

parte   Chalmers,   L.   R.  8   Ch.   289;  &   M.  504. 

Griffiths  V.  Perry,  1  El.  &  El.  680;  30  Hewlet  v.  Flint,  7  Cal.  264. 
Valpy   V.    Oakeley,    16   Q.    B.   941; 


§  853  LIENS.  878 

negotiable  note  or  bill  of  exchange  for  the  purchase-money 
does  not  defeat  his  lien  upon  the  subsequent  insolvency  of 
the  purchaser  before  he  has  taken  actual  possession  of  the 
goods. ^^  "When  the  bill  is  dishonored,  there  is  no  longer 
payment,  or  anything  which  can  be  considered  as  equivalent 
to  payment;  and  it  seems  to  me  that  the  assignee  of  the  bank- 
rupt cannot,  after  what  has  taken  place,  insist  on  delivery 
without  actual  payment."^-  A  bill  of  exchange,  taken  for 
the  price  of  goods  sold,  is  not  absolute  payment  therefor,  but 
conditional  on  its  being  honored  at  maturity.  "No  doubt,  if 
the  buyer  does  not  become  insolvent,  that  is  to  say,  if  he 
does  not  openly  proclaim  his  insolvency,  then  credit  is  given 
by  taking  the  bill ;  and  during  the  time  that  the  bill  is  cur- 
rent there  is  no  vendor's  lien,  and  the  vendor  is  bound  to  de- 
liver. But  if  the  bill  is  dishonored  before  delivery  has  been 
made,  then  the  vendor's  lien  revives;  or  if  the  purchaser  be- 
comes openly  insolvent  before  the  delivery  actually  takes 
place,  then  the  law  does  not  compel  the  vendor  to  deliver 
to  an  insolvent  purchaser."^^ 

The  fact  that  the  vendor  has  negotiated  acceptances  of  the 
vendee  for  the  price  of  the  goods  does  not  defeat  the  ven- 
dor's lien  upon  the  goods,  upon  the  subsequent  insolvency  of 
the  vendee  before  meeting  his  acceptances.^'*  This  is  cer- 
tainly the  rule  if  the  bills  are  not  secured  in  any  way,  and 
do  not  bear  the  name  of  any  third  person. 

31  Gunn  V.  Bolckow,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  34  Gunn  v.  Bolckow,  L.  R.  10  Ch. 
491;  Miles  v.  Gorton,  2  Cr.  &  M.  491.  In  Bunney  v.  Poyntz,  4  B. 
504;  Arnold  v.  Delano,  4  Gush.  &  Ad.  568,  the  fact  that  the  ven- 
(Mass.)  33,  44,  50  Am.  Dec.  754;  dor  had  taken  the  vendee's  prom- 
Thurston  v.  Blanchard,  22  Pick.  issory  note  for  the  price  of  goods 
(Mass.)  18,  33  Am.  Dec.  700;  Milli-  sold,  and  had  negotiated  it,  and  it 
ken  V.  Warren,  57  Maine  46.  was  still  outstanding,  was  regard- 

32  Miles  V.  Gorton,  2  Cr.  &  M.  ed  as  substantially  a  payment,  and 
504,  per   Bayley,  J.  it  was  consequently  held  that  the 

33  Gunn  V.  Bolckow,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  vendor  had  no  lien. 
491,  501,  per   Mellish,  J. 


8/9  seller's  lien  for  purchase-money.  §  856 

§  854.  Taking  negotiable  note  from  buyer  no  waiver  of 
seller's  lien. — The  taking  of  the  purchaser's  negotiable  note 
payable  on  demand  for  the  price  of  goods  does  not  divest  the 
seller  of  his  lien.^^ 

A  purchase-money  lien  is  of  course  waived  or  discharged 
by  payment  ;^*^  and  the  taking  of  the  note  of  another^'^  than 
the  purchaser  constitutes  payment,  and  not  security,  unless 
expressly  taken  as  collateral  for  the  price  of  the  goods,  v\rhen 
it  is  not  a  waiver  of  the  lien.^^ 

§  855.     Lien  waived  by  delivery  of  goods  sold  at  auction. — 

If  property  sold  at  auction  be  delivered  to  the  purchaser  on 
his  promise  to  pay  for  it  in  a  few  days,  without  any  reserva- 
tion of  the  title  by  the  vendor,  and  the  delivery  is  not  ob- 
tained by  fraud,  the  lien  is  waived,  just  as  it  is  in  any  case 
of  a  sale  and  delivery  of  property  on  credit.  Such  sale  and 
deHvery  pass  the  title,  and  it  is  not  divested  merely  because 
the  purchaser  fails  to  pay  for  the  property.^® 

§  856.  Parol  evidence  admissible  to  show  that  goods  were 
sold  on  credit. — If  goods  be  ordered  by  letter  without  men- 
tioning the  time  of  payment,  parol  evidence  is  admissible  to 
show  that  the  goods  were  supplied  on  credit,  the  letter  not 
being  a  valid  contract  within  the  statute  of  frauds. ^^ 

35  Clark  V.  Draper,  19  N.  H.  419.  Dummer  v.  Smedley,  110  Mich.  466, 
The  taking  of  judgment  on  a  note  68  N.  W.  260,  38  L.  R.  A.  490n. 
accepted  by  the  vendor  for  goods  Westinghouse  Electric  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
sold  is  not  a  waiver  of  his  lien  Citizens'  St.  R.  Co.,  24  Ky.  L.  334, 
when  the  vendor  holds  possession  68   S.   W.  463. 

of    the    goods.     Woodland    Co.    v.  ss  Campbell    Printing   Press   Co. 

Mendenhall,   82    Minn.   483,   85    N.  v.    Powell,   78   Tex.    53,    14    S.    W. 

W.  164,  83  Am.  St.  445.     See  also,  245;  Vogelsang  v.  Fisher,  128  Mo. 

Clark   V.    Erwin,   72   Miss.   926,    18  386,  28  S.  W.  873. 

So.  419;   Vogelsang  v.  Fisher,   128  39  Thompson  v.  Wedge,  50  Wis. 

Mo.  386,  28  S.  W.  873.  642,  7  N.  W.  560;  Singer  Mfg.  Co. 

36  Cory  V.  Barnes,  63  Vt.  456,  21  v.  Sammons,  49  Wis.  316,  5  N.  W. 
Atl.    384.  788;    Victor    Safe    &   Lock    Co.    v. 

37  Wisconsin  Marine,  &c..  Bank  Texas  State  Trust  Co.,  (Tex.  Civ. 
v.    Filer,   83    Mich.   496,  47   N.   W.  App.),  ^  S.   W.   1049. 

321;   Sears  v.   Smith,  2  Mich.  243;  40  Lockett   v.   Nicklin,  2   Ex.  93. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

THE  SELLER'S  RIGHT   OF  STOPPAGE   IN   TRANSITU. 


Sec.  Sec. 

857.  Right  of  seller  to  stop  goods      874. 

in  transitu. 

858.  The     right     of     stoppage     in      875. 

transitu  first  equitable  one. 

859.  Right  of  stoppage  in  transitu      876. 

not  recognized  by  civil  law. 

860.  Right  of  stoppage  in  transitu 

now  a  legal  right.  877. 

861.  Effect      of      exercising      the 

right. 

862.  Vendor     holding     goods     by      878. 

virtue   of   lien. 

863.  Vendor's  sale  of  the  goods. 

864.  Proof      of      vendor's      claim      879. 

made    against    vendee's    in- 
solvent   estate. 

865.  Resale    or    rescission    by   act      880. 

of   vendee. 

866.  Resale    or    rescission    of    the 

contract.  881. 

867.  Rescission     after      right     of 

stoppage  ceases  to  exist. 

868.  Upon      what      property      the 

right   may  be   exercised.  882. 

869.  Who  may  exercise  the  right 

of  stoppage  in  transitu. 

870.  Right  only  exercised  by  one      883. 

holding      the      relation      of 
vendor   to   the   consignee. 

871.  Stoppage  of  goods  consigned      884. 

to    factor. 

872.  Pledgee's      exercise      of     the 

right.  885. 

873.  Lienor  no  right  of  stoppage 

after  shipment  of  goods  to      886. 
owner. 


Surety  has  no  general  right 
of  stoppage. 

General  agent's  right  in  be- 
half   of   principal. 

Act  of  one  stopping  goods 
in  transitu  ratified  b  yven- 
dor. 

No  right  of  stoppage  where 
goods  have  been  fully  paid 
for. 

Right  of  stoppage  not  pre- 
vented by  acceptance  of 
vendee's  note. 

Right  cut  off  when  note,  or- 
der or  bill  of  third  person 
accepted    as    payment. 

Right  of  stoppage  not  pre- 
vented by  indebtedness  of 
vendor   to  vendee. 

Vendor's  right  of  stoppage 
in  transitu  not  affected  by 
part  payment  of  purchase- 
money. 

Contract  of  sale  not  re- 
scinded by  bankruptcy  of 
buyer. 

Vendor's  right  to  recover 
where  after  notice  goods 
are  delivered  to  bankrupt. 

Right  of  stoppage  in  tran- 
situ exercised  only  in  case 
of  buyer's  insolvency. 

Question  of  buyer's  insolv- 
ency is   for  the  jury. 

Vendor  bound  to  deliver 
goods   to   solvent   vendee. 


88o 


THE  SELLER  S  RIGHT  OF  STOPPAGE   IN   TRANSITU. 


Sec.  Sec. 

887.  When  insolvency  at  the  time      905. 

of   sale   immaterial. 

888.  Notice  of  vendor  to  carrier.      906. 

889.  Demand  by  vendor. 

890.  Vendor   may   claim   goods    in      907. 

the    hands    of    any    person 
having  their  charge. 

891.  Notice  to  agent  is  notice  to      908. 

the  carrier. 

892.  Notice      is      sufficient      when 

goods    are    still    in   a   ware-      909. 
house. 

893.  Duty    of    shipowner    to    noti- 

fy   ship's   master    of    notice      910. 
of   stoppage   given   him. 

894.  Vendor  gains  nothing  by  de-      911. 

manding    goods    from    ven- 
dee. 912. 

895.  No    proof    necessary   before 

demanding  goods  of  a  car- 
rier. 913. 

896.  Right  of  carrier  to  take  time 

to    investigate   authority  of 
vendor's  agent.  914. 

897.  Carrier  guilty  of  conversion 

by  ignoring  vendor's  notice.      915. 

898.  Duty  of  the  carrier  to  deter- 

mine which  of  two  different 
claimants  of  goods  had  the      916. 
better  right. 

899.  Liability    for    delivery    after 

notice.  917. 

900.  Vendor    must    pay    the    car- 

rier's  charges.  918. 

901.  Vendor's     right    of    stoppage 

prevails     against      carrier's 

lien  for  general  balance  of      919. 

account. 

902.  When  the   right  of  stoppage      920. 

in     transitu    may     be    exer- 
cised. 921. 

903.  Goods     shipped     to     seller's 

own  order. 

904.  Different  kinds  of  actual  de- 

livery. 


Right  of  vendor  when  tran- 
sit  has   not   commenced. 

Right  not  prevented  by  pro- 
curing   warehouse    receipt. 

Delivery  to  carrier  not  gen- 
erally constructive  delivery 
to  vendee. 

Not  material  that  the  car- 
rier has  Deen  designated 
by  the  vendee. 

Delivery  to  carrier  sometimes 
is  a  constructive  delivery 
to    the   purchaser. 

Delivery  to  carrier  may  be 
delivery  to   vendee. 

Delivery  on  board  of  the 
vendee's  ship. 

Right  exercised  even  where 
delivery  is  made  on  board 
vendee's  ship. 

Effect  where  bill  of  lading 
requires  delivery  to  ven- 
dor's order. 

Receipt  that  good?  are 
shipped  on  seller's  account. 

Bill  of  lading  not  conclusive 
proof  that  delivery  has 
been  made  to  vendee. 

Vendor  may  act  as  agent  of 
vendee  in  taking  bill  of 
lading. 

Transit  continues  until 
goods  arrive  at  destination. 

Transit  not  ended  by  the  ar- 
rival of  vessel  at  port  of 
call. 

Vendee  may  take  possession 
at  any  point  en  route. 

Mere  demand  by  vendee  not 
sufficient. 

Delivery  before  point  of 
of  destination  may  termin- 
ate transit. 


56 


THE   SELLER  S   RIGHT   OF   STOPPAGE   IN   TRANSITU. 


Sec.  Sec. 

922.  Transit        continues        while      937. 

goods   are   held   by    a     for- 
warding agent. 

923.  Transit    is    not    ended  when      938. 

vendee   repudiates   the  pur- 
chase. 
S'24.     Refusal   of    insolvent   vendee      939. 
to  take  the  goods  may  de- 
termine    the      question     of 
delivery.  940. 

925.  Rule   in  similar  case. 

926.  Right  of  stoppage  remains  so 

long    as    carrier    holds    the 
goods      not      as      vendee's      941. 
agent. 

927.  Necessity    that    carrier    part       942. 

with  possession  of  goods  at 
transitus.  943. 

928.  Transit  ends  when  consignee 

claims    the    goods    and    the      944. 
carrier   wrongfully    refuses 
to   deliver  them. 

929.  Goods    still    in    transit    when      945. 

on   arrival    they  are    in   the 
hands    of   a   local    carrier. 

930.  Goods   in  quarantined  vessel      946. 

after    arrival     are    still     in 
transit. 

931.  Effect  of  placing  goods  in  a 

custom-house.  947. 

932.  Entry   of   goods    at    custom- 

house without  the  payment       948. 
of  duties. 

933.  Transit    not    ended    by    stor-       949. 

age  of  goods  in  government 
warehouse.  950. 

934.  Customs  officer  is  not  a  mid- 

dleman after  consignee  has      951. 
paid  the   duties.  952. 

935.  Goods     placed     in    a    ware- 

house    by     the     carrier     to 
await    consignee's     sending      953. 
for  them   are   still    in   tran- 
sit. 

936.  Wharfinger  a  middleman. 


Goods  in  the  carrier's  car 
at  destination  are  still  in 
transit. 

Transit  ends  when  the  ven- 
dees take  possession  of  the 
goods. 

Rule  to  determine  what 
constitutes  possession  much 
discussed. 

Right  of  vendee  to  construc- 
tive possession  while 
goods  are  in  hands  of  car- 
rier. 

When  carrier  made  agent  of 
consignee  transit  ends. 

By  agreement  the  carrier  may 
become  the  buyer's  agent. 

Carrier's  consent  necessary 
to  be  made  agent  of  buyer. 

Transit  ends  when  goods  are 
put  in  warehouse  used  by 
the  purchaser. 

Goods  landed  at  wharf  and 
freight  paid  usually  ends 
transit. 

Assignment  of  bill  of  lading 
by  vendee  to  third  person 
for  value  defeats  right  of 
stoppage  in  transitu. 

Rule  where  instrument  is  not 
strictly  a  bill  of  lading. 

Assignee  for  creditors  not  a 
purchaser   for  value. 

Pre-existing  debt  a  valuable 
consideration. 

Transfer  of  bill  of  lading  af- 
ter   stoppage    in   transitu. 

Pledge  by  a  factor  or  agent. 

Fraudulent  sale  of  the  bill 
of  lading  will  not  affect 
right  of  stoppage. 

Vendor's  right  of  stoppage 
in  transitu  not  defeated  by 
transfer  of  bill  of  lading 
as   security. 


883 


SELLERS    RIGHT   OF    STOPPAGE    IN    TRANSITU. 


§    857 


Sec. 
954. 


955. 

956. 
957. 

958. 
959. 


ElBfect  of  transfer  of  bill  of 
lading  in  pledge  on  right  to 
make  sale  that  will  defeat 
the  vendor's  right  of  stop- 
page in  transitu. 

Vendor's  right  not  defeated 
by  indorsement  of  bill  of 
lading  by  vendee  to  his 
factor. 

Advances  made  on  bill  of 
lading. 

Vendor's  right  not  defeated 
by  indorsement  of  bill  of 
lading. 

Delivery  order  given  by  ven- 
dor   to   vendee. 

Difference  between  ware- 
house receipt  and  delivery 
order. 


Sec. 

960.  Sale    of     goods     in     transitu 

without       indorsement       of 
bill  of  lading. 

961.  Rule   where   original    vendor 

has   notice   of  resale    of   the 
goods  by  his  vendee. 

962.  Delivery   of    part     of    cargo 

does  not  determine  right  of 
stoppage  of  whole  cargo. 

963.  Effect  of  notice  of  stoppage 

after  part  of  goods  are  de- 
livered. 

964.  By  the  resale  by  vendee  and 

delivery    of    bill    of    lading 
right  of  stoppage  ended. 

965.  The   right  of  stoppage  para- 

mount   to   all    liens   against 
the  purchaser. 


§  857.  Right  of  seller  to  stop  goods  in  transitu. — This 
right  is  an  equitable  extension  of  the  vendor's  right  of  lien 
at  common  law  for  the  unpaid  purchase-money.^  These 
rights  are  not  distinct  and  independent,  but  are,  under  dif- 
ferent names,  the  same  right  at  different  stages  of  the  exe- 
cution of  the  contract  of  sale.  The  vendor's  right  of  lien  is 
his  right  to  detain  goods  which  he  has  sold  until  the  price 


1  Lord  Romilly,  M.  R.,  in  Fraser 
v.  Witt,  L.  R.  7  Eq.  64;  D'Aquila 
V.  Lambert,  2  Eden  75,  11,  note; 
Ellis  V.  Hunt,  3  T.  R.  464,  469; 
Rowley  v.  Bigelow,  12  Pick. 
(Mass.)  307,  313,  23  Am.  Dec.  607; 
Grout  V.  Hill,  4  Gray  (Mass.)  361; 
White  V.  Welsh,  38  Pa.  St.  396, 
420,  per  Lowrie,  C.  J.;  Benedict  v. 
Schaettle,  12  Ohio  St.  515;  Bab- 
cock  V.  Bonnell,  80  N.  Y.  244,  251 ; 
Blossom  V.  Champion,  28  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  217,  223,  per  Sutherland. 
J.;  Loeb  v.  Peters,  63  Ala.  243, 
249,  35  Am.  Rep.  17 ;  Atkins  v.  Col- 
by, 20  N.  H.  154,  155,  per  Gilchrist, 


C.  J.;  Rucker  v.  Donovan,  13  Kans. 
251,  19  Am.  Rep.  84,  per  Brewer, 
J.;  Morris  v.  Shryock,  50  Miss. 
590.  598.  In  California,  Montana, 
North  and  South  Dakota,  and 
Oklahoma,  it  is  declared  by  statute 
that  a  seller  or  consignor  of  prop- 
erty, whose  claim  for  its  price  or 
proceeds  has  not  been  extinguished, 
may,  upon  the  insolvency  of  the 
buyer  or  consignee  becoming 
known  to  him  after  parting  with 
the  property,  stop  it  while  on  its 
transit  to  the  buyer  or  consignee, 
and  resume  possession  thereof. 
California:  Civ.  Code  1906,  §  3076; 


§  857  LIENS.  884 

is  paid,  and  it  exists  while  the  goods  remain  in  his  own  pos- 
session or  control.^  His  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  is  his 
right  to  retake  the  goods  after  they  have  passed  out  of  his 
own  possession  and  control,  and  exists  so  long  as  the  goods 
are  in  the  hands  of  a  carrier  for  delivery  to  the  purchaser. 
In  one  respect,  however,  the  latter  right  differs  from  the 
former;  for,  while  a  vendor  may  retain  the  goods  still  in  his 
possession  for  the  payment  of  the  price,  whether  the  pur- 
chaser be  insolvent  or  not,  he  can  retake  the  goods  while 
they  are  in  the  possession  of  a  third  person,  in  transit  to  the 
purchaser,  only  upon  the  insolvency  of  the  latter.  The  ven- 
dor's possession  is  the  essential  condition  of  his  right  of 
lien,  and  possession  by  a  third  person  is  the  essential  con- 
dition of  his  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.  "The  sale  is  not 
executed  before  delivery:  and  in  the  simplicity  of  former 
times,  a  delivery  into  the  actual  possession  of  the  vendee  or 
his  servant  was  always  supposed.  In  the  variety  and  extent 
of  dealing  which  the  increase  of  commerce  has  introduced, 
the  delivery  may  be  presumed  from  circumstances,  so  as  to 
vest  a  property  in  the  vendee.  A  destination  of  the  goods 
by  the  vendor  to  the  use  of  the  vendee;  the  marking  them, 
or  making  them  up  to  be  delivered ;  the  removing  them  for 
the  purpose  of  being  delivered,  may  all  entitle  the  vendee 
to  act  as  owner,  to  assign,  and  to  maintain  an  action  against 
a  third  person  into  whose  hands  they  have  come.  But  the 
title  of  the  vendor  is  never  entirely  devested,  till  the  goods 
have  come  into  the  possession  of  the  vendee.  He  has  there- 
fore a  complete  right,  for  just  cause,  to  retract  the  intended 
delivery,  and  to  stop  the  goods  in  transitu."^ 

The  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu,  being  based  on  an  equi- 
table principle,  is  highly  favored. 

Montana:   Civ.   Code   1895.   §  3970;  2  Tuthill  v.  Skidmore.  124  N.  Y. 

North    Dakota:      Rev.    Code    1905,  148,  26  N.  E.  348. 

§   6298;    Oklahoma:    Comp.    Laws  -^  Mason  v.  Lickbarrow,  1  H.  Bl. 

1909,  §  4152;  South  Dakota:  Rev.  357,  364,  per  Lord  Loughborough. 
Code    (Civ.)    1903,   §   2163. 


885 


SELLER  S    RIGHT   OF    STOPPAGE   IN    TRANSITU. 


§    858 


The  exercise  by  a  vendor  of  goods  of  the  right  of  stoppage 
in  transitu  is  not  a  rescission  of  the  contract  of  sale,  but  a 
resumption  of  possession,  which  will  enable  him  to  insist 
upon  the  vendor's  lien  which  he  had  waived  by  his  delivery 
to  the  carrier.'* 


§  858.    The  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  first  equitable  one. 

— The  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  was  first  asserted  as  an 
equitable  right,^  though  it  has  now  become  a  legal  possessory 
right,  and  is  recognized  and  favored  by  courts  of  law.  The 
earliest  case  in  which  this  right  is  recognized  is  said  to  be 


4  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Ameri- 
can Oil  Works,  126  Pa.  St.  485,  17 
Atl.  671,  12  Am.  St.  885;  Patten's 
Appeal,  45  Pa.  St.  151,  84  Am.  Dec. 
479. 

5  D'Aquila  v.  Lambert,  2  Eden 
75,  n,  note,  Amb.  399;  Lickbar- 
row  V.  Mason,  1  Smith's  Lead.  Cas. 
(8th  ed.)  19T.  In  Lickbarrow  v. 
Mason,  6  East  21,  27,  note,  Mr. 
Justice  Buller  upon  this  point 
said:  "The  right  of  stopping  in 
transitu  is  founded  wholly  on 
equitable  principles,  which  have 
been  adopted  in  courts  of  law;  and, 
as  far  as  they  have  been  aaopteci, 
I  agree  they  will  bind  at  law  as 
well  as  in  equity.  So  late  as  the 
year  1690,  this  right,  or  privilege, 
or  whatever  it  may  be  called,  was 
unknown  to  the  law."  The  grounds 
on  which  the  adoption  of  this 
equitable  right  by  courts  of  law  is 
justified  are  stated  by  the  same 
eminent  judge  as  follows.  'T  have 
always  thought  it  highly  injur- 
ious to  the  public  that  dif- 
ferent rules  should  prevail  in  the 
different  courts  on  the  same  mer- 
cantile case.  My  opinion  has  been 
uniform  on  that  subject.     It  some- 


times indeed  happens  that,  in 
questions  of  real  property,  courts 
of  law  find  themselves  fettered 
with  rules,  from  which  they  can- 
not depart,  because  they  are  fixed 
and  established  rules;  though 
equity  may  interpose,  not  to  con- 
tradict, but  to  correct,  the  strict 
and  rigid  rules  of  law.  But  in 
mercantile  questions  no  distinc- 
tion ought  to  prevail.  The  mer- 
cantile law  of  this  country  is 
founded  on  principles  of  equity; 
and  when  once  a  rule  is  estab- 
lished in  that  court  as  a  rule  of 
property,  it  ought  to  be  adopted 
in  a  court  of  law.  For  this  reason 
courts  of  law  of  late  years  have 
said  that,  even  where  the  action 
is  founded  on  a  tort,  they  would 
discover  some  mode  of  defeating 
the  plaintiff,  unless  his  action 
were  also  founded  on  equity;  and 
that,  though  the  property  might 
on  legal  grounds  be  with  the  plain- 
tiff, if  there  were  any  claim  or 
charge  by  the  defendant,  they 
would  not  consider  the  retaining 
of  the  goods  as  a  conversion." 
Tooke  V.  Hollingworth,  5  T.  R. 
215,  229.     But  the   fact  that   stop- 


§    858  LIENS.  886 

Wiseman  v.  Vandeputt,*'  in  the  year  1690.  Two  Italians  had 
consigned  cases  of  silk  to  merchants  in  London;  but  before 
the  ship  set  sail  from  Leghorn  news  came  that  the  merchants 
had  failed,  and  thereupon  the  Italians  changed  the  consign- 
ment to  another  person,  against  whom  the  assignees  in  bank- 
ruptcy of  the  merchants  brought  their  bill  for  discovery  and 
relief.  "The  court  declared  the  plaintiffs  ought  not  to  have 
had  so  much  as  a  discovery,  much  less  any  relief  in  this  court 
in  regard  that  the  silks  were  the  proper  goods  of  the  two 
Florentines,  and  not  of  the  Bonnells  (the  bankrupts),  nor 
the  produce  of  their  effects;  and  therefore  they  having  paid 
no  money  for  the  goods,  if  the  Italians  could  by  any  means 
get  their  goods  again  into  their  hands,  or  prevent  their  com- 
ing into  the  hands  of  the  bankrupts,  it  was  but  lawful  for 
them  to  do  so,  and  very  allowable  in  equity." 

Lord  Kenyon  said:^  "The  doctrine  of  stopping  goods  in 
transitu  is  bottomed  on  the  case  of  Snee  v.  Prescot;^  *  *  * 
on  this  all  the  other  cases  are  founded."  In  that  case  Lord 
Hardwicke,  stating  the  case  hypothetically,  said:  "Suppose 
such  goods  are  actually  delivered  to  a  carrier  to  be  delivered 
to  A,  and  while  the  carrier  is  upon  the  road,  and  before 
actual  delivery  to  A  by  the  carrier,  the  consignor  hears  A, 
his  consignee,  is  likely  to  become  a  bankrupt,  or  is  actually 
one,  and  countermands  the  delivery,  and  gets  them  back 
into  his  own  possession  again,  I  am  of  opinion  that  no  action 
of  trover  would  lie  for  the  assignees  of  A  because  the  goods 
while  they  were  in  transitu,  might  be  so  countermanded. 
*    *    *    Though  goods  are  even  delivered  to  the  principal,  I 

page  in  transitu  is  only  a  remedial  next    case    was    Ex  parte    Wilkin- 

proceeding  doubtless  had  much  to  son    (1755),    cited    in    D'Aquila    v. 

do  with  its  early  adopttion  by  the  Lambert,  2  Eden  75  (1761).  Adopt- 

courts  of  law.     See  further,  Gibson  ed     into     common-law     courts    by 

V.  Carruthers,  8  M.  &  W.  321,  per  Lord  Mansfield.    Burghall  v.  How-. 

Lord  Abinger.  ard,  1  H.  Bl.  366,  n. 

« 2    Vern.    203.     The    next    case  7  Ellis  v.   Hunt,  3  T.  R.  464. 

was  Snee  v.   Prescott,   1  Atk.  245,  8  1  Atk.  246,  248  (1743). 
which    occurred    in    1743;   and    the 


887  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.       §  859 

could  never  see  any  substantial  reason  why  the  original  pro- 
prietor, who  never  received  a  farthing,  should  be  obliged  to 
quit  all  claim  to  them,  and  come  in  as  a  creditor  only  for  a 
shilling  perhaps  in  the  pound,  unless  the  law  goes  upon  the 
general  credit  the  bankrupt  has  gained  by  having  them  in  his 
custody.  But  while  goods  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  orig- 
inal proprietor,  I  see  no  reason  why  he  should  not  be  said 
to  have  a  lien  upon  them  till  he  is  paid,  and  reimbursed  what 
he  so  advanced;  and  therefore  I  am  of  opinion  the  defend- 
ant Prescot  had  a  right  to  retain  them  for  himself  and 
company." 

§  859.  Right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  not  recognized  by  civil 
law. — The  civil  law  did  not  recognize  the  right  of  stoppage 
in  transitu.^  It  was  a  rule  of  the  ancient  Roman  law,  as  old 
as  the  Twelve  Tables,  that  things  sold  and  delivered  were 
not  acquired  by  the  buyer  until  he  had  paid  or  secured  the 
price.  The  unpaid  vendor  might  pursue  and  retake  the 
goods  even  in  the  hands  of  a  third  person  who  had  in  good 
faith  bought  and  paid  for  them.  If  the  sale  was  upon  credit, 
the  vendor  by  action  might  establish  a  claim  to  goods  so 
long  as  they  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  purchaser,  though 
not  against  a  bona  fide  purchaser  from  him  for  value. ^^  These 
rules  were  adopted  by  most  of  the  nations  of  continental 
Europe,  and  continued  in  force  till  about  the  beginning  of 
the  present  century,  when  the  necessities  of  commerce  de- 
manded greater  security  in  the  transfer  of  property,  and  grad- 
ually brought  about  a  change  in  the  law  of  sales  and  the 
adoption  of  a  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu,  substantially  the 
same  as  that  which  had  existed  in  England  for  a  century  or 
more.^^ 

9  Domat,  part  1,  bk.  3,  tit.  1,  §  5,  n  In  France  the  old  rule  of  re- 
art.  4.                                                               vindication    was    rejected,    and    the 

10  This  right  of  the  unpaid  ven-  principle  of  stoppage  in  transitu 
dor  was  called,  in  the  civil  law,  re-  adopted  in  the  Code  de  Commerce 
vindication.  In  re  Westzynthius,  in  1807.  The  right  was  shown  to 
2  Nev.  &  M,  650  n.  exist  in  Holland  in  a  case  tried  by 


§  86o  LIENS.  888 

In  Louisiana  the  code  gives  the  seller  a  preference  over 
other  creditors  of  the  purchaser  for  the  price,  whether  the 
sale  be  on  credit  or  not,  so  long  as  the  property  remains  in 
the  possession  of  the  purchaser.  If  the  sale  be  made  with- 
out credit,  the  restitution  must  be  made  within  eight  days 
of  the  delivery.  This  privilege  is  not  conditional,  nor  depend- 
ent upon  the  solvency  or  insolvency  of  the  buyer.  It  is  posi- 
tive without  condition  so  long  as  the  property  remains  in  the 
possession  of  the  purchaser. ^^  Stoppage  in  transitu  is  a 
right  which  does  not  exist  in  Louisiana;  but  the  courts  of 
Louisiana  will  recognize  and  enforce  a  right  of  stoppage  in 
transitu  arising  from  a  sale  in  another  state  to  an  insolvent 
residing  in  Louisiana. ^^ 

§  860.    Right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  now  a  legal  right. — 

This  right,  though  originating  in  equity,  has  become  alto- 
gether a  legal  right,  so  that  a  court  of  equity  will  not  ordi- 
narily enforce  it.  Indeed,  Lord  Eldon  has  said:^^  "There 
is  no  instance,  that  I  recollect,  of  stopping  in  transitu,  by  a 
bill  in  equity;  there  have  been  many  cases  where  questions 
have  arisen  respecting  the  property  in  the  ship  itself,  in  which 
the  court  has  interfered;  but  I  do  not  remember  one  of  stop- 
page in  transitu."  In  the  case  then  before  the  court  it  was 
held  that  a  bill  would  not  lie  to  restrain  by  injunction  the 

Lord   Loughborough   in   1789;    Ma-  had     fraudulently     concealed       his 

son    V.    Lickbarrow,    1    H.    Bl.   357,  1)ankruptcy,  and  the  vendor  might 

364;  and  it  was  formally  introduced  retake  the  goods.     But  in  that  year 

into    that    country    with    the    Code  the    English    doctrine    of   stoppage 

Napoleon    in    1811.      The    doctrine  in  transitu  was  adopted.    Jaffrey  v. 

exists   in    Russia   as   a   part   of  the  Allan,  3  Paton  191. 

Code     of     Mercantile     Navigation  i-  Converse  v.   Hill,   14  La.  Ann. 

Laws    (1781),    as    is    shown    in    the  89;    Payne    v.    Buford,    106    La.    83, 

case  of  Bohtlingk  v.  Inglis,  3  East  30  So.  263. 

381,    386.      In    Scotland,    down    to  t3  Blum    v.    Marks.   21    La.    .Ann. 

1790,    it   seems   to   have    been   pre-  268,  99  Am.  Dec.  725. 

sumed    that    if    the    buyer    became  i4  Goodhart    v.    Lowe,    2   Jac.    & 

bankrupt    within    three    days    after  W.  349. 

delivery  to  him  of  goods  sold,     he 


889  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.       §  861 

sailing  of  a  vessel  containing  goods  which  a  vendor  wished  to 
resume  possession  of  on  account  of  the  insolvency  of  the  con- 
signee, though  the  reason  given  was  that  this  might  be  highly 
inconvenient  to  the  other  shippers. 

§  861.  Effect  of  exercising  the  right. — The  effect  of  the 
vendor's  exercising  this  right  is  to  restore  the  goods  to  his 
possession  so  that  he  can  hold  them  by  virtue  of  his  lien,^^ 
In  an  early  case  Lord  Kenyon  remarked, ^"^  that  "the  right 
of  the  vendor  to  stop  goods  in  transitu,  in  case  of  the  in- 
solvency of  the  vendee  was  a  kind  of  equitable  lien  adopted 
by  the  law  for  the  purposes  of  substantial  justice,  and  that  it 
did  not  proceed,  as  the  plaintiff's  counsel  supposed,  on  the 
ground  of  rescinding  the  contract."  Notwithstanding  this 
declaration,  and  other  statements  to  like  effect  by  other 
judges,^'''  Lord  Tenterden  remarked  in  1829  that  there  did  not 
appear  to  be  any  case  in  which  it  had  been  expressly  decided 
whether  the  effect  of  the  stoppage  was  to  rescind  the  con- 
tract or  not.  Even  so  late  as  1842  Baron  Parke  said:  "What 
the  effect  of  stoppage  in  transitu  is,  whether  entirely  to  re- 
scind the  contract,  or  only  to  replace  the  vendor  in  the  same 
position  as  if  he  had  not  parted  with  the  possession,  and  en- 
title him  to  hold  the  goods  until  the  price  be  paid  down,  is 
a  point  not  fully  decided,  and  there  are  dif^culties  attending 
each  construction." 

Since  that  time,  however,  the  principle  has  become  well  es- 
tablished that  the  effect  of  the  stoppage  is  not  to  revest  the 

15  Wentworth    v.    Outhwaite,    10  mans    v.    Lancashire    &    Yorkshire 

M.   &   W.   436.    Since   the   case   of  R.   Co.,   L.   R.  2   Ch.  332,  340,   per 

Goodhart    v.    Lowe,    2   Jac.    &    W.  Cairns,  L.  J. 

349,  decided  in  1819,  the  courts  have  16  Hodgson  v.  Loy,  7  T.  R.  440, 

more    clearly   shown   a    disposition  445. 

to    hold   that   stoppage   in    transitu  i7  Ex  parte  Gwynne,  12  Ves.  379, 

does  not  rescind  the  contract,  but  per  Erskine,  L.  C;  Feise  v.  Wray, 

only  gives  or  restores  to  the  ven-  3  East  93. 
dor   a   lien    for   the   price.     Schots- 


862 


LIENS. 


890 


title  in  the  vendor,  but  to  reinstate  him  in  his  lien  for  the 
price.     He  is  revested  in  his  rights  as  an  unpaid  vendor.^^ 

§  862.  Vendor  holding  goods  by  virtue  of  lien. — The  ven- 
dor, after  gaining  possession  of  the  goods,  holds  them  by  vir- 
tue of  his  lien.  The  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  being  an 
enlargement  of  the  common-law  right  of  lien,  it  follows  that 
the  vendor,  after  exercising  this  right,  must  hold  the  prop- 
erty in  the  same  manner  that  he  would  be  required  to  hold 
it  in  case  he  had  a  lien  upon  it  for  the  price.     If  the  prop- 


is  Martindale  v.  Smith,  1  Q.  B. 
389;  Tarling  v.  Baxter,  6  B.  &  C. 
360;  Valpy  v.  Oakeley,  16  Q.  B.  941; 
Griffiths  V.  Perry,  1  El.  &  El.  680; 
Kemp  V.  Falk,  L.  R.  7  App.  Cas. 
573,  581,  per  Lord  Blackburn:  "It 
is  pretty  well  settled  now  that  it 
would  not  have  rescinded  the  con- 
tract." And  see  Schotsmans  v.  Lan- 
cashire &  Yorkshire  R.  Co.,  2  Ch. 
332,  where  Lord  Cairns  pointed  out 
that,  if  the  contract  were  regarded 
as  rescinded,  a  court  of  equity 
would  have  no  jurisdiction  to  en- 
force the  right  of  stoppage  in  tran- 
situ. Newhall  v.  Vargas,  15  Maine 
314,  33  Am.  Dec.  617,  13  Maine  93, 
29  Am.  Dec.  489;  Stanton  v.  Eager, 
16  Pick.  (Mass.)  467,  475,  per  Shaw, 
C.  J.;  Rowley  v.  Bigelow,  12  Pick. 
(Mass.)  307,  313,  23  Am.  Dec.  607, 
per  Shaw,  C.  J.;  Arnold  v.  Delano, 
4  Cush.  (Mass.)  33,  39;  Rogers  v. 
Thomas  20  Conn.  S3;  Inslee  v. 
Lane,  57  N.  H.  454,  458,  per  Fos- 
ter, C.  J.;  In  re  Patten's  Ap- 
peal, 45  Pa.  St.  151,  84  Am. 
Dec.  479;  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Am.  Oil  Works  Co., 
126  Pa.  St.  485,  17  Atl.  671,  12 
Am.  St.  885;  Cox  v.  Burns,  1  Iowa 
64;   Rucker  v.   Donovan,    13    Kans. 


251,  19  Am.  Rep.  84;  Chandler  v. 
Fulton,  10  Tex.  2,  60  Am.  Dec. 
188;  Morris  v.  Shryock,  50  Miss. 
590;  White  v.  Solomonsky,  30  Md. 
585;  Jordan  v.  James,  5  Ohio  88, 
98;  Benedict  v.  Schaettle,  12  Ohio 
St.  515;  Cross  v.  O'Donnell,  44  N. 
Y.  661,  665,  4  Am.  Rep.  721,  per 
Earl,  C;  Harris  v.  Pratt,  17  N.  Y. 
249.  In  Babcock  v.  Bonnell,  80  N. 
Y.  244,  251,  Chief  Justice  Church 
said  that  the  question  had  never 
been  definitely  decided  in  that 
state.  "As  an  original  question," 
he  said,  "the  doctrine  of  rescission 
commends  itself  to  my  judgment 
as  being  more  simple,  and  in  most 
cases,  more  just  to  both  parties 
than  the  notion  that  the  act  of  stop- 
page is  the  exercise  of  a  right  of 
lien,  but  in  deference  to  the  pre- 
vailing current  of  authority,  I 
should  hesitate  in  attempting  to 
oppose  it  by  any  opinion  of  my 
own."  In  California,  Montana, 
North  Dakota,  Oklahoma  and 
South  Dakota,  it  is  provided  by 
code  that  stoppage  in  transit  does 
not  of  itself  rescind  a  sale,  but  it 
is  a  means  of  enforcing  the  lien  of 
the  seller.  California:  Civ.  Code 
1906,  §  3080;   Montana:     Civ.  Code 


891  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.       §  863 

erty  was  sold  upon  credit,  he  must  hold  it  until  the  expiration 
of  the  credit,  so  as  to  be  able  to  deliver  it  upon  the  payment 
of  the  price.  But  if  the  purchaser  does  not  pay  the  price  at 
the  time  stipulated,  the  vendor  may,  as  in  case  of  a  lien,  sell 
the  property  upon  giving  notice. ^^  In  the  meantime  the  pur- 
chaser or  his  assignee  may  enforce  his  claim  to  the  goods 
upon  payment  of  the  purchase-money,  according  to  the  terms 
of  the  original  contract,  provided  he  acts  without  unreason- 
able delay .""^  The  vendor,  by  the  exercise  of  his  right  of 
stoppage  in  transitu,  can  only  recover  the  goods  in  the  con- 
dition they  are  at  the  time  he  exercises  the  right.  He  can- 
not recover  insurance  upon  them  for  loss  or  damage  suffered 
in  the  transit.^^ 

The  vendor  may  also,  notwithstanding  his  exercise  of  the 
right  of  stoppage,  maintain  an  action  against  the  vendee  for 
the  price  of  the  goods  bargained  and  sold,  provided  he  be 
ready  and  willing  to  surrender  the  goods  according  to  the 
terms  of  the  contract.^^ 

§  853.  Vendor's  sale  of  the  goods. — The  vendor,  after  rea- 
sonable notice  to  the  vendee,  may  sell  the  goods,  and  the  con- 

1895,  §  3974;  North  Dakota:     Rev.  St.     151,     84     Am.     Dec.     479,     per 

Codes     1905,     §     6302;     Oklahoma:  Strong,  J. 

Comp.    Laws    1909,    §    4155;    South  21  Berndston   v.   Strang,   L.    R.   3 

Dakota:     Rev.    Code    (Civ.)    1903,  Ch.  588. 

§  2166.  22  Lickbarrow  v.   Mason,  6  East 

19  Babcock  v.  Bonnell,  80  N.  Y.  21n,  27,  1  Smith's  Lead.  Cas.,  8th 
244,  249,  per  Church,  C.  J.  "The  Eng.  ed.  789;  Kymer  v.  Suwer- 
general  rule  upon  the  theory  of  a  cropp,  1  Camp.  109;  Rhodes  v. 
lien,  must  be  that  the  vendor  hav-  Mooney,  43  Ohio  St.  421,  4  N.  E. 
ing  exercised  the  right  of  stoppage  233;  Newhall  v.  Vargas,  15  Maine 
in  transitu,  is  restored  to  his  posi-  314,  326,  33  Am.  Dec.  617.  "This 
tion  before  he  parted  with  the  pos-  absence  of  decided  cases  may  partly 
session  of  the  property.  The  prop-  be  accounted  for  by  supposing,  that 
erty  is  vested  in  the  vendee,  and  the  vendor  usually  obtaining  all  the 
the  vendor  holds  possession  as  se-  goods  sold,  finds  he  is  fully  paid; 
curity  for  the  payment  of  the  pur-  or  if  not,  that  the  object  of  pursu- 
chase-price."  ing    the    insolvent    vendee    is    not 

20  In  re   Patten's  Appeal,  45   Pa.  worth  the  trouble  and  expense." 


§  864  LIENS.  892 

tract  of  sale  is  then  so  far  determined  by  the  default  of  the 
vendee,  and  the  action  of  the  vendor  thereupon,  that  the  ven- 
dor may,  after  applying  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  to  the  pay- 
ment of  the  price  of  the  goods,  maintain  an  action  for  the 
balance  remaining  unpaid.^^ 

§  864.  Proof  of  vendor's  claim  made  against  vendee's  in- 
solvent estate. — The  vendor  may  also  make  proof  of  his  claim 
against  the  insolvent  estate  of  the  vendee;  but  whether  he 
make  proof  of  his  entire  claim  for  the  price  of  the  goods,  or 
whether  he  must  deduct  from  his  whole  claim  the  value  of 
the  goods  in  his  hands,  or  the  amount  he  has  received  from 
a  sale  of  the  goods,  depends  upon  the  statute  or  rule  adopted 
with  reference  to  the  proof  of  claim  for  which  the  creditor 
holds  security,  or  holds  goods  or  money  which  is  applicable 
to  the  claim  against  the  insolvent's  estate.  In  several  states 
the  vendor  may  in  such  case  prove  his  whole  claim  due  at 
the  date  of  the  assignment,  though  he  has  subsequently  sold 
a  portion  or  the  whole  of  the  goods  stopped  in  transitu,  and 
applied  the  proceeds  to  the  payment  of  the  debt  for  the  price 
of  the  goods.^^ 

§  865.  Resale  or  rescission  by  act  of  vendee. — There  may 
be  a  resale  or  rescission  of  the  contract,  by  the  act  of  the 
vendee,  which  in  its  effect  amounts  to  very  much  the  same 
thing  as  a  stoppage  in  transitu,  and  is  sometimes  spoken  of 
as  such.^-^    Thus,  if  the  vendee,  before  he  receives  the  goods 

23  Kymer  v.  Suwercropp,  1  Camp.  Sake  v.  Field,  5  T.  R.  211;  Smith 
109;  Newhall  v.  Vargas,  15  Maine  v.  Field,  5  T.  R.  402;  Neate  v.  Ball, 
314,  326,  33  Am.  Dec.  617,  13  Maine  2  East  117;  Bartram  v.  Fare- 
93,  29  Am.  Dec.  489.  brother,  4  Bing.  579;  Nicholson  v. 

24  In  re  Patten's  Appeal,  45  Pa.  Bower,  1  El.  &  El.  172;  Lane  v. 
St.  151,  84  Am.  Dec.  479,  following  Jackson,  5  Mass.  157;  Scholfield  v. 
the  rule  adopted  in  Keim's  Appeal,  Bell,  14  Mass.  40;  Naylor  v.  Den- 
27  Pa.  St.  42,  and  in  Miller's  Ap-  nie,  8  Pick  (Mass.)  198,  19  Am. 
peal,  35  Pa.  St.  481.  Dec.    319;    Grout   v.    Hill,   4   Gray 

2-">  Atkin  V.  Barwick,  1  Stra.  165;       (Mass.)  361;  Lewis  v.  Mason,  36  U. 


893 


SELLERS   RIGHT   OF   STOPPAGE   IN   TRANSITU. 


865 


from  the  carrier,  finds  that  he  is  insolvent,  and  he  leaves  the 
goods  in  the  hands  of  the  carrier  or  of  a  third  person,  for  the 
use  of  the  vendor,  wdiom  he  notifies  of  his  act,  and  the  latter 
expressly  or  tacitly  assents  to  it,  there  is  a  good  resale  or 
stoppage  in  transitu.  And  so,  if  the  vendee,  upon  ascertain- 
ing that  he  is  insolvent,  before  the  arrival  of  the  goods  exe- 
cutes a  bill  of  sale  to  the  vendor,  and  delivers  this  to  a  third 
person  for  him,  his  act  amounts  to  a  resale  or  stoppage  in 
transitu,  and  his  assignee  in  insolvency  cannot  recover  the 
goods  or  their  value  from  the  vendor,  or  from  the  third  per- 
son to  v^hom  the  bill  of  sale  was  made.^^  An  insolvency 
messenger,  before  the  appointment  of  an  assignee,  cannot 
cut  off  the  seller's  right  by  accepting  the  goods  and  paying 
the  freight  after  the  insolvent  purchaser  has  refused  to  re- 
ceive them,  in  order  that  the  seller  might  reclaim  them.  A 
messenger  is  a  mere  custodian  who  has  no  authority  to  ac- 
cept or  reject,  or  to  affirm  or  disaffirm,  the  act  of  the  insolv- 
ent  purchaser.-^ 

The  assent  of  the  purchaser  to  a  resumption  of  possession 


C.  Q.  B.  590,  604;  Mason  v.  Red- 
path,  39  U.  C.  Q.  B.  157.  In  the 
leading-  case  of  Atkin  v.  Barwick, 
1  Stra.  165,  the  goods  sold 
and  sent  by  the  vendors  actually 
reached  the  hands  of  the  vendees  ; 
but  the  latter,  being  satisfied  they 
could  not  pay,  delivered  them  to 
one  Penhallow,  to  be  redelivered 
to  the  vendors.  Shortly  after  the 
delivery  to  Penhallow^,  the  vendees 
wrote  to  their  vendors,  stating 
their  inability,  and  expressing  an 
unwillingness  that  the  goods 
should  go  to  pay  their  creditors. 
This  letter  was  sent  two  days  after 
they  had  become  bankrupts,  though 
the  goods  had  been  received  and 
delivered  to  Penhallow  some  time 
before.     The  latter  may  have  been 


a  mere  stranger  to  the  vendors  and 
not  their  agent.  At  any  rate  the 
vendors  got  no  notice  of  the  de- 
livery to  him  till  after  the  vendee's 
bankruptcy.  They  then  assented. 
Ail  the  judges  held  that  the 
property  in  the  goods  revested  in 
the  vendors,  from  the  time  when 
they  were  delivered  to  Penhallow, 
subject  to  the  dissent  of  the  ven- 
dors; and  that  the  precedent  debt 
was  a  sufficient  consideration.  Al- 
though this  case  has  been  fre- 
quently questioned,  it  has  never 
been  overruled ;  on  the  contrary, 
it  has  been  many  times  approved. 

26  Grout  V.  Hill,  4  Gray  (Mass.) 
361. 

27  Tufts   V.    Sylvester,   79    Maine 
213.  9  Atl.  357,  1  Am.  St.  303. 


§  866  LIENS.  894 

by  the  unpaid  vendor  does  not  make  his  possession  illegal 
under  the  bankrupt  law,  because  the  vendor  could  exercise 
this  right  without  the  assent  of  the  purchaser,  and  thereby 
gain  the  same  preference  over  other  creditors  which  he  ac- 
quires with  the  voluntary  assent  of  the  purchaser.  "It  is  not 
giving  a  preference  to  a  creditor,  when  a  debtor,  peaceably 
and  for  convenience,  assents  to  the  doing  by  the  creditor  of 
what  the  creditor,  if  objection  and  collision  arose,  could  law- 
fully do  in  spite  of  objection."-^  Therefore  the  vendor  may 
retain  the  goods  voluntarily  surrendered  by  the  purchaser 
under  such  circumstances,  and  may  prove  his  claim  against 
the  estate  of  the  purchaser  in  bankruptcy  for  any  balance  of 
account  not  satisfied  by  such  surrender. ^^ 

§  866.  Resale  or  rescission  of  the  contract. — Perhaps  in 
some  cases  of  this  nature  it  should  be  said  that  there  is  a  re- 
sale or  rescission  of  the  contract  rather  than  a  stoppage  in 
transitu,  for  the  latter  act  is  in  its  nature  adverse  to  the 
vendee. ^^  Whether  the  transaction  be  called  a  resale  or  a 
rescission,  the  effect  is  the  same;  though,  if  the  transaction 
be  a  resale,  it  follows  that  the  property  vested  in  the  vendee, 
and  was  revested  by  his  act  in  the  vendor;  while,  if  it  be  a 
rescission  or  refusal  to  accept,  the  vendor  was  never  divested 
of  the  property.^^  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  refusal  of  the 
vendee  to  receive  the  goods  on  account  of  his  insolvency, 

28  In  re  Foot,  11  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  the  right  of  stopping  in  transitu 
530,  533,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  4907,  per  cannot  be  exercised  under  a  title 
Woodruff,  J.  derived    from    the    consignee,    nor 

29  In  re  Foot,  11  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  that  it  shall  be  exercisd  in  hostility 
530,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  4907.  to  him."  Per  Parker,  C.  J.,  in  Nay- 

30  Siffken  v.  Wray,  6  East  371,  lor  v.  Dennie,  8  Pick.  (Mass.)  198, 
per  Lord  Ellenborough,  C.  J.;  Ash  204,  19  Am.  Dec.  319;  quoted  and 
V.  Putnam,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.)  302;  Cox  approved  in  Cox  v.  Burns,  1  Iowa 
V.  Burns,  1  Iowa  64.     But  in  saying  64,  68. 

that  stoppage  in  transitu  is  an  ad-  si  Ash  v.  Putnam,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.) 

verse  proceeding,  and  must  be  ex-  302,  per  Cowen,  J.;  Cox  v.   Burns, 

ercised  adversely  to  the  vendee,  the  1   Iowa  64.    A  rescission  or  resale 

courts   mean    "no    more    than    that  is   complete    before   the   assent   of 


895  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.       §  868 

taken  in  connection  with  the  vendor's  assent  to  such  refusal 
and  his  subsequent  taking  back  the  goods,  be  regarded  as  a 
species  of  stoppage  in  transitu,  it  must  follow  that  the  ven- 
dor, upon  receiving  them,  has  only  a  lien  upon  them  for  his 
purchase-money,  and  not  an  absolute  title. 

§  867.    Rescission  after  right  of  stoppage  ceases  to  exist. — 

A  rescission  may  take  place  after  the  right  of  stoppage  has 
ceased  to  exist.  But  after  the  vendee  has  actually  received 
the  goods,  intending  to  make  them  his  own,  he  cannot  re- 
scind the  contract  so  as  to  defeat  the  claim  of  the  general 
body  of  his  creditors.^^  After  the  right  of  stoppage  has  once 
ended  through  a  delivery  to  the  vendee,  it  cannot  be  revived 
by  a  subsequent  refusal  of  the  consignee  to  accept  a  portion 
of  the  goods,  by  reason  of  their  not  being  merchantable  or 
salable,  under  the  terms  of  the  contract  of  purchase. 

§  868.    Upon  what  property  the  right  may  be  exercised. — 

This  right  is  usually  exercised  upon  merchandise  or  personal 
chattels,  because  these  are  more  frequently  the  subject-mat- 
ter of  sales  and  shipments  by  carriers.  But  there  is  no  rea- 
son why  the  right  should  not  exist  as  well  under  like  cir- 
cumstances in  respect  to  such  property  as  specie,  bank  bills, 
or  negotiable  paper.  Thus,  if  a  person  remits  money  on  a 
particular  account,  or  for  a  particular  purpose,  and  the  con- 
signee becomes  insolvent,  payment  of  the  money  may  be 
stopped. ^^ 

the  vendor  is  actually  given  or  ex-  -"^^  Barnes  v.  Freeland,  6  T.  R.  80; 
pressed,  provided  he  does  subse-  Neate  v.  Ball,  2  East  117;  Smith 
quently  assent;  or,  in  other  words,  v.  Field,  5  T.  R.  402;  Heinekey 'v. 
his  subsequent  assent  relates  back  Earle,  8  El.  &  Bl.  410.  See.  in  con- 
to  the  time  of  the  vendee's  act;  nection  w^ith  the  foregoing,  Dixon 
and  therefore  an  attachment  of  the  v.  Baldwen,  5  East  175;  Byrnes 
goods  made  by  a  creditor  of  the  v.  Fuller,  1  Brev.  (S.  Car.)  316; 
vendee  after  the  vendee's  act  of  Wilds  v.  Smith,  2  Ont.  App.  8. 
rescission,  and  before  the  vendor's  33  Smith  v.  Bowles,  2  Esp.  578; 
assent  to  it,  is  ineffectual.  Sturte-  Muller  v.  Pondir,  55  N.  Y.  325,  14 
vant  V.  Orser,  24  N.  Y.  538,  82  Am.  Am.  Rep.  259,  affg.  6  Lans.  (N.  Y.) 
Dec.  321.  472. 


§    869  LIENS.  896 

Property  sold  in  violation  of  a  statute,  as,  for  instance, 
intoxicating  liquors,  may  be  stopped  in  transitu  by  notice  to 
the  carrier,  or  demand  upon  him.  But  under  a  statute  which 
provides  that  no  action  shall  be  maintained  for  a  recovery  or 
possession  of  intoxicating  liquors  a  right  of  stoppage  in  tran- 
situ of  such  property  cannot  be  enforced  by  an  action  of 
replevin.^^ 

§  869.    Who  may  exercise  the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu. 

— Not  only  a  vendor,  but  any  person  substantially  in  the  po- 
sition of  a  vendor,  may  exercise  this  right.^°  Thus  a  com- 
mission merchant,  or  factor,  or  consignor,  or  other  agent 
who  has  bought  goods  on  his  own  credit,  though  by  order 
and  on  account  of  another,  may  exercise  a  vendor's  right  of 
stoppage.  But  the  agent  must  pay  for  the  goods,  or  render 
himself  liable  for  them,  in  order  to  be  entitled  to  stop  them 
in  transitu  as  a  vendor.^^ 

The  vendor  may  exercise  this  right  even  when  he  has  con- 
signed goods  to  the  joint  account  of  himself  and  the  con- 
signee, and  a  bill  of  lading  has  been  sent  to  the  latter  making 
the  goods  deliverable  to  him  or  his  assigns,'^''^  unless  the  ven- 
dor has  indorsed  the  bill  of  lading  in  trust  to  secure  drafts 
drawn  against  the  consignment.^® 

§  870.  Right  only  exercised  by  one  holding  the  relation  of 
vendor  to  the  consignee. — The  right  can  be  exercised  only  by 
one  who  holds  the  relation  of  vendor  to  the  consignee.     If 

34  Howe  V  Stewart,  40  Vt.  145.  v.    Vargas,    13    Maine,    93,   29    Am. 

25  Feise  v.  Wray,  3  East  93;  Ire-  Dec.    489,    IS    Maine    314,    33    Am. 

land  V.   Livingston,   L.   R.  5   H.   L.  Dec.   617;    Gossler   v.    Schepeler,   5 

395;   Ex  parte   Banner,  2   Ch.   Div.  Daly  (N.  Y.)  476. 

278;  Ex  parte  Miles,  L.  R.  IS  Q.  B.  36  Oakford   v.   Drake   2   F.    &   F. 

Div.  39;  Ogle  v.  Atkinson,  5  Taunt.  493. 

7S9;   Patten  v.  Thompson.  5   M.   &  3"  Newsom   v.   Thornton,  6   East 

S.    3S0;    Tucker    v.    Humphrey,    4  17. 

Bing.     516;     Turner    v.     Liverpool  38  Haille   v.   Smith,    1    Bos.   &   P. 

Dock  Co.,  6  Exch.  543;   Ellershaw  563. 
v.   Magniac,  6  Exch.  570;   Newhall 


897  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.       §  872 

one  buys  goods  and  directs  his  vendor  to  consign  them  to  a 
customer  of  his  own  with  whom  the  vendor  has  no  privity, 
and  the  vendor  accordingly  ships  the  goods  to  such  third  per- 
son, he  cannot  stop  them  in  transitu  to  him  upon  the  insolv- 
ency of  his  immediate  purchaser.  Thus,  a  merchant  at  Dar- 
danelle,  in  Arkansas,  ordered  goods  of  merchants  at  St. 
Louis.  They  sent  the  order  to  merchants  at  New  Orleans, 
with  directions  to  ship  the  goods  to  the  purchaser  at  Dar- 
danelle,  which  they  did,  and  sent  the  bill  and  bill  of  lading 
to  the  St.  Louis  merchants,  and  charged  the  goods  to  them. 
During  the  transit  from  New  Orleans  to  Dardanelle  the  St. 
Louis  merchants  failed,  and  the  New  Orleans  merchants, 
claiming  a  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu,  demanded  the  goods 
of  the  carrier  and  obtained  possession  of  them.  In  a  suit  by 
the  consignee  against  the  carrier,  it  was  held  that  the  New 
Orleans  merchants  were  not  the  vendors  of  the  consignee ; 
that  there  was  no  right  of  privity  between  him  and  them; 
and  that  they  had  no  right  to  stop  the  goods,  and  conse- 
quently the  carrier  was  liable  to  the  consignee  for  their 
value. ^^ 

§  87L  Stoppage  of  goods  consigned  to  factor. — A  princi- 
pal may  stop  goods  in  transitu  consigned  to  his  factor  upon 
the  insolvency  of  the  latter,  though  he  has  accepted  bills 
upon  the  faith  of  the  consignment,  and  paid  a  portion  of  the 
freight.  A  factor  has  no  lien  on  goods  for  a  general  balance 
until  they  come  into  his  possession,  when  he  holds  them  in 
pledge,  or  has  a  lien  upon  them,  neither  of  which  can  be  en- 
forced except  through  possession. ^^ 

§  872.  Pledgee's  exercise  of  the  right. — A  pledgee  of  the 
bill  of  lading  may  exercise  this  right. "^^    To  the  extent  of  his 

39  Memphis    &    L.    R.    R.    Co.    v.  ■i'^  Kinloch  v.  Craig,  3  T.  R.  119, 

Freed,  38  Ark.  614.    And  see  also,  783,  affirmed  4  Brown  C.   P.  47. 

Stubbs  V.  Lund,  7  Mass.  453,  5  Am.  -ii  Gossler    v.    Schepeler,   5    Daly 

Dec.  63;  Eaton  v.  Cook,  32  Vt.  58.  (N.  Y.)  476. 

57 


§  873  LIENS.  898 

interest  in  the  property  he  is  a  quasi  vendor,  and  is  entitled 
to  use  all  lawful  means  to  protect  his  interest. 

§  873.  Lienor  no  right  o£  stoppage  after  shipment  of 
goods  to  owner. — But  one  who  has  only  a  lien  upon  goods 
cannot  stop  them  in  transitu  after  he  has  shipped  them  to  the 
general  owner  at  the  expense  of  the  latter. ^^  Lord  Kenyon 
said,  upon  this  point  :"*^  "The  right  of  lien  has  never  been 
carried  further  than  while  the  goods  continue  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  party  claiming  it.  Here  the  goods  were  shipped 
by  the  order  and  on  account  of  the  bankrupt,  and  he  was  to 
pay  the  expense  of  the  carriage  of  them  to  London;  the  cus- 
tody therefore  was  changed  by  the  delivery  to  the  captain." 

§  874.  Surety  has  no  general  right  of  stoppage. — A  surety 
for  the  price  of  goods  has  no  right  to  stop  them  in  transitu, 
upon  the  failure  of  the  consignee,  without  authority  from  the 
vendor,^'*  unless  the  circumstances  of  the  case  are  such  that 
the  title  to  the  goods,  with  the  lien  of  the  vendor,  has  passed 
to  the  surety,  who  is  then  not  merely  a  surety,  but  occupies 
the  position  of  the  vendor  himself.'*^ 

§  875.  General  agent's  right  in  behalf  of  principal. — A  gen- 
eral agent  may  exercise  this  right  in  behalf  of  his  principal. 
The  authority  of  an  agent  of  the  vendor  to  stop  the  goods  in 
transitu  need  not  be  specified,  that  is,  having  reference  to 
that  particular  measure,  or  to  that  particular  transaction.^® 
The  authority  of  an  agent  acting  within  the  general  scope 
of  his  principal's  business  is  sufficient  to  enable  him  to  exer- 
cise the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.     A  merchant  to  whom 

^~  Sweet  V.  Pym,  1  East  4;  Gwyn  St.  Katharine  Docks  Co.,  5  Ch.  Div. 

V.  Richmond  &  Danville  R.  Co.,  85  195. 

N.    Car.   429,    39  Am.    Rep.    708,    13  -ic  Hutchings  v.  Nunes,  1  Moo.  P. 

Rep.  473.  C.  CX.  S.)  243;  Reynolds  v.  Boston 

43  Sweet  V.  Pym,  1  East  4.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  43  N.  H.  580;  Bell  v. 

44  Sififken  V.  Wray,  6  East  371.  Moss,   5   Whart.    189;    Chandler   v. 
■io  Imperial    Bank    v.    London    &  Fulton,  10  Tex.  2,  60  Am.  Dec.  188. 


899  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  876 

goods  are  sent  to  be  forwarded  to  the  purchaser  may  stop 
them  in  transitu  for  the  benefit  of  the  vendor,  provided  the 
latter  affirms  the  act. 

A  vendor's  agent  who  is  vested  with  the  legal  title  to  the 
property,  by  transfer  of  the  bill  of  lading,  may  stop  it  in 
transitu  in  his  own  name  ;^^  and  may,  moreover,  in  his  own 
name,  upon  refusal  of  the  person  in  possession  to  surrender 
it,  sue  for  and  recover  it.^^ 

Of  course  the  vendor  may  give  notice  to  stop  delivery  by 
on  authorized  agent. ^^  He  may  also  avail  himself  of  the  act 
of  another  in  giving  the  notice  in  his  behalf  by  ratifying  and 
adopting  such  act,  so  that  the  notice  will  have  the  same  ef- 
fect as  if  it  had  been  specially  authorized. ^^  But  a  ratification 
after  the  goods  have  reached  the  possession  of  the  vendee  is 
too  late  to  give  validity  to  an  unauthorized  demand.^^ 

§  876.  Act  of  one  stopping  goods  in  transitu  ratified  by 
vendor. — The  act  of  one  who  stops  goods  in  transitu,  with- 
out any  previous  general  or  special  authority,  may  be  ratified 
by  the  vendor,  but  it  is  said  that  the  act  of  ratification  must 
take  place  at  a  time  and  under  circumstances  when  the  ratify- 
ing party  himself  might  have  lawfully  done  the  act  which  he 
ratifies.  A  merchant  in  New  York  sold  and  shipped  goods  to 
a  merchant  in  Liverpool,  who  became  bankrupt  before  the 
arrival  of  the  goods  at  Liverpool.  Another  merchant  at  Liv- 
erpool, who  was  not  the  general  agent  of  the  seller,  though 
he  had  purchased  some  of  the  bills  drawn  upon  the  purchaser 
for  the  goods,  claimed  to  stop  the  goods  in  transitu  in  behalf 
of  the  seller  upon  their  arrival  at  Liverpool  and  before  the 
transitus  was  at  an  end.  Soon  afterwards,  on  the  11th  day 
of  May,  the  assignees  in  bankruptcy  of  the  buyer  made  for- 

47  Morison  v.  Gray,  2  Bing.  260,  ^^  Wood  v.  Jones,  7  Dow.  &  Ry. 
9  Moore  484;  Jenkyns  v.  Usborne,  126;  Hutchings  v.  Nunes,  1  Moo. 
7  M.  &  G.  678.  But  see  Waring  v.  P.  C.  (N.  S.)  243;  Bailey  v.  Culver- 
Cox,  1  Camp.  369.  well,   8   B.    &   C.  448;    Bartram   v. 

48  Morison  v.   Gray,  2  Bing.  260.  Farebrother,  4  Bing.  579. 

49  Hoist  V.  Pownal,  1  Esp.  240.  &i  Bird  v.  Brown,  4  Exch.  786. 


§    8/7  LIENS.  900 

mal  demand  for  the  goods  of  the  master  of  the  vessel  and 
tendered  the  freight;  but  the  master  refused  to  deliver  them, 
and  delivered  them  to  the  merchant,  claiming  to  act  in  be- 
half of  the  seller.  The  latter,  having  heard  of  the  insolvency 
of  the  buyer,  on  the  29th  day  of  the  previous  April,  exe- 
cuted a  power  of  attorney  to  another  person  in  Liverpool 
authorizing  him  to  stop  the  goods  in  transitu.  This  agent 
received  the  power  on  the  13th  day  of  May,  and  on  the  same 
day  confirmed  the  previous  stoppage  by  the  merchant  who 
had  assumed  to  act  for  the  seller.  Subsequently  the  seller 
adopted  and  ratified  all  that  had  been  done  in  his  behalf  by 
both  these  agents.  In  trover  for  the  goods  by  the  assignees 
of  the  bankrupt,  against  the  merchant  holding  them,  it  was 
held  that  the  ratification  of  the  stoppage  by  the  seller  had 
not  the  effect  of  altering  retrospectively  the  ownership  of  the 
goods,  which  had  already  vested  in  the  assignees. ^^ 

§  877.  No  right  of  stoppage  where  goods  have  been  fully 
paid  for. — There  is  no  right  of  stoppage  in  case  the  goods 
have  been  paid  for  in  full.  Neither  is  there  any  such  right 
in  case  the  goods  have  been  shipped  to  pay  a  precedent 
debt.-^2 

If  the  state  of  accounts  between  the  vendor  and  vendee  is 
such  that  the  former  is  indebted  to  the  latter  in  a  sum  equal 
to  or  greater  than  the  value  of  the  goods  consigned,  there  is 
no  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu,   for  the  goods  are  in  fact 

52  Bird    V.    Brown,   4   Exch.    786,  for   him  to  stop.     The   goods   had 

800.  "In  the  present  case,  the  stop-  already  become  the  property  of  the 

page    could    only   be   made    during  plaintiffs,    free    from    all    right    of 

transitus.    During  that  period   the  stoppage."      Per    Rolfe,    B.      This 

defendants,  without  authority  from  case  referred  to  and  distinguished 

Illins  [the  vendor],  made  the  stop-  from  Hutchings  v.  Nunes,  1   Moo. 

page.      After     the     transitus     was  P.    C.    (N.   S.)   243;   also    in    Durgy 

ended,   but   not    before,   Illins    [the  Cement  &  Umber  Co.  v.  O'Brien, 

vendor),  ratified  what  the  defend-  123  Mass.  12. 

ants  had  done.    From  that  time  the  ^.s  Wood  v.  Roach,  2  Dall.   (Pa.) 

stoppage  was  the  act  of  Illins  [the  180,    1    L.    ed.    340,    1    Yeates    (Fa.) 

vendor],  but  it  was  then   too  late  177,  1  Am.  Dec.  276. 


90I 


seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu. 


878 


paid  for.^^  If  payment  has  been  made  to  the  vendor's  agent, 
though  he  has  never  paid  over  the  money  to  the  vendor,  the 
right  does  not  exist.^^ 

§  878.  Right  of  stoppage  not  prevented  by  acceptance  of 
vendee's  note. — The  fact  that  the  vendee  has  given  his  note 
or  acceptance  for  the  price  of  the  goods  does  not  defeat  the 
vendor's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu;^®  and  the  vendor  need 
not  tender  back  the  purchaser's  note  or  acceptance  before 
exercising  this  right.^"  The  rule  appHes  even  in  case  the 
vendor  has  negotiated  his  vendee's  note  or  draft. ^^  It  also 
applies  in  case  the  vendor  has  taken  the  vendee's  draft  for 
the  price  of  the  goods,  and  the  drafts  have  been  accepted  by 
the  vendee's  agent,  to  whom  the  bills  of  lading  have  been 
delivered. ^^ 

The  vendor's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  is  not  taken 
away  by  the  purchaser's  acceptance  of  bills  for  the  price  of 
the  goods,  without  tendering  back  the  bills,®*^  for,  though 
the  bills  may  be  proved  against  the  estate  of  the  purchaser 
in  bankruptcy,  and  part  payment  attained  by  this  means,  this 


5-1  Vertue  v.  Jewell,  4  Camp.  51. 

55  Bunney  v.  Poyntz,  4  B.  &  Acl, 
568. 

5*5  Inglis  V.  Usher,  1  East  515; 
Bohtlingk  v.  Inglis,  3  East  381; 
Feise  v.  Wray,  3  East  93;  Edwards 
V.  Brewer,  2  M.  &  W.  375;  Miles 
V.  Gorton,  2  Cr.  &  M.  504,  4  Tyr. 
295,  299;  Lewis  v.  Mason,  36  U.  C. 
Q.  B.  590;  Bell  v.  Moss.  5  Whart. 
(Pa.)  189,  203;  Clapp  v.  Peck,  55 
Iowa  270,  7  N.  W.  587;  Clapp  v. 
Sohmer,  55  Iowa  273,  7  N.  W.  639; 
Buckley  v.  Furniss,  15  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  137;  Ainis  v.  Ayres,  62  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  376,  16  N.  Y.  S.  905,  42  N.  Y.  St. 
827;  Newhall  v.  Vargas,  13  Maine 
93.  108,  29  Am.  Dec.  489,  15  Maine 
314,  33  Am.  Dec.  617;  Descadillas 
V.   Harris,  8  Greenl.    (Maine)    298; 


Atkins  V.  Colby,  20  N.  H.  154. 

57  Hays  V.  Mouille,  14  Pa.  St.  48. 

58  Miles  V.  Gorton,  2  Cromp.  & 
M.  504. 

5»  Ainis  V.  Ayres,  62  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
376,  16  N.  Y.  S.  905,  42  N.  Y.  St. 
827.  The  acceptance  by  the  agent 
in  this  case  was  regarded  as  in 
substance  an  acceptance  by  the 
vendee. 

<^'J  Feise  v.  Wray,  3  East  93;  Ed- 
wards V.  Brewer,  2  M.  &  W.  375; 
Patten  v.  Thompson,  5  M.  &  S.  350. 
But  in  Cowasjee  v.  Thompson,  5 
Moore  P.  C.  165,  where  the  vendor 
had  the  option  of  taking  payment 
by  bill  or  in  cash,  and  he  elected 
the  former  mode  of  payment,  it 
was  held  that  he  had  waived  the 
right  of  stoppage. 


§    8/9  LIENS.  902 

is  no  objection;  for  a  part  payment  does  not  destroy  the  ven- 
dor's right  of  stopping  in  transitu,  but  only  reduces  the 
amount  of  his  lien  upon  them  after  he  has  received  them 
into  his  possession. 

§  879.  Right  cut  off  v^^hen  note,  order  or  bill  of  third  per- 
son accepted  as  pa5nTient. — If,  how^ever,  the  goods  be  paid  for 
by  the  note,  order,  or  accepted  bill  of  a  third  person,  without 
the  indorsement  or  guaranty  of  the  purchaser,  the  vendor 
has  no  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu;®^  for  in  such  case  the 
note,  order,  or  bill  is  regarded  as  absolute  payment. 

§  880.  Right  of  stoppage  not  prevented  by  indebtedness 
of  vendor  to  vendee. — The  fact  that  the  vendor  is  indebted 
to  the  vendee  upon  an  unadjusted  account  does  not  defeat 
his  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.  He  is  not  bound  to  wait 
for  the  settlement  of  the  mutual  accounts  to  ascertain  the 
fact  or  extent  of  his  indebtedness  to  the  vendee,  but  he  may 
act , at  once  upon  the  insolvency  of  the  vendee,  and  by  the 
exercise  of  his  right  of  stoppage  make  himself  secure  against 
loss.^^  But  the  right  may  often  depend  on  the  state  of  ac- 
counts between  the  parties.  "^^  If  the  consignor  is  indebted  to 
the  consignee  to  the  full  amount  of  the  value  of  the  goods 
consigned,  and  they  are  expressly  consigned  on  account  of 
such  indebtedness,  the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  does  not 
apply,  for  there  can  be  no  risk  of  loss  to  the  consignor.^^ 

The  circumstance  that  the  shipment  is  made  at  the  risk  of 
the  consignor  does  not  in  such  case  impair  the  consignee's 
claim  to  it.*^^    The  fact  that  the  consignment  has  been  made 

61  Eaton  V.  Cook,  32  Vt.  58.  (Pa.)  1'06;  Wood  v.  Roach,  1  Yeates 

02  Wood  V.  Jones,  7  Dow.  &  Ry.  (Pa.)    177,   2   Dall.    (Pa.)    180,   1    L. 

126;  and  see   Masters  v.   Barreda,  ed.  340,  1  Am.  Dec.  276. 

18  How.  (U.  S.)  489,  15  L.  ed.  466.  cs  Haille  v.   Smith,   1   Bos.   &   P. 

C3  Vertue  v.  Jewell,  4  Camp.  31.  563,  571 ;  Clark  v.  Mauran,  3  Paige 

64  Clark  V.  Mauran,  3  Paige  (N.  (N.  Y.)  Z72>. 
Y.)  Z7Z;  Summer il  v.  Elder,  1  Binn. 


903  SELLERS  RIGHT  OF  STOPPAGE  IN   TRANSITU.  S    o5I 

by  the  debtor  to  his  creditor  at  the  request  of  the  latter,  or 
at  least  was  made  with  notice  to  him,  is  material.^^ 

§  881.  Vendor's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  not  affected 
by  part  payment  of  purchase-money. — Part  payment  of  the 
purchase-money  does  not  affect  the  vendor's  right  of  stop- 
page in  transitu.®'''  It  has  already  been  noticed  that  such  pay- 
ment does  not  affect  his  right  of  lien.®^  In  an  early  case  re- 
specting the  effect  of  such  payment.  Lord  Kenyon®''  said 
"he  did  not  think  that  this  took  the  case  out  of  the  general 
rule,  and  that  he  should  be  sorry  to  let  in  such  an  exception 
because  it  would  destroy  the  rule  itself;  since  every  payment 
however  small,  even  the  payment  of  a  farthing  by  way  of 
earnest,  would,  if  such  an  exception  were  introduced,  prevent 
the  operation  of  the  general  rule  of  stopping  in  transitu." 
On  this  point,  however,  a  second  argument  was  ordered  at 
the  request  of  the  other  judges;  but  judgment  was  entered 
without  further  argument,  because  the  judges  finally  had  no 
doubt  on  the  subject.  Lord  Kenyon  then  said:  "When  the 
distinction  was  first  taken  at  the  bar,  I  thought  it  not  well 
founded;  and  on  looking  into  the  cases  that  were  referred  to 
in  support  of  it,  we  are  clearly  of  opinion  that  the  circum- 
stance of  the  vendee  having  partly  paid  for  the  goods  does 
not  defeat  the  vendor's  right  to  stop  them  in  transitu,  the 
vendee  having  become  a  bankrupt;  and  that  the  vendor  has  a 
right  to  retake  them  unless  the  whole  price  has  been  paid." 

But  a  composition  by  the  vendor  with  his  vendee  for  the 
price  of  undelivered  goods  operates  as  an  abandonment  of 
the  right  of  stoppage,  and  the  vendor  is  bound  to  deliver  the 

GG  Walter  v.   Ross,  2  Wash.   (U.  W.    321;    Newhall    v.    Vargas,    13 

S.)  283,    7    Fed.    Cas.    No.    17122;  Maine  93,  29  Am.  Dec.  489. 

Clark  V.  Mauran,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.)  68  See  ante,  §  801. 

Z7Z.  69  Hodgson  v.   Loy,  7  T.  R.  436, 

67  McEwan  v.  Smith,  2  H.  L.  Cas.  recognized    in    Feise    v.    Wray,    3 

309;  Gibson  v.  Carruthers,  8  M.  &  East  93. 


§    882  LIENS.  904 

goods    on    receiving   payment    agreed   upon    in    the    compo- 
sition.'^'^ 

§  882.  Contract  of  sale  not  rescinded  by  bankruptcy  of 
buyer. — The  bankruptcy  of  the  buyer  does  not  of  itself  re- 
scind the  contract  of  sale,  and  therefore,  unless  the  goods  are 
stopped  by  the  seller,  the  buyer  or  his  assignee  may  take 
possession  of  the  goods,  and  put  an  end  to  the  transit  and 
to  the  vendor's  right  of  stoppage.'^^  This  rule  does  not  ap- 
ply, however,  to  a  consignment  to  a  factor.  As  Lord  Kenyon 
said  :"^  "If  the  goods  be  sent  to  a  factor  to  be  disposed  of, 
who  afterwards  becomes  a  bankrupt,  and  the  goods  remain 
distinguishable  from  the  general  mass  of  his  property,  the 
principal  may  recover  the  goods  in  specie  and  is  not  driven 
to  the  necessity  of  proving  his  debt  under  the  commission  of 
bankrupt ;  nay,  if  the  goods  be  sold  and  reduced  to  money, 
provided  that  money  be  in  separate  bags  and  distinguishable 
from  the  factor's  other  property,  the  law  is  the  same." 

And  so  if  goods  are  ordered  by  a  merchant  who  is  at  the 
time  insolvent,  and  they  are  sent  to  him  by  the  vendor  with- 
out knowledge  of  this  fact,  and  afterwards  the  purchaser  dies, 
his  administrator  is  entitled  to  receive  the  goods  upon  their 

"•'  Nichols   V.    Hart,  5   Car.   &   P.  Scott  v.  Pettit,  3  B.  &  P.  469.    But 

179.  this  suggestion  has  never  been  fol- 

"1  Ellis  V.  Hunt,  3  T.  R.  464,  467.  lowed;  and  when  an  argument  of 
In  Snee  v.  Prescot,  1  Atk.  245,  249,  this  sort,  supported  by  this  quo- 
Lord  Hardwicke  said :  "Though  tation,  was  addressed  to  Judge 
goods  are  even  delivered  to  the  Story,  he  said:  "Nothing  is  better 
principal,  I  could  never  see  any  settled,  if  an  uninterrupted  series 
substantial  reason  why  the  orig-  of  authorities  can  settle  the  law, 
inal  proprietor,  who  never  received  than  the  doctrine,  that  the  vendor 
a  farthing,  should  be  obliged  to  in  cases  of  insolvency,  can  stop  the 
quit  all  claim  to  them,  and  come  property  only  while  it  is  in  its 
in  as  a  creditor  only  for  a  shilling,  transit."  Conyers  v.  Ennis,  2  Ma- 
perhaps  in  the  pound,  unless  the  son  (U.  S.)  236,  238,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
law  goes  upon  the  general   credit  3149. 

the  bankrupt  has  gained  by  having  "-  Tooke   v.    HoUingworth,    5    T. 

them    in    his    custody."     And    see  R.  215,  226. 


905  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  884 

arrival,  and  the  vendor,  not  having  exercised  his  right  of 
stoppage  in  transitu,  cannot  reclaim  them  upon  the  ground 
of  the  purchaser's  insolvency."^ 

§  883.  Vendor's  right  to  recover  where  after  notice  goods 
are  delivered  to  bankrupt. — But  if  the  goods  pass  into  the 
hands  of  the  bankrupt  vendee  or  of  his  assignee  after  a  valid 
notice  to  stop  them  has  been  given  to  the  carrier,  as  where 
the  carrier  after  receiving  such  notice  delivers  the  goods  to 
such  vendee  by  mistake,  the  vendor  may  recover  the  goods, 
or  maintain  trover  therefor.  In  such  case,  inasmuch  as  the 
goods  have  not  come  into  the  possession  of  the  bankrupt  or 
of  his  assignee  with  the  consent  of  the  owner,  they  are  not  a 
part  of  the  bankrupt's  estate."^  The  right  of  possession  is 
revested  in  the  vendor  by  his  notice  to  the  carrier,  and  the 
assignee  has  no  other  or  greater  right  to  the  goods  than  the 
vendee  himself  would  have. 

§  884.  Right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  exercised  only  in  case 
of  buyer's  insolvency. — The  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  can 
be  exercised  only  in  case  the  buyer  becomes  insolvent.'^^     But 

"3  Conyers  v.  Ennis,  2  Mason  (U.  or    proceeds    has    not    been    extin- 

S.)    236,    Fed.    Cas.    No.   3149.    And  guished,  may,  upon  the  insolvency 

see    Scott   v.    Pettit,   3    Bos.    &    P.  of  the  buyer  or  consignee  becom- 

469;    Bohtlingk    v.    Inglis,    3    East  ing    known    to    him    after    parting 

381.  with  the  property,  stop  it  while  on 

"■1  Litt  V.  Cowley,  7  Taunt.  169.  its    transit    to    the    buyer    or    con- 

"•"»  The   Constantia,  6  Rob.   Adm.  signee,     and      resume     possession 

321 ;    Wilmhurst   v.    Bowker,   7    M.  thereof.      A    person    is     insolvent 

&  G.  882;  Walley  v.  Montgomery,  when  he  ceases  to  pay  his  debts  in 

3   East  585;   O'Brien  v.   Norris,   16  the  manner  usual  with  persons  of 

Md.    122,   77   Am.    Dec.   284;    In    re  his  business,  or  when  "he  declares 

The  St.  Joze  Indiano,  1  Wheat.  (U.  his  inability  or  unwillingness  to  do 

S.)  208,  4  L.  ed.  73;  Farrell  v.  Rich-  so.     California:     Civ.    Code    1906, 

mond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  102  N.  Car.  390,  §§  3076,  3077;  Montana:    Civ.  Code 

9  S.  E.  302,  3  L.  R.  A.  647,  11  Am.  1895,  §§  3970,  3971;  North  Dakota: 

St.    760.     In    California,    Montana,  Rev.    Codes     1905,    §§    6298,    6299; 

North      Dakota,      Oklahoma      and  Oklahoma :       Comp.      Laws      1909, 

South    Dakota    it    is    provided    by  §§  4152,  4153;  South  Dakota:  Rev. 

code  that  a  seller  or  consignor  of  Codes  (Civ.),  1903,  §§  2163,  2164. 
property,  whose  claim  for  its  price 


885 


LIENS, 


906 


it  is  not  necessary  that  proceedings  by  or  against  him  should 
have  been  commenced  before  the  seller  can  stop  the  goods 
in  transitu,  and  much  less  that  he  should  have  been  adjudi- 
cated a  bankrupt  or  insolvent  debtor,'^''  but  only  that  the 
buyer  should  have  shown  in  some  way  a  general  inability  to 
pay  his  debts  in  the  usual  course  of  business."'^  It  is  enough 
that  the  affairs  of  the  vendee  are  so  involved  that  he  is  un- 
able to  pay  for  the  goods;  and  it  does  not  matter  that  his 
insolvency  is  not  known  or  declared  at  the  time  of  the  stop- 
page, provided  he  becomes  actually  insolvent  before  he  ob- 
tains possession  of  the  goods."^  The  vendor  has  the  right 
to  judge  for  himself  of  the  danger  of  the  vendee's  insolvency, 
and  to  take  measures  to  guard  against  itJ^  He,  of  course, 
acts  at  his  peril,  but  he  has  the  right  so  to  act,  subject  to  risk 
of  being  required  to  restore  the  goods  to  the  consignee,  or  to 
respond  in  damages  if  the  latter  proves  to  be  solvent  at  the 
time  the  goods  should  have  been  delivered  to  him  and 
paid  for. 

§  885.    Question  of  buyer's  insolvency  is  for  the  jury. — The 

question  of  the  buyer's  insolvency  is  one  of  fact  to  be  deter- 
mined by  the  jury,  and  any  evidence  bearing  upon  this  fact 
is  competent.^*'     The  fact  that  the  buyer  has  stopped  pay- 


■^G  Ogle  V.  Atkinson,  1  Marsh.  323, 
327;  Durgy  Cement  &  Umber  Co. 
V.  O'Brien,  123  Mass.  12,  per  Mor- 
ton, J.  And  see  Parker  v.  Gossage, 
2  Cr.,  M.  &  R.  617;  Queen  v.  Sad- 
dlers' Co.,  10  H.  L.  Cas.  404; 
Thompson  v.  Thompson.  4  Cush. 
(Mass.)  127. 

77  O'Brien  v.  Norris,  16  Md.  122, 
77  Am.  Dec.  284;  Secomb  v.  Nutt, 
14  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  324;  James  v. 
Griffin,  2  M.  &  W.  623;  Edwards  v. 
Brewer,  2  M.  &  W.  375;  Blooming- 
dale  V.   Memphis   &  Charleston   R. 


Co.,  6  Lea  (Tenn.)  616;  Inslee  v. 
Lane.  57  N.  H.  454,  458,  per  Foster, 
C.  J.;  Benedict  v.  Schaettle,  12 
Ohio   St.  515. 

"8  Gardner  v.  Tudor,  8  Pick. 
(Mass.)  206. 

"9  Stanton  v.  Eager,  16  Pick. 
(Mass.)  467,  474,  per  Shaw,  C.  J.; 
Patten  v.  Thompson,  5  M.  &  S. 
350,  368,  per  Holroyd,  J. 

80  Hays  v.  Mouille,  14  Pa.  St. 
48;  Reynolds  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R. 
R.  Co.,  43  N.  H.  580.  As  to  evi- 
dence held  to  show  that  the  buyer 


907 


SELLER  S   RIGHT   OF  STOPPAGE  IN   TRANSITU. 


meiit  is  of  course  sufficient  evidence  of  his  insolvency  to  war- 
rant a  stoppage  in  transitu  f^  and  his  failure  to  pay  a  single 
undisputed  debt  in  the  usual  course  of  mercantile  business 
may  be  sufficient  for  this  purpose.^- 

If  the  vendee  has,  before  the  stoppage  in  transitu,  afforded 
the  ordinary  apparent  evidences  of  insolvency,  he  ought  not 
to  complain  of  the  precautionary  act  of  the  vendor  in  exer- 
cising this  right,  though  it  should  afterwards  turn  out  that 
the  vendee  was  ultimately  able  to  pay;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  ought  not  to  complain  in  case  the  vendor  exercised 
this  right  when  no  evidences  of  the  vendee's  insolvency  had 
become  manifest,  if  the  fact  of  insolvency  existed  at  the  time 
the  goods  reached  their  destination.^^ 

A  confession  of  judgment  by  the  vendee,  and  a  levy  of 
execution  upon  his  property,  has  been  held  to  be  sufficient 
evidence  of  his  insolvency.^'*  An  admission  by  the  vendee  of 
the  fact  of  his  insolvency  is  sufficient  evidence  of  it.^^     But 


was  not  insolvent  see  Rex  Buggy 
Co.  V.  Ross,  80  Ark.  388,  97  S.  W. 
291. 

81  Vertue  v.  Jewell,  4  Camp.  31; 
Dixon  V.  Yates,  5  B.  &  Aid.  313; 
Bird  V.  Brown,  4  Exch.  786;  Dodsou 
V.  Wentworth,  4  M.  &  G.  1080; 
Jackson  v.  Nichol,  5  Bing.  (N.  C.) 
508. 

s-  Benedict  v.  Schaettle,  12  Ohio 
St.  515,  519,  per  Gholson,  J.; 
O'Brien  v.  Norris,  16  Md.  122,  11 
Am.  Dec.  284.  In  Connecticut  an 
exceptional  rule  on  this  point  pre- 
vails. It  is  declared  that  an  essen- 
tial requisite  to  the  exercise  of 
this  right  is  the  insolvency  of  the 
vendee,  consisting  not  merely  of  a 
general  inability  to  pay  his  debts, 
but  in  his  having  taken  the  benefit 
of  an  insolvent  law,  or  in  his  hav- 


ing stopped  payment,  or  in  his  hav- 
ing failed  in  business.  His  insolv- 
ency should  consist  of  some  vis- 
ible change  in  his  pecuniary  situa- 
tion,— some  open,  notorious  act  on 
his  part,  calculated  to  affect  his 
credit, — some  change  in  his  appar- 
ent circumstances  which  would 
operate  as  a  surprise  on  the  ve«- 
dor.  Rogers  v.  Thomas,  20  Conn. 
53.  This  case  is  now  only  cited  to 
be  criticised  and  disapproved.  See 
Benedict  v.  Schaettle,  12  Ohio  St. 
515,  521,  and  many  other  cases. 

S3  Benedict  v.  Schaettle,  12  Ohio 
St.  515,  519. 

s-t  Loeb  v.  Peters,  63  Ala.  243,  35 
Am.  Rep.  17. 

85  Secomb  v.  Nutt.  14  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  324. 


§  886  LIENS.  908 

the  fact  that  a  creditor  of  the  vendee  has  attached  the  goods 
is  not  of  itself  sufficient  evidence  of  his  insolvency. ^° 

§  886.    Vendor  bound  to  deliver  goods  to  solvent  vendee. — 

The  vendor  is  bound  to  deliver  the  goods  if  the  vendee  is 
solvent  when  they  arrive  at  their  destination;  and  he  is  also 
liable  in  damages  to  the  vendee  for  any  delay,  loss,  or  ex- 
pense occasioned  by  the  unwarranted  stoppage.  If  the  ven- 
dor has  acted  upon  an  apprehension  of  the  consignee's  in- 
solvency which  proves  to  be  without  foundation,  his  stop- 
page of  the  goods  is  unlawful,  and  the  property  belongs  to 
the  consignee,  and  he  is  entitled  to  restitution,  which  may  be 
specifically  enforced  in  a  court  of  admiralty.^'^ 

Where  a  merchant  is  Bahia  ordered  goods  from  a  mer- 
chant in  Pittsburg,  with  instructions  to  send  them  by  sail- 
ing vessel  direct  or  via  Pernambuco,  and  the  goods  were 
shipped  by  the  vendor  to  a  forwarding  agent  in  New  York 
with  instructions  to  ship  them  to  Bahia,  saying  nothing  of  a 
shipment  via  Pernambuco,  and  the  agent  finding  no  vessel 
to  Bahia,  the  vendor  after  some  months  ordered  a  sale  of  the 
goods  in  New  York,  without  alleging  the  insolvency  of  the 
consignee  or  other  equivalent  cause,  it  was  held,  in  a  suit 
by  the  latter  against  the  vendor,  that  the  sale  was  illegal,  and 
that  the  measure  of  damages  was  the  price  of  the  goods  at 
Bahia  when  they  should  have  arrived  there,  less  the  invoice 
price,  expenses,  costs,  and  charges  of  transportation.^^ 

§  887.  When  insolvency  at  the  time  of  sale  immaterial. — 
That  the  insolvency  existed  at  the  time  of  the  sale  is  immate- 
rial if  the  vendor  w^as  ignorant  of  the  fact.^''  The  object  in  al- 
lowing the  privilege  of  stoppage  in  transitu  to  the  vendor  be- 

8«  Gustine    v.    Phillips,   38    Mich.  *>»  Schmertz  v.  Dwyer,  53  Pa.  St. 

674.  335;   and    see    Eby  v.    Schumacher, 

S7  The   Constantia,  6  Rob.  Adm.  29  Pa.  St.  40. 

R.  321 ;  The  Tigress,  32  L.  J.  Adm.  S9  Bohtlingk    v.     Inglis,    3    East 

97.  381;  Litt  v.   Cowley,  1  Holt  N.   P. 


909  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         5 

ing  to  protect  him  against  the  insolvency  of  the  vendee,  this 
privilege,  unless  waived  by  the  vendor,  should  apply  as  vv^ell 
to  cases  of  insolvency  existing  at  the  time  of  sale  as  to  cases 
of  insolvency  occurring  afterwards  at  any  time  before  the 
actual  delivery  of  the  goods,  the  only  exception  being  in 
case  the  insolvency  was  known  to  the  vendor  at  the  time  of 
the  sale,  and  the  contract  was  made  in  view  of  this  fact.'^'^ 

§  888.  Notice  of  vendor  to  carrier. — To  exercise  this  right 
it  is  only  necessary  for  the  vendor  or  his  agent  to  give  notice 
of  his  claim  to  the  carrier  or  other  person.  It  is  not  neces- 
sary that  he  should  demand  a  delivery  of  the  goods  to  him- 
self.^^  Much  less  is  it  necessary  that  he  should  make  an 
actual  seizure  of  the  goods.  A  demand  for  the  goods  of  the 
person  in  possession,  or  a  notice  to  him  to  stop  the  goods,  or 
a  claim  of  possession  under  his  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu, 
and  an  endeavor  to  get  possession,  is  suf^cient.^^  No  par- 
ticular form  of  notice  or  demand  is  required.     If  the  carrier 

338;  Inslee  v.  Lane,  57  N.  H.  454;  Peters.  63  Ala.  243,  248;  Schwa- 
Reynolds  V.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  bacher  v.  Kane,  13  Mo.  App.  126. 
Co..  43  N.  H.  580;  Buckley  v.  Fur-  oi  Northey  v.  Field,  2  Esp.  613; 
niss,  15  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  137;  Loeb  Reynolds  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R. 
V.  Peters,  63  Ala.  243;  O'Brien  v.  Co..  43  N.  H.  580.  588;  Bell  v.  Moss, 
Norris,  16  Md.  122,  11  Am.  Dec.  284.  5  Whart.  (Pa.)  189,  207.  In  Cali- 
co Reynolds  v.  Boston  &  Maine  fornia,  Montana,  North  Dakota, 
R.  Co.,  43  N.  H.  580,  588;  Benedict  Oklahoma  and  South  Dakota  it  is 
V.  Schaettle,  12  Ohio  St.  515;  Hays  provided  by  code  that  stoppage  in 
V.  Mouille,  14  Pa.  St.  48;  Blum  v.  transit  can  be  effected  only  by  no- 
Marks,  21  La.  Ann.  268,  99  Am.  tice  to  the  carrier  or  depositary  of 
Dec.  725;  Buckley  v.  Furniss,  15  the  property,  or  by  taking  actual 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  137;  Schwabacher  possession  thereof.  California: 
V.  Kane,  13  Mo.  App.  126;  Newhall  Civ.  Code  1906,  §  3079;  Montana: 
V.  Vargas,  13  Maine  93,  29  Am.  Civ.  Code  1895,  §  3973;  North  Da- 
Dec.  489;  Rucker  v.  Donovan,  13  kota :  Rev.  Codes  1905,  §  6301; 
Kans.  251,  19  Am.  Rep.  84.  The  Oklahoma:  Comp.  Laws  1909. 
case  of  Rogers  v.  Thomas,  20  Conn.  §  4155;  South  Dakota:  Rev.  Code 
53,  to  the  contrary,  is  criticised  and  (Civ.)  1903,  §  2166. 
repudiated  in  Benedict  v.  Schaet-  S's  Rucker  v.  Donovan,  13  Kans. 
tie,   12  Ohio  St.  515,  521 ;   Loeb  v.  251,  19  Am.  Rep.  84. 


§    889  LIENS.  910 

is  clearly  informed  that  it  is  the  intention  and  desire  of  the 
vendor  to  exercise  his  right  of  stoppage,  the  notice  is  suf- 
ficient.°^ 

It  is  not  necessary  that  the  vendor  should  take  possession 
of  the  goods  to  complete  the  stoppage  and  revest  the  right 
of  possession.  "It  was  held  formerly,"  said  Chief  Justice 
Gibbs,^'*  ''that  unless  the  vendor  recovered  back  actual  pos- 
session of  the  goods,  by  a  corporeal  seizure  of  them,  he  could 
not  exercise  his  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.  Latterly  it  has 
been  held  that  notice  to  the  carrier  is  sufificient,  and  that  if 
he  deliver  the  goods  after  such  notice,  he  is  liable.  That 
doctrine  cannot  be  controverted;  and  it  is  supported  by  all 
modern  decisions." 

§  889.  Demand  by  vendor. — A  demand  by  the  vendor  of 
the  bills  of  lading  which  are  in  possession  of  the  shipowner, 
having  never  been  delivered  to  the  consignee  to  whose  order 
they  are  made  out,  because  he  had  not  paid  the  freight,  is 
an  effectual  stoppage  in  transitu.  Goods  were  shipped  from 
England  to  Shanghai  for  the  account  of  a  merchant  in  Lon- 
don. Soon  after  the  vessel  sailed,  the  merchant  committed 
an  act  of  bankruptcy,  and  was  adjudicated  a  bankrupt.  Both 
the  vendor  and  the  bankrupt's  trustee  claimed  the  bills  of 
lading,  which  were  still  in  the  hands  of  the  shipowners  in 
London;  and  it  was  finally  arranged  that  the  goods  should 
be  sold  by  the  agent  of  the  shipowners  at  Shanghai,  and  the 
proceeds  paid  to  the  person  who  should  be  entitled  to  them. 
It  was  held  that  the  vendor's  demand  of  the  bills  of  lading 
was  an  effectual  stoppage  in  transitu. ^^  James,  L.  J.,  deliver- 
ing the  judgment,  said:  'Tt  so  happens,  luckily  for  the 
vendor,  that  the  documents  of  title  have  never  left  the  ship- 

03  Jones   V.   Earl,  Z7  Cal.  630,  99  o^  Ex  parte  Watson,  L.  R.  5  Ch. 

Am.     Dec.    338;     Bloomingdale    v.       Div.  35,  43.    And  see  Inglis  v.  Ush- 
Alemphis    &   Charleston   R.    Co.,  6      erwood,  1  East  515. 
Lea  (Tenn.)  616. 

94  Litt  V.   Cowley,  7  Taunt.   169, 
2  Marsh.  457. 


911  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  891 

owners'  possession.  *  *  *  The  vendor  comes  to  the  ship- 
owners and  says,  'DeHver  the  goods  to  me,'  and  the  shipown- 
ers have  undertaken  to  sell  the  goods  and  hand  over  the 
proceeds  of  sale  to  the  real  owner.  I  am  of  opinion  that  the 
goods  have  been  effectually  stopped  in  transitu,  because  the 
shipow^ners  are  to  sell  them  and  deal  with  the  proceeds  ac- 
cording to  the  legal  and  equitable  rights  of  the  parties." 

§  890.  Vendor  may  claim  goods  in  the  hands  of  any  per- 
son having  their  charge. — The  vendor  may  claim  the  goods 
in  the  hands  of  any  person  who  may  have  charge  of  them  be- 
fore the  transit  ends.^*^  Thus  he  may  claim  them  not  only 
while  they  are  in  the  hands  of  the  carrier,  but  also  while  they 
are  in  the  hands  of  a  depositary  or  warehouseman  not  act- 
ing for  the  vendee,  or  while  in  the  possession  of  the  col- 
lector of  customs  awaiting  the  payment  of  duties  before  the 
vendee  has  taken  actual  possession.^^ 

§  891.  Notice  to  agent  is  notice  to  the  carrier. — Notice  to 
the  carrier's  agent,  who  has  the  actual  custody  of  the  goods 
in  the  regular  course  of  his  agency,  is  notice  to  the  carrier.^^ 
A  letter  from  the  vendor,  delivered  to  the  carrier's  agent  in 
possession  of  the  goods,  stating  that  the  purchaser's  prop- 
erty had  been  attached,  that  the  vendor  desired  to  save  the 
goods,  of  which  he  gave  a  bill  of  particulars,  and  directing 
the  agent  to  deliver  the  goods  to  no  one  but  to  the  vendor's 
own  agent,  was  held  to  be  a  sufficient  demand.^^ 

A  station  agent  who  has  control  of  goods  received  by  rail- 
road at  that  station  is  an  agent  upon  wdiom  notice  of  stop- 
page in  transitu  may  be  made.^ 

96  Northey  v.  Field,  2  Esp.  613.  dale  v.   Memphis  &  Charleston  R. 

97  Newhall  v.  Vargas,  13  Maine  Co.,  6  Lea  (Tenn.)  616;  Poole  v. 
93,  109,  29  Am.  Dec.  489,  IS  Maine  The  H.  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.,  58  Tex.  134, 
314.  33  Am.  Dec.  617.  139. 

98  Bierce  v.  Red  Blufif  Hotel  Co.,  09  Jones  v.  Earl,  37  Cal.  630,  99 
31   Cal.  160;  Jones  v.  Earl,  37  Cal.  Am.  Dec.  338. 

630,   99   Am.    Dec.   338;    Blooming-  1  Poole  v.  The  H.  &  T.  C.  R.  Co., 


892 


LIENS. 


912 


§  892.  Notice  is  sufficient  when  goods  are  still  in  a  ware- 
house.— If  a  railroad  company  has  deposited  goods  in  a  cus- 
toms warehouse  belonging  to  the  company,  to  await  the  pay- 
ment of  duties  as  well  as  the  payment  of  the  freight  due  the 
carrier,  notice  by  the  consignor  to  stop  the  goods  given  to 
the  company  is  sufficient,  though  in  such  a  case  it  may  be 
advisable  to  give  notice  also  to  customs  officers.^  Where 
imported  goods  are  entered  in  bond  by  the  importer,  and 
are  sold  by  him  and  sent  in  bond  by  railroad  to  a  purchaser 
at  an  interior  city,  the  railroad  company  is  regarded  as  being 
in  possession  of  the  goods  while  they  are  in  transit  over  the 
road,  and  notice  to  stop  them  should  be  given  to  the  railroad 
company.  Thus,  where  the  goods  go  into  a  bonded  ware- 
house belonging  to  the  railroad  company  at  their  place  of 
destination,  it  would  seem  that  the  goods  are  still  in  charge 
of  the  railroad  company. 

§  893.  Duty  of  shipowner  to  notify  ship's  master  of  notice 
of  stoppage  given  him. — Notice  of  a  stoppage  in  transitu 
given  to  a  shipowner  doubtless  imposes  a  duty  on  him  to 
communicate  it  with  reasonable  diligence  to  the  master  of 
the  ship,  though  the  notice,  if  so  communicated,  will  not  be 


58  Tex.  134,  139.  "The  rule  is  ele- 
mentary, that  where  the  principal 
holds  out  an  agent  in  such  manner 
as  to  induce  the  public  to  believe 
that  the  agent  is  authorized  to 
transact  business  of  any  particular 
kind,  the  principal  will  be  bound 
for  the  acts  of  the  agent  in  that 
particular.  Here  the  station  agent 
was,  to  all  appearances,  held  out 
to  the  public  as  the  representative 
of  the  company  at  that  point,  in 
regard  to  freights  either  shipped 
to  or  from  that  station.  And  it 
would  seem  to  follow  that  a  notice 
to  him  of  a  stoppage  in  transitu  of 
goods  in  transit  to  that  point,  upon 


the  soundest  principles  of  law  and 
justice  ought  to  be  considered  as 
notice  to  the  company."  Per 
Watts,  J. 

2  Ascher  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co., 
36  U.  C.  Q.  B.  609,  614.  Chief  Jus- 
tice Richards,  delivering  the  judg- 
ment of  the  court,  said:  "We 
think  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  hold 
that  notice  may  be  given  to  the 
railway  company  when  the  goods, 
which  have  been  sent  forward  by 
them,  are  in  their  own  warehouse, 
and  under  their  own  charge,  sub- 
ject to  the  directions  of  the  gov- 
ernment as  to  being  held  for  du- 
ties thereon." 


913  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  893 

effectual  until  it  reaches  the  master.  In  the  recent  case  of 
Ex  parte  Falk,^  Bramwell,  L,  J.,  remarked  that  he  did  not 
think  that  the  giving  of  such  notice  to  the  shipowner  imposed 
any  duty  upon  him  to  stop  the  goods.  But  when  this  case 
came  before  the  House  of  Lords,'*  Lord  Blackburn  expressed 
a  different  view,  saying:  "I  had  always  myself  understood 
that  the  law  was  that  when  you  became  aware  that  a  man 
to  whom  you  had  sold  goods  which  had  been  shipped,  had 
become  insolvent,  your  best  way,  or  at  least  a  very  good 
way,  of  stopping  them  in  transitu  was  to  give  notice  to  the 
shipowner  in  order  that  he  might  send  it  on.  He  knew 
where  his  master  was  likely  to  be,  and  he  might  send  it  on; 
and  I  have  always  been  under  the  belief  that  although  such 
a  notice,  if  sent,  cast  upon  the  shipowner  who  received  it  an 
obligation  to  send  it  on  with  reasonable  diligence,  yet  if, 
though  he  used  reasonable  diligence,  somehow  or  other  the 
goods  were  delivered  before  it  reached,  he  would  not  be  re- 
sponsible. I  have  always  thought  that  a  stoppage,  if  effected 
thus,  was  a  sufficient  stoppage  in  transitu;  I  have  always 
thought  that  when  the  shipowner,  having  received  such  a 
notice,  used  reasonable  diligence  and  sent  the  notice  on,  and 
it  arrived  before  the  goods  were  delivered,  that  was  a  per- 
fect stoppage  in  transitu." 

But  if  the  notice  be  given  to  the  principal  when  the  goods 
are  in  the  custody  of  his  agent  or  servant,  the  notice  will  not 
be  effectual  unless  it  be  given  at  such  a  time  and  under  such 
circumstances  that  the  principal,  by  the  exercise  of  reason- 
able diligence,  may  communicate  it  to  his  servant  in  time  to 
prevent  the  delivery  to  the  consignee.  Baron  Parke  uses 
forcible  language  on  this  point,  saying:^  "To  hold  that  a 
notice  to  a  principal  at  a  distance  is  sufficient  to  revest  the 
property  in  the  unpaid  vendor,  and  render  the  principal  lia- 

3  14  Ch.  Div.  446,  455.  5  Whitehead  v.  Anderson,  9  M.  & 

4  Kemp  V.  Falk,  7  App.  Cas.  573,      W.  518. 
585. 

58 


§  894  LIENS.  914 

ble  in  trover  for  a  subsequent  delivery  by  his  servants  to  the 
vendee,  when  it  was  impossible,  from  the  distance  and  want 
of  means  of  communication,  to  prevent  that  delivery,  would 
be  the  height  of  injustice.  The  only  duty  that  can  be  im- 
posed on  the  absent  principal  is,  to  use  reasonable  diligence 
to  prevent  the  delivery." 

If  the  goods  are  on  board  a  ship,  the  vendor  may  demand 
them  of  the  master,®  or  give  notice  to  him. 

^  894.  Vendor  gains  nothing  by  demanding  goods  from 
vendee. — The  vendor  does  not  ordinarily  demand  the  goods 
of  the  vendee;  for,  if  the  latter  is  in  actual  possession,  the 
vendor's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  is  at  an  end,  and  he 
can  only  make  demand  of  the  person  in  actual  possession  at 
the  time.'^  But  if  the  vendee  is  not  already  in  possession  of 
the  goods,  a  demand  upon  him  may  be  effectual.  Thus,  in  a 
Pennsylvania  case.  Chief  Justice  Gibson,  discussing  this 
point,  said :®  "A  demand  of  the  carrier  is  a  countermand  of 
the  previous  order  to  deliver;  and  where  he  is  not  accessible 
at  the  time,  there  is  no  reason  why  an  equivalent  for  it 
should  not  be  found  in  a  countermand  of  the  consignee's  au- 
thority to  receive.  If  there  were  a  specific  object  to  be  ac- 
complished by  a  demand  on  the  carrier,  it  would  be  to  make 
him  liable;  but  his  responsibility  is  seldom  looked  to;  the  ob- 
ject being  to  prevent  the  consignee's  ovv^nership  from  becom- 
ing absolute ;  for  which  purpose,  any  act  that  warns  him  of 
an  enforcement  of  the  lien  ought  to  be  taken  for  a  suf^cient 
protest  against  his  possession."  In  the  case  under  considera- 
tion, the  vendor's  agent  wrote  to  the  assignees  of  the  in- 

6  Bohtlingk  v.  Inglis,  3  East  381,  liver  to  the  consignee,  which  is  the 
397.  usual    act    of    stoppage,    is    so    in- 

7  Rucker  v.  Donovan,  13  Kans.  variably  communicated  to  the  mas- 
251,  19  Am.  Rep.  84.  ter,  or  other  person  in  possession, 

8  Bell  V.  Moss,  5  Whart.  (Pa.)  that  I  have  seen  but  one  case  in 
189,  206.  The  learned  chief  justice  which  it  was  communicated  to  any 
also   remarked    that   "the    counter-  one  else." 

mand  of  the  original  order  to  de- 


915  SELLER^S  RIGHT  OF  STOPPAGE  IN  TRANSITU.  §    895 

solvent  purchaser,  before  the  arrival  of  the  vessel  carrying 
the  goods,  proposing  that  the  goods  should  either  be  deliv- 
ered to  this  agent,  or  that  the  assignees  should  receive  them 
and  keep  a  separate  account  of  sales;  and  in  the  latter  alter- 
native he  demanded  the  proceeds  as  the  property  of  the  ven- 
dor. In  consequence  of  this,  the  parties  agreed  that  the 
goods  should  remain  without  being  sold  till  the  question  of 
title  should  be  determined  by  a  competent  tribunal,  and  that 
the  rights  of  the  parties  should  not  be  varied  by  the  agree- 
ment. It  was  held  that  there  was  a  sufficient  exercise  of  the 
right  of  stoppage  in  transitu,  and  that  a  demand  of,  or  notice 
to,  the  carrier  was  not  necessary. 

§  895.  No  proof  necessary  before  demanding  goods  of  a 
carrier. — In  demanding  goods  of  the  carrier,  it  is  not  requi- 
site that  the  vendor  should  prove  that  the  conditions  exist 
which  give  him  the  right  of  stoppage.  Thus,  he  need  not 
prove  that  the  vendee  has  not  negotiated  the  bill  of  lading 
delivered  or  indorsed  to  him.  As  Dr.  Lushington  has  said:^ 
"Were  it  otherwise,  were  the  vendor  obliged  formally  to 
prove  his  title  to  exercise  the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu, 
that  right  w^ould  be  worthless;  for  the  validity  of  a  stoppage 
in  transitu  depends  upon  several  conditions.  First,  the  ven- 
dor must  be  unpaid;  secondly,  the  vendee  must  be  insolvent; 
thirdly,  the  vendee  must  not  have  indorsed  over  for  value. 
But  the  proof  that  these  conditions  have  been  fulfilled  would 
always  be  difficult  for  the  vendor — often  impossible;  for  in- 
stance, whether  the  vendor  is  or  is  not  unpaid  may  depend 
upon  the  balance  of  a  current  account;  whether  the  vendee 
is  insolvent  may  not  transpire  till  afterwards,  when  the  bill 
of  exchange  for  the  goods  becomes  due ;  for  it  is,  as  I  con- 
ceive, clear  law,  that  the  right  to  stop  does  not  require  the 
vendee  to  have  been  found  insolvent.     And,  lastly,  whether 

9  The  Tigress,  32  L.  J.  Adm.  97,    101. 


§    895  LIENS.  916 

the  vendee  has  or  has  not  indorsed  the  bill  of  lading  over,  is 
a  matter  not  within  the  cognizance  of  the  vendor.  He  exer- 
cises his  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  at  his  own  peril,  and 
it  is  incumbent  upon  the  master  to  give  effect  to  a  claim  as 
soon  as  he  is  satisfied  it  is  made  by  the  vendor,  unless  he  is 
aware  of  a  legal  defeasance  of  the  vendor's  claim.  Such, 
according  to  my  opinion,  is  the  law  as  laid  down  by  Lord 
Campbell,  in  Gurney  v.  Behrend.^*^  Lord  Campbell  uses 
these  words:  'Prima  facie  the  defendants  had  a  right  to  stop 
the  wheat,  for  it  was  still  in  transitu,  and  they  were  unpaid 
vendors.  The  onus  is  on  the  plaintiffs  to  prove  that  they  had 
become  the  owners,  and  that  the  right  to  stop  in  transitu 
was  gone.'  " 

It  would  seem,  however,  that  the  carrier,  in  a  suit  against 
him  by  the  vendor  for  delivering  the  goods  to  the  purchaser 
after  receiving  notice  from  the  vendor  to  stop  them,  might 
show  the  fact  that  the  purchaser  was  solvent  after  the  de- 
livery, and  that  by  due  diligence  the  debt  might  have  been 
collected,  and  therefore  the  vendor  was  not  injured  by  the 
wrongful  delivery  of  the  goods. ^^ 

In  Georgia  the  code  declares  that  the  carrier  cannot  dis- 
pute the  title  of  the  person  delivering  the  goods  to  him  by 
setting  up  adverse  title  in  himself,  or  a  title  in  third  persons 
which  is  not  being  enforced  against  him.-^^  It  is  further 
declared  that  a  stoppage  iii  transitu  by  the  vendor  relieves 
the  carrier  from  his  obligation  to  deliver,  and  he  is  not 
thenceforward  responsible  for  more  than  ordinary  diligence 
in  the  care  of  the  goods. ^^ 

10  3  El.  &  Bl.  622.  &   Western   R.    Co.   v.   Meador,   65 

11  Bloomingdale  v.  Memphis  &  Ga.  705,  it  was  said  to  be  very- 
Charleston  R.  Co.,  6  Lea  (Tenn.)  questionable  whether,  under  this 
616,  per  Freeman,  J.  And  see  Ros-  provision,  the  carrier  can  buy  the 
enfield  v.  Express  Co.,  1  Woods  vendee's  title,  as  against  the  ven- 
(U.  S.)  131,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  12060.  dor's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu. 

12  Code    1911,   §    2740.     In    Macon  i3  Code  1911,  §  2738. 


917  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  898 

§  896.  Right  of  carrier  to  take  time  to  investigate  author- 
ity of  vendor's  agent. — A  carrier,  when  in  doubt  as  to  the  au- 
thority of  an  agent  to  act  for  the  vendor  in  stopping  the 
goods,  is  entitled  to  reasonable  time  to  make  inquiry  into 
the  facts,  and  the  agent  is  also  entitled  to  reasonable  time  to 
produce  his  authority  and  to  furnish  indemnity.  The  carrier, 
having  received  notice  from  an  agent,  is  bound  to  ascertain 
his  authority,  and  he  acts  at  his  peril  in  delivering  the  goods 
after  such  notice.^* 

§  897.  Carrier  guilty  of  conversion  by  ignoring  vendor's 
notice. — A  carrier  who,  without  good  reason,  refuses  to  de- 
liver the  goods  to  the  vendor  w^hen  he  rightly  exercises  his 
right  of  stoppage  in  transitu,  is  guilty  of  a  conversion  of  the 
goods,  and  is  liable  for  their  value. ^^ 

A  vendor  is  not  estopped  from  maintaining  a  suit  against 
a  carrier  for  a  wrongful  delivery  to  the  purchaser  after  no- 
tice to  stop  the  goods,  by  bringing  suit  upon  the  debt  and  re- 
covering judgment  against  the  purchaser.  On  the  contrary, 
the  carrier,  under  some  circumstances,  might  well  set  up  the 
defense  that  the  vendor  could  have  recovered  his  debt  by 
suit  against  the  purchaser,  and  had  failed  in  diligently  prose- 
cuting such  legal  remedy.^^ 

§  898.  Duty  of  the  carrier  to  determine  which  of  two  dif- 
ferent claimants  of  goods  had  the  better  right. — If  bills  of 

1-1  Reynolds  v.   Boston   &   Maine  to   the   insolvent  consignee,   is   not 

R.  Co.,  43  N.  H.  580.  liable  to  the  vendor  in  trover,  be- 

1"'  Thompson  v.   Trail,  2  Car.    &  cause,  by  the  sale  and  delivery  to 

P.  334,  6  B.  &  C.  36,  9  D.  &  R.  31 ;  the  carrier,  the  property  passed  to 

Bloomingdale      v.       Memphis      &  the    purchaser,    and    the    stoppage 

Charleston   R.   Co.,  6  Lea   (Tenn.)  did  not  give  the  vendor  the  right 

616.    In  Childs  v.  Northern  R.  Co.,  of  property  and  possession  neces- 

25  U.  C.  Q.  B.  165,  it  w^as  held  that  sary  to  sustain  such  action, 
a  railroad  company  which  has  re-  "'  Bloomingdale    v.    Memphis    & 

ceived  a  valid  and  sufficient  notice  Charleston   R.   Co.,  6   Lea   (Tenn.) 

of    stoppage    in    transitu,    but    has  616. 
nevertheless    delivered    the    goods 


§  899  LIENS.  918 

lading  are  presented  to  a  shipowner  by  two  different  holders, 
and  he  delivers  the  goods  to  the  one  not  entitled  to  them,  the 
other  who  is  entitled  to  them  may  hold  the  master  accounta- 
ble for  the  value  of  the  goods. ^' 

If  bills  of  lading  are  presented  to  the  master  or  other  car- 
rier by  two  different  holders,  it  is  incumbent  upon  him  to 
deliver  to  the  rightful  claimant,  or  to  bring  an  action  of  in- 
terpleader. But  he  is  entitled  to  deliver  to  the  person  first 
producing  a  bill  of  lading,  no  matter  which  part  it  is,  so  long 
as  he  has  no  notice  nor  knowledge  of  any  dealing  with  the 
other  parts. ^^  "Where  the  master  has  notice  that  there  has 
been  an  assignment  of  another  part  of  the  bill  of  lading,  the 
master  must  interplead  or  deliver  to  the  one  who  he  thinks 
has  the  better  right,  at  his  peril  if  he  is  wrong." 

If  the  bill  of  lading  has  been  assigned  for  value  to  a  bona 
fide  assignee,  and  the  vendor  seizes  the  goods  in  an  action  of 
replevin,  claiming  a  right  to  stop  them  in  transitu,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  carrier  to  intervene  in  the  suit,  and  either  inter- 
plead or  contest  the  claim  of  the  vendor;  otherwise  he  will 
render  himself  liable  to  the  indorsee  of  the  bill  of  lading  for 
the  value  of  the  goods. ^^ 

§  899.  Liability  for  delivery  after  notice. — Both  the  carrier 
and  the  consignee,  or  his  assignee,  are  liable  in  trover  to  the 
vendor  if  the  carrier  by  mistake  delivers  the  goods  to  the 
consignee  after  receiving  a  valid  notice  to  stop  them.^*^  Chief 
Justice  Gibbs  declared-^  it  would  be  monstrous  to  say,  after 

17  The  Tigress,  32  L.  J.  Adm.  97.      2  Marsh.  457;  Poole  v.  Houston  & 

18  Glyn  V.  East  West  India  Dock      T.  C.  R.  Co.,  58  Tex.  134. 

Co.,    7   App.    Cas.   591,    affirming   6  21  Litt  v.   Cowley,  7  Taunt.   169. 

Q.   B.   Div.  475,  reversing  5   Q.   B.  As  the  modern  doctrine  is  that  the 

Div.  129.  effect  of  a  stoppage  is  not  to   re- 

19  The  Schooner  Mary  Ann  scind  the  contract,  but  only  to  put 
Guest,  1  Olc.  Adm.  498,  Fed.  Cas.  the  vendor  in  possession  so  that  he 
No.  9197,  affd.  1  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  can  enforce  his  lien,  the  assertion 
358,  Fed.   Cas.   No.  9196.  of  the  learned  judge  that  the  prop- 

20  Litt  V.   Cowley,   7  Taunt.    169,  erty   is    revested   in   the   vendor   is 


919  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  899 

such  notice,  that  a  transfer  made  by  the  carrier's  mistake 
should  be  such  as  to  bind  the  vendor,  and  to  vest  a  complete 
title  in  the  bankrupt  purchaser  or  his  representative.  The 
bankrupt  has  no  title  to  the  goods  except  what  he  derived 
from  the  dry  act  of  delivery,  and  that,  being  founded  on  a 
mistake,  conveyed  no  property  at  all.  "As  soon  as  the  notice 
was  given,  the  property  returned  to  the  plaintiffs,  and  they 
were  entitled  to  maintain  trover,  not  only  against  the  car- 
riers, but  against  the  defendants  or  any  other  person.  Until 
notice,  the  vendor  can  not  sue  the  carrier,  but  the  purchaser 
may;  after  notice,  the  case  is  reversed,  because  the  property 
is  divested  out  of  the  purchaser,  and  revested  in  the  vendor. 
I  cannot  conceive  a  stronger  case  in  which  the  property  is 
in  the  vendor,  and  not  in  the  vendee." 

In  a  recent  case  in  Texas  it  appeared  that  after  the  carrier, 
a  railroad  company,  had  received  a  valid  notice  to  stop  in 
transitu  a  shipment  of  goods,  and  before  the  goods  arrived 
at  their  destination,  the  purchaser  assigned  the  bill  of  lading 
without  consideration  to  his  attorney,  who  intercepted  the 
goods  at  an  intermediate  station,  effaced  the  marks  upon 
them,  re-marked  them  with  a  fictitious  name,  and  reshipped 
them  to  their  original  destination,  where  the  agent  of  the 
railroad  company,  though  suspecting  that  the  goods  were 
those  of  which  notice  of  stoppage  had  been  given,  delivered 
them  to  the  original  purchaser.  In  a  suit  by  the  vendor 
against  the  railroad  company  and  the  attorney,  it  was  held 
that  the  attorney,  having  assumed  the  apparent  ownership 
of  the  goods  with  the  intention  of  committing  a  fraud  upon 
the  creditor,  could  not  be  heard  to  deny  his  liability  for  the 
loss;  and  that,  as  to  the  railroad  company,  the  question  of 
the  good  faith  of  its  agents  should  be  submitted  to  the  jury 
with  appropriate  instructions.-- 

not  correct,  but  rather  it  should  be  --  Poole  v.  Houston  &  T.  C.   R. 

said  that  the  possession  is  revested       Co.,  58  Tex.    134. 
in  the  vendor. 


^    900  LIENS.  920 

§  900.  Vendor  must  pay  the  carrier's  charges. — The  ven- 
dor, upon  demanding  possession  of  the  carrier  or  seizing  the 
goods  by  legal  process,  should  pay  the  carrier's  charges,  for 
the  latter  has  a  lien  upon  the  goods  for  such  charges,  and 
may  insist  upon  retaining  possession  until  such  charges  are 
paid.  But  the  vendor,  or  other  person  acting  in  his  behalf, 
upon  paying  these  charges,  is  substituted  to  the  carrier's 
right  of  lien  and  possession  respecting  the  goods.^^ 

The  vendor's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  is  subject  to  the 
carrier's  lien  for  the  freight.  If  the  goods  be  consigned  to 
one  person  under  one  contract,  the  carrier  has  a  lien  upon 
the  whole  for  the  freight  and  charges  on  every  part;  and  a 
delivery  of  a  part  of  the  goods  does  not  discharge  his  lien 
upon  the  rest  without  proof  of  an  intention  so  to  do,  even  as 
against  the  right  of  the  consignor  to  stop  in  transitu  the 
goods  not  delivered;  but  the  carrier  may  charge  against  those 
goods  the  freight  on  the  whole  consignment.^* 

§  901.  Vendor's  right  of  stoppage  prevails  against  carrier's 
lien  for  general  balance  of  account. — The  vendor's  right  of 
stoppage  in  transitu  prevails  as  against  a  carrier's  lien  for  a 
general  balance  of  account  due  from  the  consignee.  A  usage 
for  carriers  to  retain  goods  for  such  a  lien  can  not  affect  the 
vendor's  right ;  and  it  would  seem  that  such  a  lien  could  not 
be  established  even  by  agreement  between  the  carrier  and 
the  vendee.^^  The  law  gives  the  consignee  a  specific  lien 
upon  the  goods,  and  he  should  not  be  allowed  to  engraft  a 
new  lien  upon  his  own  laches,  especially  as  against  the  ven- 
dor.   'T  think,"  said  Heath,  J.,  in  the  leading  case,^®  "that 

23  Rucker  v.  Donovan,   13   Kans.  R.)    64;    Leuckhart    v.    Cooper,    3 
251,  19  Am.  Rep.  84.  Bing.  N.  Cas.  99;  Potts  v.  N.  Y.  & 

24  Potts  V.  N.  Y.  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.,  N.  E.  R.  Co.,  131  Mass.  455,  41  Am. 
131  Mass.  455,  41  Am.  Rep.  247.  Rep.  247;  Macon  &  Western  R.  Co. 

25  Oppenheim  v.  Russell,  3  B.  &  v.  Meador,  65  Ga.  705. 

P.  42;  Jackson  v.   Nichol,   5    Bing.  26  Oppenheim  v.  Russell,  3  B.  & 

N.   Cas.  508,  518,  7  Scott  577,  591 ;      P.  42. 
Butler  V.  Woolcott.  2  B.  &  P.   (N. 


921  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  902 

the  right  of  seizing  in  transitu  is  a  common  law  right ; 
*  *  *  arising  out  of  the  ancient  power  and  dominion  of  the 
consignor  over  his  property,  which  at  the  time  of  dehvering 
his  g6ods  to  the  carrier  he  reserves  to  himself.  *  *  *  It  is 
paramount  to  any  sort  of  agreement  as  between  the  carrier 
and  consignee." 

But  the  owners  of  a  ship  are  not  entitled  to  freight,  as 
against  the  vendor  who  has  stopped  the  goods  in  transitu,  in 
case  the  goods  were  shipped  on  a  vessel  belonging  to  the 
vendee,  and  the  master,  with  full  authority  so  to  do,  issued 
bills  of  lading  to  the  vendor,  "freight  for  the  said  goods  free 
on  owners'  account;"  and  it  does  not  matter  in  such  case  that 
the  ship  had  been  sold  and  transferred  before  the  shipment, 
no- notice  of  the  transfer  having  reached  the  master  or  the 
vendor.  The  new  owners  of  the  ship  were  bound  by  the 
contract  of  the  master  entered  into  pursuant  to  his  original 
instructions.^'^ 

§  902.  When  the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  may  be  ex- 
ercised.— In  general  the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  may  be 
exercised  at  any  time  after  the  goods  have  been  delivered 
to  the  carrier  until  they  have  come  into  the  actual  posses- 
sion of  the  buyer.^^  During  this  time  the  title  is  in  the  buyer. 
He  may  also  have  the  right  of  possession,  and  even  construc- 
tive possession.  The  vendor  has  parted  with  the  title,  the 
right  of  possession,  and  actual  possession;  but  until  the 
vendee  has  gained  actual  possession,  upon  his  insolvency  the 
vendor  may  stop  the  goods  and  resume  the  actual  posses- 
sion. This  right  exists  till  the  goods  have  been  received  into 
the  hands  of  the  purchaser,  or  of  some  one  who  receives 

2"  Mercantile       and       Exchange  v.   Lund,   7  Mass.  453,  5  Am.  Dec. 

Bank  v.  Gladstone,  L.  R.  3  Ex.  233.  63;    Calahan   v.    Babcock,   21    Ohio 

28  Ex  parte  Rosevear  China  Clay  St.  281,  8  Am.  Rep.  63;  Aguirre  v. 

Co.,  11  Ch.  Div.  560;  James  v.  Grif-  Parmelee,    22    Conn.    473;    Lane    v. 

fin,  2  M.  &  W.  623,  1  M.  &  W.  20;  Robinson,    18    B.    Mon.    (Ky.)    623; 

White  V.  Welsh,  38  Pa.  St.  396;  At-  Halft  v.  Allyn,  60  Tex.  278. 
kins  V.  Colby,  20  N.  H.  154;  Stubbs 


§    902  LIENS.  922 

them  in  the  character  of  his  servant  or  agent,  and  not  merely 
as  carrier.  A  carrier,  unless  he  be  the  purchaser  himself, 
is  a  mere  intermediary  between  the  seller  and  the  buyer. 
The  possession  of 'this  intermediary  is  only  the  constructive 
possession  of  the  buyer.  The  actual  possession  is  in  the 
third  person,  and  such  possession  is  a  necessary  condition  to 
the  exercise  of  this  right.  Lord  Cranworth  (then  Baron 
Rolfe)  expressed  this  view:"'*  "1  consider  it  to  be  of  the 
very  essence  of  that  doctrine,  that  during  the  transitus  the 
goods  should  be  in  the  custody  of  some  third  person  inter- 
mediate between  the  seller  who  has  parted  with,  and  the 
buyer  who  has  not  yet  acquired,  actual  possession." 

In  Georgia^''  the  code  declares  that  the  right  of  stoppage 
in  transitu  exists  wherever  the  vendor  in  a  sale  on  credit 
seeks  to  resume  the  possession  of  goods  while  they  are  in 
the  hands  of  a  carrier  or  middleman,  in  their  transit  to  the 
vendee  or  consignee,  on  his  becoming  insolvent.  It  «on- 
tinues  until  the  vendee  obtains  actual  possession  of  the  goods. 

If  the  goods  are  delivered  before  the  price  is  paid,  the  seller 
cannot  retake  because  of  failure  to  pay;  but,  until  actual  re- 
ceipt by  the  purchaser,  the  seller  may  at  any  time  arrest  them 
on  the  way,  and  retain  them  until  the  price  *is  paid.  If  credit 
has  been  agreed  to  be  given,  but  the  insolvency  of  the  pur- 
chaser is  made  known  to  the  seller,  he  may  still  exercise  the 
right  of  stoppage  in  transitu. 

In     California, ^^     Montana,^-     North    Dakota,"^     Oklaho- 

29  Gibson  v.   Carruthers,  8  M.  &  -o  Codes  1911,  §§  2739,  4132;  Ma- 

W.  321,  328.  His  language  has  been  con  &  Western  R.  Co.  v.  Meador, 

adopted  by  Lord  Cains  and  Vice-  65    Ga.   705.    In   this   case  Jackson, 

Chancellor  Wood,  in  Berndston  v.  C.    J.,    said:      "We    think    that   our 

Strang,    L.   R.  4   Eq.  481,    L.    R.   3  code    contemplates   actual    delivery 

Ch.     588,     590;     by     Lord     Justice  and     possession,    as     distinguished 

James,  in  Ex  parte  Rosevear  China  from  constructive  possession." 

Clay  Co.,  11   Ch.  Div.  560;  and  by  3i  Civ.  Code  1906,  §  3078. 

Burton,    J.,    in    Wiley   v.    Smith,    1  32  Civ.  Code  1895,  §  3972. 

Ont.  App.  179,  188.  33  Rev.  Code  1905,  §  6300. 


923  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  904 

ma,"^  and  South  Dakota/'''  it  is  provided  by  code  that  the 
transit  of  property  is  at  an  end  when  it  comes  into  the  pos- 
session of  the  consignee,  or  into  that  of  his  agent,  unless 
such  agent  is  employed  merely  to  forward  the  property  to 
the  consignee. 

§  903.  Goods  shipped  to  seller's  own  order, — Inasmuch  as 
the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  presupposes  the  actual  cus- 
tody of  the  goods  by  a  third  person  intermediate  between  the 
seller  and  the  buyer,  it  is  as  important  to  the  existence  of  the 
right  that  the  vendor  should  have  parted  with  the  actual  pos- 
session as  it  is  that  the  vendee  should  not  have  acquired  it. 
Therefore  the  right  does  not  exist  in  case  the  vendor  has 
shipped  goods  to  his  own  order,  or  to  the  order  of  his  own 
exclusive  agent,  and  the  bill  of  lading  has  not  been  assigned 
to  the  purchaser  or  to  any  third  person.^® 

§  904.  Different  kinds  of  actual  delivery. — Actual  delivery 
to  the  vendee  may  be  made  in  various  ways  and  under  dif- 
ferent circumstances.  Baron  Parke  enumerates  four  kinds 
of  delivery,  in  the  following  passage  :^"  "The  actual  delivery 
to  the  vendee  or  his  agent,  which  puts  an  end  to  the  transi- 
tus,  or  state  of  passage,  may  be  at  the  vendee's  own  ware- 
house, or  at  a  place  which  he  uses  as  his  own,  though  belong- 
ing to  another,  for  the  deposit  of  goods  ;^®  or  at  a  place  where 
he  means  the  goods  to  remain,  until  a  fresh  destination  is 
communicated  to  them  by  orders  from  himself  f^  or  it  may 
be  by  the  vendee's  taking  possession  by  himself  or  agent  at 
some  point  short  of  the  original  intended  place  of  desti- 
nation." 

34  Comp.  Laws  1909,  §  4154.  37  James   v.   Griffin,  2   M.   &   W. 

33  Rev.  Codes  (Civ.),  §  2165.  623,  633. 

36  In  re  The  St.  Joze  Indiano,  1  38  Scott  v.  Pettit,  3  B.  &  P.  469; 

Wheat.    (U.   S.)   208,  210,  4  L.   ed.  Rowe  v.  Pickford,  8  Taunt.  83. 

73;    Ilsley   v.    Stubbs,   9   Mass.   65,  39  Dixon  v.  Baldwen,  5  East  175. 
6  Am.  Dec.  29;  In  re  The  St.  Joze 
Indiano,  2  Gall.  (U.  S.)  268. 


§    9^5  LIENS.  924 

Judge  Woodruff  states,  as  the  result  of  the  cases  on  this 
point:  "That  a  merely  constructive  delivery,  though  suffi- 
cient to  entitle  the  vendor  to  demand  the  price  of  the  goods, 
and  to  place  the  goods  at  the  vendee's  risk,  does  not  alone 
defeat  the  right  of  stoppage.  That  while  the  goods  are  in 
transportation  to  the  place  of  destination,  or  are  in  the  hands 
of  an  intermediate  agent  or  warehouseman  for  the  purpose 
of  being  forwarded,  they  are  not  subject  to  this  right.  That 
after  their  arrival  at  the  place  of  destination,  and  while  in  the 
hands  of  the  carrier,  or  a  wharfinger,  or  a  warehouseman  for 
the  mere  purpose  of  delivery  to  the  vendee,  the  vendor  may 
resume  the  possession.  That  delivery  to  the  vendee's  spe- 
cial agent  on  board  the  vendee's  own  conveyance,  or  a  con- 
veyance chartered  by  him,  if  the  purpose  of  the  delivery  is 
transportation  to  the  vendee,  does  not  defeat  the  right.  But 
that  the  right  is  lost  if  the  vendee  received  actual  possession; 
or  if  after  their  arrival  at  the  place  of  destination  he  exercise 
acts  of  ownership  over  the  goods;  or  if  his  agents,  having 
authority  and  power  of  disposal,  exercises  like  acts."^*^ 

There  is,  of  course,  no  right  of  stoppage  when  the  seller 
has  put  the  buyer  in  possession  of  the  goods  before  the  tran- 
sit has  commenced. ^^ 

§  905.  Right  of  vendor  when  transit  has  not  commenced. 
— Where  the  transit  has  not  commenced,  and  the  vendor  is 
still  in  control  of  the  goods,  he  may  refuse  to  allow  the  tran- 
sit to  commence  under  the  same  circumstances  that  would 
justify  him  in  stopping  the  goods  after  the  transit  had  com- 
menced.^-    The  question  is  then  more  often  one  of  a  ven- 

40  Harris  v.  Hart,  6  Duer  (N.  Y.)  distinguish  between  the  retainder 
606,  607,  affd.  17  N.  Y.  249.  of   goods    by   a   vendor,    and    their 

41  Loeb  V.  Blum,  25  La.  Ann.  232;  stoppage  in  transitu,  on  account  of 
Lupin  V.  Marie,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.)  the  insolvency  of  the  vendee;  be- 
169,  afifd.  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  11,  21  cause  these  terms  refer  to  the  sam.e 
Am.   Dec.  256.  right,    only    at    dififerent    stages    of 

42  White  V.  Welsh,  38  Pa.  St.  perfection  and  execution  of  the 
396,  420.    "Judges  do  not  ordinarily  contract  of  sale.    If  a  vendor  has  a 


925 


SELLER  S  RIGHT  OF  STOPPAGE  IN  TRANSITU. 


§  905 


dor's  lien;  yet  the  question  of  stoppage  may  arise,  especially 
where  the  goods  are  at  the  time  of  sale  in  the  possession  of 
a  warehouseman  or  other  agent,  and  the  vendor  transfers 
possession  by  a  delivery  order,  which  in  itself  does  not 
amount  to  a  constructive  delivery,  but  requires  acceptance 
by  the  warehouseman  in  order  to  confer  such  possession 
upon  the  holder. ^^  The  transfer  of  a  delivery  order  oper- 
ates differently  in  this  respect  from  the  transfer  of  a  bill  of 
lading  or  a  warehouse  receipt.  The  warehouseman  upon 
whom  a  delivery  order  is  given  remains  the  agent  of  the 
vendor  until  the  order  is  presented  to  him,  and  he  becomes 
the  agent  of  the  purchaser  by  a  transfer  of  the  goods  to  the 
name  of  the  purchaser,  or  by  some  other  equivalent  act.  In 
the  meantime,  upon  the  happening  of  the  purchaser's  in- 
solvency, the  vendor  may  stop  the  goods  in  the  hands  of  the 
warehouseman,  just  as  he  might  in  the  hands  of  a  carrier; 
but  after  the  order  has  been  presented  to  the  warehouseman, 
and  he  has  transferred  the  goods  to  the  name  of  the  pur- 
chaser, the  delivery  to  him  is  complete  and  the  right  of  stop- 
page is  gone.^^ 


right  to  stop  in  transitu,  a  fortiori 
he  has  a  right  of  retainer  before 
any  transit  has  commenced."  Per 
Lowrie,  C.  J. 

•13  Farina  v.  Home,  16  M.  &  W. 
119,  123.  "This  warrant  is  no  more 
than  an  engagement  by  the  wharf- 
inger to  deliver  to  the  consignee, 
or  any  one  he  may  appoint;  and  the 
wharfinger  holds  the  goods  as  the 
agent  of  the  consignor,  (who  is  the 
vendor's  agent)  and  his  possession 
is  that  of  the  consignee,  until  an 
assignment  has  taken  place,  and  the 
wharfinger  has  attorned,  so  to 
speak,  to  the  assignee,  and  agreed 
with   him   to  hold   for  him.    Then, 


and  not  till  then,  the  wharfinger  is 
the  agent  or  bailee  of  the  assignee, 
and  his  possession  that  of  the  as- 
signee, and  then  only  is  there  a 
constructive  delivery  to  him.  In 
the  meantime,  the  warrant,  and  the 
indorsement  of  the  warrant,  is 
nothing  more  than  an  oflfer  to  hold 
the  goods  as  the  warehouseman  of 
the  assignee,"  per  Parke,  B.  See 
Benjamin  Sales  (Corbin  ed.), 
§§  1244  et  seq. 

^4  Wood  V.  Tassell,  6  Q.  B.  234; 
Lackington  v.  Atherton,  7  M.  &  Gr. 
360;  Tanner  v.  Scovell,  14  M.  &  W. 
28;  Swanwick  v.  Sothern,  9  Ad.  & 
El.  895. 


§    906  LIENS.  926 

§  906.  Right  not  prevented  by  procuring  warehouse  re- 
ceipt,— The  procuring  of  a  warehouse  certificate  for  goods  as 
the  propert}^  of  the  vendee  prehminary  to  their  transit,  and 
not  at  the  termination  of  it,  does  not  deprive  the  vendor  of 
his  right  to  stop  them  in  transitu.  Thus,  whiskey  in  a  gov- 
ernment bonded  warehouse  in  Indiana  was  sold  to  a  pur- 
chaser in  Boston.  The  storekeeper  gave  his  certificate  for 
the  wdiiskey  as  the  property  of  the  purchaser,  and  the  seller 
sent  it  to  him.  It  was  part  of  the  terms  of  sale,  that  the 
seller  should  from  time  to  time,  as  the  buyer  should  request, 
ship  the  whiskey  to  Boston,  and  pay  the  storage  charges, 
taxes,  and  insurance,  and  draw  on  the  buyer  for  the  amounts. 
The  whiskey  could  not  be  taken  from  the  warehouse  until 
the  taxes  were  paid.  The  whiskey  was  shipped  by  railroad 
in  accordance  with  these  terms,  but  while  in  the  hands  of 
the  railroad  company  the  buyer  became  insolvent  and  the 
seller  stopped  the  goods.  It  was  held  that  his  right  of  stop- 
page in  transitu  was  not  lost.  The  transitus  in  such  case 
would  not  be  at  an  end  until  the  goods  reached  Boston,  and 
were  taken  into  custody  by  the  purchaser.  It  would  be  no 
answer  to  say  that  there  was  a  constructive  delivery  of  the 
whiskey  to  the  buyer  by  virtue  of  the  delivery  of  the  ware- 
house receipt  to  him,  and  that  he  had  the  right  to  take  pos- 
session of  it  and  withdrew  it  from  the  warehouse,  for  the 
purchaser  did  not  take  possession  of  it  at  the  warehouse,  but 
left  it  in  charge  of  the  seller,  and  to  be  shipped  by  him.  The 
seller  therefore  had  the  right  to  exercise  his  right  of  stop- 
page in  transitu  until  the  goods  reached  the  purchaser  at  the 
place  contemplated  by  the  parties  as  the  place  of  their  desti- 
nation.*^ 

§  907.  Delivery  to  carrier  not  generally  constructive  deliv- 
ery to  vendee. — Ordinarily  a  delivery  of  goods  to  a  carrier  is 

not  a  constructive  delivery  to  the  purchaser  to  whom  the 

43  Mohr  V.  Boston  &  Albany  R.    Co.,  106  Mass.  67. 


927  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  908 

carrier  is  to  take  them,  so  far  as  the  right  of  stoppage  in 
transitu  is  concerned;  for  the  carrier  is  not  the  special  agent 
of  the  purchaser,  but  a  general  agent  for  the  carriage  of  the 
goods ;  and  this  is  the  case  even  although  the  carrier  may 
have  been  specially  designated  or  appointed  by  the  pur- 
chaser.^'^  But  the  terms  of  the  contract  and  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case  may  show  that  the  parties  intended  the 
delivery  to  the  carrier  to  be  a  complete  delivery  to  the  ven- 
dee, so  that  the  vendor  will  not  retain  his  right  to  stop  the 
goods  in  their  passage.  Bills  of  lading  or  carriers'  receipts 
sent  to  the  consignee,  making  the  goods  deliverable  to  him, 
may  be  evidence  of  an  intention  on  the  part  of  the  vendor 
to  vest  the  property  and  the  possession  in  the  consignee.  In 
such  a  case,  Parke,  B.,  giving  judgment,  observed  i^"^  "If  the 
intention  of  the  parties  to  pass  the  property,  whether  abso- 
lute or  special,  in  certain  ascertained  chattels,  is  established, 
and  they  are  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  depositary,  no  matter 
whether  such  depositary  be  a  common  carrier  or  ship-master, 
employed  by  the  consignor,  or  a  third  person,  and  the  chat- 
tels are  sd  placed  on  account  of  the  person  who  is  to  have 
that  property;  and  the  depositary  assents;  it  is  enough:  and 
it  matters  not  by  what  documents  this  is  effected." 

§  908.  Not  material  that  the  carrier  has  been  designated 
by  the  vendee, — It  is  immaterial  that  the  carrier  has  been 
designated  by  the  purchaser  or  hired  by  him;  for  even  in 
such  case  a  delivery  to  the  carrier  is  only  a  constructive  de- 
livery to  the  purchaser,  and  not  an  actual  delivery  to  him. 
"The  delivery,  by  the  vendor  of  goods  sold  to  a  carrier  of 
any  description,  either  expressly  or  by  implication  named  by 
the  vendee,  and  who  is  to  carry  on  his  account,  is  a  con- 
structive delivery  to  the  vendee ;  but  the  vendor  has  a  right, 

46  In  re  Frances,  8  Cranch  (U.  S.)  Scott     (N.     R.)     43;     Cowasjee    v. 

418,  3  L.  ed.  609.  Thompson,  5  Moore  P.  C.  165;  Mel- 

•t"  Bryans  v.  Nix,  4  M.  &  W.  775,  etopulo  v.  Ranking,  6  Jur.  1095. 
791.    And   see   Evans   v.   Nichol,  4 


§    909  LIENS.  928 

if  unpaid,  and  the  vendee  be  insolvent,  to  retake  the  goods 
before  they  are  actually  delivered  to  the  vendee,  or  some  one 
whom  he  means  to  be  his  agent,  to  take  possession  of  and 
keep  the  goods  for  him,  and  thereby  to  replace  the  vendor  in 
the  same  situation  as  if  he  had  not  parted  with  the  actual 
possession. "^^ 

§  909.  Delivery  to  carrier  sometimes  is  a  constructive  de- 
livery to  the  purchaser, — When  goods  have  been  delivered  to 
one  who  is  only  a  carrier,  though  named  by  the  purchaser, 
but  not  his  agent  for  any  other  purpose,  such  delivery  is  only 
a  constructive  delivery  to  the  purchaser.'*^  If  goods  are  placed 
on  board  a  ship  chartered  by  the  purchaser,  ordinarily  the 
transit  is  not  over  until  the  carriage  is  over. 

The  distinction  between  a  constructive  delivery  to  a  pur- 
chaser by  delivery  on  board  a  vessel  chartered  by  him,  and 
an  actual  delivery  to  him,  is  well  illustrated  in  the  recent 
English  case  of  the  Rosevear  China  Clay  Company.  A  con- 
tract was  entered  into  for  the  sale  of  some  china  clay  to  be 
delivered  free  on  board  at  a  specified  port.  The^  purchaser 
chartered  a  ship,  and  the  clay  was  delivered  on  board  at  the 
port  agreed  upon.  The  destination  of  the  clay  was  not  com- 
municated to  the  vendors.  Before  the  ship  left  the  harbor, 
the  vendors  heard  of  the  insolvency  of  the  purchaser,  and 
gave  notice  to  the  master  to  stop  the  clay  in  transitu.  It  was 
held  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  Chancery  that,  the  clay  being 
in  the  possession  of  the  master  of  the  ship  only  as  carrier, 
the  transit  was  not  at  an  end  and  the  notice  to  stop  was 
given  in  time.^^  Lord  Justice  James  said:  "The  principle  is 
this — that  when  the  vendor  knows  that  he  is  delivering  the 

48  James  v.  Griffin,  2  M.  &  W.  560;  Ruck  v.  Hatfield,  5  B.  &  Aid. 
623,  632,  per  Parke,  B.  632;  Lane  v.  Robinson,  18  B.  Mon. 

49  Lickbarrow       v.       Mason,       1       (Ky.)  623. 

Smith's   Lead.   Cas.    (8th   ed.)    753;  -J'^  Ex  parte  Rosevear  China  Clay 

Berndtson   v.   Strang,  L.   R.  4  Eq.  Co.,  L.  R.  11  Ch.  Div.  560.   See  post, 

481,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  588;  Ex  parte  Rose-  S  911. 
vear   China   Clay   Co.,    11    Ch.   Div. 


929  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  910 

goods  to  some  one  as  carrier,  who  is  receiving  them  in  that 
character,  he  delivers  them  with  the  implied  right  which  has 
been  established  by  the  law,  of  stopping  them  so  long  as  they 
remain  in  the  possession  of  the  carrier  as  carrier.  I  am  of 
opinion  that  in  the  present  case,  although  the  vendors'  lia- 
bility was  at  an  end  when  they  had  delivered  the  clay  on 
board  the  ship,  which  indeed  is  the  case  in  most  instances  of 
stoppage  in  transitu,  that  did  not  deprive  them  of  the  right 
to  stop  in  transitu  so  long  as  the  clay  was  in  possession  of 
the  master  of  the  ship  as  carrier."  In  the  same  case,  Brett, 
L.  J.,  said:  "The  clay  was  placed  on  board  the  ship  for  the 
purpose  of  being  carried  to  Glasgow;  it  was  in  the  actual  pos- 
session of  the  shipowner,  and  only  in  the  constructive  pos- 
session of  the  purchaser.  Therefore  the  right  of  stoppage 
in  transitu  existed.  If  the  purchaser  had  been  the  owner  of 
the  ship,  the  vendors  would  have  had  no  such  right,  unless 
they  had  reserved  it  by  express  stipulation.  But,  in  the  ac- 
tual state  of  things,  I  think  that,  both  on  principle  and  on  the 
authorities,  the  transit  was  not  over  and  the  right  to  stop  in 
transitu  remained."  Colton,  L.  J. :  *T  am  of  the  same  opin- 
ion. *  *  *  ^\iQ  contract  with  a  carrier  to  carry  goods  does 
not  make  the  carrier  the  agent  or  servant  of  the  person  who 
contracts  with  him,  whether  he  be  the  vendor  or  the  pur- 
chaser of  the  goods.  Here  the  verbal  agreemnt  which  the 
purchaser  entered  into  to  charter  the  ship  did  not  make  the 
captain  the  agent  or  servant  of  the  purchaser;  he  was  only  a 
carrier." 

§  910.    Delivery  to  carrier  may  be  delivery  to  vendee. — A 

delivery  to  a  carrier  is  under  some  circumstances  a  delivery 
to  the  vendee,  and  then  there  can  be  no  stoppage  in  trantisu 
of  the  goods  in  the  hands  of  the  carrier.^^    Thus,  if  the  goods 

51  Fowler  v.  McTaggart,  cited  in       Adams,  2  Marsh.  366. 
1   East  522n,  3  East  388;  Noble  v. 


59 


^  gii  LIENS.  930 

are  delivered  on  board  of  a  vessel  appointed  by  the  vendee 
to  receive  them,  not  for  the  purpose  of  transportation  to  hnn, 
or  to  a  place  appointed  by  him  for  his  use,  but  to  be  shipped 
in  his  name  from  his  ov^^n  place  of  business  to  a  third  person 
at  another  port,  there  is  a  delivery  to  the  vendee  when  the 
goods  are  put  on  board  such  vessel,  and  the  vendor  has  no 
right  afterw^ards  to  stop  the  goods  to  obtain  payment  of  the 
price. ^-  But  w^hether  a  delivery  on  board  the  purchaser's  own 
ship,  or  upon  his  own  cart,  is  a  delivery  to  him,  is  a  question 
of  fact,  and  depends  upon  the  circumstances  of  the  delivery, 
and  particularly  upon  such  circumstances  as  show  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties  in  making  such  delivery.  It  is  well  said  by 
Jessell,  M.  R.,'^^  that  "it  neither  follows,  as  a  proposition  of 
law,  that  because  a  purchaser  sends  his  carts  for  goods  and 
they  are  given  to  him  in  the  cart,  the  transit  is  at  an  end,  nor 
does  it  follow  it  is  not;  it  is  to  be  considered  as  a  question 
of  what  in  law  is  called  a  question  for  the  jury,  that  is,  a  ques- 
tion of  inference  from  known  facts  as  to  what  the  real  inten- 
tion of  the  parties  was." 

§  911.  Delivery  on  board  of  the  vendee's  ship. — A  delivery 
on  board  the  purchaser's  own  ship,  or  one  chartered  by  him, 
is  ordinarily  a  delivery  to  him  so  as  to  preclude  a  stoppage 
in  transitu  by  the  vendor  before  the  delivery  of  the  goods  at 

52  Memphis    &    L.    R.    R.    Co.   v.  right    of    stoppage    ceases    on    the 

Freed,    38   Ark.   614;    Treadwell   v.  shipment   if   no   transit   is   contem- 

Aydlett,     9     Heisk.     (Tenn.)     388;  plated;  but  that  the  right  exists  if 

Eaton  V.  Cook,  32  Vt.  58;  Rowley  the  delivery  to  him  is  to  be  made 

V.    Bigelow,    12   Pick.    (Mass.)    307,  after  the  termination  of  the  voyage. 

23  Am.  Dec.  607;   Stubbs  v.  Lund,  This  distinction  is  criticised  in  Bo- 

7  Mass.  453,  5  Am.  Dec.  63.   In  the  lin  v.  Huffnagle,   1   Rawle   (Pa.)  9, 

latter  case.  Parsons,  C.  J.,  said  that  a  leading  case. 

the    distinction    in    such    case    de-  ^3  Merchants'     Banking     Co.     v. 

pends  upon  the  terms  of  shipment  Phoenix  Bessemer  Steel  Co.,  L.  R. 

as  shown  by  the  bill  of  lading;  the  5  Ch.  Div.  205,  219. 


931  SELLER''S  RIGHT  OF  STOPPAGE  IN  TRANSITU.  §    91 1 

the  port  of  consignment.^'*  In  the  words  of  Baron  Parke,^^ 
"delivery  on  the  vendee's  own  ship  is  a  final  delivery  at  the 
place  of  destination."  In  such  case  an  essential  condition  to 
the  exercise  of  the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  is  wanting, 
namely,  the  custody  of  the  goods  by  a  third  person  interme- 
diate between  the  seller  and  the  buyer  after  the  former  has 
parted  with  actual  possession,  and  before  the  latter  has  ac- 
quired it.^^  But  when  goods  are  delivered  absolutely  and 
unconditionally  on  board  the  buyer's  own  ship,  and  the  mas- 
ter signs  bills  of  lading  making  the  goods  deliverable  to  the 
buyer  or  his  assigns,  without  any  reservation  to  the  seller  of 
control  over  them,  there  is  no  intermediate  third  person  in 
custody  of  the  goods;  for  the  master  being  the  servant  or 
agent  of  the  buyer,  the  delivery  to  the  master  is  a  delivery 
to  the  buyer.^"^ 

In  this  respect  there  is  no  well-founded  distinction  between 
the  case  of  a  ship  of  the  vendee  sent  out  expressly  to  receive 
the  goods,  and  the  case  of  a  general  ship  belonging  to  him 
taking  the  goods  without  any  previous  arrangement  for  the 
purpose.^^ 

•^-t  Van  Casteel  v.  Booker,  2  Ex.  Yorkshire  Ry.,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  332,  336. 

691;    Turner    v.    Liverpool    Docks  Per  Lord  Chelmsford,   L.  C. :     "If 

Co.,  6  Ex.  543;   Ogle  v.  Atkinson,  the  vendor  desires  to  protect  liim- 

5  Taunt.  759;  Inglis  v.  Usherwood,  self  under  these  circumstances,  he 

1    East  515;   Blakey  v.   Dinsdale,  2  may  restrain  the  efifect  of  such  de- 

Cowp.  661,  664;  Fowler  v.  McTag-  livery,    and    preserve    his    right    of 

gart,  cited  1  East  522,  and  7  T.  R.  stoppage  in  transitu  by  taking  bills 

442;    Bolin   v.    Hufifnagle,    1    Rawle  of  lading,  making  the  goods  deliv- 

(Pa.)    9;   Thompson   v.    Stewart,    7  erable  to  his  order  or  assigns." 

Phila.   (Pa.)   187;    Pequeno  v.  Tay-  ^8  Schotsman     v.     Lancashire     & 

lor,  38  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  375;  Brooke  Yorkshire  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  332. 

Iron  Co.  V.  O'Brien,  135  Mass.  442.  per   Lord    Chelmsford,    L.    C.    The 

55  Van  Casteel  v.  Booker,  2  Ex.  case  of  Mitchel  v.  Ede,  11  Ad.  & 
691,  708.  El.  888,  sometimes   relied  upon   as 

56  Gibson  v.  Carruthers,  8  M.  &  creating  such  a  distinction,  was  not 
W.  321,  per  Rolfe,  B.  See  however,  a  case  of  stoppage  in  transitu,  or 
ante,  §  909.  of  vendor  and  purchaser. 

57  Schotsmans    v.    Lancashire    & 


§    913  LIENS.  932 

§  912.  Right  exercised  even  where  delivery  is  made  on 
board  vendee's  ship. — But  the  right  of  stoppage  may  exist 
even  when  goods  are  shipped  upon  the  buyer's  own  vessel, 
consigned  to  him  at  his  place  of  residence. ^^  A  vendor,  after 
putting  a  cargo  on  board  the  vendee's  ship,  and  taking  bills 
of  lading  making  the  goods  deliverable  to  the  vendee,  before 
the  sailing  of  the  ship  heard  of  the  vendee's  insolvency,  and 
thereupon  prevailed  upon  the  master  to  give  up  the  bills  of 
lading  already  signed,  and  to  sign  other  bills  of  lading  de- 
liverable to  the  vendor's  own  agent.  The  vendee  had  in  the 
mean  time  executed  a  bill  of  sale  of  the  cargo.  In  an  action 
of  replevin  for  the  goods  brought  by  the  assignee,  it  was  held 
that  the  vendor  so  far  had  control  of  goods,  after  the  goods 
had  been  put  on  board,  that  he  might  rightfully  alter  their 
destination,  or  might  stop  them  in  transitu.^^ 

It  seems  also  that  a  delivery  on  board  the  vendee's  own 
ship  should  have  the  effect  of  a  delivery  to  the  vendee  him- 
self, only  when  the  vendor  has  full  knowledge  that  the  ven- 
dee is  the  owner;  for  it  would  be  scarcely  just  that  a  vendor 
who  has  delivered  goods  to  be  carried  to  his  vendee,  under 
the  belief  that  he  could  exercise  the  ordinary  right  of  an  un- 
paid vendor  over  them,  should  be  deprived  of  that  right  be- 
cause he  had  ignorantly  placed  the  goods  on  board  the  ven- 
dee's own  ship,  and  must  therefore  be  taken  to  have  made 
an  absolute  delivery  of  them.^^ 

§  913.  Effect  where  bill  of  lading  requires  delivery  to  ven- 
dor's order. — If  the  vendor  takes  a  bill  of  lading  making  the 
goods  deliverable  to  his  own  order,  this  goes  to  show  that  no 

59  Brindley  v.  Cilgwyn  Slate  Co.,  Rawle  (Pa.)  9;  Pequeno  v.  Taylor, 

55  L.  J.  Q.  B.  (H;  Ex  parte  Rose-  38  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  375. 

vear   China  Clay   Co.,   11   Ch.   Div.  so  Hsley  v,  Stubbs,  9  Mass.  65,  6 

560;   Ilsley  v.   Stubbs,  9   Mass.  65,  Am.    Dec.   29.    And    see    Ex   parte 

6  Am.  Dec.  29;  Cross  v.  O'Donnell,  Rosevear  China  Clay  Co.,  L.  R.  11 

44  N.  Y.  661,  666,  4  Am.  Rep.  721.  Ch.  Div.  560. 

See,  however,  Bolin  v.  Huflfnagle,  1  6I  Schotsmans    v.    Lancashire    & 

Yorkshire  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  332. 


933  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  914 

property  passes  to  the  vendee,  and  that  the  vendor,  though 
shipping  the  goods  by  the  vendee's  own  vessel,  intends  to 
retain  control  of  the  goods  till  he  should  do  some  further  act, 
such  as  indorsing  the  bill  of  lading  to  the  vendee.^^  Mer- 
chants at  Liverpool  sent  orders  to  merchants  at  Charleston  to 
ship  a  quantity  of  cotton  for  the  homeward  voyage  of  a  ship 
of  theirs  then  at  that  port.  The  Charleston  merchants  ac- 
cordingly purchased  cotton  and  shipped  it  on  board  this  ves- 
sel. The  master  signed  for  the  consignors  a  bill  of  lading 
making  the  cotton  deliverable  at  Liverpool  "to  order  or  to 
our  assigns,  paying  for  freight  for  the  cotton  nothing,  being 
owners'  property;"  and  the  consignors  indorsed  the  bill  of 
lading  to  order  of  their  own  agents  at  Liverpool,  and  drew 
upon  the  consignees  for  the  consignment,  and  pledged  the 
bill  of  lading  for  advances  upon  the  draft.  The  consignees 
having  become  bankrupt  before  the  arrival  of  the  vessel  at 
Liverpool,  the  consignors  by  their  agent  stopped  the  cargo  in 
transitu.  The  assignees  in  bankruptcy  of  the  consignees 
claimed  the  cotton;  but  it  was  held  that  the  property  did  not 
vest  absolutely  in  the  consignees,  notwithstanding  the  de- 
livery on  board  their  ship;  for,  by  the  terms  of  the  bill  of 
lading,  the  consignors  reserved  to  themselves  a  jus  dispo- 
nendi  of  the  goods,  which  the  master  acknowledged  by  sign- 
ing the  bill  of  lading  making  the  cotton  deliverable  to  their 
order,  although  by  so  doing  the  master  might  have  exceeded 
his  authority.^^ 

§  914.    Receipt  that  goods  are  shipped  on  seller's  account. 

— If  a  vendor,  upon  delivering  goods  on  board  a  vessel  named 
by  the  vendee,  takes  a  receipt  from  the  person  in  charge, 

62  Seymour  v.  Newton,  105  Mass.  cumstances    bore    a    close    resem- 

272.  blance  to  the  above  case;  but  the 

03  Turner  v.   Liverpool  Docks,  6  case   is    distinguishable,    because    a 

Ex.    543.     See,    also,    Ellershaw    v.  fraud  was  practised  upon  the  mas- 

Magniac,    6    Ex.    570    n.;    Wait    v.  ter  of  the  vessel  to  induce  him  to 

Baker,  2  Ex.  1.    In  Ogle  v.  Atkin-  sign  a  bill  of  lading  with  the  name 

son,  5  Taunt.  759,  the  general  cir-  of  the  consignee  in  blank. 


§  915  LIENS.  934 

stating  that  the  goods  are  shipped  on  the  seller's  account,  he 
preserves  his  right  of  stoppage  until  he  exchanges  his  receipt 
for  a  bill  of  lading;  and  he  does  not  lose  his  right  though  the 
shipmaster  inadvertently  gives  the  bill  of  lading  to  the  pur- 
chaser or  his  assigns.*^^  "I  take  it,"  said  Gibbs,  C.  J.,^^  "that 
the  regular  practice  is,  that  the  person  who  is  in  possession 
of  the  receipt  is  alone  entitled  to  the  bill  of  lading;  and  the 
captain,  therefore,  ought  not  to  give  the  bill  of  lading,  except 
to  the  person  who  can  give  the  receipt  in  exchange;  conse- 
quently the  person  holding  the  receipt  has  a  control  over  the 
goods,  till  he  has  exchanged  it  for  a  bill  of  lading." 

§  915.  Bill  of  lading  not  conclusive  proof  that  delivery  has 
been  made  to  vendee. — Though  the  vendor  takes  a  bill  of 
lading  by  which  the  goods  are  to  be  delivered  to  the  pur- 
chaser, this  is  not  conclusive  that  the  delivery  on  board  the 
purchaser's  own  ship  is  a  delivery  to  him.  Thus,  where  a 
planter  residing  in  Jamaica  was  indebted  to  a  London  mer- 
chant, and  shipped  sugars  on  board  a  vessel  belonging  to  the 
latter,  and  received  from  the  master  a  bill  of  lading  by  which 
the  goods  were  to  be  delivered  to  the  London  merchant,  he 
paying  freight,  the  planter  made  an  indorsement  on  the  bill 
of  lading  that  the  goods  were  to  be  delivered  to  the  merchant 
only  upon  his  giving  security  for  certain  payments,  and 
otherwise  to  the  planter's  agent.  The  planter  then  indorsed 
and  delivered  the  bill  to  a  third  person,  to  whom  he  was  in- 
debted in  more  than  the  value  of  the  goods.  It  was  held  that 
the  planter  had  a  right  to  change  the  destination  of  the  goods 
before  the  delivery  of  them  or  of  the  bill  of  lading  to  the 
merchant,  and  that  the  property  had  not  passed  to  the  latter, 
although  the  planter  was  indebted  to  him  in  a  greater  sum 
than  the  value  of  the  sugars.^^ 

64  Craven  v.  Ryder,  2  Marsh.  127,  "^'J  Mitchel  v.   Ede,   11   Ad.   &  El. 

6  Taunt.  433;  Cowasjee  v.  Thomp-  888.    And  see  Moakes  v.  Nicolson, 

son.   5   Moore   P.   C.   165,   is   to  be  19    C.    B.    (N.    S.)    290;    Inglis    v. 

distinguished.  Usherwood,  1  East  515. 

•55  Craven  v.  Ryder,  2  Marsh.  127. 


935        SELLERS  RIGHT  OF  STOPPAGE  IN  TRANSITU.     §  917 

§  916.  Vendor  may  act  as  agent  of  vendee  in  taking  bill 
of  lading. — Notwithstanding  the  form  of  the  bill  of  lading, 
the  vendor  may  have  acted  as  agent  for  the  vendee  in  taking 
it.  If,  therefore,  the  bill  of  lading  be  made  "freight  free,"  and 
the  invoice  shoves  that  the  goods  were  shipped  for  and  on 
account  of  the  vendee,  and  it  appears  that  both  the  bill  of 
lading  and  invoice  are  immediately  assigned  to  the  vendee, 
it  is  a  question  for  the  jury  whether  the  goods  were  not 
really  delivered  on  board  the  vendee's  ship,  to  be  carried  for 
and  on  his  account,  and,  if  so,  the  right  of  stoppage  would 
end  with  the  delivery  of  the  goods  on  board  the  vendee's 
ship.^"^ 

§  917.    Transit  continues  until  goods  arrive  at  destination. 

— As  a  general  rule,  the  transit  continues  until  the  goods 
have  arrived  at  the  original  destination  contemplated  by  the 
purchaser  and  named  to  the  vendor.^^  Such  destination  is 
the  place  to  which  the  goods  are  to  be  conveyed  by  the  car- 
rier, and  where  they  will  remain  unless  fresh  orders  be  given 
for  their  subsequent  disposition.^^ 

When  the  goods  have  arrived  by  vessel  at  their  place  of 
destination,  and  the  purchaser  has  indorsed  the  bills  of  lad- 
ing, and  delivered  them  to  a  railroad  company,  in  order  that 
the  goods  may  be  forwarded  to  the  purchaser  at  another 
place,  they  cannot  be  stopped  by  the  vendor  while  in  posses- 
sion of  the  latter  carrier,  for  the  transitus  prescribed  by  the 

6"  Van  Casteel  v.   Booker,  2  Ex.  6  B.  &  C.  422;  Dixon  v.  Baldvven, 

691.   Also  see  Wait  v.  Baker,  2  Ex.  5  East  175;   Leeds  v.  Wright,  3  B. 

1 ;  Turner  v.  Liverpool  Docks  Co.,  &    P.    320;    Rowe    v.    Pickford,    8 

6   Ex.   543;    Ellershaw  v.   Magniac,  Taunt.  83;   Coventry  v.   Gladstone, 

6  Ex.  570;   Brown  v.  North,  8  Ex.  L.   R.  6  Eq.  44,  per  Wood,  V.  C; 

1;  Jenkyns  v.  Brown,  14  Q.  B.  496;  Rodger     v.     The     Comptoir     d'Es- 

Browne  v.   Hare,  3   H.   &   N.  484;  compte  de  Paris,  L.  R.  2  P.  C.  393; 

Ruck  V.  Hatfield,  5  B.  &  Aid.  632;  Stokes  v.  La  Riviere,  cited  3  T.  R. 

Joyce  V.  Swann,   17  C.   B.   (N.  S.)  466,  and  3  East  397;  Parker  v.  Mc- 

84.  Iver,   1    Des.   (S.   Car.)   274,   1   Am. 

08  Whitehead  v.  Anderson,  9  M.  Dec.  656. 
&  W.  518,  534;   Coates  v.  Railton,  69  Wentworth    v.    Outhwaite,    10 


§  gi8  LIENS.  936 

vendor  is  at  an  end,  and  the  railroad  company  is  the  agent 
of  the  purchaserJ*^ 

§  918.  Transit  not  ended  by  the  arrival  of  vessel  at  port  of 
call. — Where  a  port  of  call  is  named  at  which  the  vessel  must 
touch  for  orders  to  proceed  to  the  place  of  its  final  destina- 
tion, the  arrival  of  the  vessel  at  the  port  of  call  does  not  or- 
dinarily end  the  transitus.  A  merchant  at  Bahia  shipped  a 
cargo  of  sugar  to  a  sugar-refining  company  at  Glasgow  by  a 
ship  chartered  by  the  vendor.  The  charter-party  provided 
that  the  ship  should  proceed  "either  direct  or  via  Falmouth, 
Cowes,  or  Queenstown,  for  orders,  to  a  port  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  or  to  a  port  on  the  continent  (between  certain 
limits)."  The  bill  of  lading,  which  was  indorsed  to  the  con- 
signee, and  the  invoice,  specified  the  destination  of  the  cargo 
in  similar  terms.  The  ship  arrived  at  Falmouth,  and  the 
master,  in  pursuance  of  written  instructions  from  the  vendor, 
announced  its  arrival  to  his  agents  in  London,  and  asked 
them  for  orders.  The  agents  applied  to  the  consignee  for 
instructions  as  to  the  destination  of  the  ship;  but,  before  any 
instructions  were  given,  the  latter  became  insolvent,  and 
thereupon  the  vendor's  agents  stopped  the  cargo.  It  was 
held  that  the  cargo  had  not  been  constructively  delivered  to 
the  vendee,  that  the  transitus  was  not  over,  and  that  the  stop- 
page was  valid. '^^  Lord  Romilly,  M.  R.,  delivering  judgment, 
said  :'^  "The  question  is,  whether  there  was  delivery  at  a 
place  where  the  vendee  meant  the  goods  to  remain  until  a 
fresh  destination  was  communicated  to  them  by  orders  from 
himself.  If  the  ship  had,  under  the  direction  of  the  company, 
proceeded  to  the  Clyde,  still  the  transitus  would  not  have 
been  over;  but  if,  on  its  arrival,  the  company  had  determined 

M.   &  W.  436,  450,  per   Parke,   B.;  'i  Fraser  v.  Witt,  L.  R.  7  Eq.  64, 

Blackman    v.    Pierce,    23    Cal.    508;  71. 

Halff  V.  Allyn,  60  Tex.  278.  '2  Fraser  v.  Witt,  L.  R.  7  Eq.  64, 

70  Ex  parte  Gibbes,  L.  R.  1   Ch.  71. 
Div.  101. 


937  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  919 

to  send  the  cargo  to  another  port,  not  within  the  original 
charter-party,  and  had  for  that  purpose  chartered  the  vessel 
afresh,  and  thereby  made  the  master  their  own  agent,  then 
the  constructive  delivery  pointed  out  by  Lord  Wensleydale 
would  have  occurred,  and  it  would  have  been  the  same  thing 
in  substance  as  if  the  cargo  had  been  taken  from  the  vessel 
and  put  on  board  another  vessel  under  the  direction  and  con- 
trol of  the  company.  The  purchaser  must  not  only  be  the 
owner  of  the  goods,  but  he  must  be  the  owner  for  the  time 
being  of  the  receptacle  in  which  the  goods  are  placed.  This 
was  not  so  in  the  present  case;  the  company  could  not  have 
sent  the  sugar  to  any  port  in  the  Mediterranean,  or  indeed, 
to  any  port  except  one  within  the  limits  specified  in  the  char- 
ter-party effected  by  the  defendant  at  Bahia  and  even  if  di- 
rections had  been  given  by  the  company  to  proceed  to  one 
of  the  ports  specified  in  the  charter-party,  still  there  would 
have  been  no  delivery  to  the  company  until  after  the  arrival 
of  the  cargo  in  that  port,  and  some  act  done  by  which  the 
possession  and  absolute  control  over  the  sugar  had  been 
vested  in  the  company.  But,  in  truth,  not  even  this  was 
done;  for  the  agents  did  not  desire  the  company  to  give  the 
master  directions  whither  he  was  to  go,  or  put  him  under 
their  control,  but  they  wrote  to  the  company  and  said,  'Give 
us  instructions  as  to  the  port  to  which  we  are  to  send  the 
vessel,'  and  even  then  instructions  never  came  until  after 
the  delivery  of  the  goods  had  been  stopped  by  the  agents 
of  the  defendant." 

§  919.    Vendee  may  take  possession  at  any  point  en  route. 

— It  is  generally  conceded  that  the  vendee  may  anticipate 
the  delivery  at  the  place  of  consignment,  and  take  possession 
at  any  place  on  the  route  where  he  may  direct  the  carrier  to 
deliver  the  goods,  though  he  thereby  shortens  the  transit 
and  puts  an  end  to  the  vendor's  right  of  stoppage.*^^     Baron 

73  Wright  V.   Lawes,  4   Esp.   82;    Wood    v.    Yeatman,    15    B.    Mon. 


§  919 


LIENS. 


938 


Parke,  in  a  case  which  did  not  directly  involve  this  point, 
expressed  this  view  strongly,  saying :'^^  "The  law  is  clearly 
settled,  that  the  unpaid  vendor  has  a  right  to  retake  the 
goods  before  they  have  arrived  at  the  destination  originally 
contemplated  by  the  purchaser,  unless  in  the  meantime  they 
have  come  to  the  actual  or  constructive  possession  of  the 
vendee.  If  the  vendee  take  them  out  of  the  possession  of 
the  carrier  into  his  own  before  their  arrival,  with  or  without 
the  consent  of  the  carrier,  there  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that 
the  transit  would  be  at  an  end:  though  in  the  case  of  the 
absence  of  the  carrier's  consent,  it  may  be  a  wrong  to  him, 
for  which  he  would  have  a  right  of  action." 


(Ky.)  270;  Muskegon  Booming  Co. 
V.  Underbill,  43  Mich.  629,  5  N.  W. 
1073;  Stevens  v.  Wheeler,  27  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  658,  660.  In  this  case  goods 
consigned  to  the  buyer  in  Brooklyn 
were  taken  possession  of  by  him  in 
New  York.  There  are  dicta  and  im- 
plications to  this  effect  in  several 
cases.  Whitehead  v.  Anderson,  9 
M.  &  W.  518;  Jackson  v.  Nichol,  5 
Bing.  N.  Cas.  508;  James  v.  Griffin, 
2  M.  &  W.  623;  Mills  v.  Ball,  2  B. 
&  P.  457;  Foster  v.  Frampton,  6  B. 
&  C.  107;  Dixon  v.  Baldwen,  5  East 
175;  Kendall  v.  Marshall,  48  L.  T. 
(N.  S.)  951,  16  Rep.  511;  Secomb 
V.  Nutt,  14  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  324; 
Chandler  v.  Fulton,  10  Tex.  2,  60 
Am.  Dec.  188.  In  Mohr  v.  Boston 
&  Albany  R.  Co.,  106  Mass.  67,  72, 
Morton,  J.,  remarked:  "In  all  cases 
of  delivery  of  goods  to  a  common 
carrier,  for  the  purpose  of  transit, 
the  vendee,  acting  in  good  faith,  has 
the  right  to  intercept  the  goods  be- 
fore they  reach  their  destination, 
and,  by  taking  actual  possession  of 
them,  to  defeat  the  vendor's  lien." 
In  a  modern  case,  which  did  not, 


however,  involve  the  question  of 
the  vendor's  right  of  stoppage  in 
transitu,  it  was  held  that  the  car- 
rier was  not  bound  to  deliver  the 
goods  at  the  place  of  consignment, 
but  might  deliver  them  at  any  place 
at  which  the  consignee  should 
order  their  delivery;  and  Bramwell, 
B.,  said:  "It  would  probably  create 
a  smile  anywhere  but  in  a  court  of 
law,  if  it  were  said  that  a  carrier 
could  not  deliver  to  the  consignee 
at  any  place  except  that  specified 
by  the  consignor.  The  goods  are 
intended  to  reach  the  consignee, 
and,  provided  he  receives  them,  it 
is  immaterial  at  what  place  they  are 
delivered.  The  contract  is  to  de- 
liver the  goods  to  the  consignee  at 
the  place  named  by  the  consignor, 
unless  the  consignee  directs  them 
to  be  delivered  at  a  different  place." 
London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  v.  Bartlett,  7 
H.  &  N.  400,  407. 

74  Whitehead  v.  Anderson.  9  M. 
&  W.  518.  See,  also,  Oppenheim  v. 
Russell,  3  B.  &  P.  42,  per  Cham- 
bre.  J. 


939       SELLER  S  RIGHT  OF  STOPPAGE  IN  TRANSITU.     §  921 

§  920.  Mere  demand  by  vendee  not  sufficient. — But  a  mere 
demand  by  the  consignee  without  a  deHvery  of  the  goods  to 
him  is  not  sufficient  to  intercept  them  on  their  passage,  and 
determine  the  vendor's  right  of  stoppage.  Upon  this  point 
Chief  Justice  Tindal  observed  that,  "although  it  might  be 
conceded  to  be  the  better  opinion,  that  if  the  vendee  actually 
receives  the  possession  of  his  woods  on  their  passage  to  him, 
and  before  the  voyage  has  completely  terminated,  that  the 
delivery  is  complete,  and  the  right  of  stoppage  gone ;  yet  no 
authority  has  been  cited  for  the  position,  and  the  principle 
seems  the  other  way,  that  a  mere  demand  by  the  vendee, 
without  any  delivery,  before  the  voyage  has  completely  ter- 
minated, deprives  the  consignor  of  his  right  of  stoppage. "^^ 

§  921.  Delivery  before  point  of  distination  may  terminate 
transit. — Whether  an  intermediate  delivery  before  the  goods 
have  reached  their  ultimate  destination  terminates  the  tran- 
situs  or  not  depends  upon  the  authority  of  the  person  to 
whom  the  intermediate  delivery  is  made.  If  he  be  merely 
an  agent  to  forward  the  goods  in  accordance  with  the  orig- 
inal directions,  the  vendor's  right  continues  ;'^^  but  if  he  has 


"•^  Jackson  v.  Nichol,  5  Bing.  N 
Cas.  508. 

"0  Smith  V.  Goss,  1  Camp.  282 
Coates  V.  Railton,  6  B.  &  C.  422 
Jackson  v.  Nichol,  5  Bing.  N.  Cas 
508;  Ex  parte  Watson,  L.  R.  5  Ch 


Mouille,  14  Pa.  St.  48;  Buckley  v. 
Furniss,  15  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  137; 
Harris  v.  Pratt,  17  N.  Y.  249,  affirm- 
ing Harris  v.  Hart,  6  Duer  (N.  Y.) 
606;  Covell  v.  Hitchcock,  23  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  611,  613.   In  this  case  Wal- 


Div.  35;  Nicholls  v.  Le  Feuvre,  2  worth,  Chancellor,  said:  "The  law 
Bing.  N.  Cas.  81;  Rodger  v.  Comp-  appears  to  be  well  settled  that  the 
toir  d'Escompte  de  Paris,  L.  R.  2  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  ex- 
P.  C.  393;  Markwald  v.  Creditors,  ists  so  long  as  the  goods  re- 
7  Cal.  213;  Blackman  v.  Pierce,  23  main  in  the  hands  of  a  middleman 
Cal.  508;  Atkins  v.  Colby,  20  N.  H.  on  the  way  to  the  place  of  their 
154;  Lane  v.  Robinson,  18  B.  Mon.  destination,  and  that  the  right  ter- 
(Ky.)  623;  Secomb  v.  Nutt.  14  B.  minates,  whenever  the  goods  are  or 
Mon.  (Ky.)  324;  Wood  v.  Yeat-  have  been,  either  actually  or  con- 
man,  15  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  270;  Halfif  structively  delivered  to  the  vendee; 
V.  Allyn,  60  Tex.  278;  Cabeen  v.  a  delivery  to  the  general  agent  of 
Campbell,  30  Pa.  St.  254;   Hays  v.  the  vendee  is  of  course  tantamount 


922 


LIENS. 


940 


authority  to  receive  the  goods  for  the  consignee,  and  to  give 
them  a  new  destination  not  originally  intended,  the  transitus 
ends  with  the  delivery  to  him.  If  the  goods  upon  their  inter- 
mediate delivery  have  so  far  reached  the  end  of  their  jour- 
ney that  they  await  new  orders  from  the  purchaser  to  put 
them  in  motion  again,  and  give  them  another  substantive 
destination,  and  if  without  such  new  orders  they  must  re- 
main stationary,  then  the  delivery  is  complete  and  the  lien 
of  the  vendor  has  expired. '^'^  If  the  person  into  whose  hands 
the  goods  come  does  not  receive  them  for  the  purpose  of 
expediting  their  further  transportation,  but  simply  as  the 
agent  of  the  purchaser  for  his  use  for  general  purposes  un- 
connected with  transportation,  it  is  virtually  the  possession 
of  the  purchaser  himself,  and  the  transitus  is  at  an  end.'^^ 

§  922.    Transit  continuous  while  goods  are  held  by  a  for- 
warding agent. — The  transitus  continues  while  the  goods  are 


to  a  delivery  to  himself.  The  time 
during  which  the  right  exists,  there- 
fore, is  during  the  whole  period  of 
the  transit,  from  the  vendor  to  the 
purchaser,  or  the  place  of  ultimate 
destination,  as  designated  to  the 
vendor  by  the  buyer;  and  this  tran- 
sit continues  so  long  as  possession 
of  the  middleman,  whether  he  be 
the  carrier  either  by  land  or  water, 
or  the  keeper  of  a  warehouse  or 
place  of  deposit  connected  with  the 
transmission  and  delivery  of  the 
goods." 

77  This    is    the    doctrine    of    the 
leading  case  of  Dixon  v.  Baldwen, 

5  East  175;  and  of  Leeds  v.  Wright, 
3  B.  &  P.  320;  Scott  v.  Pettit,  3  B. 

6  P.  469;  Valpy  v.  Gibson,  4  C.  B. 
837;  Wentworth  v.  Outhwaite,  10 
M.  &  W.  436;  Dodson  v.  Went- 
worth, 4  M.  &  G.  1080;  James  v. 
Griffin,   2   M.    &   W.   623,   631,   per 


Parke,  B.;  Smith  v.  Hudson,  6  B.  & 
S.  431,  per  Cockburn,  C.  J.;  Rowe 
V.  Pickford,  8  Taunt.  83;  Cooper 
V.  Bill,  3  H.  &  C.  722;  Harman  v. 
Anderson,  2  Camp.  243;  Lucas  v. 
Dorrien,  7  Taunt.  278;  Kendall  v. 
Marshall,  48  L.  T.  (N.  S.)  951,  16 
Rep.  511;  Guilford  v.  Smith,  30  Vt. 
49,  where  the  cases  are  reviewed 
at  length;  Biggs  v.  Barry,  2  Cur- 
tis (U.  S.)  259,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  1402; 
Pottinger  v.  Hecksher,  2  Grant  Cas, 
(Pa.)  309;  Hays  v.  Mouille,  14  Pa. 
St.  48;  Brooke  Iron  Co.  v.  O'Brien, 
135  Mass.  442. 

78  Harris  v.  Pratt,  17  N.  Y.  249 
Covell  V.  Hitchcock,  23  Wend.  611 
Becker  v.  Hallgarten,  86  N.  Y.  167 
Hoover  v.  Tibbits,  13  Wis.  79;  At- 
kins V.  Colby,  20  N.  H.  154;  Inslee 
v.  Lane.  57  N.  H.  454,  459.  per  Fos- 
ter, C.  J. 


941  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  922 

in  the  hands  of  an  agent  appointed  by  the  purchaser  for  the 
purpose  of  forwarding  the  goods.  Though  the  agent  may  be 
the  agent  of  the  purchaser,  designated,  paid,  and  employed 
by  him,  yet,  if  the  purpose  of  his  employment  is  to  expedite 
the  property  toward  its  destination,  or  to  aid  those  engaged 
in  forwarding  it,  the  seller's  right  to  stay  the  final  delivery 
continues.''^''  "When  the  seller  attempts  to  claim  the  goods 
the  question  is  whether  they  have  arrived  at  the  end  of  their 
transit,  and  this  usually  depends  upon  the  further  question 
whether  the  party  in  whose  hands  they  are  found  is  acting 
in  the  character  of  an  agent  for  transportation,  or  as  the 
agent  of  the  purchaser,  holding  them  simply  for  his  use  un- 
connected with  the  business  of  forwarding  them.  It  some- 
times happens  that  the  seller  delivers  goods  sold  on  credit 
immediately  to  an  agent  of  the  purchaser,  or  that,  as  in  the 
present  case,  he  sends  them  a  part  of  the  way  to  their  final 
destination,  and  they  are  delivered  to  such  agent  of  the 
buyer.  When  they  have  been  so  delivered  according  to  the 
vendee's  direction,  either  immediately  upon  the  sale  or  after 
being  carried  a  part  of  the  distance,  the  question  arises 
whether  the  seller  retains  a  right  to  stop  them  on  account 
of  the  failure  of  the  purchaser.  Under  certain  circumstances 
the  depositary  in  these  cases  is  considered  as  the  general 
agent  of  the  purchaser,  and  the  goods  when  in  his  hands  are 
adjudged  to  be  virtually  in  the  possession  of  such  purchaser 
and  not  in  transitu ;  while  under  a  state  of  facts  somewhat 
different  the  person  into  whose  custody  they  thus  came  is 
regarded  as  an  agent  for  expediting  them,  and  the  right  of 
stoppage  continues  until  they  come  to  the  purchaser's  hands 

^^9  Stokes  V.  La  Riviere,  reported  508;  Tucker  v.  Humphrey,  4  Bing. 

in  Bohtlingk  v.  Inglis,  3  East  381;  516;  Harris  v.  Pratt,  17  N.  Y.  249, 

Coates  V.  Railton,  6  B.  &  C.  422;  per  Denio,  J.,  who  reviews  at  length 

Nichols  V.  Le   Feuvre,  2  Bing.   N.  the  earlier  cases;  Hays  v.  Mouille, 

C.  81;    Jackson  v.  Nichol,  5   Bing.  14  Pa.  St.  48. 


§    9^3  LIENS.  942 

at  his  place  of  business,  or  at  some  other  place  where  he  has 
directed  them  to  be  sent."®^ 

Wool  was  purchased  in  New  York  by  a  manufacturing 
company  located  at  Enfield,  through  their  agent,  to  be  paid 
for  by  the  paper  of  this  company  when  delivered  at  Enfield. 
The  wool  was  delivered  to  the  agent  upon  an  order  of  the 
vendor  to  the  storekeeper  to  deliver  it  to  the  company  named 
or  bearer.  The  agent  of  this  company  was  also  the  agent  of 
another  manufacturing  company  located  at  Simsbury,  and  it 
was  his  usual  course  of  business  to  divide  between  these  two 
companies  any  large  lots  of  wool  purchased  for  either,  each 
company  giving  its  own  notes  for  its  respective  share  of  the 
wool  when  received.  The  agent  accordingly  divided  the  wool 
purchased  in  this  case,  and  forwarded  a  portion  of  it  to  the 
corporation  located  at  Simsbury  without  the  knowledge  of 
the  vendor.  Before  the  wool  was  received  both  corporations 
became  insolvent,  and  the  portion  of  the  wool  forwarded  to 
the  Simsbury  company  was  attached  as  its  property  while  in 
the  hands  of  the  carrier.  It  was  held  that  the  transitus  of 
the  wool  was  not  terminated  by  the  delivery  to  the  agent, 
nor  by  his  act  in  sending  a  portion  of  it  to  the  Simsbury 
company;  and  that  the  vendor  might  exercise  his  right  of 
stoppage.®^ 

§  923.  Transit  is  not  ended  when  vendee  repudiates  the 
purchase. — If  the  vendee  repudiates  the  purchase,  and  de- 
clines to  receive  the  goods  after  they  have  arrived  at  their 
destination,  the  transitus  is  not  at  an  end,  and  the  unpaid 
vendor  has  the  right  to  stop  them.^^  "The  property  in  these 
goods  passed  by  the   contract  to  the   vendee.     Unless   the 

80  Harris  v.  Pratt,  17  N.  Y.  249,  439;  Nicholls  v.  Le  Feuvre,  2  Bing. 
per  Denio,  J.  N.    Cas.   81 ;   Mason   v.   Wilson,  43 

81  Aguirre  v.  Parmelee,  22  Conn.  Ark.    172;    Greve    v.     Dunham,    60 
473.  Iowa    108,    14   N.    W.    130,   15    Rep. 

82  Bolton  V.  Lancashire  &  York-  232. 
shire    R.    Co..    L.    R.    1    C.    P.   431, 


943  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  923 

property  passed,  there  would  be  no  need  of  the  right  of  stop- 
ping in  transitu.  The  only  effect  of  the  property  passing,  is, 
that  from  that  time  the  goods  are  at  the  risk  of  the  buyer. 
But  it  by  no  means  follows  that  the  buyer  is  to  have  posses- 
sion unless  he  is  prepared  to  pay  for  the  goods.  As  long  as 
the  goods  remain  in  the  warehouse  of  the  vendor,  or  in  the 
hands  of  one  who  holds  as  his  agent,  his  lien  upon  them  for 
the  unpaid  price  remains.  But,  when  once  they  have  got  into 
the  possession  of  an  agent  for  the  buyer,  the  vendor  parts 
with  his  lien.  The  right  to  stop  in  transitu  upon  the  bank- 
ruptcy of  the  buyer  remains,  even  when  the  credit  has  not 
expired,  until  the  goods  have  reached  the  hands  of  the  ven- 
dee, or  of  one  who  is  his  agent,  as  a  warehouseman,  or  a 
packer,  or  a  shipping-agent,  to  give  them  a  new  destination. 
Until  one  of  these  events  has  happened,  the  vendor  has  a 
right  to  stop  the  goods  in  transitu.  It  must  be  observed  that 
there  is,  besides  the  propositions  I  have  stated,  and  which 
are  quite  familiar,  one  other  proposition  which  follows  as 
deducible  from  these,  viz.,  that  the  arrival  which  is  to  divest 
the  vendor's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  must  be  such  as 
that  the  buyer  has  taken  actual  or  constructive  possession  of 
the  goods;  and  that  can  not  be  so  long  as  he  repudiates  them. 
This  is  the  alphabet  of  the  doctrine  of  stoppage  in  transitu."*^ 

If  after  such  refusal  of  the  buyer  to  receive  the  goods,  find- 
ing himself  insolvent,  they  are  attached  by  one  of  his  cred- 
itors, the  sheriff  paying  the  freight,  the  seller  may  still  assert 
his  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu,  though,  upon  taking  the 
goods  from  the  sheriff  by  replevin  suit,  he  may  be  required 
to  repay  to  the  attaching  creditor  the  amount  advanced  by 
him  for  payment  of  the  freight. ^^ 

A  purchaser  of  goods  which  had  been  shipped  to  him,  and 
were  stored  in  the  freight-house  of  the  railroad  company, 
finding  on  the  day  of  their  arrival  that  he  was  insolvent,  re- 

83  Bolton  V.  Lancashire  &  York-  s-*  Greve  v.  Dunham,  60  Iowa  108, 

shire  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  431,  439.       14  N.  W.  130,  15  Rep.  232. 


§  9-4  LIENS.  .  944 

marked  the  goods,  and  ordered  the  agent  of  the  railroad 
company  to  return  them  to  the  seller.  While  for  that  pur- 
pose they  were  being  transferred  from  the  freight-house 
to  the  cars,  a  sheriff  took  possession  of  the  goods,  under  in- 
solvency proceedings,  as  the  property  of  the  purchaser.  The 
seller,  upon  hearing  of  the  insolvency,  wrote  a  letter  for  the 
return  of  the  goods,  which,  however,  was  never  received.  It 
was  held  that  there  had  been  no  effectual  exercise  of  the 
right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.^^ 

§  924.  Refusal  of  insolvent  vendee  to  take  the  goods  may 
determine  the  question  of  delivery. — The  refusal  of  the  buyer 
after  his  insolvency  to  take  the  goods  upon  their  arrival  may 
determine  the  question  whether  there  has  been  a  delivery  or 
not,  for  it  may  show  the  intention  with  which  the  buyer  has 
directed  that  they  should  be  landed  or  stored.^^  Goods  were 
consigned  to  a  London  merchant,  and  by  the  bill  of  lading 
were  made  deliverable  to  him  in  the  river  Thames.  On  the 
arrival  of  the  vessel  in  the  river,  the  master  of  the  ship 
pressed  the  consignee  to  have  them  landed  immediately,  and 
the  latter  accordingly  sent  his  son  to  the  master  with  direc- 
tions to  land  them  at  a  wharf  where  he  was  accustomed  to 
have  goods  landed;  but  being  then  insolvent,  he  at  the  same 
time  told  his  son  not  to  meddle  with  the  goods,  that  he  did 
not  intend  to  take  them,  and  that  the  vendor  ought  to  have 
them.  The  goods  were  accordingly  landed  at  the  wharf,  and 
were  then  stopped  in  transitu  by  the  vendor.  In  an  action 
for  the  goods  by  the  consignee's  assignee  in  bankruptcy, 
it  was  held  that  the  declarations  so  made  by  the  consignee 
to  his  son  were  admissible  in  evidence,  although  they  were 
not  communicated  to  the  vendor  or  to  the  wharfinger;  and 

85  Millard  v.  Webster,  54  Conn.  Farebrother,  4  Bing.  579;  Cox  v. 
415,  8  Atl.  470,  Granger,  J.,  dis-  Burns,  1  Iowa  64;  Mason  v.  Red- 
senting.  path,  39  U.  C.  Q.  B.  157.    And  see 

86  James  v.  Griffin,  2  M.  &  W.  Heinekey  v.  Earle,  8  El.  &  Bl.  410; 
623,  1  M.  &  W.  20,  29;  Bartram  v.  Mills  v.  Ball,  2  B.  &  P.  457. 


945       SELLERS  RIGHT  OF  STOPPAGE  IN  TRANSITU.     §  925 

that  they  showed  that  the  consignee  had  not  taken  posses- 
sion of  the  goods  as  owner,  and  therefore  that  the  transitus 
was  not  determined. ^^  Baron  Parke,  delivering  the  judgment 
of  the  court,  said:  "If  the  order  was  given  to  land  at  the 
wharf,  with  intent  to  make  it  the  place  of  deposit  for  the 
goods  as  the  bankrupt's  own  property,  at  which  place  he 
meant  to  deal  with  them  as  his  own,  to  sell  to  his  customers, 
or  to  give  them  from  thence  a  fresh  destination,  doubtless 
the  transitus  was  at  an  end.  The  wharf  became  the  ware- 
house of  the  vendee,  and  the  landing  there  was  a  taking  pos- 
session. =i^  *  *  On  the  other  hand,  if  his  intention  in  land- 
ing the  goods  had  been  to  make  the  wharfinger  an  instrument 
of  further  conveyance  to  his  own  warehouse,  then  the  tran- 
situs still  continued;  or,  if  the  goods  were  placed  there  with 
the  intention  of  preventing  any  liability  on  his  part  to  the 
captain  for  demurrage,  and  that  they  might  remain  in  medio, 
or  that  they  might  remain  for  the  benefit  of  the  owners,  the 
transitus  had  not  ended;  they  had  not  arrived  at  the  end  of 
their  journey;  they  were  not  actually  delivered  to  the  vendee, 
or  one  who  was  an  agent  of  his,  for  the  purpose  of  keeping 
possession  on  his  account.  The  whole  question  then  is,  with 
w4iat  intent  was  the  order  to  land  given?  Of  that  there  is 
on  the  evidence  no  doubt, — the  bankrupt  did  not  mean  to 
take  possession  as  owner." 

§  925.  Rule  in  similar  case. — In  another  similar  case  it  ap- 
peared that  goods  were  sent  by  railway  to  the  buyer,  who 
gave  notice  to  the  seller  before  they  arrived  that  he  would 
not  receive  them  on  account  of  their  alleged  bad  quality; 
and  after  their  arrival  he  gave  the  railway  company  orders 
to  take  the  goods  back  to  the  seller.  The  latter  refused  to 
receive  them,  and  ordered  them  back  to  the  buyer.  The 
goods,  being  thus  rejected  by  both  the  buyer  and  the  seller, 
remained  in  the  hands  of  the  railway;  and  while  they  so  re- 

87  James  v.   Griffin,  2   M.   &   W.      ing,  1  M.  &  W.  20. 
623,   Lord  Abinger,  C.   B.,  dissent- 

60 


§    9^6  LIENS.  946 

mained  the  buyer  became  bankrupt,  and  the  vendor  stopped 
the  goods.  In  an  action  against  the  railway  company  by  the 
assignees  of  the  buyer,  it  was  held  that  the  transit  was  not 
at  an  end,  and  the  vendor  could  exercise  his  right  of  stop- 
page.^^  Erie,  J.,  said:  *'It  was  urged  that,  being  repudiated 
by  both  parties  to  the  contract,  the  goods  remained  in  the 
hands  of  the  railway  company  as  warehousemen  for  the  real 
owner,  that  is,  for  the  buyer.  There  is  no  doubt  but  that 
the  carrier  may  and  often  does  become  a  warehouseman  for 
the  consignee;  but  that  must  be  by  virtue  of  some  contract 
or  course  of  dealing  between  them,  that,  when  arrived  at 
their  destination  the  character  of  carrier  shall  cease,  and  that 
of  warehouseman  supervene."  And  Willes,  J.,  said:  "The 
right  to  stop  in  transitu  upon  the  bankruptcy  of  the  buyer 
remains,  even  when  the  credit  has  not  expired,  until  the 
goods  have  reached  the  hands  of  the  vendee,  or  of  one  who 
is  his  agent,  as  a  warehouseman,  or  a  packer,  or  a  shipping- 
agent,  to  give  them  a  new  destination.  Until  one  of  these 
events  has  happened,  the  vendor  has  a  right  to  stop  the 
goods  in  transitu.  It  must  be  observed  that  there  is,  besides 
the  propositions  I  have  stated,  and  which  are  quite  familiar, 
one  other  proposition  which  follows  as  deducible  from  these, 
viz.,  that  the  arrival  which  is  to  divest  the  vendor's  right  of 
stoppage  in  transitu  must  be  such  as  that  the  buyer  has  taken 
actual  or  constructive  possession  of  the  goods;  and  that  can- 
not be  so  long  as  he  repudiates  them." 

§  926.  Right  of  stoppage  remains  so  long  as  carrier  holds 
the  goods  not  as  vendee's  agent. — The  right  of  stoppage  in 
transitu  remains  so  long  as  the  carrier  holds  the  goods  as 
carrier,  and  not  as  the  purchaser's  agent  by  virtue  of  an 
agreement  with  him,  though  he  has  delivered  a  part.  Of 
course  the  same  principle  will  apply  under  like  circumstances 
when  the  goods  are  in  the   hands  of  a  warehouseman  or 

88  Bolton  V.  Lancashire   &  Yorkshire  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  431. 


947  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  926 

wharfinger.  A  cargo  of  one  hundred  and  fourteen  tons  of 
iron  castings  was  consigned  to  the  purchaser,  he  paying  the 
freight,  on  board  a  ship  chartered  by  the  vendor.  After 
thirty  tons  of  the  cargo  had  been  delivered  to  the  purchaser, 
the  vendor  gave  notice  to  stop  the  deHvery.  At  this  time, 
only  part  of  the  freight  had  been  paid.  The  purchaser  hav- 
ing become  insolvent  and  a  receiver  having  been  appointed, 
he  paid  the  balance  of  the  freight,  and  claimed  the  remainder 
of  the  iron.  It  was  held,  that,  inasmuch  as  it  could  not  be 
supposed  that  the  master  of  the  ship  intended  to  abandon  his 
lien  for  the  unpaid  freight,  the  delivery  of  the  thirty  tons  did 
not  operate  as  a  constructive  delivery  of  the  whole  cargo, 
and  that,  consequently,  the  transitus  was  not  at  an  end  as  to 
the  remainder  of  the  cargo,  and  the  vendor's  notice  to  stop 
in  transitu  was  given  in  time.^^  Lord  Justice  James,  deliver- 
ing judgment,  said:  "It  seems  to  me  quite  clear  there  was 
nothing  like  a  constructive  delivery  of  the  whole  by  the  cap- 
tain, or  a  constructive  acceptance  of  the  whole  by  the  vendee. 
How  it  might  have  been  if  the  whole  freight  had  been  paid, 
so  that  the  captain  had  no  lien  that  he  could  exercise  on 
behalf  of  the  owners  of  the  ship,  and  the  delivery  had  begun, 
what  difference  that  would  have  made  it  is  not  necessary  now 
to  say.  It  appears  to  me  quite  clear  that,  as  there  was  not  an 
actual  delivery  of  the  whole,  there  could  not  be  a  construc- 
tive delivery  of  the  whole,  because  it  must  be  assumed  that 
the  captain  would  not  have  delivered  the  whole  until  he  had 
received  the  whole  of  the  freight;  and  if  the  captain  had  not 
constructively  delivered  the  whole,  it  would  be  impossible  to 
say  that  the  vendee  had  constructively  accepted  a  delivery 
which  was  never  made."  Goods  remain  in  transitu  while  the 
carrier  holds  them  in  actual  possession,  and  has  not  wrong- 
fully refused  to  deliver  them.^® 

89  Ex  parte  Cooper,  L.  R.  11  Ch.  oo  Crawshay  v.  Eades,  1  B.  &  C. 

Div.  68,  72.  181;  Hoist  v.  Pownal,  1   Esp.  240; 


§    9-7  LIENS.  948 

§  927.  Necessity  that  carrier  part  with  possession  of  goods 
at  transitus. — The  transitus  is  not  at  an  end  until  the  carrier 
parts  with  the  possession  of  the  goods. ^^  The  carrier  has 
the  right  to  retain  possession  until  the  freight  due  him  is  ten- 
dered or  paid.  Of  course  he  may  assent  to  the  consignee's 
having  possession  of  the  goods  without  paying  the  freight, 
but  such  assent  will  not  be  presumed.  Iron  was  sold  and 
shipped  by  water  to  the  purchaser.  The  carrier,  upon  reach- 
ing the  purchaser's  wharf,  landed  a  part  of  the  iron,  but, 
finding  that  the  purchaser  had  stopped  payment,  reloaded  it 
on  board  his  barge,  and  took  the  entire  shipment  to  his  own 
premises.  The  freight  had  not  been  paid  nor  tendered,  and, 
there  being  nothing  to  show  that  the  carrier  intended  to  part 
with  possession  without  the  payment  of  his  freight,  it  was 
held  that  he  still  had  possession  of  the  iron  and  that  the  con- 
signor had  a  right  to  stop  it  in  transitu.^^  "When  part  of  the 
iron  was  landed  upon  the  wharf,"  said  Bayley,  J.,  "  it  might 
more  properly  be  considered  as  in  a  course  of  delivery,  than 
as  actually  delivered.  By  placing  it  upon  the  wharf,  the  car- 
rier did  not  mean  to  assent  to  the  vendee's  taking  it  away 
without  paying  the  freight.  Besides,  a  carrier  has  a  lien  on 
the  entire  cargo,  for  his  whole  freight;  and,  until  the  amount 
is  either  tendered  or  paid,  the  special  property  which  he  has 
in  his  character  of  carrier  does  not  pass  out  of  him  to  the 
vendee,  unless,  indeed,  he  does  some  act  to  shew  that  he 
assents  to  the  vendee's  taking  possession  of  the  property 
before  the  freight  is  paid.  *  *  *  In  order  to  divest  the 
consignor's  right  to  stop  in  transitu,  there  ought  to  be  such 
a  delivery  to  the  consignee,  as  to  divest  the  carrier's  lien 
upon  the  whole  cargo." 

Tucker  v.  Humphrey,  4  Bing.  516;  Marks,    21    La.    Ann.    268,    99   Am. 

Lackington  V.  Atherton,  8  Scott  (N.  Dec.  725;  Kitchen  v.  Spear,  30  Vt. 

R.)  38.  545;   Tufts  v.   Sylvester,   79   Maine 

91  McFetridge  v.  Piper,  40  Iowa  213,  9  Atl.  357,  1  Am.  St.  303. 

627;  Alsberg  v.  Latta,  30  Iowa  442;  92  Crawshay  v.  Eades,  1  B.  &  C. 

Greve  v.  Dunham,  60  Iowa  108.  14  181,  2  D.  &  R.  288. 
N.   W.   130,   15   Rep.  232;   Blum   v. 


949  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  929 

§  928.  Transit  ends  when  consignee  claims  the  goods  and 
the  carrier  wrongfully  refuses  to  deliver  them. — But  the  tran- 

situs  is  at  an  end  when  the  consignee  has  claimed  the  goods, 
and  the  carrier  has  wrongfully  refused  to  deliver  them,  and 
has  thus  rendered  himself  liable  for  them  in  trover.^^  In 
Bird  V.  Brown  it  appeared  that,  upon  the  arrival  of  the  goods 
by  vessel  at  their  port  of  destination,  the  consignee  formally 
demanded  them  of  the  master,  and  tendered  the  freight,  but 
he  delivered  them  to  one  who  claimed  to  act  for  the  vendor. 
The  Court  of  Exchequer  held  that  the  master  could  not,  by 
wrongfully  detaining  the  goods,  prolong  the  transitus,  and 
so  extend  the  period  during  which  stoppage  might  be  made. 
"The  transitus,"  said  Rolfe,  B.,^^  "was  at  an  end  when  the 
goods  had  reached  the  port  of  destination,  and  when  the  con- 
signees, having  demanded  the  goods  and  tendered  the  amount 
of  the  freight,  would  have  taken  them  into  their  possession 
but  for  a  wrongful  delivery  of  them  to  other  parties." 

§  929.  Goods  still  in  transit  when  on  arrival  they  are  in 
the  hands  of  a  local  carrier. — Goods  are  still  in  transitu  after 
they  have  arrived  at  the  place  of  their  destination,  but  are  in 
the  hands  of  a  local  carrier  for  local  delivery.^^  "The  real 
and  indeed  the  only  question  in  all  these  cases  is,  whether 
the  transitus  is  over;  in  other  words,  whether  the  goods  have 
been  delivered  to  the  buyer:  if  they  have,  then  the  right  to 
stop  is  gone,  and  the  only  remedy  of  the  seller  is  by  action 
at  law,  or  by  proof  against  the  estate  of  the  buyer."^^     The 

93  Bird  V.  Brown,  4  Exch.  786;  Co.  v.  Painter,  15  Nebr.  394,  19  N. 
Walley  V.  Montgomery,  3  East  585;  W.  488;  Mason  v.  Wilson,  43  Ark. 
Davis  V.  McWhirter,  40  U.  C.  Q.  B.  172;  O'Neil  v.  Garrett,  6  Iowa  480; 
598;  Reynolds  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  Calahan  v.  Babcock,  21  Ohio  St. 
43  N.  H.  580.  281.  8  Am.  Rep.  63;  Reynolds  v.  B. 

94  4  Exch.  786,  797.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  43  N.  H.  580. 

95  White  V.  Mitchell,  38  Mich.  96  Eraser  v.  Witt,  L.  R.  7  Eq.  64, 
390;  Jackson  v.  Nichol,  5  Bing.  N.  69,  per  Lord  Romilly,  M.  R. 

Cas.   508;    Chicago,     B.     &    Q.     R. 


§    930  LIENS.  950 

vendor's  right  is  terminated  only  by  the  passage  of  the  goods 
into  the  actual  or  constructive  possession  of  the  vendee.^^ 

§  930.  Goods  in  quarantined  vessel  after  arrival  are  still  in 
transit. — Goods  are  in  transitu,  and  may  be  stopped  by  the 
vendor,  although  the  ship  has  arrived  at  the  port  of  destina- 
tion, but  has  been  ordered  out  for  quarantine,  and  it  does 
not  matter  that  the  assignee  of  the  bankrupt  purchaser  has 
taken  possession  of  the  goods  on  board  the  ship  while  she 
was  in  port.^^  In  the  case  cited  it  was  argued  that  the  con- 
signee had  a  right  to  go  out  to  sea  to  meet  the  ship;  but 
Lord  Kenyon  declared  that  this  argument  could  not  be  sup- 
ported,'as  it  might  go  the  length  of  saying  that  the  consignee 
might  meet  the  vessel  coming  out  of  the  port  from  whence 
she  had  been  consigned,  and  divest  the  consignor  of  the 
property  and  vest  it  in  himself, — a  position  which  could  not 
be  supported,  as  there  would  then  be  no  possibility  .of  any 
stoppage  in  transitu  at  all.®^  In  the  case  before  the  court  it 
was  held  that  the  vendor  stopped  the  goods  in  time  because 
the  voyage  was  not  completed  until  the  vessel  had  performed 
quarantine. 

§  931.  Effect  of  placing  goods  in  a  custom-house. — Goods 
are  in  transitu  after  they  have  been  placed  by  the  carrier  in 
the  custom-house,  or  government  storehouse,  to  await  the 
payment  of  duties.^  In  such  case  it  does  not  matter  that  the 
assignee  of  the  purchaser  has  demanded  possession  of  the 
goods  before  the  vendor  has  interposed  to  exercise  his  right 

9"  McFetridge  v.  Piper,  40  Iowa  ^  Northey  v.   Field,   2   Esp.   613; 

627;    Greve    v.    Dunham,    60    Iowa  Burnham    v.   Winsor,   5    Law   Rep. 

108,  14  N.  W.  130;  Halff  v.  Allyn,  507;    Parker    v.    Byrnes,    1    Lowell 

60  Tex.  278;  Chandler  v.  Fulton,  10  539,   Fed   Cas.   No.   10728;    Burr  v. 

Tex.  2,  13,  60  Am.  Dec.  188.  Wilson,  13  U.  C.  Q.  B.  478;  Lewis 

98  Hoist  V.  Pownal,  1  Esp.  240.  v.    Mason,    36    U.    C.    Q.    B.    590; 

99  See,  however,  dictum  of  Lord  Ascher  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  36 
Alvanley,  C.  J.,  in  Mills  v.  Ball,  2  U.  C  Q.  B.  609;  Wiley  v.  Smith,  1 
B.  &  P.  457,  461,  Ont.  App.   179;   Wilds  v.   Smith,  2 


951  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  932 

of  stoppage  in  transitu,^  if  the  assignee  has  only  made  de- 
mand and  has  not  taken  actual  possession;  nor  does  it  mat- 
ter that  the  vendee  has  paid  the  freight  and  given  his  note 
for  the  price  of  the  goods,  which,  in  consequence  of  the  loss 
of  the  invoice,  are  stored  in  the  custom-house,  and  there  re- 
main until  the  dishonor  of  the  note,  for  until  the  duties  are 
paid  the  goods  remain  in  custodia  legis.^  The  goods  are  still 
in  transitu  after  the  vessel  has  arrived  at  the  place  of  destina- 
tion, but  has  been  ordered  out  and  placed  in  quarantine. 

§  932.  Entry  of  goods  at  custom-house  without  the  pay- 
ment of  duties. — The  goods  are  in  the  legal  possession  of  the 
government  or  its  ofBcers,  and  have  not  come  to  the  posses- 
sion of  the  vendee  so  as  to  deprive  the  vendor  of  his  right.* 

So,  if  imported  goods  are  entered  at  a  custom-house 
by  the  vendee  at  the  port  of  entry  for  transportation  to  an 
interior  city  under  bond  to  be  delivered  to  the  collector  of 
customs  at  the  latter  place,  the  legal  custody  of  the  goods 
during  the  transit  is  in  the  government,  but  the  actual  pos- 
session is  in  the  carriers,  and  neither  the  vendee  nor  his 
agent  has  such  possession  as  will  defeat  the  vendor's  right 
of  stoppage  in  transitu.     "We  apprehend,"  said  Woodruff, 

Ont.  App.  8;  Mottram  v.  Heyer,  5  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  76;  Burnham  v. 
Denio  (N.  Y.)  629,  per  Walworth,  Winsor,  5  Law  Rep.  507.  Other- 
C;  Holbrook  v.  Vose,  6  Bosw.  (N.  wise  after  the  consignee  has  made 
Y.)  76,  104,  per  Woodruff,  J.;  In  re  a  warehouse  entry  at  the  custom- 
Beams,  18  N.  Bank  Reg.  500,  per  house,  and  taken  a  warehouse  re- 
Choate,  J.;  Hoover  v.  Tibbits,  13  ceipt  and  transferred  this  in  pledge. 
Wis.  79;  Newhall  v.  Vargas,  13  Cartwright  v.  Wilmerding,  24  N.  Y. 
Maine  93,  29  Am.  Dec.  489,  15  521;  Harris  v.  Pratt,  17  N.  Y.  249; 
Maine  314,  33  Am.  Dec.  617;  Do-  Fraschieris  v.  Henriques,  6  Abb. 
nath  V.  Broomhead,  7  Pa.  St.  301.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  251.    In  the  latter  case, 

2  Northey  v.  Field,  2  Esp.  613;  Judge  Barrett,  after  reviewing  the 
Hoist  V.  Pownal,  1  Esp.  240.  cases,  deduced  from  them  the  fol- 

3  Donath  v.  Broomhead,  7  Pa.  St.  lowing  rules:  "1.  Where  the  goods 
301.  are  removed  under  general  orders, 

4  Harris  v.  Pratt,  17  N.  Y.  249,  in  default  of  an  entry,  the  right  of 
262;  Mottram  v.  Heyer,  5  Denio  stoppage  in  transitu  is  not  termi- 
(N.  Y.)   629;   Holbrook  v.  Vose,  6  nated.   2.    Where  a  formal  entry  is 


§  933  LIENS.  952 

J.,^  "that  the  true  principle  upon  which  it  must  be  held  that 
the  entry  of  the  goods  and  their  being  held  by  the  govern- 
ment to  secure  the  payment  of  duties,  does  not  defeat  the 
vendor's  right  to  stop,  is,^  that  so  long  as  the  goods  are  in  the 
custody  of  the  government,  there  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  any 
reduction  of  the  goods  by  the  vendee,  to  his  own  possession. 
They  are  kept,  for  the  time  being,  from  reaching  such  pos- 
session. By  this,  of  course,  we  do  not  mean  that  enough  was 
not  done  by  the  vendors  to  perfect  tlie  contract  of  sale,  nor 
that  the  possession  of  the  carriers  was  not  for  many  pur- 
poses to  be  deemed  the  possession  of  the  actual  owners,  (the 
vendees,)  but  the  possession  of  the  carriers  was  a  possession 
for  the  purpose  of  transportation  to  the  vendees,  and  was 
subject  to  the  right  of  the  vendors  to  stop  the  goods,  if  those 
events  which  create  that  right  should  happen  while  the  goods 
were  in  course  of  such  transportation.  The  goods  had  not 
come  to  the  actual  possession  of  any  agent  of  the  vendees, 
for  the  purpose  of  disposal.  Nor  did  the  carriers  hold  them 
subject  to  the  directions  of  the  vendees  for  disposal,  nor  as 
a  deposit  in  a  warehouse,  subject  to  the  order  of  the  vendees 
for  disposal.  The  only  substantial  change  in  the  conditions 
of  the  goods  was,  that  they  were  placed  in  a  course  of  trans- 
mission to  the  vendees,  and  were  in  the  actual  possession  of 
a  middleman  for  that  purpose ;  and  it  may  be  stated,  as  a 
general  proposition,  that  a  delivery  of  goods  to  a  carrier  or 
other  agent  of  the  buyer  for  the  purpose  of  being  carried 
forward  to  the  buyer,  does  not  terminate  the  transit." 

§  933.  Transit  not  ended  by  storage  of  goods  in  govern- 
ment warehouse. — For  stronger  reasons  the  right  continues 
when  they  have  been  stored  in  a  government  warehouse  in 
the  name  of  the  seller,  so  that  it  is  impossible  for  the  con- 
made,  but  is  not  followed  up  by  regularly  bonded  and  warehoused, 
proper  bonding,  the  right  continues.  the  right  ceases." 
3.    But  where  there  is  a  perfect  en-  ■>  Holbrook  v.  Vose,  6  Bosw.  (N. 

try,   and   the   goods   are   thereupon      Y.)  76. 


953  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  933 

signee  to  get  them  without  the  written  consent  of  the 
former.^ 

The  mere  fact  that  goods  imported  from  abroad  upon  the 
order  of  a  buyer  have  come  into  the  hands  of  the  officers  of 
the  customs,  and  have  been  by  them  put  into  a  warehouse, 
does  not  determine  the  transit  though  the  buyer  has  paid 
freight  and  given  his  note  for  the  price  of  the  goodsJ 

It  has  been  held,  however,  that  a  vendee  has  constructive 
possession  of  goods  entered  by  him  at  a  custom-house  at  the 
place  of  their  destination  to  await  the  payment  of  duties.^ 
Whatever  possession  the  government  may  have  is  said  to  be 
under  the  owner,  and  to  be  at  most  but  a  qualified  or  special 
possession  for  the  purpose  of  securing  a  lien  by  way  of 
pledge.  The  goods  are  at  all  times  subject  to  the  order  of 
the  owner  upon  payment  of  duties  and  expenses,  and  upon 
the  payment  of  these  he  is  entitled  to  actual  possession.  He 
can  sell  them  subject  to  the  duties  and  expenses.  Although 
he  has  not  paid  the  duties  he  has  constructive  possession. 

6  In  In  re  Beams,  18  N.  Bank.  301;  Parker  v.  Byrnes,  1  Lowell  (U. 
Reg.  500,  502,  Judge  Choate,  deliv-  S.)  539,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  10728,  per 
ering  the  judgment,  said:  "The  Lowell,  J.;  Mottram  v.  Heyer,  1 
right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  de-  Denio  (N.  Y.)  483,  5  Denio  (N. 
pends  upon  the  fact  that  the  goods  Y.)  629;  Barrett  v.  Goddard,  3 
have  not  come  to  the  actual  or  con-  Mason  (U.  S.)  107,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
structive  possession  of  the  vendee,  1046,  doubted. 

and  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  ob-  s  Guilford  v.  Smith,  30  Vt.  49,  re- 

stacle    which    has    prevented    this  viewing  Mottram  v.  Heyer,  1  Denio 

should  be  one  that  was  purposely  (N.  Y.)  483.    In  Guilford  v.  Smith, 

interposed  by  the  vendor  for  this  30  Vt.  49,  Bennett,  J.,  remarks  that, 

purpose,   nor  that  it  was   one  ere-  in  Northey  v.  Field,  2  Esp.  613,  the 

ated  by  him  directly  or  indirectly.  possession  of  the  carrier  was  still 

If    the    existing    regulation    of    the  continued;  and  that  neither  in  this 

Treasury     Department     has     pre-  case  nor  in  Donath  v.  Broomhead, 

vented  that  possession  being  con-  7  Pa.  St.  301,  had  the   consignees 

summated,  the  nature  of  that  regu-  themselves    exercised    anj^    owner- 

lation  is  of  no  more  consequence  on  ship  over  the  property  by  entering 

this  question  than  the  nature  of  any  the  goods  at  the  custom-house.    But 

other    fact    or    accident    that    may  in  Mottram  v.  Heyer,  1  Denio  (N. 

have  led  to  the  same  result."  Y.)  483,  Walworth,  C.,  remarks  that 

7  Donath  v.  Broomhead,  7  Pa.  St.  the  entry  of  the  goods  by  the  ven- 


§  934  LIENS.  954 

§  934.  Customs  officer  is  not  a  middleman  after  consignee 
has  paid  the  duties. — After  the  consignee  has  paid  the  duties, 
or  given' a  bond  for  their  payment,  the  customs  officer  cannot 
be  considered  a  middleman,  so  that  the  consignor  could,  by 
notice  to  him,  stop  the  goods  in  transitu.^  "From  the  mo- 
ment the  collector  of  customs  receive  the  bond  of  the  vendee, 
there  was  as  complete  a  delivery  as  if  the  goods  had  been  de- 
livered into  his  own  hands.  The  collector  has  a  lien  on  the 
goods,  and  would  be  justified  in  detaining  them  until  it  is 
satisfied;  but  as  between  vendor  and  vendee  the  goods  were 
at  home,  and  constructively  in  the  possession  of  the  pur- 
chasers; the  customs  authorities  (subject  to  the  payment  of 
the  duties)  having  by  the  acceptance  of  the  bond  under- 
taken to  hold  them  for  the  use  of  the  purchaser,  and  subject 
to  such  sales  or  dispositions  as  he  might  choose  to  make."-^° 

§  935.  Goods  placed  in  a  warehouse  by  the  carrier  to' await 
consignee's  sending  for  them  are  still  in  transit. — Goods 
placed  by  the  carrier  in  a  warehouse  at  the  place  of  their 
destination,  to  await  the  consignee's  sending  for  them  and 
paying  the  freight,  are  still  in  transitu  while  in  the  ware- 
house, and  may  be  stopped  by  the  vendor.^^  And  so  goods 
placed  by  the  carrier  in  the  hands  of  any  other  depositary,  if 
not  designated  by  the  purchaser  as  his  agent,  nor  his  agent 

dee  without  payment  of  the  duties  375;  Covell  v.  Hitchcock,  23  Wend, 

is    not   a   termination   of   the   tran-  (N.   Y.)   611;   Calahan  v.   Babcock, 

situs.  21    Ohio   St.   281,  8  Am.   Rep.   63; 

9  Wiley  V.  Smith,  1  Ont.  App.  179,  Clapp  v.  Peck,  55  Iowa  270,  7  N. 
191,  overruling  Graham  v.  Smith,  27  W.  587;  Greve  v.  Dunham,  60  Iowa 
U.  C.  C.  P.  1;  and  Howell  V.Alport,  108,  14  N.  W.  130,  15  Rep.  232; 
12  U.  C.  C.  P.  375.  Wiley  v.  Smith,  Morris  v.  Shryock,  50  Miss.  590; 
1  Ont.  App.  179,  191,  is  followed  in  Symns  v.  Schotten,  35  Kans.  310, 
Wilds  v.  Smith,  2  Ont.  App.  8,  41  10  Pac.  828;  HalfT  v.  Allyn,  60  Tex. 
Q.  B.  136,  142.  278;  More  v.  Lott,  13  Nev.  376,  384; 

10  Wiley  v.  Smith,  1  Ont.  App.  McLean  v.  Breithaupt,  12  Ont.  App. 
179,  per  Burton,  J.  383. 

11  Edwards  v.  Brewer,  2  M.  &  W. 


955  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  936 

in  fact  to  receive  and  hold  the  goods  for  him,  are  still  in 
transitu. ^^  And  even  if  the  depositary  be  designated  by  the 
vendee,  he  may  still  be  the  agent  of  the  carrier  to  hold  the 
goods  for  the  purpose  of  collecting  freight  and  charges,  and 
in  that  case  the  goods  cannot  be  considered  as  in  the  hands 
of  the  vendee  so  as  to  defeat  the  right  of  the  vendor  to  stop 
them.  If  in  any  case  there  is  evidence  to  shov;^  that  the  ware- 
houseman received  the  goods  as  agent  of  the  carrier,  and 
held  them  as  such  at  the  time  the  vendor  asserted  his  right 
to  stop  them,  it  is  erroneous  to  instruct  the  jury  that,  if  the 
vendee  directed  that  the  goods  should  be  sent  to  that  ware- 
houseman, and  they  were  so  sent  in  pursuance  of  that  direc- 
tion, they  had  come  into  the  possession  of  the  vendee  so  as 
to  deprive  the  vendor  of  the  right  of  stoppage.  The  jury 
should  be  left  free  to  determine,  upon  all  the  evidence, 
whether  the  warehouseman  received  the  goods  as  the  agent 
of  the  carrier,  or  as  the  agent  of  the  vendee.*^ 

§  936.  Wharfinger  a  middleman. — A  wharfinger  to  whom 
a  carrier  has  delivered  goods  to  be  forwarded  to  the  con- 
signee at  another  place  is  a  middleman,  in  whose  hands  the 
goods  may  be  stopped  by  the  vendor.^*  A  trader  living  in 
the  country,  about  twenty-five  miles  from  Exeter,  ordered 
goods  from  London  to  be  sent  by  ship  via  Exeter.  On  their 
arrival  at  Exeter  a  wharfinger  received  them  on  the  trader's 
account,  and  paid  the  freight  and  charges;  and,  while  they 
remained  in  the  wharfinger's  possession,  the  trader  wrote  to 
the  vendor  informing  him  of  his  insolvency,  and  that  he 
should  not  take  the  goods.  The  vendor  thereupon  demanded 
the  goods  of  the  wharfinger;  and  it  was  held  that  he  had  a 
right  to  stop  them  in  the  wharfinger's  hands. '^^  Lord  Al- 
vanley,  C.  J.,  remarked  that  the  only  question  was,  whether 

12  Hoover  v.  Tibbits,  13  Wis.  79.      783;   Hoist  v.  Pownal,  1   Esp.  240; 

13  Hoover  v.  Tibbits,  13  Wis.  79.      Smith  v.  Goss,  1  Camp.  282;   Hunt 

14  Mills  V.   Ball,  2  B.   &  P.  457;      v.  Ward,  cited  3  T.  R.  467. 

Ex  parte  Barrow,  L.  R.  6  Ch.  Div.  i5  Mills  v.  Ball,  2  B.  &  P.  457. 


§  937  LIENS.  956 

the  goods  are  to  be  considered  as  having  been  in  the  hands 
of  a  middleman,  or  as  having  been  taken  in  the  possession 
of  the  person  for  v^hom  they  w^ere  ultimately  intended;  and 
he  was  of  opinion  that  the  wharfinger,  not  having  been  par- 
ticularly employed  by  the  vendee,  was  to  be  considered  as  a 
middleman.  The  other  judges  concurred;  Brooke,  J.,  say- 
ing that  the  consignee  did  nothing  to  take  possession  of  the 
goods  while  they  remained  with  the  wharfinger  before  the 
vendor  made  his  claim;  and  Charnbre  saying,  upon  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  goods  were  in  transitu,  that  they  were  di- 
rected to  be  sent  to  the  town  where  the  purchaser  lived,  and, 
having  been  carried  as  far  as  they  could  go  by  water,  they 
were  delivered  to  a  wharfinger  to  be  forwarded  to  the  pur- 
chaser. While  they  were  with  the  wharfinger  the  demand 
was  made,  no  act  having  been  done  to  shorten  the  journey. 
We  cannot,  therefore,  say  the  goods  were  not  in  transitu. 

§  937.  Goods  in  the  carrier's  car  at  destination  are  still  in 
transit. — Goods  carried  by  railroad  are  in  transitu  while  in  a 
car  at  their  place  of  destination  awaiting  delivery  to  the  con- 
signee. Thus,  a  car  containing  the  goods  consigned  was  set 
out  upon  a  side  track,  where,  according  to  custom,  the  goods 
were  to  be  taken  from  the  car  immediately  by  the  consignee, 
or,  if  not  so  taken,  were  liable  to  be  charged  a  certain  sum 
daily  for  demurrage.  There  was  no  agreement  or  under- 
standing between  the  carrier  and  the  consignee  that  the 
goods  should  be  held  by  the  former  as  warehouseman,  or  as 
agent  of  the  consignee.  A  truckman,  who  had  a  standing 
order  from  the  consignee  to  take  any  goods  he  might  find  at 
the  railroad  station  to  the  consignee's  store,  was  notified 
of  the  arrival  of  the  goods  by  an  agent  of  the  carrier; 
but  he  did  not  remove  them,  the  consignee  having  ab- 
sconded. The  goods,  while  so  situated,  were  attached  by 
a  creditor  of  the  consignee;  but  it  was  held  that  the  con- 
signor's right  of  stoppage  was  not  then  terminated,  and  that 


957  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  938 

he  might  maintain  trover  against  the  attaching  officer  for 
the  goods. ^^ 

Goods  carried  by  raih-oad  were,  upon  arrival  at  their  des- 
tination, set  aside  by  the  railroad  company  in  its  depot,  un- 
der an  agreement  made  by  it  with  the  consignee  that  the 
goods  should  be  sold,  and  the  proceeds  used  to  pay  past-due 
freights,  the  balance,  if  any,  to  go  to  the  consignee.  The 
consignee  did  not  receive  the  goods  and  turn  them  over  to 
the  railroad  company,  nor  did  he  assign  it  to  the  bill  of  lad- 
ing, nor  pay  the  freight.  While  the  goods  were  so  situated, 
the  consignor  sought  to  stop  them  in  transitu.  It  was  held 
that  no  delivery  had  taken  place  so  as  to  prevent  a  stoppage 
in  transitu. ^'^ 

§  938.  Transit  ends  when  the  vendees  take  possession  of 
the  goods. — After  the  vendee  has  once  taken  possession  of 
the  goods  and  exercised  dominion  over  them,  the  transit  is 
at  an  end,  though  for  a  special  purpose  they  come  again  into 
the  hands  of  the  vendor.  Thus,  goods  bought  for  exporta- 
tion were  sent  to  the  purchaser's  agent  to  be  forwarded,  and 
were  by  him  shipped  on  board  a  vessel,  but  were  afterwards 
relanded  and  sent  back  to  the  vendor  to  be  repacked.  While 
the  goods  were  in  the  vendor's  possession  for  this  purpose, 
the  purchaser  became  bankrupt.  It  was  held  that  the  transit 
had  been  determined,  and  that  the  vendor  acquired  no  new 
right  by  the  redelivery  to  hini.^^  In  delivering  judgment, 
Wilde,  J.,  said:  "The  goods  being  sold  on  credit,  and  the 
complete  property  and  possession  having  vested  in  the  ven- 
dee, they  become  his  absolutely,  without  any  lien  or  right  of 
the  vendors  attaching  to  them,  any  more  than  on  any  other 

16  Inslee  v.  Lane,  57  N.  H.  454.  i?  Macon   &   Western   R.    Co.   v. 

See,  also,  McFetridge  v.   Piper,  40  Meador,  65  Ga.  705. 

Iowa   627;    Greve    v.    Dunham,    60  is  Valpy  v.  Gibson,  4  C.  B.  837, 

Iowa  108,  14  N.  W.  130;  Seymour  865. 
V.  Newton,  105  Mass.  272,  275. 


§  939  LIENS.  958 

property  of  the  vendee;  and  their  delivery  to  the  defendants 
to  be  repacked  could  not  have  the  effect  of  creating-  a  lien  for 
the  price,  without  an  agreement  to  that  effect." 

A  delivery  of  the  goods  by  the  carrier  to  a  third  person 
upon  the  order  of  the  vendee  is  equivalent  to  a  delivery  to 
him,  and  terminates  the  right  of  the  vendor  to  stop  them.^^ 

§  939.  Rule  to  determine  what  constitutes  possession 
much  discussed. — What  constitutes  such  an  actual  or  con- 
structive possession  by  the  vendee  as  will  put  an  end  to  the 
transitus,  and  with  it  to  the  vendor's  right  to  stop  the  goods, 
has  frequently  been  a  matter  of  discussion  in  the  courts. 
Lord  Kenyon,  in  an  early  case,  said:^*^  "There  have  indeed 
been  cases  where  nice  distinctions  have  been  taken  on  the 
fact,  whether  the  goods  had  or  had  not  got  into  the  posses- 
sion of  the  vendee;  but  they  all  profess  to  go  on  the  ground 
of  the  goods  being  in  transitu,  when  they  were  stopped.  As 
to  the  necessity  of  the  goods  coming  to  the  'corporal  touch' 
of  the  bankrupt;  that  is  merely  a  figurative  expression,  and 
has  never  been  literally  adhered  to.  For  there  may  be  an 
actual  delivery  of  the  goods,  without  the  bankrupt's  seeing 
them;  as  a  delivery  of  the  key  of  the  vendor's  warehouse  to 
the  purchaser."  In  the  case  under  consideration,  goods  were 
sent  by  wagon  from  Shef^eld  to  the  buyer  in  London.  Part 
of  the  goods  were  brought  to  an  inn  in  London,  and  were 

19  Stevens  v.  Wheeler,  27   Barb.  to  Lord  Mansfield.  And  see  Wright 
(N.  Y.)  658.  V.  Lawes,  4  Esp.  82,  85,  where  Lord 

20  Ellis  V.  Hunt,  3  T.  R.  464,  467.  Kenyon  said:  "I  once  said,  that. 
In  Hunter  v.  Beale,  cited  in  the  to  confer  a  property  on  the  con- 
above  case  at  p.  466,  Lord  Mans-  signee,  a  corporal  touch  was  neces- 
field  is  said  to  have  used  the  ex-  sary.  I  wish  the  expression  had 
pression,  "they  must  have  come  to  never  been  used,  as  it  says  too 
the  corporal  touch  of  the  vendee,  much;  *  *  *  i^^^  ^ij  j-h^j.  jg  nec- 
otherwise  they  may  be  stopped  in  essary  is,  that  the  consignee  exer- 
transitu."  Lord  EUenborough,  in  cise  some  act  of  ownership  on  the 
Dixon  v.  Baldwen,  5  East  184,  also  property  consigned  to  him." 
disapproved  of  the  ruling  attributed 


959  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  940 

there  attached  by  a  creditor  of  the  buyer,  who  had  become 
a  bankrupt.  The  assignee  in  bankruptcy  went  to  the  inn 
where  the  goods  remained  under  attachment,  and  put  his 
mark  upon  them,  but  did  not  take  them  away.  It  was  held 
that  when  they  were  so  marked  they  were  delivered  to  the 
buyer  so  far  as  the  circumstances  of  the  case  would  permit, 
and  that  the  vendor  could  not  afterwards  stop  them. 

This  decision  is,  however,  called  in  question  by  Baron 
Parke,"^  who  said  it  appeared  very  doubtful  whether  an  act 
of  marking,  without  any  removal  from  the  possession  of  the 
carrier,  would  amount  to  a  constructive  possession.  In  the 
case  before  the  court,  it  appeared  that  a  cargo  of  timber 
having  arrived  at  its  port  of  destination,  the  agent  of  the  as- 
signees of  the  purchaser,  who  had  become  bankrupt,  went  on 
board  the  vessel  and  told  the  captain  he  had  come  to  take 
possession  of  the  cargo.  He  went  into  the  cabin,  into  which 
the  ends  of  timber  projected,  and  saw  and  touched  the  tim- 
ber. He  then  went  ashore,  and  the  vendor  shortly  after- 
wards served  a  notice  to  stop  the  cargo  in  transitu.  It  was 
held  that  no  actual  possession  was  taken  by  the  assignees, 
and  that,  as  the  master  did  not  undertake  to  hold  possession 
for  them,  they  had  not  taken  constructive  possession.  Al- 
though the  master  told  the  agent  he  would  deliver  the  cargo 
when  he  was  satisfied  about  the  freight,  this  was  no  more 
than  a  promise  to  fulfil  the  original  contract  and  deliver  in 
due  course  to  the  consignee.  His  relation  to  the  consignee 
was  not  changed. 

§  940.  Right  o£  vendee  to  constructive  possession  while 
goods  are  in  hands  of  carrier. — The  vendee  may  obtain  con- 
structive possession  of  the  goods  while  they  still  remain  in 
the  hands  of  the  carrier.^^    But  to  effect  such  a  possession  the 

21  Whitehead  v.  Anderson,  9  M.      Div.  68;   Reynolds  v.   B.   &  M.   R. 
&  W.  518,  535.  Co.,  43  N.  H.  580. 

22  Ex  parte  Cooper,  L.  R.  11  Ch. 


§    940  LIENS.      •  960 

carrier  must,  by  some  agreement  with  the  vendee,  express  or 
impHed,  change  his  relation  from  that  of  carrier  to  that  of 
agent  for  the  vendee;  he  must  expressly  or  impliedly  enter 
into  a  nev^  agreement  with  the  vendee,  distinct  from  the 
original  contract  for  carriage,  to  hold  the  goods  in  a  new 
character  as  his  agent,  and  subject  to  his  order.^^  "A  case  of 
constructive  possession,"  said  Baron  Parke,^^  "is,  where  the 
carrier  enters  expressly,  or  by  implication,  into  a  new  agree- 
ment, distinct  from  the  original  contract  for  carriage,  to  hold 
the  goods  for  the  consignee  as  his  agent,  not  for  the  purpose 
of  expediting  them  to  the  place  of  original  destination,  pur- 
suant to  that  contract,  but  in  a  new  character,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  custody  on  his  account,  and  subject  to  some  new  or 
further  order  to  be  given  to  him."  The  carrier  cannot  be- 
come the  buyer's  agent  without  the  buyer's  consent.  His  in- 
tention to  take  possession,  and  to  make  the  carrier  his  agent 
to  hold  the  goods,  is  a  material  fact.^^ 

There  is  an  exception  to  the  rule  that  the  transitus  con- 
tinues until  there  is  an  actual  delivery  to  the  consignee,  in 
case  the  carrier  by  agreement  with  him  becomes  his  agent 
to  keep  the  goods  on  storage  for  him  f^  and  such  an  agree- 
ment may  be  inferred  where  the  consignee  has  been  in  the 
habit  of  using  the  warehouse  of  the  carrier  or  wharfinger 
as  his  own.^"^ 

After  a  consignee  has  paid  the  freight  on  goods  carried  by 

23  James   v.    Griffin,   2   M.    &   W.  25  James   v.    Griffin,  2   M.    &   W. 

623;  Jackson  v.  Nichol,  5   Bing.  N.  623;  Whitehead  v.  Anderson,  9  M. 

C.    508;    Bolton    v.    Lancashire    &  &  W.  518,  529,  per  Parke,  B. 

Yorkshire    R.    Co..    L.    R.    1    C.    P.  26  Richardson  v.  Goss,  3  B.  &  P. 

431;    Donath  v.    Broomhead,   7  Pa.  119,  127;  Scott  v.  Pettit,  3  B.  &  P. 

St.   301;    McFetridg-e   v.    Piper,   40  469;   Rowe   v.    Pickford,    1    Moore 

Iowa    627;    Alsberg    v.    Latta,    30  C.  P.  526;  Morley  v.  Hay,  3  M.  & 

Iowa  442;  O'Neil  V.  Garrett,  6  Iowa  R.  396;  Allan  v.   Gripper,  2   C.   & 

480;  In  re  Foot,  11  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  J.  218;  Reynolds  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  Co., 

530.  43  N.  H.  580. 

2-1  Whitehead  v.  Anderson,  9  M.  27  Tucker  v.   Humphrey,  4  Bing. 

&  W.  518,  535;  Langstaff  v.  Stix,  64  516,  521;  Foster  v.  Frampton,  6  B. 

Miss.  171,  1  So.  97,  60  Am.  Rep.  49.  &  C.  107,  109. 


961  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  941 

railroad,  has  receipted  for  them,  and  left  them  at  the  depot  to 
be  called  for,  the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  is  at  an  end, 
and  the  agent  of  the  railroad  company  has  no  right  to  detain 
them  upon  afterwards  discovering,  upon  opening  his  mail, 
that  he  had  instructions  not  to  deliver  them.  The  railroad 
company,  in  holding  the  goods  till  they  should  be  sent  for, 
became  the  agent  of  the  purchaser.^^ 

§  941.  When  carrier  made  agent  of  consignee  transit  ends. 
— The  transitus  is  at  an  end  when  the  goods  have  arrived  at 
their  destination,  and  the  consignee  has  made  the  carrier 
his  own  agent  to  hold  them  upon  storage,  or  to  forward 
them  to  a  new  place  of  destination.^^  Thus,  where  a  pur- 
chaser of  several  hogsheads  of  sugar,  upon  notice  from  the 
carrier  of  their  arrival,  took  samples  from  them,  and  directed 
the  carrier  to  let  them  remain  in  his  warehouse  until  he 
should  receive  further  instructions,  it  was  held  that  the  tran- 
situs was  at  an  end.  The  purchaser  made  the  carrier  his 
agent,  and  used  his  warehouse  as  his  own.  The  carrier 
ceased  to  be  a  carrier,  and,  at  least  by  implication,  entered 
into  a  new  relation  distinct  from  the  contract  for  the  car- 
riage.^*^  Baron  Parke,  referring  to  this,  said  there  were  cir- 
cumstances which  indicated  an  agreement  on  the  part  of  the 
carrier  to  hold  the  goods  for  the  consignee  as  his  agent.  He 
remarked,  however  :^^  "It  appears  to  us  to  be  very  doubt- 
ful, whether  an  act  of  marking  or  taking  samples,  or  the  like, 
without  any  removal  from  the  possession  of  the  carrier, 
though  done  with  the  intention  to  take  possession,   would 

28  Langstafif  v.  Stix,  64  Miss.  171,  -'^  Foster  v.  Frampton,  6  B.  &  C. 
1  So.  97,  60  Am.  Rep.  49.  107.   It  appeared,  also,  that  the  pur- 

29  Foster  v.  Frampton,  6  B.  &  C.  chaser  was  in  the  habit  of  leaving 
107;  Richardson  v.  Goss,  3  B.  &  P.  goods  in  the  warehouse  of  the  car- 
119;  Scott  V.  Pettit,  3  B.  &  P.  469;  rier. 

Whitehead  v.  Anderson,  9  M.  &  W.  3i  Whitehead  v.  Anderson,  9  M., 

518.   534;    Tucker   v.    Humphrey,   4      &.  W.  518. 
Bing.    516;    Rowe    v.    Pickford,    1 
Moore  C.  P.  526. 

61 


§    94^  LIENS.  962 

amount  to  a  constructive  possession,  unless  accompanied 
with  such  circumstances  as  to  denote  that  the  carrier  was 
intended  to  keep,  and  assented  to  keep,  the  goods  in  the  na- 
ture of  an  agent  for  custody." 

§  942.  By  agreement  the  carrier  may  become  the  buyer's 
agent. — The  carrier  may  by  agreement  become  the  buyer's 
agent  to  keep  the  goods,  although  at  the  same  time  he  claims 
a  lien  upon  them  for  freight  and  charges.  Thus,  where  goods 
were  conveyed  by  a  carrier  by  water,  and  deposited  in  the 
carrier's  warehouse  for  the  convenience  of  the  buyer,  to  be 
delivered  out  as  he  should  want  them,  it  was  held  that  the 
transitus  was  at  an  end,  and  the  vendor's  right  to  stop  the 
goods  gone,  although  it  appeared  that  the  carrier  claimed  a 
lien  on  them.^-  Under  such  circumstances  it  is  immaterial 
wdiether  the  carrier  has  a  lien  or  not.  "The  payment  or  the 
nonpayment  of  the  charges  and  duties  may  have  some  bear- 
ing upon  the  character  of  the  possession  which  a  third  per- 
son may  have,  but  when  it  is  found  that  such  third  person 
has  the  custody  of  the  goods  to  keep  for  the  vendee,  and 
await  a  further  order  from  him,  the  nonpayment  of  freight 
or  duties  becomes  of  no  importance.  The  vendee  has  then 
a  constructive  possession,  subject  to  all  liens. "^^  In  other 
words,  although  the  fact  that  the  carrier  claims  a  lien  upon 
the  goods  for  unpaid  freight  raises  a  presumption  that  he 
continues  to  hold  the  goods  as  carrier,  yet  this  presumption 
may  be  rebutted ;  but,  to  overcome  this  presumption,  proof 
should  be  adduced  of  an  arrangement,  express  or  implied, 
between  the  buyer  and  the  carrier,  whereby  the  latter  be- 
comes the  buyer's  agent  to  keep  the  goods  for  him. 

In  a  case  where  the  purchaser  had  absconded  before  the 
arrival    of  the   goods   at   their  destination,    and   the   carrier 

32  Allan   V.    Gripper,   2   Cr.    &   J.  33  Guilford  v.  Smith,  30  Vt.  49,  72, 

218,  2  Tyrw.  217.  And  see  Foster  v.       per  Bennett,  J. 
Frampton,  6  B.   &  C.  107;   Oppen- 
heim  v.  Russell,  3  B.  &  P.  42. 


963  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  944 

stored  them  until  they  were  stopped  by  the  vendor,  it  was 
held  that  the  transit  was  not  ended,  and  that  the  carrier  did 
not  hold  the  goods  as  agent  of  the  purchaser,  because,  from 
the  circumstances  of  the  case,  he  could  never  have  consented 
to  such  an  arrangement.^* 

§  943.  Carrier's  consent  necessary  to  be  made  agent  of 
buyer. — On  the  other  hand  the  carrier  cannot,  without  his 
own  consent,  be  made  the  buyer's  agent  to  hold  the  goods 
after  their  arrival.  Thus,  upon  the  arrival  of  a  cargo  of  tim- 
ber at  the  port  of  destination,  the  assignee  of  the  vendee, 
who  had  become  bankrupt,  went  on  board  the  vessel  and  told 
the  captain  he  had  come  to  take  possession  of  the  cargo. 
The  captain  told  him  he  would  deliver  it  when  he  was  satis- 
fied about  his  freight.  Shortly  afterwards  the  vendor  stopped 
the  goods  in  transitu.  It  was  held  that,  as  there  was  no  con- 
tract by  the  master  to  hold  the  goods  as  the  agent  of  the  pur- 
chaser's assignees,  the  latter  had  not  obtained  constructive 
possession  of  them,  and  the  transitus  was  not  at  an  end  when 
the  vendor  exercised  his  right  of  stoppage.^^ 

§  944.  Transit  ends  when  goods  are  put  in  warehouse  used 
by  the  purchaser. — When  goods  are  placed  in  the  warehouse 
of  a  third  person,  which  the  purchaser  uses  as  his  own,  the 
transit  is  ordinarily  at  an  end.  This  is  the  case  although  the 
warehouseman  does  not  charge  any  rent,  if  he  has  previously 
been  in  the  habit  of  receiving  goods  for  the  purchaser  and 
holding  them  as  his  agent  until  he  should  take  them  away, 
or  give  further  orders  for  their  disposition.^^     The  fact  that 

34  Ex  parte  Barrow,  L.  R.  6  Ch.  G.  1080;  Richardson  v.  Goss,  3  B.  & 
Div.  783.  And  see,  also,  a  similar  P.  119;  Scott  v.  Pettit,  3  B.  &  P. 
case,  Crawshay  v.  Edes,  1  B.  &  C.  469;  Leeds  v.  Wright,  3  B.  &  P. 
181.  320;   Wiley  v.   Smith,   1   Ont.  App. 

35  Whitehead  v.  Anderson,  9  M.  179,  195,  per  Moss,  J.;  Hoover  v. 
&  W.  518.  Tibbits,  13  Wis.  79;  Frazer  v.  Hill- 

36  Dodson  V.  Wentworth,  4  M.  &  iard,  2  Strobh.  (S.  Car.)  309. 


§  945  LIENS.  9b4 

the  goods  have  reached  their  destination,  and  have  been 
placed  in  a  warehouse  w^ith  which  the  carriers  have  no  con- 
nection, but  is  substantially  the  purchaser's  warehouse,  is 
conclusive  that  a  delivery  has  been  made  to  him.  But,  while 
the  fact  that  the  warehouse  does  not  belong  to  the  carrier 
makes  it  more  certain  that  the  carrier  does  not  any  longer 
hold  them  as  carrier,  yet,  if  it  appear  by  an  agreement,  ex- 
press or  implied,  that  the  consignee  has  made  the  carrier's 
warehouse  his  own,  the  transit  is  equally  at  an  end.^^ 

If  the  goods  by  the  direction  of  the  purchaser  are  for- 
warded to  a  particular  warehouseman,  who  acts  as  the  agent 
of  the  purchaser  in  receiving  them,  the  transitus  is  at  an 
end.^^ 

If  goods  are  sold,  and  by  agreement  with  the  vendor  are 
stored  in  his  warehouse,  rent  free,  the  warehouse  of  the  ven- 
dor becomes  for  the  occasion  the  purchaser's  warehouse, 
and,  the  delivery  being  complete,  the  transit  is  ended,  and  the 
vendor  has  no  right  of  lien  or  stoppage.^^ 

§  945.  Goods  landed  at  wharf  and  freight  paid  usually  ends 
transit. — Goods  landed  at  a  wharf  belonging  to  a  third  per- 
son, at  which  the  vendee  usually  receives  goods  without 
charge  for  wharfage,  the  carrier  having  no  lien  on  them  for 
freight  or  charges,  are  not  subject  to  stoppage  in  transitu. 
In  such  case  the  possession  of  the  carrier  has  ceased;  the 
wharfinger  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  goods,  and,  unless  they 
are  to  be'  considered  as  being  in  the  possession  of  the  vendor, 
no  person  has  any  possession  of  them.'*" 

3"  Smith  V.  Hudson,  6  B.  &  S.  431.  "When  the  goods  were  landed  on 

3S  Hoover  v.  Tibbits,  13  Wis.  79,  the  wharf,  the  result  of  the  orig- 

per  Cole,  J.  inal  impulse,  impressed  upon  them 

39  Barrett  v.  Goddard,  3  Mason  by  the  vendor  in  transmitting  them 
(U.  S.)  107/,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  1046;  to  the  vendee,  was  accomplished. 
Frazer  v.  Hilliard,  2  Strobh.  (S.  They  would  go  no  farther  under 
Car.)  309.  that  impulse.   They  were  not  in  the 

40  Sawyer  v.  Joslin,  20  Vt.  172,  hands  of  a  middleman,  to  be  for- 
180,  49  Am.  Dec.  768.    Hall,  J.,  said:  warded    by    other    carriers.     The 


965 


SELLER  S  RIGHT  OF  STOPPAGE  IN  TRANSITU. 


946 


§  946.  Assignment  of  bill  of  lading  by  vendee  to  third  per- 
son for  value  defeats  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu. — The  as- 
signment of  the  bill  of  lading  or  other  document  of  title  by 
the  vendee  to  a  third  person  for  value  defeats  or  impairs  the 
vendor's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu. ^^  But  if  the  assignee 
of  the  bill  of  lading  takes  it  with  notice  of  the  vendee's  in- 


wharfinger  had  no  charge  of  them, 
and  could  not  therefore  be  a  mid- 
dleman; and  there  was  no  other 
person  standing  in  that  character. 
The  wharf,  in  the  language  of  the 
books,  became  the  warehouse  of 
the  vendee  for  the  reception  of  the 
goods,  and  must  consequently  be 
considered  the  place  contemplated 
by  the  consignor,  as  that  of  their 
ultimate  destination.  The  vendee 
could  not  have  remained  in  his 
store,  with  his  arms  folded,  ex- 
pecting the  goods  to  be  driven  up 
to  his  door.  He  must  have  looked 
for  them  at  the  wharf,  which,  for 
the  purposes  of  their  reception,  he 
had  made  his  own;  and  when  they 
arrived  there,  their  transitus,  so 
far  as  regarded  the  right  of  the 
vendor  to  stop  them,  must,  I  think, 
be  considered  as  ended." 

41  Lickbarrow  v.  Mason,  2  T.  R. 
63,  1  H.  Bl.  357,  5  T.  R.  683,  1 
Smith's  Lead.  Cas.  (8th  ed.)  753 ; 
Gurney  v.  Behrend,  3  El.  &  Bl.  622, 
637;  Castanola  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R. 
Co.,  24  Fed.  267;  Sheppard  v.  New- 
hall,  47  Fed.  468;  St.  Paul  Roller- 
Mill  Co.  V.  Great  Western  De- 
spatch Co.,  27  Fed.  434;  The 
Schooner  Mary  Ann  Guest.  1  Olc. 
Adm.  498,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  9197,  af- 
firmed 1  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  358,  Fed. 
Cas.  9196;  Conard  v.  Atlantic  Ins. 
Co.,  1  Pet.  (U.  S.)  386,  7  L.  ed.  189; 
Audenreid  v.   Randall,  3  Cliff.    (U. 


S.)  99,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  644;  Hal- 
liday  v.  Hamilton,  11  Wall. 
(U.  S.)  560;  Lee  v.  Kimball, 
45  Maine  172;  Walter  v.  Ross, 
2  Wash.  (U.  S.)  283,  Fed.  Cas. 
No.  17122;  Ryberg  v.  Snell,  2 
Wash.  (U.  S.)  294,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
12189;  Dows  v.  Greene,  24  N.  Y. 
638,  affg.  32  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  490; 
Dows  V.  Perrin,  16  N.  Y.  325; 
Rawls  V.  Deshler,  4  Abb.  App.  Dec. 
(N.  Y.)  12,  affg.  28  How.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  66;  Blossom  v.  Champion,  28 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  217;  Becker  v.  Hall- 
garten,  86  N.  Y.  167;  Jordan  v. 
James,  5  Ohio  88;  Curry  v.  Roul- 
stone,  2  Overt.  (Tenn.)  110,  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  3497;  First  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Pettit,  9  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  447.  In 
Georgia  it  is  provided  that  a  bona 
fide  assignee  of  the  bill  of  lading 
of  goods  for  a  valuable  considera- 
tion, and  without  notice  that  the 
same  were  unpaid  for  and  the  pur- 
chaser insolvent,  will  be  protected 
in  his  title  against  the  seller's 
right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.  Ga. 
Code  1911,  §  4133.  In  California, 
Montana,  North  Dakota,  Oklaho- 
ma and  South  Dakota,  it  is  pro- 
vided that  all  the  title  which  the 
first  holder  of  a  bill  of  lading  had 
passes  to  every  subsequent  in- 
dorsee in  good  faith  and  for  value 
in  the  ordinary  course  of  business, 
with  like  effect  and  in  like  man- 
ner as  in  the  case  of  a  bill  of  ex- 


946 


LIENS. 


966 


solvency,  the  vendor  has  the  same  right  of  stoppage  in  tran- 
situ against  the  assignee  that  he  had  against  the  vendee  him- 
self.^- Such  knowdedge  on  the  part  of  the  vendee  tends  to 
show  that  he  did  not  purchase  in  good  faith.  Mere  knowl- 
edge by  the  indorsee  that  the  goods  have  not  been  paid  for 
does  not  defeat  his  rights,  for  one  may  have  a  perfect  right 
to  buy  goods  of  one  who  has  not  paid  for  them.  He  is  only 
defeated  by  knowledge  of  circumstances  such  as  render  the 
bill  of  lading  not  fairly  and  honestly  assignable.*^ 

A  transfer  of  the  "duplicate"  bill  of  lading,  the  original  not 
being  accounted  for,  does  not  carry  with  it  necessarily  the 
title  to  the  goods ;  and  if  the  purchaser  had  notice  which 
should  have  put  him  upon  inquiry  for  the  original,  the  trans- 
fer does  not  defeat  the  right  of  the  seller  to  stop  the  goods  in 


change.  California:  Civ.  Code 
1906,  §  2127;  see  Newhall  v.  Cen- 
tral Pac.  R.  Co.,  51  Cal.  345;  Mon- 
tana: Civ.  Code  1895,  §  2831;  North 
Dakota:  Rev.  Code  1905,  §  5647; 
Oklahoma :  Comp.  Laws  1909, 
§  458;  South  Dakota:  Rev.  Codes 
(Civ.)  1903,  §  1552;  Sheppard  v. 
Newhall,  47  Fed.  468,  was  replevin 
by  the  shipper  of  goods  against 
one  to  whom  the  consignee  had, 
before  any  attempt  to  stop  them 
in  transit,  transferred  the  bill  of 
lading  as  security  for  advances. 
Plaintiff,  an  English  merchant, 
sold  the  goods  to  a  San  Francisco 
merchant,  shipping  them  by  three 
several  consignments  and  bills  of 
lading,  in  which  they  were  con- 
signed to  plaintiff's  agent  in  New 
York,  or  his  assigns,  and  to  which 
were  attached  plaintiff's  invoice, 
by  which  the  goods  were  con- 
signed to  the  purchaser.  To  these 
papers  the  agent  attached  a  no- 
tice to  the  purchaser  of  shipment 
to  him,  and  a  new  bill  of  lading  in 


which  he  was  the  assignee,  all  of 
which  papers  and  bills  of  lading 
were  delivered  to  the  purchaser, 
and  by  him  transferred  by  in- 
dorsement to  defendants,  except 
the  first,  which  was  not  indorsed, 
but  it  and  the  goods  described  in 
it  were  put  in  defendant's  posses- 
sion, upon  the  agreement  that  the 
proceeds  of  the  sale  of  such  goods 
should  be  applied  by  defendants 
toward  the  payment  of  their  ad- 
vances made  to  the  purchaser  on 
these  and  other  prior  transfers  o£ 
goods  and  bills  of  lading.  It  was 
held  that  defendants  were  the  law- 
ful holders  of  the  bills  of  lading, 
with  such  rights  as  the  possession 
of  them  and  of  the  goods  might 
confer,  and  that  the  vendor  could 
not  stop  the  goods  in  transitu. 

■12  Vertue  v.  Jewell,  4  Camp.  31 ; 
Loeb  V.  Peters,  63  Ala.  243,  35  Am. 
Rep.  17. 

43  Cuming  V.  Brown,  9  East  506; 
Salomons  v.  Nissen,  2  T.  R.  674, 
681. 


967  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  947 

transitu.'*^  But  mere  notice  to  the  indorsee  that  the  con- 
signee has  not  paid  for  the  goods  does  not  prevent  his  hold- 
ing them  under  the  bill  of  lading  as  against  the  consignor, 
unless  the  indorsee  also  knows  that  by  the  terms  of  the  sale 
the  vendor  is  entitled  to  receive  payment  from  the  consignee 
before  he  disposes  of  the  goods  or  assigns  the  bill  of  lad- 
ing.^'^  If,  for  instance,  the  goods  have  been  sold  on  credit, 
and  the  consignee  has  given  his  note  or  acceptance  for  the 
price,  and  this  is  not  due  at  the  time  he  assigns  the  bill  of 
lading  for  value,  his  knowledge  of  this  fact  does  not  make  it 
unfair  for  him  to  accept  an  assignment  of  the  bill  of  lading. 
In  such  a  case.  Lord  Ellenborough,  C.  J.,  said:^*'  "If  a  bill 
of  lading  should  be  held  by  us  not  assignable  under  these 
circumstances,  the  consequence  would  be  that  no  bill  of  lad- 
ing could  be  deemed  safely  assignable  before  the  goods  ar- 
rived, unless  the  assignee  of  the  bill  of  lading  was  perfectly 
assured  that  the  goods  were  paid  for  in  money,  or  paid  for 
in  account  between  the  parties,  which  is  the  same  thing:  a 
position  which  would  tend  to  overturn  the  general  practice 
and  course  of  dealing  of  the  commercial  world  on  this  sub- 
ject, and  which  is  warranted  as  we  conceive  by  no  decided 
case  on  the  subject." 

§  947.    Rule  where  instrument  is  not  strictly  a  bill  of  lading. 

■ — It  does  not  matter  that  the  instrument  is  not  strictly  a  bill 

44  Castanola  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  to    stop    them    if    the    vendee    be- 
Co.,  24  Fed.  267.  comes     insolvent.      It    would    not 

45  Cuming  v.  Brow^n,  9  East  506.  therefore  be  inequitable  to  hold 
This  qualification  of  the  rule  has  that,  with  such  knowledge,  and 
been  criticised  on  the  ground  that  knowledge  also  that  the  goods 
"where  there  has  been  no  deliv-  have  not  been  paid  for,  he  makes 
ery  of  the  goods,  and  the  trans-  his  advances  subject  to  the  ven- 
feree  acts  upon  the  faith  of  the  dor's  right,  and  does  so  volun- 
bill  of  lading,  he  necessarily  tarily  with  knowledge  of  all  the 
knows  that  the  goods  are  in  tran-  facts."  Holbrook  v.  Vose,  6  Bosw. 
sit,  and  that  if  not  paid  for  they  (N.  Y.)  Id,  109,  per  Woodruflf,  J. 
are   subject   to   the   vendor's    right  46  Cuming  v.  Brown,  9  East  506. 


§    94^  LIENS.  968 

of  lading,  if  it  be  substantially  such.^'''  But  if  the  instrument 
signed  by  the  carrier  be  a  mere  receipt  acknowledging  pos- 
session of  the  goods,  but  not  making  them  deliverable  to  any 
one,  it  being  madeiin  this  form  because  the  goods  were  being 
transported  in  bond  from  the  seaboard  to  the  collector  of 
customs  at  an  interior  city,  the  transfer  of  such  receipt  by 
the  consignee  does  not  have  the  effect  to  defeat  the  vendor's 
right  of  stoppage  during  such  transit. ^^ 

Advances  made  on  a  promise  to  procure  and  deliver  bills 
of  lading  are  not  made  on  the  faith  of  such  bills,  and  the 
lender  is  not  protected  as  against  the  vendor.'*^ 


g  948.    Assignee  for  creditors  not  a  purchaser  for  value.- 


§ 

If  the  bill  of  lading  be  assigned  in  trust  for  the  creditors  of 
the  insolvent  vendee,  such  assignee  is  not  a  purchaser  for 
value,  and  consequently  takes  subject  to  the  exercise  of  any 
right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  which  might  exist  against  the 
vendee  himeslf.^^ 

§  949.  Pre-existing  debt  a  valuable  consideration. — A  pre- 
existing debt  is  a  valuable  consideration  for  a  transfer  of  a 
bill  of  lading,  and  will  protect  the  transferee  from  a  subse- 
quent stoppage  in  transitu.^^  There  is  no  distinction  in  prin- 
ciple between  cases  relating  to  the  consideration  for  a  trans- 
fer of  a  bill  of  lading  and  cases  relating  to  the  consideration 
for  a  transfer  of  negotiable  paper. 

47  Rawls  V.  Deshler,  4  Abb.  App.  467,  476;  Arnold  v.  Delano,  4  Cush. 
Dec.  (N.  Y.)  12.  afifg.  28  How.  Pr.       (Mass.)  33,  50  Am.  Dec.  754. 

(N.  Y.)  66.  ''1  Leask  v.  Scott,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B. 

48  Holbrook  v.  Vose,  6  Bosw.  Div.  376  (dissenting  from  Rodger 
(N.  Y.)  76,  109.  V.  Comptoir  d'Escompte  de  Paris, 

49  Holbrook  v.  Vose.  6  Bosw.  L.  R.  2  P.  C.  393) ;  Clementson  v. 
(N.  Y.)  76,  104,  111;  Barnard  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  42  U.  C.  Q. 
Campbell.  65  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  286,  B.  263;  Lee  v.  Kimball,  45  Maine 
292,  afifd.  55  N.  Y.  456,  14  Am.  Rep.  172;  Sheppard  v.  Newhall,  47  Fed. 
289.  468.  revd.  54  Fed.  306,  4  C.   C.  A. 

50  Harris  v.  Pratt,  17  N.  Y.  249;  352. 
Stanton  v.  Eager,  16  Pick.  (Mass.) 


969  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  950 

But  by  some  courts  it  is  held  that  a  transfer  in  security  or 
in  payment  of  an  existing  indebtedness,  without  anything  ad- 
vanced, given  up,  or  lost,  on  the  part  of  the  transferee,  does 
not  constitute  such  an  assignment  as  will  preclude  the  vendor 
from  exercising  the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.^^ 

§  950.    Transfer  of  bill  of  lading  after  stoppage  in  transitu. 

■ — Whether  a  transfer  of  the  bill  of  lading  by  the  vendee,  after 
a  stoppage  in  transitu,  has  the  same  effect  as  such  a  transfer 
made  before  such  stoppage,  is  a  question  which  was  for  the 
first  time  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  California.  In 
that  case  the  bill  of  lading  which  the  vendor  sent  to  the  buyer 
was  indorsed  by  the  latter  for  advances  made  upon  it  in  good 
faith,  after  the  seller  had  given  notice  to  the  carrier  to  stop 
the  goods  in  transitu;  and  it  was  held  that  the  indorser  of  the 
bill  of  lading  was  entitled  to  the  goods  as  against  the  seller. 
Mr.  Justice  Crockett,  delivering  the  judgment  of  the  court, 
stated  very  clearly  the  grounds  of  the  decision,  saying  :^^ 
"The  vendor  has  voluntarily  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  ven- 
dee a  muniment  of  title,  clothing  him  with  the  apparent  own- 
ership of  the  goods ;  and  a  person  dealing  with  him  in  the 
usual  course  of  business,  who  takes  an  assignment  for  a  valu- 
able consideration,  without  notice  of  such  circumstances  as 
render  the  bill  of  lading  not  fairly  and  honestly  assignable, 
has  a  superior  equity  to  that  of  the  vendor  asserting  a  recent 
lien,  known,  perhaps,  only  to  himself  and  the  vendee.""*  These 
being  the  conditions  which  determine  and  control  the  rela- 
tive rights  of  the  vendor  and  assignee,  where  the  assignment 
is  made  before  the  notice  of  stoppage  is  given,  precisely  the 
same  principles,  in  my  opinion,  are  applicable  when  the  as- 

52  Lessasier  v.  The  Southwest-  only  in  states  where  bills  of  lad- 
ern,  2  Woods  (U.  S.)  35;  Loeb  v.  ing  are  made  negotiable,  for,  ordi- 
Peters,  63  Ala.  243,  35  Am.  Rep.  17.  narily.    an    indorser    can    give    no 

53  Newhall  v.  Cent.  Pac.  R.   Co.,  better  title  than  he  himself  has. 
51   Cal.  345,  350.  21   Am.  Rep.  713.  ^4  Brewster  v.  Sime,  42  Cal.  139. 
This    would    seem    to    hold    good 


§    951  LIENS.  970 

signment  is  made  after  the  carrier  is  notified  by  the  vendor. 
Notwithstanding  the  notice  to  the  carrier,  the  vendor's  hen 
continues  to  be  only  a  secret  trust  as  to  a  person,  who,  in  the 
language  of  Mr.  Benjamin,  in  his  work  on  Sales,  section 
eight  hundred  and  sixty-six,  takes  an  assignment  of  a  bill  of 
lading  'without  notice  of  such  circumstances  as  render  the 
bill  of  lading  not  fairly  and  honestly  assignable.'  The  law 
provides  no  method  by  which  third  persons  are  to  be  afifected 
with  constructive  notice  of  acts  transpiring  between  the  ven- 
dor and  the  carrier;  and  in  dealing  with  the  vendee,  whom 
the  vendor  has  invested  with  the  legal  title  and  apparent 
ownership  of  the  goods,  a  stranger,  advancing  his  money  on 
the  faith  of  this  apparently  good  title,  is  not  bound,  at  his 
peril,  to  ascertain  whether  possibly,  the  vendor  may  not  have 
notified  a  carrier — it  may  be  on  some  remote  portion  of  the 
route — that  the  goods  are  stopped  in  transitu.  If  a  person, 
taking  an  assignment  of  a  bill  of  lading,  is  to  encounter  these 
risks,  and  can  take  the  assignment  with  safety  only  after  he 
has  inquired  of  the  vendor,  and  of  every  carrier  through 
whose  hands  the  goods  are  to  come,  whether  a  notice  of 
stoppage  in  transition  has  been  given,  it  is  quite  certain  that 
prudent  persons  will  cease  to  advance  money  on  such  securi- 
ties, and  a  very  important  class  of  commercial  transactions 
w^ll  be  practically  abrogated." 

§  951.  Pledge  by  a  factor  or  agent. — By  the  common  law, 
a  consignee  who  was  a  mere  factor  or  agent  of  the  consignor 
could  only  defeat  the  latter's  rights  by  a  sale,  and  not  by  a 
pledge,  of  the  bill  of  lading.-^^  But  now%  under  the  factors' 
acts,  a  factor  or  agent  may  make  a  valid  pledge  of  a  bill  of 
lading  or  other  document  of  title,  which  operates  as  an  as- 
signment of  the  contract,  and  defeats  the  consignor's  rights.^^ 

55  Lickbarrow   v.    Mason,    1    Sm.  ''^  Thompson   v.    Dominy,    14   M. 

Lead.  Cas.  (8th  ed.)  753;  Walter  v.  &  W.  403;  Howard  v.  Shepherd,  9 

Ross,   2   Wash.    (U.    S.)    283,    Fed.  C.  B.  297. 
Cas.  No.  17122. 


971  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  953 

§  952.  Fraudulent  sale  of  the  bill  of  lading  will  not  affect 
right  of  stoppage. — An  apparent  sale  of  the  bill  of  lading, 
fraudulently  made,  for  goods  not  received,  for  the  purpose  of 
defeating  the  right  of  stoppage,  will  not  have  that  effect. ^^ 
The  fraudulent  assignee,  if  he  effectually  aids  the  original 
vendee  in  obtaining  possession  of  the  goods,  may  make  him- 
self personally  liable  for  the  loss  sustained  by  the  vendor.^* 

So,  if  the  bill  of  lading  has  been  obtained  from  the  con- 
signor by  fraud,  his  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  is  not  de- 
feated, either  as  against  his  immediate  indorsee,  or  as  against 
a  subsequent  indorser  for  value,  for  the  latter  can  obtain  no 
better  title  to  the  goods  than  his  indorser  had.^^ 

§  953.  Vendor's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  not  defeated 
by  transfer  of  bill  of  lading  as  security. — The  transfer  of  a  bill 
of  lading  as  security  does  not  absolutely  defeat  the  vendor's 
right  of  stoppage  in  transitu,  but  he  may  resume  possession 
of  the  goods  upon  satisfying  the  pledgee's  claim. ^"^  When 
the  vendor  has  done  this,  he  stands  exactly  in  the  same  po- 
sition as  to  everybody  else,  both  the  original  purchaser  and 
those  claiming  under  him,  as  if  there  had  never  been  any 
pledge  of  the  bill  of  lading.  His  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu 
covers  every  interest  in  the  goods  which  has  not  passed  by 
the  pledging  of  the  bill  of  lading.  The  vendor,  moreover, 
has  in  such  case  the  equitable  right  of  having  the  assets  mar- 
shalled; that  is,  the  pledgee  may  be  called  upon  to  exhaust 

57  Rosenthal  v.  Dessau,  11  Hun  573,  affg.  L.  R.  14  Ch.  Div.  446;  In 
(N.  Y.)  49;  Poole  v.  Houston  &  T.  re  Westzynthius,  5  B.  &  Ad.  817; 
C.  R.  Co.,  58  Tex.  134.  Berndtson  v.   Strang,   L.   R.  4   Eq. 

58  Poole  V.  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  481,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  588;  Spalding  v. 
Co.,  58  Tex.  134.  Ruding,    6    Beav.    376;    Turner    v. 

59  Gurney  v.  Behrend,  3  El.  &  Liverpool  Docks,  6  Ex.  543; 
BI.  622;  Dows  v.  Perrin,  16  N.  Y.  Chandler  v.  Fulton,  10  Tex.  2,  60 
325;  Decan  v.  Shipper,  35  Pa.  St.  Am.  Dec.  188;  and  see  Ex  parte 
239,  78  Am.  Dec.  334.  Golding,  L.  R.  13  Ch.  Div.  628. 

60  Kemp    V.    Falk,    7    App.    Cas. 


8  954  LIENS.  972 

any  other  securities  he  has  for  the  same  debt  before  pro- 
ceeding against  the  goods  claimed  by  the  unpaid  pledgor.^^ 
But  in  an  action  of  replevin  the  assignee  of  a  bill  of  lading, 
after  his  right  to  possession  of  the  goods  has  been  estab- 
lished, cannot  be  recjuired  to  render  an  account  of  advances 
and  of  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  the  goods,  with  a  view  of 
paying  plaintiff  the  surplus,  but  plaintiff  must  seek  his  rem- 
edy in  another  action.  If  a  plaintiff  in  such  action  fails  to 
establish  his  right  of  possession,  his  action  fails.  He  can  ask 
for  such  an  accounting  only  in  an  equitable  proceeding.^^ 

§  954.  Effect  of  transfer  of  bill  of  lading  in  pledge  on  right 
to  make  sale  that  will  defeat  the  vendor's  right  of  stoppage 
in  transitu. — After  the  purchaser  has  transferred  the  bill  of 
lading  in  pledge,  he  can  make  no  sale  that  will  discharge  the 
vendor's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu ;  for  he  can  transfer  no 
greater  or  better  title  than  he  has;  and  the  right  which  he 
has  is  a  right  subject  to  the  vendor's  right  of  stoppage  in 
transitu,  for  the  indorsement  of  the  bill  of  lading  transfers  the 
title  to  the  pledgee  and  not  to  any  other  person. ^^  A  sub- 
purchaser in  such  case  is  like  any  subpurchaser  without  a 
document  of  title;  he  has  no  greater  rights  than  the  original 
purchaser.  It  has  been  suggested  that  in  such  case  the  sub- 
purchaser, having  an  equitable  interest  in  the  goods  subject 
to  the  rights  of  the  pledgee  and  of  the  vendor,  might  come  in 
and  satisfy  the  claim  of  the  vendor  who  has  stopped  the  goods 
in  transitu,  after  paying  off  the  claim  of  the  pledgee. ^^ 

§  955.  Vendor's  right  not  defeated  by  indorsement  of  bill 
of  lading  by  vendee  to  his  factor. — The  fact  that  the  vendee 
has  indorsed  the  bill  of  lading  to  his  factor  does  not  impair 

61  Aldrich  v.  Cooper,  1  White  &  ^'■'^  Kemp    v.    Falk,    7    App.    Cas. 
Tudor's  Lead.  C.  in  Eq.  (7th  Eng.      573. 

ed.)  (1897)  36.  C4  Kemp    v.    Falk,    7    App.    Cas. 

62  Sheppard  v.   Newhall,  47  Fed.      573,  per  Lord  Selborne,  L.  C. 
468,   revd.  54  Fed.  306,  4  C.   C.  A. 

352. 


973  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  958 

the  vendor's  right  to  stop  the  goods  in  transitu  upon  the  in- 
solvency of  the  vendee,  provided  the  indorsement  w^as  not  in 
pledge,  though  the  vendee  is  indebted  to  the  factor  on  gen- 
eral account. ^'^ 

§  956.  Advances  made  on  bill  of  lading. — After  a  consignee 
has  made  advances  to  the  consignor  upon  the  bill  of  lading, 
the  latter  has  no  right  to  stop  them  in  transitu.'''^ 

§  957.  Vendor's  right  not  defeated  by  indorsement  of  bill 
of  lading. — The  indorsement  of  the  bill  of  lading  by  the  ven- 
dor to  the  vendee  does  not  affect  the  right  of  the  former  to 
stop  the  goods  in  transitu.*^"  This  does  not  amount  to  a  ne- 
gotiation of  the  bill  of  lading,  such  as  is  ordinarily  meant  by 
the  use  of  that  term  in  this  connection.  The  negotiation 
which  puts  an  end  to  the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  is  a  ne- 
gotiation by  the  vendee  to  a  third  person  for  a  valuable  con- 
sideration. 

§  958.  Delivery  order  given  by  vendor  to  vendee. — A  de- 
livery order  given  by  the  vendor  to  his  vendee,  and  trans- 
ferred by  the  latter  to  a  purchaser  from  him,  does  not  defeat 
the  vendor's  right  of  stoppage.''^ 

The  delivery  of  a  shipping  note,  with  an  order  on  a  ware- 
houseman to  deliver  the  goods  to  a  third  person,  does  not 
pass  the  property  in  the  goods  so  as  to  prevent  a  stoppage  in 
transitu. ®®  So  a  delivery  of  the  original  bill  of  parcels, 
in  which  the  vendor  acknowledges  he  has  received  the  price 

65  Patten  v.  Thompson,  5  M.  &  S.  ^^  The  Tigress,  32  L.  J.  Adm.  97, 
350.  See  Vertue  v.  Jewell,  4  Camp.      per  Dr.  Lushington. 

31,    where    it    is    asserted    that    the  cs  Jenkyns   v.    Usborne,    7   M.    & 

right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  does  G.   678,   680;    McEwan   v.    Smith,   2 

not   exist   in   case   the   shipment   is  H.      L.      Cas.     309;     Akerman     v. 

made  in   payment   of  a  balance   of  Humphrey,    1    Car.    &   P.   53;    Ives 

account.  v.  Polak,  14  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  411. 

66  Burritt    v.    Rench,    4    McLean  69  Akerman      v.      Humphrey,      1 
(U.  S.)  325,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  2201.  Car.  &  P.  53. 


§  959  LIENS.  974 

in  the  vendee's  notes,  secured  by  mortgage,  together  with  an 
order  for  the  delivery  of  the  goods,  does  not  protect  the  sub- 
purchaser in  his  title  against  the  vendor,  unless  the  subpur- 
chaser has  obtained  possession  of  the  goods.'" 

§  959.  Difference  between  warehouse  receipt  and  delivery 
order. — A  warehouse  receipt  differs  in  its  legal  effect  from 
a  delivery  order,  for  the  latter  is  not  binding  upon  the  ware- 
houseman until  he  has  accepted  it,  while  the  former  is  in  it- 
self a  document  of  title.  Of  late  years  the  factors'  acts  have 
generally  placed  such  receipts  upon  the  same  footing  as  bills 
of  lading,  as  being  documents  of  title,  conferring  upon  the 
holder  who  has  received  them  from  the  true  owner,  for  the 
purpose  of  enabling  him  to  dispose  of  the  property,  full  power 
to  sell  or  pledge  the  property  by  transferring  such  documents 
of  title. "^  A  factor  making  a  warehouse  entry  at  a  custom- 
house, and  taking  a  warehouse-keeper's  receipt,  which  en- 
ables him  to  withdraw  the  goods  at  his  pleasure  upon  dis- 
charging the  lien  for  government  duties,  is  regarded  as  in 
possession,  and  so  enabled  to  effectually  pledge  them.^- 

§  960.  Sale  of  goods  in  transitu  without  indorsement  of 
bill  of  lading. — A  mere  sale  of  goods  in  transitu,  without  in- 
dorsement of  the  bill  of  lading,  does  not  determine  the  tran- 
situs.""  It  has  even  been  said  that  a  transfer  of  the  bill  of 
lading  to  the  subpurchaser,  or  the  making  of  a  bill  of  lading 
in  his  name,  does  not  of  itself  destroy  the  right  of  the  vendor 

"0  Holbrook  v.  Vose,  6  Bosw.  (N.  worth  v.  Napier,  3  Caines  (N.  Y.) 

Y.)    76,    106.      If    the     vendor     has  182,  2  Am.  Dec.  268. 

given  a  bill  of  parcels  of  the  goods  '^i  Cartwright  v.  Wilmerding,  24 

sold,  together  with  an  order  on  a  N.  Y.  521. 

warehouseman   for   their   delivery,  "i^  Cartwright  v.   Wilmerding.  24 

and  the  vendee,  on  the  strength  of  N.  Y.  521.    This  he  might  do  irre- 

these,  sells  the  goods,  and  the  pur-  spective  of  the  factor's  act. 

chaser    from    him    fairly    obtains  "2  Kemp    v.    Falk,    7    App.    Cas. 

possession,   the   right  of   stoppage  573. 
in     transitu     is     gone.      Rollings- 


975 


SELLER  S  RIGHT  OF  STOPPAGE  IN  TRANSITU. 


§    960 


to  Stop  the  goods  in  transitu.  It  is  only  when  the  subpur- 
chaser has  taken  possession  of  the  goods,  or  changed  their 
destination,  or  paid  value  for  them,  that  the  right  of  stoppage 
in  transitu  is  affected  by  the  subsale.  If  the  vendor  has 
given  notice  to  stop  in  transitu  before  his  vendee  has  received 
the  purchase-money  from  the  subpurchaser,  the  vendor  is 
entitled  to  have  his  purchase-money  satisfied  out  of  the  un- 
paid purchase-money  of  the  subpurchaser.'^^ 

But  the  proposition,  that  a  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu 
can  be  exercised  as  against  the  purchase-money  payable  by  a 
subpurchaser  to  his  vendor,  was  called  in  question  by  Lord 
Selborne  in  the  House  of  Lords. '^     ''I  am  bound  to  say  that 


74  Ex  parte  Golding,  L.  R.  13  Ch. 
Div.  628,  638.  Cotton  L.  J.,  in  giv- 
ing his  opinion,  said:  "Except  so 
far  as  it  is  necessary  to  give  ef- 
fect to  interests  which  other  per- 
sons have  acquired  for  value,  the 
vendor  can  exercise  his  right  to 
stop  in  transitu.  It  has  been  de- 
cided that  he  can  do  so  when  the 
original  purchaser  has  dealt  with 
the  goods  by  way  of  pledge. 
Here  we  have  rather  the  converse 
of  that  case.  There  has  been  an 
absolute  sale  of  the  goods  by  the 
original  purchaser,  but  the  pur- 
chase-money has  not  been  paid. 
Can  the  vendor  make  effectual  his 
right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  with- 
out defeating  in  any  way  the  in- 
terest of  the  sub-purchaser?  In 
my  opinion  he  can.  He  san  say, 
'I  claim  a  right  to  retain  my  ven- 
dor's lien.  I  will  not  defeat  the 
right  of  the  sub-purchaser,  but 
what  I  can  claim  is  to  defeat  the 
right  of  the  purchaser  from  me, 
that  is,  to  intercept  the  purchase- 
money  which  he  will  get,  so  far 
as  is  necessary  to  pay  me.'    That, 


in  my  opinion,  he  is  entitled  to  do, 
not  in  any  way  thereby  interfer- 
ing with  the  rights  of  the  subpur- 
chaser, but  only,  as  against  his 
own  vendee,  asserting  his  right  to 
resume  his  vendor's  lien  and  to 
obtain  payment  by  means  of  an 
exercise  of  that  right;  interfering 
only  with  what  would  have  been  a 
benefit  to  the  vendee,  who  would 
otherwise  have  got  his  purchase- 
money  without  paying  for  the 
goods,  but  in  no  way  interfering 
with  any  right  acquired  by  the 
subpurchaser  of  the  goods."  See, 
also,  Craven  v.  Ryder,  6  Taunt. 
433;  Dixon  v.  Yates.  5  B.  &  Ad. 
313;  Davis  v.  Reynolds,  4  Camp. 
267;  Seymour  v.  Newton,  105 
Mass.  272.  275;  Secomb  v.  Nutt,  14 
B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  324;  Macon  & 
Western  R.  Co.  v.  Meador,  65  Ga. 
705 ;  Clapp  v.  Sohmer,  55  Iowa  273, 
7  N.  W.  639;  Pattison  v.  Culton, 
33  Ind.  240,  5  Am.  Rep.  199;  Hol- 
brook  V.  Vose,  6  Bosw.  (N.  Y.) 
76,  106. 

■^5  Kemp    V.    Falk,    7    App.    Cas. 
573,  587. 


§'961  LIENS.  976 

it  is  not  consistent  with  my  idea  of  the  right  of  stoppage  in 
transitu  that  it  should  apply  to  anything  except  to  the  goods 
which  are  in  transitu.  But  when  the  right  exists  as  against 
the  goods  which  are  in  transitu,  it  is  manifest  that  all  other 
persons  who  have,  subject  to  that  right,  any  equitable  inter- 
est in  those  goods  by  w'ay  of  contract  with  the  original  pur- 
chaser or  otherwise,  may  come  in,  and  if  they  satisfy  the 
claim  of  the  seller  who  has  stopped  the  goods  in  transitu, 
they  can  of  course  have  effect  given  to  their  rights;  and  I 
apprehend  that  a  court  of  justice,  in  administering  the  rights 
which  arise  in  actions  of  this  description,  would  very  often 
find  that  the  rights  of  all  parties  w^ere  properly  given  efifect 
to,  if  so  much  of  the  purchase-money  payable  by  the  sub- 
purchasers were  paid  to  the  original  vendor  as  might  be 
sufficient  to  discharge  his  claim;  and,  subject,  of  course,  to 
that,  the  other  contracts  would  take  effect  in  their  order  and 
in  their  priorities." 

^961.  Rule  where  original  vendor  has  notice  of  resale  of 
the  goods  by  his  vendee. — But  if  the  original  vendor  has  no- 
tice of  the  resale  of  the  goods  by  his  vendee,  and  consigns 
them  to  the  second  vendee,  his  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu 
is  gone.''^^  There  is  in  such  case  a  final  and  irrevocable  de- 
livery from  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the  carriage 
of  the  goods  to  the  second  purchaser. 

There  is  no  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  of  goods  shipped 
in  the  name  of  the  buyer  to  a  third  person  as  consignee.  The 
seller,  by  shipping  the  goods  in  this  way  and  taking  a  bill  of 
lading  in  the  buyer's  name  as  consignor,  recognizes  his  right 
to  control  the  goods  as  owner,  and  to  vest  the  title  of  the 
goods  in  the  consignee.'^" 

§  962.  Delivery  of  part  of  cargo  does  not  determine  right 
of  stoppage  of  whole  cargo. — The  delivery  of  a  part  of  a 

70  Eaton  v.  Cook,  32  Vt.  58.  ^7  Treadwell  v.  Aydlett,  9  Heisk. 

(Tenn.)  388. 


977  seller's  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.         §  962 

cargo  does  not  determine  the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu 
of  the  whole  cargo,  unless  the  circumstances  show  that  a  de- 
livery of  part  was  intended  to  have  that  effect.'^^  Lord 
Blackburn  well  expressed  the  law  upon  this  point  in  a  recent 
case  before  the  House  of  Lords  :^^  "It  is  said  that  the  de- 
livery of  a  part  is  a  delivery  of  the  whole.  It  may  be  a  de- 
livery of  the  whole.  In  agreeing  for  the  delivery  of  goods 
with  a  person  you  are  not  bound  to  take  an  actual  corporeal 
delivery  of  the  whole  in  order  to  constitute  such  a  delivery, 
and  it  may  very  well  be  that  the  delivery  of  a  part  of  the 
goods  is  sufficient  to  afford  strong  evidence  that  it  is  in- 
tended as  a  delivery  of  the  whole.  If  both  parties  intend  it 
as  a  delivery  of  the  whole,  then  it  is  a  delivery  of  the  whole; 
but  if  either  of  the  parties  does  not  intend  it  as  a  delivery 
of  the  whole,  if  either  of  them  dissents,  then  it  is  not  a  de- 
livery of  the  whole.  I  had  always  understood  the  law  upon 
that  point  to  have  been  an  agreed  law,  which  nobody  ever 
doubted  since  an  elaborate  judgment  in  Dixon  v,  Yates,^"  by 
Lord  Wensleydale,  who  was  then  Parke  J.  The  rule  I  had 
always  understood,  from  that  time  down  to  the  present,  to 
be  that  the  delivery  of  a  part  may  be  a  delivery  of  the  whole 
if  it  is  so  intended,  but  that  it  is  not  such  a  delivery  unless 
it  is  so  intended,  and  I  rather  think  that  the  onus  is  upon 
those  who  say  that  it  was  so  intended." 

The  same  rule  applies  in  case  of  a  stoppage  in  transitu  of 
a  portion  of  the  goods  after  the  delivery  of  another  portion. 
The  vendor's  lien  on  the  part  so  stopped  in  transitu  is  re- 

78  Turner  V.  Scovell,  14  M.  &  W.  Furniss,    17    Wend.    (N.    Y.)    504; 

28;   Slubey   v.    Heyward,   2   H.    Bl.  Secomb  v.  Nutt,  14  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 

504;    Hammond  v.   Anderson,  4   B.  324;  Hamburger  v.  Rodman,  9  Daly 

&   P.   69;    Betts   v.    Gibbins,  2  Ad.  (N.   Y.),  93;   In   re   Beams,    18   N. 

&    E.    57,    72>;    Miles   v.    Gorton,   2  Bank  Reg.  500. 

Cr.  &  M.  504;  Ex  parte  Gibbe,  L.  79  Kemp    v.    Falk,    7    App.    Cas. 

R.  1  Ch.  Div.  101;  Jones  v.  Jones,  573.  586,  afifg.  Ex  parte  Falk,  L.  R. 

8    M.     &    W.     431;     Crawshay    v.  14    Ch.    Div.    446. 

Eades,   1   B.  &  C.  181;   Buckley  v.  so  5  B.  &  Ad.  313,  339. 

62 


§    9^3  LIENS.  978 

Stored,  and  it  covers  not  only  the  price  of  such  part  of  the 
goods,  but  also  the  price  of  the  portion  already  delivered.^^ 

§  963.  Effect  of  notice  of  stoppage  after  part  of  goods 
delivered. — In  case  the  goods  are  resold  and  a  part  delivered 
when  the  notice  to  stop  in  transitu  is  given  by  the  vendor, 
though  the  vendor  loses  by  the  resale  the  right  to  stop  the 
goods  in  transitu,  he  is  entitled,  if  he  gives  that  which  would 
have  been  a  valid  notice  of  stoppage  in  transitu  had  there 
been  no  resale,  to  intercept,  to  the  extent  of  his  own  unpaid 
purchase-money,  so  much  of  the  subpurchaser's  purchase- 
money  as  remains  unpaid  by  him.^^ 

§  964.  By  the  resale  by  vendee  and  delivery  of  bill  of  lad- 
ing right  of  stoppage  ended.  After  a  vendee  has  resold  the 
goods  and  delivered  the  bill  of  lading  to  his  vendee,  the  right 
of  stoppage  in  transitu  by  the  original  vendor  is  gone,  be- 
cause the  last  purchaser  is  entitled  to  rely  upon  the  title  and 
possession  of  his  vendor  as  evidenced  by  his  holding  and  in- 
dorsing the  bill  of  lading.^-''  And  in  like  manner  one  purchas- 
ing from  a  vendee,  who  has  acquired  actual  possession  from 
the  carrier,  may  properly  rely  upon  such  possession,  if  the 
sale  be  made  in  good  faith  and  without  knowledge  of  any 
claim  to  their  possession  on  the  part  of  the  original  vendor. 
Thus,  if  goods  at  a  railroad  station  at  the  place  of  their  des- 
tination are  received  by  the  purchaser,  who  pays  the  freight 
and  thereupon  sells  and  delivers  them  to  another  while  they 
are  still  at  the  station,  the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  is 
gone.^'* 

81  Wentworth     v.     Outwaite,     10  17,  43;  Loeb  v.  Peters,  63  Ala.  243, 

M.  &  W.  436,  452,  per  Parke,  B.  35  Am.  Rep.  17;  Sheppard  v.  New- 

S2  Ex  parte    Falk,    L.    R.    14    Ch.  hall,  47  Fed.  468,  revd.  54  Fed.  306, 

Div.  446,  following  Ex  parte  Gold-  4  C.  C.  A.  352. 

ing,  L.  R.  13  Ch.   Div.  628.  s-*  United    States    Wind    Engine 

83  Newson   v.    Thornton,   6    East  Co.  v.   Oliver,   16   Nebr.  612. 


979 


SELLER  S  RIGHT  OF  STOPPAGE  IN  TRANSITU. 


§    965 


§  965.  The  right  of  stoppage  paramount  to  all  liens  against 
the  purchaser. — An  attachment  or  seizure  upon  execution  of 
the  goods  while  in  the  hands  of  the  carrier  by  another  cred- 
itor of  the  purchaser  as  his  property  does  not  defeat  the  sell- 
er's right  of  stoppage  in  transitu. ^^  Even  an  attachment  by 
the  holder  of  the  draft  drawn  by  the  seller  upon  the  buyer 
does  not  affect  the  seller's  right  to  stop  the  goods  in  transitu 
upon  the  insolvency  of  the  buyer. ^*^  But  an  attachment  of  the 
goods  by  the  vendor  as  the  property  of  the  vendee,  while  they 
are  in  the  course  of  transportation,  destroys  the  vendor's 
right  to  stop  them  in  transitu.^" 

The  goods  are  subject  to  attachment  at  the  suit  of  the  con- 


85  Smith  V.  Goss,  1  Camp.  N.  P. 
282;  Morley  v.  Hay,  3  M.  &  Ry. 
396;  Oppenheim  v.  Russell,  3  B. 
&  P.  42;  Jackson  v.  Nichol,  5 
Bing.  N.  Cas.  508,  518,  per  Tindal, 
C.  J.  Massachusetts:  Naylor  v. 
Dennie,  8  Pick.  (Mass.)  198.  19 
Am.  Dec.  319;  Seymour  v.  New- 
ton, 105  Mass.  272;  Durgy  Cement 
&  Umber  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  123 
Mass.  12.  New  York:  Buckley  v. 
Furniss,  15  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  137; 
Covell  V.  Hitchcock,  23  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  611.  Connecticut:  Aguirre 
V.  Parmelee,  22  Conn.  473.  Ne- 
braska: Chicago,  Burlington  & 
Quincy  R.  Co.  v.  Painter,  15 
Nebr.  394.  New  Hampshire :  Ins- 
lee  V.  Lane,  57  N.  H.  454.  Kan- 
sas :  Rucker  v.  Donovan,  13  Kans. 
251,  19  Am.  Rep.  84.  Mississippi: 
Morris  v.  Shryock,  50  Miss.  590. 
Missouri :  Schwabacher  v.  Kane, 
13  Mo.  App.  126.  Texas:  Chand- 
ler V.  Fulton,  10  Tex.  2,  60  Am. 
Dec.  188.  Tennessee:  Mississippi 
Mills  V.  Union  &  Planters'  Bank, 
9  Lea  (Tenn.)  314.  Contra,  Boyd 
V.    Mosley,    2    Swan    (Tenn.)    661. 


Pennsylvania:  Hays  v.  Mouille,  14 
Pa.  St.  48;  Pottinger  v.  Hecksher, 
2  Grant  Cas.  (Pa.)  309.  Ohio: 
Calahan  v.  Babcock,  21  Ohio  St. 
281,  8  Am.  Rep.  63;  Benedict  v. 
Schaettle,  12  Ohio  St.  515.  Mary- 
land :  O'Brien  v.  Norris,  16  Md. 
122,  n  Am.  Dec.  284.  Iowa:  Greve 
V.  Dunham,  60  Iowa  108,  14  N.  W. 
130;  O'Neil  v.  Garrett,  6  Iowa  480; 
Cox  v.  Burns,  1  Iowa  64.  Cali- 
fornia: Blackman  v.  Pierce,  23 
Cal.  508.  Kentucky:  Hause  v.  Jud- 
son,  4  Dana  (Ky.)  7,  11,  29  Am. 
Dec.  yil;  Wood  v.  Yeatman,  15  B. 
Alon.  (Ky.)  270.  Louisiana:  Blum  v. 
Marks,  21  La.  Ann.  268,  99  Am. 
Dec.  725.  North  Carolina :  Farrell 
v.  Richmond  &  Danville  R.  Co., 
102  N.  Car.  390,  9  S.  E.  302,  3  L. 
R.  A.  647,  11  Am.  St.  760.  Wis- 
consin :  Sherman  v.  Rugee,  55  Wis. 
346,  13  N.  W.  241,  14  Rep.  640. 

so  Seymour  v.  Newton,  1'05  Mass. 
272. 

8"  Woodrufif  v.  Noyes,  15  Conn. 
335;  Fox  v.  Willis,  60  Tex.  ZIZ; 
Ferguson  v.  Herring,  49  Tex.  126, 
129. 


§    965  LIENS.  980 

signer's  creditors  if  the  consignee  sustains  the  relation  of 
agent  or  factor  of  the  consignor,  so  that  the  latter  is  the 
owner  of  the  goods,  and  may  dispose  of  them  at  his  will.*^ 

The  vendor's  right  of  stoppage  is  paramount  to  a  lien  in 
favor  of  the  carrier,  v^'hen,  by  agreement  or  usage,  the  lien 
of  the  latter  is  extended  to  cover  a  general  balance  of  account 
due  from  the  consignee. ^^ 

88  Dickman  v.  Williams,  50  Miss.  ville  R.  Co.,  102  N.  Car.  .390,  9  S. 
500;  Sproule  v.  McNulty,  7  Mo.  62.      E.  302,  3  L.  R.  A.  647,   11  Am.  St. 

89  Farrell   v.    Richmond    &   Dan-      760. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 


WAREHOUSEMEN'S  AND        WHARFINGER'S    LIENS. 


Sec.  Sec. 

967.  A    warehouseman's    lien    is    a      974. 

common-law   lien. 

968.  Rule  in  some  states  as  to  lien 

on   goods   stored   but   not   in      975. 
a  warehouse. 

969.  Carrier   may    store   goods   re- 

fused by  consignee. 

970.  Warehouseman's       lien        for      976. 

freight  charges  paid  by  him.      977. 

971.  Authority     of     mortgagor    of 

chattels  to  charge  them  with 

lien  for  storage.  978. 

972.  Right    of    lienholder    to    add 

to  claim  amount  for  keeping      979. 
property. 

973.  Waiver    by   warehouseman   of      980. 

his   lien.  981. 


Delivery  of  part  of  the  goods 
not  defeating  lien  on  the  re- 
mainder for  whole  bill. 

Warehouseman's  or  wharfin- 
ger's lien  not  lost  because 
the  goods  have  a  fraudulent 
trade-mark. 

Enforcement. 

Important  distinction  between 
the  lien  of  a  warehouserrian 
and  that  of  a  wharfinger. 

The  lien  of  a  wharfinger  a 
general   lien. 

Right  of  wharfinger  to  lien 
not  inferred. 

Lien  reduced  to  a  specific  lien. 

Statutes  declaring  lien. 


§  967.     A  warehouseman's  lien  is  a  common-law  lien. — 

The  duties  of  a  warehouseman  are  similar  to  those  of  a  car- 
rier. The  latter  receives  goods  to  be  delivered  at  a  different 
place;  the  former  receives  them  to  deliver  at  a  different  time. 
Neither  the  carrier  nor  the  warehouseman  adds  anything  to 
the  intrinsic  value  of  the  property;  but  the  relative  value  to 
the  owner  is  increased  by  the  services  rendered,  either  by  the 
one  or  the  other,  else  the  owner  would  not  have  undertaken 
to  pay  for  them.^ 

A  warehouseman's  lien  at  common  law  has  generally  been 
regarded  as  a  specific  lien  for  the  charges  due  upon  the  par- 
ticular goods  that  have  been  stored,-  and  not  for  any  indeb- 


1  Steinman  v.  Wilkins,  7  Watts 
&  S.  (Pa.)  466,  42  Am.  Dec'  254, 
per  Gibson,  C.  J. 


2  Steinman   v.   Wilkins,   7  Watts 
&    S.    (Pa.)   466,  42  Am.   Dec.   254. 


981 


§  96; 


LIENS. 


982 


tedness  to  the  warehouseman  from  the  owner  disconnected 
with  the  charges  for  storage  of  the  particular  goods;  or,  in 
other  words,  that  he  has  no  Hen  for  a  balance  of  accounts  re- 
lating to  different  transactions  of  storage.  His  lien  is  gen- 
erally regarded  as  specific  upon  the  goods  stored  for  the  par- 
ticular charges  for  such  storage.^ 

A  warehouseman's  lien  may,  however,  be  made  a  general 
one  by  express  agreement,  and  possibly  by  an  agreement  im- 
plied from  a  well-established  custom,  or  from  the  circum- 
stances of  a  particular  case."* 

A  warehouseman's  lien,  as  defined  by  statute  in  some 
states,  is  a  general  lien.^ 


Warehouseman  cannot  have  lien 
for  salvage  for  goods  saved  from 
a  fire.  Savannah  Steam  Rice  Mill 
V.  Hull,  103  Ga.  831';  Richie  v. 
Brackett,   109  111.  App.  631. 

3  Scott  V.  Jester,  13  Ark.  437.  446. 
"Warehousemen  certainly  have 
not  a  general  lien  authorizing  a 
detention  of  goods,  not  only  for 
demands  arising  out  of  the  article 
retained,  but  for  a  balance  of  ac- 
counts relating  to  dealings  of 
a  like  nature."  Per  Scott,  J. 
Shingleur-Johnson  Co.  v.  Canton 
Cotton  Warehouse  Co.,  78  Miss. 
875,  29  So.  770,  84  Am.  St.  655; 
Kaufman  v.  Leonard,  139  Mich. 
104,   102  N.   W.  632 

•i  Holderness  v.  Collison,  1  Man. 
&  R.  55,  7  B.  &  C.  212. 

5  Stallman  v.  Kimberly,  121  N. 
Y.  393,  24  N.  E.  939,  31  N.  Y.  St. 
514,  affg.  53  Hun  (N.  Y.)  531,  24 
N.  Y.  St.  787,  23  Abb.  N.  Cas.  (N. 
Y.)  241,  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  706. 
O'Brien,  J.,  delivering  the  judg- 
ment in  the  Court  of  Appeals,  said 
that   at   common   law   it   seems    to 


have  been  a  matter  of  doubt 
whether  the  lien  was  specific  or 
general ;  and,  in  view  of  this  con- 
dition of  the  common  law,  and 
having  regard  to  the  words  of  the 
statute,  a  warehouseman  must  be 
regarded  as  having  a  general  lien. 
In  the  Supreme  Court,  Barrett,  J., 
said :  "The  fact  is,  warehousing 
has  become  an  immense  industry 
in  these  days,  and  the  act  is  noth- 
ing more  than  a  fair  recognition 
of  the  advance.  Formerly  the 
wharfinger  was  in  the  habit  of 
keeping  a  warehouse  on  his  wharf, 
and  the  warehousing  business 
was  a  sort  of  subsidiary  append- 
age thereto.  Now,  warehousing,  as 
an  independent  institution,  com- 
pletely dwarfs  the  wharfinger  ;  and 
it  would  be  the  height  of  absurdity 
to  retain  the  general  lien  in  the 
one  case  and  deny  it  in  the  other." 
Farrell  v.  Harlem  Terminal  Stor- 
age Warehouse  Co.,  70  Misc.  (N. 
Y.)  565,  127  N.  Y.  S.  306.  The  word 
"advances"  used  in  the  statute  does 
not  include  loans  to  the  owner  on 


983 


warehousemen's  and  wharfingers'  liens.     §  969 


§  968.  Rule  in  some  states  as  to  lien  on  goods  stored  but 
not  in  a  warehouse. — In  some  states  a  person  not  a  ware- 
honseman,  and  not  in  the  business  of  storing  goods,  has  no 
lien  on  goods  for  his  compensation  for  storing  them,  unless 
there  be  an  express  agreement  for  a  lien,  or  it  is  the  legal 
duty  of  one  to  receive  and  hold  the  goods. ^  A  mere  volun- 
teer, under  no  such  ol)ligation,  who  accepts  the  temporary 
custody  of  goods,  without  any  agreement  for  a  lien,  can  claim 
none  for  his  compensation." 

The  statutes  declaring  this  lien  generally  confer  it  upon 
any  person  who  stores  goods  at  the  request  of  the  owner. '^ 

§  969.     Carrier  may  store  goods  refused  by  consignee. — 

As  already  stated,  a  carrier  may  store  goods  which  tlie  con- 
signee neglects  or  recuses  to  receive,  and  create  a  lien  upon 
the  goods  for  such  storage,  or  he  may  himself  hold  them  as 
warehouseman  and  claim  a  lien  for  his  services  in  that  ca- 
pacity.    If  the  consignee  does  not  receive  the   goods  after 


the  security  of  the  goods.  Schwab 
V.  Oatman,  56  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  393, 
106  N.  Y.  S.  741.  One  keeping  a 
garage  has  no  warehouse  lien  on 
an  automobile  kept  at  the  garage 
but  which  the  owner  uses  at  his 
pleasure.  Laws  1897,  p.  533.  Smith 
V.  O'Brien,  46  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  325, 
94  N.  Y.  S.  673,  affg.  judgment  103 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  596,  92  N.  Y.  S. 
1146. 

6  New  York:  In  re  Kelly,  18 
Fed.  528;  Trust  v.  Pirsson.  1 
Hilton  (N.  Y.)  292;  Alt  v.  Weid- 
enberg,  6  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  Yld;  Ri- 
vara  v.  Ghio,  3  E.  D.  Smith  (N. 
Y.)  264.  So  declared  by  statute. 
Preston  v.  Neale,  12  Gray  (Mass.) 
222;  Whitlock  Mach.  Co.  v.  Hol- 
way,    92    Maine    414,    42    Atl.    799. 

"^  Rivara  v.  Ghio,  3  E.  D.  Smith 
(N.  Y.)  264,  per  Woodruff,  J.  Mer- 


ritt  V.  Peirano,  10  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  563,  42  N.  Y.  S.  97,  affd.  167 
N.  Y.  541,  60  N.  E.  1116. 

8  Where  a  bailee  ends  the  bail- 
ment and  places  the  bailed  chattel 
in  a  storage  warhouse,  the  ware- 
houseman has  no  lien  as  against 
the  real  owner.  Estey  Co.  v.  Dick, 
41  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  610  The  ostensi- 
ble owner  of  goods  in  Kentucky 
may  create  a  lien  on  them  in  fa- 
vor of  a  warehouseman  for  ad- 
vances when  the  warehouseman 
has  no  notice  that  the  consignor 
is  not  the  owner.  Sidwell  v.  Cin. 
Leaf  Tobacco  Warehouse  Co.,  23 
Ky.  L.  1501,  65  S.  W.  436.  A  land- 
lord giving  notice  can  have  a  lien 
for  storage  of  goods  of  tenant. 
Schneider  v.  Dayton,  111  Mich. 
396,  69  N    W.  829. 


§    97°  LIENS.  984 

notice  of  their  arrival,  the  carrier  may  subject  them  to  a 
warehouseman's  hen  without  notifying  either  the  consignor 
or  consignee  that  he  has  stored  the  goods.  "We  are  not 
aware,"  says  Devens,  ].,  in  a  recent  case,"  "that  it  has  ever 
been  held  to  be  the  duty  of  the  carrier  to  notify  the  owner  or 
consignor  of  goods  of  a  refusal  to  accept  them  before  he  can 
terminate  his  own  liability  as  a  carrier,  and  thereafter  hold 
them  himself,  or  transfer  them  to  another,  to  hold  as  a  ware- 
houseman. It  is  for  the  owner  or  consignor  of  goods  to  have 
some  one  at  the  place  of  delivery,  when  their  transit  is  com- 
pleted, to  accept  them.  If  he  does  not.  the  rule  which  im- 
poses a  duty  upon  the  carrier  to  hold  them  himself  as  ware- 
houseman, or  to  store  them  in  some  convenient  place,  suffi- 
ciently protects  the  goods  he  has  shipped.  It  would  be  un- 
reasonable that  the  carrier  should  not 'be  allowed  to  termi- 
nate his  contract  of  carriage  until  after  notice  to  the  con- 
signor and  subsequent  assent  by  him  to  the  storage  of  the 
goods.  The  assent  of  the  owner  or  consignor  of  goods  that  a 
lien  thereon  for  storage  shall,  under  certain  circumstances, 
be  created,  is  one  to  be  inferred  from  the  contract  of  ship- 
ment he  has  made.  If  his  consignee  cannot  be  found,  or,  be- 
ing found,  refuses  to  accept,  he  must  be  held  to  authorize  the 
storage  of  the  goods.  If  the  carrier  is  authorized  to  store 
them,  it  does  not  require  argument  to  show  that  he  may  sub- 
ject them  to  a  lien  for  the  necessary  storage  charges,  and  that 
the  owner  cannot  thereafter  sell  or  transfer  them  so  as  to 
divest  the  lien." 

§  970.  Warehouseman's  lien  for  freight  charges  paid  by 
him. — A  warehouseman  may  claim  a  lien  for  freight  charges 
he  has  paid  to  a  carrier  upon  goods  which  the  carrier  has 
placed  in  his  warehouse  upon  the  neglect  or  refusal  of  the 
consignee  to  receive  the  goods  upon   their  arrival   at   their 

9  Barker    v.    Brown,     138     Mass.    340,  343. 


985 


WAREHOUSEMEN  S    AND    WHARFINGERS     LIENS. 


971 


destination.^'^  In  sncli  case  the  warehouseman  really  acts  as 
the  agent  of  the  carrier,  both  in  holding  possession  of  the 
goods  and  in  collecting  the  freight  charges.  But  a  ware- 
houseman can  maintain  no  lien  for  freight  charges  advanced 
by  him  when  the  carrier  by  his  negligence  has  failed  to  ful- 
fil his  contract. ^^  If  the  goods  have  been  injured  by  the  car- 
rier, and  the  warehouseman  received  them  in  apparent  good 
order  without  knowledge  of  the  injury,  the  consignee  must 
look  to  the  carrier  for  his  damages,  and  cannot  offset  them 
in  an  action  by  the  warehouseman  for  carrier's  charges  paid 
by  him.^- 

§  971.  Authority  of  mortgagor  of  chattels  to  charge  them 
with  lien  for  storage. — A  mortgagor  of  chattels  has  no  au- 
thority, implied  from  his  being  allowed  to  remain  in  posses- 
sion, to  charge  them  with  a  lien  for  storage  as  against  a 
mortgagee  whose  mortgage  is  recorded. ^^  The  warehouse- 
man has  notice  of  the  mortgage  from  the  record,  and  there- 
fore he  is  not  at  liberty  to  assume  that  the  mortgagor  has  an 
absolute  jus  disponendi  from  his  possession  alone ;  and,  if 
storage  is  necessary,  he  is  chargeable  with  notice  that  the 
mortgagee  has  a  right  to  judge  for  himself  where  it  should 
be,  if  his  interest  is  to  be  charged  wnth  the  cost.^^     If  the 


10  Alden  v.  Carver,  13  Iowa  253. 
81  Am.  Dec.  430;  Bass  v.  Upton, 
1  Minn.  408  (Gil.  292);  Sage  v. 
Gittner,  11   Barb.   (N.  Y.)   120. 

11  Bass  V.  Upton,  1  Minn.  408 
(Gil.  .292). 

12  Sage  V.  Gittner,  11  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)    120. 

13  Storms  V.  Smith,  137  Alass. 
201. 

14  Storms  V.  Smith,  137  Mass. 
201,  per  Holmes,  J.  To  like  effect 
see  Baumann  v.  Post,  12  N.  Y. 
S.  213,  2(i  Abb.  N.  Cas.  134,  16  Daly 
(N.  Y.)  385,  34  N.  Y.  St.  308,  in 
which  Bookstaver,  J.,  said:  "Chat- 


tels are  not  like  mercantile  paper, 
bank-bills,  money,  etc.  The  mere 
possession  of  the  former  does  not 
import  assurance  of  title  or  au- 
thority to  dispose  of  them,  as  is 
the  case  with  the  latter.  There 
must  be  something  more  than 
mere  possession;  something  giv- 
ing such  possession  a  specific 
character,  indicative  of  authority 
or  control.  The  possession  in  this 
case  imported  no  more  to  the  ap- 
pellant than  it  would  have  done 
had  the  furniture  been  hired  with 
the  apartments,  or  loaned  to  the 
mortgagor.     If  the  mortgagor,  in- 


972 


LIENS. 


986 


mortgagee  is  afterwards  informed  of  the  storage  of  the 
mortgaged  goods,  but  is  not  informed  that  any  attempt  would 
be  made  to  charge  him  or  the  goods  with  the  storage  ex- 
penses, the  fact  that  he  expresses  no  disapproval  does  not 
render  him  liable  for  the  charges  for  storage. 


§  972.  Right  of  lienholder  to  add  to  claim  amount  for 
keeping  property. — A  person  who  has  a  lien  upon  a  chattel 
cannot  add  to  the  amount  a  charge  for  keeping  the  chattel 
till  the  debt  is  paid;  that  is,  in  truth,  a  charge  for  keeping 
it  for  his  owai  benefit,  not  for  the  benefit  of  the  owner  of  the 
chattel. ^-^ 

An  artificer  has  no  lien  upon  a  chattel  for  taking  care  of  it 
after  he  has  completed  his  work  upon  it,  and  while  he  detains 
it  to  enforce  his  lien.  "The  owner  of  the  chattel  can  hardly 
be  supposed  to  have  promised  to  pay  for  the  keeping  of  it 
while,  against  his  will,  he  is  deprived  of  the  use  of  it;  and 
there  seems  no  consideration  for  such  a  promise.  Then  the 
chattel  can  hardly  be  supposed  to  be  wrongfully  left  in  the 
possession  of  the  artificer,   when  the  owner  has  been  pre- 


stead  of  storing  the  property  af- 
ter default,  had  sold  it,  it  could 
not  be  contended  that  the  pur- 
chaser, although  honest  in  his  in- 
tentions, and  ignorant  of  the  mort- 
gage, would  have  acquired  any 
title  to  the  property  as  against 
the  respondent.  And  why?  Be- 
cause such  a  person  would  not 
have  been  a  purchaser  in  good 
faith  without  notice.  The  law  re- 
gards the  filing  of  the  mortgage 
as  notice  to  all  the  world,  and  he 
who  neglects  to  inquire  at  the 
proper  office  does  so  at  his  peril. 
If  this  is  true  of  a  purchaser  for 
value,  why  should  it  not  apply  to 
warehousemen?  .  .  Appellant  con- 
tends that  a  warehouseman's  lien 
is  analogous  to  that  of  a  common 


carrier  or  an  innkeeper,  but  he  is 
mistaken  in  this,  because  a  ware- 
houseman is  not  bound  to  receive 
every  article  offered  to  him  for 
storage.  He  has,  as  the  carrier 
and  innkeeper  have  not,  a  right 
of  selection  both  of  person  and  of 
property,  and  need  take  only  those 
goods,  and  from  such  persons,  as 
he  chooses ;  and  hence  there  is  no 
reason  why  he  should  not  take 
the  ordinary  precautions  that  oth- 
ers having  the  same  right  of 
choice  are  bound  to  do."  See  also, 
Brunswick-Balke-Collender  Co.  v. 
Alurphy,  89  Miss.  264,  42  So.  288. 
See  ante.  §§  691-697,  727,  744. 

15  Somes  v.  British  Empire  Ship- 
ping Co.,  8   H.   L.    Cases  338,   345. 


987  warehousemen's  and  wharfingers^  liens.     §  972 

vented  by  the  artificer  from  taking  possession  of  it  himself. 
If  such  a  claim  can  be  supported,  it  must  constitute  a  debt 
from  the  owner  to  the  artificer,  for  which  an  action  might  be 
maintained."-'*'  The  right  of  detaining  goods  on  which  there 
is  a  lien  is  a  remedy  which  is  to  be  enforced  by  the  act  of  the 
party  who  claims  the  lien,  and,  having  such  remedy,  he  is 
not  generally  at  common  law  allowed  the  costs  of  enforc- 
ing it. 

Where  a  purchaser  delivers  to  his  vendor  other  goods  to 
be  applied  to  the  price,  under  an  agreement  which  is  after- 
wards rescinded  by  mutual  consent,  the  vendor  is  not  en- 
titled to  a  lien  for  storage  of  the  goods  delivered  to  him.^" 

Accordingly  it  was  held  by  Lord  Ellenborough  that  a 
coachmaker,  after  having  repaired  a  coach,  could  not  claim 
any  lien  for  storage,  unless  there  was  an  express  contract  to 
that  effect,  or  unless  the  owner  left  the  property  on  the 
premises  beyond  a  reasonable  time,  and  after  notice  had  been 
given  him  to  remove  it.^-  And  so  wdiere  a  shipwright  re- 
paired a  ship  in  his  own  dock,  and  after  the  repairs  were 
completed  the  owner  was  not  prepared  to  pay  for  them,  and 
the  shipwright  gave  him  notice  that  he  should  detain  the 
ship  and  claim  a  certain  sum  per  day  for  the  use  of  the  dock 
during  the  detention,  it  was  held  by  the  Exchequer  Chamber, 
affirming  the  judgment  of  the  Queen's  Bench,  that  the  ship- 
wright had  no  lien  for  the  use  of  the  dock  during  the  deten- 
tion.19 

One  claiming  possession  of  goods  adversely  to  the  owner 
can  not  have  a  lien  upon  the  goods  for  money  paid  by  him 

10  British   Empire   Shipping  Co.  15   Daly   (N.  Y.)   532.  28  N.  Y.   St. 

V.   Somes,   El.,   Bl.   &   El.   353.   365,  884. 

367,  per  Lord  Campbell.  C.  J.,  af-  ^^  Hartley  v.  Hitchcock,  1'  Stark. 

firmed  in  House  of  Lords,  8  H.  L.  408. 

Cas.  338.  19  British    Empire    Shipping   Co. 

17  Shepard  v.  Rice.  8  N.  Y.  S.  472.  v.   Somes.   EL.    Bl.   &  El.  353. 


973 


LIENS. 


988 


for  their  storage.     The  owner  can  recover  in  an  action  of 
trover  without  tendering  the  rent  paid  for  their  storage.-" 

But  where  the  purchaser  of  swine  returned  them  to  the 
seller,  claiming  to  rescind  the  contract,  and  the  seller  after- 
wards obtained  a  judgment  for  the  price,  it  was  held  that 
he  had  a  lien  for  the  expense  of  keeping  the  swine,  because 
he  had  been  made  a  bailee  by  compulsion,  though  he  had 
lost  his  lien  as  vendor  by  obtaining  judgment  for  the  price. ^^ 

§  973.  Waiver  by  warehouseman  of  his  lien. — A  ware- 
houseman waives  his  lien  bv  claimins^  to  hold  the  sfoods  when 
demanded  of  him  upon  a  different  ground,  as  that  they  are 
his  own  property,  without  making  mention  of  his  lien.-- 

He  waives  his  lien  by  stating  to  an  officer,  who  is  about  to 
seize  the  goods  upon  legal  process,  that  he  has  no  charge 
against  them.-^ 

He  waives  his  lien  by  accepting  a  note  for  the  amount  due 
him  for  storage  and  delivering  the  goods ;  and  he  cannot  re- 
vive the  lien  by  again  taking  possession  of  the  goods.-'* 
And  so,  if  by  the  course  of  trade  the  wharfage  due  upon 
goods  is  not  due  until  Christmas  following  the  importation, 
whether  the  goods  are  removed  in  the  meantime  or  not, 
the  course  of  business,  which  amounts  to  an  agreement  be- 
tween the  parties,  prevents  the  wharfinger  from  maintaining 
his  lien.-^ 


20  Allen  V.  Ogden,  1  Wash.  (U. 
S.)    174,   Fed.   Cas.   No.  233. 

21  Leavy  v.  Kinsella,  39  Conn.  50. 

22  Boardman  v.  Sill,  1  Camp. 
410,  n.  A  warehouseman  does  not 
waive  his  lien  when  goods  in  his 
possession  are  sought  to  be  levied 
upon  and  the  warehouseman  re- 
fuses to  allow  the  goods  to  be  re- 
moved, by  merely  offering  to  act 
himself  as  keeper.  Robinson  v. 
Columbia  Spinning  Co.,  31  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  238,  52  N.  Y.  S.  751,  28 


Civ.  Proc.  R.  135,  6  N.  Y.  Ann.  Cas. 
112. 

23  Blackman  v.  Pierce,  23  Cal. 
508. 

24  Hale  V.  Barrett,  26  111.  195,  79 
Am.  Dec.  367;  Kaufman  v.  Leon- 
ard, 139  Mich.  104,  102  N.  W.  632. 

2j  Crawshay  v.  Homfray,  4  B.  & 
Aid.  50.  See  in  this  connection,  as 
to  the  effect  of  a  course  of  trade, 
Fisher  v.  Smith,  39  L.  T.  R.  430; 
Dunham  v.  Pettee,  1  Daly  (N.  Y.) 
112,    Seld.     Notes     154.     In     Craw- 


989 


warehousemen's  and  wharfingers'  liens,     §  974 


A  warehouseman  does  not  lost  his  lien  for  grain  actually 
stored  by  fraudulently  issuing  receipts  for  other  grain  not  in 
store. -^ 

A  warehouseman  does  not  waive  his  lien  for  storage  by 
giving  a  receipt  which  is  expressly  made  subject  to  such  lien 
and  charge  for  storage ;  but  he  waives  it  by  permitting  the 
purchaser  or  holder  of  such  receipt  to  remove  the  goods  with- 
out paying  the  charges  for  storage.  He  does  not,  however, 
forfeit  his  right  to  demand  the  amount  of  the  storage 
charges  as  a  personal  debt  of  the  holder  of  the  receipt.-' 
The  wrongful  sale  by  a  warehouseman  to  himself  to  foreclose 
a  lien  under  the  statute  is  no  waiver  of  the  lien.-^ 

§  974.  Delivery  of  part  of  the  goods  not  defeating  lien  on 
the  remainder  for  whole  bill. — A  warehouseman  may  deliver 
a  part  of  the  goods  and  retain  the  residue  for  the  price 
chargeable  on  all  the  goods  received  by  him  under  the  same 
bailment,  provided  the  ownership  of  the  whole  is  in  the  same 
person.  The  lien  attaches  to  the  whole  and  every  part  of 
the  goods  for  the  storage  of  the  whole,  if  the  goods  were  re- 
ceived tosrether  under  one  transaction.-'-^ 


shay  V.  Homfray,  4  B.  &  Aid. 
50,  Holroyd,  J.,  said:  "The 
principle  laid  down  in  Chase 
V.  Westmore,  Selw.  N.  P.  1322, 
where  all  the  cases  came  under 
the  consideration  of  the  court, 
was  this,  that  a  special  agreement 
did  not  of  itself  destroy  the  right 
to  retain;  but  that  it  did  so  only 
wher^  it  contained  some  term  in- 
consistent with  that  right.  Now 
if  by  such  agreement  the  party 
is  entitled  to  have  the  goods  im- 
mediately, and  the  payment  in  re- 
spect of  them  is  to  take  place  at 
a  future  time,  that  is  inconsistent 
with  the  right  to  retain  the  goods 
till   payment.     That  was   the   case 


here :  the  wharfage  was  not  pay- 
able till  Christmas,  and  by  the 
sale  the  plaintiffs  had  a  right  to 
an  immediate  delivery  of  the 
goods." 

2«  Low  V.  Martin,  18  111.  286.  A 
warehouseman  has  a  lien  as 
against  the  owner  of  stored 
goods  even  though  the  instrument 
is  valueless  as  a  statutory  ware- 
house receipt.  In  re  New  Glen- 
wood  Canning  Co.,  150  Iowa  696, 
130   N.   W.  800. 

2T  Cole  V.  Tyng,  24  111.  99,  Id 
Am.    Dec.   735. 

28  Ceroid  v.  Guttle,  106  111.  App. 
630. 

29  Schmidt    v.     Blood,    9    Wend. 


§  975  LIENS.  990 

§  975.  Warehouseman's  or  wharfinger's  lien  not  lost  be- 
cause the  goods  have  a  fraudulent  trade-mark.  A  wine 
merchant  brought  an  action  against  another  wine  merchant 
to  restrain  an  infringement  of  a  trade-mark  on  the  corks  of 
champagne  bottles.  Some  of  the  bottles  with  the  pirated 
trade-mark  were  in  the  possession  of  wharfingers  acting  for 
a  consignee,  and  the  wharfingers  were  made  defendants  in 
the  action.  In  their  statement  of  defense  they  disclaimed  all 
interest  in  the  matter,  and  submitted  to  act  as  the  court 
should  direct  upon  the  payment  of  their  costs.  They  con- 
tended at  the  trial  that  the  plaintiff,  if  he  should  establish  his 
right,  ought  not  to  touch  the  bottles,  for  the  purpose  of  re- 
moving the  branded  corks,  without  first  paying  their  ware- 
house charges.  It  was  held  that  the  wharfingers  had  a  prior 
lien  upon  the  bottles  for  their  charges,  and  that,  if  the  plain- 
tiff had  any  lien  for  his  costs,  this  must  be  postponed  to  the 
wdiarfingers'  lien.  There  was  nothing  to  deprive  them  of 
their  lien  as  wharfingers  because  the  corks  in  the  champagne 
bottles  had  fraudulent  'marks  which  they  knew  nothing 
about. ^*^  "The  lien  of  the  wharfinger  is,  I  assume,"  said  Lord 
Justice  Cotton,  "only  as  against  the  bottles  and  wine  when 
the  fraudulent  corks  have  been  removed,  but  I  can  not  see 
any  possible  ground,  when  those  have  been  removed,  for 
saying  that  their  lien  for  warehouse  expenses  loses  any  pri- 
ority that  it  before  had,  and  which  was  a  first  charge  against 
these  goods." 

§  976.  Enforcement. — A  warehoiiseman's  lien,  like  other 
common-law  liens,  confers  no  right  to  sell  the  property  to 
wdiich  the  lien  attaches,  but  only  a  right  to  hold  it  till  his 

(N.    Y.)    268,    24     Am.     Dec.     143;  N.    W.    R.    Co..    108    111.    App.   520, 

Steinman    v.    Wilkins,    7  Watts    &  affd.    207    111.     199,    69    N.    E.    825. 

S.   (Pa.)  466,  42  Am.  Dec.  254.  And  ^o  Moet    v.    Pickering,     L.     R.    8 

see    Blake    v.    Nicholson,   3    M.    &  Ch.     Div.    Z12,    rev.     L.    R.    6    Ch. 

S.    167;    Morgan  v.   Congdon,  4   N.  Div.      770,      where      Mr.      Justice 

Y.  552;   Schumacher  v.   Chicago  &  Fry  held   that   the  plaintiff  had  a 


991 


WAREHOUSEMEN  S    AND    WHARFINGERS     LIENS. 


976 


charges  are  paid.''^^  In  most  of  the  states,  however,  a  remedy 
by  sale  is  provided  by  statute.  Only  in  a  few  states  are  there 
any  statutes  expressly  enacted  for  the  purpose  of  providing  a 
remedy  for  the  enforcement  of  warehousemen's  liens;'-  but 
in  quite  a  number  of  states  there  are  statutes  applicable  to 
the  enforcement  of  all  common-law  liens;  and  in  other  states 
the  statutes  which  provide  for  the  sale  of  unclaimed  goods 


lien  for  the  costs  of  his  action  in 
priority  to  the  lien  of  the  whar- 
finger  for   his   charges. 

31  Where  an  attachment  against 
goods  stored  in  a  warehouse  is  re- 
leased, the  owner  cannot  replevy 
them  until  he  has  paid  reasonable 
storage  charges.  Case  Plow 
Works  V.  Union  Iron  Works,  56 
Mo.  App.  1.  See  also,  Marks  v. 
New  Orleans  Cold  Storage  Co., 
107  La.  172,  31  So.  671,  57  L.  R. 
A.  271,  90  Am.  St.  285.  The 
warehouseman  cannot,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  contract  to  that  effect, 
sell  goods  stored  with  him  until 
the  maturity  of  the  debt.  Whig- 
ham  V.  Fountain,  132  Ga.  277,  63 
S.  E.  1115.  Warehouseman  is  en- 
titled to  hold  possession  of  mort- 
gaged goods  for  his  charges  until 
he  is  paid.  Industrial  Loan  Assn. 
V.  Saul,  34  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  188,  68 
N.  Y.  S.  837;  Reidenback  v.  Tuck, 
85  N.  Y.  S.  352.     See  ante,  §  335. 

32  In  Alabama  it  is  provided 
that  warehousemen,  to  whom 
goods  are  delivered  by  a  common 
carrier,  may  advertise  and  sell  for 
the  same  purposes  and  in  the 
same  manner  as  common  carriers 
are  authorized  to  do.  Civ.  Code 
1907,  §§  6138-6141.  See  ante,  §  339. 
In  the  District  of  Columbia  the 
warehouseman  has  a  right  to  en- 
force  his   lien   by   sale,   but   to   do 


so  he  must  follow  the  provisions 
of  the  statute.  Code  1901,  §  1619. 
See  also.  Van  Buren  Storage  & 
Van  Co.  V.  Mann,  139  111.  App.  652, 
as  to  rule  in  Illinois.  In 
Indiana,  any  forwarding  and 
commission  merchant,  having  a 
lien  upon  goods  which  may  have 
remained  in  store  for  one  year  or 
more,  may  proceed  to  advertise 
and  sell,  at  public  auction,  so 
much  thereof  as  may  be  necessary 
to  pay  the  amount  of  the  lien  and 
expenses.  Burns'  Ann.  Stat.  1914, 
§  8315.  Property  left  in  storage 
is  only  subject  to  a  lien  of  the 
keeper  for  his  charges.  Pibble  v. 
Kent,  10  Ind.  325,  71  Am.  Dec.  327. 
In  Kentucky,  a  warehouseman 
whose  charges  have  not  been  paid 
for  twelve  months  upon  goods  in 
his  care  may  sell  such  property, 
or  enough  thereof  to  pay  his 
charges,  at  public  sale  at  the 
warehouse  door.  Stats.  1909, 
§  4778.  As  to  Montana,  see  post, 
981.  In  South  Carolina,  it  is  provid- 
ed that  a  warehouseman  in  pos- 
session of  any  property,  by  virtue 
of  any  agreement  or  warehouse 
receipt,  having  claims  for  storage, 
at  least  one  year  overdue,  may 
proceed  to  sell  the  same  at  public 
auction,  but  no  sale  may  be  made 
imtil  after  the  giving  of  a  written 
or  printed  notice  of  such   sale  to 


§  977  LIENS.  992 

are  expressly  made  applicable  to  goods  in  the  hands  of  ware- 
housemen.^^ 

§  977.  Important  distinction  between  the  lien  of  a  ware- 
houseman and  that  of  a  wharfinger. — The  lien  of  a  ware- 
houseman is  a  common-law  lien;  while  that  of  a  wharfinger 
is  a  commercial  or  customary  lien.  The  lien  of  a  warehouse- 
man is  specific,  not  general.  A  wharfinger's  lien,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  general."^  "There  is  a  well-known  distinc- 
tion," says  Chief  Justice  Gibson, ^'^  between  a  commercial 
lien,  which  is  the  creature  of  usage,  and  a  common-law  lien, 
wdiich  is  the  creature  of  policy.  The  first  gives  a  right  to  re- 
tain for  a  balance  of  accounts;  the  second,  for  services  per- 
formed in  relation  to  the  particular  property.  Commercial 
or  general  liens,  which  have  not  been  fastened  on  the  law 
merchant  by  inveterate  usage,  are  discountenanced  by  the 
courts  as  encroachments  on  the  common  law." 

Considered  as  a  new  question  and  upon  general  principles, 
there  seems  to  be  no  reasonable  foundation  for  this  distinc- 
tion between  the  lien  of  a  warehouseman  and  that  of  a  whar- 
fi.nger.  Upon  general  principles  it  would  seem  that  in  both 
cases  the  lien  should  be  a  specific  lien  on  the  goods  for  the 
storage  or  wharfage.  The  lien,  perhaps,  should  not  be  based 
upon  the  ground  that  the  property  had  been  given  an  addi- 

the    person    or    persons    in    whose  sota,     Mississippi,     Missouri,     Ne- 

name  such  goods  were  stored,  re-  vada,      Ohio,      Oregon,      Vermont, 

quiring   him    or    them    to    pay    the  Washington,  and   Wisconsin.     See 

amount    due    for    storage.     If    not  statutes    referred    to     in     note    to 

paid   the    warehouseman    may   sell  §   336. 

the    same    at    the    time    and    place  ^'^  Rex   v.    Humphery,    1    McClel. 

specified  in  the  notice.     Code  1912,  &  Y.  173. 

§  2595.    As  to  Wisconsin,  see  post,  ^.j  Steinman  v.  Wilkins,  7  Watts 

§    1060c.      As    to    Utah,    see    post,  &  S.  (Pa.)  466,  42  Am.  Dec.  254.  The 

§  981.  learned  chief  justice  criticises  the 

33  As  in  Alaska,  California,  Col-  position   taken   by    Baron   Graham 

orado,        Connecticut,       Delaware,  in    Rex    v.    Humphery,    1    McClel. 

Florida,      Idaho,      Illinois,      Iowa,  &    Y.    194,    that     a     warehouseman 

Kansas,    Maine,   Michigan,   Minne-  has  a  general  lien. 


993  warehousemen's  and  wharfingers'  liens.     §  978 

tional  value,  though  there  is  very  much  the  same  reason  for 
saying  that  the  property  has  been  given  an  additional  value, 
by  keeping  it  in  a  warehouse,  as  there  is  in  the  case  of  a  car- 
rier for  saying  that  the  goods  have  been  improved  by  car- 
riage to  a  different  place;  but  the  lien  may  perhaps  be  placed 
upon  the  broader  ground  that  care  and  labor  have  been  ex- 
pended upon  goods  at  the  request  of  the  owner. 

A  wharfinger's  lien  is  likened  to  that  of  a  factor,  and  a 
warehouseman's  lien  to  that  of  a  carrier.  The  likeness  in  the 
former  case  may  have  arisen  from  the  custom  of  wharfingers 
in  earlier  times  to  make  advances  upon  the  goods. 

§  978.  The  lien  of  a  wharfinger  a  general  lien. — That  a 
wharfinger's  lien  is  a  general  lien  seems  to  have  been  an 
established  rule  since  the  cases  at  nisi  prius  in  Espinasse's 
Reports.  In  the  first  of  these,  tried  before  Lord  Kenyon  in 
1794,^®  it  appeared  that  a  person  having  twenty-five  hogs- 
heads of  sugar  stored  with  a  wharfinger  sold  the  sugar,  but 
the  wharfinger  refused  to  deliver  it  to  the  purchaser,  claim- 
ing to  hold  it  for  a  balance  of  account  due  him  from  the  seller 
on  account  of  wharfage  and  advances  not  relating  to  this 
particular  sugar.  Lord  Kenyon  said :  "A  lien  from  usage 
was  matter  of  evidence.  The  usage  in  the  present  case  has 
been  proved  so  often,  it  should  be  considered  as  a  settled 
point,  that  wharfingers  had  the  lien  contended  for."  In  a 
later  case  before  the  Court  of  Exchequer,^"  the  cases  in  Espi- 

36  Naylor  v.  Mangles,  1  Esp.  109.  subject,  that  he  has  such  a  lien 
Spears  v.  Hartley,  3  Esp.  81,  tried  as  is  claimed  in  the  present  case." 
at  nisi  prius  before  Lord  Eldon,  ^7  Rex  v.  Humphery,  1  McClel. 
was  a  similar  case.  The  distin-  &  Y.  173,  194.  Graham,  B.,  said 
guished  judge  said:  "This  point  he  had  always  considered  the  case 
has  been  ruled  by  Lord  Kenyon,  of  a  wharfinger  and  of  a  ware- 
that  a  wharfinger  has  a  lien  for  houseman  as  standing  on  the 
the  balance  of  a  general  account,  same  ground.  The  other  judges 
and  considered  as  a  point  com-  intimated  a  doubt  on  this  point, 
pletely  at  rest.  I  shall,  therefore,  which  was  afterwards  held  to  be 
hold  it  as  the  settled  law  on  the  immaterial  to  the  case.     It  is  said 

63 


§  979  LIENS.  994 

nasse's  Reports  are  referred  to  as  clearly  establishing  this 
lien.  The  court  regarded  the  wharfinger's  lien  for  a  general 
balance  of  account  as  equally  clear  and  decided  as  in  the  case 
of  a  factor  who  has  by  custom  the  same  lien.  Baron  Graham, 
delivering  the  judgment,  said:  "After  these  cases  it  seems 
to  me  to  be  infinitely  too  much  to  be  argued  in  a  court  of  law, 
that  this  right  of  wharfingers  is  not  perfectly  clear,  and  gen- 
erally and  universally  admitted." 

§  979.  Right  of  wharfinger  to  lien  not  inferred. — If  it  ap- 
pears that  a  wharfinger's  right  to  a  general  lien  is  a  matter 
in  dispute  at  the  port  where  it  is  claimed,  the  right  can  not 
be  inferred.  "The  onus  of  making  out  a  right  of  general  lien 
lies  upon  the  wharfinger.  There  may  be  an  usage  in  one 
place  varying  from  that  which  prevails  in  another.  Where 
the  usage  is  general,  and  prevails  to  such  an  extent  that  a 
party  contracting  with  a  wharfinger  must  be  supposed  conu- 
sant of  it,  then  he  will  be  bound  by  the  terms  of  that  usage. 
But  then  it  should  be  generally  known  to  prevail  at  that 
place.  If  there  be  any  question  as  to  the  usage,  the  wharf- 
inger should  protect  himself  by  imposing  special  terms,  and 
he  should  give  notice  to  his  employer  of  the  extent  to  which 
he  claims  a  lien.  If  he  neglects  to  do  so,  he  cannot  insist 
upon  a  right  of  general  lien  for  anything  beyond  the  mere 
wharfage."^® 

In  this  case  the  court,  while  sustaining  the  wharfinger's 
claim  of  a  general  lien  for  his  wharfage,  refused  to  allow  the 
lien  for  labor,  such  as  landing,  weighing,  and  delivering,  and 
for  warehouse  rent,  because  the  custom  proved  was  not  sufifi- 
ciently  certain  and  uniform  to  found  such  a  general  lien  upon 

to  be  to  this  intimation  of  a  Reg.  465,  469.  But  this  view  as- 
doubt  by  a  majority  of  the  barons  sumes  that  there  was  no  differ- 
in  this  case  that  we  owe  the  im-  ence  in  the  origin  of  these  liens, 
pression  of  a  difference  between  38  Holderness  v.  Collison,  7  B. 
the  lien  of  a  warehouseman  and  &  C.  212,  1  Man.  &  R.  55,  per 
that  of  a  wharfinger.     23  Am.  Law  Bayley,  J. 


995  warehousemen's  and  wharfingers'  liens.     §  980 

for  these  matters.  As  to  such  charges  his  lien  is  specific, 
attaching  only  to  the  goods  with  respect  to  which  the  services 
were  rendered. ^"^ 

§  980.  Lien  reduced  to  a  specific  lien. — The  wharfinger's 
general  lien  may  be  reduced  to  a  specific  lien  if  the  property 
does  not  vest  in  the  consignee  against  whom  the  wharfinger 
claims  a  general  balance.  If  the  contract  of  sale  to  the  con- 
signee be  rescinded  before  the  arrival  of  the  goods,  the  wharf- 
inger, though  he  receives  and  stores  the  goods  without  hav- 
ing been  informed  of  the  determination  of  the  contract,  ac- 
quires no  general  lien  upon  the  goods.  Thus,  where  a  mer- 
chant shipped  goods  to  a  customer  who,  before  their  arrival, 
wrote  to  say  that  he  was  in  failing  circumstances  and 
would  not  apply  for  the  goods  on  their  arrival,  and  the 
merchant,  as  soon  as  possible,  applied  to  the  wharfinger,  at 
whose  wharf  the  goods  had  meanwhile  arrived,  and  tendered 
the  freight  and  charges  upon  the  goods,  but  the  wharfinger 
refused  to  deliver  them  except  upon  payment  of  a  general 
balance  due  him  from  "the  consignee,  it  was  held  that,  the 
contract  of  sale  having  been  rescinded  previously  to  the  ar- 
rival of  the  goods,  the  wharfinger  had  no  right  to  detain 
them  as  the  property  of  the  consignee  subject  to  a  general 
lien.4« 

The  result  is  the  same  if  the  consignee  sells  the  goods  be- 
fore their  arrival.  The  wharfinger,  though  not  informed  of 
the  sale  before  the  arrival  of  the  goods,  can  not  hold  them 
under  a  claim  of  lien  for  a  general  balance  due  him  from  the 
consignee. ^^ 

The  lien  does  not  attach  until  the  goods  are  actually 
landed  at  the  wharf.'*- 

39  Holderness    v.    Collison,    7  B.           •*!  Crawshay    v.    Homfray,    4    B. 
&  C.  212,  per  Bayley,  J.  &  Aid.  50. 

40  Richardson  v.  Goss,  3  B.  &  P.          42  Stephen    v.    Coster,    1    W.    Bl. 
119.  413,    423,    3    Burr.    1408;    Syeds    v. 

Hay,  4  T.  R.  260. 


§  98 1 


LIENS. 


996 


§  981.  Statutes  declaring  lien. — In  several  states  the  lien 
of  the  warehouseman  is  declared  by  statute.  These  statutes 
are  generally  merely  declaratory  of  the  common  law.  A  uni- 
form warehousemen's  law  has  been  adopted  in  Colorado, ^^ 
Iowa,**  Kansas,*^  Massachusetts, ^'^  Michigan,***^  Missouri,*^ 
Nebraska,*^  New  Jersey,*^  New  York,^^  Oregon, ^^  Pennsyl- 
vania,^^  Rhode  Island, ^^  Tennessee,^*  Utah,^^  and  Ver- 
mont.^^  The  sections  declaring  the  warehousemen's  lien 
follow : 


43  Ann.  Stat.  1912,  §§  7789-7792; 
as  to  notice  and  sale  see  Ann. 
Stat.  1912,  §  7795. 

44  Laws  1907,  p.  161,  §§  27,  30; 
Supp.  1907,  §§  3138a27,  3138a30. 
For  proceedings  for  sale  of  such 
goods,  see  Code  1897,  §§  3131- 
3133,  Supp.  1907,  §  3131.  See  Jef- 
fries V.  Snyder,  110  Iowa  359,  81 
N.  W.  678. 

45  Gen.  Stat.  1909,  §§  3392-3395. 

46  Supp.   1908,  p.  561,  §§  28,  31. 
46a  Howell's   Stat.    1912,   §§   2995- 

2998. 

4TLaws  1911',  p.  437;  Ward  v. 
Morr  Transfer  &  Storage  Co.,  119 
Mo.  App.  83,  95  S.  W.  964. 

48  Ann.  Stat.  1911,  §§  12176-12179. 

49  Comp.  Stat.  1910,  p.  5781,  §§  27, 
30. 

50  2  Birdseye  C.  &  G.  Consol. 
Laws  1909,  p.  1829,  §  11'2,  p.  1830, 
§  115.  The  law  of  1885,  ch.  526,  is 
construed  in  Stallman  v.  Kimber- 
ly,  121  N.  Y.  393,  24  N.  E.  939,  6 
N.  Y.  S.  706;  Baumann  v.  Post,  12 
N.  Y.  S.  213,  26  Abb.  N.  C.  134,  16 
Daly  (N.  Y.)  385,  34  N.  Y.  St.  308. 
See  also  Industrial  Loan  Assn.  v. 
Saul,  68  N.  Y.  S.  837,  34  Misc.  (N. 
Y.)  188;  Robinson  v.  Wappans,  34 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)  199,  68  N.  Y. 
S.     815.       A     warehouseman     can- 


not have  a  lien  on  mort- 
gaged goods  where  it  is  agreed 
in  the  mortgage  that  the  mortga- 
gor shall  not  remove  the  goods 
from  the  premises  without  the 
consent  of  the  mortgagee.  Allen 
V.  Becket,  84  N.  Y.  S.  1007.  See 
also  Singer  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Becket, 
85  N.  Y.  S.  391 ;  Farrell  v.  Harlem 
Terminal  Storage  Warehouse  Co., 
70  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  565,  127  N.  Y.  S. 
306.    See  ante,  §§  967,  971. 

51  Gen.  Laws  1913,  p.  587,  §§  27, 
30. 

52  Laws  1909,  p.  24,  §  27,  p.  25, 
§    30. 

53  Gen.  Laws  1909,  p.  939,  §  20, 
p.  940,  §  23.  Reference  is  made  in 
the  Rhode  Island  statute  to  §  11  of 
chapter  269  which  is  Gen.  Laws 
1909,  p.  944,  §  11.  This  section 
states  that  the  negotiation  is  not 
impaired  by  fraud,  mistake,  or 
duress,  where  value  is  paid  and 
there  is  no  notice  of  the  breach 
of  duty,  or  fraud,  mistake  or 
duress. 

54  Acts  1909,  p.  1234,  §  27,  p.  1235, 
§  30.  See  subsequent  paragraphs 
in  this  section. 

55  Laws  1911,  p.  276,  §§  27,  30. 

56  Laws  1912,  pp.  231,  232,  §§  27, 
30. 


997  warehousemen's  and  wharfingers'  liens.     §  981 

A  warehouseman  shall  have  a  lien  on  goods  deposited  or 
on  the  proceeds  thereof  in  his  hands,  for  all  lawful  charges 
for  storage  and  preservation  of  the  goods ;  also  for  all  lawful 
claims  for  money  advanced,  interest,  insurance,  transporta- 
tion, labor,  coopering  and  other  charges  and  expenses  in  re- 
lation to  such  goods;  also  for  all  reasonable  charges  and  ex- 
penses for  notice,  and  advertisements  for  sale,  and  for  sale 
of  the  goods  where  default  has  been  made  in  satisfying  the 
warehousemen's  lien. 

If  a  negotiable  receipt  is  issued  for  goods,  the  ware- 
houseman shall  have  no  lien  thereon,  except  for  charges  for 
storage  of  those  goods,  subsequent  to  the  date  of  the  re- 
ceipt, unless  the  receipt  expressly  enumerates  other  charges 
for  which  a  lien  is  claimed.  In  such  case  there  shall  be  a 
lien  for  the  charges  enumerated  so  far  as  they  are  within 
the  terms  of  the  above  paragraph,  although  the  amount  of 
the  charges  so  enumerated  is  not  stated  in  the  receipt. 

In  Alaska^^  any  person  who  shall  safely  keep  or  store  any 
grain,  wares,  merchandise,  and  personal  property  at  the  re- 
quest of  the  owner  or  lawful  possessor  thereof,  shall  have  a 
lien  upon  such  property  for  his  just  and  reasonable  charges 
for  the  labor,  care  and  attention  he  has  bestowed  and  the 
food  he  has  furnished  and  he  may  retain  possession  of  such 
property  until  such  charges  are  paid. 

In  Arkansas,®^  when  any  goods,  merchandise  or  other 
property  shall  have  been  received  by  any  warehouseman, 
commission  merchant,  or  common  carrier  and  shall  not  be 
claimed  or  received  by  the  owner,  consignee  or  other  author- 
ized person  for  the  period  of  six  months  from  the  time  the 
same  shall  have  been  called  for,  it  shall  be  lawful  for  such 
warehouseman,  commission  merchant  or  carrier  to  sell  such 
goods,  merchandise  or  other  property  to  the  highest  bidder 
for  cash,  first  having  given  twenty  days'  notice  of  the  time 
and  place  of  sale  to  the  owner,  consignee  or  consignor,  whert 

57  Ann.  Code  1900,  p.  414,  §  277.   ^s  Dig.  of  Stat.  1904,  §  8002. 


§    98 1  LIENS.  998 

known,  and  by  advertisement  for  two  insertions  in  a  daily  or 
weekly  newspaper  published  in  the  county  where  such  sale  is 
to  take  place,  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  to  be  applied  to  the 
payment  of  freight,  storage  and  charges  due,  and  the  cost 
of  advertising  and  making  said  sale,  and  if  any  surplus  is  left 
after  paying  freight,  storage,  cost  of  advertising  and  all 
other  just  and  reasonable  charges,  the  same  shall  be  paid 
over  to  the  rightful  owner  of  said  property  at  any  time  there- 
after, upon  demand  being  made  therefor.  A  record  of  such 
sale  shall  be  kept,  which  shall  be  open  to  the  inspection  of 
all  parties  interested  therein. 

In  California  a  warehouseman  agreeing  to  hold  goods 
until  a  named  time  and  deliver  them  to  the  order  of  the 
owner  is  a  depository  for  hire  under  the  statute."'^ 
A  depositary  for  hire  has  a  lien  for  storage  charges  and 
for  advances  and  insurance  incurred  at  the  request  of  the 
bailor,  and  for  money  necessarily  expended  in  and  about  the 
care,  preservation  and  keeping  of  the  property  stored,  and  he 
also  has  a  lien  for  money  advanced  at  the  request  of  the 
bailor,  to  discharge  a  prior  lien,  and  for  the  expenses  of  a 
sale  where  default  has  been  made  in  satisfying  a  valid  lien. 
The  rights  of  the  depositary  for  hire  to  such  lien  are  regu- 
lated by  the  title  on  liens. ®^ 

In  Connecticut^^  every  public  warehouseman,  or  other 
person  engaged  in  the  warehouse  or  storage  business  or  who 
shall  have  stored  goods  for  another,  who  shall  have  in  his 
possession  any  such  property  by  virtue  of  an  agreement  for 
the  storage  thereof  with  the  owner  of  such  property  or  per- 
son having  a  legal  right  to  store  the  same,  shall  have  a  lien 
for  the  agreed  storage  charges  on  such  property,  or,  where 
no  charges  have  been  agreed  on,  for  the  reasonable  storage 

59  Civ.    Code   1906,   §§    1856,   1857.  v.   Naud,   125  Cal.  596,  58  Pac.  186. 
3002,  3003.     Shedoudy  v.  Spreckels  60  Stat.  &  Amend,  to  Codes  1909, 

Bros.  Commercial  Co.,  9  Cal.  App.  p.    1001. 
398,  99  Pac.  535.     See  also  Stewart         ei  Qen.  Stat.  1902,  §  4927. 


999  warehousemen's  and  wharfingers'  liens.     §  981 

charges  thereon,  and,  when  there  shall  be  due  and  unpaid 
six  months'  storage  charges  thereon,  may  sell  such  property 
at  public  auction ;  but  such  sale  shall  not  conflict  with  the 
provisions  of  the  warehouse  receipt  or  other  written  agree- 
ment under  which  such  goods  were  stored. 

In  the  District  of  Columbia*'-  every  person,  firm,  associa- 
tion, or  corporation  lawfully  engaged  in  the  business  of  stor- 
ing goods,  wares,  merchandise,  or  personal  property  of  any 
description  shall  have  a  lien  first,  except  for  taxes  thereon, 
for  the  agreed  charges  for  storing  the  same  and  for  all 
moneys  advanced  for  freight,  cartage,  labor,  insurance,  and 
other  necessary  expenses  thereon.  Said  lien  for  such  unpaid 
charges,  upon  at  least  one  year's  storage  and  for  the  afore- 
said advances  in  connection  therewith,  may  be  enforced  by 
sale  at  public  auction,  after  thirty  days'  notice  in  writing 
mailed  to  the  last  known  address  of  the  person  or  persons 
in  whose  name  or  names  the  said  property  so  in  default  was 
stored,  and  said  notice  shall  also  be  published  for  six  days  in 
a  daily  newspaper  in  the  District  of  Columbia.  And  after 
deducting  all  storage  charges,  advances,  and  expenses  of 
sale,  any  balance  arising  therefrom  shall  be  paid  by  the 
bailee  to  the  bailor  of  such  goods,  wares,  merchandise,  or 
personal  property,  his  assigns  or  legal  representatives. 

In  Louisiana^^  he  who,  having  in  his  possession  the  prop- 
erty of  another,  whether  in  deposit  or  on  loan  or  otherwise, 
has  been  obliged  to  incur  any  expense  for  its  preservation, 
acquires  against  the  owner  and  his  creditors  a  right  in  the 
nature  of  a  pledge,  by  virtue  of  which  he  may  retain  the 
thing  until  the  expenses  which  he  has  incurred  are  paid. 

62  Code  1901,  §  1619.  tion,  the  charges  of  the  warehouse 

63  Rev.  Civ.  Code  1900,  arts,  keeper  for  storage  forms  a  priv- 
3224-3226.  Under  this  provision  ilege  superior  in  rank  to  that  of 
there  is  a  privilege  for  storage.  the  carrier  for  freight.  Powers 
Where  a  carrier  stores  goods  in  a  v.  Sixty  Tons  of  Marble,  21  La. 
warehouse  at  the  port  of  destina-  Ann.  402. 


§981  LIENS.  1000 

In  Minnesota^^  whoever,  at  the  request  of  the  owner  or 
legal  possessor  of  any  personal  property,  shall  store  or  care 
for  or  contributed^*  to  its  preservation,  care,  or  to  the  en- 
hancement of  its  value,  shall  have  a  lien  upon  such  property 
for  the  price  or  value  of  such  storage,  care  or  contribution, 
and  for  any  legal  charges  against  the  same  paid  by  such  per- 
son to  any  other  person,  and  the  right  to  retain  the  property 
in  his  possession  until  such  lien  is  lawfully  discharged;  but  a 
voluntary  surrender  of  possession  shall  extinguish  the  lien 
herein  given. 

In  Mississippi  it  is  held  under  a  statute^^  which  declares  a 
lien  in  favor  of  a  person  who  helps  to  prepare  a  crop  for 
market  that  a  warehouseman  is  not  entitled  to  a  lien  who 
stores  cotton  for  the  purpose  of  sale  and  shipment. 

In  Montana^^  any  storage  or  commission  merchant 
who  has  received  any  goods  for  storage,  after  keeping 
them  in  store  for  ninety  days,  may,  in  default  of  the  payment 
of  the  storage  or  freight  on  such  goods,  advertise  and  sell 
the  same  at  public  auction,  first  giving  notice  by  publication 
at  least  once  a  week  for  four  weeks  before  the  sale. 

In  North  Carolina^^  every  person,  firm  or  corporation  who 
shall  furnish  storage  room  for  furniture,  goods,  wares  or 
merchandise  and  make  a  charge  for  storing  the  same,  shall 
have  the  right  to  retain  possession  of  and  a  lien  upon  all  fur- 
niture, goods,  wares  or  merchandise  until  such  storage 
charges  are  paid. 

In  North  Dakota^^  any  storage  company  or  warehouseman 
who  stores,  keeps,  cares  for,  or  advances  money  on,  or  in- 
sures personal  property,  shall  have  a  lien  thereon  for  his  rea- 
sonable charges  for  storing,  keeping,  caring  for,  and  insuring 

64  Gen.  Stats.  1913,   §   7036.  Warehouse    Co.,    78    Miss.   875,   29 
64a  See   Gen.   Stats.    1913,    §   7037,      So.  770,  84  Am.  St.  655. 

for   further  details  66  Codes   (Civ.)    1895,   §  2495. 

65  Code   1906,   §   3042;   Shingleur-  67  Pub.   Laws   1913,  p.  313. 
Johnson    Co.     v.     Canton    Cotton          68  Rev.   Code  1905,  §  2269. 


looi         warehousemen's  and  wharfingers'  liens.     §  981 

the  same,  and  for  the  charges  he  may  have  advanced  on  the 
same  and  legal  interest  thereon. 

In  Ohio^^  every  person  in  whose  name  merchandise  is 
shipped,  or  delivered  to  the  keeper  of  a  warehouse,  or  other 
factor  or  agent,  to  be  shipped,  shall  be  deemed  the  true 
owner  thereof,  so  far  as  to  entitle  the  consignee  of  such  mer- 
chandise to  a  lien  thereon:  for  any  money  advanced,  or  ne- 
gotiable security  given  by  such  consignee,  to  or  for  the  use 
of  the  person  in  whose  name  such  shipment,  or  delivery  of 
merchandise  to  be  shipped,  has  been  made;  for  money  or 
negotiable  security  received  by  the  person  in  whose  name 
such  shipment,  or  delivery  of  merchandise  to  be  shipped  has 
been  made  to,  or  for  the  use  of,  such  consignee. 

In  Tennessee'''"  the  owners  and  proprietors  of  wharves 
and  landings  where  wharfage  is  allowed  by  law,  have  a  lien 
on  all  boats,  rafts,  and  other  water  crafts,  and  their  loading, 
for  the  payment  of  their  wharfage  fees,  and  the  same  may  be 
enforced  by  attachment  within  three  months  after  the  lien 
accrued.  Every  warehouse  company,  firm,  person,  or  persons 
engaged  in  the  warehouse  or  storage  business,  who  shall  re- 
ceive in  his  or  their  possession  any  goods,  wares,  or  mer- 
chandise in  store  for  hire,  shall  have  a  lien  thereon  superior 
to  unregistered  liens  or  titles  for  the  storage  charges  that 
may  accrue  thereon,  together  with  any  necessary  expense  in- 
curred in  making  the  sale;  provided,  however,  that  where 
sale  of  goods  or  chattels  are  made  and  a  lien  retained  by  the 
seller  for  the  purchase  money,  such  lien,  whether  registered 
or  not,  shall  be  superior  to  the  lien  hereby  created. ''^^ 

In  Wisconsin'^-  a  warehouseman  engaged  only  in  the  bus- 
iness of  storage  must  enforce  his  lien  as  provided  by  the 
statutes. '^^  He  can  not  claim  and  enforce  his  lien  under  the 
statute  providing  a  means  for  common  carriers  to  enforce 
their  liens  on  unclaimed  or  perishable  goods.     The  statute 

69  Gen.  Code  1910,  §  8358.  '^2  Devlin   v.    Wisconsin   Storage 

TO  Code  1896,  §  3549.  Co.,  147  Wis.  518,  133  N.  W.  578. 

71  Acts  1909,  p.  248.  73  Stat.   1898,  §  3347. 


§    981  LIENS.  1002 

provides  that  lienholders  may,  in  case  such  debt  remain  un- 
paid for  three  months  and  the  value  of  the  property  affected 
thereby  does  not  exceed  one  hundred  dollars,  sell  such  prop- 
erty at  public  auction  and  apply  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  to 
the  payment  of  the  amount  due  him  and  the  expenses  of  such 
sale.  Notice,  in  w^riting,  of  the  time  and  place  of  such  sale 
and  of  the  amount  claimed  to  be  due  shall  be  given  to  the 
owner  of  such  property  personally  or  by  leaving  the  same  at 
his  place  of  abode,  if  a  resident  of  this  state,  and  if  not,  by 
publication  thereof  once  in  each  week,  for  three  weeks  suc- 
cessively, next  before  the  time  of  sale  in  some  newspaper 
published  in  the  county  in  which  such  lien  accrues,  if  there 
be  one,  and  if  not,  by  posting  such  notice  in  three  public 
places  in  such  county.  If  such  property  exceed  in  value  one 
hundred  dollars,  then  such  lien  may  be  enforced  against  the 
same  by  action  in  any  court  having  jurisdiction. 

In  Wyoming''^*  any  warehouseman  or  other  person  who 
shall  safely  keep  or  store  any  personal  property  at  the  re- 
quest of  the  owner  or  person  lawfully  in  possession  thereof, 
shall,  in  like  manner,  have  a  lien  upon  all  such  personal  prop- 
erty, for  his  reasonable  charges  for  the  transportation,  stor- 
age, or  keeping  thereof,  and  for  all  reasonable  and  proper 
advances  made  thereon  by  him  in  accordance  with  the  usage 
and  custom  of  warehousemen. 

"^Comp.   Stat.   1910,   §   3756;    W.W.  Kimball  Co.  v.  Payne,  9  Wyo. 
441,  64  Pac.  673. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

ASSIGNMENT  OF  LIENS. 

Sec.  Sec. 

982.  Common-law  lien  not  subject      989.  Interest  of  lienholder  not  at- 

to  sale  or  assignment.  tachable. 

983.  Lien  a  personal  privilege.  990.  Assignment  of  statutory  liens. 

984.  Transfer  of  possession.  991.  Equitable   lien   passed   by  as- 

985.  Transfer  of   the  lien  debt,  signment  of  debt. 

986.  Forfeit    of    lien    by    lienhold-  992.  Attorney's    lien    assignable. 

er's  sale  of  property.  993.  Transfer  of   lien   by  subroga- 

987.  Right  of  wrong-doer  to  set  up  tion. 

lien.  994.  The    seller's     lien    passed    to 

988.  Effect  of  a  sale  of  the  prop-  surety  paying  the  debt. 

erty  by   lienholder.  995.  No  subrogation  to  a  lien  un- 

til  the  debt   is  paid. 

§  982.  Common-law  lien  not  subject  to  sale  or  assign- 
ment.— A  common-law  lien  is  not  a  proper  subject  of  sale 
or  assignment,  for  it  is  neither  property  nor  is  it  a  debt,  but 
a  right  to  retain  property  as  security  for  a  debt.^  "A  lien," 
says  Mr.  Juster  Buller,  "is  a  personal  right,  and  can  not  be 
transferred  to  another."- 

It  is  a  general  rule  that,  in  the  absence  of  any  statutory 
provision,  the  assignment  of  a  demand  for  which  the  assignor 
may  have  by  law  a  specific  lien  at  common  law  destroys  the 
right  of  lien;  and  a  reassignment  to  him  before  action  does 
not  revive  the  lien.^  A  lien  can  not  be  assigned  while  the 
assignor  retains  possession  of  the  property  charged   there- 

1  Lovett  V.  Brown,  40  N.  H.  511;  604,  606.  And  see  Holly  v.  Hug- 
Bradley  V.  Spofford,  23  N.  H.  444,  geford,  8  Pick.  (Mass.)  73;  Glas- 
447,  55  Am.  Dec.  205;  Jacobs  v.  cock  v.  Lemp,  26  Ind.  App.  175, 
Knapp,   50   N.    H.    71;    Roberts    v.  59  N.  E.  342. 

Jacks,    31    Ark.    597,    25    Am.    Rep.  3  Tewksbury  v.  Bronson,  48  Wis. 

584  581,  4  N.  W.  749;  Caldwell  v.  Law- 

2  Daubigny    v.    Duval,    5    T.    R.       rence,    10  Wis.   331. 

1003 


§    983  LIENS.  1004 

with.^  On  the  other  hand,  a  transfer  of  the  property,  while 
the  assignor  retains  the  lien  debt,  destroys  the  lien,  unless 
the  transfer  be  merely  to  an  agent  of  the  assignor  to  hold 
for  him  subject  to  the  lien. 

§  983.  Lien  a  personal  privilege. — A  lien  is  a  purely  per- 
sonal privilege,  and  can  only  be  set  up  by  the  person  to 
whom  it  accrued.^  He  can  not  assign  his  claim,  so  as  to  en- 
able the  assignee  to  set  up  the  lien  as  a  ground  of  claim  or 
defense  to  an  action  for  the  property  or  its  value  as  against 
the  general  owner. ^^  A  manufacturer  of  starch,  having  a 
lien  for  the  price  of  manufacturing  several  tons  for  one  who 
furnished  the  materials,  and  the  latter  not  being  ready  to 
receive  and  pay  for  the  starch  when  it  was  ready  for  deliv- 
ery, obtained  from  a  third  person  the  amount  of  his  claim  on 
the  starch,  and  delivered  the  stock  to  him  by  placing  it  in 
another  building  near  the  factory,  and  marking  it  with  the 
name  of  such  third  person.  The  latter  notified  the  general 
owner  of  the  starch  that  he  had  purchased  the  manufactur- 
er's claim,  and  that  the  owner  could  have  his  property  by 
paying  what  he  had  agreed  to  pay  the  manufacturer.  The 
owner,  however,  took  possession  of  the  starch  without  pay- 
ing the  price  for  manufacturing,  and  the  person  who  had 
made  advances  upon  it  brought  suit  against  him,  declaring 
in  trespass  and  trover  for  taking  and  converting  the  starch 
to  his  own  use.  It  was  held  that  he  could  not  maintain  the 
suit,  because  the  lien  was  a  personal  privilege  which  the 
original  lienholder  could  not  sell  or  transfer  except  with  the 
consent  of  the  general  owner  of  the  property.^ 

§  984.  Transfer  of  possession. — A  person  having  a  lien 
upon  goods  may  transfer  the  possession  of  them  to  a  third 

4  Wing  V.  Griffin,  V  E.  D.  Smith      D.   Smith   (N.  Y.)    162. 

(N.   Y.)    162.  5*  Quoted  in  Cincinnati  Tobacco 

5  Holly  V.  Huggeford,  8  Pick.  Warehouse  Co.  v.  Leslie.  117  Ky. 
(Mass.)  73;  Ruggles  v.  Walker,  478,  25  Ky.  L.  1570,  64  L.  R.  A.  219. 
34  Vt.  468;  Wing  v.   Griffin,   1   E.  e  Ruggles  v.  Walker,  34  Vt.  468. 


I005  ASSIGNMENT    OF    LIENS.  §    985 

person  to  hold  subject  to  the  lien  as  agent  or  bailee  of  the 
original  lienholder,  until  the  lien  shall  be  satisfied.  The  lien 
is  not  affected  in  such  case  because  the  possession  of  the 
property  really  remains  with  the  lienholder. 

If  the  lien  debt  be  assigned  to  such  third  person  with  the 
possession  of  the  property,  for  the  purpose  of  collection,  or 
otherwise  to  hold  for  the  original  lienholder  as  his  agent,  it 
would  seem  that  the  lien  would  not  be  destroyed  by  the 
transfer.  But  though  the  lienholder  may,  under  some  cir- 
cumstances, put  the  property  into  the  hands  of  another  per- 
son without  forfeiting  his  lien,  yet  inasmuch  as  the  general 
rule  is  that  the  lien  is  divested  by  a  transfer  of  the  posses- 
sion, the  burden  is  upon  the  lienholder  to  show  that  the 
transfer  was  of  such  a  nature  as  to  make  it  lawful.  "Al- 
though it  may  be,  and  no  doubt  is  true,  that  the  holder  of 
goods  or  chattels  subject  to  a  lien  may  transfer  them  to  third 
persons  under  special  circumstances,  and  for  purposes  con- 
sistent with  the  continuance  of  the  lien,  yet  it  would  seem 
equally  plain  that  the  burden  of  proof  and  allegation  lies  on 
those  who  aver  that  such  a  transfer  is  rightful,  and  seek  to 
hold  the  goods  under  it  against  the  owner. "'^ 

§  985.  Transfer  of  the  lien  debt. — The  lienholder  may 
transfer  the  lien  debt,  and  with  it  the  possession  of  the  thing 
as  security  for  the  debt,  for  this  amounts  merely  to  an  ap- 
pointment of  the  assignee  as  his  agent  to  keep  possession  and 
collect  the  claim  in  the  name  and  for  the  account  of  the  as- 
signor.^ 

The  rights  of  the  owner  remain  unchanged.  He  can  de- 
mand and  receive  the  property  from  the  assignee  on  the 
same  terms  he  could  if  it  still  remained  in  the  hands  of  the 
original  lienholder.  "In  the  absence  of  fraud  or  removal  of 
the  property  out  of  reach,  or  any  other  act  of  abuse  of  the 

^  Bean  v.  Bolton,  3   Phila.   (Pa.)       1  Am.  Rep.  393.    And  see  Buckner 
87,  89,  per  Hare,  J.  v.    Mcllroy,  31   Ark.  631,   per    Pin- 

8  Davis  V.  Bigler,  62  Pa.  St.  242,      dall,  J. 


§    9^6  LIENS.  1006 

original  relation  of  bailment,  there  seems  to  be  no  equity  in 
permitting  him  to  recover  without  doing  equity  by  paying  or 
tendering  the  charge  which  is  a  lien  on  the  property."" 

An  assignee  of  the  lien  debt,  accomplished  by  possession 
of  the  property  to  which  the  lien  attaches,  is  only  an  equit- 
able assignee.  Fie  can  not  enforce  the  lien  in  his  own  name, 
but  must  use  the  name  of  the  original  lienholder  for  that  pur- 
pose, unless  the  assignee  he  authorized  by  statute  to  prose- 
cute the  action  in  his  own  name. 

§  986.     Forfeit  of  the  lien  by  lienholder's  sale  of  property. 

— An  absolute  sale  of  the  property  by  the  lienholder  forfeits 
the  lien,  and  neither  he  nor  the  purchaser  can  set  up  the  lien 
as  against  the  owner  of  the  general  title.  A  lienholder  may 
assign  his  lien  and  deliver  the  property  to  another  if  the 
assignment  be  in  strict  subordination  to  the  rights  of  the 
owner;  but  an  absolute  sale  is  in  violation  of  the  property 
rights  of  the  owner,  is  tortious,  and  works  a  forfeiture  of  the 
lien.^^  And  so,  if  the  assignee  of  the  lien  having  possession 
of  the  property  sells  it  absolutely  to  a  third  person,  the 
owner  is  remitted  to  his  original  rights  freed  from  the  lien, 
and  may  maintain  trover  against  the  assignee. ^^  The  owner 
can  not  maintain  trespass  or  replevin  after  such  absolute  sale, 
because  the  purchaser  has  come  lawfully  into  possession  of 
the  property  by  delivery  from  a  bailee  in  rightful  posses- 
sion.^^ 

9  Rodgers  v.  Grothe,  58  Pa.  St.  27,  note,  per  BuUer,  J.;  Coit  v. 
414,  419,  per  Agnew,  J.  The  trans-  Waples,  1  Minn.  134  (Gil.  110) ; 
fer  in  this  case  was  an  attempted  Doane  v.  Russell,  3  Gray  (Mass.) 
sale  under  a  statute  which  was  in-  382;  Holly  v.  Huggeford,  8  Pick, 
effectual  to  pass  the  title  to  the  (Mass.)  73;  Ruggles  v.  Walker,  34 
property    as    against     the     owner,  Vt.   468. 

but   was   a    transfer    of   the    claim  n  Nash  v.  Mosher,  19  Wend.  (N. 

and  of  the  possession  of  the  prop-  Y.)   431. 

erty.  12  Nash  v.  Mosher,  19  Wend.  (N. 

10  Jones  V.  Pearle,  1  Str.  556;  Y.)  431;  Coit  v.  Waples,  1  Minn. 
Legg   V.    Evans,   6    M.    &   W.    36;  134  (Gil.  110). 

Lickbarrow   v.    Mason,   6    East   21, 


I007  ASSIGNMENT    OF    LIENS.  §    989 

§  987.  Right  of  wrongdoer  to  set  up  lien. — A  wrong- 
doer can  not  set  up  the  hen.  A  hen  which  a  bailee  has,  for 
the  price  of  labor  done,  can  not  be  set  up  by  a  wrongdoer  to 
defeat  the  action  of  the  general  owner.^^ 

A  lien  will  not  pass  by  a  tortious  act  of  the  party  claiming 
it,  such  as  his  selling  or  pledging  the  goods  without  author- 
ity.^^ Thus  the  lien  of  a  master  upon  a  cargo  for  freight  may 
be  asserted  by  his  factor  or  agent;  but  if  the  master,  without 
authority,  directs  the  factor  to  sell  the  goods  and  the  latter 
sells  them,  the  purchaser  can  not  set  up  the  lien  and  require 
it  to  be  discharged  before  the  owner  can  properly  demand 
possession  of  the  goods  or  bring  suit  for  them.^^ 

§  988.     Effect  of  a  sale  of  the  property  by  lienholder. — If  a 

lienholder  sells  the  property  on  which  he  has  a  lien  without 
due  process  of  law,  but  subject  to  the  lien,  the  owner  may 
bring  trover  or  replevin  for  it  freed  from  the  lien;  but  he 
can  not  bring  trespass,  as  the  transferee  came  lawfully  into 
possession  by  delivery  from  a  lienholder  who  was  rightfully 
in  possession. ^^  If  the  lienholder  or  his  assignee  wrongfully 
sells  or  pledges  the  property  not  in  subordination  to  the 
rights  of  the  general  owner,  the  transfer  puts  an  end  to  the 
possession  under  the  lien  and  destroys  it,  and  the  owner  may 
sue  in  trespass  for  the  property.^'^ 

§  989.  Interest  of  lienholder  not  attachable. — The  inter- 
est of  one  having  possession  of  a  chattel  by  virtue  of  a  lien 
is  not  attachable  as  personal  property,  or  as  a  chose  in  ac- 

13  Bradley  v.  Spofford,  23  N.  H.  i5  Everett    v.    Saltus,    15    Wend. 
444,  55  Am.  Dec.  205;  Jones  v.  Sin-       (N.  Y.)  474. 

clair,  2  N.  H.  319,  9  Am.  Dec.  75.  le  Nash  v.  Mosher,  19  Wend.  (N. 

14  McCombie  v.  Davies,  7  East  Y.)  431;  Davis  v.  Bigler,  62  Pa. 
5;    Urquhart   v.    Mclver,   4  Johns.      St.  242,  1  Am.  Rep.  393. 

(N.  Y.)   103;  Everett  v.  Saltus,  15  i"  Davis    v.    Bigler,    62    Pa.    St. 

Wend.  (N.  Y.)  474;  Bean  v.  Bol-  242,  1  Am.  Rep.  393,  per  Shars- 
ton,  3  Phila.  (Pa.)  87.  wood,   J.;    Rodgers   v.    Grothe,   58 


§  990 


LIENS. 


1008 


tion.^^  The  lien  can  not  be  set  up  by  the  attaching  officer,  or 
other  person,  in  defence  of  an  action  by  the  owner. ^'''  It  is  a 
personal  privilege  whiclf  the  person  who  is  entitled  to  it  may 
avail  himself  of  or  not,  as  he  pleases.-*' 

§  990.  Assignment  of  statutory  liens. — Some  statutory 
liens  may  be  assigned.  Statutory  liens  which  are  not  merely 
declaratory  of  the  common  law  do  not  generally  require  pos- 
session to  support  them.-^  Such  liens  without  possession 
have  generally  the  same  operation  and  efficacy  as  common- 
law  liens  with  possession,  and  the  assignment  of  the  claim 
may  in  such  cases  carry  with  it  the  right  to  the  lien,  equit- 
ably at  least.--  But  statutory  liens,  which  are  really  com- 
mon-law liens  declared  by  statute,  and  which  depend  upon 
possession  for  their  existence  in  the  same  way  that  common- 
law  liens  depend  upon  possession,  can  be  assigned  only  as 
common-law  liens  can  be  assigned:  the  assignment  of  such 
a  lien  debt  without  a  transfer  of  the  property  does  not  carry 
with  it  the  lien,  but  on  the  contrary  destroys  the  lien.-"     But 


Pa.  St.  414;  Ely  v.  Ehle,  3  N.  Y. 
506. 

18  Lovett  V.  Brown,  40  N.  H. 
511';  Kittredge  v.  Sumner,  11  Pick. 
(Mass.)  50;  Holly  v.  Huggeford,  8 
Pick.    (Mass.)    Th. 

i*)  Kittredge  v.  Sumner,  11  Pick. 
(Mass.)   50. 

20  Holly  V.  Huggeford,  8  Pick. 
(Mass.)  IZ;  Ruggles  v.  Walker,  34 
Vt.  468. 

21  See  ante,  §   104. 

22  Leslie  v.  Hinson,  83  Ala.  266, 
3  So.  443;  Westmoreland  v.  Fos- 
ter, 60  Ala.  448.  Notes  taken  for 
purchase-money  secured  by  a  ven- 
dor's lien  may  be  assigned  and 
the  assignee  of  such  notes  may 
recover  the  land  on  non-payment 
much  the  same  as  the  original 
vendor  could  have  done.     Grain  v. 


National  Life  Ins.  Co.  of  U.  S., 
56  Tex.  Civ.  App.  406,  120  S.  W. 
1098.  The  assignment  of  a  check 
carries  v/ith  it  the  vendor's  lien. 
Majors  v.  Maxwell,  120  Mo.  App. 
281,  96  S.  W.  731.  See  also,  as  to 
rights  of  assignee  of  executory 
contract  for  sale  of  land,  Mid- 
land County  Sav.  Bank  v.  T.  C. 
Prouty  Co.,  158  Mich.  656,  123  N. 
W.  549,  133  Am.  St.  401.  The  as- 
signee of  a  vendor's  lien  note 
takes  the  -superior  legal  title. 
Hatton  v.  Bodan  Lumber  Co.,  57 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  478,  123  S.  W.  163. 
See  also  Singletary  v.  Golman, 
(Tex.   Civ.  App.)    123  S.  W.  436. 

23  Caldwell  v.  Lawrence,  10 
Wis.  331;  Tewksbury  v.  Bronson, 
48  Wis.  581,  4  N.  W.  749. 


I009 


ASSIGNMENT    OF    LIENS. 


§    991 


if  the  existence  of  the  lien  does  not  depend  upon  possession, 
it  may  be  assigned.-^ 

A  Hen,  though  created  by  statute,  is  not  assignable  at  law 
so  as  to  enable  the  assignee  to  maintain  an  action  in  his  own 
name.  Any  assignment  that  can  be  made  is  only  ec^uitable.-'' 
An  action  to  enforce  the  lien  may  be  maintained  by  the  as- 
signee in  the  name  of  the  assignor.-*^ 

§  991.  Equitable  lien  passed  by  assignment  of  debt. — An 
equitable  lien  reserved  by  express  agreement  passes  by  an 


2-i  Pearsons  v.  Tincker,  36  Maine 
384;  Phillips  v.  Vose,  81  Maine 
134,  16  Atl.  463;  Murphy  v.  Adams, 
71  Maine  113,  36  Am.  Rep. 
299.  The      statutory      lien      of 

the  laborer,  like  that  of  the 
mechanic  upon  real  property, 
is  assignable,  and  the  assignee 
may  enforce  the  lien  in  the  same 
manner  and  to  the  same  extent 
as  the  laborer.  Kerr  v.  Moore, 
54  Miss.  286.  In  Georgia,  all  liens 
may  be  assigned  in  writing  and  the 
assignee  has  all  the  rights  of  the 
assignor.  Code  1911,  §  3372.  In 
Minnesota,  all  liens  for  labor 
and  material  are  assignable  and 
may  be  enforced  by  the  assignee 
or  his  personal  representatives. 
Gen.  Stats.  1913,  §  7084.  In 
Missouri,  claims  entitling  the 
holders  to  liens  may  be  as- 
signed, and  the  assignee  may  file 
a  lien  therefor,  and  bring  suit  in 
his  own  name,  and  may  include 
in  such  suit  all  claims  assigned  to 
him,  and  enforce  such  liens  as 
fully  as  if  they  had  been  filed  by 
the  original  claimant.  Rev.  Stat. 
1909,  §  8266.  In  Nevada  two 
or  more  creditors  of  the  same 
class     may     assign     their     claims 


to  any  other  creditor  or 
person  of  the  same  class,  and 
the  assignee  may  prosecute  an  ac- 
tion upon  them  in  his  own  name. 
Liens  are  assignable  as  any  other 
choses  in  action.  Rev.  Laws  1912, 
art.  2229,  §  17.  In  Texas,  liens 
are  assignable,  and  an  assignee  has 
the  same  rights  and  privileges  as 
the  original  lienholder.  Civ.  Stat. 
1911,  §  5647.  A  judgment  lien 
may  be  assigned  by  the  hold- 
er to  his  attorneys  as  col- 
lateral security  for  their  fees 
and  they  will  have  a  lien 
thereon  prior  to  the  right  of 
set-off  which  might  exist  against 
it.  Stanley  v.  Bouck,  107  Wis. 
225,  83  N.  W.  298.  The  pur- 
chaser of  vendor's  lien  notes 
before  maturity  for  value  with- 
out any  notice  of  a  dedication  of 
a  part  of  the  land  by  the  maker 
is  an  innocent  purchaser  and  will 
be  protected.  Adone  v.  LaPorte, 
(Tex.   Civ.  App.)   124  S.  W.   134. 

2"  Cairo  &  Vincennes  R.  Co.  v. 
Fackney,  78  111.  116;  Pearsons  v. 
Tincker,  36   Maine   384. 

2C  Phillips  V.  Vose,  81  Maine 
134,  16  Atl.  463. 


64 


99- 


LIENS. 


lOIO 


assignment  of  the  debt  it  was  created  to  secure.     Such  a  lien 
does   not   depend   upon   possession   as   does   a   common-law 
Jien." 

An  equitable  lien  not  reserved  by  contract  or  declared  by 
court  will  not  pass  by  an  assignment  of  the  debt,  as  for  in- 
stance by  the  transfer,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  business,  of 
a  note  representing  the  lien  debt.-^ 

§  992,  Attorney's  lien  assignable. — An  attorney's  lien 
upon  a  judgment  is  assignable. ^^  In  this  regard  there  is  no 
distinction  between  an  attorney's  lien  and  the  lien  of  a  me- 
chanic or  materialman.  There  is  nothing  in  public  policy, 
nor  in  the  policy  or  language  of  the  statutes  creating  these 
liens,  which  forbids  the  assignment  of  them.  To  take  away 
their  assignability  would  be  to  take  away  part  of  their  value. 
An  attorney's  lien  upon  a  judgment  is  a  lien  of  an  equitable 
nature,  though  in  many  states  it  is  declared  by  statute. 

§  993.  Transfer  of  lien  by  subrogation. — A  lien  may  be 
transferred  by  subrogation  to  one  who  pays  the  lien  debt,  not 
as  a  volunteer,    but  in    the  line    of  his    duty.     Thus    one  in 


27  Ober  V.  Gallagher,  93  U.  S. 
199,  23  L.  ed.  829;  Batesville  In- 
stitute V.  Kauffman,  18  Wall.  (U. 
S.)  151,  154,  21  L.  ed.  775 ;  Pkyne  v. 
Wilson,  74  N.  Y.  348,  354;  Talie- 
ferro  v.  Barnett,  'il  Ark.  511  ; 
Campbell  v.  Rankin,  28  Ark.  401, 
overruling  to  the  contrary  Shep- 
pard  V.  Thomas,  26  Ark.  617,  and 
Jones  V.  Doss,  27  Ark.  518.  See 
ante,  §  28. 

28  Owen  V.  Reed.  21  Ark.  122; 
Rawls  V.  Moye,  98  Ga.  564,  25 
S.   E.  582. 

29  Sibley  v.  County  of  Pine,  31 
Minn.  201,  202,  17  N.  W.  ZZl,  per 
Mitchell,  J.  "There  being  nothing 
in   the  lien-right   in   the  nature  of 


a  personal  trust,  there  is  no  dis- 
tinction in  this  regard  between 
an  attorney's  lien  upon  a  judg- 
ment and  the  lien  of  a  mechanic 
or  material-man.  Where  the  lien- 
holder  is  intrusted,  as  a  personal 
trust,  with  the  property  bound  by 
the  lien,  as  would  be  the  case 
where  the  papers  of  a  client  have 
come  into  the  possession  of  his 
attorney  in  the  course  of  his  pro- 
fessional employment,  an  entire- 
ly different  case  would  be  pre- 
sented, which  we  do  not  now  con- 
sider. But  no  such  element  of 
personal  trust  existed  in  the  pres- 
ent  case." 


lOII  ASSIGNMENT    OF    LIENS.  §    993 

charge  of  a  horse,  practically  as  a  stablekeeper,  upon  paying 
a  farrier's  bill  for  shoeing,  is  entitled  to  stand  in  the  farrier's 
shoes  and  enforce  his  lien.  It  being  the  duty  of  the  keeper 
of  the  horse  to  see  that  the  horse  is  cared  for,  he  is  not  a 
mere  volunteer  in  paying  the  farrier's  bill ;  and  he  can  retain 
the  horse  for  the  payment  of  the  bill  if  the  farrier  could  re- 
tain him.^*' 

A  surety  upon  a  tenant's  bond  for  rent  may  take  up  the 
bond,  and  have  it  assigned  to  him,  so  as  to  substitute  him  to 
all  the  rights  and  lien  of  the  landlord. ^^ 

A  surety  upon  the  bond  of  a  collector  of  taxes,  upon  an- 
swering for  his  default,  is  subrogated  to  a  statutory  lien  of 
the  state  upon  the  collector's  land ;  and  the  fact  that  the 
surety  has  taken  a  mortgage  to  indemnify  him  against  loss  is 
no  waiver  of  his  right  of  subrogation.^-  A  release  by  such 
surety  of  part  of  the  land  mortgaged  to  the  surety  to  indem- 
nify him  against  loss,  without  notice  of  the  equitable  right 
of  a  purchaser  of  land  from  the  collector  which  was  subject 
to  such  statutory  lien,  will  not  defeat  his  right  to  be  subro- 
gated to  the  lien  of  the  state,  after  he  has  paid  judgments  in 
a  suit  on  the  collector's  bond.  A  surety  upon  such  bond, 
against  whom  a  judgment  has  been  recovered,  may,  before 
paying  the  judgment,  file  a  bill  to  require  the  lands  of  the 
collector,  subject  to  the  statutory  lien,  to  be  first  sold  for  the 
payment  of  such  judgment.  If  the  surety  pays  the  judgment 
he  is  subrogated  to  the  lien  of  the  state,  and  may  have  the 
lands  sold  for  his  reimbursement.^'^ 

The  failure  of  the  holder  of  a  lien  to  enforce  or  preserve  it 
does  not  of  itself  discharge  a  surety  of  the  lien  debt.     It  is 

30  Hoover    v.    Epler.    52    Pa.    St.  assignee  pays  subsequent  taxes  on 
522.  the   land   he   is   subrogated   to   the 

31  Smith  V.  Wells,  4  Bush   (Ky.)  lien   of  the   state   thereon.     Lewis 
92.  Co.   V.   Knowlton,  84   Minn.   53,  86 

32  Crawford  v.  Richeson.  101  111.  N.   W.  875. 

351.     Where   a  tax  certificate   reg-  3-3  Crawford  v.  Richeson,  101  111. 

ular  in  form  but  issued  on  a  void      351. 
tax  judgment,  is  assigned  and  the 


§    994  LIENS.  IOI2 

enough  if  the  lienholder  does  nothing  to  impair  the  Hen,  or 
to  prevent  the  surety  from  being  subrogated  to  his  rights. ^^ 

§  994.  The  seller's  lien  passed  to  surety  paying  the  debt. 
— A  seller's  unpaid  lien  passes  to  a  surety  who  pays  the  pur- 
chase-money upon  the  default  of  the  purchaser.  Thus,  if  a 
broker  who  has  bought  goods  for  an  undisclosed  principal, 
and  therefore  stands  in  the  relation  of  surety  for  his  princi- 
pal, pays  the  purchase-money  upon  the  insolvency  of  his 
principal,  he  acquires  the  vendor's  lien  upon  the  goods,  and 
may  hold  them  by  virtue  of  such  lien  as  against  the  pur- 
chaser's pledgee  of  a  delivery  order  for  the  goods. ^^ 

§  995.  No  subrogation  to  a  lien  until  the  debt  is  paid. — 
But  there  can  be  no  subrogation  to  a  lien  until  the  lien  debt 
is  fully  satisfied.  Therefore,  where  a  groom  gave  his  prom- 
issory note  to  a  stable-keeper  for  the  keeping  of  a  horse 
which  the  groom  had  engaged  to  take  charge  of  for  a  stipu- 
lated sum  for  a  time  specified,  it  was  held  that  he  could  not 
claim  the  right  to  use  the  lien  of  the  stable-keeper  until  he 
had  actually  paid  the  note,  or  had  shown  that  the  note  was 
received  as  payment. ^^ 

34  Variol  v.  Doherty,  1  McGloin  35  Imperial      Bank      v.      London 

(La.)    118;   Parker  v.  Alexander.  2  Docks   Co.,   L.   R.  5   Ch.   Div.   195. 

La.    Ann.    188;    Gordon    v.    Diggs,  36  Hoover    v.    Epler,    52    Pa.    St. 

9  La.  Ann.  422;   Elmore  v.  Robin-  522. 
son,  18  La.  Ann.  651,  652;   Hill  v. 
Bourcier,   29  La.   Ann.  841,  844. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 


WAIVER  OF  LIENS. 


Sec. 
996. 
997. 

998. 

999. 

1000. 
1001. 
1002. 

1003. 

1004. 

1005. 
1006. 

1007. 
1008. 
1009. 
1010. 
1011. 
1012. 
1013. 


Introductory. 
Common-law 


Sec. 
1014. 


founded 


lien 
upon  possession.  1015. 

Contract  lien  not  discharged 
by  owner  taking  possession.       1016. 

Intention  as  effecting  waiv- 
er. 

Lien  once  lost  not  regained.       1017. 

Delivery  of  part. 

No  lien  where  parties  make      1018. 
special     contract     inconsis- 
tent with  a  lien.  1019. 

Lien  excluded  by  special 
contract  for  payment  at  a 
future   time.  1020. 

Principle    extended    to   cases 
where     credit     is     claimed       1021. 
without    special    contract. 

Effect  of  express  agreement      1022. 
to  give   credit.  1023. 

An  agreement   for  credit   by 
note    conditional    upon    the       1024. 
giving  of  the  note. 

Waiver  of  lien  by  condition-       1025. 
al  agreement. 

Effect    of   agreement    to   pay       1026. 
in  advance. 

Taking  debtor's  note  not  a 
waiver.  1027. 

Note  taken  as  payment  a 
waiver  of  right  to   lien. 

Taking  security  does  not  de-       1028. 
stroy  lien. 

Equitable  lien  not  waived  by 
taking  legal   lien.  1029. 

Lien  not  displaced  by  mort- 
gage. 

IOI3 


Waiver  of  lien  by  attach- 
ment   by   lienor. 

Waiver  of  lien  by  inconsis- 
tent   agreement. 

Special  contract  giving  the 
seller  a  lien  not  a  waiver 
of   statutory  lien. 

Estoppel  to  set  up  lien  by 
taking  bill  of  sale. 

Waiver  by  claim  of  owner- 
ship  by   lienor. 

Refusal  to  deliver  property 
on  grounds  inconsistent 
with  a  lien. 

Lien  not  waived  by  failure 
to  assert  it. 

Claim  of  general  lien  no 
waiver   of   special    lien. 

Two  liens  for  the  same  debt. 

Lien  lost  if  the  claim  is 
mixed  with  other   claims. 

Lien  lost  by  merger  into 
judgment. 

Tender  of  actual  indebted- 
ness. 

Lien  not  extinguished  by 
tender  of  performance  of 
agreement. 

Lien  not  waived  by  giving 
receipt  for  property  with- 
out  reservation. 

Waiver  from  unintentional 
relinquishment  of  a  right 
not   known   to   exist. 

Nonperformance  of  con- 
tract. 


§  996 


LIENS. 


IOI4 


Sec. 

1030.  Use  of  property  for  its  pres- 

ervation. 

1031.  Waiver  of  a  lien  a  new^  con- 

sideration. 
10.32.  Effect    of    execution   of   con- 


Sec. 

tract  on  Sunday  on  right  to 

lien. 
1032a.  Lien    not   ordinarily   lost   by 

obtaining    a    judgment    for 

the  debt. 


§  996,  Introductory. — The  .subject  of  the  waiver  of  liens 
has  been  briefly  considered  in  connection  with  the  several 
kinds  of  liens  treated  of  in  the  preceding  chapters.  In  gen- 
eral it  was  intended  to  state  only  those  grounds  or  modes  of 
waiver  which  are  peculiar  to  the  lien  under  consideration,  or 
which  have  peculiar  application  to  such  lien.  Of  course 
waiver  by  surrender  of  possession  to  the  general  owner  has 
been  repeatedly  referred  to  in  connection  with  all  the  com- 
mon-law liens;  for  possession  is  the  foundation  of  such  liens, 
and  the  necessity  of  retaining  possession  in  order  to  preserve 
the  lien  has  been  repeatedly  referred  to.  But  there  are  many 
other  circumstances  under  which  liens  are  waived,  and  it 
has  seemed  best  to  treat  in  the  present  chapter  of  all  matters 
of  waiver  of  general  application  to  all  liens. 

§  997.  Common-law  lien  founded  upon  possession. — A 
common-law  lien  is  founded  upon  possession,  and  is  dis- 
solved by  a  voluntary  and  unconditional  surrender  of  the 
property  to  the  owner. ^  If  a  mechanic  surrenders  an  article 
made  or  repaired  for  another  without  payment,  he  loses  his 


1  King  V.  Indian  Orchard  Canal 
Co.,  11  Cush.  (Mass.)  231;  Stlck- 
ney  v.  Allen,  10  Gray  (Mass.)  352; 
Sears  v.  Wills,  4  Allen  (Mass.) 
212;  Huckins  v.  Gushing,  36  Maine 
423;  McFarland  v.  Wheeler,  26 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  467;  Wingard  v. 
Banning,  39  Gal.  543;  Sensenbren- 
ner  v.  Mathews,  48  Wis.  250,  3  N. 
W.  599,  33  Am.  Rep.  809;  Smith  v. 
Scott,  31  Wis.  420;  Vane  v.  New- 
combe,  132  U.  S.  220,  33  L.  ed.  310. 


10  Sup.  Ct.  60.  In  Kansas, 
it  is  provided  by  statute  that 
the  voluntary  delivery  to  the 
owner  or  claimant  of  any 
personal  property,  by  any  per- 
son claiming  a  lien  thereon,  shall 
be  held  to  be  an  abandonment  of 
such  lien,  and  such  lien  may  also 
be  waived  by  special  contract. 
Gen.  Stat.  1909,  §  4817.  See  ante, 
§§  308,  466,  519,  699,  821. 


IOI5  M'AIVER   OF   LIENS.  §    997 

lien  upon  it  at  common  law,  and  under  the  statutes  also,  un- 
less these  expressly  provide  for  the  continuance  of  the  lien 
for  a  limited  time  after  delivery  of  the  chattel  to  the  owner.^ 

But  the  lien  is  not  waived  by  returning  the  work  to  the 
owner  of  the  goods  for  inspection  before  receiving  payment, 
for,  by  so  producing  it,  no  unconditional  surrender  is  made 
or  intended.  "If  the  employee  was  wrongfully  refused  the 
right  to  resume  his  possession  after  the  inspection,  in  case 
the  employer  insisted  the  work  was  not  according  to  con- 
tract, he  would  not  be  remediless,  but  his  right  of  possession 
would  be  amply  protected  in  a  proper  action  therefor.^ 

If  the  owner  of  a  sawmill  permits  boards  sawed  by  him  to 
be  removed  from  his  mill-yard  by  the  owner  to  the  bank  of 
the  canal,  half  a  mile  distant  from  the  mill,  he  loses  his  lien 
as  against  third  persons ;  and  it  does  not  avail  him  that  the 
owner  expressly  stipulated  with  him  that  the  lien  should  con- 
tinue notwithstanding  the  removal.^  And  so  the  millowner 
loses  his  lien  for  sawing  by  allowing  the  owner  of  the  lum- 
ber to  remove  it  to  a  shed  belonging  to  a  third  person,  and 
over  which  the  millowner  has  no  control.^ 

A  blacksmith  repaired  a  sled,  and  refused  to  give  it  up 
until  his  charges  should  be  paid.  Thereupon  the  owner 
agreed  that  the  sled  should  be  the  property  of  the  black- 
smith until  the  latter  should  be  fully  paid,  and  the  owner  was 
allowed  to  take  and  keep  the  sled.  It  was  afterwards  at- 
tached as  his  property.     It  was  held  that  the  blacksmith  had 

2  McDougall  V.  Crapon,  95  N.  App.  298,  30  Pac.  355.  A  lienhold- 
Car.  292.  The  manager  of  a  bus-  er  in  possession  does  not  lose  his 
iness  having  a  lien  thereon  for  right  to  claim  the  property  where 
advances  does  not  lose  possession  it  is  seized  under  an  execution 
so  as  to  waive  his  lien  by  trans-  against  the  owner,  by  purchasing 
ferring  the  property  to  a  trus-  it  at  execution  sale.  Brown  v. 
tee  to  hold  until   the  lien  is  paid  Petersen,  25  App.  D.  C.  359. 

for  the  trustee's  possession  is  his  *  McFarland      v.      Wheeler,      26 

possession.     Dewing  v.  Hutton,  40  Wend.   (N.  Y.)  467. 

W.  Va.  521,  21  S.   E.  780.  5  Bailey   v.    Quint,   22   Vt.   474. 

3  Hillsburg  v.   Harrison,  2  Colo. 


§    99^  LIENS.  IOI6 

lost  his  lien  by  voluntarily  parting  with  the  possession  of  the 
sled.« 

A  lien  upon  grain  harvested  and  thrashed  is  not  waived  as 
against  an  attaching  creditor  of  the  owner  with  knowledge 
of  the  lien  by  leaving  it  on  the  premises  of  the  owner  in 
charge  of  a  third  person." 

§  998.  Contract  lien  not  discharged  by  owner  taking  pos- 
session.— A  lien  created  by  contract  is  not  discharged  by 
permitting  the  general  owner  to  take  possession  of  the  prop- 
erty, if  it  may  be  done  consistently  with  the  contract,  the 
course  of  business,  and  the  intention  of  the  parties.^  Thus, 
under  a  provision  of  a  contract  for  sawing  lumber,  that  the 
quantity  should  be  determined  by  the  sales,  or  by  inspection 
at  the  place  of  shipment,  some  five  miles  from  the  mill,  it 
was  held  that  the  removal  of  the  lumber  to  the  place  of  ship- 
ment, and  such  inchoate  and  conditional  possession  as  might 
be  taken  by  the  purchaser  as  the  inspection  proceeded,  would 
not  cut  off  the  lien.^ 

But  if  the  conduct  of  the  lienholder  be  inconsistent  with 
the  preservation  of  his  lien,  it  will  be  presumed  that  he  in- 
tended to  waive  it.  Thus,  if  a  person  has  a  lien  upon  logs 
for  driving  them  into  a  boom,  and  afterwards,  with  knowl- 
edge that  the  owner  has  sold  them,  assists  the  purchaser  to 
take  possession  of  the  logs  for  the  purpose  of  having  them 
sawed  and  converted  to  his  own  use,  without  making  known 
that  he  had  any  lien  or  claim  upon  them,  he  will  be  regarded 
as  having  waived  or  abandoned  his  lien.^° 

And  so  if  a  lien  claimant  acquiesces  in  the  action  of  a  third 
person  in   taking  possession  of  the  property  on  exception, 

<>  Kitteridge   v.    Freeman,   48   Vt.  ^  Chadwick     v.      Broadwell,      27 

62.  Mich.  6,  Campbell,  J.,  dissenting. 

"*  Hogue   V.    Sheriff,   1   Wash.   T.  if  Spaulding  v.  Adams,  32  Maine 

172.  211. 

8  Spaulding  v.  Adams,  32  Maine 
211. 


I0I7  WAIVER   OF   LIENS.  §    lOOO 

without  notifying  him  of  his  own  adverse  claim,  he  waives 
his  lien.^^ 

§  999.  Intention  as  effecting  waiver. — A  common-law  lien 
is  created  by  implication,  and  it  may  be  waived  by  implica- 
tion. But  it  is  always  competent  to  negative  an  implied 
waiver  by  showing  by  other  facts  that  no  waiver  was  in- 
tended.^- An  intention  to  waive  a  lien  will  not  be  pre- 
sumed, in  the  absence  of  evidence  clearly  tending  to  show 
such  an  intention. ^^ 

A  lien  which  is  not  given  by  operation  of  law,  but  created 
by  express  contract,  can  be  waived  only  by  acts  done  with 
the  intention  of  discharging  the  lien.^^  A  lien  expressly  re- 
served is  not  impliedly  waived  by  giving  credit  or  taking 
other  security.^^ 

An  agreement  to  deliver  up  the  property  is  not  in  this  re- 
spect equivalent  to  an  actual  delivery  of  it,  unless  the  agree- 
ment be  based  on  a  legal  consideration,  so  as  to  be  obliga- 
tory.^^ 

§  1000.  Lien  once  lost  not  regained. — A  lien  once  lost  by 
parting  with  possession  of  the  property  can  not  be  restored 
by  regaining  possession,  unless  this  be  with  the  consent  or 
agreement  of  the  owner. ^'^     Thus  the  lien  of  a  seller  is  lost 

11  McMaster  v.  Merrick,  41  i^  Montieth  v.  Great  Western 
Mich.  505,  2  N.  W.  895.  Printing  Co.,  16  Mo.  App.  450. 

12  Pratt  V.  Eaton,  65  Mo.  157,  i6  Danforth  v.  Pratt,  42  Maine 
1'65 ;  Montieth  v.  Great  Western  50.  "A  lien  must  be  regarded  as 
Printing  Co.,  16  Mo.  App.  450.  The  something  of  value.  It  may  be 
burden  rests  on  a  vendee  who  re-  given  up  without  any  valuable 
sists  the  enforcement  of  a  ven-  consideration.  But  an  agreement 
dor's  lien,  to  show  that  the  lien  to  give  it  up,  in  order  to  be  ob- 
was  intentionally  waived  or  re-  ligatory,  must  be  based  on  a  legal 
linquished.  Cook  v.  Atkins,  173  consideration."  Sugg  v.  Farrar, 
Ala.  363,  56  So.  224.  107  N.  Car.  123,  12  S.  E.  236. 

13  Muench  v.  Valley  Nat.  Bank,  ^''  Cowell  v.  Simpson,  16  Ves. 
11   Mo.  App.   144.  275;   Hewison  v.   Guthrie,  2   Bing. 

14  Smith  V.  Scott,  31  Wis.  420.  N.  Cas.  755;  Hartley  v.  Hitchcock, 


§    lOOI  LIENS,  IO18 

by  delivering  the  goods  to  the  purchaser;  yet,  if  the  posses- 
sion be  afterwards  redelivered  to  the  seller  for  the  express 
purpose  of  rendering  it  subject  to  the  lien,  this  is  revived 
from  that  time,  and  will  continue  so  long  as  the  vendor  re- 
tains possession. ^^ 

§  1001.  Delivery  of  part. — One  who  has  a  lien  upon  goods 
in  his  possession  does  not,  by  delivering  to  the  owner  a  part 
of  them,  waive  his  lien  for  his  whole  demand  upon  the  re- 
maining part.^^ 

§  1002.  No  lien  where  parties  make  special  contract  in- 
consistent with  a  lien. — There  can  be  no  lien,  at  common 
law  or  by  usage,  where  the  parties  make  a  special  agreement 
inconsistent  with  a  lien,  either  for  a  particular  mode  of  pay- 
ment, or  for  payment  at  a  future  particular  time,  although 
without  such  agreement  the  right  to  a  lien  would  be  implied 
or  recognized.  If  such  agreement  is  antecedent  to  the  pos- 
session, no  lien  is  created;  if  it  is  made  afterwards,  the  lien 
is  waived. ^*^ 

A  contract  whereby  a  sawmill  was  leased  without  rent  for 

1  Stark.  408;  Holderness  v.  Shack-  Chandler  v.   Belden,  16  Johns.  157, 

els,  3  M.  &  R.  25,  8  B.  &  C.  612;  9  Am.    Dec.    193;    Burdict   v.    Mur- 

Au  Sable  River  Boom  Co.  v.  San-  ray,   3    Vt.    302,   21    Am.    Dec.    588; 

born,  36  Mich.  358;  Nevan  V.  Roup,  Pinney    v.    Wells,    10    Conn.    104; 

8  Iowa  207.     See  ante,  §§  310,  469.  Darlington      v.      Chamberlain,     20 

18  Huff  V.  Earl,  3   Ind.  306.  111.    App.    443;    Lee    v.    Gould,    47 

19  Palmer  v.  Tucker,  45  Maine  Pa.  St.  398;  Pulis  v.  Sanborn,  52 
316;  McFarland  v.  Wheeler,  26  Pa.  St.  368.  A  vendor  who  has 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  467.  See  ante,  §§  320,  agreed  to  waive  his  lien  is  es- 
411.  topped  to  assert  it  against  a  mort- 

20  Raitt  v.  Mitchell,  4  Campb.  gage  thereafter  executed.  Wil- 
146,  149;  Crawshay  v.  Homfray,  son  v.  Shocklee,  94  Ark.  301,  126 
4  B.  &  Aid.  50;  Blake  v.  Nichol-  S.  W.  832.  For  evidence  held  to 
son,  3  M.  &  S.  167,  168;  Bailey  v.  show  that  a  vendor  did  not  agree 
Adams,  14  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  201;  Dun-  to  waive  his  lien  see  Wittliff  v. 
ham  V.  Pettee,  1  Daly  (N.  Y.)  112,  Biscoe,  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  128  S.  W. 
Seld.  Notes  154;  Trust  v.  Pirsson,  1  1153.  See  ante,  §§  322,  325,  522. 
Hilton    (N.   Y.)   292,   per   Daly,   J.; 


IOI9  WAIVER   OF    LIENS.  §     I002 

the  sawing  season,  but  the  lessees  were  to  saw  all  logs  fur- 
nished by  the  lessor  at  certain  prices,  and  were  to  season  and 
ship  the  lumber  as  ordered,  was  held  to  be  inconsistent  with 
a  lien  for  the  sawing  and  other  work  done  by  the  lessees ;  for 
the  prices  at  which  the  work  was  to  be  done  could  not  be 
considered  as  independent  of  the  use  of  the  mill,  and  the 
rental  value  could  not  be  apportioned  on  the  price  of  sawing, 
because  it  could  not  be  determined  how  much  sawing  was  to 
be  done.  Moreover,  the  work  was  to  continue  until  the  end 
of  the  lease,  when  the  lessees  would  be  bound  to  quit,  and 
could  not  remain  on  the  premises  to  enforce  the  lien ;  and 
the  obligation  to  ship  was  unlimited,  and  might  exhaust  the 
whole  of  the  lumber.-^ 

A  provision  in  a  contract  for  sawing  lumber,  that  the  bill 
for  sawing  should  be  paid  "as  often  as  once  a  month  after  the 
lumber  is  delivered  out  of  the  mill,"  was  held  not  to  be  in- 
consistent with  a  lien.  From  the  whole  contract  the  manu- 
facturer was  regarded  as  entitled  to  payment  before  any 
lumber  could  be  taken  from  his  possession,  and  as  entitled  to 
monthly  payments  on  inspections  to  be  made  at  the  place  of 
shipment,  whether  sales  were  actually  made  or  not.-- 

And  so  an  agreement  by  a  woollen  manufacturer  to  dress 
what  flannels  should  be  furnished  him  by  the  other  party  dur- 
ing the  year,  and  to  receive  his  pay  quarterly,  is  a  waiver  of  a 
lien  upon  the  cloth ;  and  if  some  of  the  cloth  remains  in  the 
manufacturer's  hands  at  the  end  of  the  quarter,  he  is  not  en- 
titled to  retain  it  for  the  price  of  dressing  it.^^ 

21  McAIaster  v.  Merrick,  41  operation  of  a  lien  is  to  place  the 
Mich.  505,  2  N.  W.  895.  property    in    pledge    for    the    pay- 

22  Chadwick  v.  Broadwell,  27  ment  of  the  debt;  and  where  the 
Mich.  6,  Campbell,  J.,  dissenting.  party  agrees  to  give  time  of  pay- 
See,  also,  Cardinal  v.  Edwards,  5  ment,  or  agrees  to  receive  pay- 
Nev.  36.  ment  in  a  particular  mode,  incon- 

23  Stoddard  Woollen  Manufac-  sistent  with  the  existence  of  such 
tory  V.  Huntley,  8  N.  H.  441,  31  a  pledge,  it  is  evidence,  if  nothing 
Am.  Dec.  198.  Judge  Parker,  de-  appears  to  the  contrary,  that  he 
livering  the  judgment,  said :  "The  did    not    intend    to    rely    upon    the 


§    I003  LIENS.  I020 

In  case  of  a  statutory  Hen  which  exists  for  only  a  definite 
period  after  it  is  acquired,  unless  proceedings  be  commenced 
within  such  period  for  its  enforcement,  it  follows  that  if  the 
person  claiming  a  lien  has  taken  his  debtor's  promissory 
note,  which  does  not  mature  till  the  expiration  of  the  time 
within  which  proceedings  for  enforcing  the  lien  may  be  com- 
menced, the  taking  of  the  note  is  a  waiver  of  the  lien.-'* 

§  1003.  Lien  excluded  by  special  contract  for  payment  at 
a  future  time. — A  special  agreement  for  a  lien,  which  pro- 
vides for  payment  at  a  future  time  or  in  a  particular  mode, 
generally  excludes  an  implied  lien.  If  such  agreement  is 
made  before  the  claimant  acquires  possession,  the  common- 
law  right  of  lien,  which  otherwise  would  be  implied,  does  not 
attach;  and  if  such  agreement  be  made  after  the  claimant 
has  acquired  possession,  and  this  lien  has  attached,  it  is 
thereby  waived.  In  such  case  there  is  no  lien  at  all,  unless  it 
is  expressly  provided  for  by  the  contract. ^-^  Thus,  by  agree- 
ment one  was  to  have  the  right  to  store,  repair,  and  sell 
pianofortes  in  a  store,  without  exclusive  possession,  but  in 
common  with  the  owner,  and  for  the  privilege  he  was  to  pay 
the  owner  a  certain  sum  per  month  at  the  expiration  of  each 
month.  In  a  suit  to  enforce  a  lien  upon  the  pianos,  this 
agreement  was  held  to  exclude  any  lien  for  the  amount  due. 
"The  distinction,"  said  Judge  Daly,^^  "that  there  can  be  no 
lien  where  the  day  or  time  for  payment  is  regulated  and 
fixed  by  the  parties,  is  as  old  as  the  year  books,  and  it  is 
manifest  that  the  law  could  not  be  otherwise.  The  right  to 
detain  all  the  property  to  which  the  lien  attaches,  until  the 
charge  upon  it  is  paid,  is  incident  to  the  right  of  lien.  When, 
then,  did  the  lien  in  this  case  attach?     Certainly  not  when 

pledge    of    the    goods,    in    relation  25  Trust  v.  Pirsson,  1  Hilton  (N. 

to  which  the  debt  arose,  to  secure  Y.)   292,  3  Abb.   Pr.   (N.   Y.)  84. 

the    payment."  20  Trust  v.  Pirsson,  1  Hilton  (N. 

24  Peyroux    v.    Howard,     7     Pet.  Y.)   292. 
(U.  S.)  324,  8  L.  ed.  700;  Green  v. 
Fox,  7  Allen  (Mass.)  85. 


I02I  WAIVER   OF    LIENS.  §    IOO4 

the  possession  commenced,  for  no  payment  was  to  be  made 
until  a  month  after.  During  that  time  the  defendant  had  a 
right,  under  the  agreement,  to  sell  any  of  his  pianos  that 
might  be  there,  and  of  course  to  deliver  them  to  the  buyers, 
for  the  plaintiff  could  set  up  no  claim  to  action  then,  nothing 
being  due.  The  contract,  therefore,  went  into  operation 
with  a  recognition  of  rights  on  the  part  of  the  defendant 
wholly  inconsistent  with  a  reservation  of  a  right  of  lien.  It 
was  nothing  else  but  an  agreement  for  the  use  of  the  store 
for  a  certain  period,  at  so  much  per  month,  for  the  prosecu- 
tion of  a  particular  business  by  the  defendant,  and  gave  the 
plaintiff  no  lien  upon  the  property  which  the  defendant  had 
there  in  the  prosecution  of  that  business,  but,  by  its  nature 
and  terms,  was  wholly  inconsistent  with  the  existence  of 
such  a  right." 

§  1004.  Principle  extended  to  cases  where  credit  is 
claimed  without  special  contract. — This  principle  has  been 
extended  to  cases  where  a  credit  might  be  claimed  by  cus- 
tom, without  any  special  agreement  for  it.  Thus,  in  a  case 
where  a  ship  was  taken  to  a  dock  for  repairs,  and  great  ex- 
pense was  incurred  by  the  shipwright,  and  it  was  shown  that 
by  usage  the  shipowner  might  demand  a  credit,  it  was  held 
that  there  was  no  lien  for  the  repairs.-^  And  so,  where  a 
wharfinger  was  in  the  habit  of  receiving  goods,  upon  which 
he  might  have  had  a  lien,  but  the  course  of  business  was  that 
he  parted  with  the  goods  from  time  to  time,  receiving  pay- 
ment at  the  end  of  every  six  months,  or  every  year,  for  all 
his  dues,  it  was  held  that  this  course  of  business  prevented 
him  from  maintaining  his  right  of  lien.-^ 

But  where  the  course  of  business  with  an  insurance  broker 
was  to  make  out  monthly  accounts,  and  to  settle  the  amounts 
due  for  each  month  at  the  commencement  of  the  following 

2T  Raitt    V.    Mitchell,    4    Camph.  28  Crawshay  v.  Homfray,  4  B.  & 

146.  Aid.  50. 


§     I005  LIENS.  I022 

month,  the  broker  meanwhile  retaining  the  policies,  it  was 
held  that  this  course  of  business  was  not  inconsistent  with 
the  retention  of  his  lien.-^  Lord  Cairns,  Lord  Chancellor, 
remarked,  in  giving  judgment,  that  "if  it  had  been  the  course 
of  business  here  for  the  insurance  broker  not  merely  to  effect 
these  policies,  but  from  time  to  time  to  give  them  up  as  they 
were  effected,  and  simply  to  stand  upon  his  right  to  be  paid 
at  the  end  of  the  month,  then  I  can  understand  that  the  case 
would  be  like  that  of  Crawshay  v.  Homfra^^"^" 

§  1005.  Effect  of  express  agreement  to  give  credit. — An 
express  agreement  to  give  credit  has  the  same  effect  as  a 
credit  given  by  note  or  other  obligation.  Thus,  where  a  me- 
chanic made  repairs  upon  certain  stage-coaches  under  an 
agreement  to  give  four  months'  credit  upon  the  bill  from  the 
time  of  completion  of  the  repairs,  it  was  held  that  he  had  no 
lien  for  the  repairs  though  the  owner  became  insolvent  be- 
fore the  coaches  passed  out  of  the  possession  of  the  me- 
chanics^ 

§  1006.  An  agreement  for  credit  by  note  conditional  upon 
the  giving  of  the  note. — An  agreement  to  take  the  debtor's 
note,  or  the  independent  security  of  a  third  person,  falling 
due  at  a  day  beyond  the  period  within  which  the  lien  must  be 
asserted,  is  no  waiver  of  the  lien,  when  the  agreement  is  not 

29  Fisher  v.   Smith,  39  L.  T.  430.  er.     Neither   the   solvency  nor   in- 

304  B.  &  Aid.  50.  solvency    of    the    latter     can     be 

31  Fieldings    v.     Mills,    2    Bosw^.  deemed    an    element    in    the    crea- 

(N.     Y.)     489,     498.     "There     is     a  tion    of    the    right    of    lien    which 

marked     difiference,     in    some    re-  exists    in    favor    of    the    mechanic, 

spects,"    said     Bosw^orth,    J.,    "be-  No  lien  exists  in  favor  of  the  lat- 

tween    the    right    of    stoppage    in  ter,    v^^hen    his    services    are    per- 

transitu  and  that  of  a  mechanic  to  formed    upon    an    agreement    that 

detain.     Insolvency    alone    creates  payment    for    them    is    not    to    be 

the  right  to  stop,  in  transitu.    The  made  until  after  the  article  which 

common-law  right  of  the  mechan-  they  have    improved    is   to   be   de- 

ic  to  detain,  arises  as  well  against  livered." 
a  solvent  as  an  insolvent  employ- 


I023  WAIVER    OF    LIENS.  §     lOO/ 

performed  by  the  debtor.  To  hold  otherwise  would  be  to 
say  that  the  person  entitled  to  a  lien  intended  to  waive  it 
whether  the  debtor  kept  his  agreement  to  give  his  note  or 
collateral  security  or  not.  On  the  debtor's  failure  to  keep  his 
agreement  the  creditor  ought  not  to  be  bound  by  it.  but 
should  be  remitted  to  his  rights,  independently  of  the  con- 
tract.^- Thus,  an  agreement  to  extend  the  time  of  payment 
of  a  claim  beyond  the  time  within  which  a  mechanic's  lien 
should  be  asserted,  provided  a  mortgage  should  be  given, 
will  not  defeat  the  lien  if  the  mortgage  be  not  given.  The 
giving  of  the  mortgage  is  a  condition  precedent. ^^ 

In  like  manner,  if  the  parties  agree  to  settle  a  claim  for 
work  upon  a  steamboat,  for  which  there  is  a  right  of  lien,  by 
the  debtor's  note  extending  the  time  of  payment  beyond  the 
time  allowed  for  asserting  the  lien,  the  lien  is  not  displaced 
if  the  note  be  not  given  in  pursuance  of  the  agreement.  The 
credit  is  conditional  upon  the  debtor's  giving  the  note.  On 
his  neglecting  or  refusing  to  give  the  note,  the  credit  ceases, 
and  the  demand  becomes  immediately  due  and  payable. ^^ 

§  1007.     Waiver  of  lien  by   conditional   agreement. — An 

agreement  by  a  mechanic  to  do  certain  labor,  in  considera- 
tion of  being  employed  to  do  other  labor,  is  inconsistent  with 
a  right  of  lien,  and  is  a  waiver  of  it.  Thus,  a  printer  who 
agreed  to  repair  and  alter  certain  stereotype  plates,  in  con- 
sideration of  being  allowed  to  do  the  owner's  printing  for  an 
indefinite  time,  has  no  lien  on  the  plates,  on  account  of  the 
repairs  and  alterations,  when,  after  several  years,  the  owner 
withdraws  the  printing  from  him.^^  In  such  case  it  might 
properly  be  presumed  that  the  pay  received  by  the  printer 
for  the  other  work  performed  was  a  remuneration  for  his 

32  Chicago  &  Alton  R.  Co.  v.  34  The  Highlander,  4  Blatch.  (U. 
Union    Rolling    Mill    Co.,    109    U.      S.)  55,  Fed.  Cas.  6475. 

S.   702,   27   L.    ed.    1081,   3   Sup.    Ct.  35  Stickney    v.    Allen,     10     Gray 

594.  (Mass.)  352. 

33  Gardner  v.   Hall,  29  HI.  277. 


$     I008  LIENS.  1024 

labor  done  upon  the  plates;  and  at  any  rate,  this  is  the  re- 
muneration which  the  printer  agreed  to  take. 

§  1008.  Effect  of  agreement  to  pay  in  advance. — The  fact 
that  by  a  special  agreement  payment  is  to  be  made  in  ad- 
vance does  not  affect  the  right  of  lien  where  the  debtor  neg- 
lects or  refuses  to  make  such  payment. ^^ 

§  1009.  Taking  debtor's  note  not  a  waiver. — The  taking 
of  a  debtor's  promissory  note,  or  acceptance,  for  the  amount 
of  a  debt  secured  by  a  lien,  is  not  necessarily  a  waiver  of  the 
lien ;  for,  by  the  general  commercial  law,  a  promissory  note 
or  acceptance  given  for  a  precedent  debt  does  not  operate 
as  payment,  unless  the  parties  agree  that  it  shall  have  this 
effect.3^ 

If,  however,  the  debtor's  promissory  note  or  acceptance  be 
payable  at  a  future  day,  the  lien  is  generally  regarded  as 
waived;  for  it  can  not  be  presumed  that  the  parties  intended 
that  the  lien  should  be  extended  through  any  considerable 
period,  but,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  goods  or  other  prop- 
erty should  be  delivered  up  immediately.^^ 

Where  a  lien  claimant  knows  that  the  property  upon  which 
he  claims  a  lien  has  been  sold,  and  assents  to  the  sale  by  set- 
ting the  property  apart  and  marking  it  with  the  purchaser's 
initials,  and  takes  the  seller's  note  for  the  amount  of  the 
lien  claim,  he  can  not  afterwards  claim  the  lien  as  against 

36  Ruggles  V.  Walker,  34  Vt.  468.  316;    Butts    v.    Cuthbertson,    6    Ga. 

3T  De  Wolf  V.   Holland,  2  Paine  166;  First    Nat.    Bank    v.    Wm.    R. 

(U.   S.)  356,   Fed.   Cas.  3852;   Kim-  Trigg   Co.,    106    Va.   327,   56   S.    E. 

ball  V.  Ship  Anna  Kimball,  2  Cliff.  158;  Beall  v.  Hudson  County  Wa- 

(U.  S.)  4,  affd.  3  Wall.  (U.  S.)  i7,  ter    Co.,    185    Fed.    179.     See    ante, 

18  L.  ed.  50;  The  Skillinger.  1  Flip.  §  324. 

(U.   S.)   436,    Fed.    Cas.    No.    12181 ;  38  Cowell    v.    Simpson,    16    Ves. 

Lessels  v.  Farnsworth,  3  How.  Pr.  275;  East  v.  Ferguson,  59  Ind.  169; 

(N.  S.)  7Z,  affd.  3  How.  Prac.    (N.  Au  Sable  River  Boom  Co.  v.  San- 

S.)    (N.   Y.)    364;    Myers   v.    Upte-  born,    36    Mich.     358;     Murphy    v. 

grove,  3  How.  Pr.   (N.  S.)   (N.  Y.)  Lippe.  3  J.  &  S.  (N.  Y.)  542. 


I025 


WAIVER   OF    LIENS. 


lOIO 


the  purchaser.  Thus,  where  a  millowner,  knowing  that  the 
lumber  to  be  sawed  from  the  logs  has  been  sold,  saws  them 
according  to  the  purchaser's  directions,  separately  piles  the 
lumber,  and  marks  it  with  his  initials,  and  accepts  the  seller's 
note  for  the  price  of  sawing,  he  thereby  waives  his  right  to  a 
lien  on  the  lumber. ^^ 

In  pleading  a  waiver  by  taking  the  debtor's  promissory 
note  payable  at  a  future  day,  it  should  be  alleged  that  the 
note  was  taken  in  payment.'*'-* 

If  the  creditor  gives  a  receipt  in  full  upon  taking  the  debt- 
or's note  for  the  amount  of  a  lien  debt,  while  the  receipt  is 
prima  facie  evidence  of  payment  and  a  discharge  of  the  lien, 
it  is  not  necessarily  so;  for  the  receipt  is  not  an  estoppel,  but 
is  open  to  explanation.  It  may  be  shown  that  there  was  no 
intention  of  surrendering  the  lien.^^ 

§  1010.     Note  taken  as  payment  a  waiver  of  right  to  lien. 

But  where  a  note  is  regarded  as  payment,  unless  a  contrary 
intention  be  shown,  the  acceptance  of  a  promissory  note  for 
the  amount  for  which  a  lien  is  claimed  is  a  discharge  of  the 
lien.^^  The  taking  of  a  promissory  note  for  the  claim  is  such 
a  manifestation  of  intention  to  rely  upon  the  personal  secur- 
ity of  the  maker  of  the  note  that  a  waiver  of  the  lien  is  in- 
ferred, whether  the  note  be  payable  on  demand  or  at  a  future 
time,  and  whether  negotiated  or  not.^^  The  taking  of  a  note 
will  not  have  this  effect  if  the  parties  agree  that  it  shall  not 


39  Tyler  v.  Blodgett  &  Davis 
Lumber  Co.,  78  Mich.  81,  43  N.  W. 
1034. 

40  East  V.  Ferguson,  59  Ind.  169. 

41  Sutton  V.  The  Albatross,  2 
Wall.  Jr.  327,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  13645,  1 
Phila.  (Pa.)  423.  Where  a  lien  is 
released  through  fraud  or  mistake 
equity  will  restore  it  unless  to  do 
so  will  injuriously  affect  the 
rights  of  third  persons.     Seymour 


V.  Alkire,  47  W.  Va.  302,  34  S.   E. 
953. 

42  Coburn  v.  Kerswell,  35  Maine 
126;  Gren  v.  Fox,  7  Allen  (Mass.) 
85;  Hutchins  v.  Olcutt,  4  Vt.  549, 
24  Am.  Dec.  634;  Kimball  v.  Ship 
Anna  Kimball,  2  Cliff  (U.  S.)  4, 
affirmed  3  Wall.  (U.  S.)  37,  18  L. 
ed.  50.     See  ante,  §  324. 

43  Hutchins  V.  Olcutt,  4  Vt.  549, 
24  Am.  Dec.  634. 


65 


lOII 


LIENS. 


1026 


be  a  satisfaction  of  the  debt.  It  is  in  such  case  a  mere  liqui- 
dation or  adjustment  of  the  original  debt.  But  if  the  cred- 
itor indorses  such  note  for  value,  he  can  not,  while  the  note 
is  outstanding,  enforce  his  lien  against  the  original  debtor.^^ 
The  taking  of  a  note  of  a  third  person,  for  the  amount  of 
a  debt  secured  by  a  lien,  does  not  discharge  the  lien  if  it  be 
expressly  agreed,  in  a  receipt  for  the  note,  that  it  should  not 
be  regarded  as  payment  until  paid.  The  note  in  such  case  is 
taken  conditionally.^^  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  note  be 
taken  in  discharge  of  the  lien  debt,  the  lien  is  lost.^® 

§  1011.  Taking  security  does  not  destroy  lien. — The  mere 
taking  of  security  for  the  amount  of  a  debt  for  which  a  lien  is 
claimed  does  not  ordinarily  destroy  the  lien.  To  have  this 
effect  there  must  be  something  in  the  facts  of  the  case,  or  in 
the  nature  of  the  security  taken,  which  is  inconsistent  with 
the  existence  of  the  lien,  and  destructive  of  it.^''^  Some  gen- 
eral expressions  of  Lord  Eldon,  in  his  judgment  in  the  case 
of  Cowell  v.  Simpson, ^^  seem  to  support  the  view  that  a  spe- 


■*4Morton  v.  Austin,  12  Cush. 
(Mass.)  389. 

45  Prentiss  v.  Garland,  67  Maine 
345. 

40  Button  V.  New  England  Mut. 
Fire  Ins.  Co.,  29  N.  H.  153. 

4'  Angus  V.  McLachlan,  23  Ch. 
Div.  330,  per  Kay,  J.;  Myers  v. 
Humphries  (Tex.),  47  S.  W.  812; 
Ohio  Falls  Car  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Cen- 
tral Trust  Co.,  71  Fed.  916,  18  C. 
C.  A.  386.  One  who  accepts  notes 
for  his  saw  bill  and  agrees  that 
the  owner  may  sell  the  lumber 
and  pay  the  notes  from  the  pro- 
ceeds waives  his  lien.  Germain  v. 
Central  Lumber  Co.,  120  Mich.  61, 
78  N.  W.  1007.  See  also,  Darling 
V.  Hunt,  46  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  631,  61 
N.  Y.  S.  278.  Where  it  is  held  that 
where   a   livery    stable   keeper   ac- 


cepts a  cash  payment  and  a  chattel 
mortgage  for  the  balance  of  his 
bill  and  allows  the  owner  to  take 
possession  of  his  horse  and  buggy 
he  waives  his  lien.  Where  the 
lienor  does  an  act  manifesting  an 
intention  not  to  rely  on  his  lien, 
such  as  taking  security  therefor 
not  reserving  a  right  to  still  hold 
his  lien  he  will  be  held  to  have 
lost  his  lien.  Finnell  v.  Finnell, 
156  Cal.  589,  105  Pac.  740,  134  Am. 
St.  143.  Taking  collateral  secur- 
ity will  waive  a  lien.  Buffalo 
Oolitic  Limestone  Quarries  Co.  v. 
Davis,  45  Ind.  App.  116,  90  N.  E. 
327;  Spears  v.  Taylor,  149  Ala.  180, 
42  So.  1016. 

48  16  Ves.  275,  279.  In  another 
case,  Balch  v.  Symes,  T.  &  R.  87, 
92,    Lord    Eldon    says:     "Notwith- 


1027  WAIVER   OF    LIENS.  §    I0I2 

cial  agreement  for  security,  or  the  taking  of  security,  is  of 
itself  a  waiver  of  a  lien  for  the  debt  secured.  "My  opinion," 
he  said,  ''therefore  is,  that,  where  these  special  agreements 
are  taken,  the  lien  does  not  remain;  and  whether  the  securi- 
ties are  due  or  not,  makes  no  difference."  But  in  the  case 
before  him  the  security  was  taken  by  a  solicitor  who  had  a 
lien  on  his  client's  paper,  and  the  security  was  in  the  form  of 
promissory  notes  which  were  payable  in  three  years,  and  it 
was  very  properly  held  that  the  security  was  in  its  nature 
inconsistent  with  the  retention  of  a  lien.  That  was  the  case 
decided,  and  it  must  be  presumed  that  the  fact  of  the  long 
credit  given  was  the  reason  why  Lord  Eldon  held  the  lien  to 
have  been  lost,  rather  than  the  fact  of  the  giving  of  se- 
curity.*^ 

In  the  case  of  Angus  v.  McLachlan  above  cited,  an  inn- 
keeper accepted  from  a  guest,  as  security  for  his  bill,  a  letter 
whereby  he  charged  his  interest  in  a  certain  ship  with  the 
payment  of  any  account  due  or  to  become  due.  The  inn- 
keeper subsequently  locked  up  the  guest's  room  and  detained 
his  goods.  It  was  held  that  the  taking  of  this  security  was 
no  waiver  of  the  innkeeper's  lien. 

§  1012.     Equitable  lien  not  waived  by  taking  legal  lien. — 

When  an  equitable  lien  has  once  arisen  and  there  is  no  ex- 
press waiver,  it  is  not  waived  by  the  subsequent  taking  of  a 
legal  and  perfected  lien  to  the  same  extent  and  upon  the 
same  property,  nor  is  the  equitable  merged  in  the  legal  lien. 
Thus,  if  there  be  an  agreement  to  give  a  mortgage,  and 
afterwards  a  mortgage  be  delivered  which  is  void  as  against 

standing  the  Court  of  King's  ■^^  That  taking  a  security  pay- 
Bench  has  expressed  a  doubt,  able  at  a  distant  day  is  a  waiver 
whether  my  decision  was  right  in  of  a  lien,  see  also,  Hewison  v. 
the  case  of  Cowell  v.  Simpson,  I  Guthrie,  3  Scott  298,  2  Bing.  N.  C. 
still  entertain  the  opinion,  that  an  755;  Mason  v.  Morley,  34  Beav. 
attorney  who  takes  a  security  471 ;  Cood  v.  Pollard,  10  Price,  109, 
abandons  his  lien."  9  Price  544. 


§    IOI3  LIENS.  1028 

a  purchaser  or  incumbrancer  because  not  properly  executed, 
the  creditor  may  rely  upon  the  agreement  which  created  an 
equitable  lien,  and  this  will  prevail  against  a  mechanic's  lien 
which  has  intervened  between  the  agreement  and  the  exe- 
cuted mortgage. ^^  "The  equitable  lien  has  had,  in  the  case 
in  hand,  an  existence.  There  has  been  no  express  waiver  of 
it.  The  law  is  not  anxious  to  imply  a  waiver.  Whether  it 
has  ceased  to  exist,  depends  upon  the  rules  of  equity,  which 
determine  whether  a  merger  has  taken  place.  It  is  a  general 
rule  that,  where  an  equitable, and  legal  estate  meet  and  vest 
in  the  same  ownership,  the  former  is  merged  in  the  latter. 
But  the  doctrine  of  merger,  as  applied  to  mortgages,  is 
founded  upon  equitable  principles,  and  is  only  applied  where 
equity  requires  that  it  should  be.  Where  the  owner  of  the 
legal  and  equitable  titles  has  an  interest  in  keeping  those 
titles  distinct,  as  where  there  is  an  intervening  incumbrance, 
he  has  a  right  so  to  keep  them,  and  the  equitable  title  will 
not  be  merged  and  thereby  extinguished;  so  that,  even  if  we 
should  treat  the  right  obtained  by  the  mortgage,  after  its 
due  acknowledgment  and  recording,  as  a  legal  one,  the 
equitable  lien  would  not  have  been  extinguished  thereby. 
Still  less  so,  when  we  consider  that  both  are  liens  of  the 
same  character,  both  equitable  in  their  nature,  one  implied, 
the  other  express. "^^ 

§  1013.  Lien  not  displaced  by  mortgage. — The  taking  of 
a  mortgage  upon  the  same  property  upon  which  the  creditor 
claims  a  statutory  lien  may  not  displace  the  lien.  The  mort- 
gage is  regarded  as  a  cumulative  security;  and  the  creditor 
may  enforce  either  the  lien  or  the  mortgage. ''- 

So,  also,  the  taking  of  the  collateral  obligation  of  another 
person  for  the  payment  of  the  lien  debt  does  not  ordinarily 

50  Payne  v.  Wilson,  74  N.  Y.  348,  52  Roberts  v.  Wilcoxson,  36  Ark. 
affg.  11  Hun  (N.  Y.)  302.                         355;  Franklin  v.  Meyer,  36  Ark.  96. 

51  Folger,   J.,    in    Payne   v. 'Wil- 
son, 74  N.  Y.  348. 


1029 


WAIVER   OF    LIENS. 


IOI4 


debar  the  lienholder  from  claiming  the  security  of  his  Hen, 
unless  the  circumstances  are  such  that  an  intention  to  waive 
the  lien  may  reasonably  be  inferred. ^^ 

A  futile  efTort  to  accjuire  a  lien  more  specific  and  exclu- 
sive than  that  provided  for  by  statute  in  no  wise  manifests 
an  intention  to  release  the  property  from  the  statutory  lien, 
but  it  shows  the  very  opposite  intention, — an  intention  to 
hold  the  property,  if  possible,  for  the  payment  of  the  claim. ^^ 

§  1014.  Waiver  of  lien  by  attachment  by  lienor. — An  at- 
tachment of  goods  by  one  who  claims  a  lien  upon  them,  to 
secure  the  same  debt  for  which  the  lien  is  claimed,  is  a  waiver 
of  the  lien.^'^  The  attachment  is  in  efTect  an  assertion  that 
the  property  attached  belongs  to  the  defendant.  Having 
made  the  attachment,  he  is  estopped  from  afterwards  assert- 
ing the  contrary  by  claiming  a  lien  upon  the  property.^^ 

In  like  manner,  a  person  having  a  lien  on  goods  waives 
it  by  causing  them  to  be  taken  on  execution  at  his  own  suit, 
although  he  purchases  the  goods  under  the  execution,  and 
they  are  never  removed  from  his  premises;  for,  in  order  to 
sell,  the  sheriff  must  have  had  possession,  and,  after  he  had 
possession  with  the  assent  of  the  person  claiming  the  lien,  the 
subsequent  possession  of  the  latter  must  have  been  acquired 


53  In  New  Mexico  it  is  provided 
by  statute  that  no  person  shall  be 
entitled  to  a  lien  who  has  taken 
collateral  security  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  sum  due  him.  Comp. 
Laws  1897,  §  2235;  Fulton  v.  Har- 
rington, 7  Houst.  (Del.)  182,  30 
Atl.  856.     See  ante,  §§  587,  588. 

54  Clark  V.  Moore,  64  111.  273. 
55Legg     V.     Willard,     17     Pick. 

(Mass.)  140;  Wingard  v.  Banning, 
39  Cal.  543.  See,  however,  Roberts 
V.  Wilcoxsen,  36  Ark.  355.  See  ante, 
§  328.  The  lien  may,  under  some 
circumstances,  be  retained.  Town- 
send   V.    Newell,    14   Pick.    (Mass.) 


332;  City  Nat.  Bank  of  Marshall- 
town  V.  Crahan,  135  Iowa  230,  112 
N.  W.  793,  one  holding  a  claim 
secured  by  lien  does  not  waive 
his  lien  by  filing  his  claim  against 
the  estate  of  the  party  against 
whom  the  right  to  a  lien  existed. 
Waschow  v.  Waschow,  155  111. 
App.  167. 

•^c  This  is  especially  the  case 
where  an  attachment  can  only  be 
made  upon  afifidavit  to  the  effect 
that  the  debt  is  not  secured  by  lien 
or  mortgage.  Wingard  v.  Ban- 
ning, 39  Cal.  543. 


§    I0I5  LIENS.  1030 

under  the  sale,  and  not  by  virtue  of  his  lien.^^  Property  in 
the  hands  of  a  person  having  a  lien  thereon  cannot  be  taken 
from  him  under  an  attachment  against  the  general  owner. 
He  has  a  right  to  retain  it  until  discharged  of  the  onus;  and 
if  it  be  v^^rongfully  taken  av^ay,  he  may  maintain  an  action 
against  the  seizing  officer  for  the  tort.  But  he  may  waive 
his  right;  and  if  he  does,  it  does  not  lie  in  the  mouth  of  the 
debtor  himself  to  object. ^^ 

§  1015.  Waiver  of  lien  by  inconsistent  agreement. — A  lien 
is  waived  by  making  any  agreement  inconsistent  with  its 
existence,  though,  if  the  new  agreement  be  not  in  writing, 
it  will  ordinarily  be  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury  whether 
the  lien  was  waived  or  not.  Thus,  one  in  possession  of  a  cow 
belonging  to  another,  and  having  a  lien  upon  it  for  keeping 
it,  purchased  the  cow  of  the  owner,  and  agreed  that  the  cow 
should  be  and  remain  the  property  of  the  seller  until  paid 
for.  There  was  no  change  of  possession  of  the  cow.  It 
was  held  that  it  was  not  for  the  court  to  decide  as  a  matter 
of  law  whether  the  lien  was  waived  or  not,  but  that  it  was  a 
question  for  the  jury  whether  the  lien  was  intended  and 
understood  by  the  parties  to  be  waived.  The  jury  is  to  con- 
sider the  new  contract  with  all  its  attendant  circumstances; 
and  if  nothing  was  said  about  the  lien,  the  jury  must  find 
from  all  the  evidence  what  the  understanding  of  the  parties 
was  concerning  the  lien.^^ 

5"  Jacobs  V.  Latour,  5  Bing.  130;  is  not  waived.    Dewing  v.   Hutton, 

Brown  v.  Petersen,  25  App.  D.  C.  40  W.  Va.  521,  21  S.  E.  780. 

359.  59  Pickett   v.    Bullock,   52   N.    H. 

58  Meeker  v.  Wilson,  1  Gall.  (U.  354.  An  attorney  having  a  lien  on 
S.)  419,  425,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  9392,  per  a  judgment  for  attorney's  fees 
Story,  J.  Where  the  manager  of  does  not  waive  his  lien  by  con- 
a  business  has  a  lien  on  the  prop-  senting  to  the  sale  and  assign- 
erty  for  advances  and  transfers  ment  of  the  judgment  where 
the  property  to  a  trustee  directing  the  assignee  agrees  to  pay 
him  to  hold  it  until  the  lien  is  such  lien.  Hutchinson  v.  Worth- 
paid,  the  trustee's  possession  is  ington,  7  App.  D.  C.  548.  See,  also, 
that  of  the  manager  and  the  lien  In  re  V.  &  M.   Lumber  Co!,  Inc., 


IO3I  WAIVER   OF   LIENS.  §    101/ 

§  1016.  Special  contract  giving  the  seller  a  lien  not  a 
waiver  of  statutory  lien. — A  special  contract  that  a  seller 
shall  have  a  lien  on  goods  sold  till  payment,  and  that  the  pos- 
session of  the  purchaser  shall  be  the  possession  of  the  seller, 
is  not  a  waiver  of  a  statutory  lien.  Thus,  a  statutory  lien  for 
rails  furnished  to  a  railroad  company  is  not  affected  by  a 
special  agreement  that  the  manufacturer  should  have  a  lien 
on  the  rails  till  pa3mient,  and  that  the  possession  of  the  rail- 
road should  be  the  possession  of  the  manufacturer.*^*^  Such 
a  stipulation  shows  no  purpose  on  the  part  of  the  manufac- 
turer to  waive  his  statutory  lien.  The  evident  purpose  of 
such  a  stipulation  is  to  secure  a  specific  lien  on  the  materials 
furnished,  and  to  require  them  to  be  used  in  the  construction 
of  the  railroad  where  they  would  become  subject  to  the  stat- 
utory lien.  The  contract,  instead  of  showing  a  waiver  of  the 
statutory  lien,  shows  a  purpose  to  retain  it. 

§  1017.    Estoppel  to  set  up  lien  by  taking  bill  of  sale. — If  a 

lienholder  purchases  goods  and  takes  a  bill  of  sale  from  the 
general  owner,  and  afterwards  claims  them  solely  under  such 
purchase,  he  cannot,  in  a  suit  in  regard  to  the  title,  set  up  his 
lien.  Thus,  a  carrier  who  had  a  lien  upon  skins  which  he 
was  currying  purchased  them  of  the  owner,  partly  in  pay- 
ment for  the  work  done  upon  them,  by  a  contract,  though 
valid  between  the  parties,  yet  void  as  against  the  seller's 
creditors.  Proceedings  in  insolvency  were  commenced 
against  the  seller,  and  the  messenger  of  the  court  of  insolv- 

182  Fed.  231;  Harrington  v.  Union  force  a  lien.   W.  W.  Brown  Const. 

Oil   Co.,   144  Fed.  235.    When  one  Co.  v.  Central  Illinois  Const.  Co., 

agrees  not  to  assert  a  lien  as  fol-  234  111.  397,  84  N.  E.  1038.  See  also, 

lows,  "The  completed  work,  when  Perry    v.    Dowdell,    38    Tex.    Civ. 

offered    to    the    company    for    ac-  App.   96,   84  S.   W.  833;   Anderson 

ceptance,    shall    be    delivered    free  v.  Perry,  98  Tex.  493,  85  S.  W.  1138. 

from  any  and  all  liens,  claims  or  60  Chicago    &    Alton    R.    Co.    v. 

encumbrances  of  any  description,"  Union  Rolling  Mill  Co.,  109  U.  S. 

it    is   held   not   so    definite    in    its  702,  27  L.  ed.  1081,  3  Sup.   Ct.  594. 

terms  as  to  constitute  a  waiver  of  And    see    Clark    v.    Moore,    64    111. 

the  statutory  right  to  assert  or  en-  273. 


ioi8 


LIENS. 


1032 


ency  took  possession  of  the  goods.  At  the  time  the  messen- 
ger took  the  goods  away,  the  currier  claimed  them  only  as 
purchaser,  and  gave  the  messenger  no  notice  of  his  lien,  and 
made  no  demand  for  the  amount  of  his  lien.  It  was  held  that 
he  could  not  set  up  his  lien  in  a  suit  against  the  messenger 
for  taking  away  the  goods. ^^ 

§  1018.  Waiver  by  claim  of  ownership  by  lienor. — A  per- 
son having  a  lien  waives  it  by  claiming  to  own  the  property 
absolutely,  and  on  that  ground  refusing  to  deliver  it  to  the 
owner.  A  lien  cannot  be  waived  and  resumed  at  pleasure. ^^ 
When  one  who  has  a  lien  sets  up  a  claim  to  the  property 


01  Mexal  v.  Dearborn,  12  Gray 
(Mass.)  2,2,6,  227.  Merrick,  J.,  de- 
livering the  judgment  of  the 
court,  said:  "A  lien  is  an  incum- 
brance upon  property,  a  claim 
upon  it  which  may  be  maintained 
against  the  general  owner.  But 
there  is  no  foundation. upon  which 
he  owns  the  whole  can  create  a 
special  right  in  his  own  favor  to 
a  part.  The  inferior  or  partial 
title  to  a  chattel  necessarily 
merges  in  that  whch  is  absolute 
and  unconditional,  when  both  are 
united  and  held  by  the  same  indi- 
vidual. This  is  a  general  conse- 
quence. But  in  the  present  in- 
stance, it  is  obvious  that  the  par- 
ties extinguished,  and  intended  to 
extinguish,  the  lien  which  had 
been  previously  created  upon  the 
calfskins;  for  the  value  of  the 
work  and  labor  which  had  previ- 
ously been  bestowed  upon  them 
by  the  vendor  was  by  their  ex- 
press agreement  made  part  of  the 
consideration  of  the  sale.  After 
such  a  transaction  the  rights  of 
the  parties  were  wholly  changed." 
Upon   the  point  of  the   waiver  of 


the  lien  by  concealment,  the 
learned  judge  said:  "The  law  will 
not  allow  a  party  to  insist  upon 
and  enforce  in  his  own  behalf  a 
secret  lien  upon  personal  prop- 
erty after  he  has  claimed  it  un- 
conditionally as  his  own,  and  has 
thereby  induced  another  to  act  in 
relation  to  it,  in  some  manner  af- 
fecting his  own  interest,  as  he 
would,  or  might,  not  have  done  if 
he  had  been  openly  and  fairly  no- 
tified of  the  additional  ground  of 
claim.  It  would  be  fraudulent  in 
him  to  practise  such  concealment 
to  the  injury  of  others;  and,  to 
prevent  the  possibility  of  attempts 
so  unjust  becoming  successful,  the 
law  implies  that  an  intended  con- 
cealment of  that  kind  is  of  itself 
a  waiver  of  the  lien." 

02  Picquet  v.  McKay,  2  Blackf. 
(Ind.)  465;  Boardman  v.  Sill,  1 
Campb.  410,  n;  Munson  v.  Porter, 
63  Iowa  453,  19  N.  W.  290;  Peo- 
ple's Bank  v.  Frick  Co.,  13  Okla. 
179,  72  Pac.  949;  Buffalo  Oolitic 
Limestone  Quarries  Co.  v.  Davis, 
45  Ind.  App.  116,  90  N.  E.  327. 


I033  WAIVER   OF   LIENS.  §     IOI9 

hostile  to  the  right  of  the  owner,  and  wrongfully  sells  it,  he 
cannot  afterwards  set  up  the  lien  as  a  bar  to  an  action  against 
him  for  his  illegal  act.®^ 

A  lien  may  be  waived  by  setting  up  any  claim  of  right  of 
detention,  instead  of  a  claim  under  the  lien.^'* 

If  one  having  a  lien  does  not  disclose  it  when  the  owner 
demands  the,  property,  but  claims  to  be  himself  the  owner, 
he  is  estopped  from  setting  up  a  lien  in  defense  to  the  owner's 
action  to  recover  possession.*'^ 

But  a  factor  does  not  waive  his  lien  for  advances  on  goods 
by  declining  to  give  information  as  to  the  amount  of  his  ad- 
vances to  one  claiming  the  goods  who  is  not  the  party  who 
placed  them  in  his  hands.^^ 

The  right  to  a  common-law  lien  is  waived  by  perfecting  a 
claim  for  a  lien  under  a  statute. ^''^ 

§  1019.  Refusal  to  deliver  property  on  grounds  inconsist- 
ent with  a  lien. — When  property  is  demanded  of  a  person 
who  means  to  claim  a  lien  upon  it,  but  he  refuses  to  sur- 
render it  upon  a  ground  which  is  inconsistent  with  a  lien,  he 
is  not  allowed  afterwards  to  set  up  a  claim  of  lien  of  which 
the  plaintiff  was  ignorant  at  the  time  he  brought  the  action.^* 
Retention  on  a  ground  inconsistent  with  a  claim  by  virtue 
of  a  specific  lien  operates  as  a  waiver  of  the  lien.  On  the 
trial  the  claimant  will  not  be  permitted  to  rest  his  refusal 
to  deliver  the  property  to  the  general  owner  on  a  diiTerent 

63  Andrews  v.  Wade,  3  Sad.  ^^'>  Maynard  v.  Anderson,  54  N. 
(Pa.)  133,  6  Atl.  48;  Davis  v.  Big-  Y.  641;  De  Bouverie  v.  Gillespie, 
ler,  62  Pa.  St.  242,  251,  1  Am.  Rep.  2  Edm.  Sel.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  472;  Leh- 
393;  Brown  v.  Truax,  58  Ore.  572,  mann  v.  Schmidt,  87  Cal.  15,  25 
115  Pac.  597;  Mosteller  v.  Holborn,  Pac.  161. 

21    S.    Dak.    547,    114    N.    W.    693;  ec  Buckley    v.    Handy,    2    Miles 

Whitehead  v.  Jessup,  7  Colo.  App.  (Pa.)   449. 

460,  43  Pac.  1042.  C7  Vane  v.  Newcombe,  132  U.  S. 

64  Boardman    v.    Sill,    1    Campb.  220.  33  L.  ed.  310,  10  Sup.  Ct.  60. 
410,  n;    Dirks  v.   Richards,   Car.   &  68  Boardman    v.    Sill,    1    Campb. 
M.    626.      See,    however.    White    v.  410,    n;    Judah   v.    Kemp,    2   Johns. 
Gainer,  2  Bing.  23.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  411;  Weeks  v.  Goode, 


§    I020  LIENS.  1034 

and  distinct  ground  from  that  on  which  he  claimed  to  retain 
the  property  at  the  time  of  the  demand  and  refusal. 

§  1020.  Lien  not  waived  by  failure  to  assert  it. — A  lien 
may  not  be  waived  by  the  mere  omission  of  the  claimant  to 
assert  his  lien  as  the  ground  of  his  refusal  to  deliver  up  the 
property  on  the  demand  of  the  owner.*^^ 

A  general  refusal  to  surrender  the  goods,  without  specify- 
ing the  ground  of  the  refusal,  may  not  be  inconsistent  with 
a  subsequent  claim  of  a  lien.  It  is  not  necessary  for  the  per- 
son of  whom  the  demand  is  made  to  speak  and  claim  to  hold 
the  goods  by  reason  of  a  lien,  if  the  person  making  the  de- 
mand knows,  or  has  reason  to  know,  that  the  other  has  a  lien, 
or  is  doing  an  act  which  would  entitle  him  to  a  lien.  But  it 
may  be  that  if  the  lien,  or  the  ground  of  the  lien,  is  unknown 
to  the  person  making  the  demand,  and  the  person  in  posses- 
sion knows  or  has  reason  to  know  this,  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
latter  to  give  the  former  notice  of  the  lien,  if  he  is  going  to 
rely  upon  it."^^ 

§  1021.    Claim  of  general  lien  no  waiver  of  special  lien. — • 

The  fact  that  a  party  claims  a  general  lien  when  he  is  only 
entitled  to  a  specific  lien  is  no  waiver  of  the  latter  lien.     If, 

6  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  367;  Jones  v.  Tarl-  ley,  20  Wall.  (U.  S.)  407,  411,  22  L. 

ton,    9    M.    &    W.    675;    Saltus    v.  ed.    385;    Fowler    v.    Parsons,    143 

Everett,  20  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  267,  32  Mass.    401,    9    N.    E.    799,   803,    per 

Am.    Dec.   541;    Everett   v.   Saltus,  Field,  J.    Laches  may  be  set  up  as 

15    Wend.     (N.    Y.)    474,    affd.    20  a   defense    in   an   action   in    equity 

Wend.    (N.    Y.)    267,   32   Am.    Dec.  to  enforce  a  lien  without  any  spe- 

541;  Louisville  &  Nashville  R.  Co.  cial  pleading.    Hughes  v.  Kershow, 

V.    McGuire,  79  Ala.  395;    Bean  v.  42  Colo.  210,  93  Pac.  1116,  15  L.  R. 

Bolton,   3   Phila.    (Pa.)   87;    Hanna  A.    (N.    S.)    122,.      See    also,    as    to 

v.   Phelps,  7  Ind.  21,  63  Am.   Dec.  waiver  by  laches  Stieff  Co.  of  Bal- 

410;   Picquet  v.    McKay,  2  Blackf.  timore    City    v.    Ullrich,    110    Md. 

(Ind.)  465.  629,  1Z  Atl.  874;  Worth  v.  Worth, 

69  White  V.   Gainer,  9  Moore  41,  155  Cal.  599,  102  Pac.  663. 

2  Bing.  23,  1  Car.  &  P.  324;  Ever-  70  Fowler  v.   Parsons,   143   Mass. 

ett  V.  Coffin,  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  603,  401,  9  N.  E.  799,  803. 
22  Am.    Dec.  551 ;  Avery  v.   Hack- 


1035  WAIVER   OF   LIENS.  §    I02I 

therefore,  the  general  owner  brings  an  action  of  trover  for 
the  property  detained  without  tendering  the  amount  of  the 
specific  Hen,  lie  can  not  recover. '''^  There  are  some  cases, 
however,  in  which  it  is  declared  that,  after  one  has  refused 
to  deliver  up  property  on  the  ground  of  having  a  lien  for  a 
general  balance  of  account,  he  can  not  afterwards  set  up  a 
specific  lien,  because,  it  is  said,  if  he  holds  possession  by  vir- 
tue of  a  specific  lien,  it  is  obligatory  upon  him  to  apprise  the 
owner  of  this  ground  of  his  claim  at  the  time  of  the  owner's 
demand  for  the  property,  so  that  the  owner  may  then  have 
the  opportunity  of  paying  or  tendering  the  amount  for  which 
the  lien  exists. 

But  it  is  clear  that  one  does  not  waive  a  specific  lien  by 
claiming  not  only  this,  but  a  general  lien  as  well.  Having  a 
specific  lien  upon  property,  such  as  a  lien  for  work  upon  it, 
he  does  not  waive  it  if,  at  the  time  of  the  owner's  demand 
for  it,  he  mentions  this  ground  to  justify  his  right  to  detain 
the  property,  although  he  at  the  same  time  insists  upon  a 
right  to  detain  it  for  a  general  balance  of  account,  or  for  any 
other  claim  for  which  he  has  no  right  of  lien.  He  need  not, 
in  such  case,  specify  the  amount  of  the  particular  charge  for 
which  a  lien  exists.  All  that  is  necessary  is,  that  he  should 
at  the  time  of  the  demand  apprise  the  owner  of  his  claim  to 
hold  the  property  by  virtue  of  a  lien  on  which  he  had  a  legal 
right  to  detain  it.  It  does  not  answer  that  he  had  a  specific 
lien,  but  claimed  to  detain  the  property  for  a  general  bal- 
ance of  account,  or  for  another  claim  for  which  he  had  no 
lien.  He  waives  his  lien  in  such  case  by  not  insisting  upon  it 
as  the  ground  of  his  right  of  possession.'''- 

''^  Scarf e  v.  Morgan,  4  M.  &  W.  ought  to  pay."    Munson  v.  Porter, 

270.   Alderson,  B.,  said:    "It  seems  63    Iowa   453,    19   N.    W.   290.     See 

to  me  you  cannot  say,  that'because  ante,  §  334. 

the  party  claims  more  than  it  may  "^^2  Thatcher  v.   Harlan,  2  Houst. 

be  ultimately  found  he  had  a  right  (Del.)    178;    Brown  v.   Holmes,  21 

to,  he  would  not  have  a  right  to  a  Kans.  687. 
tender  of  the  sum  which  the  other 


§     I022  LIENS,  1036 

A  lienholder  does  not  lose  his  lien  by  detaining  more  prop- 
erty subject  to  the  lien  than  is  necessary  to  preserve  it.'^^ 

§  1022.  Two  liens  for  the  same  debt. — A  creditor  may 
have  two  liens  for  the  same  thing.'^  Thus,  where  the  maker 
of  a  steam-engine  reserved  a  lien  upon  it,  and  at  the  same 
time  an  express  lien  was  created  upon  the  real  estate  of  the 
debtor  upon  which  the  engine  was  placed,  it  was  held  that 
the  taking  of  the  one  was  no  waiver  of  the  other. '^^ 

§  1023.    Lien  lost  if  the  claim  is  mixed  with  other  claims. — 

The  lien  is  lost  or  waived  if  the  claim  for  which  there  is  a 
lien  is  so  mingled  and  intermixed  with  other  claims,  for 
which  the  claimant  is  entitled  to  no  lien,  that  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  distinguish  between  the  two."*^  By  commingling  privi- 
leged claims  with  those  for  which  there  is  no  lien,  so  that  the 
amount  of  the  lien  is  not  kept  ascertainable  without  restat- 
ing the  accounts,  the  lien  is  impliedly  waived.'^  But  a  lien  is 
not  waived  by  merely  restating  the  account,  and  deducting 
three  small  items  for  which  no  lien  is  claimed. '^^ 

§  1024.  Lien  lost  by  merger  into  judgment. — A  lien  is  lost 
when  the  claim  is  merged  in  a  judgment  with  other  claims 
for  which  no  lien  exists;  but  if  a  suit  is  brought  upon  such 
claims,  the  lien  may  be  preserved  by  amending  the  writ  be- 
fore judgment  by  striking  out  the  items  for  which  there  is  no 
lien,  and  taking  judgment  upon  the  items  for  which  there 
is  a  lien."*^ 

'3  Hall    V.    Tittabawassee    Boom  135.     See    Baker    v.    Fessenden,    71 

Co.,  51  Mich.  377,  16  N.  W.  770.  Maine  292. 

"-1  Lagow   V.    Badollet,   1    Blackf.  ""  Terry  v.  McClintock,  41  Alich. 

(Ind.)  416,  12  Am.  Dec.  258.    Con-  492,  505,  2  N.  W.  787. 

tra,    McRae    v.    Creditors,    16    La.  "S  Comstock    v.     McCracken,    53 

Ann.  305.  Mich.  123,  18  N.  W.  583. 

"5  Lagow    V.    Badollet    1    Blackf.  "»  Sands  v.  Sands,  74  Maine  239; 

(Ind.)  416,  12  Am.  Dec.  258.  Spofford    v.    True,    33    Maine    283, 

'G  Kelley    v.    Kelley,    77    Maine  297,  54  Am.   Dec.  621. 


1037  WAIVER   OF    LIENS.  §    IO25 

A  statute  exempting  household  furniture  and  working 
tools  from  execution  provided  that  such  exemption  should 
not  extend  to  any  execution  issued  on  a  demand  for  the  pur- 
chase-money of  such  furniture  or  tools.  A  judgment  for  an 
entire  sum  was  recovered  upon  separate  and  distinct  debts 
only,  one  of  which  was  for  the  purchase-price  of  property 
exempt  from  execution,  and  the  judgment  creditor  sought 
to  levy  this  portion  of  the  execution  upon  property  exempt 
from  execution.  It  was  held  that  he  could  not  levy  the  exe- 
cution in  this  manner.  His  right  as  against  exempt  property 
is  in  the  nature  of  a  particular  lien  on  specific  property,  and 
must  be  enforced  by  itself  upon  that  property.  He  moreover 
waived  his  right  to  follow  the  property  sold  by  him  by  tak- 
ing a  judgment  wdiich  included  other  debts.  By  taking  such 
a  judgment  he  is  deemed  to  have  elected  to  abandon  his  claim 
to  follow  the  specific  property.^" 

§  1025.  Tender  of  actual  indebtedness. — If  the  demand  for 
which  a  lien  is  claimed  is  deemed  excessive,  the  owner  of  the 
property,  in  order  to  dissolve  it,  should  tender  such  a  sum  as 
he  himself  considers  reasonable. ^^  If  one  wrongfully  claims 
a  lien  for  a  larger  indebtedness  than  that  for  which  he  has  a 
lien,  he  may  perhaps  be  deemed  to  have  waived  or  forfeited 
his  lien,  especially  if  he  fails  to  disclose  the  true  amount  of 
the  lien,  and  this  can  not  be  presumed  to  be  within  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  debtor,  so  that  he  could  tender  the  true  amount 
for  which  the  lien  attached.  But  if  the  claimant  has  rendered 
an  itemized  account  which  shows  the  nature  of  his  demand 
and  the  time  for  which  the  charge  was  made,  and  if  the 
debtor's  knowledge  of  the  true  amount  of  the  account  for 
which  there  is  a  lien  may  be  presumed,  and  it  does  not  dis- 
tinctly appear  that  the  claimant  asserts  a  lien  for  the  whole 

80  Hickox  V.   Fay,   36   Barb,    (N.  Scarf e  v.  Morgan,  4  M.  &  W.  270; 
Y.)  9,  revd.  25  How.  Prac.  163.  Munson  v.  Porter,  63  Iowa  453,  19 

81  Hall    V.    Tittabawassee    Boom  N.  W.  290;  Hillsburg  v.  Harrison, 
Co.,  51   Mich.  Zn,  16  N.  W.  770;  2  Colo.  App.  298,  30  Pac.  355. 


§    I026  LIENS.  1038 

balance  of  the  account,  or  for  a  greater  amount  than  he  ac- 
tually had  a  lien  for,  he  does  not  waive  his  lien.  "If,  under 
an}^  circumstances  a  lien  could  be  deemed  forfeited  by  the 
assertion  of  a  claim  for  a  lien  for  too  large  an  amount,  the 
assertion  should  be  clear  and  distinct,  and  operate  to  inter- 
fere in  the  present  with  a  claimed  right  on  the  part  of  the 
owner."^^ 

The  mere  demand  of  an  excessive  sum  by  a  creditor  hold- 
ing a  lien  does  not  dispense  with  a  tender  by  the  debtor  of  the 
sum  really  due,  unless  the  demand  be  so  made  that  it  amounts 
to  a  declaration  by  the  creditor  that  a  tender  of  a  smaller 
sum  is  useless;  for  in  that  case  a  tender  is  dispensed  with,*^ 
although  it  appears  that  the  debtor  was  unwilling  to  tender 
the  amount  really  due.^^  The  claim  of  a  general  lien  may  dis- 
pense with  the  tender  of  the  amount  of  a  specific  lien  to  which 
the  creditor  is  entitled,  and  the  owner  may  maintain  trover 
without  a  tender.^^ 

§  1026.  Lien  not  extinguished  by  tender  of  performance 
of  agreement. — Tender  of  performance  of  an  agreement  will 
not  operate  to  extinguish  the  lien  by  which  the  agreement  is 
secured,  if  it  is  not  unequivocal,  and  reasonably  capable  of 
being  understood  by  the  other  party  as  a  bona  fide  tender 
of  the  requisite  thing,  act  or  service  ;^*^  and  the  offer  itself 
should  be  accompanied  by  circumstances  fairly  implying  con- 
trol of  the  necessary  means,  and  possession  of  the  necessary 
ability,  to  fulfil  it.^"^ 

§  1027.  Lien  not  waived  by  giving  receipt  for  property 
without  reservation. — A  lien  is  not  waived  by  the  lienholder's 

82  Munson  v.  Porter,  63  Iowa  man  v.  All  persons,  etc.,  16  Cal. 
453,  19  N.  W.  290,  per  Adams,  J.  App.  287,   117   Pac.   586. 

83  Dirks  V.  Richards,  4  M.  &  G.  §5  Jones  v.  Tarlton.  9  M.  &  W. 
574,  5  Scot.  N.  R.  534;  Kerford  v.  675. 

Mondel,  28  L.  J.  Exch.  303.  sc  L'Hommedieu    v.    Dayton,    38 

84  The   Norway,   3   Moore   P.    C.      Fed.  926. 

(N.  S.)  245,  V3  W.  R.   1085;  Kauf-  S7  Selby  v.   Hurd,  51   Mich.  1,  16 

N.  W.  180,  per  Graves,  C.  J. 


I039  WAIVER   OF    LIENS.  §    IO29 

giving  of  a  receipt  for  the  property  without  making  a  reserva- 
tion of  the  lien.  The  owner  of  certain  barley  pledged  to  a 
bank  as  collateral  for  a  loan,  washing  to  have  the  barley 
malted,  arranged  with  the  owner  of  a  malthouse,  with  the 
concurrence  of  the  bank,  for  converting  the  barley  into  malt. 
The  maltster  delivered  to  the  bank  a  receipt  for  the  barley, 
which  he  agreed  to  hold  subject  to  the  written  order  of  the 
bank;  nothing  being  said  in  the  receipt  about  the  charges  for 
malting,  or  any  lien  therefor.  It  was  held  that  the  absence 
of  a  reservation  of  such  lien  did  not  deprive  the  malt  man 
of  his  lien.^^ 

§  1028.  Waiver  from  unintentional  relinquishment  of  a 
right  not  known  to  exist. — One  having  a  lien  on  certain  cows, 
being  in  ignorance  of  the  fact  that  his  lien  extends  to  their 
offspring,  does  not  waive  his  lien  by  telling  an  attaching  of- 
ficer that  the  latter  did  not  belong  to  him.^^  To  constitute 
a  waiver,  there  must  be  an  intentional  relinquishment  of  a 
knowm  right. 

§  1029.  Nonperformance  of  contract. — One  who  has  un- 
dertaken to  perform  certain  labor  and  has  failed  to  fulfil  his 
contract,  and  performed  only  a  part  of  the  service,  has  no 
lien  for  what  he  has  done.  The  other  party  is  entitled,  if  he 
elects,  to  recover  damages  for  the  nonperformance  of 'the 
contract;  and,  these  damages  being  of  uncertain  amount,  it 
is  uncertain  whether  the  person  wdio  has  undertaken  to  per- 
form the  labor  will,  on  final  adjustment,  receive  anything 
for  the  labor  he  has  done.  Under  such  circumstances  he  can 
not  be  permitted  to  hold  possession  by  virtue  of  the  lien  until 
this  matter  is  settled. ^° 

S8  Hazard    v.    Manning,    8    Hun  90  Hodgden  v.  Waldron,  9  N.   H. 

(N.    Y.)    613.  66.     And  see  Hilgar  v.  Edwards,  5 

89  Boynton  v.   Braley,  54  Vt.  92.       Nev.  84. 


S    1030  LIENS.  1040 

§  1030.  Use  of  property  for  its  preservation. — A  creditor 
having  a  lien  does  not  forfeit  it  by  using  the  property  so  far 
as  is  necessary  for  its  preservation.  Thus,  a  Hverystable 
keeper  may  use  a  horse  left  in  his  care  to  the  extent  of  giv- 
ing the  horse  proper  exercise.  If  he  should  go  beyond  this 
and  habitually  let  the  horse  to  others,  he  might  be  guilty  of 
a  conversion  of  the  horse  to  his  own  use,  so  that  he  would 
not  afterwards  be  allowed  to  occupy  the  inconsistent  position 
of  claiming  a  lien  upon  the  same  thing.  But  even  if  the 
keeper  uses  the  horse  beyond  the  extent  of  giving  it  proper 
exercise,  or  lets  it  to  others,  if  the  ownier  knows  of  such  use, 
and  at  times  when  the  horse  is  in  use  he  accepts,  without  ob- 
jection, a  substituted  horse,  the  owner  can  not  claim  that 
there  is  such  a  conversion  of  the  horse  as  will  defeat  the 
lien.^^ 

§  1031.  Waiver  of  a  lien  a  new  consideration. — The  waiver 
of  a  lien  by  agreement  is  a  new  and  original  consideration  for 
a  promise  by  a  person  not  personally  bound  for  the  debt  se- 
cured by  the  lien  to  pay  that  debt ;  and  such  need  not  be  in 
writing,  as  the  promise  is  original  and  not  collateral,  and  so 
not  within  the  statute  of  frauds. ^^  A  release  of  a  lien  under 
seal,  executed  on  a  promise  to  pay  the  money  for  which  the 
lien  was  claimed,  is  void  for  failure  of  consideration.^^ 

§  1032.  Effect  of  execution  of  contract  on  Sunday  on  right 
to  lien. — The  fact  that  the  contract  under  which  a  lien  is 
claimed  was  executed  on  Sunday  does  not  defeat  the  lien 
after  the  contract  has  been  executed,  and  the  property  upon 
which  the  lien  is  claimed  has  passed  into  the  possession  of 
the  person  claiming  the  lien.  Both  parties  in  such  case  are 
in  pari  delicto,  and  the  party  who  has  possession  is  in  the 

91  Munson    v.    Porter,    63    Iowa  Koehler,   11  N.    Y.  91 ;    Mallory  v. 
453,  19  N.  W.  290.  Gillett,  21  N.  Y.  412. 

92  Robinson    v.    Springfield    Iron  93  Benson      v.      Mole,     9      Phila. 
Co.,  39  Hun  (N.  Y.)  634;  Prime  v.  (Pa.)  66. 


I04I  WAIVER   OF   LIENS.  §    1032a 

better  position.    The  property  must  remain  in  the  possessor's 
hands  until  the  Hen  is  discharged  by  payment.^^ 

§  1032a.  Lien  not  ordinarily  lost  by  obtaining  a  judgment 
for  the  debt. — Though  the  debt  is  merged  in  the  judgment, 
its  nature  is  not  destroyed  or  affected;  and  if  the  debt  was 
one  for  which  a  lien  was  given  at  common  law  or  by  statute, 
the  lien  continues  after  judgment.  Though  it  is  provided  that 
a  statutory  lien  shall  be  enforced  by  attachment,  the  right  is 
not  taken  away  by  a  previous  suit  and  judgment  on  the  debt.^-' 

94  Scarfe  v.  Morgan,  4  M.  &  W.  9^  Wilson  v.  Taylor,  89  Ala.  368, 

270.  8   So.    149. 


66 


CHAPTER  XXII. 


REMEDIES  FOR  THE  ENFORCEMENT    OF   LIENS. 


Sec. 

1033.  A    common-law    lien    defined. 

1034.  Conversion  by  lienor. 

1035.  Right    of    possession    under 

lien. 

1036.  Lienholder's       measure       of 

damages      in      trover     and 
trespass. 
1'037.    First  step  in  enforcing  lien. 

1038.  Jurisdiction    of    a    court    of 

equity  to   enforce   lien. 

1039.  Has   jurisdiction  when   mat- 

ters of  account  are  in- 
volved. 

1040.  Jurisdiction     dependent      on 

fact  that  accounts  may  re- 
quire adjustment  after 
sale. 

1041.  In     what     states     courts     of 

equity  have  jurisdiction  to 
enforce  liens. 

1042.  Jurisdiction     of     courts     of 

United  States. 

1043.  Loss  of  lien  by  taking  prop- 

erty to  another  state. 

1044.  Lien  of  partnership  not  lost 

by  dissolution. 

1045.  Lien    on    two    funds    or    two 

properties. 

1046.  Application       of       equitable 

principle  as  between  cred- 
itors  of   different   persons. 

1047.  Enforcement  as  to  rights  of 

other-  lienholders  or  pur- 
chasers as  dependent  on 
nature  of  lien. 


Sec. 

1048. 

Rights  of  bona  fide  purchas- 

ers for  value. 

1049. 

Statutes    as    to    remedies    by 

sale. 

1049a. 

Alaska. 

1049b. 

Arizona. 

1049c. 

California. 

1050. 

Colorado. 

1051. 

Delaware. 

1051a. 

District  of  Columbia. 

1052. 

Florida. 

1053. 

Georgia. 

1053a. 

Idaho. 

1054. 

Indiana. 

1054a. 

Kentucky. 

1055. 

Maine. 

1056. 

Massachusetts. 

1056a. 

Michigan. 

1056b. 

Minnesota. 

1057. 

New  Hampshire. 

1057a. 

New  Mexico. 

1057b. 

New  York. 

1057c. 

North   Dakota. 

1058. 

Oregon. 

1059. 

Pennsylvania. 

1059a. 

Rhode   Island. 

1059b. 

South  Dakota. 

1059c. 

Tennessee. 

1060. 

Texas. 

1060a. 

Utah. 

1060b. 

Virginia. 

1060c. 

Washington. 

1060d. 

West  Virginia. 

1060e. 

Wisconsin. 

1060f. 

Wyoming. 

1042 


I043 


REMEDIES   FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT   OF   LIENS. 


1033 


§  1033.  A  common-law  lien  defined. — A  common-law  lien, 
as  has  already  been  stated,  is  merely  the  right  of  a  person  in 
possession  of  the  property  of  another  to  detain  it  until  cer- 
tain demands,  either  specific  or  general,  are  satisfied.  In 
general  there  is  no  remedy  for  enforcing  the  lien  unless  it  is 
given  by  statute.^  In  this  respect  a  lien  differs  essentially 
from  a  pledge ;  for  a  pledgee,  when  the  debt  has  become  due 
and  remains  unpaid,  may,  after  due  notice,  sell  the  thing 
pledged  and  reimburse  himself  from  the  proceeds.^ 

A  sale  of  the  property  by  the  person  in  possession  and 
claiming  a  lien,  without  the  consent  of  the  owner,  is  a  con- 
version of  it.    But  if  the  person  having  a  lien  does  dispose  of 


1  Pothonier  v.  Dawson,  Holt  (N. 
P.)  383;  Jones  v.  Pearle,  1  Stra. 
557;  Lickbarrow  v.  Mason,  6  East 
21,  note;  Thames  Iron  Works  Co. 
V.  Patent  Derrick  Co.,  1'  J.  &  H. 
93;  Doane  v.  Russell,  3  Gray 
(Mass.)  382;  Busfield  v.  Wheel- 
er, 14  Allen  (Mass.)  139;  Briggs  v. 
Boston  &  Lowell  R.  Co.,  6  Allen 
(Mass.)  246,  83  Am.  Dec.  626;  Rod- 
gers'v.  Grothe,  58  Pa.  St.  414.  See 
ante,  §  335.  In  Doane  v.  Russell,  3 
Gray  (Mass.)  382,  which  arose  be- 
fore the  enactment  in  Massachu- 
setts of  a  statute  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  liens.  Chief  Justice  Shaw 
observed  with  reference  to  the  se- 
curity of  a  lienholder :  "If  it  be 
said  that  a  right  to  retain  the 
goods,  without  the  right  to  sell,  is 
of  little  or  no  value;  it  may  be 
answered  that  it  is  certainly  not 
so  adequate  a  security  as  a  pledge 
with  a  power  of  sale;  still,  it  is 
to  be  considered  that  both  parties 
have  rights  which  are  to  be  re- 
garded by  the  law;  and  the  rule 
must  be  adapted  to  general  con- 
venience.    In    the   greater   number 


of  cases,  the  lien  for  work  is  small 
in  comparison  with  the  value,  to 
the  owner,  of  the  article  subject 
to  lien;  and  in  most  cases  it  would 
be  for  the  interest  of  the  owner 
to  satisfy  the  lien  and  redeem  the 
goods ;  as  in  the  case  of  the  tailor, 
the  coach-maker,  the  inn-keeper, 
the  carrier  and  others.  Whereas, 
many  times,  it  would  cause  great 
loss  to  the  general  owner  to  sell 
the  suit  of  clothes  or  other  ar- 
ticles of  personal  property.  But 
further,  it  is  to  be  considered  that 
the  security  of  this  lien,  such  as  it 
is,  is  superadded  to  the  holder's 
right  to  recover  for  his  services 
by  action."  When  a  lien  is  pro- 
vided by  statute  as  well  as  a  provi- 
sion for  foreclosure  the  remedy 
given  is  generally  exclusive,  but 
it  may  be  enforced  in  chancery 
when  entire  justice  can  only  be 
done  to  the  parties.  Wynn  v.  Tal- 
lapoosa County  Bank,  168  Ala. 
469,  53  So.  228. 

2  Jones  on   Collateral    Securities 
(3d  ed.),  §§  2,  720-729. 


§    I034  LIENS.  1044 

it,  though  wrongfully,  he  may  set  up  his  lien  as  a  defense  to 
any  action  which  the  owner  may  bring  against  him  for  a  con- 
version.^ 

§  1034.  Conversion  by  lienor. — If  one  holding  goods  un- 
der a  lien  sells  them  without  legal  proceedings,  the  sale  is 
a  conversion  and  renders  him  liable  to  the  owner  in  an  action 
for  such  conversion,  or  the  owner  may  resume  possession 
of  the  goods  wherever  he  may  find  them.  The  lien  only  gives 
the  holder  the  right  of  possession  until  the  debt  is  paid,  and 
he  can  do  nothing  else  to  enforce  payment  except  in  pursu- 
ance of  some  statute  providing  for  the  enforcement  of  liens. 

In  a  suit  by  the  owner  of  goods  against  a  bailee  who  has 
converted  the  goods  on  which  he  has  bestowed  labor  and 
acquired  a  lien,  the  latter  may  set  up  his  lien  claim  in  reduc- 
tion of  damages.* 

If,  however,  he  does  not  set  up  his  claim  in  that  suit,  he 
may  afterwards  maintain  a  suit  for  the  debt.  In  trover  for 
the  conversion  of  the  goods,  the  owner  would  recover  the 
full  value  of  the  goods  at  the  time  of  the  conversion,  in  case 
the  defendant  does  not  set  up  his  lien  claim  in  reduction  of 
damages;  and  prima  facie  the  value  of  the  goods  at  the  time 
of  conversion  is  the  measure  of  damages  recovered.^  "It  may 
be  greatly  against  the  interest  of  the  defendant  to  present  his 
claim  in  such  action,  and  against  his  rights  to  compel  him  to 
do  so.  Cases  may  readily  be  supposed,  where  the  value  of 
work  and  material  put  upon  plaintiff's  property  would 
greatly  exceed  the  value  of  the  property  in  its  altered  condi- 
tion. The  article,  with  all  the  labor  put  upon  it  might  en- 
tirely fail  to  meet  the  purposes  which  the  owner  designed  it 
for,  and  be  valueless  for  any  other;  if,  being  left  upon  the 
hands  of  the  artisan,  he  should  destroy  [it],  by  carelessness 

3  Briggs  V.   Boston  &  L.  R.  Co.,  4  Longstreet  v.  Phile,  39  N.  J.  L. 

6  Allen   (Mass.)  246,  83  Am.   Dec.  63. 

626;  Rodgers  v.  Grothe,  58  Pa.  St.  ^  Edmondson  v.  Nuttall,  17  C.  B. 

414.    See  ante,   §§   523,  525.    Judge  (N.  S.)  280. 
V.'  Curtis,  72  Ark.  132,  78  S.  W.  746. 


1045  REMEDIES    FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT    OF   LIENS.       §    IO36 

or  design,  to  rid  himself  of  it,  it  would  not  be  just  to  compel 
the  defendant,  in  a  suit  for  its  conversion,  to  set  up  his  claim, 
to  be  balanced  and  liquidated  by  the  inferior  value  of  the  con- 
verted goods.  He  may  prefer  to  pay  the  damages  and  bring 
suit  for  his  debt,  and  he  has,  in  his  election,  the  right  to 
do  so."« 

§  1035.  Right  of  possession  under  lien. — A  lien  confers  a 
special  property  and  the  right  of  possession,  and  if  the  holder 
is  unlawfully  deprived  of  the  possession  he  may  maintain  an 
action  of  replevin  for  the  purpose  of  reclaiming  it,  or  an  ac- 
tion of  trespass  or  trover  for  damages. 

The  general  owner  can  not  maintain  trespass  either  against 
the  lienholder  or  a  third  person  for  the  property  subject  to 
the  lien,  so  long  as  the  lienholder  remains  in  either  actual  or 
constructive  possession;  for  the  gist  of  the  action  is  an  in- 
jury to  the  plaintiff's  possession,  and,  the  possession  belong- 
ing to  the  lienholder,  he  alone  can  maintain  trespass  for  the 
property."^ 

When  articles  subject  to  a  lien  are  taken  from  the  posses- 
sion of  one  entitled  to  a  lien  upon  them,  the  general  owner 
may  maintain  trover  for  them,  and  the  lien  can  not  be  set  up 
in  bar  except  by  the  lienholder  or  by  his  express  authority. 
The  lien  can  not  be  set  up  by  a  wrongdoer  to  defeat  the  ac- 
tion of  the  general  owner.^ 

§  1036.  Lienholder's  measure  of  damages  in  trover  and 
trespass. — Lienholder's  measure  of  damages  in  trover  and 
trespass,  in  an  action  of  trespass  against  the  owner,  or  those 
claiming  under  him,  for  the  removal  or  destruction  of  the 
goods,  is  compensation  to  the  plaintiff  for  his  loss,  and  con- 
sequently he  can  recover  damages  only  to  the  extent  of  his 

6  Longstreet  v.  Phile,  39  N.  J.  L.  8  Jones  v.  Sinclair,  2  N.  H.  319, 
63,  per  Knapp,  J.  9  Am.    Dec.   75;    Bradley  v.    Spof- 

7  Wilson  V.  Martin,  40  N.  H.  88;  ford,  23  N.  H.  444,  55  Am.  Dec.  205. 
Cowing  V.  Snow,  11   Mass.  415. 


§    I037  LIENS.  1046 

lien.^  There  is  a  distinction  to  be  observed  between  the 
measure  of  damages  in  an  action  against  the  general  owner 
and  in  an  action  against  a  stranger;  for,  while  in  the  former 
case  he  can  recover  only  according  to  his  special  interest,  in 
the  latter  case  he  may  recover  the  full  value,  though  exceed- 
ing the  amount  of  his  lien.^^  The  amount  recovered  in  ex- 
cess of  the  lien  claim,  or  other  special  interest,  he  will  hold  in 
trust  for  the  general  owner. 

§  1037.  First  step  in  enforcing  lien. — If  the  property  upon 
which  it  is  sought  to  enforce  a  lien  be  in  the  adverse  posses- 
sion of  a  third  person,  the  lien  claimant  should  first  recover 
possession  of  the  property,  or  should  sue  for  a  wrongful  con- 
version of  it.  If  he  brings  an  action  to  enforce  the  lien  with- 
out making  such  third  person  a  party  defendant  and  obtains 
judgment,  this  is  void  as  to  such  third  person. ^^ 

§  1038.    Jurisdiction  of  a  court  of  equity  to  enforce  lien. — 

Generally  a  court  of  equity  has  no  jurisdiction  to  enforce  a 
common-law  lien  by  sale  merely  because  there  is  no  remedy 
at  law,  or  because  the  retaining  of  possession  under  a  passive 
lien  involves  expense  or  inconvenience.  Generally  a  lien  at 
law  or  by  statute  can  be  enforced  only  under  express  statu- 

9  Outcalt  V.  Durling,  25  N.  J.  L.  property,  and  upon  the  evidence 
443;  Ingersoll  v.  Van  Bokkelin,  7  damages  shall  be  mitigated;  but 
Cow.  (N.  Y.)  670,  revd.  5  Wend.  clearly,  the  bailee,  or  he  who  hath 
(N.  Y.)  315;  Spoor  v.  Holland,  8  the  general  property,  and  upon  the 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  445,  24  Am.  Dec.  Zl ;  evidence  damages  shall  be  miti- 
Burdict  v.  Murray,  3  Vt.  302,  21  gated;  but  clearly,  the  bailee,  or 
Am.  Dec.  588.  he    who    hath    a    special    property, 

10  Lyle  V.  Barker,  5  Binn.  (Pa.)  shall  have  a  general  action  of  tres- 
457,  460;  Heydon  and  Smith's  Case,  pass  against  a  stranger,  and  shall 
13  Coke  (>].  "So  is  the  better  opin-  recover  all  in  damages,  because 
ion  in  11  Hen.  IV.  23,  that  he  who  that  he  is  chargeable  over." 

hath    a    special    property    of    the  11  Wingard   v.    Banning,   39    Cal. 

goods  at  a  certain  time,  shall  have  543;    Perkins    v.    Ogilvie,    140    Ky. 

a     general      action      of     trespass  412,  131  S.  W.  200. 
against  him  who  hath  the  general 


I047 


REMEDIES    FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT   OF   LIENS. 


1038 


tory  provisions.  An  equitable  form  of  procedure  may  be  ex- 
pressly provided;  but  in  the  absence  of  such  provision,  a  lien 
can  not  be  enforced  in  equity  unless  jurisdiction  is  acquired 
under  well-established  rules. ^^ 

This  subject  was  ably  discussed  by  Vice-Chancellor  Wood 
in  the  High  Court  of  Chancery,  where  it  was  sought  to  en- 
force a  shipbuilder's  common-law  lien  by  a  bill  in  equity. ^^ 
"It  was  argued,"  he  said,  "that,  to  create  a  mere  right  of  re- 
tainer, involving  considerable  expenditure,  and  rendering  the 
subject  of  the  lien  utterly  useless  to  both  parties,  would  be 
absurd ;  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  there  is  authority  to  show 
that  this  is  not  the  law.  The  case  referred  to,  of  a  horse  hav- 
ing eaten  its  full  value,  is  one  instance  of  a  right  of  sale  be- 
ing held  to  flow  from  a  lien.^^  In  one  statement  this  is  said 
to  rest  on  the  local  customs  of  London  and  Exeter,  but  else- 
where it  is  treated  as  a  general  right.  Whatever  the  law 
may  be,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  certainly  very  common  for 
such  a  right  to  be  exercised;  for  advertisements,  threatening 
to  sell  horses  or  other  chattels  unless  removed  by  a  given 
date,  are  constantly  to  be  seen.    The  contention  was,  that,  as 


12  Wynn  v.  Tallapoosa  County- 
Bank,  168  Ala.  469,  53  So.  228.  See 
ante,  §§  94,  112. 

13  Thames  Iron  Works  Co.  v. 
Patent  Derrick  Co.,  1  J.  &  H.  93, 
97. 

14  In  Bacon's  Abr.  (Inns  D.)  it 
is  said  that,  "by  the  custom  of 
London  and  Exeter,  if  a  man  com- 
mit a  horse  to  an  hostler  and  he 
eat  out  the  price  of  his  head,  the 
hostler  may  take  him  as  his  own, 
upon  the  reasonable  appraisement 
of  four  of  his  neighbors;  which 
was,  it  seems,  a  custom  arising 
from  the  abundance  of  traffic  with 
strangers,  that  could  not  be 
known,  to  charge  them  with  the 
action.    But  the  innkeeper  hath  no 


power  to  sell  the  horse,  by  the 
general  custom  of  the  whole  king- 
dom." He  cites  among  the  other 
cases  Jones  v.  Pearle,  1  Str.  557, 
where,  "in  trover  for  three  horses, 
the  defendant  pleaded,  that  he  kept 
a  public  inn  at  Glastenbury,  and 
that  the  plaintiff  was  a  carrier  and 
used  to  set  up  his  horses  there, 
and  £36  being  due  to  him  for  the 
keeping  the  horses,  which  was 
more  than  they  were  worth,  he  de- 
tained and  sold  them,  prout  ei 
bene  licuit :  and  on  demurrer  judg- 
ment was  given  for  the  plaintiff, 
an  innkeeper  having  no  power  to 
sell  horses,  except  within  the  city 
of  London." 


§    1039  LIENS.  1048 

a  corollary  from  the  case  I  have  referred  to,  there  followed 
a  general  rule  of  law,  that  wherever  the  retaining  of  a  chat- 
tel under  a  lien  occasions  considerable  expense,  there  the 
right  of  sale  must  arise.  But  no  such  doctrine  has  ever  been 
held,  and  the  authorities,  on  the  contrary,  point  to  the  con- 
clusion, that  the  right  of  sale  can  not  be  raised  on  the  mere 
ground  of  the  expense  of  retaining  the  chattel  which  is  the 
subject  of  the  lien.  If  it  could,  it  would  arise  in  every  case  of 
a  lien  on  bulky  goods,  the  retaining  of  which  must  involve 
warehousing  expenses.  It  is  not  material  to  consider  how 
far  such  a  case  as  that  put  by  Story,  of  notice  being  given 
that  expense  is  being  incurred,  and  that  if  the  goods  are  not 
removed  they  will  be  sold,  may  hereafter  be  held  to  justify 
a  sale,  because  the  present  case  does  not  raise  such  a  ques- 
tion. If  it  did,  it  would  be  necessary  to  analyze  the  right  of 
lien,  and  consider  whether  it  amounts  to  anything  more  than 
this — that  a  person  who  chooses  to  insist  on  the  right  of 
retainer  which  the  law  gives,  and  is  willing  to  put  up  with 
any  inconvenience  which  may  be  the  consequence,  is  at  lib- 
erty to  do  so,  but  has  no  further  right.  Even  though  such  an 
arrangement  should  be  most  inconvenient  for  both  parties, 
it  does  not  follow  that  this  is  not  the  law." 

§  1039.  Has  jurisdiction  when  matters  of  account  are  in- 
volved.— A  court  of  equity  has  jurisdiction  to  enforce  a  lien 
when  matters  of  account  are  involved,  although  the  lien  may 
not  in  itself  be  an  equitable  lien.^^  Thus,  where  a  landlord 
reserved  in  his  lease  a  lien  for  rent  upon  the  improvements 
made  or  to  be  made  by  the  lessee  on  the  demised  premises, 
and  upon  the  lessee's  interest  in  the  lease,  and  the  lien  is 
enforcible  against  those  claiming  under  the  lessee,  and  the 
lease  has  been  assigned  and  the  premises  sublet,  there  is  such 

15  Story     Eq.     Jur.      (13th     ed.).  ing    in    equity,    see    Pritchard    v. 

§§  506,  1217.    As  to  facts  held  not  Pritchard,    134   App.   Div.    (N.   Y.) 

to  be  a  showing  of  inadequacy  of  301,  ITS  N.  Y.  S.  882. 
legal    remedy    justifying   proceed- 


I049  REMEDIES   FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT    OF   LIENS.       §    IO4I 

necessity  for  taking  an  account  as  to  bring  the  case  within 
the  equitable  jurisdiction  of  the  court.  If,  pending  the  bill  in 
such  case,  rents  coming  to  the  assignee  have  been  paid  into 
court,  on  establishing  the  lien  the  court  may  require  the 
money  to  be  applied  to  the  rent  due  from  the  assignee.  The 
right  to  control  the  income  follows  as  a  sequence  from  the 
right  to  enforce  the  lien.^^ 

§  1040.  Jurisdiction  dependent  on  fact  that  accounts  may 
require  adjustment  after  sale. — But  the  mere  fact  that  after 
the  sale  accounts  may  require  adjustment  by  the  court  does 
not  give  jurisdiction  to  a  court  of  equity  to  decree  a  sale.^^ 
There  is  no  right  to  an  account  in  equity  where  the  debt  for 
which  a  lien  is  claimed  is  a  liquidated  debt  with  interest 
which  is  a  mere  matter  of  calculation.  "Even  if  the  lien  (in 
such  case)  were  supposed  to  be  equivalent  to  a  pledge,"  said 
Wood.  V.  C,  "it  would  be  only  a  pledge  for  an  ascertained 
sum,  and  no  accounts  would  be  necessary.  Were  this  other- 
wise, I  know  of  no  authority  for  saying  that  where  the 
pledgor  makes  no  claim  to  redeem  and  the  pledgee  insists 
on  selling  hostilely,  this  court  acquires  jurisdiction  in  respect 
of  the  sale,  because  after  a  sale  there  may  be  some  possi- 
bility of  questions  of  account  arising  such  as  to  require  the 
aid  of  the  Court.  ...  If  such  a  jurisdiction  existed,  it 
would  arise  in  all  cases  of  pledges  of  chattels;  and  I  am  not 
aware  of  any  case  in  which  relief  of  this  description  has  been 
asked." 

§  1041.  In  what  states  courts  of  equity  have  jurisdiction  to 
enforce  liens. — In  a  few  states  it  is  held  that  a  court  of  equity 
has  jurisdiction  to  enforce  liens  of  personal  property  gen- 
erally.  Thus,  it  was  held  in  Kentucky  that  a  court  of  equity 

ic  Webster    v.    Nichols,    104    111.  i' Thames    Iron    Works    Co.    v. 

160;  American  Trading  &  Storage       Patent  Derrick  Co.,  1  J.  &  H.  93. 
Co.  V.   Gottstein,   123  Iowa  267,  98 
N.  W.  770,  101  Am.  St.  319. 


§     1042  LIENS.  1050 

may  order  the  sale  of  a  horse  belonging  to  an  innkeeper's 
guest,  in  satisfaction  of  the  lien  upon  the  horse. ^'^  In  Illi- 
nois it  is  held  that  liens  for  the  enforcement  of  which  there 
is  no  special  statutory  provision  are  enforcible  only  in  equity. 
This  is  true  not  only  of  equitable  liens  but  also  of  all  statu- 
tory liens,  except  when  the  lien  is  in  the  nature  of  a  pledge, 
and  possession  accompanies  the  lien.  A  court  of  law  does 
not  possess  the  means  of  enforcing  such  liens. ^^ 

It  is  a  general  rule  that  all  persons  who  claim  an  interest 
in  property  on  which  a  lien  is  sought  to  be  foreclosed  should 
be  made  parties  to  the  suit.-*^  If  the  lien  be  limited  in  dura- 
tion to  a  specified  time,  it  must  be  shown  affirmatively  that 
the  proceeding  to  enforce  it  was  commenced  within  that 
time.^^ 

§  1042.  Jurisdiction  of  courts  of  United  States. — The 
courts  of  the  United  States  have  jurisdiction  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  statutory  liens  wherever  the  citizenship  of  the  par- 
ties would  give  jurisdiction  in  other  cases.  This  jurisdiction, 
whether  at  common  law  or  in  equity,  is  not  derived  from 
the  power  of  the  state,  but  from  the  laws  of  the  United  States. 
The  United  States  courts  are  not  necessarily  confined  to  the 
remedy  prescribed  by  the  state  law;  but  this  remedy  will  be 
pursued  if  it  be  substantially  consistent  with  the  ordinary 
modes  of  proceeding  used  on  the  chancery  side  of  these 
courts.^^ 

§  1043.  Loss  of  lien  by  taking  property  to  another  state. — 
A  lien  valid  by  the  laws  of  one  state  is  not  lost  by  taking  the 

18  Black     V.     Brennan.     5     Dana      wards,  35  Ind.  467;  Ellison  v.  Bran- 
(Ky.)  310.  strator,  45  Ind.  App.  307,  88  N.  E. 

19  Cairo  &  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Fackney,      963,  89  N.  E.  513. 

78  111.  116.  21  Union  Slate   Co.  v.  Tilton,  11 

20  Jones    on    Chattel    Mortgages       Maine  207. 

(5th    ed.),    §    783;    Templeman    v.  22  Fitch    v.    Creighton,    24    How. 

Gresham,  61  Tex.  50;  Hall  v.  Hall,       (U.  S.)  159,  16  L.  ed.  596. 
11   Tex.   526,   547;   Trippito   v.    Ed- 


I05I  REMEDIES   FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT   OF   LIENS.       §    IO45 

property  to  another  state.  Although  the  holder  of  the  lien 
can  enforce  it  only  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  the  state 
under  which  the  lien  accrued,  yet  the  owner  of  the  property 
can  not  take  it  away  from  the  lienholder.-^  The  lien  is  as 
perfect  in  the  one  state  as  in  the  other,  so  long  as  the  lien- 
holder  retains  possession.  The  title  and  claim  under  the  lien 
may  be  set  up  in  defense  of  the  possession  wherever  these 
may  be  assailed,  just  as  the  title  under  a  mortgage  may  be 
shown  in  defense  in  any  state  to  which  the  mortgaged  prop- 
erty may  be  taken. ^'*  Whether  the  lienholder  could  maintain 
an  action  in  another  state  against  one  who  had  obtained  pos- 
session of  the  property  wrongfully,  is  another  question. 

§  1044.  Lien  of  partnership  after  dissolution. — A  lien 
which  has  accrued  to  a  partnership  is  not  lost  by  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  firm,  and  the  assignment  by  one  partner  to  the 
other  of  his  interest  in  the  claim.  All  statutory  proceedings 
for  the  enforcement  of  the  claim  must  be  had  in  the  name 
of  the  partnership.  It  is  a  general  principle  that  the  continu- 
ing partner  takes  all  the  rights  of  the  firm,  and  may  exercise 
them  in  the  name  of  the  firm,  for  all  purposes  necessary  for 
their  enforcement  and  for  closing  up  the  joint  business.-'^ 

A  lien  in  behalf  of  a  partnership  may  ordinarily  be  enforced 
by  a  petition  made  by  one  member  of  the  firm  for  and  in  be- 
half of  such  firm.^^ 

§  1045.  Lien  on  two  funds  or  two  properties. — A  lien- 
holder  who  has  a  lien  upon  two  funds  or  upon  two  pieces  of 
property  for  his  debt  is  not  allowed  to  enforce  his  lien  in  such 
a  way  as  to  exclude  the  lien  of  another  who  has  a  lien  upon 
only  one  of  the  funds  or  pieces  of  property;  but  he  may  be 

23  Jaquith  v.  American  Express  (Mass.)  139;  Vinson  v.  Cantrell 
Co.,  60  N.  H.  61.  (Tenn.),  56  S.  W.  1034. 

24  Jones  on  Chattel  Mortgages  26  Garland  v.  Hickey,  7h  Wis. 
(5th  ed.),  §  260a.  178,  43  N.  W.  832;  Bennett  v.  Gray, 

25  Busfield  V.  Wheeler,  14  Allen  82  Ga.  592,  9  S.  E.  469. 


1046 


LIENS. 


1052 


compelled  to  resort  in  the  first  instance  to  the  fund  or  prop- 
erty upon  which  the  other  has  no  lien,  if  that  court  be  neces- 
sary for  the  satisfaction  of  the  claims  of  both  lienholders.^^ 
This  principle,  however,  is  only  applicable  where  the  lien- 
holder's  right  to  resort  to  both  funds  is  clear,  and  not  seri- 
ously disputed,  and  where  the  remedies  available  for  reach- 
ing and  applying  the  funds  are  .reasonably  prompt  and  efB- 
cient.^^  Thus,  a  lienholder  will  not  be  compelled  in  the  first 
instance  to  resort  to  the  personal  obligation  of  a  third  per- 
son, who  w^ould  probably  contest  his  liability  and  delay  the 
collection  of  the  lien  debt.^^ 


§  1046.  Application  of  equitable  principle  as  between 
creditors  of  different  persons. — This  equitable  principle  has 
no  application  as  between  creditors  of  different  persons.  It  is 
confined  to  cases  where  two  or  more  persons  are  creditors  of 
the  same  debtor,  and  have  successive  demands  upon  the  same 
property,  the  creditor  prior  in  right  having  other  securities. 
Thus,  a  landlord  having  a  statutory  lien  for  his  rent  upon 
the  crops  raised  upon  the  rented  premises,  whether  raised 
by  the  tenant  or  subtenant,  can  not  be  compelled  to  so  exer- 
cise his  statutory  right  as  to  protect  or  benefit  another  person 
who  may  have  a  lien  on  the  crop  of  the  under  tenant.^"     A 


27  Bruner's  Appeal,  7  Watts  &  S. 
(Pa.)  269;  Bryant  v.  Stephens,  58 
Ala.  636;  Goss  v.  Lester,  1  Wis.  43. 
A  creditor  holding  a  lien  taking  a 
whole  fund  on  which  several 
other  creditors  have  liens  must 
account  to  his  fellow  lienors  in 
accord  with  their  ratable  shares. 
Stiles  V.  Galbreath,  69  N.  J.  Eq. 
222,  60  Atl.  224. 

28  Kidder  v.  Page,  48  N.  H.  380. 

29  Block  V.  Latham,  63  Tex.  414. 

30  Ex  parte  Kendal,  17  Ves.  514, 
520.  "It  was  never  said,  that,  if  I 
have  a  demand  against  A  and  B, 
a   creditor  of   B    shall   compel   me 


to    go    against    A;    without    more. 

*  *  *  If  I  have  a  demand 
against  both,  the  creditors  of  B 
have  no  right  to  compel  me  to 
seek  payment  from  A;  if  not 
founded  on  some  equity,  giving  B 
the  right  for  his  own  sake,  to  com- 
pel  me   to  seek  payment  from  A. 

*  *  *  Unless  they  can  establish 
that  it  is  just  and  equitable  that 
Devaynes's  estate  should  pay  in 
the  first  instance,  they  have  no 
equity  to  compel  a  man  to  go 
against  that  estate."  Per  Lord  El- 
don. 


1053  REMEDIES   FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT   OF   LIENS.       §    IO47 

landlord  having  sued  out  an  attachment  to  enforce  such  a 
lien  on  the  crops,  and  having  afterwards  released  the  attach- 
ment on  the  crops  of  under  tenants  who  had  paid  their  rent 
to  their  immediate  landlord,  does  not  thereby  forfeit  or  im- 
pair his  right  to  subject  other  portions  of  the  crop,  or  to 
proceed  against  a  third  person  who,  having  notice  of  the 
landlord's  lien,  has  received  and  sold  a  portion  of  the  crop. 
The  landlord  having  brought  an  action  against  a  merchant 
who  had  received  and  sold  some  of  the  products  raised  by 
under  tenants,  on  account  of  advances  made  to  them,  the 
merchant  has  no  right  to  insist  that  the  landlord's  demand 
shall  be  credited  with  the  value  of  the  crops  so  released  from 
attachment  by  the  landlord. '^^  This  sale  has  no  application 
in  a  proceeding  at  law.    It  is  enforced  only  in  equity.^" 

§  1047.  Enforcement  as  to  rights  of  other  lienholders  or 
purchasers  as  dependent  on  nature  of  lien. — The  effect  of  the 
enforcement  of  a  lien  upon  the  rights  of  other  lienholders 
and  of  bona  fide  purchasers  depends  largely  upon  the  nature 
of  the  lien.  Possession  under  a  common-law  lien  is  notice  of 
the  rights  of  the  person  in  possession,  so  that  any  sale  of  the 
property  by  the  general  owner,  or  any  liens  upon  it  created 
by  him,  must  be  subject  to  the  rights  of  the  Henholder  in  pos- 
session. Whether  such  liens  take  precedence  of  liens  al- 
ready existing  depends  upon  the  circumstances  attending  the 
creation  of  the  lien.'"^^  Equitable  liens  and  liens  by  contract, 
where  the  possession  of  the  property  remains  with  the  gen- 
eral owner,  can  not  be  enforced  after  a  sale  to  a  bona  fide 
purchaser  without  notice."^  As  between  such  liens  and  other 
liens  upon  the  same  property,  much  depends  upon  the  prior- 
ity in  time  at  which  the  liens  come  into  existence.'^^  An  at- 
torney who  has  obtained  a  judgment  for  his  client  has  pri- 

31  Robinson   v.   Lehman,   72  Ala.  33  See  ante,  §  744. 
401.  34  See  ante,  §  95. 

32  Hunter    v.    Whitfield,    89    111.  35  Where  a  junior   Henholder   is 
229.  not  made  a  party  to  a  foreclosure 


§    1048  LIENS.  1054 

ority  over  an  assignee  of  the  judgment;  for  the  attorney  is 
regarded  as  an  equitable  assignee  of  the  judgment  from  the 
time  it  was  rendered;  and  under  the  statutes  of  many  of  the 
states,  he  is  an  equitable  assignee  of  the  cause  of  action,  so 
that  his  lien  attaches  from  the  commencement  of  the  suit. 
Any  person  taking  an  assignment  of  the  cause  of  action,  or 
of  the  judgment,  from  the  client,  must  take  notice  of  the  at- 
torney's connection  with  the  suit,  and  can  acquire  only  the 
rights  of  the  assignor.^^ 

The  priority  of  statutory  liens  depends  for  the  most  part 
upon  the  terms  of  the  statutes  creating  them.  A  landlord's 
statutory  lien  generally  attaches  from  the  beginning  of  the 
tenancy,  and  any  person  dealing  with  the  tenant,  with  re- 
spect to  the  property  subject  to  the  lien,  must  take  notice  of 
the  effect  of  the  statute."'^  But  the  lien  is  generally  defeated 
by  a  sale  made  by  the  tenant  to  a  purchaser  for  value  and  in 
good  faith. ^^  Priorities  under  statutory  liens  are  also  affected 
by  notice  arising  from  the  possession  of  the  lienholder.  Thus^ 
the  possession  of  animals  by  a  stablekeeper  or  agistor  is  con- 
structive notice  to  a  purchaser  of  his  claim  to  a  lien,  just  as 
possession  under  a  common-law  lien  is  constructive  notice  of 
the  claim  of  such  lienholder.^^ 

§  1048.  Rights  of  bona  fide  purchasers  for  value. — A  statu- 
tory lien  may  be  given  priority  by  the  express  terms  of  the 
statute.  It  is  a  characteristic  feature  of  the  statutes  giving 
liens  to  lumbermen,  that  they  are  declared  paramount  to  all 
other  liens  or  claims  against  the  property. ^°  Whether  such  a 
statute  gives  a  lumberman  priority  from  the  time  the  labor  is 

of  a  senior  lienholder,   the  junior  38  A  purchaser  at  a   foreclosure 

is   not  bound  by  a  judgment  ren-  sale  may  be  a  bona  fade  purchaser. 

dered  and  may  have  the  property  East  St.  Louis  v.  111.  &  St.  Louis 

resold.    Evans  v.  Borchard,  8  Tex.  Bridge   Co.,   52  111.   App.  436.    See 

Civ.   App.   276,  28   S.   W.   258.    See  ante,  §§  577-582. 

ante,  §  96.  •'JO  See  ante,  §§  691-697. 

SGSee  ante,  §§  226-228.  40  See  ante,   §§   704,  727. 

3T  See  ante,  §§  551-560. 


I055  REMEDIES   FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT   OF   LIENS.       §    IO48 

performed,  as  against  a  subsequent  bona  fide  purchaser  as 
well  as  against  the  holders  of  other  claims  and  liens,  is  a 
question  which  has  been  ably'  discussed  and  determined  in 
cases  in  Michigan  and  Wisconsin;  and  it  is  held  that  the  lien 
does  not  prevail  against  a  bona  fide  purchaser  who  has  no 
notice  of  it  through  the  claimant's  possession  of  the  property, 
or  his  filing  a  claim  or  petition  under  the  statute,  or  through 
actual  notice. ^^  The  language  of  the  statutes — "all  other 
claims  or  liens" — is  not  regarded  as  broad  enough,  or  suffi- 
ciently specific,  to  cover  the  claim  of  a  subsequent  bona  fide 
purchaser  for  value  without  notice. 

In  the  Wisconsin  case,  Mr.  Justice  Orton,  delivering  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  said  :^-  "The  language  would  have  to  be 
forced  beyond  its  natural  meaning  to  embrace  such  a  case; 
and  we  do  not  think  that  the  legislature  intended  such  a 
meaning,  for  it  has  omitted  to  use  the  language  to  express 
it  as  against  the  well-known  policy  of  the  law  governing  the 
transfer  of  personal  property,  for  the  protection  of  bona  fide 
purchasers,  in  an  open  market  for  value  without  notice  of 
prior  claims  thereon.  .  .  .  The  paramount  importance 
and  incalculable  value  of  personal  property  in  these  modern 
times  makes  its  ready  and  easy  transfer  from  hand  to  hand, 
and  the  protection  of  bona  fide  purchasers  thereof,  abso- 
lutely essential  to  our  modern  systems  of  trade  and  com- 
merce. Secret  trusts,  liens,  and  incumbrances,  and  unknown 
and  concealed  claims  and  interests,  in  and  upon  personal 
property,  and  especially  that  kind  of  personal  property  that 
enters  so  largely  into  the  general  commerce  of  a  country, 
would,  if  enforced  by  law,  work  the  greatest  injustice  and 

41  Haifley  v.  Haynes,  2,1  Mich.  Co.,  68  Wis.  89,  31  N.  W.  694.  Mr. 
535;  Au  Sable  River  Boom  Co.  v.  Justice  Taylor  delivered  a  dissent- 
Sanborn,  36  Mich.  358;  Smith  v.  ing  opinion.  The  decision  of  the 
Shell  Lake  Lumber  Co.,  68  Wis.  court,  as  delivered  by  Mr.  Justice 
89,  31  N.  W.  694;  Ashmore  v.  Orton,  seems  to  be  in  accordance 
Whatley,  99  Ga.  150,  24  S.  E.  941.  with  sound  principles  and  the  best 

42  Smith   V.    Shell    Lake   Lumber  precedents. 


§    1048  LIENS.  1056 

be  utterly  destructive  of  the  greatest  financial  interest  that 
any  country  can  have.  *  *  *  Logs,  timber,  lumber,  in- 
cluding boards,  shingle,  and  lath,  constitute  most  valuable 
and  important  articles  of  our  trade  and  commerce,  and  are 
readily  and  necessarily  and  almost  constantly,  being  trans- 
ferred and  sold  in  wholesale  and  retail  in  open  market,  and 
carried  and  scattered  over  vast  distances  by  land  and  w^ater. 
This  interest  and  trade  are  too  vast  and  important  to  be 
clogged,  impeded,  and  incumbered  by  secret  liens,  following 
them  into  all  the  distant  markets  of  the  land,  to  be  enforced 
in  violation  of  such  a  cardinal  principle  to  facilitate  and  pro- 
tect the  sale  of  personal  property. 

"In  view  of  these  considerations  and  authorities,  what  is 
the  true  interpretation  of  our  statutes  giving  to  laborers 
thereon  a  lien  upon  logs,  timber,  and  lumber?  What  is  the 
object  or  purpose  of  filing  a  claim  for  such  lien  in  the  office 
of  the  clerk  of  the  circuit  court  of  the  county  unless  it  be  for 
notice  to  somebody?  In  Sec.  3341,  R.  S.,  it  is  called  the  'no- 
tice of  such  lien.'^^  This  constructive  notice  would  in  most 
cases  be  the  only  notice  a  subsequent  purchaser  would  be 
likely  to  have.  If  he  has  actual  notice,  or  knowledge  of  such 
facts  and  circumstances  as  to  imply  it,  or  to  put  him  on  in- 
quiry of  such  liens,  then  he  is  not  an  innocent  or  bona  fide 
purchaser  as  against  them,  and  should  not  be  protected,  and 
will  not  be  by  a  reasonable  construction  of  the  statute.  The 
laborer,  while  he  is  working  upon  the  logs,  timber,  or  lum- 
ber, is  protected  by  the  notice  inherent  in  this  very  act  in 
connection  with  the  article  itself,  equivalent  to  possession  of 
it,  as  in  common-law  liens.  After  he  has  completed  his  la- 
bor upon  it,  he  can  at  once  file  his  claim  and  his  protection 
will  continue.  It  is  not  necessary  that  he  should  delay  his 
remedy  until  the  article  has  been  removed  and  gone  into  the 
markets  of  the  country  and  into  the  hands  of  many  subse- 

43  Wisconsin,  Stats.  1898,  §§  3329-      p.  655,  §  39. 
3342b,     amended     by     Laws     1899, 


I057  REMEDIES   FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT   OF   LIENS.       §    IO49 

quent  purchasers  for  value  and  in  good  faith  without  any 
notice  whatever  of  his  claim.  The  proper  meaning  of  the 
statute  would  seem  to  be  that  the  laborer  has  a  statutory  lien 
for  the  value- of  his  labor  upon  the  logs  or  lumber  from  the 
time  of  its  commencement.  But  it  is  a  lien  that  he  must 
claim  in  the  way  provided  for,  or  he  will  be  held  to  have 
waived  it.  He  has  a  lien,  no  doubt,  against  all  the  world 
having  actual  or  constructive  notice  of  it.  *  *  *  If  this 
peculiar  language  of  our  statute  can  have  force  without  vio- 
lating the  great  principle  and  clear  public  policy  of  the  law 
that  protects  bona  fide  purchasers  in  the  usual  course  of 
trade  for  value  without  notice  of  the  lien,  then  such  should 
be  its  construction.  If  one  purchase,  before  the  filing  of  the 
claim,  with  notice  that  a  certain  person  has  worked  upon  the 
article  to  produce  it  and  the  time  has  not  expired  for  the 
filing  of  his  claim,  it  would  seem  proper  that  he  should  take 
notice  of  such  a  laborer's  lien  upon  it.  Or  if  he  had  been  in- 
formed that  a  lien  existed,  or  had  such  knowledge  as  to  put 
him  on  equity  of  it,  and  be  bound  to  so  inquire,  he  could 
scarcely  be  called  a  bona  fide  purchaser  without  notice.  In 
this  way  the  laborer  can  have  ample  protection  of  his  lien 
without  any  infraction  of,  or  violent  exception  to,  the  general 
law  which  protects  subsequent  bona  fide  purchasers  without 
notice." 

§  1049.  Statutes  as  to  remedies  by  sale. — By  legislation, 
remedies  by  sale  have  been  very  generally  provided  for  the 
common-law  liens  and  for  those  created  by  statute.  In  only 
a  few  states,  hov/ever,  has  legislation  reached  the  compre- 
hensive form  of  a  general  provision  for  enforcing  all  liens,  or 
all  similar  liens.  In  the  preceding  chapters  have  been  given 
the  statutory  provisions  applicable  to  the  enforcement  of  the 
different  liens ;  and  reference  has  been  made  to  the  present 
chapter  for  the  statutory  provisions  which  are  of  general  ap- 
plication. Much  of  the  legislation  on  the  subject  of  liens  has 
been  fragmentary,  uncertain,  and  apparently  experimental; 
67 


§    10493-  LIENS.  1058 

and  it  is  to  be  hoped  and  expected  that  more  comprehensive 
and  better  considered  legislation  will  follow. 

§  1049a.  Alaska.^^ — If  the  liens  of  carriers,  storers  of 
merchandise,  and  agistors  of  cattle  are  not  paid  within  three 
months  after  the  care,  attention,  and  labor  have  been  fur- 
nished, the  lienholder  may  sell  the  property,  or  as  much  as  is 
necessary,  at  public  auction  to  pay  his  charges.  He  must 
give  three  weeks'  notice  of  such  sale  in  a  newspaper  pub- 
lished in  the  precinct,  or  by  posting  notice  in  three  public 
places  of  the  precinct,  one  of  which  shall  be  the  post-office  or 
adjacent  thereto.  The  proceeds  of  such  sale  shall  be  applied 
first  to  the  discharge  of  the  lien,  and  the  costs  of  keeping 
and  selling  such  property,  and  the  remainder,  if  any,  shall  be 
paid  to  the  owner. 

§  1049b.  Arizona.^^ — When  possession  of  any  property  by 
one  claiming  an  innkeeper's,  liverystable  keeper's  or  mechan- 
ic's lien  thereon  has  continued  for  twenty  days  after  the 
charges  have  accrued,  and  the  charges  so  due  have  not  been 
paid,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  person  so  holding  such  property 
to  notify  the  owner,  if  in  the  county  where  the  property  is 
to  come  forward  and  pay  the  same,  and  on  his  failure  within 
ten  days  after  such  notice  has  been  given  him  to  pay  said 
charges,  the  holders  of  said  property  after  five  days'  notice, 
may  sell  said  property  at  public  auction  and  apply  the  pro- 
ceeds to  the  payment  of  said  charges,  and  shall  pay  over  the 
balance  to  the  persons  entitled  to  the  same. 

§  1049c.  California.'*''' — If  any  mechanic,  livery  stable  pro- 
prietor, laundry  proprietor,  veterinary  hospital  proprietor, 
veterinary  surgeon,  or  keeper  of  garage  entitled  to  a  lien 
for  work  or  labor  done  or  for  caring  for  property  be  not  paid 
the   amount   due   and   for  which   said   lien   is   given,   within 

<4  Carter's  Ann.  Code  1900,  §  278.  ^6  Stat.  &  Amend,  to  Codes  1907, 

*5Rev.  Stat.  1901,  §  2924.  p.  86;  1911,  p.  887. 


I059  REMEDIES    FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT   OF   LIENS.       §    IO5O 

twenty  days  after  the  same  shall  have  become  due,  then  such 
lienholder  may  proceed  to  sell  said  property,  or  so  much 
thereof  as  may  be  necessary  to  satisfy  said  lien  and  costs  of 
sale,  at  public  auction,  and  by  giving-,  at  least  ten  days'  pre- 
vious notice  of  such  sale  by  advertising  in  some  new^spaper 
published  in  the  count}^  in  which  such  property  is  situated; 
or,  if  there  be  no  newspaper  published  in  such  county,  then 
by  posting  notices  of  the  sale  in  three  of  the  most  public 
places  in  the  town  or  place  where  such  property  is  to  be  sold, 
for  ten  days  previous  to  the  date  of  sale.  The  proceeds  of 
the  sale  must  be  applied  to  the  discharge  of  the  lien  and  the 
cost  of  keeping  and  selling  the  property;  the  remainder,  if 
any,  must  be  paid  over  to  the  owner  thereof. 

§  1050.  Colorado.^^ — If  any  charges  due  any  ranchman, 
farmer,  agistor,  herder  of  cattle,  or  person  to  whom  any 
animals  shall  have  been  entrusted  for  feeding,  herding,  pas- 
turing, keeping  or  ranching  or  livery-stable  keeper,  or  to  any 
keeper  of  a  hotel  or  boarding-house  or  to  any  com- 
mon carrier  or  warehouseman,  or  to  any  mechanic  for 
labor  upon  personal  property  for  which  a  lien  is  given,  be  not 
paid  within  thirty  days  after  the  same  becomes  due  and  pay- 
able, the  mechanic,  innkeeper,  agistor,  or  other  person  to 
whom  such  lien  is  given,  may  apply  to  any  justice  of  the 
peace  of  the  county  wherein  he  resides  to  appoint  appraisers 
to  appraise  the  several  articles  of  personal  property  whereon 
such  lien  is  claimed.  Such  justice  shall  thereupon  appoint, 
by  warrant  under  his  hand,  three  reputable  householders  of 

47  Mills'  Ann.  Stat.  1912.  §§  4571-  houseman  to  sell  goods  on  which 
4576.  For  a  special  statute  author-  he  has  made  advances,  see  Mills' 
izing  the  sale  of  goods  received  by  Ann.  Stat.  1912,  §  7624.  A  failure 
a  common  carrier,  commission  to  give  notice  to  an  owner  as  re- 
merchant,  or  warehouseman,  and  quired  by  the  statute  makes  a 
not  called  for  by  the  consignee,  see  sale  a  trespass  and  the  proceed- 
Mills'  Ann.  Stat.  1912,  §  7620.  And  ing  is  void.  Bailey  v.  Fallon,  30 
for  a  special  statute  authorizing  Colo.  419. 
any  commission  merchant  or  ware- 


§    1050  LIENS.  1060 

the  county,  not  interested  in  the  matter,  to  appraise  such 
personal  property. 

The  appraisers  shall  be  sworn  by  the  justice  to  well  and 
faithfully  appraise  and  value  all  such  personal  property,  and 
shall  thereupon  proceed  to  view  and  appraise  the  same,  and 
shall  return  their  appraisement,  wherein  shall  be  set  down 
each  article  separately,  to  the  justice  by  whom  they  were 
appointed,  within  ten  days  after  their  appointment. 

After  such  appraisement  is  made,  the  person  to  whom 
such  lien  is  given  may,  after  giving  ten  days'  prior  notice  of 
the  time  and  place  of  such  sale,  with  a  description  of  the 
property  to  be  sold,  by  publication  in  some  newspaper  pub- 
lished in  the  county  where  he  resides  (or  if  there  be  no  such 
newspaper,  then  by  posting  in  three  public  places  within 
such  county),  and  delivering  to  the  owner  of  such  personal 
property,  or  if  he  do  not  reside  in  the  county,  transmitting 
by  mail  to  him  at  his  usual  place  of  abode,  if  known,  a  copy 
of  such  notice,  proceed  to  sell  all  such  personal  property  or 
so  much  thereof  as  may  be  necessary,  at  public  auction,  for 
cash  in  hand,  at  any  public  place  within  such  county,  be- 
tween the  hours  of  ten  a.  m.  and  four  p.  m.  of  the  day  ap- 
pointed; and  from  the  proceeds  thereof  may  pay  the  reason- 
able costs  of  such  appraisement,  notice  and  sale,  and  his  rea- 
sonable charges  for  which  he  has  his  lien,  together  with  the 
reasonable  cost  of  keeping  such  property  up  to  the  time  of 
sale.  The  residue  of  the  proceeds  and  of  the  property  un- 
sold he  shall  render  to  the  owner. 

No  such  sale  shall  be  made  for  less  than  two-thirds  of  the 
appraised  value  of  the  article  sold,  nor  except  upon  due  no- 
tice, as  required  by  the  preceding  paragraph.  Every  such 
sale  made  in  violation  of  the  provisions  of  this  paragraph 
shall  be  absolutely  void. 

At  such  sale  the  person  to  whom  such  lien  is  given  may 
become  the  purchaser. 

In  any  case  where  the  property  to  be  sold  can  not  con- 
veniently be  sold  in  one  day  the  sale  may  be  continued  from 


I06l  REMEDIES    FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT   OF   LIENS.    §    I05ia 

day  to  day  by  public  outcry  at  the  place  of  sale.  Upon  the 
completion  of  such  sale,  the  person  to  whom  the  lien  is  given 
hereby  shall  cause  a  sale  bill  thereof  to  be  filed  with  the  jus- 
tice of  the  peace  before  whom  such  appraisement  was  had, 
in  which  shall  be  set  down  the  sum  for  which  each  separate 
article  of  property  was  sold,  and  the  name  of  the  purchaser. 
The  justice  shall  record  such  sale  bill  in  his  docket,  and  pre- 
serve the  original  thereof  together  with  the  appraisement. 

§  1051.  Delaware.*^ — In  all  cases  in  which  commission 
merchants,  factors,  and  all  common  carriers,  or  other  per- 
sons, have  a  lien  upon  any  goods,  for  or  on  account  of  the 
costs  or  expenses  of  carriage,  storage,  or  labor  bestowed 
thereon,  if  the  owner  or  consignee  shall  fail  or  neglect  or 
refuse  to  pay  the  charges  upon  the  same  within  sixty  days 
after  demand  thereof,  made  personally,  or  at  his  last  known 
place  of  residence,  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  person  having 
such  lien  to  expose  such  goods,  wares,  merchandise,  or  other 
personal  property,  to  sale  at  public  auction,  and  to  sell  the 
same,  or  so  much  thereof  as  shall  be  sufficient  to  discharge 
said  lien,  together  with  costs  of  saFe  and  advertising.  No- 
tice of  such  sale,  together  with  the  name  of  the  person  or 
persons  to  whom  such  goods  shall  have  been  consigned,  shall 
first  be  published  for  three  successive  weeks  in  a  newspaper 
published  in  the  county,  and  by  six  written  or  printed  hand- 
bills, put  up  in  the  most  public  and  conspicuous  places  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  depot  where  said  goods  may  be. 

§  1051a.  District  of  Columbia.^^ — If  the  amount  due  and 
for  which  a  lien  is  given  to  a  mechanic,  artisan,  innkeeper, 
boardinghouse  keeper  or  liveryman  is  not  paid  after  the  end 
of  a  month  after  the  same  is  due,  and  the  property  bound  by 
said  lien  does  not  exceed  the  sttm  of  fifty  dollars,  then  the 

48  Rev.    Code   as   Amended    1893,  49  Code  1901,  §  1263. 

pp.  816,  817,  §§  1-3. 


§    1052  LIENS.  1062 

party  entitled  to  such  lien,  after  demand  of  payment  upon  the 
debtor,  if  he  be  within  the  District,  may  proceed  to  sell  the 
property  so  subject  to  lien  at  public  auction,  after  giving 
notice  once  a  week  for  three  successive  weeks  in  some  daily 
newspaper  published  in  the  District,  and  the  proceeds  of  such 
sale  shall  be  applied,  first,  to  the  expenses  of  such  sales  and 
the  discharge  of  such  lien,  and  the  remainder,  if  any,  shall  be 
paid  over  to  the  owner  of  the  property. 

§  1052.  Florida.''" — Liens  upon  real  or  personal  property 
are  enforcible  by  persons  in  privity  with  the  owner, — 1.  By 
a  retention  of  possession,  for  a  period  not  exceeding  three 
months,  of  the  property  upon  which  the  lien  has  attached,  by 
the  person  entitled  to  such  lien,  if  he  were  in  such  possession 
at  the  time  the  lien  attached.  2.  By  a  bill  in  equity.  3.  By 
an  ordinary  suit  at  law,  and  the  levy  of  the  execution  ob- 
tained therein  on  the  property  on  which  the  lien  is  held. 
4.  By  a  suit  at  law,  in  which  the  declaration  shall  state  the 
manner  in  which  the  lien  arose,  the  amount  for  which  the 
lien  is  held,  the  description  of  the  property,  and  a  prayer  that 
the  property  be  sold  to  satisfy  the  lien.  In  such  suit  the  judg- 
ment for  the  plaintiff  shall  be  a  personal  judgment  against 
the  defendant,  as  well  as  declare  the  lien  upon  the  property, 
describing  it;  and  shall  direct  execution  against  such  prop- 
erty, as  well  as  against  the  property  generally  of  the  de- 
fendant. If  any  person  entitled  to  a  lien  under  this  act, 
upon  personal  property  shall  have  reason  to  believe  that  the 
same  is  about  to  be  removed  from  the  county  in  which  it  may 
be,  he  may  enjoin  the  removal  of  the  same  in  the  manner 
provided  for  enjoining  the  removal  of  property  subject  to  a 
mortgage,  or,  if  the  lien  shall  have  been  perfected,  may  at- 
tach the  same  in  the  manner  provided  for  attachment  in  aid 
of  foreclosure  of  mortgages. 

Whenever  any  person  shall  entrust  to  any  mechanic  or  la- 

50  Gen.  Stats.  1906,  §§  2212-2214. 


1063  REMEDIES    FOR    THE    ENFORCEMENT    OF    LIENS.       §     IO53 

borer  materials  with  which  to  construct,  alter,  or  repair  any 
article  of  value,  or  any  article  of  value  to  be  altered  or  re- 
paired, such  mechanic  or  laborer,  if  such  article  be  completed 
and  not  taken  away,  and  the  fair  and  reasonable  charges  not 
paid,  may,  after  three  months  from  the  time  such  charges  be- 
come due,  sell  the  sam<e,  and  such  sale  shall  be  at  public  auc- 
tion for  cash.  But  before  any  such  sale  such  mechanic  or  la- 
borer shall  give  public  notice  of  the  time  and  place  thereof 
by  advertisements  posted  for  ten  days  in  three  public  places 
in  the  county,  one  of  which  shall  be  the  court  house,  and 
another  in  some  conspicuous  part  of  his  shop  or  place  of  busi- 
ness, and  the  proceeds  of  such  sale,  after  payment  of  charges 
for  construction  or  repair,  with  the  costs  of  such  sale,  shall, 
if  the  owner  be  absent,  be  deposited  with  the  clerk  of  the  cir- 
cuit court  for  such  county,  where  the  same  shall  remain,  sub- 
ject to  the  order  of  the  person  legally  entitled  thereto,  and 
the  clerk  shall  be  entitled  to  receive  from  all  proceeds  so  de- 
posited with  him  five  per  centum  on  such  proceeds  for  the 
care  and  disbursement  thereof. 

§  1053.  Georgia.^^ — Liens  on  personal  property  not  other- 
wise provided  for  shall  be  foreclosed  as  follows: — 

1.  There  must  be  a  demand  on  the  owner,  agent,  or  lessee 
of  the  property  for  payment,  and  a  refusal  to  pay,  and  such 
demand  and  refusal  must  be  averred.  If,  however,  no  such 
demand  can  be  made,  by  reason  of  the  absence  from  the 
county  of  his  residence,  of  the  party  creating  the  lien  on  per- 

51  Code  1911,  §  3366.  As  to  the  foreclosing  an  attorney's  lien  on 
enforcement  of  factors'  liens,  see  a  homestead  see  Davis  v.  Taylor, 
ante,  §  455.  Landlords'  liens,  see  103  Ga.  366,  30  S.  E.  50.  Where  a 
ante,  §§  611,  612.  The  general  la-  counter  affidavit  is  dismissed  on 
borer's  lien  upon  personalty  may  motion  the  case  passes  out  of  the 
be  foreclosed  by  affidavit,  under  jurisdiction  of  the  court  and  is  re- 
Code  1911,  §  3366,  and  in  so  do-  manded  back  to  the  levying  officer, 
ing  it  is  not  necessary  to  specify  Murphy  v.  McGough,  105  Ga.  816, 
any  particular  items  or  articles  of  31  S.  E.  757.  See  also,  Allen  v. 
property.  Allred  v.  Hale,  84  Ga.  Middleton,  99  Ga.  758,  27  S.  E.  752. 
570,    10   S.    E.    1095.     For   mode   of 


§    I053  LIENS.  IOG4 

sonal  property,  by  reason  of  removal  from  the  same,  ab- 
sconding from  the  same,  or  other  reasons  showing  an  inten- 
tion to  be  absent  to  defeat  such  demand,  then  the  party  hold- 
ing such  lien  shall  not  be  obliged  to  make  a  demand,  or  affi- 
davit thereof,  but  may  foreclose  without  such  demand,  by 
stating  on  oath,  why  no  such  demand  was  made.^^ 

2.  It  must  be  prosecuted  within  one  year  after  the  debt  be- 
comes due. 

3.  The  person  prosecuting  such  lien,  either  for  himself  or 
as  guardian,  administrator,  executor,  or  trustee,  must,  by 
himself,  agent,  or  attorney,  make  affidavit  showing  all  the 
facts  necessary  to  constitute  a  lien  under  this  code,  and  the 
amount  claimed  to  be  due.  If  the  amount  claimed  is  under 
one  hundred  dollars,  the  application  may  be  made  to  a  jus- 
tice of  the  peace,  who  may  take  all  the  other  steps  herein- 
after prescribed,  as  in  other  cases  in  this  court. ^^* 

4.  Upon  such  affidavit  being  filed  with  the  clerk,  it  shall 
be  the  duty  of  the  clerk  of  the  superior  court,  or  the  justice 
of  the  peace  if  in  his  court,  to  issue  an  execution  instanter 
against  the  person  owing  the  debt,  and  also  against  the  prop- 
erty on  which  the  lien  is  claimed,  or  which  is  subject  to  said 
lien,  for  the  amount  sworn  to,  and  the  costs,  which  execution, 
when  issued,  shall  be  levied  by  any  sheriff  of  this  state,  or 
bailiff  if  the  amount  be  less  than  one  hundred  dollars,  on  such 
property  subject  to  said  lien,  under  the  same  rules  and  regu- 
lations as  other  levies  and  sales  under  execution. 

52  As    to    demand    and    affidavit,  in   issuing   it   inserted   therein   the 

see  Gilbert  v.  Marshall,  56  Ga.  148;  words  "lands  and  tenements"  does 

Moore  v.  Martin,  58  Ga.  411;  Lind-  not  vitiate  the  execution  as  to  the 

say  V.  Lowe,  64  Ga.  438.   An  affida-  personal  property.    Dixon  v.  Will- 

vit    is    sufficient    which    seeks    to  iams,  82  Ga.   105,  9  S.   E.  468.    See 

foreclose  a  laborer's  lien  in  a  sum-  also,    Giddens    v.    Gaskins,    7    Ga. 

mary  manner,  not  against  land,  but  App.  221,  66  S.  E.  560. 
against    the    property    of    the    de-  52a  Unless     counter    affidavit     is 

fendant,  and  where  the   execution  filed  the  defendant  cannot  contest 

is    levied  upon   personal   property  amount   or   existence  of  plaintiff's 

only;   and  the   fact  that  the  clerk  lien.     Allen   v.    Middleton,    99    Ga. 


1065  REMEDIES    FOR   THE    ENFORCEMENT    OF   LIENS.    §     1053a 

5.  Affidavit  may  be  made  before  any  officer  authorized  to 
administer  an  oath. 

6.  If  the  person  defendant  in  such  execution,  or  any  cred- 
itor of  such  defendant,  contests  the  amount  or  justice  of  the 
claim,  or  the  existence  of  such  lien,  he  may  file  his  affidavit 
of  the  fact,  setting  forth  the  grounds  of  such  denial,  which 
affidavit  shall  form  an  issue  to  be  returned  to  the  court  and 
tried  as  other  causes, 

7.  If  only  a  part  of  the  amount  claimed  is  denied,  the 
amount  admitted  to  be  due  must  be  paid  before  the  affidavit 
shall  be  received  by  the  officer. 

8.  The  defendant  may  replevy  the  property  by  giving 
bond  and  security  in  double  the  amount  claimed,  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  eventual  condemnation  money.  Where  no  re- 
plevy bond  is  given  there  must  be  a  special  verdict  sustaining 
the  lien.    A  general  verdict  is  not  proper.^^ 

Liens  of  pav^nees,  innkeepers,  boardinghouse  keepers,  liv- 
erystable  men,  and  attorneys  at  law,  in  possession  of  personal 
property  under  a  lien  for  fees,  shall  be  satisfied  according  to 
the  provisions  of  the  next  following  paragraph,  in  cases  where 
there  is  no  notice  of  conflicting  liens;  but  if  there  is  a  con- 
flicting lien,  the  mode  of  foreclosure  pointed  out  in  the  pre- 
ceding paragraphs  shall  be  pursued.^"* 

The  pawnee  may  sell  the  property  received  in  pledge  after 
the  debt  becomes  due  and  remains  unpaid;  but  he  must  al- 
ways give  notice  for  thirty  days  to  the  pawnor  of  his  inten- 
tion to  sell,  and  the  sale  must  be  in  public,  fairly  conducted, 
and  to  the  highest  bidder,  unless  otherwise  provided  by  con- 
tract.^^ 

§  1053a.  Idaho.^® — Liens  of  common  carriers,  commission 
merchants,  consignees,  innkeepers,   and  warehousemen  are 

758,  27  S.  E.  752.  54  Code  1911,  §  3368. 

53  Argo  V.  Fields,  112  Ga.  677,  Zl         55  Code  1911,  §  3530. 
S.  E.  995.  56  Rev.  Code  1908,  §§  1547,  1548. 


§     I054  LIENS,  1066 

enforced  as  follows :  If  no  person  calls  for  the  property  with- 
in four  months  from  the  receipt  thereof  and  pays  freight  and 
charges  thereon,  the  carrier,  commission  merchant,  inn- 
keeper, or  warehouseman  may  sell  such  property,  or  so  much 
thereof  as  will  pay  freight  and  charges,  at  auction,  to  the 
highest  bidder,  first  having  given  twenty  days'  notice  of  the 
time  and  place  of  sale  to  the  owner,  consignee,  or  consignor, 
when  known,  and  by  advertisement  in  a  daily  paper  ten  days 
(or,  if  in  a  weekly  paper,  four  weeks)  published  where  such 
sale  is  to  take  place ;  and  if  any  surplus  is  left  after  paying 
freight,  storage,  cost  of  advertising,  and  other  reasonable 
charges,  the  same  must  be  paid  over  to  the  owner  of  such 
property  at  any  time  thereafter,  upon  demand  being  made 
therefor  within  sixty  days  after  the  sale.  If  the  owner  or  his 
agent  fails  to  demand  such  surplus  within  sixty  days  of  the 
time  of  such  sale,  then  it  must  be  paid  into  the  county  treas- 
ury, subject  to  the  order  of  the  owner. 

§  1054.  Indiana.^'^ — Whenever  any  person  shall  intrust  to 
any  mechanic  or  tradesman  materials  to  construct,  alter  or 
repair  any  article  of  value,  such  mechanic  or  tradesman,  if 
the  same  be  completed  and  not  taken  away,  and  his  fair  and 
reasonable  charges  not  paid,  may,  after  six  months  from  the 
time  such  charges  became  due,  sell  the  same;  or,  if  the  same 
be  susceptible  of  division  without  injury,  he  may  sell  so  much 

•57  Burns'       Ann.       Stats.       1914,  balance    due    for   sawing  a   larger 

§§    8308-8310.     The   above    statutes  lot  of  lumber.    Bierly  v.  Royse,  25 

do  not  declare  a  lien  but  only  pro-  Ind.  App.  202,  57  N.  E.  939.    A  vol- 

vide  for  enforcing  a  lien  given  by  untary  surrender  of  possession  by 

the  common  law.    Watts  v.  Swee-  the   mechanic,   of   the   property  to 

ney,   127  Ind.  116,  26  N.  E.  680.    It  the  owner  is  a  waiver  of  the  lien, 

has  no  application  to  property  left  Tucker  v.  Taylor,  53  Ind.  93;  Hol- 

in  pledge.    Rosenzweig  v.   Frazer,  derman  v.   Manier,  104  Ind.   118,   3 

82   Ind.   342.     Mill    owners    have    a  N.  E.  811.    A  temporary  surrender 

lien  for   their  charges    on    lumber  of   possession    of   the    property   is 

sawed   by  them   and   may   enforce  not    a   waiver.      Walls    v.    Long,   2 

such   lien   against  any   lumber   re-  Ind.  App.  202,  28  N.  E.  101. 
maining  in  their  possession   for   a 


1067  REMEDIES   FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT   OF   LIENS.       §     I055 

thereof  as  is  necessary  to  pay  such  charges,  and  such  sale 
shall  be  at  public  auction,  for  cash  or  on  reasonable  credit, 
taking  sufficient  sureties  in  case  of  a  sale  on  time. 

Before  such  sale,  such  mechanic  or  tradesman  shall  give 
public  notice  of  the  time  and  place  thereof,  by  advertisements 
set  up  for  ten  days  in  three  public  places  in  the  city  or  town- 
ship where  he  resides,  one  of  which  shall  be  in  some  con- 
spicuous part  of  his  shop,  or  place  of  business;  or,  if  the  value 
of  the  article  be  ten  dollars  or  more,  by  publishing  the  same 
three  weeks  successively  in  a  newspaper  in  the  county,  if  any. 

The  proceeds  of  such  sale,  after  payment  of  charges  for 
construction  or  repair,  and  for  publication  and  notice  afore- 
said, shall,  if  the  owner  be  absent,  be  deposited  with  the 
treasurer  of  the  proper  county  by  the  person  making  such 
sale,  he  taking  the  treasurer's  receipt  therefor,  and  shall  be 
subject  to  the  order  of  the  person  legally  entitled  thereto. 

§  1054a.  Kentucky .^^ — One  holding  a  lien  may  enforce  the 
same  in  an  action  in  court  for  that  purpose  and  he  is  required 
to  state  in  his  petition  the  liens  held  by  others  on  the  same 
property  and  make  such  other  lienholders  defendants  there- 
to and  such  other  lienholders  may  file  their  answers  and 
cross-petitions  to  enforce  their  respective  liens  and  no  sum- 
mons is  necessary  on  such  cross-petitions  unless  personal 
judgments  are  sought. 

§  1055.  Maine.^^ — Whoever  has  a  lien  on  or  pledge  of  any 
stock  or  certificate  thereof,  bond,  note,  account  or  other  chose 
in  action,  or  on  any  other  personal  property  in  his  posses- 

58  Civ.  Code  1895,  §  692.  Mitchell  ting  up  their  respective  liens.    Mc- 

V.  Fidelity  Trust  &  Safety  Vault  Kibben  v.  Worthington's  Exrs.,  103 

Co.,  20   Ky.    L.   713,  47  S.   W.   446.  Ky.  356,  20  Ky.  L.  61,  45  S.  W.  233. 

Where   there   is  an  omission   in  a  59  Rev.   Stat.   1903,   ch.  93,   §§  66- 

petition  to  enforce  a  lien  to  state  74.   A  statutory  lien  cannot  be  ex- 

the  amount  due  named  defendants  tended   by   estoppel.      Gile   v.   At- 

the   omission   is   cured  when   such  kins,  93  Maine  223,  44  Atl.  896,  74 

defendants  file  cross-petitions  set-  Am.    St.    341.     As    to    sale    of    un- 


§    1055  LIENS.  1068 

sion,  may  enforce  it  by  a  sale  thereof,  in  the  manner  provided 
in  the  contract  creating  such  lien  or  pledge,  if  in  writing,  or  as 
hereinafter  provided.  The  person  claiming  the  lien  may  file, 
in  the  supreme  judicial  or  superior  court  in  the  county  where 
he  resides,  or  in  the  office  of  the  clerk  thereof,  a  petition 
briefly  setting  forth  the  nature  and  amount  of  his  claim,  a  de- 
scription of  the  article  possessed,  and  the  names  and  resi- 
dences of  its  owners,  if  known  to  him,  and  a  prayer  for 
process  to  enforce  his  lien. 

If  the  owners  are  set  forth  in  a  petition  filed  in  the  clerk's 
office,  and  are  residents  of  the  state,  the  clerk  may  issue  an 
order  of  notice,  to  be  given  by  serving  them  with  a  copy  of 
the  petition  and  order  thereon,  fourteen  days  before  the  next 
term  of  the  court  in  such  county. 

If  the  owners  are  not  known,  or  are  not  residents  of  the 
state,  or  if  the  petition  is  filed  in  court,  the  court  may  order 
reasonable  notice  of  at  least  fourteen  days  to  them  and  to 
others  interested  returnable  at  the  same  or  a  subsequent 
term;  to  be  given  by  personal  service  of  a  copy  of  the  peti- 
tion w4th  the  order  of  court  thereon,  or  by  publication  in  a 
newspaper,  or  both,  as  the  court  directs. 

At  the  time  fixed  in  the  notice,  any  party  interested  in  the 
article  as  owner,  mortgagee  or  otherwise,  may  appear,  and 
after  appearance,  the  proceedings  shall  be  the  same  as  in  an 
action  on  the  case  in  which  the  petitioner  is  plaintiff  and  the 
party  appearing  is  defendant.  Questions  of  fact,  at  the  in- 
stance of  either  party,  shall  be  submitted  to  a  jury  on  an  issue 
framed  under  the  direction  of  the  court. 

If,  in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  the  article  on  which  the  lien 
is  claimed  is  not  of  sufficient  value  to  pay  the  petitioner's 

claimed   goods   left   with  carriers,  see   ante,   §§   710,   711.     Mechanics' 

see   Rev.   Stat.    1903,    ch.   54,    §    16.  liens,  see  ante,  §  761.    By  suing  in 

Innkeepers'  liens,  see  ante,   §  531.  trespass   plaintiff  waives   his  lien. 

Landlords'   liens,   see   ante,    §   621.  Brown   v.   Howard,  86   Maine  342, 

Liverystable    keepers'     liens,     see  29  Atl.  1094. 
ante,    §    662.     Lumbermen's    liens. 


1069  REMEDIES   FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT   OF   LIENS.       §     IO56 

claim,  with  the  probable  costs  of  suit,  the  court  may  order  the 
persons  appearing  in  defense  to  give  bond  to  the  petitioner, 
with  sufficient  sureties  approved  by  the  court,  to  pay  such 
costs  as  are  awarded  against  him,  so  far  as  they  are  not  paid 
out  of  the  proceeds  of  the  articles  on  which  the  lien  is  claimed. 

After  trial  and  final  adjudication  in  favor  of  the  petitioner, 
the  court  may  order  any  competent  officer  to  sell  the  article 
on  which  the  lien  is  claimed,  as  personal  property  is  sold  on 
execution,  and  out  of  the  proceeds,  after  deducting  his  fees 
and  the  expenses  of  sale,  to  pay  to  the  petitioner  the  amount 
and  costs  awarded  him,  and  the  balance  to  the  person  entitled 
to  it,  if  he  is  known  to  the  court,  otherwise  into  court. 

Money  paid  into  court  may  be  paid  over  to  the  person  le- 
gally entitled  to  it,  on  petition  and  order  of  the  court.  If  it  is 
not  called  for  at  the  first  term  after  it  is  paid  into  court,  it 
shall  be  paid  into  the  county  treasury;  and  if  afterwards  the 
person  entitled  to  it  petitions  and  establishes  his  claim  to  it, 
the  court  may  order  the  county  treasurer  to  pay  it  to  him. 

Liens  for  less  than  twenty  dollars  may  be  enforced  before 
any  trial  justice,  for  the  county  where  the  person  having  the 
lien  resides,  and  all  proceedings,  rights  and  liabilities,  shall  be 
the  same  as  hereinbefore  provided,  so  far  as  the  nature  of  the 
tribunal  admits ;  and  either  party  may  appeal,  as  in  other 
cases. 

§  1056.  Massachusetts.*^^ — Whoever  has  a  lien  (other  than 
those  in  favor  of  mechanics  upon  real  property  and  liens  upon 
vessels)  for  money  due  to  him  on  account  of  work  and  la- 

60  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  198,  §§  23-  itor  having  a  lien  could  do  nothing 

29.     As   to    the   sale   of   unclaimed  w^ith  the  property  but  hold  it,  and 

goods  left  with  carriers,  see  Rev.  wait    for    the    debtor    to    redeem. 

Laws  1902,  ch.  95.    As  to  mechan-  Busfield     v.     Wheeler,     M     Allen 

ics'  and    artisans'   Hens,   see   ante,  (Mass.)    139,    143,    per    Wells,    J.; 

§   762.    Until   the  adoption  of   the  Doane  v.  Russell,  3  Gray  (Mass.) 

General    Statutes    in    1860,   a   cred-  382. 


1056 


LIENS. 


1070 


bor,  care  and  diligence,  or  money  expended*'^  on  or  about 
personal  property  by  reason  of  any  contract  express  or  im- 
plied,''^ if  such  money  is  not  paid  within  sixty  days  after  a 
demand*^"  in  writing,  delivered  to  the  debtor,  or  left  at  his 
usual  place  of  abode,  if  within  this  commonwealth,  or  made 
by  letter  addressed  to  him  at  his  usual  place  of  abode  with- 
out the  commonwealth,  and  deposited,  postpaid,  in  the  post- 
office,  may  file  a  petition  in  the  superior  court,  a  police,  dis- 
trict, or  municipal  court,  or  with  a  trial  justice  in  the  county 
where  the  petitioner  resides  or  has  his  usual  place  of  business 
for  an  order  for  the  sale  of  the  property  in  satisfaction  of  the 
debt.«^ 

The  court  or  justice  shall  thereupon  issue  a  notice'^''  to  the 
owner  of  the  property  to  appear  at  a  time  and  place  desig- 
nated, which  shall  be  served  by  an  officer  qualified  to  serve 
civil  process  or  by  a  disinterested  person  by  delivering  to  the 


•jI  Such  lien  may  cover  the  cost 
of  materials.  Busfield  v.  Wheeler, 
14  Allen  (Mass.)  139. 

62  It  is  not  necessary  that  the 
agreement  under  which  the  work 
is  done  should  be  in  writing,  or 
that  any  notice  of  an  intention  to 
claim  a  lien  should  be  given  to  the 
owner  or  recorded.  Busfield  v. 
Wheeler,  14  Allen  (Mass.)  139. 

63  The  demand  is  merely  a  pre- 
liminary to  the  proceedings.  It 
need  not  set  out  "a  just  and  true 
account,"  nor  "a  description  of  the 
property  intended  to  be  covered 
by  the  lien,"  as  in  the  case  of  a 
mechanic's  lien  upon  real  prop- 
erty. The  petition  is  not  defeated 
by  the  petitioner's  demanding  too 
large  a  sum.  Notice  of  the  claim 
and  a  request  for  payment  is  a  de- 
mand. Busfield  v.  Wheeler,  14  Al- 
len (Mass.)  139.  Notice  mailed  and 
actually  received  is  good.    Blanch- 


ard  v.  Ely,  179  Mass.  586,  61  N.  E. 
218. 

64  No  time  being  fixed  by  the 
statute  for  the  commencement  of 
proceedings  to  enforce  the  lien,  a 
petition  may  be  sustained  though 
not  commenced  for  more  than  two 
years,  and  though  no  written  de- 
mand for  payment  was  made  for 
more  than  fifteen  months,  after  the 
completion  of  the  work.  The  gen- 
eral owner  has  no  occasion  to 
complain  of  delay;  for  if  he 
wishes  to  have  the  property  re- 
turned, he  can  pay  the  debt  and 
claim  the  property  at  any  time. 
Busfield  V.  Wheeler,  14  Allen 
(Mass.)    139. 

6a  The  notice  issued  on  the  pe- 
tition need  not  set  forth  a  state- 
ment in  detail  of  the  work  done 
and  money  expended  for  which  a 
lien  is  claimed.  Busfield  v. 
Wheeler.  14  Allen   (Mass.)   139. 


lO/I  REMEDIES   FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT   OF   LIENS.       §    IO56 

owner,  or  by  leaving  at  his  usual  place  of  abode,  if  within 
the  commonwealth,  a  copy  thereof  fourteen  days  before  the 
day  of  hearing.  The  return,  if  not  made  by  an  officer,  shall 
be  under  oath. 

If  the  owner  or  his  usual  place  of  abode  is  unknown,  the 
petition  may  be  filed  sixty  days  after  the  money  becomes  due, 
and  a  notice  may  issue  "to  the  unknown  owner"  describing 
the  property,  or  to  the  owner,  naming  him,  "whose  usual 
place  of  abode  is  unknown."  If  the  owner  resides  out  of  the 
commonwealth,  or  he  or  his  usual  place  of  abode  is  un- 
known, notice  may  be  given  by  a  publication  in  the  same 
manner  as  a  notice  of  intention  to  foreclose. 

If  the  owner  makes  default  at  the  time  appointed,  or  if 
upon  a  hearing  of  the  parties  it  appears  that  a  lien  exists 
upon  the  property,  and  that  the  property  ought  to  be  sold 
for  the  satisfaction  of  the  debt,  the  court  or  justice  may  make 
an  order  for  such  sale,  determine  and  record  the  amount  then 
due  and  award  costs  to  the  prevailing  party.  Any  surplus  of 
the  proceeds  of  the  sale,  after  satisfying  the  debt  and  all  costs 
and  charges,  shall  be  paid  to  the  owner  upon  demand. 

Either  party  may  appeal  from  the  final  order  of  the  court 
or  justice  in  the  same  manner  as  in  other  civil  actions  to  the 
superior  court,  which  shall  make  an  appropriate  order.  If  the 
respondent  appeals,  he  shall  give  bond  or  recognize  for  the 
prosecution  of  his  appeal  and  for  the  payment,  if  judgment 
is  rendered  against  him,  of  any  balance  of  the  debt,  with  costs, 
which  may  remain  unsatisfied  after  a  sale  of  the  property. 

When  a  lien  upon  live  animals  is  sought  to  be  enforced, 
the  application  by  petition  may  be  made  at  the  expiration 
of  ten  days  after  a  demand  in  writing;  and  the  notice  issued 
thereon  may  be  served  seven  days  before  the  hearing.^^ 

66  It  is   expressly  provided   that  boarding,    or    keeping    horses    or 

boarding-house    keepers    may    en-  other    domestic    animals    may    be 

force    their   liens   under   the   fore-  enforced     in     the     same     manner, 

going  provisions.    Rev.  Laws  1902,  Rev.   Law^s   1902,  ch.   198,   §   29.    As 

ch.  198,  §  28.    A  lien  for  pasturing,  to   the   application   of   the   statute 


§    1056a  LIENS.  1072 

§  1056a.  Michigan.^' — A  mechanic,  tradesman  or  artisan, 
or  keeper  of  live  stock  has  a  lien  upon  the  property  made, 
repaired,  or  constructed,  or  the  stock  kept  or  cared  for.  The 
person  having  such  lien  may  commence  a  suit  for  the  recov- 
ery of  such  charges,  by  summons  in  the  usual  form,  before 
any  justice  of  the  peace  of  the  city  or  township  in  which  he 
resides,  or  in  any  court,  as  the  case  may  require,  against  the 
person  liable  for  the  payment  thereof.  If  such  summons  be 
returned  personally  served  upon  the  defendant,  the  same 
proceedings  shall  thereupon  be  had,  in  all  respects,  as  in  other 
suits  commenced  by  summons,  in  which  there  is  a  personal 
service  of  process,  and  judgment  shall  be  rendered  in  such 
suit  in  like  manner.  If  the  officer  return  upon  such  summons, 
that  the  defendant  can  not  be  found  within  his  county,  the 
same  proceedings  shall  be  thereupon  had,  in  all  respects,  as 
near  as  may  be  as  in  suits  commenced  by  attachment,  in 
which  there  is  not  a  personal  service  of  a  copy  of  the  attach- 
ment upon  the  defendant,  and  judgment  shall  be  rendered 
in  such  suit  in  like  manner.  If  the  plaintiff  recover  judgment 
in  such  suit,  execution  shall  issue  thereon  in  the  same  man- 
ner and  with  the  like  effect,  as  upon  judgments  rendered  in 
suits  commenced  by  attachment,  and  the  property  upon 
which  the  plaintiff  holds  such  lien,  or  so  much  thereof  as 
shall  be  sufficient  to  satisfy  such  execution  may  be  sold 
thereon  in  the  same  manner  as  if  it  had  been  seized  and  held 
upon  an  attachment  in  such  suit. 

These  provisions  shall  apply  to  all  cases  of  personal  prop- 
erty on  which  the  bailee  or  keeper  thereof  has  by  law  a  lien 
for  any  keeping,  feed,  care  or  labor  by  him  bestowed  upon 
such  property. 

If  the  property  upon  which  any  such  lien  shall  be  enforced 
as  herein  provided,  consist  of  horses,  cattle,  sheep,  swine  or 

to  liens  of  carriers,  see  Briggs  v.         C7  Howell's  Stats.   1913,  §§  13804- 
Boston  &  Lowell  R.   Co.,  6  Allen      13812. 
(Mass.)  246,  83  Am.  Dec.  626. 


I073  REMEDIES   FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT   OF   LIENS.       §    IO57 

other  beasts,  and  any  expenses  shall  have  been  incurred  by 
the  person  having  such  lien  after  the  same  accrued,  in  keep- 
ing and  taking  care  of  such  property,  the  amount  of  such 
expenses  shall  be  an  additional  lien  upon  the  property,  and 
shall  be  computed  and  ascertained  upon  the  trial  or  assess- 
ment of  damages,  and  included  in  the  judgment. 

§  1056b.  Minnesota.^^ — If  any  sum  secured  by  a  lien  of  a 
carrier,  warehouseman,  liverystable  keeper,  veterinary,  black- 
smith, mechanic  or  laborer  be  not  paid  within  ninety  days 
after  it  becomes  due,  the  lienholder  may  sell  the  property 
and  out  of  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  there  shall  be  paid,  first, 
the  disbursements  aforesaid,  and,  second,  all  charges  against 
said  property  paid  by  such  person  to  any  other  person,  and, 
third,  the  total  indebtedness  then  secured  by  the  lien.  The 
remainder,  if  any,  shall  be  paid  on  demand  to  the  owner  or 
other  person  entitled  thereto. 

§  1057.  New  Hampshire.*^^ — Any  person  having  a  lien  on 
personal  property,  by  pledge  or  otherwise,  where  no  time 
is  limited  for  the  payment  of  the  debt  or  redemption  of  the 
property,  may  sell  the  same  or  so  much  thereof  as  is  needful, 
at  auction,  notice  thereof  being  given  as  hereinafter  required, 
and  from  the  proceeds  he  may  reimburse  himself  for  his  debt 
and  the  expenses  incident  to  the  sale. 

If  a  time  is  limited  for  the  payment  of  the  debt  or  the  re- 
demption of  the  property,  the  property  may  be  sold  at  any 
time  after  the  expiration  of  the  limited  time,  upon  like  no- 
tice, provided  such  sale  shall  not  be  in  conflict  with  the  terms 
of  the  contract  under  which  it  is  holden. 

Notice  of  such  sale  shall  be  given  by  posting  notices  there- 
of in  two  or  more  public  places  in  the  town  where  the  prop- 
erty is  situate,  fourteen  days  at  least  before  the  sale,  and,  if 

68  Gen.  Stat.  1913,  §  7038.  69  Pub.  Stats.  1901,  ch.  141,  §§  3- 

8. 

7         68 


§    1057a  LIENS.  1074 

the  value  of  the  property  exceeds  one  hundred  dollars,  by 
publishing  the  notice. 

A  notice  of  the  sale  shall  be  served  upon  the  pledgor  or 
general  ov^ner,  if  resident  in  the  county,  the  same  number 
of  days  before  the  sale,  stating  in  w^riting  the  time  and  place 
of  sale,  the  property  to  be  sold,  and  the  amount  of  the  lien 
thereon. 

The  balance  of  the  proceeds  of  sale,  if  any,  after  payment 
of  the  amount  of  the  lien  or  pledge  and  the  reasonable  ex- 
penses incident  to  the  sale,  shall  be  paid  to  the  pledgor,  gen- 
eral owner,  or  person  entitled  thereto,  on  demand. 

The  holder  of  the  lien  shall  cause  a  copy  of  such  notices 
and  an  af^davit  of  service,  w^ith  an  account  of  the  sale,  and 
the  fees  and  charges  thereon,  to  be  recorded  in  the  books  of 
the  tow^n  where  the  sale  is  had.  A  certified  copy  thereof  may 
be  used  in  evidence. 

§  1057a.  New  Mexico.'^° — Innkeepers,  liverystable  keep- 
ers, landlords,  and  common  carriers  may  enforce  their  liens 
as  follows:  After  the  debt  for  which  the  lien  is  claimed  be- 
comes due  and  payable,  those  who  are  entitled  to  a  lien  may 
serve  the  party  or  parties,  against  whom  the  lien  is  sought 
to  be  enforced,  with  a  written  notice,  setting  forth  the 
amount  of  the  indebtedness,  upon  what  account  or  cause  the 
same  accrued,  and  that,  if  the  same  is  not  paid  within  ten 
days  after  the  service  of  said  notice,  the  property  will  be  ad- 
vertised and  sold  to  satisfy  said  indebtedness. 

If  default  be  made  in  the  payment  of  the  debt,  after  notice 
as  provided  above,  then  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  lien  claimant 
or  creditor,  as  herein  provided,  to  advertise  and  sell  such 
property  at  public  auction  to  the  highest  bidder  for  cash, 
after  giving  twenty  days'  notice  of  such  sale  by  at  least  six 
handbills  posted  up  in  public  places  in  the  county  in  which 
such  sale  is  to  be  made;  such  notices  of  sale  shall  set  forth  the 

70  Comp.  Laws  1897,  §§  2240-2245. 


I075  REMEDIES   FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT   OF   LIENS.    §    1057b 

time  and  place  of  sale,  and  a  description  of  the  property  to 
be  sold. 

After  sale,  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  shall  be  applied  to  the 
payment  of  the  costs  of  advertising  and  making  the  sale  and 
satisfaction  of  the  demand  of  the  lien  claimant,  and  the  resi- 
due, if  any,  shall  be  refunded  to  the  lien  debtor:  provided, 
that  the  lien  claimant  shall  not  be  precluded  from  bidding  on 
or  purchasing  the  property  at  such  sale. 

§  1057b.  New  York.'^^ — Any  lien  against  personal  prop- 
erty, other  than  a  mortgage  on  chattels,  if  in  the  possession 
of  the  lienor,  may  be  enforced  by  the  public  sale  of  such 
property,  but  before  such  sale  the  lienor  must  serve  a  notice 
upon  the  owner  if  the  owner  can  be  found  when  such  lien 
arose,  if  not  then  to  the  person  for  whose  account  the  same 
is  then  held.  When  no  proper  person  may  be  found  in  the 
county  upon  which  such  notice  can  be  served,  then  such  no- 
tice shall  be  served  by  mailing  it  to  the  last  known  address 
of  such  owner.  A  like  notice  must  also  be  served  upon  any 
person  who  shall  have  notified  the  lienor  of  an  interest  in  the 
property  subject  to  the  lien.  Such  notice  must  specify  the 
estimated  value  of  the  property  held,  a  brief  description  of 
such  property,  the  amount  of  such  lien  at  the  date  of  the 
notice  and  shall  require  the  owner  to  pay  the  amount  of  such 
lien  on  or  before  a  day  mentioned  therein,  not  less  than  ten 
days  from  the  service  of  the  notice.  Such  notice  must  also 
state  the  time  when  and  the  place  where  such  property  will 
be  sold,  if  the  sum  due  be  not  paid  before  such  day.  The  rio^ 
tice  must  be  verified  by  the  lienor  to  the  eflfect  that  the  lien  is 
valid,  that  the  debt  for  which  the  lien  is  claimed  is  due  and 
is  unpaid.  The  sale  following  such  notice  must  be  at  public 
auction  to  the  highest  bidder  and  must  be  held  in  the  city  or 
town  where  the  lien  was  acquired.  Before  such  a  sale  may 
be  had  a  notice  thereof  must  be  published  once  each  week 

71  Birdseye's   C.   and   G.    Consol.    Laws  1909,  p.  3237. 


§    1057c  LIENS.  1076 

for  two  consecutive  weeks  in  a  newspaper  published  in  the 
town  or  city  where  such  sale  is  to  be  held.  Such  sale  must  be 
held  not  less  than  fifteen  days  from  the  first  publication.  If 
no  newspaper  be  published  in  such  town  or  city  then  the  sale 
must  be  advertised  by  posting  notice  thereof  at  least  ten 
days  before  such  sale  in  not  less  than  six  conspicuous  places. 
After  sale  the  lienor  may  retain  an  amount  of  the  proceeds 
thereof  to  satisfy  his  lien  and  the  expense  of  the  sale  and 
advertisements;  the  balance  thereof,  if  any,  shall  be  held  by 
the  lienor  subject  to  the  demands  of  the  owner  or  his  as- 
signee or  personal  representatives.  Such  a  lien  may  also  be 
enforced  by  foreclosure  in  any  court  which  would  have  juris- 
diction to  render  a  judgment  in  an  action  founded  upon  a 
contract  for  a  sum  equal  to  the  amount  of  the  lien. 

§  1057c.  North  Dakota^- — An  action  to  foreclose  a  lien 
upon  a  chattel  may  be  maintained  by  an  innkeeper,  boarding- 
house  keeper,  mechanic,  workman,  bailee,  or  other  person 
having  a  lien  at  common  law  or  under  the  statutes  of  this 
state.  A  judgment  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  must  specify  the 
amount  due  on  the  lien,  and  direct  a  sale  of  the  property  to 
satisfy  the  same  and  costs,  by  a  person  appointed  thereby  or 
b}'  an  officer  designated  therein,  in  the  manner  provided  for 
the  sale  of  personal  property  under  execution,  and  the  appli- 
cation by  him  of  the  proceeds  of  the  sale,  less  his  fees  and  ex- 
penses, to  the  payment  of  the  judgment  and  costs.  The  judg- 
ment must  also  provide  for  the  payment  of  the  surplus  to  the 
owner  of  the  chattel,  and  for  the  safe-keeping  of  such  sur- 

■5^2  Rev.   Code  1905,   §§   7512,  7516.  chanics    and    artisans    for    making 

For  statute  authorizing  carriers  to  or    repairing   any    article    of    per- 

sell    unclaimed    goods,    see    Rev.  sonal  property,  see  ante,  §  768a.   A 

Code    1905,   §   5643.    For  a   special  justice  of  the   peace  has  jurisdic- 

statute  for  the  enforcement  of  an  tion   of   an  action   to    foreclose   a 

innkeeper's  lien,  see  ante,  §   536b.  lien  vi^here  the  amount  of  the  lien 

As  to  liens  of  liverystable  keepers  claimed  is  not  more  than  two  hun- 

and  agistors,  see  ante,  §  673a.    As  dred  dollars, 
to  the  enforcement  of  liens  of  me- 


I077  REMEDIES   FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT    OF   LIENS.       §    IO59 

plus,  if  necessary,  until  it  is  claimed  by  him.  If  the  defendant 
upon  whom  the  summons  is  personally  served  is  liable  for 
the  amount  of  the  lien,  or  for  any  part  thereof,  judgment  may 
be  entered  against  him  accordingly. 

§  1058.  Oregon." — In  order  to  make  the  lien  of  a  black- 
smith, wagon  maker,  automobile  repairer,  or  machinist  ef- 
fectual, the  lien  claimant  shall,  within  sixty  days  from  the 
date  of  delivery  of  such  chattel  to  the  owner  thereof,  or  his 
duly  authorized  agent,  file  in  the  office  of  the  county  clerk  of 
the  county  in  which  said  labor,  skill  and  materials  were  ex- 
pended on  such  chattel  a  lien  notice,  which  notice  shall  state 
the  name  of  the  claimant,  the  name  of  the  owner,  or  reputed 
owner,  a  description  of  the  chattel,  sufficient  for  identifica- 
tion, upon  which  the  claimant  has  expended  labor,  skill,  and 
material,  the  amount  for  which  the  lien  is  claimed,  and  the 
date  upon  which  such  expenditure  was  completed,  which  no- 
tice shall  be  verified  by  the  oath  of  the  claimant,  or  by  some 
one  in  his  behalf,  having  knowledge  of  the  facts.  (Then  fol- 
lows the  statutory  form.) 

§  1059.  Pennsylvania.''^ — A  commission  merchant,  factor, 
common  carrier,  or  other  person  having  a  lien  for  the  ex- 
penses of  carriage,  storage,  or  labor  bestowed  upon  any 
goods,  wares,  merchandise,  or  other  property,  for  or  on  ac- 
count of  the  costs  or  expenses  of  carriage,  storage,  or  labor 
bestowed  on  such  goods,  wares,  or  merchandise,  if  the  owner 
or  consignee  of  the  same  shall  fail  or  neglect  or  refuse  to  pay 
the  amount  of  charges  upon  any  such  property,  goods,  wares, 
or  merchandise,  within  sixty  days  after  demand  thereof,  made 

73  Gen.  Laws  1911,  p.  214,  §  7498.  ment  of  loggers'  liens,  see  Bellin- 

For  the    enforcement   of   liens   on  ger     &     Cotton's     Ann.     Codes     & 

mares   and    colts,    see    Gen.    Laws  Stats.  1902,  §§  5677-5683,  as  amend- 

1911,  p.  352,  §  5716;  for  manner  of  ed  by  Gen.   Laws   1907,  p.  225. 

enforcing  liens  on  crops,  see  Gen.  '''*  Purdon's    Dig.     (13th    ed.),    p. 

Laws    1907,    p.    277;    for    enforce-  617,  §  6. 


§  L059a  LIENS.  1078 

personally  upon  such  owner  or  consignee,  then  and  in  such 
case  it  shall  and  may  be  lawful  for  any  such  commission  mer- 
chant, factor,  common  carrier,  or  other  person  having  such 
lien  as  aforesaid,  after  the  expiration  of  said  period  of  sixty 
days,  to  expose  such  goods,  wares,  merchandise,  or  other 
property  to  sale  at  public  auction,  and  to  sell  the  same,  or 
so  much  thereof  as  shall  be  sufficient  to  discharge  said  lien 
together  with  costs  of  sale  and  advertising. 

§  1059a.  Rhode  Island.^^ — One  having  a  lien  at  common 
law  for  money  due  him  for  work  or  labor,  care  and  diligence 
or  for  money  expended  on  or  about  personal  property  or  for 
storage  or  has  a  lien  on  personal  property  by  reason  of  a 
contract,  express  or  implied,  if  the  debt  be  not  paid  within 
thirty  days  after  demand  therefor  in  writing  delivered  to 
the  owner  or  some  one  of  the  owners  or  left  at  his  usual  resi- 
dence, if  in  the  state,  with  some  person  living  there,  or  made 
by  letter  mailed  to  him  at  his  usual  post-office  address  with- 
out the  state,  may  apply  by  petition  in  equity  to  the  court  for 
the  county  where  the  petitioner  or  some  one  of  the  petition- 
ers resides  for  an  order  for  the  sale  of  the  property  in  satis- 
faction of  the  debt  and  the  clerk  of  the  court  shall  issue  a 
citation  to  the  owner  of  the  property  to  appear  at  a  time  and 
place  named  to  show  cause  why  the  lien  should  not  be  al- 
lowed and  enforced.  The  citation  must  be  served  on  the 
owner  by  the  sheriff  at  least  ten  days  before  return  day  of  the 
citation,  by  leaving  an  attested  copy  at  the  last  and  usual 
place  of  residence  of  the  owner  or  by  reading  the  same  to 
him. 

If  the  owner  resides  without  the  state  such  citation  may  be 
served  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  law  for  services  of  sub- 
poenas on  nonresident  defendants. 

If  the  owner  is  unknown  such  petition  may  be  filed  thirty 
days  after  the  money  becomes  due  and  citation  may  issue 

75  Gen.  Laws  1909,  p.  896,  §§  24-29. 


I079  REMEDIES    FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT    OF   LIENS.    §    IO59C 

to  the  unknown  owner  and  may  be  served  by  publication  in 
the  manner  directed  by  the  court.  Upon  service  in  any  one 
of  the  above  ways  and  upon  default  upon  trial  the  court  must 
adjudge  the  amount  due  and  order  the  property  sold  to  pay 
the  same  and  any  sum  received  from  such  sale  in  excess  of 
an  amount  sufficient  to  pay  the  lien  and  costs  will  be  paid 
into  the  registry  of  the  court  for  the  benefit  of  the  owner. 
This  remedy  is  cumulative. 

§  1059b.  South  DakotaJ^ — An  action  to  foreclose  a  lien 
upon  a  chattel  may  be  maintained  by  an  innkeeper,  boarding- 
house  keeper,  mechanic,  workman,  bailee,  or  other  person 
having  a  lien  at  common  law  or  under  the  statutes  of  this 
state.  A  judgment  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  must  specify  the 
amount  of  the  lien  and  direct  a  sale  of  the  chattel,  to  satisfy 
the  same  and  costs,  by  the  sheriff  or  other  officer  of  the  court 
in  like  manner  as  when  the  sheriff  sells  personal  property 
under  execution,  and  the  application  by  him  of  the  proceeds 
of  the  sale,  less  his  fees  and  expenses,  to  the  payment  of  the 
judgment  and  costs.  The  judgment  must  also  provide  for 
the  payment  of  the  surplus  to  the  .owner  of  the  chattel,  and 
for  the  safekeeping  of  such  surplus  if  necessary,  until  it  is 
claimed  by  him. 

§  1059c.  Tennessee.'^^ — Any  and  all  liens  given  by  statute 
in  this  state,  on  personal  property,  where  no  method  of  en- 
forcing the  same  is  prescribed  by  statute  law,  may  be  en- 
forced by  original  attachment  issued  by  any  justice  of  the 
peace  or  court  having  jurisdiction  of  the  amount  claimed  to 
be  due,  on  affidavit  that  the  debt  is  due  and  unpaid,  to  be 
levied  on  the  property  upon  which  the  lien  exists,  be  it  either 
in  the  hands  of  the  creditor,  owner,  or  other  party  not  an 
innocent  purchaser. 

76  Rev.   Codes   (Civ.   Proc.)    1903,      Rev.  Code  (Civ.)  1903,  §  1548. 
§  743.    For  statute  authorizing  car-         77  Code  1896,  §  5330. 
riers  to  sell  unclaimed  goods,  see 


§    I060  LIENS,  1080 

§  1060.  Texas.'^^ — Liens  in  favor  of  the  proprietors  of  ho- 
tels and  boarding-houses  and  of  Hvery-stables,  and  in  favor  of 
mechanics  for  labor  upon  personal  articles,  may  be  foreclosed 
as  follows : — 

When  possession  of  any  of  the  property  under  either  of 
such  liens  has  continued  for  sixty  days  after  the  charges  ac- 
crue, and  the  charges  so  due  have  not  been  paid,  it  shall  be 
the  duty  of  the  persons  so  holding  said  property  to  notify 
the  owner,  if  in  the  state  and  his  residence  be  known,  to  come 
forward  and  pay  the  charges  due,  and,  on  his  failure  within 
ten  days  after  such  notice  has  been  given  him  to  pay  said 
charges,  the  persons  so  holding  said  property,  after  twenty 
days'  notice,  are  authorized  to  sell  said  property  at  public 
sale,  and  apply  the  proceeds  to  the  payment  of  said  charges, 
and  shall  pay  over  the  balance  to  the  person  entitled  to  the 
same. 

If  the  owner's  residence  is  beyond  the  state  or  is  unknown, 
the  person  holding  said  property  shall  not  be  required  to  give 
the  ten  days'  notice  before  proceeding  to  sell.  If  the  person 
who  is  legally  entitled  to  receive  the  balance  mentioned  is 
not  known,  or  has  removed  from  the  state  or  from  the  county 
in  which  such  repairing  was  done,  or  such  property  was  so 
held,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  person  so  holding  said  prop- 
erty to  pay  the  balance  to  the  county  treasurer  of  the  county 
in  which  said  property  is  held,  and  take  his  receipt  therefor. 

Whenever  any  balance  shall  remain  in  the  possession  of 
the  county  treasurer  for  the  period  of  two  years  unclaimed 
by  the  party  legally  entitled  to  the  same,  such  balance  shall 
become  a  part  of  the  county  fund  of  the  county  in  which  the 
property  was  so  sold,  and  shall  be  applied  as  any  other  county 
fund  or  money  of  such  county  is  applied  or  used. 

78  Civ.   Stats.  1911,  art.  5667-5670.  sale   of  the   lien  property.     Bailey 

A  levy  cannot  be  made   on  other  v.   Block   (Tex.    Civ.  App.),   125   S. 

property  of  a  defendant  to  a  judg-  W.    955.     As    to   necessary   parties 

ment  foreclosing  a  lien  until  after  in  a   suit   to   foreclose  a   lien,   see 


Io8l  REMEDIES   FOR   THE   ENFORCEMENT    OF   LIENS.    §    Io6ob 

§  1060a.  Utah."^ — At  any  time  after  thirty  days  after  de- 
fault made  in  the  payment  of  a  debt  secured  by  a  lien  upon 
personal  property,  such  lien  may  be  foreclosed  by  advertise- 
ment, upon  the  notice  and  in  the  manner  provided  for  the 
foreclosure  of  mortgages  on  personal  property;  provided, 
that  a  copy  of  the  notice  shall,  at  the  time  of  posting  or  pub- 
lication, be  delivered  to  the  owner  of  the  property,  or  if  he 
does  not  reside  in  the  county,  shall  be  transmitted  to  him  by 
mail  at  his  usual  place  of  abode,  if  known.  After  paying  the 
reasonable  expenses  of  the  sale,  together  with  the  amount 
due  and  the  cost  of  keeping  the  property  up  to  the  time  of  the 
sale,  the  residue,  if  any,  shall  be  rendered  to  the  owner  of 
the  property.  If  the  property  be  sold  by  advertisement,  a 
statement  shall  be  rendered  to  the  owner  of  the  property  as 
the  law  prescribes  shall  be  made  to  a  mortgagor,  and  on  fail- 
ure to  render  such  statement,  the  lienholder  shall  forfeit  to 
the  owner  the  sum  of  twenty-five  dollars  damages.  The  fees 
for  the  publication  of  notice  shall  in  no  case  exceed  the  sum 
of  three  dollars,  and  the  fees  of  the  person  crying  the  sale 
shall  be  two  dollars  per  day. 

§  1060b.  Virginia.^^ — Liens  of  mechanics,  innkeepers,  liv- 
erystable  keepers,  and  all  bailees^^  having  liens  at  comm.on 

Hatton     V.     Bodan     Lumber     Co.  It  is  sometimes  proper  in  a  decree 

(Tex.    Civ.   App.),    123   S.    W.    163.  to   require   a   debtor   to   pay    to  a 

It  is  not  necessary  to  sue  to  fore-  third  person  a  balance  as  a  condi- 

close    a   judicial    lien.     Slayden    v.  tion    to    his    right    of    redemption. 

Palmo  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  90  S.  W.  Cupp  v.  Lester,  1(M  Va.  350,  51  S. 

908.  As  to  sale  of  unclaimed  goods  E.  840.    A  lienor  may  sue  for  him- 

left   with   carriers,    see   Rev.    Civ.  self  and   other  lienors   to   subject 

Stat.  1911,  art.  725-730.   As  to  land-  property  to  the  payment  of  liens, 

lord's  liens,  see  ante,  §  638.   As  to  Monk    v.     Exposition    Deepwater 

mechanics'  and  artisans'  liens,  see  Pier   Corporation.    Ill    Va.    121.   68 

ante,  §  112.  S.  E.  280. 

79  Comp.  Laws  1897,  §  1405.  si  See   ante.    §    336,   note   90,    for 

80  Code  1904,  §  2491.  See  the  sale  of  goods  for  transportation 
statute    for    provisions   about    suit  charges. 

and  trying  the  validity  of  the  lien. 


§    I060C  LIENS.  1082 

law  on  personal  property,  may  be  enforced  as  follows :  If 
the  debt  for  which  the  lien  exists  be  not  paid  within  ten  days 
after  it  is  due,  and  the  value  of  the  property  affected  does  not 
exceed  twenty  dollars,  the  lienholder  may  sell  the  property, 
or  so  much  as  may  be  necessary,  by  public  auction,  for  jash, 
and  apply  the  proceeds  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  debt  and 
expenses  of  sale,  and  the  surplus,  if  any,  he  shall  pay  to  the 
owner  of  the  property.  Before  making  such  sale,  he  shall 
advertise  the  time,  place,  and  terms  thereof,  in  such  manner 
as  to  give  publicity  thereto,  and  also  give  to  the  owner,  if 
he  be  in  the  county  or  corporation,  ten  days'  written  notice 
of  the  same,  and  of  the  amount  claimed  to  be  due.  If  the 
owner  can  not  be  found  in  such  county  or  corporation,  post- 
ing the  notice  at  three  public  places  therein  shall  be  sufficient 
service  thereof. 

§  1060c.  Washington.^^ — Whenever  property  upon  which 
charges  for  advances,  freight,  transportation,  wharfage,  or 
storage,  due  and  unpaid,  and  a  lien  shall  remain  and  be  held 
in  store  by  the  person  or  persons  in  whose  favor  such  lien 
exists  uncalled  for,  it  shall  be  lawful  for  such  person  or  per- 
sons to  cause  such  property  to  be  sold,  after  notice. 

§  1060d.  West  Virginia.^^ — Any  common-law  lien  may  be 
enforced  against  any  personal  property  upon  which  the  same 
exists,  in  the  same  way  and  manner  and  by  the  same  meth- 
ods now  or  hereafter  authorized  by  law  to  be  used  by  a  land- 
lord to  enforce  the  payment  of  rent  due,  and  the  owner  of 
such  personal  property  may  defend  and  protect  his  rights 
therein  in  the  same  way  and  manner,  and  by  the  same  meth- 
ods that  a  tenant  may  or  hereafter  be  authorized  by  law  to 
use  or  employ,  for  the  purpose  of  defending  and  protecting 
his  rights  in  the  case  of  a  distress  or  action  for  rent. 

82  Rem.     and     Bal.     Code     1910,  83  Acts  1909,  p.  381. 

§§  1191-1196. 


1083  REMEDIES    FOR   THE    ENFORCEMENT    OF   LIENS.    §    Io6of 

§  1060e.  Wisconsin.^* — Liens  of  mechanics,  innkeepers, 
livery-stable  keepers,  consignees,  factors,  and  bailees  for  hire, 
carriers,  warehousemen,  or  others,  under  the  common  law, 
may  be  enforced  as  follows :  In  case  such  debt  remains  un- 
paid for  three  months,  and  the  value  of  the  property  does  not 
exceed  one  hundred  dollars,  the  lienholder  may  sell  such 
property  at  public  auction,  and  apply  the  proceeds  of  such 
sale  to  the  payment  of  the  amount  due  hini,  and  the  expenses 
of  such  sale.  Notice,  in  writing,  of  the  time  and  place  of 
such  sale,  and  of  the  amount  claimed  to  be  due,  shall  be  given 
to  the  owner  of  such  property  personally,  or  by  leaving  the 
same  at  his  place  of  abode,  if  a  resident  of  this  state,  and, 
if  not,  by  publication  thereof,  once  in  each  week,  for  two 
weeks  successively,  next  before  the  time  of  sale,  in  some 
newspaper  published  in  the  county  in  which  such  lien  accrues, 
if  there  be  one,  and,  if  not,  by  posting  such  notice  in  three 
public  places  in  such  county.  If  such  property  exceed  in 
value  one  hundred  dollars,  then  such  lien  may  be  enforced 
against  the  same  by  action  in  any  court  having  jurisdiction. 

§  1060f.  Wyoming.^^ — Liens  of  laborers,  mechanics,  arti- 
sans, agistors,  liverystable  keepers,  common  carriers  and 
warehousemen  are  enforced  in  the  following  manner:  If  any 
charges  for  which  a  lien  is  given  to  any  such  persons  be  not 
paid  within  thirty  days  after  the  same  become  due  and  pay- 
able the  mechanic  or  other  person  to  whom  such  lien  is  given 
may  apply  to  any  justice  of  the  peace  of  the  county  wherein 
the  property  on  which  the  lien  is  claimed  is,  to  appoint  ap- 
praisers to  appraise  such  property.  Such  justice  shall  there- 
upon appoint  by  warrant,  under  his  hand,  three  disinterested 
householders  of  the  county  to  appraise  such  personal  prop- 

84  Stat.   1898,  §  3347.  foreclose  a  lien  may  be  amended 

85  For  other  details  as  to  en-  and  other  lien  claimants  added  as 
forcement  see  Comp.  Stats.  1910,  new  parties.  Cross  v.  Dore,  20 
§§     3757-3769.       A     complaint     to  Wash.  121,  54  Pac.  1003. 


§    Io6of  LIENS.  1084 

erty.  Ten  days'  notice  must  be  given  of  the  time,  place,  and 
terms  of  sale,  together  with  a  description  of  the  property  to 
be  sold.  The  sale  must  be  at  public  auction  for  cash,  and 
from  the  proceeds  the  lien  and  reasonable  costs  are  paid.  No 
sale  shall  be  made  for  less  than  two-thirds  of  the  appraised 
value  of  the  article  sold.  The  person  to  whom  such  a  lien  is 
given  may  become  a  purchaser.  No  mortgage  on  personal 
property  is  valid  as  against  the  rights  and  interest  of  any 
person  entitled  to  such  a  lien.  No  lien  upon  personal  prop- 
erty shall  be  valid  as  against  an  innocent  and  bona  fide  pur- 
chaser without  notice  thereof  before  making  payment  for  the 
property. 


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